Ukraine is not alone in facing the complex task of supporting return, reintegration and diaspora engagement. Many countries have also addressed challenges following conflict, disaster or large‑scale emigration. This chapter draws on international examples to explore how displaced persons have been supported to return in safety and dignity, and how those remaining abroad have contributed to national recovery. While grounded in shared international principles, these experiences highlight the importance of context-specific and flexible approaches, offering practical lessons for Ukraine’s evolving strategy.
Ukraine’s Strategic Response to the Displacement Crisis
Return, Reintegrate, Reconnect
Abstract
Supporting the return and reintegration of displaced populations is a complex task that many governments have addressed in various contexts. Even more governments have sought meaningful ways to engage with nationals for whom returning home is not an option, as well as with their diaspora, to maintain ties and enable them to contribute to recovery and development efforts. Drawing on a broad range of international experience, this chapter explores how return, reintegration, and engagement with diaspora communities have been approached worldwide, and what lessons can be drawn from these international examples for Ukrainian policymakers.
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section sets the policies of return and reintegration within a broader perspective of international standards and frameworks. It stresses that, as of 2025, given the security situation, the principle of voluntariness remains the dominant standard guiding the policy on returns for Ukraine and, importantly, for countries hosting Ukrainian nationals. As such, these principles also guide the selection of international examples presented in the subsequent sections. The second section provides examples of concrete measures and policies to support voluntary and spontaneous returns and reintegration of displaced persons and to prepare repatriation when a peace or settlement agreement is reached. Echoing the previous chapters, particular attention is paid to the role of security and safety concerns, housing, employment policies and access to other public services in supporting return and reintegration. Examples of ways to monitor the outcomes of returnees and evaluate programmes that address return and reintegration are also included. The final section is dedicated to examples of international practices of diaspora engagement. The examples presented in this report were collected through a series of expert workshops and consultations organised by the OECD throughout 2025.
While Ukraine is not alone in developing meaningful strategies to support the return and reintegration of its nationals and engage with its diaspora, the situation in which the Ukrainian state and its displaced citizens find themselves as a result of Russia’s war of aggression is exceptional in many ways. Several features characterise its uniqueness. Ukraine is facing external aggression rather than internal conflict. The sheer scale of internal and external displacement creates complex challenges for managing the situation. The human resources needed to implement programmes are often displaced themselves, or continue to face active hostilities. The severe fiscal pressures generated by the war also limit the state’s capacity to expand support systems on a large scale. Many voluntary returns occur amidst ongoing hostilities that not only provoke new displacements and jeopardise the sustainability of returns, but also leave the non-displaced population in an increasingly vulnerable position, requiring support for all these different groups simultaneously.
The uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the war perpetuates the protracted situation faced by displaced persons, returnees, and non-displaced individuals alike. In this context, many existing international examples of return following civil wars or internal ethnic conflicts are generally of limited relevance. Many of these examples were reviewed but not included in the report. Meanwhile other examples in the areas of security, safety, or social cohesion are only partially relevant for Ukraine. Some could only become relevant under certain future conditions and settings, such as after the end of active hostilities. Nevertheless, they can currently serve as reference points to help anticipate the types of concerns Ukraine may need to address. In contrast, examples relating to monitoring and evaluation, as well as diaspora engagement, are more universally applicable.
The Ukrainian Government is also not starting to develop its policies of return, reintegration, and diaspora engagement from scratch. Rather, it builds on its own previous experience addressing these issues since independence. Moreover, in the three years following the start of the war, the Ukrainian Government, civil society, and international organisations have already deployed numerous innovative solutions. Given this context, the examples presented here are not prescriptive, but rather serve as a source of inspiration for Ukrainian policymakers in areas where gaps remain and the situation continues to evolve.
In international practice, the term “return” can have a range of meanings depending on the context. In the Ukrainian context in 2025, it remains appropriate to speak about policies that support voluntary and spontaneous return and that aim to support and encourage repatriation once a peace settlement is reached (Box 5.1). UNHCR continues to call upon states not to apply forced return to nationals and former residents of Ukraine, including those who have had their asylum claims rejected.
While the topic of return migration has received growing international attention in recent decades, there is no single universally agreed definition of the term (OECD, 2020[1]), as it is applied in diverse policy contexts. Return can be broadly understood as the act or process of going back to, or being taken back to, the point of departure (IOM, 2019[2]). This may occur within national borders or across international borders. The term is most often used in relation to first-generation migrants, though discussions around diasporic or ethnic return may also involve later-generation descendants returning to their ancestral homelands (Cohen, 1997[3]).
Return may take different forms, which are typically categorised as either voluntary or forced.
Voluntary return can be either spontaneous or assisted. Spontaneous voluntary return is an independent return that involves no formal support from States or other international or national actors. In contrast, assisted voluntary return involves administrative, logistical and financial support. Typically, it is applied to individuals who have received a negative decision on their asylum application, victims of trafficking in human beings, stranded migrants, qualified nationals, and other migrants who are unable or unwilling to remain in the host country but who wish to return to their countries of origin (IOM, 2019[2]). In many cases, this support is extended through Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) programmes, which can include pre‑departure counselling, cash or in-kind assistance to facilitate reinsertion into the country of origin (OECD, 2020[1]).
In addition, in humanitarian settings, the term repatriation is also used to designate “the personal right of a prisoner of war, civil detainee, refugee, or of a civilian to return to his or her country of nationality under specific conditions laid down in various international instruments” (IOM, 2019[2]).
Forced return, by contrast, refers to situations in which individuals are returned under pressure, compulsion or coercion (IOM, 2019[2]). This may involve legal or administrative enforcement, and while it is lawful under certain conditions, particularly in the context of irregular migration, it raises distinct concerns in humanitarian contexts. Forced return in such settings may conflict with international protection obligations and human rights principles, particularly the obligation to ensure that return does not place individuals at risk of serious harm.
In displacement contexts generally, and in the case of Ukraine specifically, repatriation and voluntary return from international protection abroad is regarded by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as one of three durable solutions, alongside local integration and resettlement in a third country (UNHCR, 2003[4]). Where conditions permit, return to the place of origin is often the preferred solution for many displaced persons, provided that it occurs voluntarily, in conditions of safety and dignity, and with realistic prospects for sustainable reintegration.
Indeed, in contexts of humanitarian displacement, the principle of voluntariness in return is central, reflecting both the agency of the individual and the need for conditions that enable informed, uncoerced decision making. This principle is embedded in numerous international standards and frameworks governing refugee returns. In addition to voluntariness, international standards are grounded in two other core legal principles: the right to return and the obligation of non-refoulement. The right to return is a long-standing principle of international human rights law. First articulated in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, it affirms that “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.” This right has since been reaffirmed in various binding instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976), and is reflected in regional frameworks such as the European Convention on Human Rights, which states that no one shall be denied the right to enter the territory of the state of which they are a national. Legal scholars widely consider these instruments to have attained the status of customary international law, thereby binding even on states that are not formal parties.
Closely linked to the right to return is the principle of non-refoulement, one of the most fundamental protections in international refugee law, and typically relevant to host countries. Enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention and widely recognised as a rule of customary international law, non-refoulement prohibits States from returning individuals to a country where there is a real risk of being subjected to persecution, torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment, or to any other human rights violation (EMN, 2025[5]). Some legal scholars and international bodies, including UNHCR, have argued that non-refoulement has acquired the status of jus cogens – a peremptory norm of international law – from which no derogation is permitted (Costello and Foster, 2016[6]; Allain, 2001[7]; Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 2021[8]).
In the case of internally displaced persons (IDPs), while no binding international treaty exists, normative guidance is provided by the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, endorsed by the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1998. Although not legally enforceable, these principles have been widely accepted as a standard for national and international responses to internal displacement. They affirm the right of IDPs to return voluntarily, in safety and dignity, and emphasise the responsibilities of national authorities to support their reintegration and recovery. As with international displacement, the principles underline that return must not be imposed and that displaced persons should be enabled to make informed decisions about their future.
These, alongside other principles (see Table 5.1), establish a foundation that should continue to guide national strategies in both Ukraine and host countries on voluntary return and the eventual repatriation of displaced Ukrainians.
Because other forms of return are not relevant to the case of displaced Ukrainians, this report does not examine examples of their management in other countries.
This table summarises key international legal and normative references that support voluntary return, repatriation, and sustainable reintegration of displaced persons. The information is ordered by year.
Chapter 4 has shown that the key considerations for displaced individuals contemplating return are safety and security, as well as housing, employment, access to public services and sustainability of livelihoods. Drawing on this, this chapter is structured thematically to highlight international practices in these key areas that can support the return and reintegration of displaced persons. Even if decisions to return are often influenced by factors beyond the direct control of national authorities, public policy can play an important role in ensuring that displaced persons and returnees are treated with dignity, protected from harm, and supported in rebuilding their lives.
This section focusses on those persons displaced by the war of aggression who are seeking to exercise their right to return. Ukrainians abroad who left for economic reasons prior to the war of aggression, or who were born outside Ukraine but may now consider returning, are guided by different circumstances and motivations. Their differing circumstances require different support, which will be discussed in the next section on diaspora engagement.
Strengthening conditions for safe return that are within Ukraine’s reach
Ensure that voluntary returnees receive the same level of protection as the non-displaced. It is important to make all returnees aware of the existing safety measures and lifesaving options in their place of return, and to ensure they are adequately consulted as stakeholders in future plans.
Safety means more than the absence of active hostilities. Displaced persons assess safety through various forms of physical security. Demining, restoration of essential services, and a clear commitment to rebuilding are key signals of readiness for return. These must be monitored and communicated effectively to support safe and voluntary return decisions.
Plan for the future by establishing clear recovery benchmarks grounded in trust and transparency. In the immediate aftermath of the settlement of the war of aggression, there will be a need to establish well-defined frameworks for return and repatriation. Government assessments of safe return areas will need to align with displaced persons’ own perceptions. Engaging communities, supporting go‑and-see visits, and sharing returnee experiences can help build confidence.
Social cohesion is a core element of safety. Even if physical risks are addressed, returnees may not return, or may leave again, if they feel excluded. Social cohesion among returnees and stayers should be assessed and strengthened alongside other security concerns. Community engagement and trust-building initiatives can help prevent tensions between returnees and stayers and support voluntary, dignified, and sustainable returns.
The direct threat to physical safety has been the key reason for the displacement of Ukrainians since 2014, and especially since February 2022. As of 2025, when this report was written, this threat remains present in Ukraine. Regions are affected by active hostilities in different ways. While the frontline areas are particularly dangerous and at risk of a broader military offensive, daily large‑scale drone and missile attacks across the entire country mean that no part of Ukraine can be considered fully safe. Moreover, as of 2025, there remains considerable uncertainty regarding the effectiveness and reliability of any future security guarantees that can be put in place in the face of and external aggressor.
Living with an external threat
As of 2025, security and safety for returnees cannot be fully guaranteed anywhere in the country. What Ukraine can do, however, is support voluntary, spontaneous returnees by ensuring they have the same access to information and lifesaving support as the non-displaced Ukrainian population, who have developed a range of strategies for living with the threat. This is particularly important for returnees who have spent considerable time away from Ukraine and are unaware of the most recent developments and practices relating to safety and security in their region of return. Moreover, it is important that returnees and displaced populations are adequately consulted as stakeholders in the preparation of future security measures and plans, alongside non-displaced population.
Israel is a modern example of a country that, over the decades, has adapted to living with external threats, which have shaped many aspects of its national policy, society, and infrastructure. While the overview of its comprehensive set of national programmes and strategies to ensure physical safety is outside the scope of this report, what is relevant is how immigrants and returning residents are integrated into these frameworks. In Israel, the Home Front Command is responsible for developing civil defence instructions that guide civilians on how to respond to emergencies, including reacting to missile alerts, locating and using public shelters, and using emergency hotlines and other emergency alert systems. These materials are available in several languages and significant efforts are made to disseminate them widely. For example, the Jewish Agency for Israel, which facilitates immigration to Israel and supports the integration of new immigrants and returnees, in co‑operation with the Ministry of Aliyah and Integration, disseminates these materials and ensures that they are available even prior to departure (Nefesh B'Nefesh, 2025[9]). Once in Israel, immigrants and returnees have numerous ways to access this information. For example, newly arriving immigrants (olim) can benefit from voluntary integration programmes offered by Absorption Centres (Merkaz Klita). These centres serve as transitional hubs to facilitate a “soft landing” in the country. The numerous integration services they offer include life skills training, emergency protocols, and psychological support.
Japan is another country that lives under constant threats of a different nature, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, typhoons, and volcanic eruptions, which make disaster preparedness a critical part of daily life and public policy. Japan has developed the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 as a roadmap for reducing disaster risk, strengthening resilience, and ensuring effective recovery. Understanding the risk and investing in preparedness are key parts of the Framework. Importantly, the Framework explicitly recognises migrants, displaced people, and newcomers as critical groups to be included in disaster risk reduction strategies and in strengthening the resilience of communities. Building on this Framework, Japan ensures that all population groups have access to disaster information, early warnings, and participatory measures, enabling newcomers and displaced persons to prepare for, respond to, and recover from natural hazards alongside local populations (UNDRR, 2015[10]).
Acting on other elements of physical safety and security
The decision to return depends not only on the absence of active hostilities, but also on whether individuals believe they can enjoy other aspects of safety. In Ukraine, as of 2025, in addition to drone attacks, missile strikes, and active shelling, landmine contamination is another major threat to physical security. Ukraine is currently assessed to be the most heavily mine contaminated country in the world (UNMAS, 2025[11]), which makes large scale demining operations essential for enabling safe return. In many international settings, the completion of mine clearance and the removal of unexploded ordnance often serves as a tangible indicator that physical conditions are sufficiently secure to allow other returns.
For example, upon the end of active hostilities in both Iraq and Syria, mine clearance has been identified as a priority in return areas, emphasising the need to address these threats before broader return movements are facilitated. In the case of Syria, while an estimated 60 000 returnees had returned to Raqqa shortly after the Islamic State left the area in 2017, unexploded landmines were estimated at the time to be causing between 50 and 70 casualties per week (Reuters, 2018[12]). The United Nations continues to support clearance efforts in various areas, estimating that more than 60 people were killed and 90 injured due to explosive ordnance in January 2025, making returnee groups such as farmers and shepherds particularly vulnerable, as they return to their land in newly accessible regions (UN, 2025[13]). In Iraq, widespread contamination from landmines and explosive remnants of war, affecting an area equivalent to 300 000 football fields, continues to endanger civilians and severely hinder the return of displaced families and the reconstruction of communities (ICRC, 2025[14]) (See also Box 5.2).
Between 2002 and 2022, Sri Lanka’s demining efforts, led by the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC), resulted in the clearing of over 200 km² of minefields. Mine action has played an instrumental role in the safe resettlement of IDPs in Sri Lanka’s northern and eastern provinces, releasing safe land for resettlement, reconstruction, and livelihood activities.
The Ministry of Housing and Construction reported that over 900 000 IDPs had been resettled by July 2022. The Sri Lanka National Mine Action Completion Strategy (2023-2027) continues to prioritise the clearance of land for the resettlement of the remaining IDPs (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, 2022[15]); (Mine Action Review, 2021[16]) (The Halo Trust, 2025[17]) Despite contaminated areas being marked and mine risk education being provided to all societal groups, returnees are still likely to enter contaminated areas, especially zones with potential for agriculture (Sri Lanka National Steering Committee for Mine Action, 2010[18]). Non-technical survey activities are therefore implemented in parallel to identify previously unknown contamination and inform the populations about continued risks (Sri Lanka National Mine Action Centre, 2024[19]).
Furthermore, other international organisations, such as the Halo Trust, employ mostly formerly displaced persons in demining activities. This approach contributes to spreading information about the safety situation on the ground, enables returnees to become directly familiar with the situation, and involves returnees in their communities’ development.
In other cases, the restoration of basic services has also served as a practical benchmark for enabling returns and for assessing the readiness of heavily damaged areas for return. Following the 2017 siege of Marawi in the Philippines, alongside other criteria, authorities guided returns based on the re‑establishment of essential services such as water, electricity, and healthcare (ADB, 2018[20]; CCCHP, 2023[21]). This underscores that provisions for safe return should go beyond addressing the physical threat and include access to hygienic and healthy living conditions.
Anticipating future needs to establish clear safety frameworks and build trust in the safety of returns
Several international examples can serve as a reference point for the types of considerations that will become pressing for Ukraine in the immediate aftermath of the settlement of the war of aggression.
One key consideration is the need to establish well-defined frameworks for return and repatriation, grounded in transparent values and principles. For example, the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Peace Agreement, which put an end to the Bosnian War, contains an Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons. The Agreement served as a foundation for voluntary return and repatriation. Its key principle was the right to return to homes in a voluntary manner and the commitment of the signatory parties to ensure the safety of returns (Annex 7, Art. 1). The signatories called upon UNHCR and countries hosting war refugees to co-develop a repatriation plan to enable an early, peaceful, orderly, and phased return of refugees and displaced persons, including priorities for certain areas and certain categories of returnees (Annex 7, Art. 1). Ultimately, the Agreement emphasised that the choice of return destination must rest with the individual or family, without external pressure or forced relocation to areas facing serious danger or insecurity, or to areas lacking the basic infrastructure necessary for resuming a normal life (Annex 7, Art. 1). The signatories also committed to creating in their territories sustainable conditions conducive to return and harmonious reintegration, and to providing all possible assistance to that effect (Annex 7, Art. 2), including adequately monitored short-term repatriation assistance on a non-discriminatory basis to all returning refugees and displaced persons in need, to help them re‑establish their lives and livelihoods in their communities (Annex 7, Art. 6). Amnesty provisions were included for returnees, with exceptions only for those accused of serious violations of international humanitarian law (Annex 7, Art. 7) (OHR, 1995[22]).
Another consideration is that perceptions of safety are inherently personal and shaped by individual experiences and context. Yet authorities typically need to establish additional well-defined safety standards and benchmarks for what constitutes a safe return. Such frameworks should reflect the lived realities of both non-displaced and displaced populations and should be developed in consultation with those directly affected.
For example, in the case of the 2011 accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant, the Japanese Government set a reference dose of 20 mSv/year, which became the de facto safety threshold, guiding initial evacuation zones and the return of 160 000 evacuees six years later once airborne radiation fell below this level. However, this threshold was publicly contested and led to the voluntary evacuation of over 50 000 individuals who chose to leave despite not living in areas formally designated for evacuation. The resulting lack of trust in government safety assurances is believed to have contributed to persistently low rates of return, between 17 and 30% as of 2024 (IRSN, 2016[23]; Reconstruction Agency, 2024[24]).
While safety benchmarks such as those applied in Fukushima were met with scepticism among displaced communities, the government’s efforts to communicate the criteria transparently eventually allowed adaptive responses to emerge that gradually overcame the initial mistrust. In situations where immediate return was not desirable for many displaced individuals due to ongoing safety concerns, the Japanese authorities, in collaboration with affected communities, explored alternative transitional return models that gradually rebuilt trust in the return process and its safety while also promoting continuity, agency, and a sense of control over the return process (see 0).
Yet another consideration is balancing immediate perceptions shaped by social media with a broader and more durable understanding of safety. Here, the lived experience and perspectives of returnees themselves can be critical in addressing possible misperceptions. Examples from other countries show that go‑and-see visits, where individuals travel to their area of origin for a short period, enable them to assess whether they feel safe to return based on their personal circumstances (see Annex 5.B). Such visits also reinforce confidence in the authorities’ own reporting and evaluations of the situation. Beyond providing a direct impression of the physical safety conditions, these visits allow returnees to envision their reintegration, anticipate potential challenges, and prepare more effectively for a sustainable return, including on an emotional level.
Between January and July 2025, with the support and oversight of UNHCR and the Turkish Red Crescent, Türkiye’s Directorate General of Migration Management introduced a formal go‑and-see scheme for Syrians under temporary protection. Under this programme, one adult per Syrian family could apply through provincial migration offices using an online booking system, obtain an exit and re‑entry permit, and visit Syria up to three times within six months without losing protection status in Türkiye (Lagrand, 2025[25]; Directorate of Immigration Administration, 2025[26]). Importantly, the scheme is not understood as the first step towards permanent return, but rather as a trust-building mechanism. It fosters the circulation of first-hand information within returnee networks and helps shape support measures that reflect the actual needs reported by beneficiaries, with the involvement of both host and home countries.
Somali returnees from Kenya benefited from similar visits organised by the two governments with UNHCR’s support. These initiatives provided a more nuanced understanding of conditions for return, enabling concrete adjustments to return planning, such as revising transportation routes for safety reasons and prompting local authorities to allocate land for returnees.
Prioritising social inclusion, social cohesion and fairness as a pre‑condition of safe return
Alongside physical security, the sense of being accepted and valued within a community is an essential dimension of safety for returnees. This form of psychological safety determines whether people feel welcome, respected, and able to rebuild their lives without fear of exclusion, hostility, or discrimination. Even when physical risks have been reduced, a lack of social acceptance can deter returns or prompt onward movement. A cohesive society can be understood as one that works towards the well-being of all its members, combats exclusion and marginalisation, creates a shared sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers opportunities for upward mobility for all (OECD, 2011[27]). While approaches to fostering cohesion vary, common elements across different conceptualisations include promoting trust within and between social groups, co‑operation for the common good, and an inclusive identity that bridges differences (Fiedler and Rohles, 2021[28]).
One of the distinct features of the Ukrainian situation is that, in the face of external aggression, Ukrainian society has solidified in many ways. The feeling of national identity, belonging, and common purpose has been strengthened, in stark contrast to countries that have experienced internal conflicts and civil wars that have led to polarisation. Despite this, and especially if the situation becomes protracted, there is a risk that social cohesion may be challenged in the longer term, as has been the case in other countries after major crises (Fiedler and Rohles, 2021[28]). Typically, trust among various groups within society weakens because many individuals live through different shared (and non-shared) experiences. Social divisions can appear along various lines, such as whether individuals have had homes and localities fully destroyed or not, whether they have served in the military or not, and whether they have been displaced or not. The risk of future social divisions between stayers and returnees should not be ignored in Ukraine, where large‑scale displacement has affected communities differently, and where both the displaced and non-displaced have developed distinct perspectives, networks, and coping strategies.
Experience from Israel, Syria, Central Asia, and the Western Balkans suggests that co‑operation tends to decline between different groups, and individuals act more generously towards members of their own group but less so towards others. When such attitudes translate into preferential treatment towards certain groups, a sense of justice and fairness can be altered, creating feelings of insecurity among different groups.
Research from Burundi, which experienced a major conflict between 1993 and 2005 that resulted in an estimated 5% of the population being killed, 10% displaced abroad, and a much higher share internally displaced, shows that a higher proportion of returnees within a community can have a negative effect on social cohesion. Nationwide data indicate that communities with larger shares of returnees tend to report lower levels of trust, mutual help, and community participation among residents (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2022[29]). One explanation is that those who remained during the conflict had to protect scarce community resources and formed stronger bonds with other local residents. Those who were displaced were less likely to develop or maintain such bonds. Further research found this dynamic to be particularly pronounced among internal returnees (Ruiz and Vargas-Silva, 2024[30]), who had significantly lower levels of trust, reconciliation, and community engagement than the non-displaced. Greater exposure to violence was also associated with more negative effects on reconciliation and community engagement for returnees compared to stayers, while the effects on trust were more mixed.
It is not only the perceptions of returnees that matter. Distrust and discriminatory attitudes from stayers towards returnees can also undermine social cohesion. Studies from the aftermath of the Balkan Wars document how discrimination against returnees could escalate from individual acts in daily life to more systemic forms. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, local authorities and residents’ tactics against returnees included delaying the processing of property claims, refusing to reconnect utilities, and engaging in petty bureaucratic harassment of some returnees (Ó Tuathail and Dahlman, 2004[31]). Some municipalities allocated socially owned land to displaced persons of the locally dominant ethnicity in order to consolidate wartime demographic changes. Minority returnees often faced low-level antagonism and social pressure to sell reclaimed property at unfavourable prices to stayers. Similar patterns were reported in post-war Croatia, where Serb returnees frequently encountered hostility from Croat stayers, including verbal harassment, social exclusion, and in some cases violence, as well as discriminatory barriers to employment and public services. These practices contributed to an environment in which many returnees felt unwelcome and, in some cases, were pressured either directly or indirectly to re‑emigrate or relinquish property rights (Koska, 2008[32]; Djuric, 2010[33]).
Tensions in post-conflict and post-displacement settings can emerge not only between different ethnic groups, as was largely the case in the Western Balkans, but also within affected groups themselves. In Kyrgyzstan, for example, trust within Uzbek communities was found to be low after conflict, as some individuals felt that their co‑ethnics had not provided sufficient support during the clashes (Hager, Krakowski and Schaub, 2019[34]). Differences in the experiences of violence led to suspicions about why certain community members had not been targeted or had suffered less, which in turn strained internal relationships further.
To address and prevent these issues, it is vital to establish clear and solid foundations for social acceptance of returnees. At least some of these foundations can be envisaged by Ukraine already now.
For example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Dayton Peace Agreement explicitly recognised the right of return “in safety, without risk of harassment, intimidation, persecution, or discrimination” (Annex 7, Art. 1), placing responsibility on signatories to take all necessary steps to prevent activities within their territories that would endanger this principle. Under the agreement, immediate confidence‑building measures were taken, including the repeal of any remaining discriminatory legislation and administrative practices, suppression of incitement to hatred through media and other channels, and protection of minority populations. Moreover, the signatories explicitly committed not to “discriminate against returning refugees and displaced persons with respect to conscription into military service” (Annex 7, Art. 2). Further, the Law on Prohibition of Discrimination, first adopted in 2009 and amended in 2016, expanded the protected grounds to include, among others, language, social origin, and “any other status” which implicitly encompasses displacement history.
Alongside legislative reform, training for judges and judicial staff on international and European anti-discrimination standards and their application were organised, reinforcing institutional capacity to uphold these protections. Complementing legal reform and institutional capacity-building, public awareness initiatives helped to reinforce equality norms and encourage social acceptance. International organisations also played an important role in implementation. The sustained engagement of the OSCE, including national surveys on public perceptions of discrimination and support for awareness campaigns, was instrumental in challenging stereotypes and encouraging equal treatment for vulnerable groups, including returnees, migrants, and minorities.
While there is broad agreement on the importance of social cohesion for durable reintegration, there is less consensus on the most effective methods for fostering it in post-conflict environments. Community-driven development (CDD) programmes, however, tend to be the most common tool for supporting social cohesion in post-conflict societies. They aim to promote cohesion by fostering community participation in decision making, bringing divided groups together, and addressing shared needs (King, 2013[35]; Idris, 2016[36]). While the specific design of such programmes varies, they generally provide communities with a high degree of control over the development process, the allocation of resources, and decision making authority.
Some CDD programmes have demonstrated notable success in these contexts. In Indonesia’s Kecamatan Development Programme, post-conflict communities in Maluku and Aceh used the CDD model to jointly identify priorities, manage funds transparently, and rebuild infrastructure serving multiple groups. Its emphasis on open meetings, clear rules for fund allocation, and inclusive facilitation helped reduce perceptions of bias in resource distribution (Barron, Diprose and Woolcock, 2011[37]).
Other CDD initiatives have had more limited or even negative impacts on social cohesion. In Sierra Leone, a large‑scale CDD programme increased community participation in decision making but did not lead to measurable improvements in trust. Deep-seated grievances meant that competition over project resources intensified existing divisions (Casey, Glennerster and Miguel, 2012[38]). Insufficient attention to the local political economy, unequal participation, and the absence of mechanisms to mediate disputes over resource allocation undermined the intended inclusivity and reconciliatory objectives of the programmes.
Evidence suggests that both the design of a CDD programme and the context are critical in determining its impact. As noted by Mallett and Slater (2013, p. 8[39]), “How something is designed and implemented may be just as, if not more important, than what it is that is being implemented in the first place.” The success of such initiatives depends on factors such as the baseline level of social cohesion, the extent to which community relations were damaged by conflict, and the motives and strategies of key actors (Mallett and Slater, 2013[39]; Idris, 2016[36]). These factors can vary between communities within conflict-affected regions, and programme design should reflect these differences to avoid reinforcing existing divisions.
While not a traditional CDD programme, Colombia’s Manos a la Paz (Hands for Peace) initiative demonstrates how CDD principles can be adapted to target specific groups as agents of change. Led by the High Council for Post-Conflict and implemented by UNDP, the programme placed more than 1 500 young people from diverse backgrounds in mayors’ and governors’ offices and other regional entities across 263 municipalities prioritised for post-conflict development. These young people contributed to reconciliation and capacity-building by delivering workshops on education for peace, anti-discrimination, and gender-sensitive policies (UNDP, 2017[40]). By positioning youth as intermediaries between communities and local authorities, the programme built trust, reduced stigma around vulnerable populations, and illustrated how participatory and inclusive approaches can be adapted to strengthen social cohesion in targeted, group-focussed peacebuilding efforts.
Together, these programmes illustrate how structured mentoring, shared cultural experiences, and inclusive leadership can break down barriers and strengthen social cohesion across communities and groups. While some of the mentioned initiatives are not specifically designed for returning migrants, the underlying model is readily adaptable to benefit returnees and stayers alike. Often, such programmes are run by non-governmental and civil society organisations, with local or central government playing, at most, a financing role. A more prominent role for government in designing and scaling up such programmes could strengthen alignment with national strategies, avoid duplication, and expand multi-stakeholder partnerships. Moreover, programmes to address and prevent tensions among displaced individuals, returnees, and stayers should be undertaken as part of a broader approach involving legal protections, institutional redress mechanisms, public campaigns that acknowledge past traumas and promote equality between these different groups, and appropriate communication from all levels of authority.
Addressing housing needs
Invest in social housing as a way to support IDPs and vulnerable returnees. Affordable housing plays a central role in supporting IDPs and shaping displaced persons’ decisions to return. Begin work early on building a strong institutional framework for social housing that is inclusive of these populations as a durable exit strategy from temporary solutions, as well as on establishing sustainable financing mechanisms to reduce reliance on short-term donor funding and fragmented projects.
Regulate the housing market as a tool to improve conditions for IDPs and support returns. Large‑scale destruction and displacement inevitably create disequilibrium in the private housing rental market, placing IDPs in fragile positions and excluding vulnerable returnees. Stabilising prices, protecting tenants’ rights, and ensuring non-discrimination require modern regulation and enforcement mechanisms at different levels.
Clear, accessible mechanisms are needed to resolve housing, land, and property claims. This includes ensuring legal assistance, preserving records, and addressing gaps in documentation and inheritance rights.
Link housing to livelihoods and services. Reconstruction should prioritise areas where returnees can access employment, public services, and infrastructure. Return to places of origin may not always be viable, and sustainable reintegration depends on more than shelter alone.
The war of aggression has created multiple and overlapping housing challenges in Ukraine, especially for displaced populations – both those still displaced and those considering return. As shown throughout the report, as of 2025, the following three major housing issues affect current and future integration, return, and reintegration prospects for displaced populations. The first issue is the lack of available housing for the currently displaced population within Ukraine, especially in light of continued displacement and damage, as well as for returnees whose housing was destroyed.
The second issue is the unregulated rental market, with a power imbalance between tenants and landlords. The lack of protections and widespread discrimination is especially palpable for IDPs, exacerbating their uncertainty and instability, preventing their local integration, and motivating either relocation abroad or a move back to damaged housing in dangerous areas. For those contemplating return from abroad, rising prices not only create a barrier to return, but can also encourage prolonged stay abroad for owners who can rent out their housing in Ukraine and finance their continued stay, or result in returns to dangerous areas and damaged housing for those who are not owners and who cannot continue staying abroad.
The third issue is the lack of documentation to prove ownership for a significant number of displaced persons, a problem that impedes access to existing housing programmes. In the future, when the war of aggression is settled and return to damaged and re‑occupied areas is envisaged, this issue will pose serious challenges for resolving property disputes and housing restitution.
Taken together, these challenges suggest that an effective response will require not only physical reconstruction of housing but also sustained progress on legal and institutional reforms that enable access at scale and help ensure that vulnerable groups are not left behind. Such reforms will also be essential for addressing ownership disputes and supporting fair and transparent restitution processes as people seek to recover their homes. International experience indicates that without a strong legal and institutional foundation, even well-designed housing initiatives can face delays in implementation, uneven outcomes, and reduced trust among affected communities.
Investing into housing and developing the social housing sector
Given the scale and urgency of housing needs, a range of complementary schemes to support rebuilding and the provision of temporary or permanent housing is typically envisaged. Often, these efforts result in a patchwork of parallel initiatives targeting different populations and regions.
To overcome fragmentation, some post-conflict housing efforts have aimed to bring greater coherence to reconstruction through co‑ordinated, large‑scale programmes. One of the most ambitious housing recovery efforts in Europe was the Regional Housing Programme (RHP), launched in 2012 by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia. It was designed to provide durable housing solutions for the most vulnerable refugees and internally displaced persons from the 1990s conflicts (see Annex 5.C). Supported by the European Union, UNHCR, OSCE, and the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), the RHP delivered over 11 300 housing units across the region by 2023, benefiting approximately 36 000 individuals (see Table 5.2). The programme ensured that housing was tailor-made to meet the needs of the beneficiaries, allowing them to choose whether to remain in the places of displacement or return to their home area, as well as to select the appropriate type of housing based on their reported needs.
Source: Compilation based on the Regional Housing Programme Country Factsheets 2023, to be accessed via https://regionalhousingprogramme.org/media/publications/.
This project, however, required time. Progress in the early years was slowed by gaps in legal and regulatory frameworks, complex procurement processes, and the time needed to establish institutional responsibilities (European Commission, 2014[41]). These initial challenges were gradually overcome, and during its mid-phase the programme accelerated significantly (see Figure 5.1), supported by improved co‑ordination, clearer beneficiary selection processes, and stronger engagement across all levels of government.
In addition to housing itself, the greatest challenge for affected populations is the affordability of housing. To address this issue, a significant part of the external donor funding in Bosnia and Herzegovina was channelled into social housing, often with an explicit objective of providing durable housing solutions for IDPs (Council of Europe Development Bank, 2017[42]). Moreover, efforts were made to develop the institutional and regulatory frameworks needed to strengthen the country’s social housing system (Council of Europe Development Bank, 2023[43]).
Source: Compilation based on the Regional Housing Programme Country Factsheets 2023, to be accessed via https://regionalhousingprogramme.org/media/publications/.
The Durable Solutions for Collective Centre Residents (DSCCR) project in Bosnia and Herzegovina was implemented by Catholic Relief Services (CRS), which has been present in the country since 1993. Initially focussed on emergency assistance for those displaced by conflict, CRS became a key implementing partner of the BiH Government in 2003, supporting housing reconstruction and the return of displaced persons (Catholic Relief Services, 2019[44]).
The DSCCR initiative has extended well beyond physical reconstruction, requiring parallel progress on legislative reform. Due to BiH’s complex administrative structure, a harmonised national social housing system would require the adoption of 13 separate laws across different jurisdictions. As of 2023, CRS had provided technical assistance leading to the enactment of six such laws in select cantons, with work ongoing in others (CRS, 2023[45]).
The project introduced six distinct models of social housing, tailored to different needs and implemented in both urban and rural contexts. In some cases, housing was specifically designed for vulnerable groups. For example, in Potocari, two buildings comprising 33 apartments and seven business premises were constructed to support displaced persons from Srebrenica, enabling both housing and opportunities for self-employment. Similarly, in 2010, a centre was established in the municipality of Jablanica to house former collective centre residents who could not return to their pre‑war homes.
Importantly, the project helped challenge prevailing assumptions about return – particularly the widespread belief among citizens and some international actors that return should only involve reclaiming one’s pre‑war home and property. Given the widespread destruction across BiH, where 40% of housing stock had been damaged, this expectation was often unrealistic. Through sustained advocacy, technical expertise, and inclusive dialogue, CRS helped shift perceptions and demonstrate that durable solutions could include well-integrated, non-profit rental housing in new communities. These housing models not only offered safe and dignified living conditions but also provided long-term support such as subsidised rent and essential utilities.
More generally, social housing, defined as residential rental accommodation provided at sub-market prices, targeted and allocated according to specific rules (Salvi del Pero et al., 2016[46]), represents an important solution to the problem of housing unaffordability worldwide, even outside the conflict and disaster management context. A key prerequisite for investing in social housing is the setting of an appropriate legal framework that establishes its operational principles and outlines its model. Many OECD countries have developed solid institutional frameworks for diverse social housing models to respond to their varied demographic and socio‑economic needs (Salvi del Pero et al., 2016[46]; OECD, 2020[47]). In Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands, social housing encompasses over 20% of all housing stock. Examples of models vary, but the key considerations when building social housing models from scratch include the principles of eligibility (universalist or targeted), the type of providers (regional and municipal authorities, non-profit, limited-profit or co‑operative housing associations, national governments, for-profit providers, and others), and the type of financing for expansion and maintenance (rental income from tenants, borrowing by the social housing provider, payments and/or subsidies from others, including governments).
These modalities have important social implications, including for the integration of vulnerable displaced populations. For example, a universalist approach to eligibility, such as the one practised in Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands, generally results in greater social mixing and minimises the “ghettoisation” of neighbourhoods, even though a certain degree of targeting towards refugees and other vulnerable groups also exists (OECD, 2021[48]).
Reconstruction examples from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia also show that rehabilitating and rebuilding housing in post-conflict settings is not only a lengthy process but also a costly one, requiring sustainable financing solutions over an extended period. Long-term funding enables authorities to plan strategically and can foster confidence among potential returnees in the viability of rebuilding their lives. In practice, housing reconstruction efforts are typically financed through a range of mechanisms, but in many post-conflict contexts they are heavily reliant on donor support. For example, in the RHP programme, in each participating country the contribution of external donors – primarily the European Union – was at least four times greater than national funding.
To anticipate donor fatigue, and in the face of the sheer scale of the housing needs, it is important to attract other sources of financing early on and ensure a gradual transition toward more autonomous financing models. Having a stable, self-sustaining, long-term funding source for affordable housing is a major issue that many countries have to address even in a peaceful context. Latvia is an example of a country that recently had to seek ways to resolve its general problem of housing affordability. Similarly to Ukraine, it had an under-developed social housing model and sought sustainable ways to finance it. In response, Latvia established a revolving fund scheme – the Housing Affordability Fund – composed of initial capital from the Latvian Recovery and Resilience Plan together with a state loan, while factoring in future loan repayments from developers and a share of the rents paid by tenants of the newly built affordable dwellings. The establishment of the Fund is largely considered a major first step towards boosting investment in affordable housing (OECD, 2023[49]).
Regulating the private rental market
While waiting for the housing stock to be rebuilt, displaced individuals often have to find housing solutions in the private rental market. Large‑scale destruction and displacement can lead to housing rental market imbalances, resulting in rising prices, housing insecurity, a weakening of tenants’ rights, and discrimination against affected populations.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005, rental prices in New Orleans increased by 36% in the first year and by 46% within three years, far outpacing income growth, especially for low-income households who were disproportionately affected (Sapat et al., 2011[50]). The situation was aggravated by the fact that the recovery response overlooked the needs of tenants and non-owners. Despite early proposals advocating for rental repair programmes and the adaptive reuse of existing housing stock, only 18% of damaged rental units received assistance, compared to 62% of owner-occupied units (Sapat et al., 2011[50]). This disparity underscores the importance of ensuring that all displaced households, regardless of tenure status, are included in housing recovery efforts, otherwise deepening inequalities within communities. Even if financial housing assistance was provided to counter the situation, it proved ineffective and led to prolonged longer-term instability (Box 5.4).
Displaced residents of New Orleans encountered numerous barriers in accessing housing support following the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Henrici, Childers and Shaw, 2015[51]). Many were transitioned from public housing, where rents were income‑based and utilities included, into the Housing Choice Voucher Programme. This tenant-based subsidy required displaced persons to secure accommodation in the private rental market. Many landlords were unwilling to participate, and displaced households, unfamiliar with the full costs and procedures of renting privately, struggled to qualify. At the same time, rent and utility costs rose substantially, further burdening families who had previously lived in stable, subsidised housing.
To respond to the prolonged displacement crisis, several federal programmes were introduced. The Disaster Housing Assistance Programme (DHAP), developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), provided longer-term rental assistance and case management to over 36 000 households. DHAP did not adjust benefits based on income and was designed to gradually transition households from full assistance to paying market rents. However, unclear eligibility rules and limited guidance meant that many households left the programme early in search of other support. While the case management element was viewed positively, it lacked a focus on employment or skills development, leaving many households without the income stability required for long-term recovery (Buron and Locke, 2013[52]).
At the same time, the Disaster Voucher Programme (DVP) expanded eligibility to households affected by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, including those already receiving HUD support before the storms. Two years after Katrina, more than 11 000 households in the Gulf region were still receiving what had originally been intended as temporary assistance (Katz, 2008[53]). Additional Tenant Protection Vouchers were later issued to former residents of demolished public housing developments, with the aim of enabling access to new housing following large‑scale redevelopment.
Despite these efforts, residents frequently faced confusion about eligibility, limited access to information, and overlapping forms of support. In some cases, households received duplicate assistance through multiple programmes, reflecting weaknesses in co‑ordination and oversight (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2008[54]). Many were also unaware that their former housing developments would not be rebuilt, only learning of demolition plans informally. The sudden shift from publicly managed housing to market-based assistance, combined with administrative barriers, contributed to prolonged housing insecurity for many low-income and displaced families.
Similarly, as a result of the 2023 earthquake in Türkiye and Syria, in Hatay (one of the most affected provinces), rental prices rose substantially. In neighbouring towns just outside the earthquake zone, rents reportedly rose by as much as 100%, largely due to opportunistic price increases by private landlords (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2023[55]). Importantly, these high prices emerged as a key factor in delaying return and prompting displaced persons to relocate to other regions (Eraslan, 2024[56]). In response, the Turkish Government introduced fines to penalise landlords found to be exploiting the crisis.
The particularity of rental market imbalances is that they can be found worldwide even outside emergency contexts. As such, examples of housing market regulations are abundant and some can serve as inspiration in contexts where conflict and disaster have led to long-lasting nationwide imbalances. For example, private housing rental markets are well regulated in the vast majority of OECD countries. In many cases, regulations address rent levels as a tool to ensure longer-term economic sustainability, prevent poverty, combat homelessness, and support social mobility (Salvi del Pero et al., 2016[46]; United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2021[57]). In Australia, Austria, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Sweden and the United States, regulated and non-regulated rents co‑exist in the private rental sector (OECD, 2025[58]). In Germany, rental prices are regulated through a rent index, which calculates the average rent for specific neighbourhoods or districts. This index serves as a benchmark for setting and adjusting rents. Landlords are generally not allowed to increase rents beyond a certain percentage above the local reference rent. Adjustments to rent are often linked to the Consumer Price Index, ensuring that changes reflect broader economic conditions. Additionally, rent increases are usually permitted only once per year, making the process predictable for tenants. These regulations are enforced at both the federal and municipal levels, and the index is updated regularly to reflect current market conditions. In France, since 2018, agglomerations with tight housing markets have piloted a rent control measure, whereby the initial rent levels are determined within a benchmark range. The city of Paris was the first jurisdiction to implement the measure in 2019, followed by several other cities in subsequent years.
The success of these pricing regulations is grounded in the broader housing regulations that define the rights and obligations of landlords and tenants, including landlord registration and written rental contracts (OECD, 2025[58]). In many OECD countries, enforcement of these regulations is delegated to the municipal level for better efficiency. Many countries have a sophisticated governance structure to implement, enforce, monitor, and improve these regulations, with particular attention paid to non-discrimination and the inclusion of vulnerable populations, such as refugees.
Facilitating the recovery of ownership
The loss or denial of access to homes, land, and property is one of the most common and enduring consequences of conflict-related displacement. The longer the displacement lasts, the higher the risk that returnees will find their property destroyed, requisitioned by the state (for example, for military purposes), or occupied or appropriated. Others face the challenge of having lost legal or informal claims to what was once theirs. These issues make housing, land, and property (HLP) restitution often one of the central priorities of recovery and reconstruction, particularly once conflict is settled. Looking ahead, these issues may become pressing in Ukraine, especially after the war’s settlement and in the most heavily damaged areas.
One successful example of addressing the issue is the Dayton Peace Agreement, which enshrined the right of all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina displaced during the war to return to their homes. To implement this principle, the Property Law Implementation Plan (PLIP) was created to ensure that property rights were recognised and enforceable for everyone (Office of the High Representative, 2000[59]). PLIP’s success was driven by co‑ordinated pressure on local authorities to implement property law decisions, combined with support for relocating unlawful occupants and identifying alternative housing options. Authorities also took steps to ensure that those enforcing restitution, including local police and elected officials, were themselves adequately housed. This helped build trust in state institutions and judicial processes among displaced claimants. The regular publication of municipality-level implementation statistics further enhanced transparency and accountability (Poulsen, 2010[60]). The initiative proved highly effective, with the restitution rate for 200 000 occupied housing units in Bosnia and Herzegovina, increasing from 21% in its first year to 92% by the fourth year. PLIP remains one of the most recognised achievements in the implementation of Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace Agreement (Serrano, 2015[61]).
To strengthen restitution efforts globally, the United Nations developed the Pinheiro Principles, which establish key standards to guide HLP restitution for displaced persons (see Box 5.5). These principles reaffirm key human rights standards and outline the responsibilities of states in creating national procedures, institutions, and mechanisms to support fair, accessible, and effective restitution. They also emphasise the need for a process that is transparent, non-discriminatory, and responsive to all affected groups.
The Pinheiro Principles, adopted by the United Nations in 2005, provide a comprehensive normative framework for the restitution of housing, land and property to refugees and displaced persons (UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 2005[62]). The Principles are intended to guide states, local authorities and international partners in developing fair, lawful and inclusive restitution policies and mechanisms in the aftermath of conflict or disaster.
The Principles affirm that all persons, whether displaced internally or externally, and regardless of their legal status, have a right to reclaim housing, land or property from which they were arbitrarily or unlawfully removed. This right applies equally to those who return to their place of origin and to those who do not, underscoring that restitution is a legal entitlement rather than a benefit contingent on return. In cases where restitution is not factually possible, affected persons should be entitled to fair and effective compensation.
The Principles stress the importance of equality and non-discrimination in restitution processes. They place a particular focus on ensuring that women’s and girls’ rights to housing, land and property are recognised and upheld both in law and in practice.
The Principles also address the rights of tenants and other non-owners following displacement, as well as the situation of secondary occupants who may have taken up residence during the period of displacement.
To make these rights effective, the Principles call for accessible, transparent and timely restitution procedures. States should support these with sufficient resources and, where necessary, provide legal aid. Informal or collective claims mechanisms may also be integrated, provided they align with international standards.
The right to restitution is linked to broader rights, including the right to adequate housing, the peaceful enjoyment of possessions, and freedom of movement. Importantly, restitution should not be used as a means to pressure or accelerate return movements.
Although not legally binding, the Pinheiro Principles have become a widely used international reference in post-conflict recovery and have informed housing and land policies in countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia and Iraq. They provide a rights-based foundation for rebuilding trust, restoring property rights, and supporting long-term reintegration after displacement.
Despite its importance, the practical implementation of restitution is often fraught with difficulties. Land records and civil documentation may have been damaged, destroyed, or never existed, particularly for households with informal or undocumented tenure. Properties may have been transferred without prior formalised agreement. In some contexts, unclear or overlapping legal frameworks create confusion over ownership or use rights. Where return is delayed, property boundaries may become contested, and families may lose use‑rights over time. The presence of secondary occupants further complicates restitution, especially where those now living in the properties have no other place to go. If not carefully managed, these challenges can undermine broader return and reconstruction efforts.
One of the most persistent practical challenges in receiving compensation for damaged housing, and in securing restitution of housing when it has been requisitioned or unlawfully occupied, relates to the documentation required to prove ownership or rights to use or inhabit a property. In Ukraine, as in many displacement contexts, documentation is often lost, destroyed, or left behind during flight. Even where documents are preserved, they may not be legally sufficient to assert ownership, particularly if they are informal, outdated, or issued in the name of a deceased relative.
A 2017 survey conducted by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) among Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan found that while two‑thirds of respondents reported having owned their previous residence in Syria, only 17% had access to any form of property documentation while in displacement. Many refugee heads of household perceived themselves as owners, even when the land or housing was formally registered to another member of the family. Nearly 70% of those who reported holding documentation stated that the documents were in someone else’s name, often a male relative, which further complicates efforts to verify ownership and pursue restitution claims (NRC, 2017[63]).
Women often face singular challenges in being recognised as legal heirs or rights-holders. In many contexts, property documentation and land titles are issued in the names of male family members, making it particularly difficult for women to assert their rights in cases of separation, or when the spouse is missing or has died. In Uganda, for example, women and children were especially vulnerable to dispossession and land grabbing, with only 36% of widows in Northern Uganda reporting that they had received the majority of their late husband’s assets (World Bank, 2006[64]; Adelman and Peterman, 2014[65]). Similar patterns have been observed in other contexts. Following Hurricane Katrina in the United States in 2005, almost none of the low-income African American women had access to HLP documentation necessary to pursue legal remedies (Henrici, Childers and Shaw, 2015[51]).
Examples of how to address documentation-related barriers include using a broader range of evidence beyond formal ownership titles. In Kosovo, the Housing and Property Claims Commission (HPCC) accepted, and when necessary actively sought, alternative forms of proof to support claims (HPCC, 2007[66]). These included witness statements, utility bills such as electricity, water and telephone records, photographs, and tax receipts to verify claims when formal documentation was missing or incomplete. This flexible evidentiary approach enabled displaced persons to assert their rights more easily and improved access to restitution procedures. It also allowed authorities to verify claims in situations where official records were partial or contested.
Anticipating possible disputes and judicial bottlenecks
Restitution processes, while essential, almost inevitably give rise to disputes. Conflicting claims, incomplete documentation, and overlapping rights mean that housing, land, and property (HLP) restitution can become highly contested. In such settings, flexibility in evidence requirements, though critical to ensuring access, can also open the door to abuse.
In Kosovo, some individuals exploited the process through fraudulent practices, including the use of forged property titles and false identity documents. Other concerns included the intimidation or corruption of local officials to validate illegitimate claims, unlawful expropriation of property for the benefit of well-connected property developers, and the manipulation of land registries to alter official ownership records (Tawil, 2009[67]). These experiences highlight that while the acceptance of diverse forms of evidence is critical to ensuring access to restitution, it must be supported by strong verification processes and credible, impartial dispute resolution mechanisms to prevent abuse.
Looking ahead, it is essential to anticipate and prepare for a likely increase in HLP disputes following returns, so that these do not overwhelm judicial systems or exceed the processing capacity of relevant authorities. Equally, unresolved disputes may deter returns, as potential returnees may visit their areas of origin but choose not to return permanently if disputes are not settled in a timely or credible manner.
In the case of Syria, it was estimated in 2022 that the approximately HLP 3 million claims submitted to courts since the start of the conflict in 2011 would require the exclusive work of about 2 000 courts and 1 000 administrative bodies over the following ten years to be processed and resolved. Just six months after the fall of the Assad regime, OCHA noted a dramatic increase in HLP claims and a pressing need for legal assistance to help individuals recover or reconstitute the documentation required to prove property ownership (OCHA, 2025[68]; Clutterbuck, 2025[69]).
Limited institutional capacity can hinder restitution efforts. Authorities may face constraints in staffing and co‑ordination across levels of government. In Lebanon, for example, efforts to support return after the civil war were slowed by overlapping mandates and weak co‑ordination, despite the creation of dedicated institutions and the availability of funding (UN-Habitat, 2025[70]). Restitution processes may also be hampered by low public trust, insufficient legal assistance, and limited public access to information. These factors highlight the need for HLP restitution frameworks that are legally robust, inclusive, and tailored to the realities on the ground.
Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, particularly community-based solutions involving customary committees or family networks, often play a prominent role in resolving housing, land and property (HLP) disputes. Their flexibility allows for the resolution of a higher volume of cases and the management of agreements that range from informal to semi-formal arrangements (NRC, 2017[63]). Their purpose is to address property, inheritance, and family disputes amicably and at low cost, outside the formal court system. While their rulings are generally not legally binding, they are grounded in local customs and mutual consent, fostering social trust in contexts where state institutions lack the technical capacity to resolve each case. Their emergence demonstrates both community resilience and the demand for flexible dispute‑resolution mechanisms that can respond to high volumes of claims.
In post-conflict Uganda, local councils functioned as grassroots justice providers, resolving disputes over land, inheritance, and property through locally accessible, low-cost mechanisms (Khadiagala, 2001[71]). These elected committees typically relied on a combination of customary norms and informal procedures to mediate conflicts. For female returnees, especially widows, local councils offered an alternative to traditionally male‑dominated dispute resolution forums, enabling them to assert claims to land and housing that were previously out of reach. By decentralising dispute resolution and embedding it within familiar community settings, they helped to democratise access to justice. Although the effectiveness of local councils declined over time due to limited formal authority and increasing elite capture, other community-based dispute resolution approaches continued to emerge (see Box 5.6).
The Norwegian Refugee Council’s Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA) programme developed a decentralised model of collaborative dispute resolution in Uganda’s West Nile region (NRC, 2024[72]). This approach was tailored to settings marked by displacement and overlapping claims, and recognised that formal court processes are often perceived by refugees as inaccessible due to their length, cost and complexity.
The collaborative dispute resolution model includes structured training for local leaders, representatives of the Office of the Prime Minister, and key stakeholders from both refugee and host communities. Training covers core topics such as HLP conflict analysis, dispute resolution procedures, roles and responsibilities of community actors, and the promotion of women’s HLP rights. The goal is to enable participants not only to mediate disputes effectively but also to share this knowledge within their communities.
By empowering local leaders to manage disputes at scale and monitoring their engagement through regular follow-up by ICLA paralegals, the model fosters local ownership, broad outreach and long-term sustainability. Where power imbalances arise between disputing parties, the ICLA team intervenes directly to help ensure fair and equitable mediation.
At the same time, their limitations should not be overlooked. Without formal recognition, such mechanisms remain vulnerable to political interference and may lack the consistency and authority needed to guarantee durable solutions. If agreements are not anchored in formal legal frameworks, there is a risk that disputes may resurface, particularly as returnees seek to secure long-term housing stability or to transfer property across generations. The most effective approaches therefore tend to combine the accessibility and community legitimacy of informal mechanisms with pathways to formal adjudication, ensuring both immediate conflict resolution and lasting legal certainty.
Looking ahead: Rebuilding areas
Housing reconstruction efforts following displacement often focus on rebuilding in areas where displaced populations have settled. However, returning to one’s place of origin does not necessarily ensure sustainable livelihoods or long-term recovery (see also Box 5.7). In some cases, reconstruction may take place in new locations, particularly where more viable labour opportunities are available. In post-conflict contexts, these areas may differ from returnees’ original homes, and not all returnees may be able or willing to return to them. In such situations, governments not only lead physical reconstruction, but also conduct labour market assessments and engage with potential returnees to understand their skills, needs and aspirations. These insights can guide decisions on where to prioritise housing provision, ensuring that it is aligned with access to public services and sustainable livelihood opportunities.
The long-term goal of returning to Fukushima led to the creation of transitional towns, sometimes referred to as “second towns” or “long-term refuge in waiting”. These were community-based, temporary resettlement models established in host municipalities. They allowed displaced communities to remain together and access public services while awaiting the possibility of return, which in some cases could take decades.
This approach resonated particularly with younger evacuees from towns such as Naraha. The mayor of Iitate Village then advanced this idea by proposing a dual-residency registry, enabling residents to remain legally connected to both their current and original municipalities. This gave rise to the dual residency (or half return) temporary solution, which enabled evacuees to resettle in nearby cities but continue commuting to work in their areas of origin during the day (Mosneaga, 2015[73]). This became the case also for those in temporary housing sites in Fukushima urban and rural areas such as Date City, which became semi-permanent bases particularly for young families, whose children also commuted to school in their original home regions (Itonaga, 2014[74]). Even severely affected municipalities in the radiation “red zone”, including Futaba, Ōkuma, Namie and Tomioka, expressed interest in such solutions.
Bangladesh provides a cautionary example. Following Cyclone Sidr in 2007, the government and international partners engaged in a reconstruction effort, yet a more complex challenge emerged in restoring income sources in areas where livelihoods were closely linked to natural resources. In the cyclone‑affected coastal zones, the destruction of farmland, fishing equipment and forest access left many traditional subsistence activities no longer viable. While approximately 90% of displaced households expressed willingness to rebuild their homes, the absence of economic security meant that restoring housing in environmentally depleted areas could not ensure long-term sustainability and led to re‑migration.
In the Western Balkans, the Regional Housing Programme (RHP) aimed not only to restore homes but also to support livelihoods. It helped returnees to establish small home‑based businesses, such as catering services, hair salons, and small-scale farming in their communities of origin. These efforts were supported by additional livelihood assistance provided by non-governmental organisations outside the RHP, including the provision of greenhouses and farming equipment. Under the RHP, close to 3 000 contracts were signed with approximately 200 companies across four participating countries, contributing to job creation and generating broader economic benefits in the affected regions (Regional Housing Programme, 2023[75]).
These examples highlight that while the reconstruction of permanent housing is a vital component of return, policies must address the full scope of livelihood restoration. Achieving sustainable reintegration requires an integrated approach that combines adequate housing with meaningful opportunities for income generation and self-reliance.
Promoting employment and entrepreneurship opportunities
Link training to recovery needs. Map returnee skills and focus retraining on sectors with labour shortages. Collaborate with employers to ensure clear pathways into available jobs.
Adapt employment support to diverse returnee profiles. Provide targeted measures for women, youth, older persons, persons with disabilities, and skilled professionals considering return.
Promote entrepreneurship before and after return. Offer training, mentoring and business support to enable self-employment, especially in areas with limited wage jobs.
Facilitate access to finance and incentives. Support returnee entrepreneurs through grants, loans, guarantees, and targeted business incentives to stimulate local recovery.
Re‑establishing livelihoods is a critical pillar of sustainable reintegration, requiring comprehensive support that extends beyond the reconstruction of housing. While housing provides the physical foundation for return, it is often access to employment and income‑generating opportunities that determines whether displaced persons can return and remain.
For many, the decision to return is influenced not only by the safety conditions in their place of origin, but also by the availability of sustainable livelihoods upon arrival. Governments and communities frequently consider the return of displaced populations essential to post-conflict or post-disaster recovery, particularly in restoring human capital and revitalising local economies. Yet returnees often face significant challenges in accessing the labour market. Skills mismatches, shifts in the economic landscape, and structural barriers for groups such as women, youth, and persons with disabilities may hinder successful reintegration. Without targeted support, many returnees may struggle to find decent employment or risk falling into the NEET category (not in employment, education or training), particularly among younger cohorts entering the labour market for the first time.
In response to these challenges, governments and their partners have introduced a wide range of policies and initiatives. This section draws on international experience to highlight three priority areas: aligning employment support with local recovery needs, promoting inclusive labour market access following return, and supporting entrepreneurship and self-employment as pathways to reintegration.
Link employment with local recovery
Whether displacement is caused by conflict or natural disasters, it often results in damage that extends well beyond the immediate destruction of homes and infrastructure. It can profoundly disrupt local economies, labour markets and employment opportunities. Productive land, business premises and distribution networks may be severely affected, and the economic sectors that once provided the majority of jobs may no longer be viable. Return and reintegration efforts must therefore take account of the changed economic landscape.
The experience of Aceh, Indonesia, following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, illustrates how local labour markets can shift over the course of recovery. The tsunami caused widespread devastation, including the loss of over 150 000 lives. Fishing had previously been the dominant economic activity in the region, but the resumption of this sector was dependent on the reconstruction of ports and other infrastructure, much of it supported through international aid (Nose, 2019[76]). In the immediate post-disaster period, labour-intensive public works created short-term jobs in a range of sectors, but the construction sector expanded particularly fast. Over time, many former fishers, particularly those with higher levels of education or affected by trauma, moved into other sectors, contributing to more lasting changes in the labour market (Nose, 2019[76]; Vidyattama, Merdikawati and Tadjoeddin, 2021[77]).
Employment support for returnees and local communities must reflect these new realities rather than replicate pre‑displacement conditions. In post-conflict and post-disaster contexts, economic recovery is often accompanied by rapid shifts in the types of skills demanded, which is why access to upskilling and reskilling opportunities, particularly in sectors with current labour shortages, is essential. Yet both employers and workers may struggle to adapt to these changes. Businesses often face uncertainty and limited resources to invest in training, while workers may lack the financial means or confidence to retrain without a clear prospect of stable employment. For displaced persons, these barriers are especially high, as many cannot afford to interrupt existing income streams or relocate for training opportunities.
The sheer scale of economic disruption in Ukraine, combined with prolonged periods of unemployment and underemployment linked to displacement, means that skill development cannot be addressed in an ad hoc manner. Skilling, reskilling and upskilling initiatives must be planned systematically, grounded in evidence and responsive to labour market realities. They should recognise the evolving needs of employers while also allowing flexibility for workers to participate without jeopardising their livelihoods. A balanced approach that connects training provision to local economic demand can help ensure that such programmes contribute meaningfully to both individual recovery and wider reconstruction efforts.
One area where both employer interest and potential for impact are particularly high in post-conflict settings is in technical and vocational education and training (TVET). During recovery and reconstruction, labour demand often rises in technical and construction sectors. To ensure that labour market support effectively meets the needs of local recovery, opportunities to access TVET or targeted courses that facilitate rapid upskilling and reskilling should be made available to both returnees and local populations, while integrating other complementary components of livelihood provision in line with the realities on the ground.
A large‑scale initiative in Rwanda between 2010 and 2014 demonstrates the potential of combining TVET with complementary support. Implemented by IOM and the Japanese Ministry for Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs, the programme assisted over 13 000 beneficiaries, including Rwandan returnees and vulnerable members of high-return areas (Gedde, 2012[78]; Reliefweb, 2016[79]). Beneficiaries received vocational training alongside support such as livestock and construction materials, enabling both income generation and housing rehabilitation. The programme led to an average income increase of 78% for direct participants, with 63% reporting improved living conditions (IOM, 2015[80]). To ensure continuity and sustainability, a training-of-trainers component was introduced, enabling 184 instructors to pass on their skills to an estimated 1 500 additional returnees and host community members (IOM, 2015[80]). The project was eventually handed over to the Government of Rwanda, marking a transition to national ownership (IOM, 2014[81]; IOM Rwanda, 2015[82]).
Investments in upskilling and reskilling need not wait until return has taken place. In fact, they can be particularly valuable when initiated during displacement. One of the most persistent challenges facing displaced persons is long-term unemployment, which is commonly defined as being out of work for more than 26 weeks or, in some cases, for more than a year. Prolonged unemployment is associated with a range of negative effects, including heightened stress, anxiety and depression, the emergence of physical and mental health issues, and declining self-confidence. It also tends to contribute to skill erosion and reinforce social stigma, all of which reduce the likelihood of re‑employment (Juncker, 2016[83]). These patterns are well documented even in stable contexts and are often exacerbated in situations of displacement. For this reason, supporting access to employment services and training during displacement can help mitigate the longer-term consequences of inactivity and facilitate more effective reintegration upon return.
The Step Forward to Return project in Serbia offers a practical example of how employment-focussed interventions delivered prior to return can enhance the sustainability of reintegration. The programme supported IDPs through enrolment in TVET programmes, the provision of income‑generation grants to families, and targeted entrepreneurship training. By addressing employment barriers before relocation, the initiative helped equip participants with market-relevant skills, enabling them to generate income immediately upon return. Providing such support in advance ensures that returnees are not only physically relocated but are also economically prepared to reintegrate into their communities, thereby reducing dependence on social assistance and strengthening their long-term prospects (IDC, 2025[84]).
The URA programme, jointly implemented by the governments of Kosovo and Germany, provides targeted support to Kosovar returnees both before and after their return. In selected Länder in Germany, individuals considering return can access financial assistance to help cover the costs of TVET, as well as receive job counselling and psychosocial support to prepare for reintegration. Upon return to Kosovo, responsibility for delivering these support measures is transferred to the relevant authorities in Priština, ensuring continuity of assistance throughout the reintegration process.
An important consideration in supporting returnees is the recognition of skills and training acquired abroad or in other regions. Returnees who have completed education or vocational training, or who have gained work experience in different sectors, may possess valuable and transferable skills. However, without formal recognition by national authorities or informal acceptance by employers, they may face barriers to entering the formal labour market. In many cases, a combined approach is needed, supporting both the certification of prior learning and access to additional training to address any remaining skills gaps.
The Recognition of Prior Learning (RPL) programme implemented by the ILO in Jordan illustrates how such measures can improve access to formal employment. The programme has supported 13 550 individuals – including 10 795 Syrian refugees and 2 755 Jordanians – by providing training and certifying newly acquired or previously held skills in sectors such as construction, confectionery and garment production. Notably, 45% of beneficiaries were women, a significant achievement in light of the male‑dominated nature of the construction sector. (ILO, 2025[85]; UNHCR, 2021[86]).
Aligning employment support with local economic recovery efforts offers additional benefits beyond improving livelihoods. It can help strengthen returnees’ attachment to their place of return, foster social cohesion, and accelerate the broader recovery process, objectives that often reflect the priorities of national and local authorities encouraging return. The PROSPECTS programme, implemented by the International Labour Organization (ILO) across eight countries in the Middle East and North Africa and East Africa, seeks to enhance how governments and stakeholders, including the private sector, respond to forced displacement and support sustainable reintegration and economic recovery (ILO, 2025[87]). The programme provides an integrated framework built on four pillars: education and learning, economic inclusion, protection and social protection, and critical infrastructure development. Notably, PROSPECTS is situated at the humanitarian – development – peace nexus, aiming to move beyond short-term responses and deliver more durable, locally adapted solutions for both displaced populations and their host communities. Its interventions are tailored to the specific needs and institutional contexts of each participating country (see Figure 5.2 for Phase I results and Annex 5.D).
A key element of the PROSPECTS programme is the Employment-Intensive Investment Programme (EIIP), which focusses on labour-intensive public works that address immediate community needs while generating short- and medium-term employment for both displaced and host populations. As a cross-cutting intervention, the EIIP not only helps to close infrastructure gaps but also creates economic opportunities at the local level. It enables individuals to develop practical skills, contribute to local economic revitalisation, support emergency response efforts, and gain valuable experience within the labour market. Although primarily designed for refugee and IDP-hosting contexts, the EIIP model has been used in return settings as well.
Source: Selective compilation of indicators based on results from ILO exclusively of the first phase of the programme (2019-2024), available on ILO (2024[88]), PROSPECTS Monitoring Dashboard, https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiZGNjZjg0YTAtMDEwNC00MDhmLTk4MGMtODAxMTBkMTc4OTUzIiwidCI6ImQ0OWIwN2NhLTIzMDItNGU3Yy1iMmNiLWUxMjEyNzg1Mjg1MCIsImMiOjl9.
While public authorities and international organisations often play a central role in the early stages of reintegration programmes, long-term employment opportunities and sustainable livelihoods are typically generated by the private sector. Moreover, the government alone cannot meet the scale of upskilling and reskilling needs that accompany recovery and reconstruction needed in Ukraine. It is therefore essential to ensure the close involvement of the private sector in upskilling and reskilling, hiring returnees and recognising the value of the skills and experience they may bring.
This cannot however be assumed to happen on its own, and a nationwide approach is required to foster an environment in which employers have clear incentives to invest in workplace training and to view skills development as a productive long-term investment. Creating such conditions is essential for building a more resilient labour market and ensuring that both businesses and workers are equipped to adapt to structural economic change.
Engaging the private sector is key to creating sustainable livelihoods for returnees, but incentives must be designed with care. Experience from OECD countries shows that governments can encourage employers to invest in training and recruitment through a range of measures. These include wage and training subsidies, as in Ireland, and tax incentives, as used in Germany. Other approaches involve loans offered at preferential rates, such as those under Korea’s programme or the EU’s Skills and Education Guarantee Pilot. Some countries, including Italy, have introduced training levies to support collective investment in skills, while France has established individual learning account schemes that are transferable between jobs and accessible to all workers, including the self-employed (OECD, 2021[89]). In Ireland, companies can also include payback clauses in employment contracts, allowing them to recover part of their investment in training if a worker leaves shortly after completing it.
Ukraine could explore similar mechanisms to encourage greater investment in skills within its labour market. Specific incentives could also be introduced for employers who recruit and train displaced Ukrainians, particularly those returning from abroad, by developing incentives that combine skills development with clear pathways to employment. For multinational companies that operate both in Ukraine and in host countries where many displaced Ukrainians currently reside, such schemes could be designed to facilitate recruitment abroad with a view to encouraging intra-company transfers and long-term employment in Ukraine upon return. Encouraging this type of employer engagement can also help retain talent within company networks, strengthen business continuity, and create more predictable pathways for the reintegration of skilled workers.
Governments can also turn to alternative or complementary tools, such as incorporating social inclusion criteria into public procurement processes. For instance, contractors bidding for public tenders can be required to employ a specified number or share of returnees alongside non-displaced local residents, thereby expanding employment opportunities for everyone while advancing broader reintegration objectives.
Businesses can also be encouraged to support the employment of displaced persons and returnees through non-financial measures. Public hiring pledges, for example, can motivate companies to commit voluntarily to recruiting individuals from specific groups. A notable example is the Tent Partnership for Refugees, an initiative that has mobilised the private sector to support the economic integration of refugees. Since 2016, the initiative has worked with over 500 companies globally, including Amazon, Starbucks, IKEA and Unilever, to secure commitments to hire, train, and support refugees in their workforce. In 2022, the Tent Partnership introduced a dedicated programme and set of guidelines to support companies in hiring Ukrainians displaced abroad. This experience provides a useful reference point for designing similar efforts to facilitate the employment of returnees (Tent Partnership for Refugees; DLA Piper, 2022[90]). Moreover, many of the participating companies already have operations in Ukraine or plan to expand their presence, which could open further opportunities for Ukrainian refugees hired abroad who may wish to transfer their employment within the same company to Ukraine. By adapting these models to return contexts, it is possible to strengthen private sector engagement in reintegration and expand access to meaningful employment for returnees.
Promote inclusive labour market access
A key objective of employment support in return contexts should be to promote inclusivity and equal access across the labour market. This applies not only to balancing opportunities between returnees and members of the local community, but also to ensuring that no particular group is either systematically favoured or excluded. If support measures are perceived as prioritising one group over another, this can risk undermining social cohesion and generating resentment. At the same time, it is important to recognise that different groups may face distinct challenges and barriers, which merit tailored attention and targeted interventions.
To enhance labour force participation and reduce the risk of long-term unemployment, employment programmes must reflect the diverse profiles and needs of returnees. One group requiring particular support is young people whose final years of schooling and entry into the labour market occurred during displacement. These circumstances may have resulted in gaps in education, limited exposure to work experience, and a lack of access to career guidance. As a result, some young returnees may fall into the NEET category. Programmes must be sufficiently flexible to respond to these challenges by offering targeted skills development, career counselling, and psychosocial support to help them navigate the transition into employment and overcome uncertainty in the labour market.
To address the specific needs of NEET youth, those with limited prior work experience, or individuals who have never participated in the labour market of their country of origin, the PROSPECTS programme has introduced Job Search Clubs (JSCs). This group-based model offers a practical and accessible way to support young people in their transition into employment. Unlike traditional training programmes, JSCs consist of short, intensive sessions that help participants identify job opportunities, improve their CVs, practice interview techniques, and provide mutual support throughout the job search process. The model places strong emphasis on peer learning, behavioural activation, and ongoing coaching, which often continues informally beyond the initial sessions. Within the PROSPECTS framework, JSCs have been tailored to different country contexts and embedded in public employment services, TVET systems, and youth strategies. As a low-cost and adaptable intervention, JSCs have proved effective in tackling youth unemployment and promoting social cohesion between displaced and host community youth.
Another group disproportionately represented among displaced Ukrainians is women. Some of the challenges they faced during displacement, including care responsibilities, exposure to exploitation, and work in the informal economy (OECD, 2023[91]), are likely to continue upon return. This highlights the importance of gender-sensitive and targeted measures to support their reintegration into the labour market. These efforts should extend beyond the returnee population and contribute more broadly to improving labour market participation among women in Ukraine. Key priorities could include expanding access to childcare, removing structural barriers to employment, and supporting women’s entrepreneurship.
Moreover, experience from other recovery and reconstruction settings shows that well-designed interventions can help women enter new sectors where labour shortages have emerged. In Iraq, for example, the ILO worked in partnership with Erbil Polytechnic University and with the tourism and antiquities authorities to introduce training in culturally significant areas such as stone paving, clay brick building, and other professions. These sectors, traditionally male‑dominated, have become increasingly accessible to women. The training programmes are delivered alongside formal certification, equipping women with marketable skills in the region (ILO, 2023[92]). This and similar initiatives across Iraq have aimed not only to create employment and contribute to reconstruction, but also to promote more inclusive workplaces and challenge traditional gender roles. The ILO has also involved local governments and communities in programme delivery, including by training engineers from local authorities to supervise activities on the ground, thereby strengthening local ownership and institutional capacity.
Yet inclusive labour market access also needs a geographical dimension, ensuring that reskilling, upskilling, and employment opportunities are accessible across the country and not concentrated in specific regions, such as capital cities. Returnees have a right to return to their home and home region, even if options elsewhere in the territory should also be available to them. This means that livelihood opportunities should be made available also under reconstruction taking place at different speeds in different places.
Making training opportunities more accessible outside major urban centres is therefore essential for inclusive recovery and reintegration. This is particularly important for returnees who face barriers such as distance, limited mobility, inadequate transport infrastructure, or other socio‑economic constraints. In Uganda, mobile TVET units have proven to be an effective way of addressing such challenges. Under the Refugee and Host Community Access and Innovation in Skills for Employment (RAISE) programme, existing facilities such as local schools were used as training centres. This allowed skills development to reach individuals who could not or did not wish to relocate to urban areas, especially women and those with caregiving responsibilities. The decentralised model led to participation levels that exceeded expectations by 32%, with particularly strong engagement among vulnerable groups (ANCHOR, 2023[93]).
Support entrepreneurship and self-employment among returnees
In parallel to promoting wage employment, entrepreneurship and self-employment can serve as important pathways for returnees and displaced persons seeking to rebuild their lives. These options are particularly relevant in areas where formal employment opportunities remain limited or where conditions may not support immediate job creation. By combining entrepreneurial skills with vocational skills, returnees can establish new income sources and reduce dependence on often scarce wage employment.
When adequately supported, small-scale business ventures can also help revitalise local economies. They can create additional jobs and services, benefiting not only returnees but also members of the host communities who may continue to face economic challenges. The dual role of entrepreneurship as both a coping strategy in the absence of formal jobs and a contributor to local development highlights the need for integrated support programmes. Such programmes should aim to build individual business capacity while also addressing structural gaps in employment provision.
One of the most significant barriers to entrepreneurship is limited access to financing. In Pakistan, for example, while up to 57% of returnees expressed a desire to start a business, fewer than 25% had sufficient savings or access to capital to act on these plans (Farooq and Arif, 2023[94]). This underscores the importance of targeted support initiatives such as grants, start-up capital and pre‑return business counselling or training.
In most cases, financial support to returnees looking to start their own businesses is provided through relatively small grants. The “Reintegrate II” project in Serbia, for example, offers pre‑return support to individuals interested in establishing small enterprises in their former communities. Under this initiative, beneficiaries received grants of up to EUR 3 000 to launch their businesses before returning. This was complemented by additional reintegration assistance upon their arrival, contributing to more stable and sustainable reintegration outcomes. In contrast, programmes targeting potential returnees from the diaspora or from among economic migrants may be able to offer more extensive financial incentives or tax-related benefits, as will be further discussed later in the chapter.
Social enterprises can also offer a valuable model for creating employment opportunities for returning displaced persons. By combining economic activity with social objectives, these enterprises not only promote entrepreneurship but also help to strengthen the local business environment. Although they may not always be highly competitive in purely economic terms, their broader contributions, including the provision of essential services and the reinforcement of social capital, make them an important complement to traditional labour market mechanisms.
Micro-franchising initiatives in Haiti, such as V’ice Haiti, illustrate the potential of the social and solidarity economy in addressing both livelihood needs and service delivery gaps (Blumenthal, 2019[95]). These models generate income opportunities for low-income populations while delivering affordable goods to underserved communities. By combining the flexibility of self-employment with the structured support of a franchisor and a last-mile distribution model, social micro-franchising can reduce risks for individual entrepreneurs, broaden economic participation, and help strengthen local service provision.
Worker co‑operatives represent another form of enterprise that can support entrepreneurs who may lack the resources to start a business independently. By pooling efforts and resources, individuals can pursue shared objectives and overcome financial barriers. In Spain, the Mondragon Corporation co‑operative played a significant role in restoring employment and stimulating economic development in the Basque region after the Spanish Civil War (OECD, 2023[96]). Beyond their potential to generate employment, modern co‑operative movements often bring together a more diverse range of stakeholders and place greater emphasis on promoting the general interest. This extends beyond the traditional focus on serving the mutual interests of members with similar professional or sectoral backgrounds (OECD, 2023[96]).
In this context, the social and solidarity economy offers promising avenues for inclusive development. With appropriate government support, including subsidies, tax incentives, and regulatory flexibility, such models can help create sustainable employment opportunities for returnees, particularly in fragile or post-conflict settings where more community-oriented economic structures are needed.
Since 2021, the Social Entrepreneurship, Empowerment, and Cohesion Project (SEECO) in Türkiye has supported over 4 000 women and young people from both refugee and host communities across 11 provinces. The project has provided targeted entrepreneurship training and subgrants to 1 100 women entrepreneurs, with 73% of these grants awarded to women-led enterprises operating in sectors that contribute to the green transition. In parallel, SEECO has established 14 community facilities, with plans to develop 76 more. These centres offer essential services such as childcare, safe transportation, and co-working spaces, directly addressing the structural barriers that limit women’s participation in economic activity.
In a context where women’s labour market participation remains below 40% and access to credit is limited, SEECO provides an important model for enabling women’s entrepreneurship and linking it to environmental sustainability objectives.
Building on SEECO’s success, the Socially Inclusive Green Transition Project (SOGREEN) was launched in 2025. SOGREEN will provide reimbursable financing to more than 1 800 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 60% of which are expected to be women-led or women-owned. It will also offer incubation and acceleration grants to over 3 000 entrepreneurs, maintaining a similar proportion of women beneficiaries. Importantly, SOGREEN is designed to include returnees as part of Türkiye’s broader recovery and reconstruction efforts following the 2023 earthquake, enabling their participation in economic revitalisation.
As Ukraine seeks to support women returnees and vulnerable groups in the aftermath of displacement and conflict, the SEECO and SOGREEN projects offer a practical and scalable framework. By combining entrepreneurship support with green and inclusive development priorities, and by addressing critical barriers to participation, these initiatives demonstrate how targeted support can be embedded into broader recovery strategies. Their financing structure also offers valuable insights: SEECO began with a USD 48.04 million grant from the European Union Facility for Refugees in Türkiye (FRiT), while SOGREEN is backed by a USD 400 million loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), providing a path towards long-term sustainability and national ownership.
Source: World Bank (2025[97]), Women at the Heart of Change: Shaping Entrepreneurship and Green Innovation in Türkiye, https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2025/02/20/women-at-the-heart-of-change-shaping-entrepreneurship-and-green-innovation-in-turkiye.
Ensuring access to public services and safety nets
Prepare public services for possible surges in demand. Returns can place an additional strain on schools, health facilities and welfare offices. Adjusting capacity where necessary and investing in service delivery staff will be critical to maintain service quality.
Build local capacity and information systems. Training municipal officials, improving co‑ordination and developing accessible one‑stop digital and in-person platforms will ensure returnees can navigate services effectively.
Ensure fairness in public assistance but acknowledge that returnees have different needs. Assistance should be provided on the basis of need and integrated into mainstream systems to avoid perceptions of preferential treatment, while still addressing the specific barriers faced by returnees.
Strengthen portability of pensions. Alongside negotiating international arrangements, Ukraine should consider establishing unilateral schemes that allow displaced persons to maintain or expand contributions to domestic social protection systems while abroad.
Access to public services and social protection systems is fundamental to the viability of return and reintegration. For those considering a return, confidence that they will be able to rely on healthcare, education, pensions and other forms of social support is often as important as physical security or housing. These systems offer not only essential services but also reassurance of continuity and fairness, which can significantly influence decisions about return and long-term reintegration.
The nature of challenges differs between those displaced internally and those who have lived abroad. Internally displaced persons have remained within Ukraine’s institutional framework, with their needs visible to the state and their entitlements maintained within the existing system. By contrast, returnees from abroad will face the task of re‑entering Ukrainian public services after an extended period in host countries. Questions such as how children will reintegrate into schools, how health records can be transferred, or how pension contributions abroad can be recognised are likely to come to the fore. Addressing these issues will be essential to ensure a smooth and equitable transition, particularly given the considerable efforts host countries have made to integrate Ukrainians into their own public systems at the outset of displacement.
Experience from other contexts shows that ensuring access to services and safety nets requires action across several interconnected areas. Anticipating and reinforcing the capacity of public services is crucial, particularly in post-conflict situations where infrastructure and staffing are already fragile. At the same time, reintegration support must address the specific needs of returnees in a way that remains fair and inclusive, avoiding perceptions of preferential treatment. Equally important is ensuring that returnees have clear and accessible information on how to navigate public services and exercise their entitlements, which helps to foster trust and support effective reintegration. Finally, continuity of entitlements across borders is also essential, as the portability of pensions can help prevent the loss of rights and encourage voluntary and sustainable returns.
Anticipate possible changes in demand on public services
Returns of displaced persons can increase demands on public services. Health services, schools, social assistance, housing offices and local administrations are often the first to experience strain as they respond to a sudden spike in returnees seeking support. Anticipating these pressures is not only a matter of service delivery for the entire population but also of maintaining trust, preventing inequalities, and safeguarding social cohesion during a sensitive period of reintegration.
The specific conditions of return flows play an important role. While there have been cases where displaced people have returned in large numbers over a short period of time due to return programmes in host countries or sudden expulsion orders, as with Afghan refugees from Iran and Pakistan, returns in the case of Ukraine are unlikely to follow this pattern. Unlike displacement, which often occurs suddenly and under chaotic conditions, returns are expected to be more planned and gradual. Individuals are likely to take time to assess conditions, secure accommodation, identify schools for their children, and in some cases arrange employment before moving back. This means that governments, in principle, have the opportunity to plan ahead. Anticipating increases in demand and preparing the ground for them is therefore not only possible but essential. Effective preparation requires early investment in planning, the mobilisation of additional capacity, and mechanisms to ensure that both returnees and host communities have equitable access to services.
Area-based capacity-building approaches have been utilised in several contexts. In Afghanistan, UNHCR worked with national and local stakeholders to establish 80 Priority Areas of Return and Reintegration (PARRs). These areas were strategically selected based on the concentration of returnees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as on their absorption capacity and the availability of existing services. Within each PARR, projects seek to improve access to education, healthcare, shelter and livelihoods, while also supporting community-based initiatives that strengthen public services as a whole. In parallel, cash and in-kind assistance is provided to the most vulnerable families to help them cope with the immediate pressures associated with returns (UNHCR, 2025[98]). The PARRs exemplify an inclusive, area-based “whole-of-community” approach that supports both returnees and host populations. Their design recognises that sustainable reintegration depends on strengthening services for all, rather than targeting returnees in isolation.
Uganda offers a further example of how area-based planning can reinforce local service systems under strain. Through the ReHoPE framework and a dedicated National Education Response Plan, additional resources were channelled to districts facing rapid population increases (Government of Uganda and United Nations, 2017[99]). Rather than establishing parallel structures, the approach sought to strengthen mainstream education and health services for both newcomers and residents. By aligning with the national development plan and securing multi-year financing, Uganda was able to maintain service quality during periods of demographic pressure while avoiding perceptions of preferential treatment.
Bosnia and Herzegovina developed a complementary approach to managing simultaneous returns to fragile municipalities after the conflict. In partnership with UNHCR, authorities established a network of legal aid and information centres and created the Return Application Database System (UNHCR, 2004[100]). The database offered planners forward-looking data on the likely timing and destinations of return movements, enabling them to anticipate pressure points in housing offices, schools and local welfare systems. At the same time, the legal aid centres channelled people to the appropriate services, reducing administrative backlogs and ensuring that returnees had better access to support.
In Iraq, the government, together with IOM, developed tools to map service capacity in areas of large‑scale returns. The Return Index and accompanying governorate profiles track conditions across indicators for basic services, livelihoods and social cohesion (IOM, 2025[101]). The Index aggregates 16 indicators into two severity scales: one for livelihoods and basic services and another for safety and social cohesion. This evidence‑based approach provides insights into the severity of conditions in return locations and has enabled the prioritisation of investments where schools, clinics, water supply and civil documentation services were most under strain. By aligning the pace of returns with the absorptive capacity of local systems, the tool has supported more sustainable reintegration planning.
The experiences of Iraq and Bosnia and Herzegovina underscore the importance of data-driven approaches to anticipate and manage the pressures that accompany returns. Since the time of the Balkan Wars, advances in technology and data systems now allow for more dynamic forms of monitoring. Tools such as IOM’s Return Index which relies on structured expert interviews to assess capacities across regions can provide valuable insights but could increasingly be complemented by automated data collection and digital platforms. Harnessing such tools would enable authorities not only to track evolving demands on schools, healthcare, housing and social services in real time but also to respond more swiftly and allocate resources more effectively. Developing such monitoring capacities is therefore an important dimension of planning for sustainable reintegration. While the Return Index has already been applied on an ad hoc basis in Ukraine, there will be a need for more consistent monitoring of capacities once wider returns become feasible and are encouraged.
Finally, the capacity of national systems to absorb returns will depend not only on infrastructure but also on the ability of local and regional authorities to manage the pressures administratively. Without targeted investments in training, staffing and institutional strengthening, even well-designed policies may falter when implemented on the ground. Preparing officials, enhancing co‑ordination across agencies and ensuring that resources are equitably distributed will be decisive in determining whether public services can cope with the demands of return flows in a way that supports stability, fairness and long-term reintegration.
Ensure targeted support for returnees where necessary
Reintegration requires not only strong public services but, in some cases, targeted support to address the particular barriers returnees may face. These may include challenges with documentation, education, healthcare continuity and psychosocial well-being. Providing such support in a needs-based manner helps ensure that returnees can reintegrate without disadvantage, while avoiding perceptions of unfair preferential treatment. When carefully balanced, targeted measures can complement broader public services and reinforce fairness and cohesion within communities.
Education of children is a particularly sensitive area. Returnee households, especially those from abroad, may require additional support to re‑enter the school system. Children often return with diverse educational experiences, shaped by different curricula, languages of instruction and teaching methods. Some may have faced long interruptions in their schooling or difficulties in adapting to new environments while displaced. On return, they may encounter barriers to the recognition of prior learning, uncertainty over grade placement, or even requirements to repeat a school year. During the Ukrainian displacement crisis, many host countries invested considerable effort to ensure that Ukrainian children could enter their schools quickly and smoothly (OECD, 2023[102]). Ensuring an equally efficient re‑entry into Ukraine’s education system will be vital to avoid frustration, stigma or prolonged disruptions to children’s learning.
Return flows can place pressures on schools, and there may be a temptation to establish parallel classes or separate tracks for local and returnee children. This, however, should be approached with caution. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, following the large‑scale returns of displaced persons in the early 2000s, international organisations supported bridging classes and provided psychosocial support to children who had been educated abroad or under different entity curricula. In response, the policy of “two schools under one roof” was introduced as a temporary measure to address the divisive post-war education system and encourage refugee return. Despite international efforts to phase it out, the arrangement became permanent, reinforcing ethnic divisions and separation between returnees and stayees. While some progress has since been made through administrative and legal unification, the case demonstrates the risks of unequal or fragmented reintegration measures (OSCE, 2018[103]).
In Mexico, the Programa Binacional de Educación Migrante (PROBEM) was established to ease the bureaucratic process of enrolling returnee children who had studied in the United States into the Mexican education system (Government of Mexico, 2015[104]). The programme has played an important role in facilitating the recognition of school records, simplifying enrolment procedures, and providing bilingual support to help children adapt to Mexican schools. It has also promoted exchanges between teachers in Mexico and the United States, enabling educators to better understand the experiences of migrant children and helping to reduce stigma (Ramirez, Davalos and Gómez, 2024[105]). At the same time, PROBEM has faced challenges, particularly in ensuring consistent implementation across Mexico’s states and in securing sufficient funding. These limitations have sometimes resulted in uneven access to support, underscoring the importance of strong co‑ordination and adequate resources in similar initiatives.
Healthcare continuity is another critical area. Returnees from abroad may face difficulties in transferring medical records or maintaining ongoing treatment, particularly for chronic illnesses or specialised care. Records may be fragmented across health systems and languages, complicating continuity of care.
One way of addressing this challenge is through cross-border health data exchange. The European Union’s Directive on Patients’ Rights in Cross-border Healthcare (2011/24/EU) established the eHealth Digital Service Infrastructure, which enables the secure transfer of prescriptions and patient summaries between member states. Although originally designed to facilitate care for temporary cross-border patients, the framework has also proven highly relevant for returning migrants and retirees, as it provides a reliable mechanism for the interoperable exchange of essential health data. Over time, the system is expected to include additional records such as medical images, laboratory results, and hospital discharge reports.
By early 2025, however, only a limited number of EU countries had the technical capacity to exchange data digitally across borders. Work is ongoing to expand participation, and some successful examples already demonstrate its potential. Since 2024, Estonia and Finland have enabled the exchange of electronic health records, thereby ensuring continuity of treatment for patients moving between their systems. Transfers require the explicit consent of patients through national eGovernment platforms, yet the arrangement is already being used by cross-border migrants, highlighting the practical value of interoperable health systems.
These experiences underline the potential of bilateral and regional mechanisms to facilitate continuity of care for returning displaced persons. Such arrangements are particularly valuable in areas such as chronic illness management or children’s vaccination records, where uninterrupted access is essential. Nonetheless, significant challenges remain. Ensuring robust data protection and achieving interoperability between national health systems are complex and require sustained political and technical co‑operation. Establishing clear protocols for recognising health records issued abroad, including those in non-standard formats, would further help to reduce administrative barriers and safeguard continuity of treatment.
Beyond physical health, mental health support also requires attention. Reintegration often brings an additional layer of stress linked to changed community dynamics, feelings of alienation, reverse culture shock when returning from abroad, and uncertainties about belonging, alongside the trauma of conflict itself. Training mainstream mental health providers to recognise displacement-related stressors is therefore essential. Kosovo, after 1999, expanded its mental health services to address the distinct pressures faced by returnees, combining psychiatric care with social work interventions. In Sierra Leone, programmes for demobilised combatants and displaced returnees integrated counselling into reintegration packages, addressing both psychological and practical challenges.
Colombia’s PAPSIVI programme, established under the 2011 Victims and Land Restitution Law, represents one of the most ambitious efforts globally. It provides individual, family and community-based care through interdisciplinary teams, with particular attention to cultural sensitivity and the differentiated needs of groups such as Afro-Colombian, Indigenous and Roma populations (Government of Colombia, 2017[106]). PAPSIVI provides individual, family, community and culturally sensitive collective care, delivered by interdisciplinary teams that include both professionals and trained conflict survivors. Between 2012 and 2021, PAPSIVI reached more than 768 000 victims, reflecting the scale and ambition of the initiative. However, this figure represents only around one ninth of the estimated 9.25 million Colombians officially recognised as affected by the conflict (Infobae, 2022[107]).
Some groups will require particular attention, as reintegration processes often involve populations that are diverse. Persons with disabilities, the elderly, and minorities may face compounded challenges upon return. Targeted support and inclusive social assistance are needed to ensure that reintegration is equitable and sustainable. Access to accurate and up-to-date information is a cross-cutting need. During displacement, public service systems evolve, with new procedures, digitalisation, or changes in entitlements that may be unfamiliar to those who have been away. Ensuring that returnees can easily navigate these systems is vital both for reintegration and for decisions about whether and when to return.
A digital one‑stop information portal is considered good practice. Portugal’s Programa Regressar, for example, not only provides financial and employment assistance but also centralises information through a single digital platform and dedicated helpdesk. This enables returnees to access guidance on taxes, social security, education, and housing in one place, reducing the need to interact with multiple ministries.
At the same time, face‑to-face support remains indispensable, particularly for those in vulnerable situations, including the elderly. While digital platforms such as Ukraine’s Diia can greatly expand access to services, reliance on them alone risks alienating groups affected by the digital divide. Georgia has addressed this need through the creation of Public Service Halls (PSH), one‑stop shops offering more than 250 government services under a single roof. Mobile PSH units also travel to remote settlements and areas heavily affected by displacement, providing returnees and IDPs with direct access to essential documentation. These services include issuing identity cards, registering births for children born abroad, and reissuing lost property papers, ensuring that all individuals can restore their legal status and access public services without unnecessary delay. This exists alongside digital tools such as my.gov.ge, but by combining digital innovations with face‑to-face assistance, it is better able to ensure inclusion of vulnerable groups who may otherwise be disadvantaged by the digital divide.
Finally, access to legal advice and counselling can be decisive in helping returnees navigate rights, documentation, and entitlements. After the Dayton Peace Agreement, UNHCR and OSCE supported the establishment of local legal aid centres across Bosnia and Herzegovina. These centres provided free advice on property restitution, housing reconstruction, documentation, and welfare, acting as crucial intermediaries for returnees often unfamiliar with new legislation or facing obstruction from local authorities. Similarly, Colombia’s Personerías (local ombudsman offices) offered guidance to returnees and other conflict victims under the 2011 Victims’ Law, supporting claims for reparations, land restitution, pensions, and welfare enrolment. NGOs further complemented these efforts by running mobile legal clinics in rural areas of return. Despite these initiatives, challenges persisted in both BiH and Colombia, including long administrative delays, uneven access in rural areas, and continued bureaucratic complexity. These experiences underline the importance of ensuring not only that services are available but also that returnees can effectively understand and access them.
Improve the portability of pension contributions across borders
When it comes to returns from abroad, a key longer-term challenge regarding public services relates to the portability of pensions. This refers to the ability of individuals to retain and access the entitlements they have built up through employment-based contributions while living and working abroad. Allowing these rights to be recognised across borders helps to safeguard entitlements, reduces uncertainty, and fosters confidence in both mobility and return.
For Ukrainian displaced persons abroad, this question is particularly significant. Many have entered employment during displacement and contributed to host-country pension systems. The prospect of losing access to these contributions upon return could create perceptions of disadvantage for individuals and their families and weaken incentives to return. Experience from the Western Balkans and elsewhere also shows that some people return after extended periods abroad, often at retirement or other key life‑course stages. These are precisely the stages when social protection needs are the greatest, making the recognition and transfer of contributions accrued abroad at fair conditions decisive for secure returns later in life.
This challenge is amplified by pre‑existing pressures on Ukraine’s social protection system. Even before 2022, international assessments highlighted structural weaknesses, including gaps in coverage for vulnerable groups, limitations in service quality and gender responsiveness, and persistent financing constraints (United Nations Ukraine, 2021[108]). Addressing pension portability is therefore not only about supporting voluntary and dignified return in the short term, but also about equipping Ukraine’s social protection system to manage long-term demographic and fiscal pressures in a sustainable and equitable way.
Countries employ a variety of mechanisms to make social benefits and pensions portable for migrants, with practices differing considerably across regions. One of the most established approaches is the use of bilateral or multilateral agreements that align benefit entitlements between participating states. Such agreements typically allow pension contributions made in one country to be recognised in another, thereby enabling workers to build up rights across borders and avoiding the risk of losing entitlements when relocating. Within this field, the European Union represents the most advanced model, offering a co‑ordinated framework that links national social security systems and facilitates the accumulation and transfer of rights across its member states. Beyond the EU, countries including Canada and the United States have developed multiple bilateral arrangements that cover pensions and, in certain cases, extend also to healthcare and unemployment insurance (Holzmann, 2021[109]).
Another model relies on private or mixed schemes, which tend to emerge in contexts where national social protection systems are less comprehensive or fragmented (Holzmann, 2021[109]). In such situations, migrants may turn to private pension and insurance providers offering cross-border portability, or to hybrid instruments developed with the involvement of international organisations. While these initiatives provide some continuity of protection, their reach is limited, as they are often accessible only to better-off migrants and cover a narrower range of benefits.
A further option involves the adoption of national legislation with extraterritorial provisions, through which states unilaterally allow their nationals abroad to continue contributing to and benefiting from the domestic social protection system (Holzmann, 2021[109]). Although still relatively uncommon, such measures are becoming more popular among migrant-sending countries, particularly where migrants are expected to return or retire in their country of origin. Under these arrangements, workers can remain affiliated with home‑country pension funds even while employed abroad. In some cases, governments extend voluntary pension schemes to diaspora communities, offering flexible contribution options that maintain links with the national system. While this approach cannot fully resolve challenges of co‑ordination with host-country schemes, it provides a baseline of protection and continuity for mobile populations.
In Ukraine’s case, where millions of displaced persons are currently abroad, exploring such measures could bring significant benefits. Allowing or encouraging displaced persons to maintain or expand contributions to Ukrainian pension and social insurance funds while abroad would not only enhance their long-term security but also strengthen financial and social connections with Ukraine. Importantly, such schemes could operate in parallel with bilateral agreements, complementing rather than replacing them, and position Ukraine as a proactive partner in managing returns longer term. By offering a degree of predictability to those who remain uncertain about the timing of their return but wish to secure future entitlements, unilateral mechanisms could provide both a safety net for individuals and a constructive channel of engagement for the state.
The Philippines offers an example of how origin countries can secure social protection for citizens working abroad and ensure continuity upon return (PSI, 2025[110]). The Social Security System (SSS), which manages the private‑sector pension fund, has adopted a twofold approach. First, it has concluded social security agreements with destination countries to ensure the mutual recognition of rights. Second, it has developed dedicated programmes for overseas Filipinos, enabling them to retain entitlement to the Social Security System benefits and loan facilities while abroad. Two main schemes are in place. The Regular Coverage Programme provides both long-term and short-term benefits, including sickness, maternity, disability, retirement, and death or funeral support, subject to qualifying conditions. It also grants access to salary, housing, and educational loans, with loan amounts linked to contributions and service duration. The Flexi-fund Programme offers an additional savings mechanism, allowing overseas workers to set aside a portion of their income abroad and benefit from tax-exempt returns, supplementing their regular entitlements. Health coverage is complemented by the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth), which maintains offices in 13 countries to facilitate access and assistance.
In addition to the Social Security System, the Philippines has established the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA), an agency attached to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) that is mandated to protect and promote the welfare of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) and their dependents (PSI, 2025[110]). OWWA functions as a membership-based institution, financed through a USD 25 contribution from each member, which is pooled into a trust fund to sustain its operations and services. Membership provides access to a wide range of benefits, including health-related assistance such as disability and burial support, as well as education and training opportunities, including scholarships for dependents and skills upgrading. Members are also entitled to welfare assistance, such as psychosocial and legal support for distressed OFWs, and repatriation in cases of political unrest or natural disasters. Beyond immediate protection, OWWA also invests in livelihood development and reintegration programmes, helping returning migrants and their families to re‑establish sustainable livelihoods.
Sri Lanka has taken a different approach by introducing a contributory pension scheme for its estimated 2 million migrant workers abroad (ILO, 2018[111]). Participants can contribute either through regular monthly instalments or through lump-sum payments, making the system more flexible. A notable feature of the scheme is the government’s commitment to subsidising 60% of the cost, which makes it significantly more accessible than many other unilateral arrangements that place the full burden on workers (Olivier, 2017[112]). The scheme provides a guaranteed old-age pension from the age of 60 and includes survivors’ benefits, thereby ensuring a degree of long-term social protection for both migrants and their families.
Monitoring, evaluating, and adapting to changing needs
Build integrated and trusted monitoring. Link administrative records across ministries and municipalities, establish nation-wide surveys, possibly with digital collection methods, produce timely and disaggregated indicators on the number of IDPs and returnees, their needs and progress towards reintegration; as well as on safety, housing, employment, public services and social cohesion, and communicate findings clearly to meet live information expectations and counter misinformation.
Institutionalise adaptive and participatory evaluation. Apply a national framework with clear criteria of effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, sustainability, coherence and impact, combine quantitative and qualitative evidence, involve returnees and communities, track outcomes over time including secondary migration, and translate findings into programme adjustments and budget shifts.
Resource and govern for the long term. Allocate stable financing for data, analysis and public communication, define mandates and data sharing protocols across levels of government, ensure national ownership with targeted technical support from partners, and draw on methods from AVRR evaluations while recognising the different context of returns by displaced citizens.
Return and reintegration are not one‑off events but dynamic processes that unfold over time. The needs of returnees, as well as those of the communities to which they return, are likely to evolve as circumstances change. Initial priorities may centre on housing, safety and access to basic services, while over the longer term challenges linked to livelihoods, social cohesion, and psychological well-being often become more prominent. These shifts require monitoring systems that can capture not only immediate conditions but also emerging vulnerabilities and opportunities over time. Resource availability is also likely to change. Support that is readily mobilised in the immediate aftermath of displacement or return may not be sustained in the longer term, requiring authorities to adjust expectations, identify new sources of funding, and prioritise interventions strategically. At the same time, reintegration outcomes may diverge across regions and population groups, underscoring the need for monitoring systems that are disaggregated, inclusive and sensitive to diverse experiences.
It is important to distinguish between two complementary dimensions of monitoring. The first concerns tracking numbers, locations, characteristics, needs and outcomes of returnees, which provides a basis for anticipating pressures on services and targeting support geographically. The second relates to monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of policies and measures, ensuring that resources invested translate into positive outcomes for both returnees and host communities. Both dimensions are necessary, and without the second there is a risk of generating data without learning from it.
As part of the current displacement crisis, significant monitoring is already being undertaken by international organisations, civil society actors and various ad hoc initiatives, often with support from private partners. However, systematic monitoring by the state itself remains limited. Building national capacity in this area will be critical to ensure ownership, coherence and sustainability. International practice highlights that effective approaches combine robust institutional systems for data collection and co‑ordination with adaptive mechanisms that allow policies to be refined as evidence emerges. Transparent data-sharing arrangements across government institutions, complemented by inputs from civil society, international partners and returnees themselves, can provide the foundation for responsive and accountable policies. Equally, participatory evaluation methods and innovative digital tools can ensure that feedback loops are maintained and that policy adjustments remain grounded in the lived realities of displaced populations. For Ukraine, developing such monitoring and evaluation mechanisms will be essential to sustain reintegration efforts, allocate resources effectively, and maintain public trust over what is certain to be a long and evolving process.
Build integrated data collection and monitoring systems
Effective return and reintegration policies require reliable data. Without systematic monitoring, authorities risk overlooking both immediate needs and longer-term vulnerabilities of returnees and host communities. International statistical standards provide a useful guidance as to what to measure when it comes to return and reintegration, as well as how to measure.
For returnees from external displacement, the key international statistical standard is the International Recommendations on Refugee Statistics (IRRS) (EGRISS, 2018[113]), compiled by the Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics and adopted by the United Nations Statistical Commission (Decision 49/115) in 2018. They provide the internationally agreed statistical frameworks standardising terminology and classifications for refugees and for persons returned from abroad after having sought or received international protection, including refugees and beneficiaries of temporary protection. The Recommendations contain guidance on the inclusion of these populations in national systems, as well as priority indicators to assess and monitor their situation. According to the IRRS, for returnees, the basic statistics to collect would include the total stock of persons who returned from abroad after seeking international protection, and the flow of citizens who have returned after seeking international protection over a pre‑defined reference period of time, disaggregated by a number of demographic characteristics.
For IDPs, the key international statistical standard is the International Recommendations on IDP Statistics (IRIS) (EGRISS, 2020[114]), compiled by the Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics, and adopted by the United Nations Statistical Commission (Decision 51/116) in 2020. They provide the internationally agreed statistical frameworks standardising terminology and classifications for IDPs. According to IRIS, countries may collect data on three categories of IDPs: those in locations of displacement, in locations of return, and in other settlement locations. In addition, it is critically important to statistically identify persons who have overcome key displacement-related vulnerabilities (have been locally integrated, returned and reintegrated, or settled elsewhere), and may no longer require support. Finally, for policymakers, it is also important to monitor progress towards progress towards a “durable solution” – a situation in which “IDPs no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement”, as per the Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons. IRIS contains a statistical framework for measuring such progress.
Both documents provide an assessment of data sources and data collection methods for these purposes, including administrative data, population and household censuses data, sample surveys, and other data sources; outlining advantages and disadvantages of each source. They also contain recommendations to improve co‑ordination at national, regional and international levels as well as data quality, statistical legal frameworks and capacity development.
The experiences of host countries during the Ukrainian displacement crisis, however, also offer valuable practical insights for the design and operationalisation of administrative data to monitor displacement. Faced with an unprecedented inflow of displaced persons from Ukraine in 2022, several governments developed interactive dashboards to ensure transparent and timely access to information. These tools were not only instrumental in managing immediate pressures but also served to build public trust by making data widely available and accessible. The lessons from these experiences highlight the importance of cross-agency co‑operation, integration of diverse data sources, and regular public updates, all of which could be adapted to monitor return and reintegration in Ukraine.
Spain provides a strong example of such an approach. The Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security and Migration has maintained a dashboard that systematically presents information on the number of Ukrainians with valid residence documentation affiliated with the national social security system (Ministerio de Inclusión, Seguridad Social y Migraciones, 2025[115]; Permanent Observatory on Immigration, 2025[116]). Updated monthly and freely accessible online, the dashboard is a product of inter-institutional collaboration that brings together data from the General Directorate of Police, the General Treasury of Social Security and other agencies. This integration allows not only for the tracking of residence permits and social security contributions, but also for a much broader set of indicators that reflect vulnerabilities and integration challenges. Variables such as type of permit, reason for granting, economic activity, and demographic factors including gender and age provide a granular picture of the status of Ukrainians in Spain. The result is a comprehensive monitoring tool that captures both legal-administrative data and socio‑economic realities, offering a transparent basis for policymaking and public communication.
Ireland has similarly provided timely and accessible data. The Central Statistics Office compiles information from at least five public sector bodies and updates its dashboards roughly once a month. Data on arrivals are presented through heat maps disaggregated by county, making patterns of settlement and regional impact immediately visible to a wide audience. The dashboards also include information on school enrolment of Ukrainian children, allocation of social housing units, and marital status, offering a multidimensional perspective on the integration of displaced persons. At the same time, the Irish example underlines the methodological challenges of monitoring highly mobile populations. Many figures remain estimates, as not all Ukrainians who received a Personal Public Service Number (PPSN) continued to reside in Ireland, and some arrivals may never have been captured by the registration system in the first place (Central Statistics Office, 2024[117]). While these limitations complicate precise measurement, the dashboards nonetheless demonstrate the value of inter-agency co‑operation and regular dissemination of available data as a means of ensuring transparency, managing expectations, and informing different stakeholders.
To strengthen the reliability of its estimates, the Irish Statistical Office has also experimented with monitoring so-called “signs of life” in administrative data. Rather than relying solely on registration numbers, the authorities tracked indicators of continued residence and activity, such as attendance at events organised by Intreo Public Employment Services, receipt of welfare payments, enrolment in further education and training courses offered by the state agency SOLAS (Further Education and Training Authority), evidence of employment income, or changes of address reported to the Department of Social Protection (Central Statistics Office, 2024[117]). These indicators enabled a more accurate assessment of whether Ukrainians registered under the Temporary Protection Directive remained in Ireland or had subsequently left. Despite this, significant limitations persist. The system cannot easily capture patterns of circular migration, nor can it provide clarity on the destinations of those who have departed. Nonetheless, the experiment demonstrates the value of inter-agency data exchange and the potential of administrative records, when combined with occasional surveys, to generate more detailed insights into the social and economic integration of displaced populations (Central Statistics Office, 2025[118]).
In Europe, such monitoring was possible largely because Ukrainians were visible in administrative data through registration under the Temporary Protection Directive. In Ukraine, IDPs are registered, but there is no equivalent system for returnees. Authorities will therefore need to consider whether returnees should be made visible in national data in order to track their numbers and reintegration processes, or whether programme evaluations alone can provide sufficient insights into uptake and needs.
The broader lesson from these examples is that robust inter-agency collaboration is essential to generate the kind of comprehensive picture needed for effective policymaking. No single institution is able to collect and analyse all the necessary information on its own. Monitoring typically relies on the linking of diverse data sources and on co‑operation across agencies at national and local levels (see also Box 5.9). By combining administrative data, survey evidence and real-time monitoring tools, governments can move beyond partial or fragmented insights to produce a more accurate and actionable understanding of reintegration dynamics.
Since the aftermath of the Balkan Wars, the Organization for Security and Co‑operation in Europe (OSCE) Mission in Kosovo has taken a leading role in monitoring and assessing the situation of returnees, with a mandate focussed on promoting and protecting human rights and ensuring compliance with international standards. Monitoring has been co‑ordinated with the Ministry of Communities and Returns and supported technically by international partners, notably UNHCR. A multi-level structure was established that includes municipal offices for communities and return (MOCRs), municipal task forces for returns, and Municipal Working Groups on Return (MWGRs) (OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 2014[119]). This structure has been underpinned by robust legislation, notably Regulation 02/2010, which set out clear mandates for assessing the needs of returnees, providing relevant information, and reporting regularly to municipal and central bodies on reintegration challenges (OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 2016[120]). Over time, legal frameworks, action plans and strategies have been repeatedly revised to expand support and align with guidance from organisations such as the CEB, OSCE and UNHCR.
One outcome of these efforts was the Strategy for Reintegration of Repatriated Persons in Kosovo (2013), which incorporated OSCE recommendations to strengthen data collection, improve co‑ordination between municipalities and central government, and enhance analysis of reintegration outcomes. A case management system was created to facilitate information exchange across levels of government. For example, the Department for Reintegration of Repatriated Persons (DRRP) in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the MOCRs began sharing information on assisted voluntary returnees and those requesting support, enabling more consistent monitoring (OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 2016[120]). Regular interviews and meetings between OSCE, the DRRP and MOCRs further ensured follow-up on data reporting obligations and analysis.
Despite these advances, gaps remain. Under-reporting is a persistent challenge, with only around 62% of repatriated persons registered in the case management system, and capacity constraints limit the analytical use of data. The OSCE has identified the need for continued investment in training and capacity-building so that collected information is not only used for statistics but also for evaluating integration outcomes and adapting support.
In parallel, the OSCE has monitored security incidents affecting minority communities, including robberies, attacks, property destruction and desecration of graves. Because police data does not distinguish whether victims are returnees, the OSCE relies on MOCR records to add this dimension. These efforts have enabled targeted advocacy, such as increasing police presence in areas of heightened tension.
The Kosovo experience demonstrates the importance of clear legal mandates, inter-institutional co‑operation, and transparent data management in monitoring return and reintegration. Sustained government commitment to maintaining and updating databases remains critical. Making such data available not only to institutions but also to the wider public can strengthen transparency, accountability, and trust – while also informing those abroad about safety conditions and livelihood opportunities in areas of return.
Neither the monitoring of returnee stocks and locations nor the evaluation of programme effectiveness can rely solely on administrative or governmental sources. Complementary data collection, for example through surveys or other innovative methods, is often necessary.
Innovative tools can support survey data collection. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), for instance, has made extensive use of KoboToolbox, a computer-assisted personal interviewing platform created in 2013 with support from the United Nations Office for the Co‑ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and in partnership with UNHCR. KoboToolbox has been deployed in over 220 countries and territories by more than 32 000 NGOs, IGOs, government institutions and development banks to collect survey data. It enables field workers to record the number of people reached by programmes, conduct site assessments, and capture information on needs and intentions. More than half of national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies now use KoboToolbox, supported by dedicated servers for secure data storage (DeLange, 2022[121]). The tool has been applied in a range of humanitarian contexts, including the displacement crises in Ukraine, and for real-time monitoring of social inclusion and service delivery projects (KoboToolbox, 2025[122]).
MARTA (Monitoring Automated for Real Time Analysis) is another example of an innovative, low-cost and community-driven data collection system that was designed to monitor socio‑economic conditions and project outcomes in difficult environments. Initially piloted during the 2018‑2020 Ebola crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), MARTA utilises mobile tools such as KoboToolbox and relies on training local students to conduct high-frequency surveys using smartphones. These surveys capture data on beneficiary well-being, project progress and community perceptions, with the option of including Global Positioning System co‑ordinates and photos. Information is uploaded to a secure server, enabling real-time, geolocated analysis.
During its pilot phase, MARTA collected more than 100 000 surveys and 2 million data points, demonstrating its capacity to track key indicators, identify risks at an early stage and inform timely responses (Bermeo, Bance and Kiemtoré, 2021[123]). Its flexibility makes it particularly relevant for return and reintegration contexts, where rapid beneficiary registration, dynamic needs assessments and continuous monitoring of outcomes such as employment, mobility and social cohesion are critical. Reflecting this potential, the MARTA system was scaled up to monitor the entire World Bank social protection portfolio in the DRC, covering interventions from community infrastructure to public works.
Valuable lessons here can also be drawn from efforts to assess migrant integration outcomes, particularly for underrepresented groups. In addition to quantitative statistical data, qualitative and participatory approaches can be useful to ensure that the voices of those most affected are fully reflected. A recent initiative addressing the integration of migrant and refugee children across Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy and Spain illustrates this well (Serrano, Fernández and Marcos, 2024[124]). Recognising the lack of indicators to capture children’s specific integration experiences, researchers adopted a participatory action research approach that placed children at the centre of the process. A Children’s Advisory Group was involved throughout, guiding the design, selection and validation of indicators. More than 300 children, starting from the age of six, took part in mapping exercises, workshops and refinement of indicators, alongside parents, educators and policymakers. The process was deliberately iterative and inclusive, combining bottom-up engagement with expert review and multi-level validation. The outcome was a set of up to 30 indicators, capturing both children’s integration outcomes and the barriers or enablers shaping them. This experience shows how participatory approaches can generate context-sensitive indicators, uphold ethical standards and ensure that measurement tools reflect the lived realities and priorities of the groups they seek to serve.
The credibility of monitoring systems is as important as their technical capacity. In the digital age, individual experiences and impressions spread rapidly through online networks, shaping narratives about return and reintegration. Negative accounts, or reports of tension between returnees and host communities, can easily overshadow positive developments and deter others from returning. At the same time, overly selective promotion of success stories without acknowledgement of ongoing challenges can undermine public trust. To be effective, monitoring frameworks must therefore provide balanced, transparent and reliable information, offering an honest reflection of both progress achieved and the difficulties encountered.
Establishing such systems can help manage expectations among displaced populations by ensuring that decisions about return are informed by accurate information rather than rumours or fragmented impressions. It can also reinforce confidence in national and local institutions by showing a readiness to engage openly with the complexities of reintegration and to adapt policies as evidence emerges. By capturing diverse experiences across regions and groups, monitoring systems can counter misinformation, promote understanding between returnees and host communities, and support the view that reintegration is a shared national priority rather than a challenge borne only by individuals.
Evaluate return and reintegration support regularly and adapt as needed
Return and reintegration are long-term processes that cannot be fully understood through one‑off measurements. Monitoring systems play an important role in tracking numbers, locations and immediate conditions, but they do not in themselves reveal whether support measures are effective. To generate real insight, monitoring must be coupled with structured programme evaluations that assess whether interventions are achieving their intended results and remain relevant as circumstances evolve.
Evaluations should not be understood narrowly as technical audits, but as comprehensive exercises that combine quantitative and qualitative evidence to assess effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. Importantly, they should capture the perspectives of returnees and host communities alongside those of implementing authorities. By doing so, evaluations can provide a more accurate understanding of reintegration dynamics, highlight where interventions succeed or fall short, and suggest how programmes should adapt over time.
Regular and well-designed evaluations also help ensure accountability, both to displaced populations and to the wider public. They demonstrate that reintegration efforts are not static, but responsive to changing needs and grounded in evidence. In Ukraine’s case, embedding such mechanisms from the outset would provide a means to track progress, identify emerging vulnerabilities, and build confidence in the state’s capacity to manage reintegration effectively. For return and reintegration, evaluations can be broadly understood as structured, evidence‑based analyses that combine quantitative and qualitative information to answer questions on effectiveness, efficiency, appropriateness and implementation (EMN, 2016[125]; EUAA, 2024[126]).
To serve as a reliable basis for adaptation, they should apply clear and consistent criteria and measure outcomes against well-defined goals. Establishing clear and consistent benchmarks is not only a technical exercise but a way of shaping what is seen as evidence of success or failure and whether overall policy is moving in the right direction. Applying such criteria systematically at national and local levels also enables comparisons between regions and programmes, allowing evaluators to identify recurring challenges, highlight good practice and build a cumulative evidence base.
When considering how benchmarks could be established, and how municipalities could be encouraged to track them consistently, useful inspiration can be drawn from related fields such as migrant integration and disaster recovery. Frameworks developed for assessing integration outcomes, for instance, demonstrate the value of structured and comparable benchmarks. The United Kingdom’s Home Office Indicators of Integration Framework (2019) provides a strong example. It sets out 14 domains of integration, including employment, housing, education, health, language, safety, social connections, and rights and responsibilities. Each domain is accompanied by suggested outcome indicators, data sources and methods of measurement. This approach enables policymakers and practitioners to link interventions to measurable outcomes and to assess progress across both individual and community levels. Crucially, the framework was designed to be flexible: it can be applied consistently at national and local levels, while still allowing authorities and civil society organisations to adapt indicators to their specific contexts. By establishing a clear structure and encouraging the systematic use of both administrative and survey data, the framework offers a tool for tracking integration in a way that is comparable across regions and over time, while also remaining responsive to evolving needs.
Another relevant field is disaster recovery, which faces similar challenges of evolving needs over extended periods. Australia has developed a comprehensive monitoring and evaluation framework specifically tailored for disaster recovery programmes. The framework defines expected outcomes, standardises key evaluation questions such as effectiveness, efficiency and governance, and places strong emphasis on community involvement in both the design and dissemination of findings. This ensures that evaluations capture not only technical dimensions but also local perspectives, while enabling lessons from one recovery effort to inform future responses and maintaining accountability over time.
To support local actors in developing their own recovery programmes and monitoring systems, the federal government has established the National Disaster Recovery Monitoring and Evaluation Database (Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, 2025[127]). This platform consolidates evaluations from nine different types of disaster events across five jurisdictions, highlighting lessons learned and identifying programme outcomes, activities and associated indicators. By offering practitioners access to past and current evaluations, the database promotes consistency and quality in recovery efforts nationwide.
A second key consideration for designing evaluations of return and reintegration policies and measures is the importance of adopting a longitudinal perspective. Reintegration is not a short-term outcome that can be captured only in the first months after return, but a gradual and often uneven process that unfolds over years. Evidence from longer-term studies shows that while initial support may stabilise returnees, new vulnerabilities often surface later, such as difficulties in sustaining employment, challenges in securing adequate housing, or exclusion from social and community networks. Evaluations conducted too early risk presenting an overly optimistic view of outcomes, as they capture temporary stabilisation rather than durable reintegration. Longitudinal approaches, although resource‑intensive, provide essential insights into how reintegration trajectories evolve, which forms of support prove most sustainable, and when additional interventions may be required to prevent renewed marginalisation.
Evaluations should also employ participatory approaches that give greater weight to the perspectives of returnees and local communities. Evidence shows that the perceived usefulness of reintegration measures often differs markedly between beneficiaries and programme administrators. For example, in an assessment of Belgian-supported returns to Armenia and Georgia, returnees highlighted the flexibility and relevance of financial assistance in starting small businesses, while caseworkers placed stronger emphasis on procedural oversight and accountability (Lietaert, 2019[128]). Such differences underscore the risk that programmes lose credibility if designed and assessed without meaningful engagement of those directly affected. Participatory methods, including structured interviews, community consultations and participatory action research, not only reveal context-specific challenges and solutions often overlooked in top-down reviews but also strengthen ownership and trust. By embedding these perspectives, reintegration support becomes more responsive, legitimate and better aligned with the realities of returnees and their communities.
Successful evaluations also employ mixed methods that combine quantitative and qualitative evidence. Evaluations that have integrated qualitative research, through interviews, focus groups or ethnographic methods, have revealed critical factors such as social acceptance, psychological resilience, and the role of family and community networks. These elements often prove decisive in determining whether reintegration is sustainable. For Ukraine, adopting a mixed-methods approach would help ensure that monitoring frameworks do not reduce reintegration to economic metrics but instead capture the broader social and human dimensions of the process.
At the same time, experience from past evaluations of return and reintegration measures, even if they focus primarily on AVRR programmes, brings to light enduring challenges (EMN, 2016[125]). Moreover, many evaluations have been shaped by external donor priorities, limiting the role of national authorities and local communities in setting objectives or applying lessons learned. This can weaken local ownership and reduce the likelihood that findings translate into long-term policy adjustments. It is also important to recognise that in many past cases return programmes were influenced by the priorities of host countries seeking to repatriate foreign nationals without a legal basis to stay. These political and institutional dynamics differ fundamentally from the situation of displaced Ukrainians, whose potential returns are grounded in their right to return and in the broader framework of national recovery.
Sustainable monitoring and evaluation require not only sound methodologies but also dedicated financing and clear institutional responsibility. Without earmarked budgets, trained personnel, and well-defined mandates, evaluations risk remaining ad hoc exercises that do not inform long-term policymaking. For Ukraine, it will be important to reserve a share of reintegration funding specifically for evaluation and to strengthen analytical capacities at both local and national levels. International partners can play a valuable role in providing technical support and bridging initial capacity gaps, but ultimate ownership of monitoring and evaluation processes must lie with Ukrainian institutions. National leadership will ensure continuity, foster public trust, and allow reintegration policies to evolve on the basis of credible and nationally anchored evidence.
Taken together, the lessons from international practice highlight that monitoring and evaluation are not peripheral tasks but essential components of effective return and reintegration strategies. They provide the mechanisms through which policies can remain adaptive, inclusive and accountable over what will inevitably be a protracted and uneven process. For Ukraine, embedding robust systems of data collection, participatory evaluation and longitudinal analysis within clear institutional frameworks will be crucial to sustaining progress. Evaluations should not only measure outcomes but also support continuous learning, allowing reintegration policies to respond to shifting needs, resource constraints and diverse regional realities. By investing early in credible, transparent and nationally led evaluation systems, Ukraine can build the evidence base necessary to guide reintegration at scale, maintain the confidence of both returnees and host communities, and ensure that the right to return is realised in ways that contribute to national recovery and cohesion.
As discussed in earlier chapters, Ukraine’s global presence long predates the events of 2022. The Ukrainian diaspora has evolved over many decades, encompassing historic communities dating back to the nineteenth century, more recent emigrants who left following independence and acquired citizenship elsewhere, and substantial numbers of labour migrants who were already abroad in 2022. Since the full-scale invasion, millions of externally displaced persons have joined these existing groups, further expanding and diversifying Ukraine’s communities abroad. While the term diaspora is at times used to refer mainly to long-standing Ukrainian organisations and historic communities, the forward-looking policy agenda must consider all groups that now constitute the Ukrainian global community. The international practices presented in this section are therefore reviewed with this broader and more inclusive understanding in mind.
Engaging this diverse global community is increasingly important for Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction. Many Ukrainians abroad, irrespective of when or why they left, have retained strong personal, professional or cultural ties to the country. Their potential contributions span economic, social and civic spheres, and can be mobilised both from a distance and through more direct involvement. An effective policy approach therefore requires recognising the different profiles, expectations and capacities within these communities and tailoring engagement instruments accordingly.
There are, however, important distinctions to consider. Unlike displaced persons, for whom the state has a responsibility to ensure conditions for safe and dignified return, those in the diaspora or those who left for economic reasons are not entitled to the same forms of state‑supported return. Their involvement is more likely to depend on the creation of favourable conditions that encourage voluntary engagement, whether through investment, knowledge transfer or, in some cases, return. These efforts are typically situated within broader migrant attraction and diaspora engagement strategies.
At the same time, return should not necessarily be viewed as the primary objective for these groups. In many cases, the efforts required to facilitate return may be substantial and not justified under current conditions. International experience also shows that return intentions are highly personal and not easily predicted by a person’s migration profile. Individuals with ancestral ties may choose to return even if they have never lived in the country, while recent emigrants may not consider return feasible due to family, economic or personal circumstances. Nonetheless, Ukrainians abroad can bring significant benefits regardless of their place of residence. The focus should be on fostering sustained engagement that enables meaningful contributions to recovery and reconstruction, whether from a distance or through direct involvement.
This section presents relevant policy options and international experiences for Ukraine, with a focus on two core areas: leveraging economic contributions from abroad, and strengthening cultural, educational and civic ties within an inclusive and forward-looking diaspora engagement framework.
Leveraging diaspora contributions for economic recovery and reconstruction
Create visible and accessible pathways for contribution from abroad. Recognise that many Ukrainians overseas may not return soon, yet are willing to support recovery. Provide concrete and accountable channels to contribute skills, knowledge or volunteer time remotely, and ensure these are widely communicated.
Enable transparent and trusted financial engagement. Put in place the legal, regulatory and digital infrastructure needed to facilitate diaspora capital flows, including secure online platforms, matching grant schemes, tailored investment products and diaspora bonds, with clear safeguards against misuse.
Foster an enabling environment for diaspora entrepreneurship. Develop coherent policies and co‑ordinated support frameworks that attract and facilitate diaspora-led or diaspora-supported ventures, ensuring they can mobilise investment, knowledge, networks and credibility to strengthen domestic industries and connect them to global markets.
Leverage diaspora expertise in critical sectors. Engage professionals abroad in targeted initiatives to support priority areas such as health, education, digitalisation and green reconstruction.
Economic engagement from diaspora communities can play a transformative role in supporting post-conflict recovery and long-term development. International experience shows that diaspora contributions extend far beyond household transfers to encompass investment, entrepreneurship, knowledge exchange and market access. These flows of capital and expertise can bolster resilience, stimulate innovation and connect national economies to global networks. For Ukraine, they could also provide vital support in addressing the extraordinary financial, technical and human capital needs of reconstruction.
Realising their full potential requires more than goodwill: it depends on transparent and predictable legal frameworks, trusted financial and digital infrastructure, and targeted mechanisms that make participation from abroad straightforward and secure. When such foundations are in place, diaspora engagement can become a stable and sustainable driver of economic growth, whether through direct involvement at home or sustained contributions from a distance.
Strengthen channels for diaspora investments
Mobilising diaspora investment will be especially important for Ukraine’s recovery. Rebuilding housing, infrastructure and utilities, while also revitalising small and medium-sized enterprises, will demand levels of capital that cannot be met by public budgets and international assistance alone. Diaspora investors can help bridge this gap, while also bringing innovation, skills and market connections that stimulate long-term growth. To make this possible, governments need to create predictable and transparent regulatory frameworks, ensure the security of financial flows, and establish trusted and accessible platforms tailored to diaspora communities. Equally important are incentives that encourage sustained engagement, whether through financial products designed for the diaspora, opportunities to co‑invest with local partners, or programmes that prioritise investment in key sectors such as housing, energy, agriculture and technology. When combined with inclusive governance and clear alignment with national recovery strategies, such measures can channel diaspora resources into high-impact initiatives that reinforce both reconstruction and economic resilience.
Several countries have already shown how enabling conditions can be built, with policies that integrate diaspora investment into wider development strategies. Mexico’s long-standing “3×1” scheme offers an example of how governments can directly match and multiply diaspora contributions. Under this programme, every dollar invested by hometown associations abroad is matched by contributions from federal, state and local authorities, tripling the original sum. The pooled resources are then channelled into social infrastructure or productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. The initiative has not only mobilised substantial collective investments in areas with high poverty or marginalisation, but has also strengthened co‑operation between diaspora groups and public institutions, creating enduring partnerships for local development.
Beyond collective contributions to community projects, some countries have sought to create avenues for more substantial investments by enabling diaspora members to pool resources and access national financial systems. In Rwanda, the Rwanda Diaspora Mortgage Group (RDMG) pools resources from diaspora members in Europe to collectively access mortgage facilities from national banks. This approach has lowered barriers to investment in sectors such as real estate, agriculture, tourism, education, IT and transport (Kabeera, 2011[129]). By providing a structured mechanism for diaspora financing, the RDMG addresses several obstacles that typically hinder diaspora investment, including limited access to credit, lack of co‑ordination, and high entry costs. However, investors still face challenges such as bureaucratic hurdles, poor customer service, corruption, and limited access to reliable information about opportunities (Rubyutsa, 2012[130]). Nonetheless, the growing range of mortgage products offered by national Rwandan banks (including the Bank of Kigali) for diaspora investors, alongside improvements in banking services for remittances management and personal transactions, provides significant opportunities for the Rwandan diaspora to engage in productive investment in their home country (BK, 2025[131]).
Tunisia’s recent policies also demonstrate a move towards more systematic and inclusive approaches to attracting diaspora capital. Measures to improve financial inclusion are enabling members of the diaspora to invest in priority sectors, positioning them as important contributors to economic growth and technological advancement. These actions form part of a broader commitment to people‑centred migration governance that values the role of diasporas in meeting long-term development objectives. Tunisia is also upgrading its financial systems to allow diaspora investors to operate either as resident or non-resident investors, supported by digital investment profiles and reforms set out in its 2026‑2030 development plan. Different initiatives led by the Office of Tunisians Abroad (OTE) are helping to simplify cross-border investment procedures, reflecting a broader trend towards the digitalisation and institutionalisation of diaspora engagement.
Enterprises, SMEs and infrastructure in the country of origin can also be supported by the diaspora or by those unable to return from abroad, provided that appropriate incentives, grants, tax benefits, or investment platforms are in place to encourage their business activities. The “Diaspora Investment Window” programme in Kosovo is an example of an initiative that promotes diaspora-led investments and entrepreneurship, offering a structured pathway for Kosovars living abroad to contribute meaningfully to their country’s economic development. Launched in 2024 by the Kosovo Credit Guarantee Fund, the programme enables members of the diaspora to invest in newly established micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in Kosovo (Kosovo Credit Guarantee Fund, 2025[132]). Eligible businesses must be at least 30% owned by diaspora members, who may invest alone, with local partners, or with foreign co‑investors. Loans can range from EUR 3 000 to EUR 3 million and have flexible terms, with eligible investment sectors including real estate, agriculture, manufacturing and education. The programme thus encourages both diaspora-led business activity and foreign direct investment in key sectors that foster nationwide economic development. Further financial incentives are provided through loan guarantees of up to 80%, making it easier to access credit from registered financial institutions such as Raiffeisen Bank.
To support housing development in Nigeria and enable property ownership among its diaspora, the Committee of Nigerians in Diaspora has partnered with the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN) and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to facilitate diaspora contributions to the National Housing Fund (NHF). Through this initiative, eligible members of the diaspora can access loans of up to 50 million Naira (approximately USD 80 000‑100 000) to purchase homes in Nigeria (Owotemu, Ifechi-Fred and Faleti, 2024[133]). A similar approach has been adopted in Colombia, where the programme Colombia Nos Une, run by the Directorate for Immigration, Consular Affairs and Citizen Services of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, offers a housing scheme for emigrants seeking to buy property in the country but requiring financial assistance. Implemented in partnership with the National Bank of Colombia and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the Mi Casa con Remesas initiative enables participants to leverage remittance flows to secure housing finance.
Innovative financial instruments such as diaspora bonds have also enabled members of the diaspora to contribute economically to the development of their country of origin without perceiving the investment as excessively risky or requiring continuous, hands-on involvement to generate satisfactory returns (see Annex 5.E). In India and Nigeria, diaspora bonds have proven to be trusted instruments, typically issued for a designated and limited period to mobilise funding for specific infrastructure development projects. By contrast, Israel’s long-standing bonds programme has been designed to operate on a continuous basis, regardless of the country’s economic cycle, thereby providing a stable source of funding while fostering social cohesion between citizens abroad and those at home. For many in the diaspora, purchasing such bonds is both an economic act and an expression of solidarity with their country of origin.
Beyond government-led initiatives, partnerships with development agencies, civil society and the private sector can expand investment opportunities. In 2020, the London-based African Foundation for Development (AFFORD) launched its AFFORD Business Centre Benin project, supported by the Swiss Agency for Development and Co‑operation, to mobilise diaspora-led SMEs through outreach campaigns in Europe and match them with viable projects in their country of origin. In Tunisia, the Mobi-TRE project has targeted investment from diaspora members based in Italy, with a focus on fostering regional investment in Tunisia.
Crowdfunding platforms can also serve as effective tools for mobilising diaspora finance, particularly when they are designed around shared identities or causes. Homestrings, for example, enables diaspora investors to fund infrastructure and SME projects in their countries of origin through a regulated online platform, offering both financial returns and measurable social impact. Initially launched as an early-stage crowdfunding platform in Africa, Homestrings has since evolved into a diaspora investment advisory service. With a network of over 5 000 members, it has channelled more than USD 25 million into 35 transactions across 12 countries, often with relatively modest minimum capital requirements.
Other platforms target different communities but apply similar principles. LaunchGood, for instance, was founded by members of the global Muslim community to support initiatives that reflect shared values such as compassion, justice and generosity. While rooted in a faith-based network, it is open to all and has attracted a diverse donor base. By offering zero per cent platform fees and connecting projects to a large and engaged global audience, LaunchGood has facilitated the rapid mobilisation of resources for causes ranging from humanitarian relief to educational initiatives. During Ramadan 2024 alone, the platform raised approximately USD 69 million for projects worldwide.
These examples illustrate how platforms tailored to a specific community or identity can foster trust, visibility and scale in fundraising. A similar model could be adapted to mobilise diaspora communities around the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine, enabling small contributions from a broad base of supporters to be channelled into targeted, high-impact projects aligned with national priorities.
Across these diverse examples, several enabling conditions emerge as critical for sustaining diaspora finance and investment. These include reducing transaction costs, ensuring the security and transparency of all channels, offering trusted and accessible platforms, and aligning investment opportunities with national priorities. When such conditions are in place, diaspora capital can flow through multiple pathways such as remittances, direct investment, housing finance, or innovative instruments such as diaspora bonds, becoming a reliable driver of economic recovery and long-term development.
Encourage diaspora entrepreneurship and business co‑operation
Diaspora entrepreneurs can make important contributions to innovation, capital mobilisation and access to global markets. Their combination of knowledge of local conditions and international experience enables them to identify market opportunities, strengthen value chains and link domestic firms with partners abroad. Many operate as transnational entrepreneurs, drawing on established networks, sector-specific expertise, technical knowledge and cultural awareness to create economic linkages between host and origin countries. In high-risk investment environments, they can provide both financial resources and the credibility needed to attract additional investment. Facilitating continued transnational mobility and circular migration can maximise these benefits and may, in some cases, be more effective than focussing solely on permanent return.
Research has demonstrated how the growth of technology industries in India, Taiwan and Israel in the late 20th century was directly linked to the return of professionals from Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 2002[134]; Saxenian, 2006[135]). Returning diaspora engineers brought valuable international experience, extensive social and business networks and the ability to operate fluently in multiple economic systems, enabling them to identify market opportunities, locate foreign partners and manage cross-border business operations more effectively than domestic peers with limited international experience and connections.
Taiwan’s Hsinchu Science Park provides an example of the transformative impact of diaspora entrepreneurship. Many US-educated Taiwanese engineers returned to establish businesses in sectors such as semiconductors, making use of their professional contacts and encouraging further investment in the nascent industry. Within two decades of the Park’s creation, it hosted more than 280 companies, 40% of which had been founded by US-educated returnees (Saxenian, 2002[134]). The contributions of the Taiwanese diaspora to local development have not depended on permanent return. Many engineers routinely travelled between the United States and Taiwan, acting as intermediaries between the two markets, creating synergies and fostering trust between investor communities. Taiwanese angel investors and venture capitalists often worked for companies or start-ups in both regions, seizing opportunities in both their home and host countries.
Recognising the value of diaspora entrepreneurship, several countries have developed dedicated programmes to attract and support these actors. In Armenia, the NerUzh Diaspora Tech Startup Programme, implemented by the government in collaboration with the Foundation for Armenian Science and Technology, introduces diaspora entrepreneurs to the Armenian innovation landscape through an intensive programme in Armenia. The programme targets young entrepreneurs aged 18 to 35 of Armenian descent who are ready to move to Armenia to implement their business ideas. Grants of up to USD 30 000, mentorship and technical support are awarded to the most promising projects (The Ministry of High-Tech Industry, 2025[136]; Office of the High Commissioner for Diaspora Affairs, 2025[137]). Launched in 2018, NerUzh is currently supporting its sixth cohort, after a brief suspension during the COVID‑19 pandemic.
Efforts to support diaspora entrepreneurs have also extended beyond the technology sector. Portugal’s Programa Regressar, a comprehensive government initiative for returnees, facilitated access to a dedicated “Return Credit Line” for diaspora entrepreneurs. This instrument, with a credit limit of EUR 1 million per enterprise and EUR 500 000 per returning citizen, aimed to promote business investment and new ventures by Portuguese entrepreneurs and their descendants. The programme was paused prior to the COVID‑19 pandemic with plans for revision, although no updates have been announced. In the Indian state of Kerala, the NORKA ROOTS agency operates several schemes for returning Non-Resident Keralites, including business development support offering access to loans in sectors such as agriculture, fisheries and small-scale industries through partnerships with nearly 20 financial institutions.
While such initiatives highlight the potential of diaspora entrepreneurship, many entrepreneurs face regulatory, financial and market access barriers that can be difficult to overcome without targeted support. To address these challenges, governments and development partners have created programmes offering comprehensive assistance. MEETAfrica, a joint initiative of the French Development Agency and Expertise France under the Rabat Process, provides expert advice, mentoring and access to start-up funds for diaspora entrepreneurs from Cameroon, Morocco, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and Tunisia (MEETAfrica, 2025[138]). In the case of the Tunisian diaspora, for example, MEETAfrica has supported enterprises in sectors including science and technology, health, renewable energy and organic agriculture. It has also developed “soft landing” facilities in innovation hubs, mapped resources and created networks of support structures to strengthen entrepreneurship ecosystems. The programme places particular emphasis on engaging African university students in France and Germany and supporting them to launch businesses in their home countries (Campus France, 2017[139]).
Not all diaspora entrepreneurs establish their own ventures in their countries of origin. Many play a bridging role, investing in existing enterprises, mentoring local business leaders and opening access to international markets. The Netherlands-based ZidiCircle illustrates how such engagement can be structured. Operating across Europe and Africa, ZidiCircle works with small and medium-sized enterprise support organisations to identify promising businesses in sectors such as renewable energy, sustainable agriculture and technology, and matches them with trained diaspora angel investors and experienced entrepreneurs. This model enables diaspora professionals to contribute expertise, market knowledge and contacts to strengthen local enterprises. By facilitating targeted investment and knowledge transfer without requiring full business relocation, such initiatives broaden the scope of diaspora engagement and ensure that domestic firms benefit from the skills and networks necessary for growth.
This bridging role can be particularly valuable in contexts where local markets face structural challenges, as seen in Lebanon. Despite prolonged political and economic instability, diaspora entrepreneurs and investors have been instrumental in developing innovation ecosystems capable of sustaining high-risk, high-growth ventures (Benton, 2023[140]). These ecosystems often rely on a small number of experienced diaspora professionals who bring both strong international networks and trusted local relationships, enabling them to connect global capital with domestic opportunities. Lebanon Venture Partners, founded in 2009 by three general partners from North America and the Gulf, demonstrates how diaspora investors can introduce international business practices, foster trust among stakeholders and attract investment that might otherwise not have materialised. Their dual perspective allowed them to adapt global models to local conditions, build confidence among foreign and domestic partners, and advance the longer-term vision of a competitive knowledge economy.
Many countries also draw on diaspora business networks to drive innovation and expand opportunities for domestic firms. In Chile, the ChileGlobal Network, supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ export promotion agency ProChile, links Chilean entrepreneurs to members of the diaspora in the United States, Canada and Europe. It organises technological missions, meetings with entrepreneurs and authorities, and internships for young Chileans in diaspora-led companies abroad, fostering skills transfer and innovation. Similarly, in Scotland, the GlobalScot Network engages experienced diaspora professionals overseas to mentor local enterprises, provide market insights, facilitate introductions to potential partners and strengthen trade and investment links. New Zealand’s World Class New Zealand Network connects leading members of the Kiwi diaspora to domestic businesses and celebrates their contributions through annual awards, while Albania’s Connect Albania scheme supports entrepreneurs, business leaders and sector specialists from the Albanian diaspora in Italy with grants to attract Italian investors to Albania.
When supported by well-designed policies and co‑ordinated engagement frameworks, diaspora entrepreneurs can become key agents of economic transformation. They bring investment, knowledge, networks and credibility that can strengthen domestic industries and connect them to global markets. For countries facing the complex task of post-crisis recovery, creating an enabling environment for diaspora entrepreneurship is not only a matter of economic opportunity but also a strategic investment in long-term resilience and competitiveness.
Promote skills exchange and knowledge transfer
Effective diaspora engagement extends beyond remittances and investment to encompass the exchange of skills, knowledge and professional experience. Mechanisms such as professional exchanges, targeted return projects, mentorship initiatives and virtual collaboration platforms can help connect diaspora skills with domestic needs. When aligned with strategic priorities and implemented through accessible and trusted channels, such initiatives can strengthen institutional capacities, promote innovation and enhance the competitiveness of economies in countries of origin.
A critical first step in enabling such engagement is to identify and map the skills, experience and areas of interest available within diaspora communities. Several governments have developed online platforms and digital tools for this purpose, encouraging members of their diaspora to self-report their professional expertise and indicate how they would like to contribute. In Barbados, for example, a dedicated data platform invites Barbadians abroad to register, share their skills and perspectives, and become involved in strategic national initiatives. The Be Basque Talent Network, established to attract skilled workers to the Basque region of Spain, uses a similar approach. While aimed at skilled migrants more broadly, it actively markets its services to individuals of Basque descent interested in returning, allowing them to register their interest and indicate their skills profile.
In India, a comparable database was developed during the COVID‑19 pandemic in response to the increased return of economic migrants. To support their reintegration into the labour market, the Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship, under the Skill India Mission and in partnership with the Ministry of Civil Aviation and the Ministry of External Affairs, established the SWADES (Skilled Workers Arrival Database for Employment Support) programme. Returning citizens complete a skills form, following which they receive a SWADES skills card. The data is then shared with employers to facilitate suitable placement opportunities.
Identifying and mapping skills within the diaspora is only the first step. The next challenge lies in effectively mobilising this expertise in ways that benefit both the individual and the country of origin. For many origin countries, particularly those with significant ongoing emigration of highly qualified professionals and students, the objective is to promote forms of engagement and return migration that foster brain circulation and brain gain rather than permanent loss of talent.
The I Choose Croatia programme illustrates how targeted interventions can leverage diaspora expertise to address specific national priorities. It supports the involvement of highly skilled members of the diaspora in the development of underserved or depopulated regions by offering reintegration grants for up to two years to those who relocate to less developed areas, facilitating both economic and social revitalisation.
Strengthening public sector capacities through the return of skilled diaspora members has gained momentum in recent decades as governments increasingly recognise the value of such engagement for national development. These initiatives are often premised on the understanding that potential returnees may be motivated less by financial incentives and more by the opportunity to make a meaningful and lasting contribution to their country of origin. By providing structured opportunities to serve in public institutions, such programmes can enable diaspora professionals to apply their expertise, introduce international best practices and strengthen governance systems.
In Benin, for example, the National Association of Communes signed an agreement in 2018 with the Association of French Elected Officials of Beninese Origin to facilitate the engagement of Beninese‑origin elected officials from France in supporting local mayors to improve governance and administrative effectiveness. In Armenia, the iGorts Fellowship, launched in 2020, places diaspora professionals in government institutions for 12 months, enabling them to contribute to policy development, institutional reform and capacity building while drawing on their international experience.
A similar approach is taken in Lithuania through the Create Lithuania programme, which annually attracts around 20 highly skilled diaspora members to work in public sector bodies on issues ranging from improving the country’s image to enhancing competitiveness, promoting entrepreneurship and fostering foreign direct investment. Participants are integrated into the government structure, collaborating with public officials, businesses and civil society to address complex policy challenges. The success of this initiative has led to the piloting of a similar programme in Ukraine, known as Create Ukraine.
Other programmes, such as the Romania Wants to Meet You – Young Professionals Programme, launched by the I Believe in Romania (Cred în România) youth association, follow similar models but focus on building partnerships with leading companies and private employers, including Deloitte, Microsoft and Accenture. These partnerships create employment opportunities exclusively for diaspora members who have been living abroad for at least five years, hold a higher education qualification from an institution outside Romania, and are seeking suitable roles in Bucharest. Leveraging shared history and cultural ties, the programme also targets young professionals from the Republic of Moldova, thereby widening the pool of applicants and increasing the potential for return.
The Repat Armenia Foundation illustrates the importance of establishing robust support networks for highly skilled expatriates who wish to return to Armenia and contribute their expertise to the country’s economic and innovation landscape. While there may be a clear demand for skills and knowledge, effective matching of diaspora talent with suitable opportunities often requires targeted facilitation. Initiatives of this kind typically place strong emphasis on ensuring that the opportunities offered are commensurate with the skills, experience and aspirations of diaspora members, thereby making return a more attractive and viable option. In the case of Armenia, the Foundation provides repatriation and integration consultations to more than 1 000 expatriates annually, building a network of over 12 000 members. It supports them in securing appropriate employment with local companies, facilitates recruitment processes, and assists them in contributing to Armenia’s innovation sector. To date, more than 750 Armenian expatriates have permanently returned through the Foundation.
In Viet Nam, Come Home Pho Good similarly facilitates connections between employers and prospective returnees, with recruitment agencies such as Robert Walters identifying and engaging overseas Vietnamese professionals who are willing to return and interested in employment opportunities in Viet Nam.
In some cases, these programmes focus on specific sectors. Many initiatives prioritise attracting scientists and researchers, recognising their potential to strengthen research and development capacity and foster innovation in countries of origin. The Balik Scientist Programme in the Philippines encourages scientists, technologists and experts from the diaspora to return and share their knowledge in areas critical to the country’s scientific, agro‑industrial and economic development. Between 2007 and May 2019, the programme engaged 236 scientists in 348 projects, with the majority coming from North America and Asia, and a smaller proportion from Europe, Australia and Africa. Similarly, Croatia’s Unity through Knowledge Fund facilitates exchanges between Croatian researchers abroad and their domestic counterparts. It aims to strengthen national research capacity, support technology transfer to Croatian companies, and promote international investment in Croatian science, while fostering an environment conducive to innovation.
Countries such as China and India operate large‑scale national programmes to encourage the return of skilled diaspora members, but these are increasingly complemented by targeted regional and city-level initiatives designed to meet specific local development priorities. This shift reflects a recognition that while national frameworks provide strategic direction and resources, regional and municipal authorities are often best placed to identify pressing skills shortages, adapt incentives to local conditions, and foster the institutional and business environments in which returnees can have the greatest impact. For example, in China, the national strategy to attract overseas talent is supported by a network of localised programmes that address the needs of particular industrial clusters and innovation hubs. Shenzhen, one of the country’s leading technological and innovation centres, launched the Peacock Talent Programme in 2011 to attract highly qualified overseas returnees, many of whom have completed postgraduate or doctoral studies abroad (Box 5.10).
The Peacock Talent Programme provides subsidies to returning scientists and engineers in the ICT and Internet industries, with amounts determined by their professional experience and affiliations with internationally recognised universities. Its objective is to attract and transform these returnees into “scientific entrepreneurs” in Shenzhen, enabling them not only to engage in advanced research but also to collaborate with local institutions on applied innovations.
Participants have noted that Shenzhen’s well-developed supply chains, strong industrial base and supportive entrepreneurship policies create an enabling environment for professional growth. Many have sought to work with Chinese employers, while others have established businesses in China that build on their international experience and capitalise on the potential of the domestic market. The programme offers direct financial support from the city government of up to USD 74 000, with allocations based on educational qualifications, the feasibility of the proposed venture and its capacity to attract additional talent.
However, some returnees have chosen to retain academic positions abroad as a safeguard in the event of dissatisfaction with their professional integration in China. This tendency has been linked to perceptions of a limited “nurturing environment” in certain higher education institutions, which may constrain the ability of returnees to contribute to institutional development alongside their entrepreneurial and innovation roles. For many, the flexibility to maintain overseas academic posts, combined with favourable visa arrangements for individuals of Chinese descent holding foreign passports, has been an important factor in the decision to return.
Source: Wang (2022[141]), “Talent Migration in Knowledge Economy: The Case of China’s Silicon Valley, Shenzen”, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-021-00875-5.
A central challenge in designing diaspora return programmes for skilled professionals is ensuring that the conditions offered are sufficiently attractive to encourage return. While it is rarely feasible to match the salary levels available in host countries, other factors can be decisive in influencing return decisions. Professional opportunities, career development prospects, and quality-of-life benefits can help offset potential reductions in income and make return a viable and appealing option. The specific considerations vary depending on individual profiles. A study of Italian scientists working overseas found that the probability of returning was highest (77%) among those on fixed-term contracts, while it declined sharply to 18% for those in permanent academic positions (Sbalchiero and Tuzzi, 2017[142]). Full professors were the least inclined to return, with factors such as older age, extended periods abroad, favourable professional circumstances and working conditions, and family responsibilities cited as possible reasons.
It is also important to ensure that such initiatives are not perceived domestically as unfair. The Create Lithuania programme, for example, has acknowledged challenges related to offering slightly higher financial compensation than the average in the public sector in order to attract participants. This has the potential to be viewed negatively by other public servants whose salaries are fixed by law at lower levels. Addressing such sensitivities requires careful management and clear communication of the tangible benefits these programmes bring to national institutions, the wider economy and local communities.
Given that many members of the diaspora prefer to maintain transnational lifestyles, and in light of the significant resources required to facilitate permanent return, some countries have developed temporary or “virtual” return schemes to facilitate knowledge transfer and skills exchange. These mechanisms allow professionals to contribute to national development without requiring relocation. Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals (TRQN) programmes, implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) on behalf of the Netherlands, are one example. They provide opportunities for diaspora professionals to apply their knowledge, expertise and cultural understanding to support development and reconstruction in their countries of origin.
During the TRQN III phase (December 2012 to November 2015), assignments covered a wide range of sectors and activities. In Afghanistan, diaspora medical professionals provided two and a half months of essential training to the next generation of doctors at Kabul Medical University. In Ghana, health specialists undertook short but repeated missions of between two and eight weeks to improve the use of ICT in healthcare. In Georgia, urban planners delivered targeted training, while in Morocco, diaspora experts worked with local NGOs to raise awareness on social issues such as sexual and reproductive health and human rights. In Armenia, geophysics specialists provided technical training in the local language. The duration of assignments varied across countries and projects, averaging between 60 and 187 days per expert, demonstrating the model’s adaptability in addressing different national and sectoral needs (Table 5.3).
Note: These numbers draw from the April 2015 List of TRQN III experts. The statistics in this chart differ slightly from the overall project numbers. For example, the total number of experts contracted under the project was 212, but 6 had not begun their assignments by then and were not included.
Source: Leith and Rivas (2015[143]), “The Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals Project (TRQN) III: Evaluation report”, https://iom-nederland.nl/images/Publications/Evaluation_TRQN__Response_IOM.pdf.
The 2015 evaluation of the third phase of TRQN found that 91.0% of participating experts identified “the opportunity to contribute to your home country” as their primary motivation for involvement (Leith and Rivas, 2015[143]). This underlines that diaspora professionals are often driven more by personal and emotional connections, or by a sense of duty to their country of origin, than by financial gain or career advancement. Short-term return assignments can therefore provide a valuable means of harnessing diaspora expertise in areas critical for recovery and reconstruction, while avoiding many of the significant costs associated with permanent return for both the individuals and the communities involved. The relatively short duration of these assignments – often taken as a form of professional sabbatical – allows experts to maintain their existing employment and personal arrangements in their current countries.
In some cases, such short-term return opportunities have been actively facilitated through bilateral arrangements between origin and host countries, particularly in response to urgent recovery needs. Following the 2009 earthquake and tsunami in Samoa, the Samoan and New Zealand Governments agreed on a scheme that allowed Samoans in New Zealand to return temporarily for up to one month to assist in relief and reconstruction efforts, without risking the loss of their jobs or residence permits in New Zealand. For affected households, this arrangement not only provided critical emotional support during a period of crisis but also encouraged the flow of informal remittances and in-kind contributions to communities in need.
Recognising the benefits of such partial return models, several countries have integrated them into their broader return strategies. China was one of the first to formally adopt this approach, initially encouraging short visits by international students settled abroad as early as 1992. In 2001, it expanded this policy to include professionals working overseas, inviting them to contribute to China’s economic development without the need for relocation (Zweig, Fung and Han, 2008[144]). Since then, most Chinese return initiatives have incorporated flexible short-term and even virtual return opportunities (Lei and Guo, 2020[145]), including the Peacock Talent Programme (see Box 5.10).
Virtual returns refer to the engagement of diaspora human capital while individuals remain physically abroad, with no relocation taking place. Through remote collaboration, they can contribute to the economy of their ancestral country and its enterprises by providing specialised expertise, undertaking project-based work, mentoring local professionals, or participating in research and innovation activities (Labrianidis and Karampekios, 2022[146]). Such arrangements allow skills and know-how to be channelled into recovery and reconstruction efforts without incurring the relocation costs and personal disruptions that are often associated with permanent return. Virtual return models can be particularly relevant in post-crisis settings, where security conditions, family commitments or professional obligations may limit physical mobility, but where digital connectivity offers an effective alternative for sustained engagement.
Fostering cultural, educational and civic ties with the diaspora
Invest in cultural, educational and civic co‑operation with the diaspora. While diaspora self-organisation often emerges during times of crisis, sustained engagement requires continued support and active efforts from the country of origin.
Prioritise engagement of younger generations, including young adults. Support cultural exchange, educational partnerships and leadership initiatives, including co‑operation with Ukrainian heritage schools and scouting organisations abroad, to strengthen identity and connections to Ukraine and foster the foundations for their future contribution to recovery and development.
Make diaspora’s political participation meaningful, not symbolic. Establish structured feedback channels and targeted consultations to ensure diaspora voices and expertise help shape recovery policies.
Diaspora engagement is not limited to its economic dimension. The global Ukrainian community can play a vital role in sustaining and promoting Ukrainian identity, language and culture, while fostering mutual understanding and solidarity between Ukrainians at home and abroad. Through cultural exchanges, educational partnerships and civic co‑operation, the diaspora can strengthen social cohesion, contribute to democratic processes in Ukraine, and serve as a credible and influential voice for Ukraine internationally. Maintaining strong two‑way connections requires institutionalised channels for political participation, support for community-led initiatives, and investment in programmes that encourage active engagement across generations. When nurtured over time, these ties can help transform temporary contacts and return visits into longer-term commitments, while ensuring that those who choose to return permanently have access to the reintegration support they need to contribute fully to the country’s future.
Strengthen cultural ties
Strengthening cultural identity and emotional ties with the country of origin remains an essential dimension of diaspora engagement, particularly for sustaining connections among second- and third-generation members. Cultural expressions through food, music and art nurture a shared sense of pride and belonging, while structured initiatives such as internships, volunteer placements and cultural exchanges provide meaningful pathways for young people to engage with their heritage and contribute to development initiatives. Well-designed strategies in this area can deepen emotional bonds, encourage youth leadership in areas such as climate action and innovation, and foster inclusive environments that recognise and empower diaspora youth as active contributors to sustainable development.
Many diaspora engagement programmes focus specifically on young people, with the aim of cultivating a lasting sense of identity across generations. Camps for children and other short-term visits that combine cultural and touristic experiences with opportunities to learn about social life, services and professional prospects in the country of origin can create valuable and lasting links. Such experiences often enable participants to form networks with peers in the diaspora who share a similar connection to the ancestral country, as well as with local residents. These personal and professional relationships can serve as a foundation for sustained engagement and, in some cases, pave the way for deeper involvement in the country’s future.
Since 2012, Armenia has implemented the Ari Tun programme, which brings young people from the diaspora to Armenia for homestay visits, language immersion and civic engagement. It is open to diaspora youth aged 13 to 18 who are not citizens of the Republic of Armenia, except those with dual citizenship. The programme aims to strengthen cultural identity and foster enduring connections with the homeland. Over a two‑week period, participants receive Armenian language courses in both Eastern and Western Armenian, attend classes in Armenian studies, and take lessons in national songs and dances. The programme also includes educational visits to historical and cultural landmarks, museums and academic institutions, as well as meetings with government officials, cultural and artistic figures, and opportunities to participate in sports and cultural events. All in-country costs are covered by the government of the Republic of Armenia. In 2025, the programme hosted 600 diaspora youth.
Similarly, Taglit Birthright Israel offers young diaspora Jews aged between 18 and 26 free ten‑day heritage trips to Israel, with the aim of strengthening Jewish identity and fostering global connections with the State of Israel. The programme combines cultural education, travel and civic dialogue, and has hosted nearly 1 million participants since its inception in 1999. Its stated mission is to provide all young Jewish adults with opportunities for transformative and immersive shared experiences in Israel, laying the foundation for ongoing engagement with their heritage. Eligibility requires recognition as Jewish by one of the recognised Jewish denominations (Reform, Reconstructionist, Conservative, Orthodox, Sephardic) and the absence of exclusive adherence to another religion. Participants must also have at least one Jewish parent who identifies as such, or be recognised as Jewish through conversion. The programme is largely funded by Jewish diaspora organisations in partnership with the Government of Israel.
While many earlier initiatives primarily targeted underage diaspora members, there is an increasing trend towards adopting a broader definition of diaspora youth. Such approaches recognise that engagement opportunities should extend to young adults who may already have completed their education and begun their professional careers, yet remain open to exploring their heritage and considering future connections with their country of origin.
The Know India Programme, implemented by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, reflects this expanded scope. It targets members of the Indian diaspora aged under 35, enabling participants who are no longer in school and may be established in their careers to familiarise themselves with India’s history, politics, culture and economic opportunities. Over three weeks, participants take part in organised visits to research institutions, cultural landmarks and sites of historical significance. The programme also provides information on relevant government schemes and organisations that could support them at various stages of their lives, including in the event of a return to India. In this way, it serves as both a cultural immersion and a practical orientation to potential pathways for engagement (Ministry of External Affairs, 2024[147]).
There are a range of cultural activities aimed at all age groups and individuals with diverse ties to ancestral countries. Cultural celebrations and gatherings, such as the Global Irish Festival Series, which each year organises activities and facilitates travel for members of the Irish diaspora in different locations of the country (Fáilte Ireland, 2025[148]). These events can help the diaspora associate holidays with their home country, spend time in new areas of the country, and meet other members of the diaspora. In honouring shared history and cultural ties, many commemorative ceremonies, organised at the county or city level, can engage the entire national diaspora, as is the case with the Ireland-Canada Homecoming 2025 ceremony which marks the departure of 2 500 people setting sail for Upper Canada two centuries prior. Spanning a rich programme that includes conversations with various speakers, celebratory meals, and other activities, the celebration is particularly symbolic for the Irish diaspora.
Similarly, Barbados organises the We Gatherin’ events, designed to deepen connections between the country and its diaspora while highlighting different themes in each edition. The 2025 programme invites all Barbadians to celebrate traditional ways of life, showcase the country’s diverse talent and achievements, contribute to local communities, capitalise on economic opportunities, and collaborate on shaping a shared vision for the nation’s future. As in Ireland, these “homecoming” events also serve to strengthen local pride. During the We Gatherin’ year, for instance, individual parishes open their own heritage centres to highlight their distinct culture, history and identity. These events demonstrate how diaspora-focussed activities can be combined with broader community-building efforts, creating a mutually reinforcing relationship between national heritage and local development.
Origin countries increasingly seek to sustain diaspora connections through a gradual spectrum of opportunities. What may begin with cultural immersion or youth exchanges is often complemented by initiatives that provide diaspora members with practical entitlements and legal recognition. Such measures not only acknowledge heritage but also create a structured framework for longer-term engagement. Importantly, they are often designed with more than cultural preservation in mind: governments view them as a way to build trust, lower barriers for future relocation, and, in some cases, pave the way for eventual return.
One prominent approach has been to grant diaspora members a semi-formal status that both recognises their heritage and provides tangible benefits. In Poland, the Karta Polaka grants holders a range of rights and entitlements, including eligibility to apply for a residence permit and, subsequently, for Polish citizenship with fee exemptions. It also eases access to education, healthcare, and financial assistance intended for settlement and livelihood, as well as discounted train fares and free entry to state museums. Holders are further exempt from the requirement to obtain a work permit or a permit to establish and conduct business activities. Initially introduced to support individuals of Polish ancestry who, due to the Second World War, had been forced to leave their home territories and had acquired new citizenship under the USSR, the Karta Polaka was expanded in 2019 to allow citizens of any country with proven Polish ancestry to obtain it. This reform has extended its reach beyond Eastern Europe, strengthening Poland’s capacity to engage its diaspora more globally (Kuznicow-Wyszynski, 2024[149]).
A comparable model has been introduced in Serbia. The NGO Returning Point, which facilitates access to legal services for all members of the diaspora who are considering return, tailors assistance to their specific needs. Reflecting elements of the Polish model, the organisation has introduced the Carta Serbica, which simplifies the process for diaspora members without Serbian citizenship to obtain the necessary residence or work permits. In addition to legal facilitation, it provides broader support and fosters direct contact between potential returnees and relevant government institutions, ensuring that assistance is adapted to individual circumstances.
Other countries adopt a more gradual, step-by-step approach that allows diaspora members to test their attachment to the homeland before making a permanent decision. Israel, for example, has developed measures to accommodate different levels of interest and commitment.
Taglit Birthright Israel offers an initial entry point, but those wishing to explore Israel more deeply can join the Masa programme, which provides a wide range of opportunities lasting from one to ten months, including academic study, internships, volunteer placements and cultural immersion. Among its offerings is the Masa Remote Work programme, which enables members of the Jewish diaspora aged 22 to 30 from selected countries, including the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom, to live in Israel as digital nomads while continuing to work for their overseas employers. Masa covers a comprehensive package of arrangements, including entry permits and visas, medical insurance, accommodation, workspace, security and guidance. Participants receive a visa that allows remote work without imposing Israeli tax obligations on them or their employers. Evaluations indicate that alumni of Masa are more likely to remain engaged with Israel, pursue aliyah (immigration to Israel), or return for work and study.
For those who decide to return permanently, Israel provides additional support (see Annex 5.F). The Sal Klita Absorption Basket offers a package of financial assistance to cover living expenses for the first six months, supports language immersion activities, and provides rental assistance during the first year.
While few countries have as comprehensive a framework as Israel, others have nonetheless established targeted systems that combine engagement with practical return support. The Global Estonian programme illustrates how sustained engagement can be achieved through a combination of tailored assistance, proactive outreach, and co‑ordinated service provision. Managed in co‑operation with foundations and relevant government agencies, the programme offers personalised counselling and practical guidance to diaspora members considering a return, including information on employment opportunities, education, housing, and administrative procedures. By ensuring that advice is relevant to individual circumstances and accessible from abroad, the initiative helps potential returnees make informed decisions and prepares them for reintegration. Such measures are important not only to facilitate return when it occurs, but also to maintain long-term connections across generations, reinforcing a sense of belonging even for those who may not return immediately.
Taken together, these examples demonstrate that fostering cultural, educational, and civic ties is not only about preserving heritage but also about building a foundation for deeper engagement. When complemented by accessible legal pathways and practical return support, such ties can gradually evolve into concrete mobility decisions. For Ukraine, ensuring that cultural affinity and civic engagement are linked to well-designed opportunities for return can transform diaspora bonds into a long-term asset for national recovery and reconstruction.
Work towards meaningful and reciprocal engagement
Building meaningful civic and political partnerships with diaspora communities, including those unable or unwilling to return, can play a critical role in national recovery and long-term reconstruction strategies. Beyond remittances and humanitarian support, the diaspora represents a reservoir of civic, political, cultural, and professional capital that can be mobilised to shape inclusive post-crisis futures. An essential part of this approach is ensuring the diaspora receives a clear message that they matter to the country of origin and that their engagement is valued as a partnership of mutual benefit and shared commitment to national development.
Ireland’s Emigrant Support Programme demonstrates effective engagement through civil society and NGOs, promoting Irish cultural heritage by funding language classes, events and celebrations abroad, thereby supporting diaspora community activities. By awarding grants to organisations and initiatives that demonstrate positive impact on Irish diaspora communities, the government recognises and encourages further engagement whilst supporting diaspora visibility internationally, confirming their value to national identity and efficiently reaching the most disadvantaged and potentially disengaged communities abroad.
There are a growing number of initiatives from other origin countries as well aimed at investing in and supporting their diaspora communities. Colombia’s programme “Colombia Nos Une” exemplifies this by transforming consular services into comprehensive support centres that address diaspora needs through targeted social initiatives whilst simultaneously strengthening national connections. Similarly, Georgia has developed an integrated framework combining digital platforms, youth leadership programmes, and national celebrations to maintain diaspora engagement. Both examples underscore that sustainable diaspora engagement requires reciprocal arrangements to bring value to both sides.
Various initiatives have sought to involve diaspora communities in recovery and reconstruction processes. The Sri Lankan experience illustrates both the opportunities and the challenges of such engagement in a post-conflict context. In 2015, the government invited diaspora communities to contribute to its post-war development and peace agenda, including through a national conference on reconciliation and sustainable peace. Discussions covered themes such as diaspora identity, the role of skills, ideas and capital in recovery, and activism in justice, reconciliation and social cohesion. The process also brought to the fore concerns raised by diaspora representatives, including the need to broaden the focus beyond the Tamil diaspora to include Sinhala and Muslim communities, to address gaps in understanding diaspora expectations, to improve mechanisms for negotiating aid with local communities, and to integrate gender perspectives. However, despite broad areas of agreement emerging during the consultations, the outcomes were not translated into a coherent and sustained strategy, which ultimately weakened trust and engagement among diaspora communities.
Fostering meaningful engagement with new generations of diaspora communities requires structured approaches that institutionalise their participation across all phases of public policy. Establishing continuous channels of communication through embassies and dedicated government platforms ensures that younger diaspora members remain informed about national priorities and opportunities for contribution. Inclusive policy planning that integrates their perspectives into short-, medium-, and long-term strategies strengthens the link between diaspora expertise and national development needs. Consequently, moving from basic outreach to institutional frameworks, many countries have successfully formalised diaspora engagement by legally recognising their membership in the diaspora and through mechanisms such as advisory councils, external voting rights, and formal roles in policymaking. These approaches not only strengthen ties between the diaspora and their countries of origin, but also empower displaced citizens to remain actively involved in shaping policies that affect their communities at home.
France’s approach through the Assemblée des Français de l’Étranger (AFE) illustrates how formal consultation mechanisms can provide diaspora communities with direct input into national policy. Established in 2004 as a consultative body to the French Government, the Assemblée des Français de l’Étranger provides insights and recommendations on issues affecting French expatriates, including education, social services, taxation, and cultural affairs. The institution’s distinctive structure involves 90 members appointed by consular advisors and the 11 deputies of France’s National Assembly representing French citizens abroad, who convene twice yearly for plenaries to deliberate on policies affecting approximately 2.5 million French expatriates worldwide (Sénat, 2025[150]).
One of the most recent and large‑scale initiatives of the Assemblée des Français de l’Étranger has been the organisation of the Social Protection Conference for French Citizens Abroad (Assises de la Protection Sociale des Français de l’Étranger), aiming to engage the French diaspora in shaping national social policy. This participatory process, organised in collaboration with the National Commission for Public Debate (CNDP), is centred around three key themes: educational scholarships (including support for students with disabilities), direct social assistance and support for local social organisations, and the future of the Caisse des Français de l’Étranger (CFE) – a public institution that enables French citizens living abroad to maintain access to French-style social security, including health insurance, maternity benefits, and workplace accident coverage while living abroad (Alliance Solidaire des Français de l’Etranger, 2025[151]). By collecting testimonies, proposals, and expert input from across the global French community, and by opening all debates to any member of the diaspora, the Assemblée des Français de l’Étranger seeks to formulate actionable recommendations to improve these systems (Français du Monde, 2025[152]).
Mexico has likewise invested significantly in strengthening diaspora engagement, particularly by enhancing the involvement of its diaspora in national political processes. Since 2002, Mexico has maintained a permanent inter-ministerial commission, the National Council for Mexican Communities Abroad (Consejo Nacional para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Exterior), with the mandate of proposing and implementing policies for the benefit of Mexican communities abroad. In addition, the majority of Mexican states, as well as Mexico City, have established state‑level offices or ministries dedicated to migrant or expatriate affairs, co‑ordinated through a national secretariat.
At the institutional level, another important mechanism for engaging diaspora groups operates through structures such as the Institute for Mexicans Abroad (IME). This body, established within Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reaches Mexicans living and working abroad to ensure their voices are represented in national policymaking. IME’s stated mission is to strengthen the ties between the Mexican diaspora and their home country by nurturing their cultural identity and sense of national pride, whilst also supporting their integration into their host societies (Government of Mexico, 2025[153]). The IME has also established the Consultative Council of the Institute for Mexicans Abroad (CCIME), composed of 101 elected members representing the Mexican and Mexican-American communities in the United States, 4 members in Canada, 10 Latin American organisations, and 10 special advisors (Consulado General de México en San Francisco, 2016[154]). As an advisory body to the ministry, its mandate is to analyse the problems, challenges, and opportunities facing Mexican communities abroad.
Drawing from observations from the Consultative Council of the Institute for Mexicans Abroad, the IME has implemented numerous programmes addressing the various needs of the diaspora in the areas of education, business and entrepreneurship, and healthcare. One such initiative was the 2024 Summit in Seattle, organised in collaboration with the Mexican diaspora, to design and strengthen adult education programmes tailored to migrants’ needs. By creating a channel for representation of diaspora voices, other grassroots diaspora organisations (such as La Asociación de Líderes de las Plazas Comunitarias en el Exterior, supported by the Mexican Consulate in Seattle), were included in co-developing educational tools specifically for Mexican communities in the United States and Canada (Instituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior, 2024[155]). This underscored a broad, community-driven approach to educational inclusion, co-created with diaspora groups. The work of the Institute for Mexicans Abroad in North America, where significant numbers of Latin Americans reside, has been found to be distinctly inspiring for other countries from the region, whose diaspora populations have similar needs (ILO, 2015[156]). Under the umbrella of Latino communities, Mexico’s innovative diaspora engagement programmes in the areas of health and labour policy – particularly its Ventanilla de Salud (Health Window) and Labor Rights Week initiatives – have been adapted or emulated by consulates from countries like Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Ecuador and Colombia (Délano, 2014[157]).
Building on more accessible digital engagement models, the Global Estonian programme demonstrates how countries can create comprehensive online platforms that facilitate meaningful participation without requiring substantial resource commitments. The programme ensures that all services and information covering aspects of interest to diaspora members are accessible online, whilst some live events and services can be made fully interactive, enabling meaningful participation from Estonians abroad. This includes bi‑annual virtual forums co‑ordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which Estonians abroad can participate, featuring high-level members of the Estonian Government or notable personalities, such as ministers or former presidents. The most recent forum’s theme was Estonian cultural identity, whilst themes of past editions also included Estonia’s education system, multilingualism, and storytelling from diaspora members. At the latest edition of the forum, in-person consultations and meetings were also organised in cities abroad with high numbers of Estonians, such as Stockholm.
These diverse examples illustrate that meaningful political engagement requires both investment and institutional commitment from countries of origin. Effective diaspora engagement necessitates creating genuine opportunities for political participation, policy input, and civic involvement. The most successful approaches combine multiple channels of engagement, from formal advisory structures to digital platforms and support for diaspora-led initiatives in host countries. For Ukraine, embracing such comprehensive engagement frameworks could transform the diaspora from temporary supporters into long-term partners in national development, ensuring that their commitment to Ukraine’s future is matched by Ukraine’s commitment to their meaningful participation in shaping that future.
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Following the Fukushima nuclear accident, Japan saw the emergence of transitional towns and dual residency arrangements as pragmatic responses to the complex realities of return. These solutions enabled displaced persons to navigate concerns about safety and uncertainty over long-term conditions, while preserving ties to their home communities. For Ukrainian policymakers, these experiences offer relevant insights into how flexible, in-between arrangements can support voluntary return over time, even after prolonged displacement and in areas where perceptions of risk remain a barrier.
Following the 2011 nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, the Japanese Government established a reference dose of 20 millisieverts per year (mSv/year) as the operational safety threshold for return. This level, which was 20 times higher than the pre‑Fukushima limit, informed the designation of evacuation zones and the phased return of approximately 160 000 evacuees. Returns began six years after the disaster, once airborne radiation levels had fallen below the established threshold.
However, the government’s safety assessment was not widely accepted by many affected residents. Public concern regarding the elevated dose level contributed to the voluntary self-evacuation of over 50 000 further individuals who were not subject to formal evacuation orders but nonetheless chose to leave. This misalignment between official guidance and displaced persons’ perceptions of risk generated lasting distrust in government communication and policy decisions. As of 2024, return rates to former evacuation zones remained low, ranging between 17 and 30% (IRSN, 2016[23]; Reconstruction Agency, 2024[24]).
In areas such as the Nagadoro district, where evacuation orders were lifted in 2023, residents faced a number of practical and social barriers to return. While decontamination efforts were concentrated in the designated revitalisation base, radiation levels in surrounding homes and farmland remained a concern. The expiration of evacuee status also meant the loss of associated government support, placing many in a difficult position: either return to a region where infrastructure had deteriorated over more than a decade of restricted access, or resettle permanently elsewhere without continued assistance. The physical degradation of dwellings, many of which had collapsed after years of neglect, further discouraged return. Interviews with potential returnees revealed a range of additional concerns, including fear of social exclusion by neighbouring communities due to doubts over decontamination, and anticipated low demand for local agricultural products. At the same time, some expressed concern that choosing not to return might be seen as a betrayal of public investment in clean-up efforts. These complex social dynamics significantly influenced individual decisions about return (Hidaka et al., 2022[158]).
Similar patterns were observed in Minamisoma City, where return remained limited despite the lifting of formal restrictions. A small increase in returns followed the termination of compensation and housing subsidies in areas of resettlement, suggesting that economic pressure played a role. However, many former residents cited ongoing concerns about radiation, limited employment opportunities, and the deterioration of services in their home areas as major deterrents to return (Do, 2020[159]).
In response to these challenges, some adaptive solutions emerged outside the formal return framework. One such idea was the concept of a “transitional town,” also referred to as an out-of-town or virtual community. Proposed by scholars and local leaders, this approach offered an alternative to the binary choice between return and permanent resettlement. It aimed to relocate entire communities to host municipalities, preserving social networks and service access while allowing return to be postponed until conditions improved (Fassert and Hasegawa, 2019[160]). Although no large‑scale relocations were implemented, individual arrangements were made. In Iitate Village, for example, some displaced families formed a de facto satellite community in Fukushima City. During the 2018‑2019 school year, 75 children from Iitate were enrolled in their original village school, with 90% commuting from neighbouring cities.
Closely related to this concept was the practice of dual residency, sometimes referred to as “half-return.” This arrangement allowed households to divide their lives between their places of origin and their temporary homes. In municipalities such as Kawauchi and Watari, families adopted flexible living patterns, enabling one parent to remain in the village for work or care responsibilities while the other relocated with children to areas perceived as safer. However, such arrangements were not formally supported. As temporary housing assistance and compensation were phased out between 2017 and 2018, families were increasingly pressured to choose between full return or permanent relocation. Many faced the risk of falling into financial hardship due to the cost of maintaining two households (Fassert and Hasegawa, 2019[160]).
Efforts to formalise dual residency were limited and uneven. In Japan, residents must register with their municipality of residence to access services such as education and healthcare. In response, Iitate Village proposed the creation of evacuation communities and a system of two‑district residency. Its “Two-District Residence 100-Year Vision” advocated a long-term model of gradual recovery for individuals, families, and communities. This approach recognised the persistence of contamination, particularly in forested areas, and the challenges of decontamination. A formal “double residency card” system was later proposed to local authorities and gained the endorsement of the Science Council of Japan in 2017 (Itonaga, 2019[161]). The institutionalisation of such dual residential rights has been seen as essential for sustaining community ties and facilitating future restoration efforts in affected regions (Mosneaga, 2015[73]).
The Fukushima case illustrates that even when formal restrictions are lifted, return cannot be assumed. Divergences between institutional safety assessments and displaced persons’ lived experience can undermine confidence in return policies. Adaptive solutions, such as dual residency and transitional communities, offer alternative models that acknowledge uncertainty and support gradual reintegration. Ensuring that return strategies are responsive to diverse perceptions of safety, and that they prioritise trust-building and inclusive planning, is essential for enabling informed, voluntary and sustainable return.
Ensuring that decisions to return are voluntary, safe and informed will be central to Ukraine’s long-term strategy for supporting the return and reintegration of displaced persons. Experience from other contexts shows that perceptions of safety and trust in information provided by authorities are as important as the actual security situation on the ground. Structured go‑and-see and come‑and-tell mechanisms have proven valuable tools for building confidence in return processes, allowing potential returnees to assess conditions first-hand and to hear directly from peers who have already returned.
For Ukraine, such mechanisms could provide a credible way of bridging the information gap between displaced populations abroad, internally displaced persons, and national and local authorities. Alongside supporting well-informed choices, these visits can also help authorities better understand the expectations, concerns and practical needs of those considering return, informing the design of reintegration support policies and communication strategies.
Go‑and-see and come‑and-tell visits are participatory confidence‑building mechanisms commonly used in post-conflict and post-disaster settings to ensure that decisions to return are genuinely voluntary and based on reliable, first-hand information. Typically organised by humanitarian partners such as UNHCR in co‑operation with national authorities, go‑and-see visits enable selected representatives of displaced populations to travel to potential areas of return to assess security, access to services and livelihood opportunities. Come‑and-tell visits involve former returnees travelling to displacement areas to share their experiences and provide realistic information about living conditions at home.
These visits aim to address a recurring challenge in return processes: the limited availability of trustworthy and up-to-date information for displaced persons when deciding whether to return. They also strengthen dialogue between displaced communities, host and home‑country governments, and local authorities, often revealing practical obstacles and policy gaps that can be addressed before actual returns take place.
When conducted transparently and with appropriate safeguards, such visits can enhance voluntariness, manage expectations and build trust in official information. Experiences from Somalia and, more recently, from Syria demonstrate both the potential and the limitations of these mechanisms, offering valuable lessons for Ukraine on how participatory approaches can foster informed and sustainable return when designed and co‑ordinated effectively.
The Voluntary Repatriation Programme (VolRep) in Somalia, established under the 2013 Tripartite Agreement between the governments of Kenya and Somalia and UNHCR, provided a structured framework for the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees from Kenya. It enshrined the principles of voluntariness, safety and dignity, while mandating each party to provide accurate and timely information about conditions in Somalia (Government of the Republic of Kenya; Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia; UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 2013[162]). Around 82 000 returnees from Kenya to Somalia benefitted from the programme before it closed in 2019. Go‑and-see and come‑and-tell visits were introduced as confidence‑building measures to ensure that any decision to return was informed and uncoerced.
Organised by UNHCR in close co‑operation with Somali and Kenyan authorities and humanitarian partners such as the Norwegian Refugee Council, these visits enabled refugee community representatives from the four refugee camps in Dadaab, Kenya to travel to selected areas in Somalia to assess living conditions and security (UNHCR, 2015[163]; NRC, 2017[164]). In total, seven go‑and-see missions took place between 2015 and 2019, each bringing around 30 Somali refugee leaders to 12 different locations such as Mogadishu and Baidoa. Participants met with government officials, inspected schools and health facilities, and consulted with internally displaced persons and recent returnees.
The visits generated practical recommendations, including proposals for safer transport arrangements, such as encouraging air travel over road travel to Baidoa, and for land allocation to returnees by local authorities in South West State. They also provided an opportunity for direct dialogue between potential returnees and national and local institutions, fostering mutual understanding and trust. Come‑and-tell visits followed a reciprocal logic, with former returnees visiting the Dadaab camps to share their experiences of reintegration, helping others make better-informed decisions and reducing misinformation (UNHCR, 2018[165]).
While the number of visits remained limited, they were instrumental in aligning expectations, supporting voluntariness and prompting authorities to address logistical and administrative bottlenecks. They also led to complementary support measures, including Return Help Desks established in Dadaab camps to provide continuous information on safety, services and assistance. These efforts illustrate how structured and participatory approaches can make return processes more transparent and responsive to displaced populations’ concerns, while preventing premature or unsafe return.
Following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, discussions on the return of Syrian refugees regained prominence across host countries and Syria. As of October 2025, more than 1.1 million Syrians had returned from neighbouring countries, while nearly 2 million internally displaced persons had returned to their places of origin (UNHCR, 2025[166]). In this context, the Government of Türkiye introduced a temporary arrangement allowing registered Syrian refugees to undertake short visits to Syria to evaluate conditions before deciding on return.
The arrangement, implemented between January and July 2025 under the supervision of the Provincial Directorates of Migration Management with humanitarian oversight from UNHCR, was open to all Syrian households. One adult per household could apply for a travel permit for up to three short visits of 15 days each within a six‑month period. Participation in these visits did not affect the individual’s legal status in Türkiye and did not imply any obligation to return permanently.
The initiative aimed to enable refugees to make better-informed decisions about return by offering first-hand observation of safety, services and livelihood conditions. While the programme was designed to safeguard voluntariness, participation remained relatively limited. Recent surveys have found that the main barriers included lack of information, continued security risks in parts of Syria, financial constraints, and the absence of accommodation or social networks to facilitate temporary visits (Upinion, 2025[167]).
Among those who travelled, experiences varied according to region and individual circumstances. Participants generally reported that conditions in many areas remained fragile, with limited access to public services, constrained economic opportunities and incomplete infrastructure restoration. For some, the visits confirmed that conditions for return were not yet met, while others observed gradual improvements in specific locations.
It is too early to evaluate the full impact of the scheme, but early surveys suggest mixed effects on return intentions: around 46% of participants said the visits encouraged return, while a similar share (46%) said they were discouraged, with the rest reporting no effect (Upinion, 2025[167]). Regardless whether it leads to actual returns, this still suggests that go‑and-see visits can support more informed and realistic decision making, helping to manage expectations and reduce misinformation within refugee communities. However, the experience from Türkiye also shows that displaced persons may require targeted support, such as financial assistance, accommodation options, or contact networks, to be able to participate safely and effectively.
This indicates that while such visits can facilitate informed decisions and reduce misinformation, interested displaced persons may face financial or logistical barriers, reinforcing the need for complementary support measures.
Experience from Somalia and Syria highlights both the potential and the limitations of go‑and-see and come‑and-tell visits as instruments to support voluntary and informed return. While such initiatives can foster trust and provide reliable information on local conditions, they also present practical, legal and institutional challenges that require careful design and co‑ordination. The table below summarises key considerations.
The Regional Housing Programme (RHP) offers valuable lessons for Ukrainian authorities as they plan long-term housing solutions for displaced persons. Initiated by four Western Balkan countries, the RHP demonstrates how co‑ordinated regional co‑operation, strong donor partnerships, and diversified housing modalities can provide durable solutions for displaced populations following conflict. The experience also highlights the importance of inclusive beneficiary selection processes, tailored housing support, and investment in institutional frameworks to ensure transparency, sustainability and local ownership. At the same time, the RHP reveals common challenges, such as expanding scale, inter-governmental co‑ordination, and securing sustainable financing, which should be anticipated and addressed in Ukraine’s reconstruction planning.
The Regional Housing Programme (RHP) was a joint initiative launched by four Western Balkan countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and Serbia) to provide durable housing solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) who were displaced during the 1990s conflicts. Implemented between 2012 and 2023, the programme was supported by international donors and co‑ordinated by the Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), in partnership with UNHCR and the OSCE.
The RHP offered seven housing modalities designed to respond to the diverse needs and preferences of displaced persons:
Construction of apartments: Built on municipally owned plots in specially designated locations. Apartment size was adjusted to the number of family members.
Reconstruction of houses: Repaired or completed damaged or partially built homes, either at the original site or in a new location where beneficiaries had acquired land but lacked the means to finish construction.
Provision of building materials: Enabled self-reconstruction by supplying building materials or, where needed, providing financial support to outsource the works.
Purchase of apartments: Acquired available properties on the market to provide immediate housing.
Construction of prefabricated houses: Delivered prefabricated units that could be quickly assembled on-site to meet urgent needs.
Purchase of village houses: Facilitated return to rural areas by purchasing homes with adjoining land, supporting agricultural livelihoods.
Provision of accommodation in institutions of social welfare: Offered housing in supported living facilities for elderly or disabled beneficiaries requiring additional care.
These modalities were implemented based on beneficiary choice and local context, with attention to construction standards, energy efficiency, and resilience to natural hazards. In cities such as Belgrade and Novi Sad, large‑scale apartment construction also stimulated local labour markets and service economies.
The provision of housing and adjoining land enabled some beneficiaries to develop home‑based income‑generating activities, including catering, farming, and small-scale services such as hairdressing. Complementary livelihood support was also provided by NGOs outside the RHP framework, including greenhouses and farming tools. In total, close to 3 000 contracts were signed with over 200 companies across the region, contributing to local job creation and economic recovery.
The governance of the RHP was designed to promote national ownership, strategic co‑ordination, and donor engagement. In each participating country, line ministries and implementing agencies were fully responsible for managing their national housing projects. This included developing feasibility assessments, identifying technical assistance needs, and overseeing implementation in collaboration with the CEB. Before grant disbursement, the CEB carried out institutional capacity assessments to verify compliance with programme standards.
Technical Assistance, managed by the CEB and embedded within national institutions, was demand-driven, results-oriented, and adapted to each country’s needs. Beneficiary selection prioritised the most vulnerable, guided by broad outreach campaigns and a shared set of eligibility criteria. To support programme delivery, the CEB worked closely with EPTISA Southeast Europe (for implementation support) and Deloitte Belgrade (for financial management). Programme tools – such as guidance manuals and standardised templates – were jointly developed with international partners including GIZ and the Danish Refugee Council, contributing to consistency and quality assurance.
In its early years, the RHP was subject to regular monitoring, including by the European Commission through its Instrument for Pre‑Accession Assistance (IPA II) (European Commission, 2014[41]). These assessments identified several challenges, many of which are common to post-conflict housing programmes. These are summarised below:
The PROSPECTS programme demonstrates how an integrated approach at the humanitarian, development and peace nexus can help displaced persons move from assistance to self-reliance while strengthening host communities. PROSPECTS has been implemented in settings marked by both internal displacement and cross border refugee movements, where uncertainty about the future of displaced populations required flexible approaches grounded in employment, dignity and local capacity building. Across these diverse environments, PROSPECTS has consistently used employment creation as a central mechanism to empower displaced persons, rebuild livelihoods, while also reinforcing social cohesion. Its focus on education, skills, social protection and decent work, delivered through national systems and with private sector participation, offers valuable lessons for Ukraine in preparing for returns, local (re)integration, but also labour-intensive reconstruction period.
The Employment-Intensive Investment Programme (EIIP) within PROSPECTS provides a practical model for combining short-term job creation with local infrastructure rehabilitation, linking training to real worksites and creating entry points for women and vulnerable groups. This experience is particularly relevant for Ukraine, where the reconstruction of essential infrastructure will require sizeable public works that could also serve as structured employment pathways for internally displaced persons and returnees from abroad. EIIP type approaches can contribute to rebuilding local economies, reducing social tensions and strengthening trust within communities receiving returnees.
Equally important are the operational lessons. PROSPECTS highlights the value of multi-year planning, clearly defined institutional roles, and consistent labour standards across programmes. For Ukraine, adapting these elements could help transform emergency support into durable reintegration outcomes, anchor returns in local economic development, and foster confidence through transparent, nationally led delivery.
The Partnership for Improving Prospects for Forcibly Displaced Persons and Host Communities (PROSPECTS) is a multi-country initiative led by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and funded by the government of the Netherlands. Implemented since 2019, with a second phase running from 2024 to 2027, it operates across eight countries in the Middle East and East Africa: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. The programme brings together key international partners, including UNHCR, UNICEF, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the World Bank, to strengthen national and local capacities to manage displacement, promote self-reliance, and support sustainable livelihoods.
Across these countries, PROSPECTS adapts its interventions to distinct displacement dynamics and national priorities. The programme does not focus on a single population group but responds to the composition of displaced persons in each context. In Sudan, for example, activities target refugee, internally displaced, returnee and host community populations in East Darfur and West Kordofan. In Iraq, the focus varies across regions, ranging from refugees in Dohuk governorate to internally displaced persons and host communities in Ninewa. These interventions are therefore concentrated in areas most affected by displacement pressures or in need of reconstruction, rather than being applied uniformly across national territories. This flexibility in design and targeting represents an important lesson for Ukraine, where return and reintegration needs will also vary considerably across regions.
Working at the humanitarian – development – peace nexus, PROSPECTS seeks to move beyond short-term assistance towards durable and locally driven solutions. Its activities are structured around four interlinked pillars: education and learning, economic inclusion, social protection and critical infrastructure development. The programme aims to expand access to quality education and skills development, create decent employment and enterprise opportunities, and reinforce social protection systems for both displaced persons and host communities.
By combining labour-intensive public works, vocational training and partnerships with employers, PROSPECTS builds resilience, fosters social cohesion and supports inclusive local economic growth in areas affected by displacement. Its complementary interventions link job creation with skills development and employability support. For example, the EIIP generates decent work through community infrastructure projects, while work-based learning and Job Search Clubs (JSCs) prepare individuals to access these opportunities with relevant skills and confidence. Together, these components help bridge the gap between job seekers and available employment, contributing to local development and social stability.
Main outcomes of Phase I (2019‑2023) (ILO, 2024[88]):
During its first phase, PROSPECTS achieved significant results across the eight participating countries:
51 policies, plans and laws addressing inclusive access to social protection and services for forcibly displaced and host communities were adopted or amended.
218 000 people received work permits or business registrations, enabling formal participation in local economies.
108 000 individuals were supported by business development services and financial institutions to expand earning and livelihood opportunities.
25 000 apprenticeships, on-the‑job training and work-based learning opportunities were created or developed (UNHCR, 2025[170]).
16 876 beneficiaries completed certified skills development programmes, including life skills, digital skills and vocational education and training, with the largest number in Egypt (9 219).
51 352 paid jobs or employment opportunities were created, with 53% allocated to host community members.
These outcomes underline the programme’s contribution to strengthening labour markets, expanding decent work opportunities, and fostering social inclusion in fragile and displacement-affected contexts.
A key element of the PROSPECTS programme is the Employment Intensive Investment Programme (EIIP), which serves as a flexible and cross cutting mechanism that simultaneously addresses infrastructure gaps, creates employment, builds skills, strengthens local economies and enables rapid crisis response in refugee hosting areas. EIIP interventions are designed around labour intensive public works that meet immediate community needs while generating short- and medium-term jobs for both refugees and host populations.
A defining feature of the EIIP is its strong emphasis on community participation. Local actors, including government officials, contractors and workers, are actively engaged in participatory planning processes to identify infrastructure priorities and employment opportunities. Projects undertaken through this approach have included the rehabilitation of water irrigation systems in Iraq, the restoration of health and water facilities in Sudan, rubble removal in post blast Beirut, and road upgrades in Kenya and Ethiopia.
Following the earthquake in Syria at the beginning of 2024, the EIIP model was also applied to support critical infrastructure rehabilitation and to restore water systems in the affected areas of Aleppo. Over a three‑month period, the project specifically targeted women and persons with disabilities to ensure inclusive access to decent employment. It also provided vocational training to 60 individuals to enhance their long-term employability. In total, 140 workers participated in the rehabilitation of infrastructure and recycling of debris, restoring essential public services while earning income and contributing both to individual livelihoods and to the broader recovery of affected urban areas.
One of the key operational lessons from the EIIP is the value of localised monitoring, particularly in fragile contexts affected by insecurity or environmental constraints. In Sudan, decentralised mechanisms such as Local Economic Development Committees, comprising representatives from state level ministries, employers and workers’ organisations, were established to maintain oversight and continuity when central government access was limited due to conflict or resource constraints. In Iraq, university students were engaged to support real time data collection in conflict affected areas through digital tools.
The EIIP has also demonstrated the potential for displaced persons to contribute beyond the role of workers. In Uganda, refugee owned construction businesses have participated in project delivery, while in Ethiopia, graduates of technical and vocational education and training programmes formed co‑operatives to take on implementation roles. These examples point to the broader economic potential of returnees and displaced persons as entrepreneurs and contractors.
While the programme has provided short term employment to support the reconstruction and maintenance of essential public infrastructure, its contributions extend further. It has reinforced multiple thematic pillars of the PROSPECTS programme, particularly in the area of skills development. In both Ethiopia and Iraq, trainees from vocational education institutions were able to apply their new competencies directly through EIIP supported contracts, thereby bridging training with practical labour market experience.
In addition, the programme has supported pathways into entrepreneurship. Participants interested in establishing their own businesses were referred to the ILO’s Start and Improve Your Business services, which provided business counselling and guidance for developing enterprise ideas, particularly in construction and related fields. The EIIP has also been linked to infrastructure projects that support psychosocial services and employment counselling. In Uganda and Iraq, this included the construction of community and youth centres, where PROSPECTS partners subsequently expanded the range of services offered. Through collaboration with agencies such as UNICEF and UNHCR, the EIIP model has demonstrated flexibility and alignment with broader development goals. It has served as both an entry point and a bridge to more durable livelihoods, enterprise development and improved access to social services.
In Iraq, the EIIP has also had a notable impact on women’s labour market participation, not only by providing immediate employment opportunities but also by opening pathways for long term training and professional development. Through its partnership with Erbil Polytechnic University, the programme introduced skills training in stone paving and clay brick building, fields that had previously largely excluded women. These training programmes, backed by formal certification, have helped women gain marketable technical skills relevant for heritage restoration and reconstruction. Moreover, the EIIP has integrated women into the broader institutional strengthening process by building the capacities of local trainers and supervisors, many of whom are women, to manage future infrastructure projects under decent work conditions. The programme’s alignment with national policy efforts, including the development of a National Public Works Programme, further ensures that these skills and employment channels will be sustained and scaled.
To promote equitable access to decent work for both refugees and host community members, the PROSPECTS programme has implemented a range of targeted initiatives to strengthen education and skills development systems. Its activities focus on improving the delivery and relevance of training, ensuring the recognition of prior learning and qualifications, and facilitating smoother school-to-work transitions through career guidance and work-based learning opportunities.
Work-based learning has been a central pillar of this approach. In Uganda, where apprenticeships had traditionally taken place informally, the programme helped formalise arrangements between craftspeople and trainees, aligning training content with industry needs and linking successful participants to national certification. A hospitality-sector pilot, co-designed with hotel owners, developed a curriculum tailored to employer demand. Refugee apprentices received accommodation, stipends and fee coverage, enabling 94 of 100 participants to complete the year-long course, of which three‑quarters consisted of on-the‑job learning. Supervisors were trained to mentor apprentices and track their progress through logbooks, bridging the gap between theory and practice. The Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development co‑ordinated the initiative under Uganda’s National Apprenticeship Framework, ensuring compliance and stakeholder alignment (ILO, 2022[171]).
The programme has also fostered partnerships with the private sector and technology providers to modernise skills delivery and widen employment opportunities. In Egypt, collaboration between the ILO and Amazon Web Services supported refugees and host community members to develop technical and soft skills for entry-level roles in the cloud-based services industry through the “re/Start” initiative (AWS, 2025[172]).. In parallel, the ILO partnered with SkillLab, a social enterprise from the Netherlands, and the Alexandria Business Association to pilot a digital skills-profiling tool that enables jobseekers to assess and communicate their competencies to potential employers (ILO, 2022[173]). These complementary efforts demonstrate how PROSPECTS integrates innovation and partnerships to build more inclusive and demand-driven training systems in displacement-affected settings.
Job Search Clubs (JSCs) are a group-based approach developed under the PROSPECTS programme to help young people transition into employment. In participating countries, where youth unemployment is high and many young people, including many displaced persons, are out of work or education, the clubs offer a practical and behavioural method to build confidence and job seeking skills. Through short, intensive sessions, participants identify job opportunities, improve their CVs, practise interviews and support one another throughout the job search. The model emphasises peer learning, behavioural activation and ongoing coaching, and has been adapted to different national contexts within public employment services and vocational education systems.
Following the completion of the first phase of the programme (2019‑2024), the International Labour Organization conducted a comprehensive evaluation highlighting key lessons across all activity pillars and noting differences in implementation across the eight participating countries. The main findings and challenges identified are summarised below (ILO, 2025[174]), unless specified otherwise.
Many Ukrainians abroad wish to contribute to recovery and reconstruction without relocating or making long-term business commitments. Diaspora bonds can offer a structured way to channel this support, combining financial security for investors with visible national impact. International experience shows that such instruments can mobilise substantial resources, whether as a crisis response, as in India and Nigeria, or through sustained issuance over decades, as in Israel. For Ukraine, diaspora bonds could become a complementary tool to harness solidarity capital for reconstruction, particularly from those not yet ready or able to return. Their success, however, will depend on credible institutions, transparent use of funds, and careful design to reflect the diversity of Ukraine’s diaspora communities.
Diaspora bonds are government debt securities marketed primarily to nationals living abroad, their descendants, or others with close ties to the country (Gevorkyan, 2021[175]). Typically issued at below-market yields, whether through a patriotic discount or during times when access to conventional borrowing is constrained, they can help diversify investor bases, provide predictable external finance, and reinforce connections between states and their diaspora communities.
Beyond financial returns, diaspora investors are often motivated by solidarity and identity. Research highlights the importance of “emotional returns”, the pride of contributing to one’s homeland, as a key factor in investment decisions (Chander, 2001[176]; Ayanruoh and Benedetto, 2018[177]). This dynamic has been particularly visible in Israel and Nigeria, where diaspora bonds have been explicitly framed as contributions to national development. Nevertheless, the success of diaspora bonds depends on trust, sound governance, and credible institutions. International experience shows that while patriotism can provide an incentive, investors remain highly attentive to transparency, accountability, and robust regulatory compliance (Ketkar and Ratha, 2007[178]).
Not all initiatives have succeeded as intended. Ethiopia’s attempt in the late 2000s to raise funds for the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam illustrates the risks of weak credibility and contested projects. Despite the presence of a large diaspora, the initiative raised limited resources due to concerns over governance, political repression, and the absence of transparent monitoring mechanisms. Many diaspora members also objected to the project itself, which was politically sensitive and environmentally controversial, and felt excluded from meaningful consultation. As a result, the initiative not only failed to mobilise significant resources but also contributed to alienation among parts of the diaspora community. The case demonstrates that patriotic appeals alone are insufficient, and that poorly chosen or divisive projects can undermine confidence and trust in such instruments.
For Ukraine, where the desire among citizens abroad to support recovery and reconstruction is likely to be considerable, diaspora bonds could represent a meaningful complementary tool. Their feasibility, however, will depend on transparent governance, credible safeguards, and careful design to ensure both financial viability and sustained diaspora confidence.
Israel’s diaspora bond initiative, managed by the Development Corporation for Israel (DCI), is one of the longest-standing and most successful examples. Launched in the 1950s under the leadership of Prime Minister David Ben Gurion, it targeted the Jewish diaspora in the United States, supported by high-level outreach and marketing campaigns (Gevorkyan, 2021[175]). Since 1951, Israel Bonds have raised more than USD 44 billion, with most sales in North America (Gevorkyan, 2021[179]). Proceeds have been channelled into sectors such as agriculture, energy, transport, technology, and immigration. More recently, investors have also been able to donate bonds to charities, universities, and other institutions in Israel.
Although yields are lower than comparable sovereign bonds, their appeal derives from trust in their developmental impact and solidarity with Israel. Key contractual features, including limited transferability and the absence of collective action clauses, have reinforced investor confidence (Mulliken, 2024[180]). Unlike many diaspora bond schemes, which are often designed to raise concessional financing during crises, Israel Bonds are issued continuously across market cycles, with a wide range of maturities and denominations. Bradley, Salvatierra and Gulati (2024[181]) have analysed the connections between periods of financial recession in Israel and the uptake of diaspora bonds. They find that diaspora bonds attract significantly more funding during crises, such as the COVID‑19 pandemic, when they provided an important source of low-cost financing. Nonetheless, they have also offered a permanent vehicle for diaspora engagement since their establishment (Vos, 2012[182]).
A further factor in Israel’s success has been the careful adaptation of bond issuance to the legal and regulatory frameworks of key host countries (Gevorkyan, 2021[179]). The DCI was established in New York and registered as an official broker-dealer with the US Securities and Exchange Commission. Canada Israel Securities, Ltd was incorporated to operate in Canada, while Israel Bonds International was established in Mexico with activities across South America and Europe. Each organisation was set up in compliance with local legislation. Although this approach entailed additional complexity and required strong monitoring and reporting, it also signalled the government’s willingness to prioritise trust and financial security by meeting the regulatory requirements of countries where diaspora communities had settled.
India has made use of diaspora bonds at several critical moments to address external financing needs. The government-owned State Bank of India (SBI) first issued the Indian Development Bonds in 1991 during a balance‑of-payments crisis. This was followed by the Resurgent India Bonds in 1998 and the Indian Millennium Deposits (IMDs) in 2000, which alone raised USD 5.5 billion. Across the three programmes, more than USD 11 billion was mobilised (Ketkar and Ratha, 2007[178]).
The relative success of these instruments has been partly attributed to diaspora familiarity with India’s markets, which reduced their risk aversion compared to other foreign investors. Unlike Israel’s approach, however, India offered near-market yields, suggesting that patriotic or solidarity motives played a smaller role. Instead, investors were primarily motivated by the combination of competitive returns and confidence in their knowledge of domestic market dynamics (Ketkar and Ratha, 2007[178]).
Selecting the right markets for issuance is a critical decision in any diaspora bond programme, and India’s experience with the IMDs highlights both the opportunities and the trade‑offs involved. The State Bank of India chose not to register the IMDs with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), as their classification as deposits made compliance with US securities law more complex. As a result, the bonds were issued instead to diaspora investors in Europe, the Gulf States and the Middle East. While this approach avoided regulatory complications, it also excluded the large and economically influential Indian diaspora in the United States, limiting the programme’s overall reach. For Ukraine, this underscores the importance of carefully weighing regulatory feasibility against the need to include major diaspora communities in any potential bond initiative.
Nigeria launched its first five‑year diaspora bond in 2017, raising USD 300 million in its first week, with an interest rate of 5.62% (Kazeem, 2017[183]). The initiative was launched against the backdrop of significant remittance inflows, with Nigerian diaspora communities in the United States sending USD 5.7 billion in 2015. Given that Nigerians represent the largest population of foreign-born Africans in the Unite States, the bond was expected to provide a promising avenue for financing part of the government’s deficit. From a financial perspective, the issuance was a success: it was oversubscribed by 30% and the principal was fully repaid in 2022.
A key factor in this success was Nigeria’s ability to secure regulatory approval in major high-income jurisdictions, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom (Rustomjee, 2018[184]). Clearance from the US Securities and Exchange Commission and the UK Listing Authority enabled Nigeria to market the bond as a retail instrument to diaspora investors living in developed economies. Access to these well-regulated capital markets was essential in building confidence and enhancing the bond’s credibility. By aligning its issuance with international standards for transparency and investor protection, Nigeria mitigated concerns related to sovereign and currency risk. Successfully navigating these regulatory environments, home to some of the largest Nigerian diaspora communities, was a critical factor in the oversubscription of the bond. The experience highlights the importance of institutional readiness and compliance for emerging economies seeking to mobilise diaspora capital through formal financial instruments.
International experience shows that diaspora bonds can mobilise significant resources, but their success depends on credibility, inclusiveness, and the ability to sustain investor confidence over time. For Ukraine, these challenges are particularly relevant given the diversity of its diaspora, which includes both long-established communities and those displaced more recently. The table below summarises key considerations.
Israel has developed a long-term, staged approach to engaging its diaspora, strengthening ties over time and providing clear pathways for those who choose to settle. In the current context, returns from the Ukrainian diaspora are likely to remain limited. However, Israel’s model demonstrates how to lay the groundwork for future return through consistent outreach abroad, the promotion of visits, opportunities for short-term and permanent return, and predictable early support on arrival. For Ukraine, adapting selected elements could help sustain connections with communities abroad, support voluntary and informed choices, and improve reintegration outcomes when conditions allow.
Over the years, Israel has developed a highly structured and multi-layered approach to diaspora engagement, with numerous programmes and measures spanning different spheres of life and encouraging investment in the country. From its inception, Israel has also promoted the settlement of individuals of Jewish heritage. The 1950 Law of Return is the main legal instrument structuring Israel’s strategy of reterritorialisation of diaspora Jews. It establishes a straightforward framework that grants Israeli citizenship to any non-Israeli Jew and entitles them to settle in Israel, with provisions also applying to their children and grandchildren. In the context of the formation of the State of Israel, the Law primarily enabled the immigration of Holocaust survivors and Jews in neighbouring Arab states after 1948; later it supported those arriving after the fall of the Soviet Union.
A further shift towards actively attracting Jews abroad occurred in the 1990s, when labour and capital shortages brought greater focus on the potential economic contribution of returnees (Cohen, 2013[187]). Return programmes constructed by state agencies, notably the Ministry of Aliyah and Integration, the Jewish Agency for Israel, and other non-governmental, private and diaspora organisations working in close partnership with government, have therefore often targeted highly skilled returnees, in particular engineers and scientists, considered an economic asset to the country (Grossman, 2024[188]). While efforts to facilitate skilled return migration remain a priority, and are reflected for example in recent reforms on the recognition of qualifications, the full range of measures is available to the broader Jewish diaspora wishing to return. The selected measures below illustrate Israel’s step-by-step approach to strengthening ties and facilitating eventual return.
Israeli Houses were first launched in 2014 by the Ministry of Aliyah and Integration in co‑operation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There are currently 15 houses operating mainly in cities with large Israeli and Jewish populations abroad, including New York, Miami, Los Angeles, Paris, Berlin and Toronto. Typically located within consulates or embassies, they function as cultural and community hubs designed to maintain close contact with Israeli citizens living abroad while facilitating future return.
Activities include Hebrew-language classes, Israeli holiday celebrations, cultural events and youth activities. Co‑ordination with local diaspora organisations, Jewish community centres and NGOs is frequent, enabling wide outreach. Israeli Houses are also tasked with gathering feedback from Israelis abroad and conveying their concerns to Israeli ministries, creating a two‑way channel of communication. This model shows how consular structures can act not only as providers of documents and consular services, but also as proactive community spaces.
The official mandate of Israeli Houses is also to provide advice and guidance for those interested in returning, including personal support and counselling to plan the move (Ministry of Aliyah and Integration, 2025[189]). They organise lectures on rights and benefits for returnees, orientation sessions on employment and education in Israel, and practical guidance on the return process. In recent years, some Israeli Houses have also employed dedicated Aliyah co‑ordinators to support potential returnees throughout the process, although this role is not available in every location. The extent of return-related support therefore varies by community. While Israeli Houses in the United States place strong emphasis on guidance for return, in other settings the focus is more limited. In Berlin, for example, activities focus primarily on cultural ties, and encouragement of return occurs informally and on an individual basis upon request.
Birthright Israel was founded in 1999 to provide free, short-term heritage trips for young diaspora Jews aged 18‑26 who had not previously participated in an organised programme in Israel. Trips typically last 10 days and combine historical and cultural tours with peer-to-peer engagement and educational workshops. A distinctive element is the participation of Israeli peers, which fosters connections and dialogue.
Since its inception, more than 800 000 young adults from over 70 countries have joined Birthright trips, with annual participation reaching around 40 000 before the COVID‑19 pandemic. Evaluations indicate that the programme strengthens Jewish identity, increases connection with Israel, and encourages participation in longer-term initiatives such as Masa. Birthright is organised as a non-profit partnership with a three‑way funding model involving the Government of Israel, the Jewish Agency and Jewish communities, and major philanthropic donors (notably the Adelson Family Foundation). Participation is free of charge, supporting accessibility across socio‑economic groups.
For Ukraine, Birthright demonstrates how short, fully subsidised exposure programmes can provide an entry point for longer-term engagement. An adapted Ukrainian model could target displaced youth, offering cultural, educational and professional familiarisation visits that sustain ties during displacement while encouraging future return when conditions allow.
Masa Israel Journey was launched in 2004 as a joint initiative of the Government of Israel (through the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Aliyah and Integration) and the Jewish Agency for Israel. It offers medium- to long-term programmes, usually between five and 12 months, for young diaspora Jews aged 18‑30. By 2023, more than 200 000 young people from over 60 countries had participated, with an annual intake of around 12 000.
Masa provides over 200 tracks covering academic study, internships, volunteering, leadership training and religious study. The aim is to strengthen Jewish identity, foster professional and educational development, and create lasting links with Israel. Participants live in Israeli cities, are paired with mentors, and often integrate into local universities or workplaces. Evaluations indicate that alumni are more likely to remain engaged with Israel, pursue aliyah, or return for work and study. The programme is funded through a hybrid public – private model: roughly one‑third of costs are covered by the Government of Israel, one‑third by the Jewish Agency and philanthropic foundations, with the remainder from participant contributions. Scholarships and grants of USD 500 to USD 3 000 per person are provided, with additional needs-based support available.
The Absorption Basket is financial assistance for returnees who choose to migrate formally to Israel, providing support during the initial period as they settle. Assistance covers living expenses for the duration of ulpan study (six months), during which returnees learn Hebrew and receive orientation on Israeli society, politics and culture. Financial assistance also includes rental support for the first 12 months in Israel. The Absorption Basket is available to new immigrants from around the world.
To qualify, individuals must obtain new-immigrant status and use the financial support within the first year after arrival. Payments are issued in instalments, with the first portion provided at the airport upon arrival or directly into the recipient’s bank account. The remaining payments are disbursed monthly over six months. After this period, additional financial aid may be available, such as assured income payments, to support continued integration. The assistance is universal for those eligible and is not customised to specific needs; the value of each instalment is determined by age and marital status. In 2025, the total of cash and bank payments was ILS 21 194 (EUR 5 415) for a single person, ILS 34 262 (EUR 8 755) for a single‑parent household, and ILS 40 405 (EUR 10 325) for a couple.
Israel also operates residential acculturation centres that provide comprehensive support for new immigrants (olim) as they transition to life in the country. These Absorption Centres, or Merkaz Klita, are primarily intended for those with more substantial settlement support needs, such as limited language skills, limited financial means, or other factors that may complicate their settlement in the country. They serve as transitional hubs offering both accommodation and a structured package of integration assistance during the first months after arrival. In addition to housing, they provide language instruction, life skills training, guidance on employment and public services, psychological counselling, and support for children’s school integration.
Developed in the late 1960s to accommodate the sharp rise in immigration, particularly from Western countries, Absorption Centres have since evolved into an essential component of Israel’s integration infrastructure. A key element of each centre is the ulpan, an intensive Hebrew language school that provides around five hours of immersive instruction daily for five months. Today, 18 Absorption Centres are operated by the Jewish Agency, serving several thousand new immigrants each year. Thirteen of these are dedicated to Ethiopian newcomers, offering subsidised housing and culturally adapted assistance, while others host immigrants from the former Soviet Union, South America, and other regions. Several centres also specialise in supporting arrivals from crisis zones, including the Middle East and North Africa, under the Aliyah of Rescue programme.