Ukraine’s Strategic Response to the Displacement Crisis

3. Relevant legal, institutional and policy landscape in Ukraine

Abstract

This chapter offers an overview of the legislation, policy frameworks and institutional arrangements related to IDP support, return, reintegration, and engagement with the Ukrainian global community. It highlights Ukraine’s strategic response to the challenges in these areas arising from Russia’s full-scale invasion, as well as the concrete measures and initiatives implemented to support IDPs, returnees and engagement with Ukrainians abroad. While the focus is primarily on state‑led action in Ukraine, the chapter also examines the role of non-state actors and highlights select measures undertaken by host countries in co‑operation with Ukraine.

Legal frameworks

On the eve of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine, the concepts of IDP support, return, reintegration, and engagement with the Ukrainian global community were not entirely new to Ukraine. Existing legislation and institutional practices had already incorporated these notions, largely in response to earlier waves of migration and displacement. This foundation provided an important reference point for shaping subsequent policy responses.

However, the unprecedented scale, complexity, and geographical spread of displacement triggered by the 2022 invasion introduced entirely new challenges that existing frameworks were not fully equipped to address. As a result, while the earlier legal architecture served as a starting point, significant adaptation and expansion were required to meet the evolving needs of displaced populations, support sustainable return and reintegration processes, and engage effectively with Ukrainians abroad.

As of 2025, the regulation of relations with individuals of Ukrainian origin (both ethnic and territorial) and their descendants, whether residing within or outside of Ukraine, is grounded in the Constitution of Ukraine, national laws, presidential decrees, resolutions and orders of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (CMU), other regulatory legal acts, as well as international treaties ratified by the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine.1

Historical evolution of relevant legal frameworks

Since gaining independence in 1991, Ukraine has made significant progress in developing a comprehensive legal framework governing migration within, to and from the country, as well as in defining its relationship with individuals of Ukrainian origin, whether ethnic or territorial, and their descendants, residing both within and beyond its borders. This framework was completely novel and drew from no prior provisions, because neither a dedicated migration policy nor institutional structures to manage migration-related matters existed in the former Soviet Republic of Ukraine. Moreover, the guiding principles and objectives of building modern Ukraine’s migration framework represented a fundamental departure from the Soviet-era approach.

At its core, the current framework enshrines the principles of freedom of movement within the country and across its borders, a major difference from Soviet-era restrictions on emigration, reflecting broader processes of democratisation of Ukrainian society. It also reflects the adoption of international standards, alignment with European regulations, Ukraine’s deeper European integration process, as well as the need to address the new migration challenges that Ukraine has encountered since its independence (Malynovska, 2018[1]; Fedyuk and Kindler, 2016[2]).

Already at the dawn of its independence, Ukraine demonstrated its commitment to engaging with its global community. In the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine (1990), adopted by the parliament, Ukraine proclaimed its concern for meeting the national, cultural, religious and linguistic needs of Ukrainians living outside the country. In doing so, it acknowledged at the state level the existence of this population group and the importance of building relationships with it.

The Constitution of Ukraine includes several provisions relevant to citizenship, Ukrainians abroad, and return to Ukraine. These include: Article 4 and Article 25, which pertain to citizenship; Article 12, which states that Ukraine cares for the national, cultural, and linguistic needs of Ukrainians abroad; and Article 25, which guarantees Ukrainian state protection to its citizens abroad. Article 33 enshrines the right to freedom of movement, the choice of place of residence, the right to leave Ukraine (unless otherwise restricted by law), as well as the right to return. Article 138 refers to the development of programmes aimed at the return of citizens who had been deported during the communist totalitarian regime.

Immediately after its independence in 1991, Ukraine faced the tasks of defining and regulating its citizenship and population movements within and outside its borders, and facilitating the return of ethnic Ukrainians and their descendants. A series of laws adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament in those early years of the republic continue to form the basis of Ukraine’s policy towards its population, regardless of location. They included: the Law on the Rehabilitation of Victims of Repressions of the Communist Totalitarian Regime of 1917-1991 (1991); the Law on the Citizenship of Ukraine (1991; replaced by a new law in 2001); the Law on the Procedure for Leaving Ukraine and Entering Ukraine for Citizens of Ukraine (1994); and the Law on the Right to Freedom of Movement and the Choice of Place of Residence in Ukraine (2003) (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1. Laws regulating IDP support, return, reintegration, and diaspora engagement

Name of the legal act	Status	Main provisions
Law on the Rehabilitation of Victims of Repressions of the Communist Totalitarian Regime of 1917-1991	Adopted on 17.04.1991; active with amendments (last on 19.11.2024)	Guarantees the right of return to Ukraine for its citizens who were victims of forced displacement and deportations outside Ukrainian territory during the totalitarian regime.
Law on Ukrainian Citizenship	Adopted on 18.01.2001; active with amendments (last on 20.08.2024). Replaces the Law on Citizenship of 1991.	Regulates matters of citizenship, including the procedures for acquiring and terminating Ukrainian citizenship. Facilitates citizenship acquisition for Ukrainians with Ukrainian descent or kinship, based on the territorial principle.
Law on the Procedure for Leaving Ukraine and Entering Ukraine for Citizens of Ukraine (1994)	Adopted on 21.01.1994; active with amendments (last on 10.10.2024)	Guarantees the freedom of leaving the country and returning to Ukraine.
Law on the Right to Freedom of Movement and the Choice of Place of Residence in Ukraine	Adopted on 11.12.2003; active with amendments (last on 23.08.2023)	Guarantees the freedom of movement and the right to freely choose a place of residence within the territory of Ukraine.
Law on Foreign Ukrainians	Adopted on 04.03.2004; active with amendments (last on 10.10.2024)	Defines a “foreign Ukrainian” as a person holding citizenship of another country, or a stateless person, who has Ukrainian ethnic origin or territorial origin from Ukraine. Defines terms of obtaining this legal status, and special rights, including for entry, work, and obtaining citizenship of Ukraine for this person and his/her relatives.
Law on Ensuring the Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced Persons	Adopted on 20.10.2014; active with amendments (last on 10.10.2024)	Key guiding legal document on IDPs. Provides a definition of IDPs, guarantees protection of their rights, creation of conditions for voluntary return, and integration in a new place of living.
Law on External Labour Migration	Adopted on 05.11.2015; active with amendments (last on 20.03.2023)	Defines the legal and organisational framework for state regulation of external labour migration and social protection of Ukrainian labour migrants and their families abroad. Defines responding to national, cultural, and language needs of Ukrainians abroad, supporting civil organisations of Ukrainians abroad, and creating conditions for return and reintegration as key directions of migration policy.
Law on the Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy	Adopted on 21.07.2010; active with amendments (last on 13.12.2022). Amendment to include the question of return of Ukrainians: 07.11.2017	Ensuring the protection of the rights of Ukrainian citizens working abroad and the facilitation of their return is proclaimed as one of the main principles of domestic policy in the social sphere.
Law on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding Ensuring the Exercise of the Right to Acquire and Retain Ukrainian Citizenship	Adopted on 18.06.2025	Introduces the concept of “multiple citizenship”; allows Ukrainians to hold citizenship of other states from a list defined by the Cabinet of Ministers (excluding aggressor states, notably the Russian Federation, and countries that do not recognise Ukraine’s territorial integrity); establishes simplified procedures for certain categories (ex.: foreign Ukrainians), specifies mandatory exams for acquiring citizenship

In 2004, the adoption of the Law on Foreign Ukrainians constituted an important landmark in building relations with individuals of Ukrainian descent abroad.2 This law provided a definition of a “foreign Ukrainian” as a citizen of another state, or a stateless person, who is either originally from Ukraine, or whose ancestors are from Ukraine, or who recognises Ukraine as his or her home country. This law enshrined co‑operation with “foreign Ukrainians” as part of the consolidation of the Ukrainian nation. It proclaimed that the State of Ukraine has an obligation to meet the national, cultural, and linguistic needs of these individuals. It recognised the value of mutual cultural enrichment between Ukrainians in Ukraine and “foreign Ukrainians”. It also defined the possibility of simplified entry to and stay in Ukraine for “foreign Ukrainians”, as well as preferential treatment with regard to work permits and admission to tertiary education compared to citizens of other countries. As such, for a long time, this law has been largely seen as the Ukrainian “diaspora law” (see also Box 3.1).

By the mid‑2000s, the question of return for Ukrainian citizens working abroad had emerged in the country’s legal framework and policy space, reflecting the sizeable emigration flows from Ukraine of the previous decade. The legal basis for protecting the rights of Ukrainian labour migrants abroad was established in the 2010 Law on Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy and the 2015 Law on External Labour Migration. The latter formally enshrined the principle of creating conditions for the return and reintegration of labour migrants and their families as a key pillar of Ukraine’s migration policy (see also Box 3.2). It also encouraged Ukrainian labour migrants and their families to establish civil society organisations abroad and to co‑operate with Ukrainian executive authorities through these organisations. The State of Ukraine also undertook an obligation to meet the national, cultural, educational, religious and language needs of these individuals.

The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the subsequent outbreak of military aggression against Ukraine in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in 2014 resulted in the first major internal displacement crisis. In response to this unprecedented challenge, the Law of Ukraine on Ensuring the Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced Persons was adopted in the same year. This law continues to serve as the primary legal framework for regulating matters relating to IDPs to this day. Notably, it stipulates that, in cases of mass displacement affecting over 100 000 people or where the displacement-causing events persist for over six months, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine must implement comprehensive, targeted state measures to support and facilitate the social integration of IDPs.

In 2025, the Law on Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding Ensuring the Exercise of the Right to Acquire and Retain Ukrainian Citizenship (No. 11 469) introduced the possibility of multiple citizenship. It allows citizens of certain countries to acquire Ukrainian citizenship via a simplified process, without having to renounce their existing citizenship. The law was explicitly adopted with the aim of facilitating the return of Ukrainians and maintaining ties with those who cannot return immediately.

In addition to this national legal framework, Ukraine has also signed several international agreements. Notably, the Agreement between Ukraine and the European Community on Readmission (signed in 2007, ratified in 2008, and in force since 2010) defines the procedures for the return of citizens who are in an irregular situation.

Box 3.1. Who belongs to the Ukrainian diaspora?

There is no single definition of “diaspora”. Historically, the term has been associated with the notion of forced displacement (OECD, 2012[3]). Today, the term is broadly used from the origin-country perspective to refer to citizens or people of that country’s descent living abroad.

Classical scholars in the field of diaspora studies emphasise the importance of collective memory or sentimental attachment to the country of origin as a defining characteristic of a diaspora (Sheffer, 1986[4]). Cohen (1997[5]) includes in his definition a range of reasons for leaving the country of origin, from traumatic events to the search for employment. He also highlights the role of collective memory and the existence of a shared myth about the homeland and an idealised vision of ancestral roots.

As the topic has been gaining more policy attention around the world, the term is no longer used exclusively by academics, which has prompted the need for an operational definition. The definition proposed by the (European Commission, 2005, p. 23[6]) suggests that: “The diaspora from a given country […] includes not only the nationals from that country living abroad, but also migrants who, living abroad, have acquired the citizenship of their country of residence (often losing their original citizenship in the process), and migrants’ children born abroad, whatever their citizenship, as long as they retain some form of commitment to and/or interest in their country of origin or that of their parents”.

In the Ukrainian context, the notion of “diaspora” reflects the country’s migration history and the early migration waves of the twentieth century, which were largely permanent and often associated with political exile. This understanding of “diaspora” is reflected in, and was further reinforced by, the 2004 Law on Foreign Ukrainians. The law defines “foreign Ukrainians” as citizens of another state, or stateless persons, who are either originally from Ukraine, have ancestors from Ukraine, or who recognise Ukraine as their home country. The law provides a legal basis for the relationship between the State of Ukraine and “foreign Ukrainians” and is often referred to as the “diaspora law”.

For example, the Strategy of Demographic Development up to 2040 (adopted in 2024), explicitly refers to “diaspora” solely as individuals of Ukrainian origin and their descendants who hold the citizenship of other countries. In this document, the term “diaspora” is understood in the sense defined by the Law on Foreign Ukrainians adopted 20 years earlier and does not encompass Ukrainian citizens living abroad.

Given this narrow definition of “diaspora”, Ukrainian public discourse has faced challenges in defining, and therefore adequately addressing, the needs and roles of Ukrainian citizens living abroad. Several laws, policy processes, and institutional bodies address “labour migrants” and outline how the State should engage with them, distinguishing them from the “diaspora” and, more recently, from those “forcibly displaced abroad”. At the same time, other categories of Ukrainian emigrants, such as spouses of foreign nationals, scientists or athletes, are rarely included in discussions on how Ukraine seeks to maintain relations with its nationals abroad.

The need to consider collectively all individuals of Ukrainian descent abroad became particularly evident after 2022, when they mobilised as an integral part of Ukrainian civil society in response to the invasion. The term “Ukrainian global community”, first introduced by a Presidential Decree as early as 2006, was revived and given a formal definition in the draft strategy “Ukrainian Global Community: New Policies for the Period 2025-2027”. The Ukrainian global community is defined as encompassing Ukrainian citizens abroad, regardless of the duration of stay or reason for migration, as well as “foreign Ukrainians” who identify with the Ukrainian state and nationhood. This concept aligns with the definition of “diaspora” proposed by the European Commission in 2005.

While the draft strategy has not been formally adopted, this terminology offers a useful way to bridge the different groups that make up Ukrainian communities abroad. In this review, the term is used alongside the term “diaspora,” both being applied in their broadest sense to refer to all Ukrainians and individuals of Ukrainian descent living outside Ukraine, regardless of their migration history.

Box 3.2. What are the definitions of “integration” and “reintegration”?

In migration literature, integration is generally used to describe a migrant’s experience. It is defined as a multidimensional, two‑way process that enables individuals to participate fully in the economic, social, and cultural life of their host society. This encompasses equitable access to education, employment, healthcare and housing, as well as active engagement in community and civic activities (see, for example, (OECD/European Union, 2015[7]; Algan et al., 2012[8]).

Reintegration, in turn, is defined as the process by which a returnee restores the economic, social, cultural, political and psychosocial relationships necessary for maintaining a livelihood and dignity in their country of origin or, for IDP, in their previous habitual place of residence (Cassarino, 2014[9]; OECD, 2024[10]).

According to the International Recommendations on IDP Statistics (IRIS) (EGRISS, 2020[11]), when applied to IDPs, the terms “reintegration” and “integration” “entail that IDPs are not discriminated against and are not facing any specific protection or assistance needs in relation to their displacement. They are expected to be able to exercise their rights in the same way as the usually resident population, regardless of the settlement option (i.e. physical location) chosen. When this occurs, they should no longer be considered to be IDPs.” (p. 42).

Early state programmes to engage with Ukrainians abroad and promote return and reintegration before 2022

Already in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Ukrainian Government launched several initiatives to build ties with individuals of Ukrainian origin and their descendants living abroad. In 1996, the CMU adopted its first state programme, Ukrainian Diaspora for the Period up to 2000. This was followed in 2001 by a presidential decree establishing the national programme Foreign Ukrainianhood for the Period up to 2005. These early programmes, however, were not adequately supported by financial resources, and Ukraine lacked the institutional capacity to implement them effectively at the time. As a result, they remained largely declarative in nature (Bozhuk, 2010[12]).

To provide new impetus to earlier policies and to continue building a legal framework for co‑operation with “foreign Ukrainians” and Ukrainians abroad, the national concept for Co‑operation with Foreign Ukrainians up to 2010 was adopted by presidential decree in 2006. This document aimed to create favourable conditions for preserving and developing the cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of Ukrainians abroad, and to promote co‑operation between Ukrainian society, “foreign Ukrainians”, and Ukrainians abroad more broadly. For the first time, this legal act introduced the term “Ukrainian global community” and recognised that “foreign Ukrainians” formed an integral part of it. The decree assigned responsibility for implementing it to the CMU.

In line with this, in 2008, the CMU adopted the Plan for the Priority Measures for Developing Ties with Ukrainians Living Abroad, Preserving, Protecting, and Popularising the Cultural Heritage of Ukraine in the World for 2008-2009. Once again, due to limited budgetary allocations, most of the measures outlined in these documents were not fully implemented.

In 2006, for the first time, the issue of returning labour migrants and supporting their reintegration appeared in the Strategy of Demographic Development up to 2015. To advance this policy, in 2017, the CMU adopted the Action Plan for Ensuring the Reintegration of Labour Migrants and Their Family Members into Society. This action plan, which did not set specific deadlines, was to be implemented on an ongoing basis by several ministries, including the Ministries of Economy, Education and Science, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Social Policy, Internal Affairs, and Health. The plan outlined measures to facilitate employment and ensure social and health protection for returning labour migrants, to support the inclusion of their children in the education system, to strengthen the capacity of diplomatic missions abroad to assist with returns, and to enhance co‑operation with foreign governments and international organisations on reintegration matters.

In 2017, the Government of Ukraine developed the Strategy of the State Migration Policy of Ukraine for the Period up to 2025 (amended in 2024). From its inception, the strategy aimed to encourage the return of Ukrainian labour migrants by creating conditions for voluntary return, facilitating reintegration, and promoting co‑operation with civil society organisations representing Ukrainian migrants abroad.

Two legal documents were adopted to provide a further foundation for strengthening national unity, including the Decree of the President of Ukraine of 2016 (No. 534/2016) “On priority measures to promote the strengthening of national unity and consolidation of Ukrainian society, and support for public initiatives in this area”, and the Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of 2018 (No. 179‑r) “On approval of the action plan to strengthen national unity, consolidate Ukrainian society, and support for public initiatives in this area”.

Following the start of the internal displacement crisis in 2014, a Strategy of Integration of Internally Displaced Persons and Implementation of Long-term Solutions for Internal Displacement for the Period up to 2020, was adopted in 2017. This was followed, in 2021, by the Strategy of Integration of Internally Displaced Persons and Implementation of Medium-term Solutions for Internal Displacement for the Period up to 2024.

Institutional responsibilities and key actors

As with the legal framework, on the eve of the invasion, a number of key actors and responsible bodies were already active in the areas of displacement management, IDP support, return, reintegration, and diaspora engagement. Following the invasion, the mandates of many institutions were adjusted to address the new challenges, and several new stakeholders emerged.

Considering that the independent State of Ukraine had to establish its migration institutions from the ground up after 1991, the current institutional framework remains relatively recent and continues to evolve. It reflects the early political, administrative and financial challenges associated with state‑building, as well as Ukraine’s international obligations and the growing complexity of migration dynamics. These challenges originated before independence but have intensified since the early 2000s and remain evident in 2025.

As of 2025, the formulation and implementation of state policy relating to return, reintegration, and engagement with the Ukrainian global community are carried out within their respective mandates by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, central executive authorities, local state administrations, and local self-government bodies.

Central executive authorities

The system of central executive authorities in Ukraine comprises ministries and other national executive bodies.3 The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine directs and co‑ordinates the work of the ministries and, in part determines their mandates.4

Issues concerning individuals of Ukrainian origin and their descendants abroad, as well as the facilitation of their return to Ukraine, fall within the mandates of several ministries, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Over time, other ministries have also become involved in these areas as part of their evolving mandates. For example, from the 2000s, matters related to the return and reintegration of Ukrainian labour migrants from abroad have increasingly been integrated into the responsibilities of the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity; the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture; and the Ministry of Education and Science.

The large‑scale displacement that began in 2014 and escalated to unprecedented levels after 2022, both within and beyond Ukraine, resulted in further adjustments to the original mandates of several ministries to strengthen their ability to respond to the complex challenges of displacement, return and reintegration. This evolving situation also prompted the establishment of new ministries to manage these issues more effectively.

As of 2025, the Ministry of Internal Affairs serves as the central executive authority responsible for formulating state policy on migration, including the prevention of irregular migration, citizenship, the registration of individuals, and the management of refugees and different categories of migrants as defined by law.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs oversees and co‑ordinates the work of the State Migration Service of Ukraine, which is the central executive agency tasked with implementing national migration policy. It was created in 2010 to consolidate executive functions in the field of migration and ensure a coherent government-wide approach to migration management. The State Migration Service was responsible for developing and implementing Ukraine’s first migration strategy, the Strategy of the State Migration Policy of Ukraine for the Period up to 2025, adopted in 2017 and amended in 2024. The State Migration Service also provides documentation to IDPs, certifying their identity and legal status.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the principal body within the system of central executive authorities responsible for formulating and implementing state policy in the field of foreign relations. Among its key responsibilities are:

• Developing and maintaining relations with Ukrainians abroad and their public organisations, and co‑ordinating the activities of executive authorities to foster these connections;

• Protecting the rights and interests of Ukrainian citizens and legal entities abroad;

• Co‑ordinating the work of central executive authorities to ensure effective co‑operation with Ukrainians abroad;

• Providing organisational, methodological, technical, and other forms of support to organisations of Ukrainians abroad;

• Implementing state‑funded measures to support ties with Ukrainians living outside Ukraine;

• Ensuring the functioning of the National Commission on Ukrainians Abroad;

• Accepting applications for the status of “foreign Ukrainian” and issuing documents confirming this status.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also has the Department of Ukrainians Worldwide and Humanitarian Co‑operation, which is responsible for developing and implementing policies related to the Ukrainian diaspora and humanitarian initiatives abroad, including overseeing diaspora relations, strengthening ties with Ukrainian communities worldwide, promoting cultural and educational exchanges, and advocating for the interests of Ukrainian citizens abroad.

The Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture is the main central executive authority responsible for, among other areas, formulating and implementing state policy on employment and labour migration. In this capacity, it:

• Defines the economic foundations of demographic and social development and prepares population forecasts for Ukraine;

• Participates in analysing the economic dimensions of state migration policy;

• Develops and submits policy proposals on employment, including measures to facilitate job creation, match labour supply and demand, enhance social protection against unemployment, ensure professional training opportunities, and regulate the labour migration of Ukrainian citizens;

In 2017, the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture was designated as the lead ministry responsible for implementing the Action Plan for Ensuring the Reintegration of [Returning] Labour Migrants and Their Family Members into Society.

The ministry also directs and co‑ordinates the work of the State Employment Service, a specialised centralised body responsible for implementing state policy in the areas of employment and labour migration. To fulfil its mandate, it also co‑operates with the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity and other relevant ministries. The State Employment Service plays a prominent role in supporting the employment of IDPs by providing job search and placement assistance, career counselling, information and opportunities for reskilling and upskilling, as well as implementing other state programmes, such as training vouchers and employer compensation schemes to encourage the hiring of IDPs.

The Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity is a central executive authority responsible for formulating state policy on the social support of IDPs. Its key responsibilities here include:

• Managing the Unified Information Database on IDPs;

• Facilitating the provision of social assistance to IDPs;

• Collecting and analysing information on the social support needs of IDPs;

• Providing methodological guidance and co‑ordinating the work of national and local authorities, local self-government bodies, and administrative service centres on social support for IDPs;

• Developing and submitting proposals to the CMU on social assistance measures that take into account the needs of IDPs;

• Designing state programmes related to the social support of IDPs.

This ministry also develops and submits proposals for improving state policy on demographic development, including the regulation of migration flows. It is the lead body responsible for the development and implementation of the Strategy of Demographic Development of Ukraine for the Period up to 2040, adopted in 2024. One of the strategy’s objectives is to achieve positive net migration by promoting voluntary return, enhancing co‑operation with representatives of foreign Ukrainians, and encouraging the arrival of labour migrants in Ukraine.

Historically, throughout the 2000s and 2010s, this Ministry was also responsible for regulating labour migration, including the reintegration of labour migrants, until this mandate was transferred to the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture.

Since July 2025, the portfolio of the former Ministry of Unity was transferred to the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity. Given this, in addition to the above, they are also responsible for the development and implementation of state policy on the national unity of Ukraine, the Ukrainian national identity, the information policy on Ukraine’s unity and strategic communications (within the scope of powers related to national unity), as well as the state policy concerning Ukrainian citizens who have left their place of residence within the territory of Ukraine, including as a result of, or in order to avoid, the negative consequences of the armed conflict and/or the temporary occupation of part of Ukraine’s territory, and have departed abroad. The ministry is tasked with facilitating the exercise of their rights and interests, and with creating conditions for the voluntary return of such persons to their former place of residence or their integration at a new place of residence in Ukraine. Its main tasks pertaining to this mandate include:

• Ensuring the development and implementation of state policy on the national unity of Ukraine and shared development; Ukrainian national self-awareness; the information policy on Ukraine’s unity and strategic communications (within the scope of powers related to national unity); the rights and interests of persons who have left Ukraine, as defined by the legislation of Ukraine, and the creation of conditions for their voluntary return to their former place of residence or for their integration at a new place of residence in Ukraine.

• Facilitating, in co‑ordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the fulfilment of the national, cultural, educational and linguistic needs of persons who have left Ukraine; the exercise of rights and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens who hold multiple citizenships; and the consolidation of Ukrainian national identity and Ukrainian civic identity.

The Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories is the central executive authority responsible for formulating state policy in the areas of transport, infrastructure development, housing, and communal services, as well as reconstruction and regional development. Between January and July 2025, following the dissolution of the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories, this ministry assumed responsibility for providing financial assistance and developing affordable social housing for IDPs. It is also responsible for implementing regional development projects, including humanitarian assistance and social support for returnees in war-affected communities.

The Ministry of Education and Science is the principal authority within the system of central executive authorities responsible for formulating and implementing state policy in the areas of education and science. Since its establishment, one of its mandates has been the integration of Ukrainian education and scientific co‑operation with institutions, civil society organisations and private foundations abroad, including those of the Ukrainian diaspora, as well as responding to the cultural needs of Ukrainians outside Ukraine and encouraging the involvement of the diaspora in Ukraine’s cultural life.5

Notably, in 2007 the ministry supported the establishment of the distance‑learning International Ukrainian School for Ukrainians living abroad, which enables students to obtain a state‑recognised Ukrainian education diploma while residing outside the country.

As of 2025, the ministry is responsible for approving methodological recommendations on the provision of general secondary education under martial law, including for children who have been forcibly displaced either within or outside Ukraine. It disseminates these recommendations to the heads of general secondary education institutions and oversees their implementation.

In addition, three state institutions play a prominent role in the institutional architecture relevant for the return and reintegration of Ukrainians.

The National Qualifications Agency is a permanent collegiate body, established on a parity basis with six representatives from governmental institutions (Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity, Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture) and six from the non-governmental sector (Joint Representative Body of Employers of Ukraine, Joint Representative Body of Trade Unions of Ukraine). It implements state policy in the field of qualifications, notably harmonisation of the Ukrainian Qualifications System with the European one. It accredits qualification centres that provide the possibility to validate qualifications on the basis of formal, non-formal or informal education and training acquired in Ukraine or abroad. In addition, it co‑ordinates the development of occupational standards that meet modern labour market requirements, maintains a register of occupational standards and a register of qualifications, and also co‑ordinates the subjects of the professional improvement process of training, retraining and establishing compliance with occupational standards.

The National Agency for Higher Education Quality Assurance is a permanent collegial body, which co‑ordinates its activity with the CMU and the Ministry of Education and Sciences. Its mandate includes conducting accreditation of educational programmes and approves the procedures developed by the Ministry of Education and Science for recognising degrees and academic titles obtained in foreign higher education institutions.

National Research Foundation of Ukraine (NRFU) is a state budgetary institution. Its mission includes creating a favourable environment and attractive conditions for Ukrainian and foreign researchers in Ukraine, including for Ukrainian researchers contemplating return, by means of providing research grants.

Additionally, two ministries that have been dissolved held mandates related to the management of IDPs and returnees: the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories and the Ministry of National Unity.

The Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories was established in 2016 in response to the first displacement crisis that began in 2014. In 2024, it was restructured and renamed, with parts of its mandate transferred to the Ministry of National Unity (defunct) and the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine.

Before its restructuring, the ministry led the formulation and implementation of state policy to support IDPs between 2016 and 2024. During this period, its responsibilities included:

• Formulating and implementing state policy related to IDPs and citizens who left temporarily occupied territories due to, or to avoid, the consequences of armed conflict or occupation, as well as EDPs.

• Supporting the protection of rights and freedoms of displaced persons and creating conditions for their voluntary return or integration into new communities;

• Facilitating the social protection of IDPs and EDPs;

• Providing methodological guidance and co‑ordinating the work of central and local authorities, local self-government bodies, including administrative service centres, on IDP-related issues;

• Supporting, together with the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity the delivery of humanitarian assistance to IDPs;

• Working with the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture and the State Employment Service to inform IDPs about employment opportunities and assist with job placement;

• Co‑ordinating efforts to create conditions that enable displaced persons to return voluntarily or integrate locally, including facilitating their socio‑economic adaptation;

• Collecting and analysing data on housing and other social protection needs of IDPs and EDPs;

• Preparing proposals to the CMU on protecting the rights and freedoms of IDPs and EDPs, and developing state programmes to address these issues;

• Ensuring, together with the Ministry of Education and Science and other relevant bodies, access to education for IDPs;

• Supporting socio‑economic and cultural development, and protecting the constitutional rights and interests of citizens forced to leave temporarily occupied territories, including IDPs;

• Advocating for the protection of displaced Ukrainians in international judicial institutions.

The Ministry of National Unity was created in late 2024 and merged with the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity in July 2025. During its mandate, it was tasked with formulating and implementing state policy on national identity and unity, information policy in the area of national unity, and related strategic communications. The ministry was established in response to the challenges arising from the large‑scale displacement of Ukrainians abroad. Its key responsibilities included:

• Formulating and implementing state policy to protect the rights and interests of persons who have moved abroad, particularly as a result of the military conflict, and creating conditions for their voluntary return to their former place of residence or integration into a new community in Ukraine;

• Working in co‑ordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to meet the national, cultural, educational and linguistic needs of Ukrainians living abroad;

• Strengthening Ukrainian national and civic identity.

• Subordinate to the ministry was the Agency of National Unity, which served as the main body responsible for implementing initiatives to engage with Ukrainian communities and civil society organisations abroad.

Finally, the National Commission for Matters Concerning Foreign Ukrainians was established in 2006 following the adoption of the Law on Foreign Ukrainians and operates under the authority of the CMU. It comprises representatives from the Office of the President, the Secretariat of the CMU, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity, the State Migration Service, the State Border Service, the State Forensic Service, the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, the National Institute of Strategic Studies, the Ukrainian Bar Association for Foreign Affairs, the Ukrainian World Congress, the Society “Ukraine‑World”, and members of the Parliament of Ukraine. Among its responsibilities, the Commission is tasked with reviewing applications and granting the legal status of “foreign Ukrainian” in accordance with the provisions of the law.

Table 3.2 summarises these mandates, by the issue addressed.

Table 3.2. Who is responsible for what? Mandates of various central executive authorities, 2025

IDPs
Emergency and social support (registration, cash benefits)	Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity; Ministry of Internal Affairs
Housing	Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories (since January 2025); Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture; Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories (until September 2024).
Employment	State Employment Service (steered and co‑ordinated by the Ministry of Economy); Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories (until September 2024).
EDPs
Consular and legal support	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Education	Ministry of Education and Science; Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity (providing textbooks)
Recognition of prior education, qualifications and skills	Ministry of Education and Science; Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture; National Qualifications Agency
Cultural needs	Ministry of Culture; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of National Unity (January – July 2025)
Facilitating returns from abroad	Ministry of Internal Affairs; State Migration Service; Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity (National Social Service); Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Digital Transformation; Ministry of National Unity (January – July 2025)
Employment upon return	State Employment Service (overseen and co‑ordinated by the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture)
Housing upon return	Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture
“Foreign Ukrainians” and the broader Ukrainian global community
Consular and legal support	Ministry of Foreign Affairs; National Commission for Matters Concerning Ukrainians Worldwide
Education	Ministry of Education and Science; Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity (providing textbooks)
Cultural needs	Ministry of Culture; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of National Unity (January – July 2025)
Cooperation with the representatives of Foreign Ukrainians and the Ukrainian global community	Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity; Ministry of National Unity (January – July 2025)
Facilitating returns from abroad	Ministry of Internal Affairs: State Migration Service; Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity; Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Digital Transformation; National Research Foundation of Ukraine; National Agency for Higher Education Quality Assurance; Ministry of National Unity (January – July 2025)
Reintegration support upon return	Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture; State Employment Service; Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity

Source: OECD Secretariat, based on the review of legal acts outlined in Table 3.1 and Table 3.4 (below), and regulations of each ministry (specific documents approved by the Resolutions of the CMU), outlining the mandate, key tasks, functions, rights, and responsibilities. Latest version of the regulations, as of February 2025, unless stated otherwise.

Local executive authorities

Executive power in oblasts (administrative divisions) and raions (districts, a sub-oblast level), as well as in the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol, is exercised by local state administrations. These bodies play a key role within their respective territories in implementing laws, decrees and resolutions of the CMU, as well as national strategies related to the reintegration of IDPs and returnees. They are responsible for executing state and regional programmes and managing corresponding budgets and measures. In many instances, they have also contributed to the development of national strategies.

Even before 2022, some local executive authorities had experience in establishing ties with the Ukrainian global community. For example, in 2002, the Kyiv City State Administration launched the project “Ukrainian School Abroad”, which by 2007 had facilitated co‑operation between 77 Kyiv schools and partner schools in several countries, including Canada, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Australia (Bozhuk, 2010[12]). Several other co‑operation programmes between Ukrainian local authorities and administrations in localities hosting Ukrainian migrant communities were also developed during the 2000s and 2010s.

On 24 February 2022, a Presidential Decree established regional and district military administrations based on local state administrations to operate for the duration of martial law.

Local self-governance authorities (hromadas)

One of the defining features of the Ukrainian society is the constitutional right of citizens to organise and exercise power through local self-governance bodies. This right, enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine and strengthened by the 2015 decentralisation reform, guarantees territorial communities (residents of a village or a voluntary association of several villages, settlements, or cities) the ability to form new local governance units known as hromadas (municipalities). These entities can independently resolve a wide range of local matters and manage them under their own responsibility. As such, hromadas have been granted expanded self-governance powers within their territories (OECD, 2018[13]). By early 2025, Ukraine counted 1 439 hromadas. They also retain a significant share of tax revenues, with 60% of local revenue remaining at the local level (Brik and Brick Murtazashvili, 2022[14]), which is spent on public services in accordance with the law and the interests of the hromada population.

Since the establishment of military administrations on 24 February 2022, under martial law, local self-governance bodies have been required to facilitate the activities of military administrations, resulting in a system of joint community management. Martial law provisions have expanded the powers of local self-governance bodies and at the same time introduced partial subordination to higher-level military administrations.

The role of local self-governance in strengthening Ukraine’s resilience during the full-scale invasion has been fundamental. In just eight years since the decentralisation reform, hromadas have fostered a strong local civic identity among citizens, regardless of ethnicity or language, uniting communities and reinforcing their determination to defend the country and build a democratic nation (Myerson, 2022[15]; Brik and Brick Murtazashvili, 2022[14]). Hromadas have also played a vital role in organising voluntary territorial defence, evacuating and supporting IDPs and returnees, fostering social cohesion, mobilising public assistance and reorganising basic social services from the very first days of the invasion (Keudel and Huss, 2025[16]).

Civil society in Ukraine

In addition to these public structures, civil society plays a prominent role in Ukraine’s response to displacement, reintegration, and engagement with the diaspora.

Since independence in 1991, and particularly following the 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity, Ukrainian civil society has undergone a remarkable transformation, becoming one of the most vibrant and active in the world (Zarembo and Martin, 2023[17]). Numerous non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play a crucial role in fostering a sense of community and collective identity among Ukrainians. The proliferation of NGOs across diverse regions and sectors, including healthcare, education, veteran inclusion, gender equality, and support for people with disabilities, demonstrates the depth and breadth of civic participation of Ukrainians. This robust civil society infrastructure not only contributes to domestic reform efforts but also strengthens Ukraine’s resilience in the face of external challenges (Bahid et al., 2024[18]).

NGOs assumed a leadership role during the full-scale invasion, responding swiftly and effectively. Drawing on established networks and community-based structures, they were often the first to assist populations affected by the invasion. They also worked in close co‑ordination with local and national authorities to address urgent challenges and meet the needs of the population.

While it is not possible to list all organisations, a notable example in maintaining ties with the diaspora and Ukrainians abroad is the Society “Ukraine‑World”, which serves on the National Commission for Matters Concerning Foreign Ukrainians. This organisation, with a century-long history, has representations in every region of Ukraine.

In the field of displacement management and reintegration, longstanding international organisations active in Ukraine, such as the Ukrainian Red Cross Society (URCS) and Caritas Ukraine, also run a variety of programmes for IDPs and returnees. Numerous additional organisations emerged following the first internal displacement crisis after 2014, and new actors have since mobilised in response to the invasion.

In response to the evolving humanitarian crisis, Ukrainian NGOs have formed numerous alliances to enhance co‑ordination and effectiveness. In September 2023, 13 organisations, including the Ukrainian Red Cross Society, Caritas Ukraine, and the Right to Protection Charitable Foundation, established the Alliance of Ukrainian Civil Society Organisations. This coalition seeks to collectively address the consequences of the war and support the reintegration of displaced populations through joint planning and stronger partnerships at regional and national levels. Such collaboration underscores the importance of civil society organisations in developing a cohesive and comprehensive approach to displacement management and reintegration in Ukraine (Interfax-Ukraine, 2023[19]).

In addition to NGOs, different social partners, including workers’ and employers’ associations, have also been at the forefront of supporting IDPs. Since 2022, and in some cases since 2014, these organisations have assisted in relocating businesses and families and have played a crucial role in maintaining social cohesion in the workplace.

Through these collective efforts, NGOs, social partners, and volunteers have been instrumental in mitigating the impact of displacement in Ukraine. They continue to provide essential services, contribute to recovery efforts, and foster unity among Ukrainians, regardless of their location.

International organisations and donors in Ukraine

Between 2022 and 2025, international organisations, including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and others, played a major role in addressing the humanitarian displacement crisis in Ukraine. Their co‑ordinated efforts ensured the delivery of critical assistance, including food, medical care, and shelter, to millions of IDPs and Ukrainians fleeing the country.

These efforts were conducted in close co‑operation with the Ukrainian Government to ensure that services were effectively delivered to those in need. International organisations also consistently advocated that returns should take place only when conditions are safe (UNHCR, 2023[20]; IOM, 2023[21]). They further promoted the inclusion of IDPs and returnees in economic activities and social protection systems, with a particular emphasis on the needs of women and children.

Civil society, including diaspora organisations outside Ukraine

Outside Ukraine, the Ukrainian global community consists of a diverse network of civic activists who can be viewed as dual-role actors, functioning both as beneficiaries of and contributors to policy processes that concern Ukrainians abroad.

As shown in Chapter 2, the Ukrainian global community is highly heterogeneous. In many countries, established “old” diasporas coexist with newly arrived migrants and displaced persons. Ukraine’s complex migration history, the diversity of migration motives and the varying needs of people have translated into a wide spectrum of civic participation among Ukrainians abroad (Fedyuk and Kindler, 2016[2]; OSCE-ODIHR, 2024[22]).

One of the main channels of civic participation among Ukrainians abroad is channeled is through NGOs and associations founded by Ukrainians themselves. Before 2022, there were at least 1000 such organisations worldwide (DEMAC, 2021[23]). This civil society landscape is very diverse and continuously evolving, and there are several, interrelated ways to categorise them6 (see also examples in Box 3.3):

• By history and legacy: One way is to consider the period in which these organisations were established and the composition of their contemporary leadership. Given Ukraine’s multiple emigration waves, organisations were founded during the pre‑First World War period, after the Second World War, following the independence, after the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, and following the 2022 invasion. Earlier organisations are often led by individuals of Ukrainian descent, sometimes from the second or third generation, while more recent ones are typically led by first-generation migrants, including displaced persons. In countries neighbouring Ukraine, some organisations are also led by representatives of different ethnic minorities from Ukraine. These factors shape each organisation’s interests, mission, objectives, and capacity.

• By mission and objectives: Organisations vary widely in their goals, which largely determine their activities. These can include maintaining Ukrainian identity and heritage abroad, preserving and transmitting culture, engaging in political advocacy for Ukraine at national and international levels; other types of advocacy, such as for gender issues; shaping public opinion, and advancing cultural and business diplomacy; philanthropy; mobilising resources; humanitarian assistance; supporting Ukraine’s defence, recovery and reintegration efforts; and practical assistance for new arrivals, including administrative, legal, financial, housing, healthcare, educational, employment and social integration support. Many Ukrainian diaspora organisations shifted their priorities after February 2022 towards fundraising, humanitarian relief, public advocacy and support for displaced populations, leveraging their international networks and resources to provide such multifaceted assistance (ICMPD, 2024[24]; Keudel et al., 2024[25]).

• By location and outreach: Some organisations operate at the local or community level in host countries, while others function as umbrella bodies that co‑ordinate networks of organisations nationally or internationally (OSCE-ODIHR, 2024[22]).

• By organisational structure: The degree of formalisation also varies. Umbrella organisations tend to have structured governance systems with co‑ordinating bodies and defined mandates, while others operate more flexibly or informally. The latter include volunteer-led social media channels that provide information and mutual support (DEMAC, 2021[23]).

• By interaction with the Ukrainian state: Traditionally, diaspora communities based in North America tend to co‑operate directly with Ukraine’s political leadership, while European-based communities are more inclined towards co‑operation with civil society organisations and local authorities in Ukraine (Clarkson, 2017[26]). Many organisations also maintain close collaboration with Ukrainian embassies (ICMPD, 2024[24]).

Box 3.3. Examples of Ukrainian global community organisations and associations

The Ukrainian World Congress (UWC), established in 1967, is one of the oldest, transnational umbrella organisations working directly with the Government of Ukraine. It serves as a global co‑ordinating body for Ukrainian communities and organisations in over 80 countries. Its headquarters are in Toronto, with missions in Kyiv, New York and Brussels. The UWC is recognised by the United Nations Economic and Social Council as a non-governmental organisation with special consultative status. It also holds participatory status as an international NGO with the Council of Europe. The UWC has established several Memoranda of Co‑operation with the Ukrainian authorities, including the Ministry of Culture (2016 and 2021), the Ukrainian Investment Promotion Office UkraineInvest (2020), the CMU (2020), and the Ministry of Defence (2023). In response to the ongoing invasion, the UWC has become a major platform for raising funds, advocating for international support, providing humanitarian aid, and supporting displaced populations and those affected by the war.

A relatively new transnational umbrella organisation is the Global Ukraine Foundation, which was established in early 2015. It focusses on developing a global network of Ukrainian public diplomats and mobilising financial and intellectual resources for local development in Ukraine. It unites 350 organisations across more than 80 countries.

The World Federation of Ukrainian Women’s Organisations at the UN (WFUWO), established in 1948 in Philadelphia and now based in Toronto, is an umbrella organisation for 35 Ukrainian women’s organisations across four continents. WFUWO has had special consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council since 1993 and was accredited with the UN Department of Public Information in 1994. WFUWO’s mission is supporting the dignity and integrity of women in Ukraine and Ukrainian women in migrant communities by “supporting adherence to international standards of human rights, raising public awareness of problems and violations, maintaining Ukrainian language and culture, cultivating awareness of Ukrainian history, family and social traditions, as well as efforts that support modern Ukraine’s development into an independent, stable democracy with respect for the rule of law”. WFUWO regularly contributes to the UN Human Rights Council, the Council of Europe and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, addressing topics like transfers and deportations, and the impact of the war in Ukraine on the rights of women, children, and displaced persons.

An example of one of the oldest national umbrella organisations is the Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC), founded in 1940. It is one of the oldest national umbrella organisations representing Ukrainian Canadian communities. It brings together national, provincial and local Ukrainian Canadian organisations. Together with its member organisations, the UCC has been instrumental in leading, co‑ordinating and representing the interests of Ukrainians and their descendants in Canada. They have also mobilised the Ukrainian-Canadian community to support both displaced Ukrainians in Canada and returnees to Ukraine through fundraising campaigns and partnering with the Canadian Government to offer resettlement programmes, including on skills training, employment support, and cultural orientation.

Similarly, the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America (UCCA), established in 1940, represents the interests of Ukrainians in the United States. It has been particularly active in addressing the needs of displaced Ukrainians, co‑ordinating with various NGOs to deliver humanitarian aid, medical supplies, and psychological support. Additionally, the UCCA has advocated for US policy in favour of aid and for Ukraine’s reconstruction and the reintegration of displaced populations.

The Plast Ukrainian Scouting Organisation, founded in Lviv in 1911 and banned during the Soviet regime, focusses on youth development, cultivating and upbringing in the spirit of shared cultural, religious, and nation-building values. Its branches are active in many countries, including Poland, Germany, Austria, France the Slovak Republic, Ireland and the Baltic countries. Plast scouts help create a shared cultural space for youth of Ukrainian descent worldwide.

The Ukrainian House in Poland, founded in 2004 and based in Warsaw, is an example of an organisation that facilitates the integration of Ukrainians while preserving their cultural identity. In April 2022, it opened the Ukrainian Warsaw School in collaboration with the Polish Intelligentsia Club. This school follows the Ukrainian national curriculum and offers Ukrainian-state recognised school diplomas. Similarly to many other Ukrainian-led civil society organisations, the Ukrainian House shifted its focus following the start of the invasion, directing its efforts towards crisis response and humanitarian assistance.

Other examples of political advocacy organisations include the European Congress of Ukrainians, founded in London in 1949 and currently headquartered in Prague, which co‑ordinates efforts to represent the interests of Ukrainians in Europe, and Promote Ukraine, a Brussels-based media platform, founded during the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 and relocated to Brussels in 2022. The latter seeks to “voice the interests of Ukrainian civil society in Brussels by sharing news, connecting experts, informing the public, coordinating events, cooperating with activists, and advocating for the Ukrainian cause to EU policymakers”.

Aide Médicale Caritative France‑Ukraine (AMCFU) is a specialised humanitarian organisation. Based in France, since its foundation in 2014, it specialises in organising regular humanitarian convoys of medical supplies, including surgical, radiology and resuscitation equipment, medicines and emergency-adapted vehicles. The organisation works directly with local Ukrainian authorities to identify priority needs and ensure efficient and transparent distribution of aid. They also support the modernisation of Ukrainian hospitals, facilitates skills exchange between French and Ukrainian health professionals, and provides direct support to vulnerable populations, including sick children, orphans, and IDPs.

In Germany, there are more than 50 Ukrainian diaspora organisations linked to the Embassy of Ukraine. The Association of Ukrainian Students in Germany, for instance, was founded in 1921 and focusses on student networking and support, while the Kul’tura Agency is an organisation promoting Ukrainian culture and art abroad.

Source: Based on OSCE-ODIHR (2024[22]), Engaging the Ukrainian Diaspora in Reconstruction and Development. ICMPD (2024[24]), “The Role of Ukrainian Diaspora in Crisis Response”, https://www.icmpd.org/file/download/60826/file/UA_Diaspora_Report_RRR_Project.pdf.; Keudel et al. (2024[25]), “Why and How Involve the Global Ukrainian Community for the Recovery of Ukraine”, Joint Policy Note, web search, and respective webpages of these organisations.

In addition to civil society organisations and associations established by Ukrainians abroad, other channels of civic engagement also exist. For example, Ukrainians abroad participate in civil society structures created by host-country natives and, through these, may act in the interests of Ukraine or the broader Ukrainian global community when such local structures share similar values, objectives, or demonstrate solidarity with the Ukrainian cause. Beyond NGOs, this engagement extends to participation and membership in trade unions, political parties, and other structures.

Another important channel of engagement is non-institutional civic participation, such as joining demonstrations, signing petitions, donating, forming online communities and sharing information through social media platforms, including Telegram and Facebook. While such activities may be more dispersed and less visible to the State of Ukraine, advances in technology now make it possible to reach these individuals and groups more effectively and to strengthen their connection with Ukraine.

Policy measures since 2022

Support for internally displaced persons

In response to Russia’s full-scale invasion, the immediate actions of Ukrainian authorities included the evacuation of civilians, facilitating the reception of IDPs in host communities, and ensuring the provision of essential humanitarian and social assistance to meet basic needs. By summer 2022, several Co‑ordination Headquarters were established at the level of the Cabinet of Ministers (CMU) to manage evacuation during martial law, support the exit of Ukrainian citizens from temporarily occupied territories, and ensure the protection of the rights and freedoms of IDPs.

The sheer scale of displacement, with over a quarter of Ukraine’s population displaced at least once between 2022 and 2024, impacted all areas of socio‑economic activity. For this reason, state actors developed specific action plans and policies targeting displaced persons.

Given their proximity to affected populations and their capacity to respond swiftly, local administrations and hromadas played a major role in both the design and implementation of these state policies. While state‑led initiatives offered financial aid, employment counselling, and housing support to IDPs, it was largely the hromadas that took responsibility for managing the day-to-day challenges of displacement. Their efforts included securing housing, distributing humanitarian and financial assistance, facilitating employment, and promoting social inclusion (Keudel and Huss, 2025[16]).

To co‑ordinate actions in support of populations affected by the war of aggression, including IDPs, 996 co‑ordination centres were created across the country at the level of local administrations or hromadas7 in 2023 alone. As their name suggests, these centres aimed to streamline collaboration across executive power bodies, ensure self-governance and order, and co‑ordinate with humanitarian organisations and volunteers on matters such as social assistance, housing, employment, psychosocial, medical, and legal support, and the receipt of humanitarian aid.

Numerous localities also created humanitarian hubs, social support centres, and “Partner Spaces of International Aid” (partnerskyy maydanchyk) to provide assistance to IDPs evacuated from occupied territories and conflict zones. These hubs co‑ordinated and facilitated access to available humanitarian aid from international organisations, donors, and NGOs outside Ukraine. Many of them were actively supported by international organisations and NGOs, including UNHCR, OCHA, UNICEF, IOM, ICRC, AICM France‑Ukraine,8 Intersos, Caritas, humanitarian mission Proliska, Pravo na Zakhyst, Ljudyna v Bidi, Rokada, Phata, and many others. Establishing such centres fostered close collaboration between civil society, international organisations, and municipal administrations, aligning their efforts with national priorities. Volunteers played a vital role as intermediaries between affected populations and larger organisations, leveraging their local knowledge and networks to address urgent needs. This synergy between local and global actors significantly enhanced the effectiveness and reach of aid efforts.

Humanitarian aid, housing and living support

The immediate challenge following the invasion was the evacuation of civilians and the delivery of humanitarian aid (food, clothing, basic medication) and housing for IDPs. The Ukrainian state responded with several measures,9 some initiated in the early days of the war and others rolled out progressively but in a timely manner.

Between 2022 and 2025, national measures included the organisation of centres for the transit and short-term stay of evacuees, the disbursement of financial assistance to them, subsequent living support to IDPs, compensation for communal expenses for individuals hosting IDPs, and various housing programmes, some of which were financed by international organisations and various donors (Box 3.4).

Numerous measures were also initiated by local executive and self-governance authorities. For example, in 2022, the city of Kyiv created a programme “Turbota: Nazustrich kyjanam” (“Care: Supporting Kyivans”), which provides free public transportation for IDPs, targeted financial aid to several distinct categories of IDPs with additional vulnerabilities, and support with elderly care, mental health, and IDP rehabilitation.

Perhaps the most significant source of Ukraine’s resilience and support to displaced populations between 2022 and 2025 has been the mobilisation of volunteers and civil society organisations. They became indispensable actors in managing the country’s humanitarian displacement crisis, offering rapid and adaptive responses to the evolving needs of displaced populations and those affected by war. Their grassroots approach ensured effective humanitarian assistance, housing solutions, and community integration (Hrudka, 2023[27]). Local volunteers and NGOs, such as Ptaha, Tvoya Opora, or the Global Network of Eco-settlements, organised evacuations, food distribution, medical care, clothing drives, and the reconstruction and adaptation of temporary shelters. They provided housing across the country, including in areas inaccessible to international organisations due to ongoing hostilities, and offered legal and psychosocial support to affected individuals and communities.

However, the need for housing remains immense, and the challenges have only grown over the course of the war. Moreover, additional issues exist, such as an unregulated rental market, increased prices, unaffordability of housing, and lack of protection against eviction and discrimination, with displaced individuals particularly affected. Many temporary housing solutions are evolving into long-term options without any improvement in their quality. In this context, transitioning from programme‑based support to a nationwide housing strategy became essential. In July 2025, the Law on the Main Principles of Housing Policy was approved in its first parliamentary reading. If adopted, this law will launch a major housing reform, setting out framework principles for the development of social housing and addressing the housing needs of IDPs and other vulnerable groups.

Box 3.4. Selected national programmes of financial and housing assistance for IDPs

One‑off monetary assistance to evacuated populations

A one‑off monetary state assistance is provided through UkrPoshta (Ukrainian Post) upon arrival by evacuation trains and buses. In 2023, over 62 000 individuals received this assistance.

Cash assistance to registered IDPs1

Living assistance is granted for an initial six‑month period to all IDPs applying for the first time. The assistance is paid monthly to one family member (referred to as the authorised person) in the following amounts: 3 000 UAH for persons with disabilities and children, and 2 000 UAH for all other individuals. Under certain conditions, the six‑month period can be renewed once. In addition, cash assistance is provided to low-income IDP families with no members able to work, to ensure a subsistence minimum.

Shelter (Prykhystok)

The Shelter, created on the first day of the invasion, has been one of the largest state‑supported initiatives connecting IDPs with individuals offering temporary housing during the war. It enables IDPs to find free accommodation and allows hosts to offer their space. Hosts may receive state compensation for communal expenses related to housing IDPs, financed by the Red Cross Society Ukraine, at a rate of UAH 14.77 per day per person. In 2023, around 90 000 homeowners were receiving this compensation monthly. See https://prykhystok.gov.ua/.

eRecovery (eVidnovlennya) / HOME2

This is a compensation programme for damaged or destroyed housing located in non-occupied territories outside active combat zones. If housing is damaged as a result of military action, the owner can report the damage through Diia. Following an assessment by a commission, monetary compensation may be granted, up to UAH 350 000 for an apartment and UAH 500 000 for a private house. In cases of total housing destruction, the owner may either receive compensation for rebuilding or a voucher to acquire new housing. The certificate is valid for five years. By 2025, 1 800 individuals bought housing using their vouchers. Financial support is provided in part by the Council of Europe Development Bank. See https://erecovery.diia.gov.ua/.

eOselya

The eOselya is an affordable housing loan programme supported by the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture; and the Ministry of Finance. It offers an application process via the Diia app and a fixed interest rate of 3% to purchase an apartment in a residential building, new or not older than ten years. Eligible participants include military personnel, medical and educational professionals, veterans, and IDPs. Loans may be secured with a minimum down payment of 20% and the maximum loan term is 20 years. The programme is implemented through participating banks. See https://eoselia.diia.gov.ua/.

Housing credit for IDPs

This programme is dedicated specifically to IDPs, with conditions similar to eOselya. Loans are awarded through a lottery-like procedure organised by the State Fund of Supporting Youth Housing Construction, financed by the Government of Germany. See https://diia.gov.ua/services/kredit-na-zhitlo-dlya-vpo.

Rental subsidy for IDPs

From January 2025, IDPs from occupied territories or combat zones, as well as those whose homes have been destroyed and are uninhabitable, may be eligible for a rental subsidy, provided they do not own alternative housing in government-controlled areas. The subsidy is granted if rental costs exceed 20% of the household’s total income. Eligibility requires that the tenant and landlord are not relatives, that the tenant is not already receiving any other state housing assistance for IDPs, and that the landlord is not receiving compensation under the “Shelter” programme. The amount of the subsidy is calculated individually based on household income, family size, and regional rental costs. The programme also covers the landlord’s taxes. This rental subsidy can be combined with subsidies for communal services available to low-income families.

Housing acquisition for IDPs

Some local administrations have acquired housing and transferred it to IDPs. Between 2023 and 2024, the city of Kyiv purchased 113 apartments for IDPs. The apartments remain the hromada’s property and are given to IDP families free of charge. An additional 500 apartments were purchased by the Kyiv city administration for renting to IDPs, who have a preferential right to purchase them over a ten‑year period. More generally, in 2023, 352 families across the country were granted priority access to permanent social housing. Almost 3 000 internally displaced families received temporary social housing through the Social Housing Fund. Several regions are currently developing social housing programmes, which include the construction and renovation of social housing. Priority is often given to internally displaced orphans.

1. The legal basis for this assistance is laid down in the following documents: Law of Ukraine “On Ensuring the Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced Persons” – Article 1; Presidential Decree No. 64 of 24.02.2022 “On the Imposition of Martial Law in Ukraine” – Subparagraph 2, Paragraph 4; Resolution of the CMU No. 709 of 11.07.2023 “On Certain Issues of Support for Internally Displaced Persons” – Paragraph 1; Resolution of the CMU No. 509 of 01.10.2014 “On the Registration of Internally Displaced Persons” – Paragraphs 1 and 2; Resolution of the CMU No. 332 of 20.03.2022 “Certain Issues Regarding the Payment of Housing Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons” – Paragraph 1; Resolution of the CMU No. 1 364 of 06.12.2022 “Certain Issues Regarding the Formation of a List of Territories Where Hostilities Are (Were) Taking Place or Temporarily Occupied by the Russian Federation”; Order of the Central Executive Authority (CEA) No. 345 of 19.06.2006 “On Approval of the Instruction on the Procedure for Processing and Maintaining Personal Files of Recipients of All Types of Social Assistance”; Order of the CEA No. 309 of 22.12.2022 “On Approval of the List of Territories Where Hostilities Are (Were) Taking Place or Temporarily Occupied by the Russian Federation”.

2. The legal basis for this is the Resolution of the CMU No. 381 of 21 April 2023 “On Approval of the Procedure for Providing Compensation for the Restoration of Certain Categories of Real Estate Objects Damaged as a Result of Hostilities, Terrorist Acts, Sabotage Caused by the Armed Aggression of the Russian Federation, Using the Electronic Public Service “eRestoration” (єВідновлення)”.

Source: Own compilation based on the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories internal report on the implementation of the Action Plan of the State Policy on Internal Displacement for the period up to 2025 and its Action Plan for 2023-2025; press releases from the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories; the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity; and services available via the Diia app.

Relocation of businesses

Relocation measures were not only aimed at individuals and their families but also at businesses. By August 2022, the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture,10 in co‑operation with regional state administrations, Ukrzaliznytsia (Ukrainian Railways) and UkrPoshta (Ukrainian Post), had supported the relocation of 725 businesses to the western part of the country, out of 1 816 enterprises that had registered applications for relocation on the Prozorro.Sale online platform. By facilitating business relocation to safer regions, the government helped preserve economic activity and jobs for business owners and workers, supporting their economic integration elsewhere and reducing dependence on humanitarian aid.

Employment

The Ukrainian state has made significant efforts to support employment and enhance the human capital of IDPs. These measures, targeting the working-age population, included professional training provided by the State Employment Service (SES), distribution of training vouchers through channels other than the SES, allocation of micro-grants for entrepreneurship and business development, as well as incentives for business to hire IDPs (Box 3.5).

A major shift in the approach to supporting the unemployed, including IDPs, came into effect in September 2022. Previously, up to 75% of the Fund of Compulsory State Social Insurance in Case of Unemployment was allocated to unemployment benefits. Since the change, up to 80% is now directed towards active labour market policies (ALMPs) and business incentives.

Box 3.5. Selected national programmes to support employment of IDPs

Incentives for employers to hire IDPs

Employers are eligible for compensation when hiring an IDP, equivalent to the minimum wage for each employed IDP. This compensation is paid for a maximum of three months, or for six months if the IDP has a disability. Where an IDP is registered as unemployed with the State Employment Service and recruited on the referral of the employment centre, the compensation may be granted for up to six months, provided that the employment is guaranteed for a duration exceeding twice the length of the compensation period. In such cases, the compensation may amount to twice the minimum wage and also include the single social security contribution. In 2022, almost 16 500 IDPs were employed through this scheme, 15 000 in 2023, and a further 11 000 in 2024.

Employment of IDPs in public works

According to CMU Resolution No. 1 119 of 2023, non-working IDPs of working age may be employed in public works. In 2023, 7 100 IDPs participated in such activities through the “Army of Restoration” project. Salaries were financed from the Fund of Compulsory State Social Insurance of Ukraine.

Vouchers

Education and training vouchers worth UAH 30 280 each are available to selected target groups, including IDPs. In 2023, over 18 000 vouchers were disbursed, of which 3 800 went to IDPs. In 2024, over 22 500 were distributed for training in 155 high-demand professions.

Training for unemployed IDPs

Vocational training for registered unemployed persons, including IDPs, is funded by the Fund of Compulsory State Social Insurance of Ukraine. The SES operates a system of licensed TVET centres, offering over 400 programmes across 97 professions. Around 70% of this training is conducted at enterprises. In 2023, over 3 000 unemployed IDPs received training through this measure.

Grants for self-employment and business creation

VlasnaSprava is a state‑funded microgrant scheme available to individuals, including IDPs. As of early 2025, the following conditions apply to grants:

• UAH 50 000 to 150 000: subject to creating at least one job and employing a person;

• UAH 75.000: subject to registration as an individual entrepreneur;

• Up to UAH 250 000: subject to the creation of at least two jobs and employing people in these roles.

Young recipients aged 18 to 25 may receive a microgrant of up to UAH 150 000. Additional grant schemes include grants for veterans and their spouses; “Create!” for female entrepreneurs; grants to create or expand enterprises in processing sectors; and “SvijSad” (Own Garden) for developing horticulture, viticulture, or small-scale berry farming.

Programmes for IDP women

Several initiatives have targeted IDP women specifically. These include regional Diia.Business offline centre training programmes such as “Entrepreneurship from Scratch for IDP Women”, “Women in Business”, “Preparing Women for Entrepreneurship in Wartime”, and Zrostaj (“Grow”).

Source: Own compilation based on information received directly from the State Employment Service, the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture, and the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories reporting on the implementation of the 2023‑2025 Action Plan of the Strategy of State Policy on Internal Displacement for the period up to 2025.

The effectiveness of these initiatives has been greatly enhanced by their integration into the Diia mobile application, a dedicated SES application, and the deployment of mobile SES offices, which allow SES personnel to reach people in remote communities. In 2023, 59 100 IDPs benefited from SES services, with 15 900 securing employment. In 2024, these numbers rose to 86 000 and 21 000, respectively.

However, the SES has faced several challenges in scaling up its service provision, including the high mobility of IDPs, uncertainty about whether they will remain in host communities or relocate, and the need for comprehensive case management of IDPs. The latter requires the involvement of other social partners to support IDPs with documentation, housing, healthcare, childcare, and psychological support, either prior to or alongside retraining and employment support. To address these challenges, several SES centres have introduced one‑stop shops where these services can be accessed in one place. Nevertheless, many SES centres lack the capacity and resources to fully implement this holistic approach.

Numerous efforts to enhance the skills and employability of IDPs were also undertaken by international donors and partners, in close co‑operation with the Ukrainian Government (Box 3.6).

As with the housing sector, the employment challenges exacerbated by the war have been so significant that a nationwide policy to address the issue has become indispensable. Over 2023-2025, the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture has been developing an Employment Strategy, aimed at addressing the employment situation in Ukraine in novel ways, with a special focus on vulnerable groups, including displaced individuals. As of the writing of this report, the strategy has not yet been adopted.

In addition to state‑led efforts, social partners have played an important role in preserving and facilitating employment, and enhancing the human capital of displaced populations. In partnership with existing TVET institutions, trade unions such as Profbud have created trade union hubs for informal professional training and micro-credentials, offering rapid, free specialised training for those in need of new qualifications. Additionally, they have developed training programmes and certificates tailored to address the most pressing labour market needs. Two employers’ organisations have signed co‑operation agreements with these hubs (Profbud, 2024[28]).

Local NGOs have also been active in supporting human capital development, employment, and the integration and reintegration of IDPs. Organisations such as Razom, East SOS, Impact Force, Projector Foundation, and the Free People Employment Centre have launched programmes focussed on social and employment adaptation, reintegration and professional reorientation. They also support entrepreneurship, provided small business grants, conducted skill-building workshops, and promoted corporate social responsibility to empower displaced persons and other vulnerable groups, integrating them into local economies.

Box 3.6. Examples of donor- and IO-backed programmes and initiatives aimed at enhancing the skills and capabilities of IDPs

EU4Business

In 2023, under the EU4Business initiative, the EU funded 46 diverse projects with a total budget exceeding EUR 241 million, benefitting 17 207 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Ukraine. The initiative aimed to prevent the interruption of business activities, support business relocation, facilitate business recovery, enhance business skills, and stimulate the creation of new enterprises, particularly those led by IDPs and women. The project is estimated to have generated approximately 13 000 new jobs. Notably, 750 grants were awarded to IDPs to support micro-business development.

Skills4Recovery

This programme, funded by Germany, aims to strengthen the availability of skilled workers in key sectors essential to Ukraine’s recovery. It focusses on improving technical and vocational education and training (TVET) conditions through various measures, including training TVET teachers to better support vulnerable groups such as veterans and IDPs. Implemented in co‑ordination with the Ukrainian Ministry of Education and Science and the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture, the programme is active in six regional administrations (Lviv, Vinnytsia, Kyiv, Chernivtsi, Poltava, and Dnipro) and supports 20 educational providers nationwide.

Looking ahead, Germany seeks to collaborate with the European Union and selected member states under the Team Europe Initiative to streamline, synchronise, and scale up the support provided by different partners, with the aim of enhancing Ukraine’s human capital more effectively. By early 2025, participating countries included Germany, Poland, Czechia, and Estonia.

UNDP Recovery and Peacebuilding Programme

Funded by the Government of Germany and the European Union, and as part of the UNDP Recovery and Peacebuilding Programme, a network of 30 TVET institutions across 20 cities in six Ukrainian regions has been established. The programme mobilised 57 mentors from 50 enterprises. In 2023, there were 506 participants in the programme, 21% of whom were IDPs. Participants acquired new skills across 23 different professions, and 65% of them secured new employment.

In 2024, the programme expanded to include capacity building for TVET and supplementary educational services (SES) management and staff; equipping regional SES and TVET offices; rehabilitating TVET school infrastructure and providing equipment; and running retraining and apprenticeship campaigns, among other activities.

Dream & Achieve

Dream & Achieve is an intensive training programme for displaced Ukrainian women, led by the Ukrainian NGO Impact Force in collaboration with UN Women and funded by the governments of Austria and Japan. The programme consists of 11 comprehensive modules covering areas such as digital marketing, business strategy, and the development of sustainable, socially responsible business models. In addition to technical training, it provides mentorship and fosters community building among displaced women.

Reskilling Ukraine

This project is run by the Skill Shift Initiative in partnership with Scania and funded by the Swedish Government. Since 2024, it has supported over 300 displaced Ukrainian women through career transition programmes focussed on reskilling for new employment opportunities.

Projector Foundation’s initiative

This initiative, launched by the Projector Foundation, a Ukrainian EdTech company, in partnership with the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, Diia.Business and the UNDP, began in 2022. Partners initially committed to retraining 5 000 displaced Ukrainian women to pursue new careers in creative and technological fields, particularly in roles that can be performed remotely. By early 2025, over 50 000 applications had been received, with more than 4 000 displaced women (inside and outside Ukraine) already trained and receiving scholarships. The training target with scholarships has since increased to 10 000.

Be‑Relieve

This programme is funded by the Belgian Development Agency, in co‑operation with the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture, the Ministry of Education and Science, regional authorities of Kyiv and Chernihiv, and the cities of Kyiv and Chernihiv. It targets IDPs and possible returnees, among other groups, with the aim of addressing skills mismatches by providing reskilling and upskilling in the medical, energy and construction sectors. The implementation period runs from 2024 until 2028, with a total budget of EUR 43 million.

Iron Women

This programme supports women, including IDPs, in acquiring skills for operating construction machinery, specifically excavators and wheel loaders. The initiative is led by the Swedish non-profit Beredskapslyftet in partnership with Volvo Construction Equipment and ETS Group, with informational support from Ukraine’s Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture. The programme includes online theoretical training and hands-on practice with Volvo equipment, including Ukraine’s first electric wheel loader.

Source: OECD (2024[29]), “Strengthening the human capital of forcibly displaced persons in and from Ukraine: Background note for the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2024”, https://doi.org/10.1787/9afedf7c-en; Skills Alliance for Ukraine meetings.

Schooling

Between 2022 and 2024, IDP children had the option to either enrol in a school at their new place of residence or continue their education remotely at their previous school. Under Order No. 850 of 2024, the Ministry of Education and Science announced that, starting from the 2025 academic year, in-person schooling at the place of residence will become mandatory for IDP children. As a result, an estimated 300 000 internally displaced children were expected to return to offline education. While this measure aims to improve learning outcomes and support children’s socialisation, it has raised public concerns, particularly in areas where schools lack available places and adequate shelter facilities.

Numerous measures were also initiated by local executive and self-governance authorities to support school attendance. For example, the city of Kyiv provided free meals to IDP children upon request from parents. In 2024, 6 713 IDP children received free meals in pre‑school facilities, and 20 830 in secondary schools. IDP children were also granted priority admission to vocational training facilities (648 as of 2024) and to higher tertiary education (872 in 2024) in the city of Kyiv.

Psychosocial support

In response to the growing need for psychosocial services, the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity has been implementing a pilot initiative since November 2023 to build psychological resilience in hromadas. This pilot project entails a partnership between the ministry, the Fund for Social Protection of Persons with Disabilities (FSPPD), the National Social Service Agency of Ukraine, local authorities, civil society and the private sector for the establishment of Resilience Centres.11

Resilience Centres act as public social spaces that offer comprehensive support and services to community members, including IDPs, host populations and returnees. They carry out initial needs assessments, provide psychosocial support, and offer a range of related services, including referrals to relevant institutions and facilities. Designed to help individuals cope with stress, adapt to new living conditions and develop skills that contribute to stronger local communities, Resilience Centres are seen as not only supporting mental health, but also fostering social cohesion and solidarity within the community.

The first Resilience Centres began operating in early 2024. As of mid-2024, there were 195 centres across 23 oblasts of Ukraine, employing more than 900 specialists. Several additional communities have applied to join the initiative. Additionally, seven hromadas currently under temporary occupation by the Russian Federation use premises in safer regions to provide access to resilience services for their displaced residents.

Resilience Centres are established and managed by local governments. They operate on municipal properties or other premises with the owner’s consent. Resilience services are delivered by registered social service providers, such as municipal non-profit organisations or NGOs.

Psychological support is also delivered through many other programmes and initiatives. One prominent example is the “⁠How are you?” national mental health programme, launched at the initiative of Ukraine’s First Lady and supported by the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture. This programme aims to help individuals cope with war-induced stress. Its dedicated website offers self-help advice, guidance on supporting others, and a list of trusted psychological support providers in Ukraine.

Another initiative, carried out by the Ukrainian State Labour Service over 2022‑2023, involved the training of over 350 labour inspectors and quality-of-work specialists in providing urgent psychological first aid in the workplace, with particular attention to IDP-sensitive issues. It also informed over 32 000 enterprises about the possibilities for implementing psychological support policies at the workplace.

At the local level, psychological support for IDPs, especially children, is also provided by a wide range of international organisations and NGOs.

Information dissemination

Timely, safe, and accurate dissemination of information to the right audiences was critical in the face of massive displacement, particularly in the context of disinformation risks. The government actively communicated on safe evacuation routes, suggested steps and procedures to follow for safe evacuation actions and available support through all major media channels, including the Ukrainian National Information Agency Ukrinform, web portals, YouTube, the social media channels of ministries, state services, local administrations, and the Diia app.

Information leaflets and flyers, such as “Ukraine is my home” or “Here is Ukraine”, were distributed at the community level across several oblasts. Local municipalities also played a key role in further disseminating information about existing state programmes in the areas of social support, housing, and employment. They promoted and relayed updates from various ministries through their own social media platforms, operated hotlines, and circulated information digests and other materials. Several localities developed their own roadmaps to support arriving IDPs, and some launched their own localised versions of the Diia app.

The main in-person locations for accessing comprehensive information on integration, return and reintegration are the local centres of administrative service provision (“TsNAP”), which act as administrative one‑stop shops for IDPs. These centres serve as key access points for information on rights and entitlements and also deliver aid and services.

Social integration into receiving hromadas

At the state level, CMU Resolution No. 812 of 2023 mandated the creation of IDP Councils, with the aim of promoting the active involvement of IDPs in effective collaboration with local administrations, self-governance bodies, NGOs, international organisations, and other stakeholders involved in addressing issues concerning IDPs. These councils also promote activities designed to improve social cohesion.

By 2024, a total of 801 IDP Councils had been established across the country, including 25 at the oblast level and by the city of Kyiv, 105 at the raion level and 671 at the local level.

Furthermore, the Law on People’s Power at the Local Self-Government Level, adopted in January 2025, is expected to further support the integration of IDPs into the life of host communities. The law ensures the direct participation of all residents in local self-governance and guarantees timely and full access to information about the activities of local self-government bodies and officials to all inhabitants, regardless of their status.

In addition to this, civil society organisations have initiated a number of local initiatives to foster social cohesion through community-building activities. Cultural events, educational programmes for children, and psychosocial and legal support groups, such as those by the NGO Rokada, have helped displaced individuals adjust and connect with host communities.

Support across hromadas, including to anticipate and prepare for return and reconstruction

Plich-o-Plich (Side by Side) the United Communities is a national initiative aimed at linking partner communities in central and western regions with frontline communities located along the line of combat or near national borders. Its primary objective is to support the restoration of infrastructure in frontline areas, promote co‑operation, and strengthen national unity. Activities under the initiative include, among others, organising children’s camps; holding cultural, educational, and sports events; providing humanitarian aid; co-financing reconstruction efforts; and forming joint teams to support ongoing recovery and rebuilding. While not explicitly designed for displacement-related outcomes, the initiative is expected to produce positive spillover effects for the integration of IDPs and may help facilitate safe and sustainable returns when conditions allow.

Initiatives to support the return of IDPs, when the time is right

The stabilisation of the security situation is the key precondition for the state to support safe returns. Throughout 2023, the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories worked on developing a draft legal act for the State Programme on Supporting Safe Return and Reintegration of IDPs. Several local administrations contributed to this process by providing insights into early preparatory steps needed to support return, including the restoration of critical infrastructure, land and forest management, environmental monitoring, and assessments of the state of social infrastructure. At the time of writing this report, the status of this legal act was unknown.

In 2023, the grant programme “Mitsnist” (“Strength”) was developed to support the recovery and revitalisation of businesses affected by the invasion. This programme provides assistance to entrepreneurs, employers and their employees who are returning to their original places of residence and work. In 2023, 60 entrepreneurs and employers participated in this programme.

Support for return and reintegration of externally displaced persons

While measures to support internally displaced persons were implemented from the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, policies specifically aimed at supporting and facilitating the return of externally displaced persons (EDPs) have developed more slowly. One possible reason for this was the substantial support provided by host countries to EDPs (OECD, 2022[30]), which initially helped alleviate some of the immediate pressures on Ukraine. Additionally, there was a prevailing expectation that EDPs would return soon and reintegrate into their previous lives or, if necessary, access the existing support mechanisms available to IDPs.

However, IDPs and EDPs often have different profiles as well as distinct needs. Although the majority of EDPs still consider returning to Ukraine, their experiences and evolving circumstances abroad inevitably influence both their willingness and capacity to do so. The longer their stay outside Ukraine, the more the decision to return begins to resemble a new migration process, shaped by a complex interplay of personal, social, and economic factors.

Over time, there has been a growing recognition in Ukraine of the importance of developing specific policies to support and facilitate the return, and of the role that the Ukrainian state can and should play in this area. This reflects an increasing awareness of the need for structured and co‑ordinated approaches to support return and reintegration from abroad.12

Safety of returns

Since 2022, the vast majority of Ukrainians who have fled the country have done so because of the security situation. They left to protect themselves and their family members, especially children and elderly relatives. Given this context, the stabilisation of security conditions remains the key precondition for their return. For this reason, any return should be voluntary, appropriately timed and well prepared, ensuring that this key precondition is met and that returnees are properly informed of the security situation and the options available to them to protect themselves from any renewed danger.

Counselling and information sharing to enable return

The longer individuals remain abroad, the more complex the return process becomes, and the more important it is that it be carefully planned and thoroughly prepared. Transitioning from the intention to return to the concrete decision to return can be far more challenging than it may initially appear. Returnees often need to take a series of significant steps in the host country, such as terminating employment, concluding the academic year for their children, ending housing leases, fulfilling tax obligations, renouncing temporary protection status and its associated social benefits, closing bank accounts, cancelling insurance policies, and ensuring that travel documentation is in order. At the same time, prospective returnees are likely to feel the need to make preparations for returning to Ukraine, such as securing housing, employment and access to education for their children. In addition, many wish to ensure that the decision to return will not be accompanied by unforeseen obstacles or administrative complications, or the need to re‑migrate.

For these reasons, access to timely, accurate, and comprehensive information, as well as return counselling, is often essential before a final decision to return can be made. To address this need, in 2025, Ukraine initiated the establishment of several Unity Hubs13 across major destinations of externally displaced Ukrainians, which are specialised centres aiming to create conditions to support Ukrainians abroad and facilitate their return to Ukraine. The Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity of Ukraine is also advancing the establishment of the Network of Unity, a “network of networks”, designed to consolidate existing initiatives with the engagement of Ukrainian authorities, EU Member States, and Ukrainian civil society organisations already active abroad.

This model aims to enable Ukrainian citizens temporarily residing outside the country to maintain strong connections with Ukraine, access reliable information, and make informed decisions regarding their return. The Unity Hubs will provide a wide range of services, including educational and cultural spaces, language courses, counselling by return advisers and economic opportunity co‑ordinators, consular services (as an external function), banking and postal services, assistance from the State Enterprise “Document”, forums for opinion leaders, programmes for children and youth, a Ukrainian café, a business hub and coworking space, and a UA Job Centre, among others.

In addition, the Ukrainian Government has supported the development of information platforms specially focussed on the return of several international organisations and NGOs.

For example, “Povertajsja dodomu” (Come back home), launched in late 2024, is an online platform and Telegram bot developed by the Come Back Home NGO, with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Employment Service, and the National Social Service of Ukraine. It provides a step-by-step guide and a roadmap for return, including a list of available support services in Ukraine for returnees. This information helps Ukrainians abroad stay informed and make conscious, well-considered and well-founded decisions about voluntary return to Ukraine, including for short visits to reconnect with family and friends, assess the security situation, and evaluate living conditions, opportunities and future prospects.

Another initiative is UNHCR’s “Ukraine is Home” platform (https://ukraineishome.org), also launched in 2024 with the support of the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine. The platform provides detailed information on the rights under temporary protection and relevant regulations for visiting Ukraine across more than 20 European countries. It also includes information on available support and financial assistance for returnees from abroad, employment and business opportunities in Ukraine, and a free hotline for inquiries about extending stays abroad and returning to Ukraine, accessible from any European country. The platform also brings together a range of other valuable information for those considering long-term return.

In parallel, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is scaling up its efforts to provide return-related information through consular centres abroad.Preparing documents for return

To cross international borders, Ukrainians must possess valid documents both to re‑enter Ukraine and to prove their legal stay in their host country, particularly if they envisage returning to that country in the future. While Ukrainian citizens cannot be denied entry to Ukraine under any circumstances, some may need to contact a Ukrainian embassy or consulate in the host country prior to return. This may include applying for an extension of their biometric passport if it has expired, obtaining a certificate for return if they left Ukraine with only an internal ID, or registering the birth of a child born abroad to confirm Ukrainian citizenship.

A particular issue of concern is the return of men. As of 18 May 2024, men aged 18 to 60 requiring consular services, such as renewing their biometric passports, are required to submit their individual military registration document. Men of conscription age can obtain or update their existing military registration documents through a dedicated special mobile application. Without an updated and validated document, they cannot be issued a passport for international travel. The only exception is the issuance of a certificate for return to Ukraine, for which an updated and validated individual military registration document is not required. In many instances, Ukrainian consular services have been reinforced with additional staff and resources to address these additional demands.

Cash assistance upon return

According to CMU Resolution No. 94, “Certain Aspects of Social Support for Internally Displaced Persons and Other Vulnerable Groups” (January 2024), Ukrainians returning from abroad after an extended stay (over 90 consecutive days) who have not yet secured employment or other sources of income in Ukraine may apply for temporary cash assistance to ensure a subsistence minimum. This support is available for six months and is equivalent to the cash assistance provided to low-income IDPs.

To promote economic independence and reduce reliance on social support, the cash assistance for low-income families is combined with employment activation measures. If a returning household includes unemployed individuals of working age, they are required to take steps toward self-sufficiency within two months of receiving assistance, either by securing employment or registering with the State Employment Service.

Housing

At the time of writing this report, there were no state programmes specifically targeting the housing needs of EDPs or returnees. However, EDPs and returnees are eligible to participate in housing support programmes available to all Ukrainian citizens, such as eRecovery (eVidnovlennya)/HOME (see Box 3.1). If returnees settle in a location other than their original place of residence and register as IDPs, they may also qualify for housing programmes specifically designed for IDPs.

Employment

There were also no dedicated state programmes targeting the employment of EDPs or returnees. Nonetheless, returning EDPs are eligible to participate in general employment support schemes open to all Ukrainians and to register as unemployed with the SES. If they return to a location other than their pre‑displacement home and register as IDPs, they may also access employment programmes specifically tailored for IDPs.

Continuity of education for children

Since the start of the full-scale invasion, over 400 000 Ukrainian children displaced abroad have continued their education in Ukrainian schools online. Between 2022 and 2024, many displaced Ukrainian children studied exclusively through Ukrainian online schools, which often limited their integration in host countries. Others attended both a local school in their host country and either their original Ukrainian school online or the All-Ukrainian Online School (grades 5‑11). By the end of 2022, 516 243 Ukrainian children were enrolled simultaneously in both host country schools and Ukrainian online schooling. This number was 292 249 in 2023, 319 805 in 2024, and almost 1 million in 2025. Dual enrolment placed a heavy burden on students and their parents, and many students experienced fatigue, poor learning outcomes, and increased dropout rates, either from Ukrainian online education or from local schools.

Despite these challenges, maintaining ties with the Ukrainian education system is widely regarded as crucial for supporting children’s future return and reintegration. In recognition of this, the Ministry of Education and Science issued Recommendation No. 563 of 2023 (amended since then) “On the Approval of Methodological Recommendations on Certain Aspects of Education in General Secondary Schools Under Martial Law in Ukraine.” On this basis, a special curriculum has been developed for Ukrainian children displaced abroad to help reduce their dual schooling burden. This curriculum, known as the Ukrainian Studies Component, provides 6 to 8 hours of instruction per week, depending on the student’s grade level, and focusses on subjects not typically taught in host countries. These include Ukrainian language, literature, history, geography, and defence of Ukraine, delivered through specially designed, condensed, and adapted programmes for each subject. Lessons are held remotely, often in the evenings or on Saturdays, to accommodate students’ schedules in their host country schools. These classes can be organised within Ukrainian schools as dedicated remote streams.

The All-Ukrainian Online School – the main state online educational platform – is part of the broader online education ecosystem in Ukraine. This ecosystem additionally includes the distance‑learning International Ukrainian School for Ukrainians living abroad, numerous accredited private online schools, and the Ministry of Education and Science’s initiatives such as offlineschool.mon.gov.ua – a registry of offline schools abroad offering the Ukrainian Studies Component. These solutions play a critical role in ensuring educational continuity for children who may return to Ukraine, by maintaining access to Ukrainian-language curricula and cultural components. All children who were forced to relocate and study abroad retain the right to re‑enrol in Ukrainian schools upon their return. To determine the appropriate grade level, Ukrainian schools are advised, under Recommendation No. 1 162 of 202514 “On Amendments to the Methodological Recommendations on Certain Issues of Education in General Secondary Education Institutions under Martial Law in Ukraine”, to consider academic results from host country schools, provided the student presents an official certificate of attendance and achievement. The Ministry of Education and Science has developed correspondence tables aligning Ukraine’s 12‑point grading scale with the grading systems of 26 host countries to facilitate this process. Children who studied abroad but did not take subjects included in the Ukrainian educational curriculum, or who are unable to present documentation confirming their studies, may undergo an annual assessment before the start of the new school year or, in some cases, during the school year.

In some cases, an individual learning trajectory may be established, allowing students to independently study Ukrainian curriculum subjects using the resources of the distance‑learning All-Ukrainian Online School.

The Ministry of Education and Science regularly updates its methodological recommendations, adapting them to changes in the security and migration situation.

Continuity of education for adults and transition to the Ukrainian labour market after studying abroad

Recognition of foreign educational documents is largely regarded in Ukraine as a critical instrument for supporting the return and reintegration of students and adults, as it enables continuity of academic studies and careers upon re‑entry. The recognition of foreign educational documents in Ukraine is fully compliant with the provisions of the Lisbon Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the European Region (1997), which Ukraine ratified in 1999, and takes place through ENIC Ukraine.

Psychosocial support

There are currently no specific psychological support programmes developed exclusively for EDPs or returnees. However, they can access the programmes that are available to the general population, such as the nationwide mental health programme “⁠How are you?” or seek assistance through one of the resilience centres operating across Ukraine.

Co‑operation between Ukraine and host country stakeholders to support future returns from abroad

OECD countries offered an unprecedented level of support to Ukrainians fleeing the war of aggression (OECD, 2022[31]; OECD, 2022[30]). They provided different types of assistance to new arrivals to mitigate the risks of social and economic exclusion and to assist them in meeting their basic needs. In addition to emergency shelter, financial subsidies and cash benefits, displaced Ukrainians were typically granted access to education, health services, and labour markets. In many countries, they also benefitted from various integration measures (European Migration Network, 2024[32]; Eurofound, 2024[33]).

Intergovernmental measures and activities

Notwithstanding these support measures, the Ukrainian authorities quickly identified return as a national priority. This priority is rooted in the state’s responsibility to protect its citizens, the desire to foster unity and a sense of nationhood, and the need to ensure Ukraine’s reconstruction and long-term demographic sustainability.

To support this objective, policies aimed at facilitating return, developed in co‑operation with host countries, even while the timing of actual return remains unclear, began gaining momentum in early 2023. Between 2023 and 2025, many of these policies were shaped in line with what the OECD refers to as a dual intent approach to integration. Dual intent integration seeks to enable the socio‑economic integration of displaced Ukrainians in host countries while also avoiding the creation of barriers to future return. This approach can be pursued by ensuring that investment in human capital and inclusion support is balanced with deliberate efforts to minimise potential obstacles to return in both host countries and Ukraine (OECD, 2023[34]).

There are different ways in which Ukraine and host countries have been gradually implementing dual intent principles:

• Investing in the human capital development of Ukrainian displaced persons during their displacement. In addition to retaining and building on the existing skills of displaced Ukrainians, the Government of Ukraine has actively encouraged host countries to support skills development and work experience in sectors that are essential for Ukraine’s recovery, such as construction, engineering, energy, health, IT and the green transition. Many of the same skills are in high demand in current host countries, creating meaningful economic opportunities for Ukrainians during their displacement. Recognising the importance of maintaining and enhancing the human capital of Ukrainians, regardless of where they are located, the Government of Ukraine launched the Skills Alliance for Ukraine in 2024 with support from Germany. This umbrella initiative is intended to co‑ordinate, streamline, and scale up the efforts of host countries, international organisations and other partners to invest in the human capital of Ukrainians, including those displaced by the war (Box 3.7).

• Streamlining the recognition of skills and qualifications in both directions. Such policies aim to support the skills-appropriate labour market entry for displaced Ukrainians in current host countries, but also to ensure the effective transfer and utilisation of newly acquired skills and know-how upon their return to Ukraine. Between 2023 and 2027, Ukraine is expected to align its National Qualifications Framework with the European Qualifications Framework as part of broader efforts to facilitate mutual recognition of qualifications. In parallel, Ukraine is exploring the possibility of signing new bilateral agreements on the recognition of qualifications. In addition, Ukraine is part of the Lisbon Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the European Region (1997). Already before the full-scale war, Ukraine had concluded bilateral agreements under this framework with seven European countries for the recognition or establishment of equivalence of diplomas and qualifications. Similar agreements were also in place with 12 non-European countries (for the full list, see Annex 3.A), and efforts to expand this list currently continue.

Box 3.7. Skills Alliance for Ukraine

Launched at the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2024 in Berlin by the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Co‑operation and Development, the Skills Alliance for Ukraine is an umbrella initiative aimed at strengthening the human capital of Ukrainians, both inside the country and among those displaced abroad. The Alliance serves as a platform to share information on existing initiatives, scale up impactful activities, mobilise funding and co‑ordinate efforts among a wide range of stakeholders.

By January 2025, the Alliance had brought together 70 partners, including national governments, international organisations, including the OECD, the private sector, NGOs and other actors. As of 2025, the total pledged budget exceeded EUR 700 million, allocated to support the training, reskilling and upskilling of over 190 000 Ukrainians over a three‑year period.

Training activities are implemented through 42 projects, 25 of which explicitly target IDPs and their family members. The Skills Alliance continues to welcome new commitments on a rolling basis, with a focus primarily on scaling up and expanding existing activities.

Source: Skills Alliance meetings. Also see https://www.bmz.de/en/news/press-releases/launch-of-the-international-skills-alliance-for-ukraine-215342.

• Offering Ukrainian language training in host countries for children and young adults. Ensuring that young Ukrainians retain the necessary language skills and cultural ties is regarded as essential for their eventual return and reintegration. In addition to Ukrainian language training provided through Ukrainian online schooling, Ukraine, together with the Ukrainian global community and with the support of host countries, has promoted the establishment of Ukrainian schools and extracurricular language activities in host countries. Throughout the displacement crisis, many host countries made Ukrainian language learning available in their public school systems. Sometimes they were able to build on existing practices within the country. For instance, Sweden already incorporated the teaching of home‑country languages within its formal education system. Similarly, displaced Ukrainian students in some Canadian provinces (e.g. Alberta and Manitoba) were able to benefit from existing Ukrainian-English bilingual study programmes. Meanwhile, Estonia, Latvia and Romania have Ukrainian schools where students follow the national curriculum while studying selected subjects in Ukrainian. In August 2024, Europe’s first bilingual Hungarian Ukrainian school opened in Budapest, fully funded by the Hungarian Government. The school offers Ukrainian and Hungarian high school diplomas. In its first year, it enrolled over 300 children and employed 33 teachers, with a total capacity for 700 students.15 Starting in September 2025, a pilot project to teach Ukrainian as a second foreign language was launched in middle and high schools of four academic regions of France (Paris region, Alpes-Maritimes (Nice), Versailles, and Créteil).

• Retaining and facilitating Ukrainians’ financial and digital ties with their home country. Many displaced Ukrainians living abroad earn an income from employment in their host countries. Others also receive income from Ukraine, including through remote work for Ukrainian enterprises. Against this backdrop, Ukraine is exploring ways to address challenges related to tax and social security obligations. The issue of pension portability between countries is also increasingly under consideration due to the protracted displacement situation. Further measures could include facilitating small-scale investment flows and reducing the cost of money transfers. Ukraine’s existing e‑government infrastructure, including the Diia app, provides an opportunity for the country to remain connected with its displaced communities. It also enables displaced persons to assess their eligibility for various state‑supported programmes and thereby helps them prepare for their return.

• Supporting the right to visit Ukraine without losing temporary protection status. Allowing externally displaced Ukrainians, who are often beneficiaries of temporary protection or similar statuses in non-EU host countries, to make short visits to Ukraine without risking the loss of their legal status or documentation in the host country is essential to maintain ties with Ukraine and to support informed and voluntary decisions about return when conditions allow. Such visits enable individuals to assess the security situation and reconnect with family or check on property without making a premature commitment to permanent return that remains largely unsafe. This approach can also support more sustainable reintegration processes.

• Building unity, improving communication, and supporting return. Since early 2025, Ukraine has taken steps to develop joint programmes with host countries to support local integration while also supporting possible returns later on. In 2025, agreements were concluded with several European countries to establish Unity Hubs, which will serve as contact points for displaced Ukrainians. These hubs, once operational, aim to provide courses in the local language and culture, assistance in finding employment both in the host country and in Ukraine, as well as guidance on voluntary return and engagement in reconstruction.

Outside the context of the Ukrainian displacement crisis, one way in which origin and host countries co‑operate on return and reintegration is through Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration programmes (AVRR), which typically provide both travel and reintegration support (OECD, 2020[35]). These programmes are generally designed for situations involving irregular migration rather than humanitarian displacement, and there is currently no programme in place in host countries that seeks to encourage the return of Ukrainians. However, recognising that some Ukrainians may wish to return, a small number of host countries have adapted elements of their existing AVRR programmes or introduced new measures to support those who wish to return despite unfavourable security conditions and who lack the necessary resources to do so (see Annex 3.B).

To date, the Ukrainian Government and stakeholders have not been actively involved in the design or implementation of these measures. However, if conditions in Ukraine change and larger-scale returns become possible, and if such programmes are considered an appropriate way to facilitate returns, this would need to be reconsidered. Experience shows that close co‑ordination between home and host countries can improve the coherence and overall effectiveness of such initiatives, both in terms of uptake and in supporting the sustainability of returns (OECD, 2020[35]).

Activities by international partners and civil society

International humanitarian organisations, volunteers, and civil society organisations in host countries have provided invaluable and wide‑ranging support to displaced Ukrainians (Bejma and Ignățoiu-Sora, 2024[36]). Several of these organisations have launched programmes and projects aimed at strengthening the human capital of displaced Ukrainians in line with a dual intent approach: supporting their integration into host societies without compromising their return prospects, and in some cases, actively preparing them for return (Box 3.8).

Box 3.8. Selected initiatives by civil society in host countries that align with a dual intent approach

Poland

Care International, Tent Partnership for Refugees and UNICEF, in co‑operation with the Polish Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy, launched an initiative to support the employment of displaced Ukrainians in line with their qualifications. The programme focusses on skills development and retraining to improve labour market opportunities.

In October 2022, Upwardly Global launched the Workforce Inclusion Programme in collaboration with the Information Society Development Foundation (FRSI), Ukrainian House, and other partners. This 18‑month initiative aimed to provide displaced Ukrainian women with job coaching, job readiness training, language courses, technical skills development, and wrap-around services, such as childcare. The programme set out to help 500 participants find employment that matches their skills and to provide reskilling and upskilling opportunities for at least 200 participants.

UNITAR, with funding from the Government of Japan, launched the training programme “Bolstering livelihoods: Digital reskilling for Ukrainian women evacuees in Poland” in October 2023. The six‑month hybrid initiative trained around 500 women in high-demand digital skills, enhancing their employment and income‑generating potential. The programme also supports participants in developing socially responsible digital start-ups and building leadership and entrepreneurial skills.

Czechia

In 2022, People in Need, a Czech NGO, launched an Employment Support Programme to help displaced Ukrainians integrate into the Czech labour market. The programme includes Czech language courses, job placement support, and vocational training in sectors experiencing labour shortages. By mid-2023, the programme had benefited more than 1 000 Ukrainians, many of whom had secured employment across a range of industries.

UNICEF launched the CESTY Initiative, a multi-stakeholder partnership designed to support displaced Ukrainian youth through one of three skills-building pathways:

• paid internships and apprenticeships;

• entry-level low-skilled employment opportunities that combine work experience with language acquisition and professional development;

• scholarships enabling full-time study while covering basic living costs.

In 2024, the initiative connected 1 500 displaced Ukrainian youth with these opportunities. Through the Regional Pathways Initiative, UNICEF aims to expand this initiative to other host countries, including Poland and the Slovak Republic.

Croatia

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) partnered with the Croatian NGOs SVOJA and Solidarna in 2023 to support the economic integration of Ukrainian refugees. The initiative focusses on increasing labour market participation, particularly in the private sector, by providing skills training and employment support primarily to displaced Ukrainian women.

Slovak Republic

In 2022, the Pontis Foundation launched the Integration of Refugees project to support Ukrainian refugees in the Slovak Republic. The project provides Slovak language courses, cultural orientation, and vocational training in sectors such as construction, manufacturing, and services. By early 2024, it had attracted over 800 participants.

Source: OECD (2024[29]), “Strengthening the human capital of forcibly displaced persons in and from Ukraine: Background note for the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2024”, https://doi.org/10.1787/9afedf7c-en; Skills Alliance for Ukraine meetings.

Activities by the Ukrainian global community

The Ukrainian global community played a crucial role in responding to the displacement crisis, helping displaced Ukrainians to maintain ties with Ukraine – a vital consideration for future returns. This engagement has included mobilising support for externally displaced Ukrainians, providing them with housing and social assistance, and helping them to adapt to life in their host countries. They have also co‑ordinated closely with civil society actors in Ukraine and host countries, as well as co‑operating with national and international organisations seeking reliable partners to support displaced populations (Koinova, 2024[37]; ICMPD, 2024[24]). Those already living abroad have also played a central role in preserving the national, cultural, and linguistic identity of those displaced by the aggression (Keudel et al., 2024[25]).

Thanks to the wider Ukrainian global community, numerous initiatives in line with the dual intent integration approach have also been made possible. These activities have helped to ensure the continuity of education for displaced children and students, and to maintain the human capital of displaced adults (OSCE-ODIHR, 2024[22]).

One notable example is the Ukrainian Global University (UGU). Established by a broad network of Ukrainians abroad in collaboration with the Office of the President of Ukraine, the UGU is a consortium of educational institutions that assists high school and university students, academics, and tutors in continuing their studies and research in host countries by providing placements and financial support.

Similarly, the long-standing Shevchenko Scientific Society in New York has supported scholars, writers, and actors affected by the war (Koinova, 2024[37]). Many other grassroots initiatives have also flourished. These include teaching the Ukrainian language, history, and culture in host country schools and Ukrainian after-school programmes, organising Plast scout activities, and hosting summer camps for Ukrainian children. Such efforts have largely been made possible thanks to the commitment and voluntary work of Ukrainians already living abroad.

The role of pre‑existing Ukrainian communities abroad has also been vital in fostering solidarity and maintaining national identity and ties among Ukrainians across different countries. For example, the Ukrainian World Congress connects communities in over 60 countries and co‑ordinates numerous global actions, including simultaneous demonstrations linked to significant dates or political events. The World Federation of Ukrainian Women’s Organisations has brought together female activists across many destination countries and in Ukraine, while the Alliance of Ukrainian Organisations has played a central role in mobilising diaspora support for the annual high-level Ukraine Recovery Conferences (Koinova, 2024[37]).

State engagement with the Ukrainian global community

Ukrainian communities abroad have demonstrated unprecedented mobilisation in response to the invasion. The Ukrainian state also recognises their vital contribution to the national resistance during this time, as well as their untapped potential to preserve Ukrainian identity, promote and advocate for the Ukrainian cause abroad, and support the rebuilding and development of Ukraine.

Improving communication

A major shift in how the Ukrainian state envisions its relationship with Ukrainians abroad, including “foreign Ukrainians”, began to take shape in 2023. In late 2023, the Ukrainian Government appointed its first Ambassador-at-Large for the Ukrainian global community, with the aim of enhancing co‑operation with Ukrainian communities abroad and strengthening their support for Ukraine. This shift was also accompanied by more consistent and deliberate use of the term “Ukrainian global community” in political discourse, a concept that encompasses all Ukrainians living abroad, regardless of their reasons for migration, as well as “foreign Ukrainians”, and emphasises self-identification with the democratic Ukrainian state and Ukrainian nationhood.

Leveraging and supporting engagement

The draft Strategy “Ukrainian Global Community: New Policies for the Period 2025-2027”, developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2024 (not yet adopted at the time of writing), outlines a vision in which Ukrainians abroad and “foreign Ukrainians” feel a sense of belonging to the Ukrainian global community and one global Ukrainian family. The strategy envisions them feeling supported by the Ukrainian state, contributing to its development and the protection of its interests, and ultimately returning to Ukraine to take an active role in its recovery.

Another policy change was the establishment, in late 2024, of the Ministry of National Unity (defunct as of July 2025, with functions transferred to the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity) and the Agency of National Unity,16 a new institutional structure tasked with implementing state policy on engagement with the Ukrainian global community and Ukrainian civil society organisations in host countries. The Ministry’s main tasks included the development and implementation of state policy on issues of national unity and identity, as well as protecting the rights and interests of Ukrainians abroad. In co‑ordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was responsible for responding to the cultural, educational and linguistic needs of Ukrainians abroad and for promoting the rights and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens and citizens of other countries with Ukrainian roots.

Specific programmes to encourage and support return

Regarding the return of Ukrainian citizens (including those not displaced by the invasion) from abroad, several strategic legal documents outlined this as a priority for Ukraine even before the start of the invasion, and several initiatives exist to support this priority.

Given the large number of Ukrainians abroad with tertiary education, including those employed in research and innovation, Ukraine has introduced special programmes and initiatives to sustain connections and foster collaboration within the global Ukrainian research community.

One main example is the activity of the National Research Foundation of Ukraine, which offers competitive grants for research projects in Ukraine. It has introduced grant schemes for “foreign Ukrainians”, as well as specific grant and mobility schemes to incentivise return and reintegration. It supports research co‑operation with research institutions, communities and foundations in partner countries, and supports research mobility and frameworks of dual affiliations, enabling researchers to maintain ties with Ukrainian institutions while working abroad.

Ukraine actively participates in Horizon Europe, including instruments such as MSCA4Ukraine and ERA Fellowships, which directly address mobility and career continuity for displaced researchers, by allowing displaced Ukrainian researchers to continue their activities at academic and non-academic organisations in EU member states and Horizon Europe associated countries, while maintaining their connections to research and innovation communities in Ukraine. These programmes provide structured pathways for Ukrainian scientists to remain integrated in European research networks while facilitating eventual return and reintegration.

The Create Ukraine programme, launched in 2022, is another example of a concrete measure to facilitate the return of Ukrainians from the Ukrainian global community. It is a pilot initiative co-funded by the European Union and the Government of Lithuania under the EU4Youth programme. The project is managed by the Lithuanian organisation Central Project Management Agency and implemented by the KSE Foundation at the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine. Its objective is to reintegrate young Ukrainian professionals with international experience into Ukraine’s public sector to contribute to economic development and reform efforts. Ten selected participants engage in a 10‑month programme, joining the advisory team of the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture. They receive comprehensive support from the Kyiv School of Economics, including targeted training in leadership, policy analysis, and project management, as well as mentorship from government officials. The programme aims to harness the skills of the Ukrainian diaspora to drive change, enhance government-society partnerships, and address strategic challenges facing the country.17

Engaging with “foreign Ukrainians”

One of the tangible mechanisms through which the State of Ukraine engages with its diaspora is the formal recognition of individuals as “foreign Ukrainians”, as defined by the Law of Ukraine “On Foreign Ukrainians.” This status is granted to persons of Ukrainian origin and facilitates their return and integration into Ukrainian society. Holders of this status are entitled to certain privileges, including simplified procedures for obtaining residence permits, access to education, and eligibility for employment in Ukraine without the need for a work permit. The status serves as both a symbolic and practical instrument for fostering return, particularly among those with strong cultural or familial links to Ukraine. Since its creation in 2004, over 10 000 individuals have received this designation, illustrating an ongoing, though modest, effort to maintain legal and cultural ties with the diaspora (Table 3.3).

Table 3.3. Number of citizens of other countries and stateless persons who received the status of a “foreign Ukrainian”

Year	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Number of individuals	893	1 072	1 274	1 152	844	665	438	1 183	903	185
Year	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Number of individuals	664	481	587	..	92	660	..	..	..	217

Note: “..” stands for missing data.

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Multiple citizenship

In 2025, the Law On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding Ensuring the Exercise of the Right to Acquire and Retain Ukrainian Citizenship (No. 11 469) amended several existing legislative acts and introduced the possibility of multiple citizenship. The proposed changes will allow citizens of certain countries to acquire Ukrainian citizenship via a simplified process, without having to renounce their existing citizenship. The first countries with which agreements on multiple citizenship are expected to be established, include Germany, Poland, Czechia, the United States and Canada. This list of countries is expected to be updated frequently. The law was explicitly adopted with the aim of facilitating the return of Ukrainians and maintaining ties with those who cannot return immediately.

Strategic frameworks

The range of actions to address internal displacement, prepare and support the return of externally displaced persons and engage with the Ukrainian global community necessitated having a coherent, co‑ordinated and strategic legal framework to address complex policy challenges across all levels of state institutions and of society, ensuring a shared vision and alignment across all actors.

At the national level in Ukraine, this framework has been provided in the form of state strategies, which are legal documents containing a guiding vision for policies and actions aimed at tackling major challenges (Table 3.4). These strategies serve to streamline and organise existing actions, reduce duplication, and enhance policy coherence. They also enable strategic planning for future initiatives by fostering new thinking and a clearer long-term vision. Furthermore, they signal political commitment, reinforce institutional legitimacy, and establish a basis for co‑operation with hromadas, civil society, international partners and stakeholders.

Table 3.4. National strategic documents with a focus on displaced populations, return, reintegration, and Ukrainian global community (UGC), as of 2025

Name of the Strategy	Status	Covered population groups and issues	Lead body
2014 – 2021
Strategy of Integration of Internally Displaced Persons and Implementation of the Medium-term Solutions for Internal Displacement for the Period up to 2024	Adopted on 28 October 2021; revoked and replaced by the Strategy of 7 April 2023	IDPs	Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories*
Strategy of the State Migration Policy of Ukraine for the period up to 2025	Adopted on 12 July 2017. Amendments as of 19 January 2024 introduced an objective to support the return of EDPs	EDP, Ukrainian labour migrants, other Ukrainians abroad, questions of return	State Migration Service
Strategy of the De‑occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol**	Adopted on 24 March 2021	IDP	Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council
Strategy of Information Security**	Adopted on 28 December 2021	Ukrainian diaspora	Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council
2022 onwards
Strategy of State Policy on Internal Displacement for the Period up to 2025, and its Action Plan for 2023-2025	Adopted on 07 April 2023	IDPs	Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories*
Strategy of Promoting Employment of IDPs	Project	IDPs	Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories*
Strategy of Housing for IDPs	Project	IDPs	Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories*
Strategy of Demographic Development of Ukraine for the Period up to 2040	Adopted on 30 September.2024	EDPs, UGC, including “foreign Ukrainians”, issues related to return	Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity
Employment Strategy of Ukraine	Project	Residents of Ukraine, including IDPs	Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture
Strategy of the Consolidation of Ukrainian National and Civic Identity for the Period up to 2030	Adopted on 15 December2023, active with amendments, last on 21 July 2025	Ukrainian citizens abroad, “foreign Ukrainians”	Ministry of Youth and Sport
Strategy of Ukraine’s Foreign Policy	Adopted on 18 April 2023; a new version is in preparation	EDPs, Ukrainian citizens abroad, “foreign Ukrainians”	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ukrainian Global Community (UGC): New Policy for the Period 2025-2027 (draft)	Project	UGC including Ukrainians abroad and “foreign Ukrainians”, questions of return	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Strategy of Digital Development of Innovation Activity (aka Global Innovation Strategy WInWIn)	Adopted on 31 December2024	Ukrainians in Ukraine (preventing outflow), Ukrainians abroad	Ministry of Digital Transformation
Strategy for the Development of Culture in Ukraine for the Period up to 2030	Adopted on 28 March 2025	Ukrainians abroad, “foreign Ukrainians”	Ministry of Culture

Note: * By late 2024, Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories no longer existed. Each strategy was approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, except the ones marked with ** which were approved by presidential decrees.

Each strategy listed in Table 3.4 is usually led by one ministry or institutional body responsible for its overall development, implementation, and oversight. Strategies are subject to mandatory approval by all concerned authorities, as well as by the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture, and the Ministry of Digital Transformation. Strategies are also accompanied by action plans, which are approved for an initial three‑year period together with the strategy. Upon completion of the three‑year period, a subsequent action plan is developed either for another three‑year term, or for the remaining duration of the strategy.

Internal displacement in state strategies

At the start of the invasion, Ukraine already had a Strategy of Integration of Internally Displaced Persons and Implementation of the Medium-Term Solutions for Internal Displacement for the Period up to 2024 in place, which provided a useful framework for initial response.

In light of the unprecedented challenges that emerged, the government developed a new document to guide its response and policy actions by 2023: the Strategy of State Policy on Internal Displacement for the Period up to 2025.18 The Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories was the lead ministry responsible for co‑ordinating actions to implement the strategy, but it ceased to exist at the end of 2024.

The objective of this Strategy is to mitigate the adverse effects of internal displacement resulting from the invasion by addressing the challenges faced by displaced individuals in adapting to and integrating within host hromadas and to support their reintegration in cases of voluntary return. The Strategy has five goals:

1. Increase state capacity to respond to the challenges of internal displacement and create conditions for implementing state policy in the area of internal displacement.

2. Create conditions for safe displacement from areas of military action and fulfil the humanitarian needs of internally displaced persons.

3. Facilitate the adaptation of IDPs to their new place of residence immediately after displacement.

4. Facilitate the integration of IDPs by creating conditions to develop their potential and increasing the capacity of receiving hromadas.

5. Support the safe return and reintegration of IDPs.

The Strategy’s Action Plan for 2023-2025 contains many of the actions outlined earlier in the chapter, such as, for example, the creation of regional co‑ordination centres or special programmes for IDP employment. The Action Plan envisages that the vast majority of measures will be implemented within existing budgetary allocations and donor funding. The Action Plan’s indicators of success include a mix of indicators that track institutional processes, such as the adoption or revision of laws and regulations, and some metrics that capture increases in the number of beneficiaries reached through these policies.

Two accompanying and more specialised strategies, on the Employment of IDPs and on the Housing of IDPs, were developed by the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories but had not materialised at the time of writing this report.

External displacement, return and reintegration in state strategies

External displacement of Ukrainians is explicitly addressed by the Strategy of Ukraine’s Foreign Policy. According to its Action Plan for 2023-2025, Ukraine ensures proper protection of the rights and interests of displaced Ukrainians, notably by developing a joint policy with the EU, its Member States, other foreign countries and international organisations to protect the rights and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens who have been displaced to other regions of Ukraine, EU Member States and other foreign countries as a result of the full-scale invasion, and provide them with the necessary assistance.

The issues of return and reintegration of Ukrainians abroad already partly featured in the Strategy of State Migration Policy of Ukraine for the Period up to 2025, adopted in 2017. The State Migration Service was nominated as the lead executive body responsible for co‑ordination of actions to implement the Strategy.

The objective of the Strategy is to co‑ordinate state efforts in developing and implementing migration policy in a manner that strengthens national cohesion and state security, supports socio‑economic development, and helps to slow demographic decline. In its original version, the Strategy already stated that “the return of all Ukrainian citizens who are abroad is the main task of the State”.

To respond to the new challenges, this Strategy was amended in early 2024 to add the objective of creating “necessary conditions for the return and reintegration into the Ukrainian society of citizens of Ukraine who are labour migrants or who have received temporary protection abroad”.

The Strategy’s Action Plan for 2024‑202519 contains the following tasks to fulfil this objective:

1. Taking into account international practices, determine the responsibilities of various state and local authorities in the reintegration of returning migrants, and reflect the corresponding changes in the mandates of Ukrainian authorities. The authorities responsible for implementing this are the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories (defunct as of 2024), the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture, the State Migration Service, and the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity.

2. Conduct a comparative review of international practices for including NGOs in the process of reintegration of returning migrants. The authorities responsible for implementing this are the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories (defunct as of 2024), the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the State Migration Service, and the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity.

3. Implement targeted information campaigns for Ukrainian citizens returning from abroad, aimed at enhancing financial literacy, with a particular focus on the effective use of remittances and overseas savings for investment purposes, including entrepreneurship and small business development. The authorities responsible for implementing this are the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories (defunct as of 2024), the Ministry of Culture, and the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture.

4. Develop a methodology to estimate the number of Ukrainian citizens returning after a prolonged stay abroad (over one year), including disaggregated data on their location, needs and level of integration into receiving hromadas. The authorities responsible for implementing this are the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories (defunct as of 2024), the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Migration Service, and the State Border Service.

The Strategy states that the Action Plan’s financing will be determined by the relevant executive authorities within their budgetary allocations for the corresponding years and will also be supported by donor funding. The Action Plan primarily includes indicators that track institutional processes, such as the adoption or revision of laws and regulations, but not metrics that capture quantitative outcomes or the number of beneficiaries reached through these policies.

In addition, the 2024 Strategy of the Demographic Development of Ukraine for the Period up to 2040 enshrined the goal of “fostering conditions for positive net migration and decreasing the number of Ukrainians leaving the country”. To this end, among other measures, it highlights the need to create an environment that enables the voluntary return of forcibly displaced Ukrainians, Ukrainians living abroad and “foreign Ukrainians”; as well as enhancing co‑operation with the latter group. The Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity was nominated as the lead executive body responsible for co‑ordinating the implementation of the Strategy.

The Strategy’s Action Plan for 2024‑202720 contains the following tasks to fulfil these objectives:

1. Draft and adopt a dedicated legal act enabling the provision of accompanying measures to support the return and reintegration of Ukrainian citizens following a prolonged stay abroad. The authorities responsible for implementing this are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories (defunct as of 2024), the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity, and the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture.

2. Implement the Strategy of State Migration Policy of Ukraine for the Period up to 2025.

3. Ensure the development of social housing funds, preferential mortgage lending programmes, rental subsidies and other housing support tools that can be used by Ukrainians who have left the temporarily occupied territories or war zones, or who have lost their homes, and who return to Ukraine after staying abroad under the terms of temporary protection. The authorities responsible for implementing this are the Ministry for Communities and Territories Development of Ukraine (defunct as of 2024), the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture, the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity, and the Ministry of Finance.

4. Create digital tools for Ukrainians abroad, containing all the necessary information and services for citizens returning or intending to return to Ukraine. The authorities responsible for implementing this are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Digital Transformation, and the Ministry of Culture.

5. Optimise procedures for issuing identity cards to Ukrainians wishing to return to Ukraine. The authorities responsible for implementing this are the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the State Migration Service.

6. Conduct at least three comprehensive quantitative and qualitative studies of the needs and attitudes of different categories of migrants regarding their intent to return to Ukraine and the prerequisites for returning to Ukraine, with the involvement of representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora. The authorities responsible for implementing this are the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the State Migration Service.

7. Ensure the provision of social services to Ukrainians returning to Ukraine from abroad with the aim of accelerating their reintegration. The authority responsible for implementing this is the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity.

8. Create virtual resilience centres for Ukrainians abroad. The authority responsible for implementing this is the Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity.

9. Ensure that Ukrainian children who receive education in educational institutions in host countries study those subjects in the standard Ukrainian educational curriculum that are not provided for by the curricula of host country educational institutions. The authority responsible for implementing this is the Ministry of Education and Science.

10. Conduct an information campaign among Ukrainians abroad about opportunities for professional development and starting their own businesses in Ukraine. The authorities responsible for implementing this are the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Culture.

In addition, the Strategy’s Action Plan for 2024-2027 contains a set of tasks aimed at deepening co‑operation with representatives of “foreign Ukrainians”, and with the Ukrainian global community, including implementing various projects abroad jointly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture.

The Strategy states that the Action Plan’s financing will be determined by the relevant executive authorities within their budgetary allocations for the corresponding years and will also be supported by donor funding. The Action Plan includes a mix of indicators that track institutional processes, such as the adoption or revision of laws and regulations, or the number of studies, surveys, or activities, and some metrics that capture the number of beneficiaries reached through some of the proposed actions.

Finally, the Strategy for Digital Development and Innovation Activity, adopted in late 2024, contains as one of its goals attracting human capital, notably through the intensification of contacts with researchers, innovators and founders of startups of Ukrainian origin located abroad, and their integration into innovation clusters, business incubators, accelerators, and science parks in Ukraine.

Diaspora engagement in state strategies

The draft Strategy of the Ukrainian Global Community (UGC): New Policy for the Period 2025-2027 is dedicated entirely to fostering collaboration with Ukrainians and “foreign Ukrainians” abroad. Among its various goals, the strategy contains a set of tasks aimed at deepening co‑operation with representatives of “foreign Ukrainians” and the Ukrainian global community, including the implementation of various projects abroad. Developed over 2024, it had not been adopted at the time of writing this report.

Several other strategies, including the Strategy of Information Security, the Strategy of the Consolidation of Ukrainian National and Civic Identity for the Period up to 2030, and the Strategy for the Development of Culture in Ukraine for the Period up to 2030, while addressed to all Ukrainians, identify those abroad and the diaspora as groups requiring targeted approaches. These strategies emphasise the importance of strengthening communication and information links with these population groups, reinforcing shared civic and national identity, maintaining cultural ties, and engaging these groups in the promotion of Ukrainian culture internationally.

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[26] Clarkson, A. (2017), “Coming to terms with Odessa Ukraine: the Impact of the Maidan Uprising on the Ukrainian Diaspora”, Transnational Ukraine? Networks and Ties that Influence(d) Contemporary Ukraine, Vol. 159/Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics and Society, pp. 115-36.

[5] Cohen, R. (1997), Global Diasporas: An Introduction, University of Washington Press, Seattle, WA.

[23] DEMAC (2021), Ukrainian Diaspora Organizations and their Humanitarian Response in Ukraine, Diaspora Emergency Action and Coordination Platform, https://demac.org/stories/report-diaspora-organizations-and-their-humanitarian-response-in-ukraine.

[11] EGRISS (2020), International Recommendations on Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (IRIS), adopted by adopted by the United Nations Statistical Commission (Decision 51/116).

[33] Eurofound (2024), Social impact of migration: Addressing the challenges of receiving and integrating Ukrainian refugees.

[6] European Commission (2005), Migration and Development: Some Concrete Orientation, COM(2005) 390 final, Communication from the Commission and the Committee of the Regions, Brussels.

[32] European Migration Network (2024), Labour market integration of beneficiaries of temporary protection from Ukraine: Joint EMN-OECD inform, https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2024-05/EMN_OECD_INFORM_Labour%20market%20integration_2024.pdf.

[39] Fedasil (2025), Voluntary return, https://www.fedasil.be/en/voluntary-return (accessed on 11 February 2025).

[2] Fedyuk, O. and M. Kindler (eds.) (2016), Ukrainian Migration to the European Union, Springer International Publishing, Cham, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41776-9.

[27] Hrudka, O. (2023), Ukraine Town Turned into Huge Grassroots Volunteering Hub, https://euromaidanpress.com/2023/02/10/the-novovolynsk-miracle-how-russias-invasion-turned-a-ukrainian-mining-town-into-an-uber-volunteer-hub/.

[24] ICMPD (2024), “The Role of Ukrainian Diaspora in Crisis Response”, Future Return and Reconstruction of Ukraine: Case Study from Germany, Czech Republic and Poland Vienna: ICMPD, https://www.icmpd.org/file/download/60826/file/UA_Diaspora_Report_RRR_Project.pdf.

[19] Interfax-Ukraine (2023), Alliance of Civil Society Organizations established in Ukraine with participation of Ukrainian Red Cross, Caritas Foundation., https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/937825.htm.

[21] IOM (2023), Return, reintegration and recovery: IOM’s Position on returns to Ukraine, International Organization for Migration, Geneva.

[16] Keudel, O. and O. Huss (2025), “Polycentric crisis response and societal resilience: how local communities address internal displacement in Ukraine due to the Russian full-scale invasion”, Post-Soviet Affairs, pp. 1-23, https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2025.2480529.

[25] Keudel, O. et al. (2024), “Why and How Involve the Global Ukrainian Community for the Recovery of Ukraine”, Joint Policy Note.

[37] Koinova, M. (2024), “The Diaspora’s Mobilization Post-Invasion Has Provided Crucial Support to Ukraine”, Migration Policy Institute open access, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ukraine-diaspora-mobilization.

[44] Koinova, M. and G. Tsourapas (2018), “How do Countries of Origin Engage Migrants and Diasporas? Multiple Actors and Comparative Perspectives”, International Political Science Review, Vol. 39/3, pp. 311-321, https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512118755843.

[1] Malynovska, O. (2018), Migration Policy: Global Context and Ukrainian Realities, Kyiv.

[42] Ministry of Justice and Security (2025), Assistance by DTenV, https://english.dienstterugkeerenvertrek.nl/return-assistance/assistance-by-dtv (accessed on 10 February 2025).

[41] Ministry of Justice and Security (2022), Assistance for those returning to Ukraine / Допомога з поверненням в Україну, https://english.dienstterugkeerenvertrek.nl/latest/news/2022/07/01/assistance-for-those-returning-to-ukraine (accessed on 10 February 2025).

[40] Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic (2025), Voluntary Returns, https://mv.gov.cz/mvcren/article/en-assisted-voluntary-returns.aspx (accessed on 11 February 2025).

[15] Myerson, R. (2022), Reform that Stopped Putin.

[43] Norwegian Directorate for Immigration (2025), Apply for repatriation, https://www.udi.no/en/return/apply-for-repatriation/#link-30773 (accessed on 11 February 2025).

[10] OECD (2024), Return, Reintegration and Re-migration: Understanding Return Dynamics and the Role of Family and Community, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/625fb5e6-en.

[29] OECD (2024), “Strengthening the human capital of forcibly displaced persons in and from Ukraine: Background note for the Ukraine Recovery Conference 2024”, OECD Policy Responses on the Impacts of the War in Ukraine, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9afedf7c-en.

[34] OECD (2023), “Working towards dual intent integration of Ukrainian refugees”, OECD Policy Responses on the Impacts of the War in Ukraine, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/6b4c16f7-en.

[31] OECD (2022), International Migration Outlook 2022, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/30fe16d2-en.

[30] OECD (2022), Rights and Support for Ukrainian Refugees in Receiving Countries, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/09beb886-en.

[35] OECD (2020), Sustainable Reintegration of Returning Migrants: A Better Homecoming, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5fee55b3-en.

[13] OECD (2018), Maintaining the Momentum of Decentralisation in Ukraine, OECD Multi-level Governance Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264301436-en.

[3] OECD (2012), Connecting with Emigrants: A Global Profile of Diasporas, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264177949-en.

[7] OECD/European Union (2015), Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2015: Settling In, OECD Publishing, Paris/European Union, Brussels, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264234024-en.

[22] OSCE-ODIHR (2024), Engaging the Ukrainian Diaspora in Reconstruction and Development, Report from expert discussions organised by ODIHR in the period of 9 February - 3 July 2023. Warsaw.

[28] Profbud (2024), Trade Union Hubs. For Informal Professional Training in Microskills in the Construction Sector of Ukraine.

[4] Sheffer, G. (ed.) (1986), Modern Diasporas in International Politics, Croom Helm, Sydney.

[20] UNHCR (2023), UNHCR Position on Voluntary Return to Ukraine, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva.

[17] Zarembo, K. and E. Martin (2023), “Civil society and sense of community in Ukraine: from dormancy to action”, European Societies, Vol. 26/2, pp. 203-229, https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2023.2185652.

Annex 3.A. Bilateral agreements on mutual recognition of educational documents

 

Country	Year	Name of the agreement, in Ukrainian, with a link to the legal text where possible
Hungary	2021; 1998	Угода між Кабінетом Міністрів України та Урядом Угорщини про взаємне визнання документів про освіту та наукові ступені від 22.07.2021 р. Угода між Кабінетом Міністрів України та Урядом Угорської Республіки про взаємне визнання та еквівалентність документів про освіту і наукові ступені, виданих в Україні та Угорській Республіці, від 27.10.1998 р.
Slovak Republic	2014	Угода між Кабінетом Міністрів України та Урядом Словацької Республіки про академічне взаємне визнання і еквівалентність документів про освіту, виданих в Україні та Словацькій Республіці від 08.04.2014 р.
Argentina	2011	Угода між Кабінетом Міністрів України та Урядом Аргентинської Республіки про взаємне визнання документів про вищу освіту від 20.04.2011 р.
Poland	2005	Угода між Кабінетом Міністрів України та Урядом Республіки Польща про академічне взаємовизнання документів про освіту та рівноцінність ступенів від 11.04.2005 року.
France	2005	Угода між Урядом України та Урядом Французької Республіки про взаємне визнання документів про наукові ступені і вчені звання від 14.06.2005 р.
Viet Nam	2004	Угода між Кабінетом Міністрів України і Урядом Соціалістичної Республіки В’єтнам про взаємне визнання документів про освіту, наукові ступені і вчені звання від 04.11.2004 р.
Equatorial Guinea	2004	Угода між Кабінетом Міністрів України та Урядом Республіки Екваторіальна Гвінея про взаємне визнання документів про освіту від 17.09.2004 р.
Mongolia	2004	Угода між Кабінетом Міністрів України і Урядом Монголії про взаємне визнання документів про освіту, наукові ступені і вчені звання від 22.09.2004 р.
Peru	2004	Угода між Урядом України та Урядом Республіки Перу про взаємне визнання документів про освіту і вчені звання від 16.07.2004 р.
Libya	2003	Угода між Кабінетом Міністрів України та Вищим Народним Комітетом Великої Соціалістичної Народної Лівійської Арабської Джамагирії про взаємне визнання документів про освіту і наукові ступені від 30.06.2003 р.
Georgia	2002	Угода між КМУ і Виконавчою Владою Грузії про взаємне визнання та еквівалентність документів про освіту і вчені (науково-педагогічні) звання від 17.07.2002 р.
Kazakhstan	2001	Угода між Кабінетом Міністрів України і Урядом Республіки Казахстан про взаємне визнання та еквівалентність документів про освіту, наукові (вчені) ступені і вчені звання від 26.09.2001 р.
Bulgaria	2001	Угода між Кабінетом Міністрів України та Урядом Республіки Болгарія про взаємне визнання документів про освіту, наукові ступені і вчені звання від 27.06.2001 р.
Azerbaijan	2000	Угода між Кабінетом Міністрів України і Урядом Азербайджанської Республіки про взаємне визнання та еквівалентність документів про освіту і вчені звання від 16.03.2000 р.
Romania	1999	Угода між Кабінетом Міністрів України та Урядом Румунії про взаємне визнання і еквівалентність документів про освіту, наукові ступені, виданих в Україні та Румунії від 19.02.1999 р.
China	1998	Угода між Кабінетом Міністрів України та Урядом Китайської Народної Республіки про взаємне визнання та еквівалентність документів про освіту і наукові ступені від 10.12.1998 р.
Uzbekistan	1997	Угода між Урядом України і Урядом Республіки Узбекистан про взаємне визнання та еквівалентність документів про освіту від 18.04.1997 р.
Estonia	1996	Угода між Урядом України і Урядом Естонської Республіки про взаємне визнання документів про освіту і наукові ступені від 06.02.1996 р.

Source: Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine.

Annex 3.B. Examples of return support measures open to Ukrainians

Belgium

Belgium’s Federal Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (Fedasil) provides support to Ukrainians under temporary protection who wish to return home but do not have the resources to organise the journey themselves. This support is implemented together with IOM and Caritas International, with each request evaluated on a case‑by-case basis. Fedasil primarily organises return by bus to selected cities in Ukraine, where security conditions are reassessed regularly (Belgian Federal Government, 2025[38]). Travel costs, including transport to the departure point, are covered, and expenses for travel documents are reimbursed. Throughout the process, Fedasil and IOM offer guidance, while Caritas International may provide reintegration support upon arrival, such as assistance with housing, medical needs, or starting a business (Fedasil, 2025[39]).

Czechia

The Czech Ministry of Interior launched a pilot programme in June 2024 specifically designed for Ukrainian beneficiaries of temporary protection who wish to terminate their status and return to Ukraine. The programme covers the cost of bus tickets from selected Czech cities to the closest safe city of the returnee’s original residence in Ukraine. Additional care and adequate transportation is provided to individuals with special medical needs. Returnees are limited in their ability to reapply for a residence permit in Czechia during the following 12 months unless they reimburse half of the costs incurred for their return (Ministry of the Interior of the Czech Republic, 2025[40]).

The Netherlands

The Dutch Repatriation and Departure Service (DTenV), under the Ministry of Justice and Security, extended eligibility to its standard assisted voluntary return programme to beneficiaries of temporary protection. With support from the IOM and NGOs, DTenV assists Ukrainians who wish to permanently return to Ukraine but lack travel documents or resources to organise their journey, including those with special needs (Ministry of Justice and Security, 2022[41]). The programme provides counselling, ensuring the decision to return is conscious and voluntary (Ministry of Justice and Security, 2025[42]).

Norway

In Norway, the Directorate of Immigration (UDI) offers information and financial support to Ukrainians with valid residence permits who decide to return to Ukraine permanently (Norwegian Directorate for Immigration, 2025[43]). Ukrainians can apply for financial assistance amounting to NOK 17 500 per person, including for children. If they later choose to come back to Norway, they may be required to repay some or all of the financial assistance, depending on the duration of their stay abroad. Unlike Norway’s standard assisted voluntary return programmes, this initiative focusses on facilitating voluntary returns for Ukrainians with legal residence and protection status.

Switzerland

The State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) offers support to Ukrainians under temporary protection “S Status” who wish to return voluntarily to Ukraine. This includes personalised counselling, logistical help with the journey, and additional benefits such as financial support of 500 Swiss Francs per adult, 250 Swiss Francs per child, and a maximum of 2000 Swiss Francs per family. Each case is assessed individually by cantonal Return Counselling Services to determine eligibility and the appropriate level of support.

Notes

← 1.  This chapter reviews only regulations that are directly relevant to the issues of return, reintegration, and engagement with the Ukrainian global community. It does not include regulations governing other areas of migration, such as the migration of nationals of other countries, labour migration of Ukrainians, granting refugee status in Ukraine, etc.

← 2.  Also known as the Law on the Legal Status of Ukrainians Abroad (Закон Про закордонних українців).

← 3.  Unless stated otherwise, this section is based on the Regulations for each respective ministry (specific documents approved by Resolutions of the CMU), outlining the mandate, key tasks, functions, rights, and responsibilities, as of February 2025.

← 4.  More generally, in Ukraine, the mandate of ministries is defined through a range of normative legal acts, the main ones being:

• The Constitution of Ukraine, which establishes the general principles of the organisation of executive power and the functioning of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, which includes ministries.

• The Law of Ukraine on the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, which regulates the activities of the government and defines the powers of ministries as central executive bodies.

• Resolutions and Orders of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, approving and modifying Regulations of the Ministries.

• Regulations for the ministry, which are specific documents approved by the Cabinet of Ministers typically through Resolutions and sometimes through Orders, outlining the mandate, powers, key tasks, functions, rights and responsibilities of a particular ministry, and the organisational structure of each ministry.

• Laws of Ukraine regulating specific areas, such as, for example, legislation on education, the economy, and other sectors, which can further specify the functions of ministries in the relevant sectors.

← 5.  The mandate of the ministry dates back to 1993.

← 6.  Own elaboration. For other typologies, see, for example, (Koinova and Tsourapas, 2018[44]).

← 7.  Information collected from government officials during a fact-finding mission to Ukraine.

← 8.  Association Іnternationale de Сoopération Medicine / International Association for Co‑operation in Medicine France‑Ukraine.

← 9.  Unless stated otherwise, information in this section was provided to the OECD by Ukrainian public officials during the OECD fact-finding mission.

← 10.  For more information, see the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture Press Release “Relocation: 725 Enterprises Moved to Safe Regions”, of 30 August 2022, available at: https://me.gov.ua, as well as information available at the single government site for business relocation aid: https://auction.e-tender.ua/helpRelocation.

← 11.  The legal basis for this is the Resolution of the CMU “On the Implementation of a Pilot Project to Introduce a Comprehensive Social Service to Build Resilience” and the Order of the CMU “On the Organisation of Activities and Ensuring Functionality of the Resilience Centres”.

← 12.  Information in this section is based on reviews of information provided by various ministries and the State Employment Service during the OECD fact-finding mission; information available on the Povertajsja Dodomu (Come back home) online platform and the UNHCR “Ukraine is Home” platform; and publicly available information on the websites of the National Social Services of Ukraine and the Ministry of National Unity of Ukraine.

← 13.  The legal basis for this is the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of 14 July 2025 (No. 841) “On the implementation of an experimental project on developing a network of unity among Ukrainians abroad.”

← 14.  Replacing the previous Recommendation No. 836 of 2024.

← 15.  For more information, see the Office of the President of Ukraine press release: President Visits State Ukrainian-Hungarian School in Budapest — Official website of the President of Ukraine, accessed in March 2025.

← 16.  By Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of 24 January 2025 (No. 73‑r) “On the establishment of the state non-profit enterprise “Agency for National Unity””.

← 17.  For more information, see https://foundation.kse.ua/create-ukraine/.

← 18.  Adopted in March 2023, consulted in May 2025.

← 19.  Adopted in September 2024, consulted in May 2025.

← 20.  Adopted in November 2024, consulted in May 2025.