Ukraine’s Strategic Response to the Displacement Crisis

1. Assessment and recommendations

Abstract

This chapter provides an overall assessment of the displacement, return, and reintegration situation in Ukraine, as well as the country’s engagement with its global community. It outlines the main findings of the review and presents recommendations to inform policy development, reinforce institutional capacity, and support sustainable return, reintegration, and long-term recovery.

Assessment of the situation

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has triggered one of the largest and fastest displacement crises in recent history

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine1 in February 2022 has resulted in unprecedented population movements both within and beyond the country’s borders. The magnitude, speed, and complexity of this largest displacement crisis in Europe since the Second World War have created immense humanitarian, social, and economic challenges.

Since 24 February 2022, around one‑quarter of Ukraine’s pre‑war population has been forced to leave their homes. As of 2025, more than 4.6 million people remain internally displaced within Ukraine, although at the height of the crisis this figure was higher.

While many displaced persons sought safety within national borders, the invasion also led to large‑scale cross-border movements. Between 2022 and 2025, millions of Ukrainians sought international protection across OECD and neighbouring countries. By mid-2025, Germany had become the main host country, sheltering approximately 1.22 million displaced Ukrainians, followed by Poland, Czechia, Canada and the United States. Together, these five destinations accounted for more than 60% of all displaced Ukrainians residing in OECD countries in 2025. In per capita terms, Czechia hosted the largest share of displaced Ukrainians.

This displacement crisis in Ukraine added to a pre‑existing internal displacement situation

This new displacement crisis has unfolded against the backdrop of an existing displacement situation that began in 2014 following the illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation, and the Russia‑instigated outbreak of a military crisis in the eastern part of Ukraine. Before the full-scale invasion in 2022, nearly 1.5 million Ukrainians were already registered as internally displaced. The full-scale invasion compounded these earlier movements, creating overlapping layers of vulnerability among both newly and previously displaced populations.

External displacement movements built upon Ukraine’s extensive emigration history

In early 2022, nearly 6 million first-generation Ukrainians were already living abroad, representing around 14% of the country’s total population. The long history of emigration had resulted in a well-established Ukrainian global community across many parts of the world. Nine OECD countries ranked among the top 11 destinations, reflecting Ukraine’s deep migration links with OECD Members.

Prior to 2022, most Ukrainians residing in OECD countries were women of working age, often with high levels of education and employment. Between 2000 and 2021, more than 535 000 Ukrainians obtained citizenship of OECD countries, while over 16 000 were granted refugee status. Many OECD countries also had sizeable populations with Ukrainian ancestry.

This pre‑existing presence played a significant role in shaping both the destination choices and the reception of Ukrainians displaced by the invasion. Many relied on family and community networks already established abroad, which facilitated initial settlement and access to support. These connections continue to influence integration outcomes in host countries, intentions regarding return to Ukraine, and the evolving character of Ukraine’s diverse global community.

Host countries took unprecedented measures to support externally displaced Ukrainians abroad, and many individuals are gradually integrating into host societies

OECD and neighbouring countries responded rapidly to the large‑scale arrival of displaced Ukrainians by granting immediate protection and access to employment, education, healthcare, and social services. Temporary protection mechanisms were activated in many countries on an exceptional scale, supported by financial and logistical measures at both national and local levels. Host governments, in close co‑operation with civil society and diaspora organisations, facilitated the reception and inclusion of Ukrainians displaced abroad.

Restoring security in Ukraine is the key pre‑condition for sustainable returns and for successful implementation of policies related to return and reintegration

The direct threat to physical safety has been the main reason for the displacement of Ukrainians since 2014, and especially since February 2022. As of 2025, security risks remain significant across Ukraine. While frontline areas are particularly dangerous and face the risk of a broader military offensive, regular missile and drone strikes throughout the country mean that no region can be considered completely safe. Restoring security is integral to resolving the displacement crisis and is a fundamental precondition for voluntary and sustainable return.

The scale and dynamics of future returns will depend on the evolution of the security situation. In addition, if not addressed appropriately, compounding socio‑economic challenges are likely to become additional barriers to further returns, though the success of policies to address these challenges is also likely to be affected by the security situation.

Among the displaced Ukrainian population, several distinct groups are now clearly present

By 2025, in Ukraine, persons with a displacement history included:

• internally displaced persons (IDPs);

• returnees from internal displacement;

• externally displaced persons (EDPs) who intend to return but who, for a variety of reasons, have not been able to do so yet;

• returnees from external displacement;

• externally displaced persons (EDPs) who do not intend to return but have become part of the Ukrainian global community.2

These groups differ in their profiles and needs, including in terms of housing, employment, and access to services.

IDPs are among the most vulnerable, though their heterogeneous situation requires particular attention to the most disadvantaged

IDPs are among the most vulnerable groups in need of support, especially in the early stages of displacement. Over time, disparities among IDPs become increasingly pronounced, with some individuals integrating swiftly and successfully into host communities, eventually requiring minimal or no state support, while others remaining trapped in vulnerability and accumulating difficulties (such as facing an unaffordable, unstable housing situation, unemployment and poverty).

IDPs often face particularly acute barriers to securing decent housing compared with non-displaced persons in the areas to which they arrive and compared to those who have returned to their original settlements. Beyond destroyed and damaged housing stock, other housing-related challenges include limited rental options, a largely unregulated rental market that weakens tenants’ rights, discrimination, limited protection against eviction, and insufficient affordable housing. These issues not only prevent many displaced families from integrating into their new communities but also push them to return to insecure areas or leave Ukraine.

IDPs, especially women and those displaced in rural areas, also face severe challenges in terms of access to employment, and to good-quality employment in particular.

For IDPs, issues of integration in their current areas of residence (especially for those displaced outside of their region) are particularly high on the agenda. In view of the security situation, returns are not promoted, and questions of reintegration, often coupled with the rebuilding of livelihoods and entire areas of origin, are relegated to the time when the security situation stabilises.

Returns from internal displacement often take place out of necessity rather than choice

For those who have already returned from internal displacement, returns were most likely to happen to safer areas, from displacement within the same (typically non-frontline) oblast, among older individuals, among those with higher educational attainment, and among the self-employed. For other situations and profiles, returns remain limited. In some cases, returns were possible because enabling factors such as housing and employment were present. Too often, however, returns from internal displacement were also driven by the lack of housing and employment options in the regions of displacement, or by the need to care for family members or other individuals who could not move. As a result, returnees from internal displacement are more likely to live in damaged housing compared with returnees from abroad, current IDPs, and the non-displaced. Some returnees, similarly to IDPs, face difficulties in proving their current housing arrangements with legally recognised documents, which can be a barrier to accessing housing compensation schemes and other public services.

The majority of these returnees do not intend to leave again in the near future. However, precarious employment outcomes and uneven access to services, especially for those who returned closer to the frontline, may undermine their socio‑economic situation. Future returnees from internal displacement, especially to heavily damaged areas, will require greater reintegration support, primarily linked to sustaining and rebuilding their livelihoods.

Return intentions among those abroad have weakened over time but remain sensitive to key conditions

Most externally displaced Ukrainians continue to express an intention to return to Ukraine in the future, although the share of such individuals has declined over time. This trend should be interpreted with caution, as survey samples vary and many who initially planned to return may already have done so.

Return intentions differ considerably across profiles, circumstances, and places of origin. They tend to be stronger among older persons, single‑parent or female‑headed households, those with dependants, and individuals maintaining strong links with Ukraine.

Security and family unity remain the strongest determinants of both intentions and actually taken decisions to return. In addition, housing, employment, and access to quality public services such as healthcare and education are the most significant factors. The right to housing, employment, and access to health and education are constitutionally guaranteed in Ukraine, and are the areas within the remit of policymakers. Policymakers, therefore, need to prioritise improvements in these areas, which are directly actionable.

Spontaneous returns are taking place amidst an unfavourable security situation

While the necessary conditions for promoting safe returns are not yet in place, by 2025, between 4.1 and 5.8 million Ukrainians had already returned,3 including a quarter from displacement abroad. Most of the returns took place in mid-2022, in a voluntary and spontaneous manner. Subsequent returns were smaller in scale. A certain seasonal pattern of returns, linked to the academic year, can be discerned. Some individual profiles (older individuals, those previously employed in Ukraine, and those with good housing options in Ukraine), as well as conditions in the areas of origin (not under occupation, without active hostilities) are associated with a greater likelihood of return.

While early returnees from abroad are reintegrating, those still displaced face rising barriers to return

Early waves of returns from external displacement could be largely described as driven by personal reasons and attachment, a wish to reunite with family in Ukraine and a strong sense of longing for home. Importantly, early returnees often had key enabling conditions favouring their return: ownership of undamaged accommodation and the possibility of resuming previous employment. As a result, early returnees from external displacement tend to fare relatively well compared with the non-displaced and IDPs. However, they still face challenges, including precarious employment, low awareness about and self-reported difficulties navigating applications for housing support and compensation schemes.

As the displacement continues over a longer period of time, earlier enablers of return such as pre‑war housing and employment arrangements in Ukraine progressively disappear for those still displaced. War-related changes in Ukraine’s housing market have led to very high rents, which not only preclude returns by those who rely on rented accommodation but also create incentives for externally displaced persons to rent out their housing in Ukraine and remain abroad. War-driven economic and labour market changes mean that many previous positions no longer exist, and new skill sets are required that the displaced persons may not possess.

Moreover, those contemplating return progressively face additional hurdles, for instance, updating travel documents, renouncing temporary or another protection status and its associated social benefits, terminating employment in the host country, completing the academic year for children, ending rental agreements, fulfilling tax and other obligations, and organising the actual move. At the same time, prospective returnees need to make preparations for returning to Ukraine, including readapting to the security situation, finding or repairing housing, finding employment that may require recognition of experience, skills or qualifications gained abroad, enrolling children in the educational system, and regaining access to social and health services. In addition, many wish to ensure that the decision to return will not be accompanied by unforeseen obstacles, administrative complications, difficulties reintegrating into a society that has lived through a different shared experience, challenges of social acceptance, or a need to migrate again.

As a result, over time, return to Ukraine becomes akin to making a new migration decision. There is therefore a growing need for distinct policies for those who wish to return but cannot do so. Given their profiles and needs, they should not be considered as IDPs upon return but should be supported through approaches that reflect their distinct circumstances, preferably prior to return.

Displacement status alone does not determine socio‑economic vulnerability

Despite differences across population groups with different displacement histories, which require specific approaches, displacement status alone does not accurately reflect the socio‑economic vulnerability of households and individuals in Ukraine. Equally vulnerable, or at times even more vulnerable, families can also be found among the non-displaced population, especially among those unable to leave high-risk areas. Factors such as security conditions in the area of residence, employment status, or education level also play a significant role in determining socio‑economic outcomes, justifying development of needs-based approaches to support measures in the longer term.

The sustainability of returns depends on local conditions and determines the risk of secondary displacement

The sustainability of returns is closely linked to the security environment, economic and housing opportunities, and levels of social cohesion in the areas to which people return. Returnees who arrive in locations facing damaged or unaffordable housing, limited employment options, or strained community relations often encounter significant obstacles to rebuilding stable lives. Such conditions, alongside security risks, can lead to renewed mobility pressures, increasing the likelihood of secondary displacement or decisions to re‑migrate. These challenges underscore that return is a gradual process shaped by the pace of local recovery and the ability of individuals and communities to re‑establish livelihoods and social ties.

The scale and dynamics of future returns from abroad remain uncertain

Future returns from abroad can be expected, but their magnitude, timing and geographical distribution are uncertain. Modelling efforts by the UNHCR and Brunel University London, featured in this report, highlight this uncertainty, indicating that future return dynamics can differ significantly under various security scenarios. Under the “Ukraine’s Victory” scenario, the number of refugees returning by 2029 could reach approximately 3.5 million, accounting for 68% of the current refugee population in Europe. Under a “Fragile Peace with Concessions” scenario, however, projected returns fall to around 2.3 million (44%). In a “Prolonged Status Quo” scenario, only minimal net returns are projected, estimated at 40 000 people (1%) by 2029. These diverging projections demonstrate the sensitivity of return intentions to security developments and highlight the importance of systematically monitoring return dynamics in order to anticipate reintegration needs, population movements and the resulting pressure on local capacities.

Externally displaced persons who do not intend to return remain a valuable, although often underexplored, resource for Ukraine

Not all externally displaced persons will return to Ukraine. Return decisions are highly personal and shaped by a multitude of complex factors, including safety, stability, and family circumstances. Some do not return not because they do not want to, but because they cannot. Some reasons deterring people from return may include the destruction or occupation of their place of origin, traumatic security-related experiences in Ukraine, previous prolonged internal displacement, or family reunification abroad.

Nevertheless, these individuals remain a valuable source of support to Ukraine, joining a well-established and proactive Ukrainian global community (UGC). The UGC, including newly arrived displaced individuals, is large, diverse, and strongly engaged, with significant skills, resources, and networks. It has demonstrated exceptional solidarity through humanitarian support, advocacy for Ukraine’s cause internationally, and investment in defence and reconstruction efforts since the start of the war.

However, existing engagement channels with the UGC remain fragmented and underdeveloped, limiting the impact of diaspora efforts. While many initiatives exist, what is lacking is the representation in Ukraine, stronger bridges between the UGC and Ukrainians in Ukraine, and channels for transparent and more efficient investment. Growing stigmatisation of externally displaced non-returnees by those who remain in Ukraine risks alienating them from constructive engagement to support Ukraine from abroad. A more systematic and inclusive approach by the Ukrainian Government to its global community could better unlock the UGC’s full potential for recovery, long-term development, and possibly future returns from the diaspora.

Assessment and recommendations: Governance

Strengthening governance and monitoring

Ukrainian authorities, communities, and civil society mobilised in unprecedented ways to support displaced populations

Since the first hours of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukrainian authorities, local communities, and civil society organisations have undertaken extensive and unprecedented efforts to protect civilians and respond to the needs of those forced to leave their homes. These measures have focussed on organising evacuations, facilitating the reception of internally displaced persons, and ensuring access to essential humanitarian and social assistance.

The majority of actions within Ukraine have been directed towards supporting internally displaced persons. At the same time, the return and reintegration of Ukrainians displaced abroad, and engagement with the UGC, have also been identified as priorities for the Ukrainian Government.

Pre‑invasion frameworks have been adapted to reflect post-2022 realities, but co‑ordination and implementation challenges persist

Ukraine’s early state‑led responses to displacement built upon institutional and legal frameworks developed over three decades of independence. These pre‑existing structures provided a foundation for the initial responses to full-scale invasion in 2022, particularly in addressing internal displacement, but the war created new and complex demands that required rapid institutional and legislative adaptation.

Between 2022 and 2025, mandates for managing internal displacement, supporting return and reintegration, and engaging with Ukrainians abroad have shifted among multiple ministries and agencies. As of 2025, these responsibilities remain distributed across different institutions and levels of government. While this reflects the inherently cross-cutting nature of return and reintegration policy, it has also led in some instances to fragmented responsibilities, overlapping objectives, and weakened institutional memory.

The pre‑war legal framework had to be adapted, too. The existing laws regulating questions of IDPs, voluntary return and reintegration, and diaspora engagement reflect international standards and are consistent with Ukraine’s international obligations in this area. In addition, the use of state strategies is a distinctive feature of Ukraine’s policy landscape. Several strategies launched or updated since 2022 address different aspects of displacement, return, and reintegration. These include, among others, the Strategy of State Policy on Internal Displacement for the Period up to 2025, the Strategy of the State Migration Policy of Ukraine for the Period up to 2025, and the Strategy of Demographic Development of Ukraine for the Period up to 2040.

The successful implementation of these state strategies will largely depend on the extent to which Ukraine’s own past lessons from implementing the earlier generation of state strategies (adopted between the late 1990s and early 2020s in similar areas) can be taken into account. The limited impact of the earlier generation of strategies was due to a number of persistent common structural challenges, including the absence or short duration of accompanying action plans, insufficient monitoring mechanisms, inadequate funding, and limited institutional capacity for implementation.

To strengthen current governance and ensure continuity of policy implementation, Ukraine will need to reinforce co‑ordination and implementation mechanisms. Greater interministerial co‑operation and co‑ordination across levels of government would be essential, particularly where mandates intersect. Establishing or designating a durable co‑ordinating institution with the authority and capacity to plan, implement, and monitor long-term action on return and reintegration would help consolidate efforts, enhance accountability, and ensure that the objectives set out in state strategies translate into tangible results. Such an institution should also hold a clear mandate to oversee accountability mechanisms, ensuring that responsibilities are well defined and that progress can be systematically tracked across all relevant authorities.

The long-term success of the current generation of strategies will also depend on Ukraine’s ability to link institutional responsibilities with policy implementation in a consistent and predictable manner. Sustained efforts to build institutional capacity and strengthen mechanisms for follow-up and evaluation will be critical for translating strategic commitments into measurable progress on recovery, return, and reintegration.

Alongside crisis management, greater emphasis can be placed on implementing a long-term strategic vision

There is a growing understanding in Ukraine that urgent crisis response needs to be complemented by forward-looking planning and longer-term solutions. The mandates of many ministries and the objectives of existing state strategies continue to evolve, yet one of the main challenges lies in translating these into long-term, sustained and broad-based policy implementation. Ongoing security threats, instability, and the need for constant emergency responses make it difficult to allocate resources for planning ahead.

Despite these constraints, it is increasingly important to complement crisis-driven measures, which remain necessary in the current context, with activities that also incorporate long-term objectives. The mandates of responsible institutions and the objectives of national strategies should explicitly recognise that return, reintegration, and engagement with Ukraine’s global community are long-term, generational processes. These cannot be addressed effectively through temporary or short-term interventions.

Establishing predictable, multi-year implementation processes is essential for sustaining reform momentum and supporting a long-term vision (OECD, forthcoming[1]). Developing durable, forward-looking multi-year implementation plans could help move beyond pilot initiatives, ensure continuity, and build predictability. Over time, such predictability would strengthen institutions, foster trust among displaced persons and the wider public, and reinforce confidence among Ukraine’s international partners.

Policies for return and reintegration need to distinguish between different displaced populations and between immediate versus long-term support measures

Effective longer-term planning for return and reintegration requires distinguishing between displaced populations with different experiences and needs, and consequently between policies requiring immediate implementation and those that can be introduced gradually.

Current policies place greater emphasis on supporting and integrating internally displaced persons, while the specific needs of prospective returnees, whether from internal or external displacement, are less systematically addressed. In many cases, it is assumed that returnees can access the same support measures as internally displaced or non-displaced populations. Yet the experiences and profiles differ considerably across IDPs, returnees from internal and external displacement, and those who envisage return but face increasing barriers and seek ways to overcome them. As such, these groups increasingly require differentiated policy approaches.

Although the security situation does not permit the promotion of large‑scale returns at present, spontaneous returns are already taking place, and policies are needed to support these returnees in their reintegration. At the same time, authorities in Ukraine and abroad are beginning to consider how best to prepare for the moment when broader return and reintegration become possible, once the war of aggression ends and security guarantees are in place; and how to address other socio‑economic barriers to return. At least some future returns can be anticipated and therefore prepared for.

Laying the groundwork for these returns, including through future dedicated repatriation programmes, can begin now in co‑operation with international partners, host countries, and key institutions already supporting displaced Ukrainians within Ukraine and abroad. Their engagement will be essential for co‑ordinating international mobility, facilitating voluntary return, and ensuring that reintegration policies align with Ukraine’s reform agenda and the EU accession process. Aligning return and reintegration within these broader frameworks will ensure coherence with international standards and support Ukraine’s path towards sustainable recovery and European integration.

Additionally, understanding the needs, aspirations, and return prospects of Ukrainians in different global locations is crucial, as these vary significantly by host region. Ukrainians in neighbouring European countries, who maintain closer proximity to Ukraine, are more likely to consider actual return, particularly as security conditions improve, requiring concrete return and reintegration planning. Conversely, Ukrainians in North America and other overseas destinations face greater barriers that make permanent return less likely. There are also different degrees of institutionalisation of diaspora organisations across regions, requiring different diaspora engagement strategies. Return programmes and engagement with Ukrainian communities should reflect these variations.

Predictable and sustainable financing is essential for delivery at scale

Many of the current measures aimed at displaced persons, including those embedded within state strategies and their corresponding action plans, have been made possible through donor funding. However, prolonged dependence on external financial support risks making these measures vulnerable to disruption. Short-term and fragmented financing reduces predictability and constrains the capacity of national and local authorities to plan strategically and expand effective initiatives. Similar challenges were already evident before the war of aggression, when the absence of dedicated, stable funding streams prevented several earlier generations of state strategies from being fully implemented.

Going forward, it will be important to underpin current and future strategies with realistic and transparent budgeting frameworks. Establishing a dedicated and stable budget line within the national budget, complemented by predictable support from donors and international financial institutions, would strengthen planning and delivery. Prioritising the scaling up and institutionalisation of successful initiatives and proven practices, rather than launching new and potentially duplicative efforts, could further enhance efficiency and sustainability, and save on the costs of administering multiple programmes. Encouraging partners, including initiatives such as the Skills Alliance for Ukraine, to align with national priorities and contribute to long-term financing instruments would help ensure continuity and maximise impact.

Action plans for state strategies can be enhanced by including clear measurable indicators of outcomes

Some current action plans that accompany state strategies contain measurable targets. Too often, however, they focus on institutional processes or activities but not the actual situation of individuals with different displacement histories. They can be strengthened by including indicators that allow gauging progress towards desirable outcomes, such as the number of IDPs and returnees supported with various measures, number of housing units delivered, number of IDP and returnees supported through SES, etc. Having such measures would also improve accountability and ensure transparency.

Developing a monitoring system to track progress and inform policy change is desirable

Statistics on displacement, return and reintegration are essential to monitor both short-term and long-term outcomes and assess the effectiveness of policies supporting displacement-affected populations. Monitoring systems should focus not only on institutional processes or activities but on the actual number, needs, and socio‑economic outcomes of individuals with different displacement histories.

Ukraine has a well-developed administrative system for registering IDPs (the Unified Information Database on IDPs). It allows tracking the number of persons with legal IDP status, provides information on their main demographic characteristics, and information on some of their vulnerabilities. This system, however, currently does not allow tracking individuals who have returned to their habitual place of residence or settled elsewhere; progress towards integration or reintegration; or the identification of IDPs who have overcome their displacement-related vulnerabilities. In addition, there is no equivalent administrative system for registering returnees from external displacement, and no systematic monitoring framework to capture their evolving socio‑economic needs and outcomes.

There are several surveys covering IDPs and returnees, their characteristics, needs and outcomes. These surveys are largely managed by international organisations or private initiatives rather than by the State of Ukraine and often rely on differing definitions and methodologies.

As a result, information remains limited and fragmented. There are significant data gaps regarding the housing, employment, and social services needs of IDPs; who among internally displaced persons has already locally integrated or has overcome their displacement-related vulnerabilities and no longer requires support; who is returning from both internal and external displacement and how they are reintegrating; and how barriers to return are evolving among those still displaced.

Looking ahead, it will be important for Ukraine to establish its own monitoring system and analytical tools. Both administrative and survey data can serve as a basis for a set of comprehensive and measurable indicators at both national and regional levels for monitoring progress on return and reintegration of externally displaced persons; as well as progress of IDPs towards local integration, settlement and integration elsewhere in the country, or return and reintegration in their habitual places of residence.

Clear and consistent legal and statistical definitions of “returnee” and “reintegration” are essential for effective monitoring, policy design and service delivery

While status should not determine access to support, clear legal and statistical definitions remain essential for effective support and monitoring. Although Ukraine has a legal definition of an internally displaced person and of a “foreign Ukrainian”, other key terms remain ambiguous. Establishing clear criteria on who qualifies as a “returnee”, including distinctions between those returning from abroad and from internal displacement, is essential for visibility in policy and data systems.

Equally, clear criteria are needed to define when an internally displaced person or returnee can be considered to have reintegrated, or to be someone who has overcome displacement-related vulnerabilities. Establishing such standards would help delineate when government assistance should begin and end, as well as which services individuals should have access to at different stages of the process. Greater definitional clarity would also improve data comparability, enable accurate resource planning, and support the design of targeted and equitable programmes.

Statistics and indicators on IDPs can be further enhanced drawing on international standards

For IDPs, the relevance of existing administrative data can be enhanced by enforcing existing mechanisms to regularly update records. This can include clear guidelines on tracking, at least for statistical purposes, people who have returned to their habitual place of residence, resettled, or moved abroad. It can also include additional guidelines on identifying persons who have overcome displacement-related vulnerabilities and who should no longer be counted as IDPs for statistical purposes.

In addition, Ukraine could draw on the International Recommendations on IDP Statistics (IRIS) (EGRISS, 2020[2]), compiled by the Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics, and adopted by the United Nations Statistical Commission (Decision 51/116) in 2020, to collect additional statistics to monitor IDPs’ location and outcomes (Box 1.1). Both the OECD and Ukraine are members of the Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics that drafted these recommendations.

Population and housing census would be the most desirable source of such data. In the absence of the possibility to conduct a census, sample household surveys, ideally longitudinal, containing dedicated questions, can be a valuable source of such statistics. The survey would ideally be owned and managed by the State of Ukraine, have a clearly defined periodicity (and hence reporting intervals), an assigned responsible body, and a dedicated implementation budget. Dedicated surveys for IDPs could remain complementary, but ideally not the primary mechanism for monitoring the long-term needs and outcomes of IDPs.

Box 1.1. Examples of statistics and indicators to inform policy on IDPs

According to the International Recommendations on IDP Statistics (IRIS) (EGRISS, 2020[2]), statistics on IDPs that can be useful for policymakers include:

• Total number of IDPs in locations of displacement, in locations of return, and in other settlement locations (stocks); by sex, age, place of habitual residence, current place of usual residence, and years since initial displacement; at a defined moment in time.

• Total number of IDP-related persons (children of at least one IDP parent); disaggregated as above; at a defined moment in time.

• Total number of persons who have overcome key displacement-related vulnerabilities, by sex, age, and current place of usual residence; at a defined moment in time.

In addition, it is desirable to collect statistics that capture progress towards a “durable solution” – a situation when “IDPs no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement”, as per Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s (IASC) Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons. IRIS contains a framework of practical indicators and target measures that allow for capturing such progress, based on the IASC Durable Solutions Indicator Library. It covers eight durable solutions dimensions crucial for return to previously affected zones: safety, security and freedom of movement; adequate standard of living; employment and livelihoods; housing, land and property; personal and other documentation; family reunification; participation in public affairs; effective remedies. For details on measurement, sub-criteria, indicators, and suggested sources of data, please refer to (EGRISS, 2020[2]).

Ukraine can also develop statistics and indicators on return and reintegration on the basis of international standards and examples of OECD countries

For returnees from external displacement, Ukraine could draw on the International Recommendations on Refugee Statistics (IRRS) (EGRISS, 2018[3]), compiled by the Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics and adopted by the United Nations Statistical Commission (Decision 49/115) in 2018. These recommendations provide the internationally agreed statistical frameworks for refugees and for persons returned from abroad after having sought or received international protection, including refugees and beneficiaries of temporary protection. These recommendations also provide guidance on the inclusion of these populations in national systems, as well as priority indicators to assess and monitor their situation (Box 1.2). Similarly to the IRIS discussed above, both the OECD and Ukraine are members of the Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics that drafted these recommendations, mandated by the United Nations Statistical Commission to support implementation.

A population and housing census would be the most desirable source of such data, allowing identification of returnees, IDPs, and non-displaced populations, not only to track the situation of returnees but also to ensure comparability between these population groups. In the absence of the possibility to conduct a census, national sample surveys, ideally longitudinal, containing dedicated questions, can be a valuable source of such statistics. The survey would ideally be owned and managed by the State of Ukraine, have a clearly defined periodicity, an assigned responsible body, and a dedicated implementation budget.

In addition, for returnees, administrative data could be collected. It could build on the existing Unified Information Database on IDPs, to create a single digital registry for IDPs, returnees, and “foreign Ukrainians”, integrated with the Diia platform. Individuals receiving a “foreign Ukrainian” status, as well as those returning through dedicated support programmes, would be registered in this database through a mechanism similar to that used for IDPs. In addition, spontaneous returnees would have an option to register through a voluntary registration mechanism. This could be supported by adopting a “tell-us-once” approach, in which information provided to one public authority is securely shared across relevant government institutions, would simplify administrative procedures, reduce burdens on individuals, and encourage voluntary registration. Co‑ordination and data sharing on returnees with host countries, particularly EU Member States, to ensure that persons identified as returnees in Ukraine are not simultaneously kept on temporary protection or asylum registers abroad, would also be desirable.

Additional statistics related to “foreign Ukrainians”, as well as statistics and indicators to inform policies of preparedness for return from abroad, can also be envisaged, using administrative data (Box 1.2).

Box 1.2. Examples of statistics and indicators to inform return and reintegration policy

Statistics on persons returned from abroad after seeking international protection and their reintegration

According to the IRRS (EGRISS, 2018[3]), statistics on persons returned from abroad after seeking international protection would cover the following four groups:

• Repatriating refugees (persons, likely to be citizens, who have returned to Ukraine after having enjoyed asylum abroad).

• Repatriating asylum seekers (persons returning after having attempted to seek asylum abroad. To the extent possible, this category should include persons who return after their asylum applications have been decided negatively as well as persons who may not have been able to apply for asylum but who stayed abroad under temporary protection for some time).

• Returning after having received international protection other than refugee status abroad (persons who received temporary protection or other types of international protection).

• Others returning from seeking international protection abroad (persons who left Ukraine to seek international protection abroad but were not covered by the other three categories above; for example admitted by another country for purposes such as such as tourism, study or work).

The basic statistics that may be adopted at the national level include:

• Total number of persons returned to Ukraine after having sought international protection abroad, by sex and age (stocks), possibly disaggregated by the four categories stated above.

• Total number of persons who returned to Ukraine after having sought international protection abroad during a reference period, by sex and age (flows), possibly disaggregated by the four categories stated above.

Indicators on returnees that may be useful include:

• Percentage of persons returned from having sought international protection abroad among all returned citizens.

• Proportion of females among persons returned from having sought international protection abroad.

Ukraine may find it useful to distinguish the returnee population on the basis of the following characteristics: age or date of birth; sex; country of birth; country of citizenship (including stateless, undetermined status, and multiple citizenship; date of leaving Ukraine; date of return to Ukraine; reason for migration; status abroad; country of previous or last residence; date of first displacement/leaving previous country of habitual residence; parents’ refugee statuses; whether an unaccompanied child (under the of 18 years and separated from both parents or a legal guardian; legal residential/international protection status as applicable to the national context including repatriated refugee, repatriated asylum seeker, returning from other forms of international protection, returning from international protection other than the previous three categories.

In addition, indicators that can be used to measure satisfaction of needs, access to rights, and reintegration across a number of dimensions can include legal indicators; civil-political; socio‑economic; and those related to social inclusion (for specific examples of indicators see Chapter 5 of (EGRISS, 2018[3]) and also (OECD, 2024[4]; OECD/European Commission, 2023[5]).

Finally, Ukraine could also further explore more systematically measures of social cohesion (as per OECD social cohesion indicators (OECD, 2011[6]) and Social COhesion and REconciliation Index (SCORE) framework, which has already been applied in Ukraine by several international organisations).

Statistics related to “foreign Ukrainians”

• Total number of “foreign Ukrainians” who have benefitted from adaptation and integration services in Ukraine, during a reference period, by sex and age.

Statistics and indicators to inform policies of preparedness for return from abroad

• Number of Unity Hubs providing individual advisory services to prepare safe and voluntary returns.

• Total number of beneficiaries of Unity Hub services, by Hub, during a reference period.

• Total number of individuals who received individual consultations at Unity Hubs, directly related to preparing for return, per hub, during a reference period.

• Total number of Ukrainians abroad accessing state‑developed or state‑supported digital platforms providing information and counselling on voluntary return, by host country, during a reference period.

• Total number of Ukrainians expressing an intention to return and indicating the need for assistance to do so, by host country, at regular intervals.

Government statistics

• Government expenditure on reintegration measures targeting returnees and “foreign Ukrainians”, total and per beneficiary, annually.

• Government expenditure on Unity Hubs, total and per hub, annually.

• Government expenditure on adaptation and integration measures targeting “foreign Ukrainians”, total and per beneficiary, over a reference period.

Programme evaluation is necessary to inform future policy

Between 2022 and 2025, Ukraine has launched a wide variety of programmes and measures to support IDPs, and, in some instances, returnees. These initiatives have covered diverse areas, ranging from compensation for damaged housing and skills development to psychological and social support. Many programmes differ in scale, duration, eligibility criteria, accessibility, ease of application, level of public awareness, and number of beneficiaries. Some show strong potential for expansion. However, systematic evaluation of their effectiveness is often lacking, preventing a clear assessment of which programmes should be scaled up, what barriers have limited participation, and what lessons can be drawn for future implementation. Moreover, the needs of potential participants continue to evolve, too.

Regular evaluation of key programmes is essential to ensure that interventions remain responsive to evolving conditions and needs and allocate resources effectively. Establishing a robust feedback mechanism to feed evaluation results back into programme design and decision making would strengthen accountability, policy learning, and institutional performance.

Assessment and recommendations: Policy action

Supporting potential returnees before their return

Planned and well-supported returns are more likely to take place

As of 2025, given the security situation, the principle of voluntariness remains the key foundation guiding Ukraine’s policy on returns. While larger repatriation schemes and policies to proactively encourage returns can only be envisaged once the war of aggression ends and security guarantees are established, policies to support voluntary and spontaneous returns have already become increasingly relevant.

Returns from abroad are likely to be gradual and carefully planned rather than rushed. Most returnees will make decisions after thorough reflection. When feasible, putting in place a system of support, planning and information that allows displaced Ukrainians abroad to prepare documentation, secure opportunities, and access essential services in advance will make returns more feasible and sustainable.

Ukraine should continue developing digital instruments to provide services that facilitate return

Ukraine already operates the e‑government portal Diia, which integrates citizen consultation features, and includes information, services and reporting on conditions of IDPs. Diia can be further leveraged for reaching out to potential returnees (OECD, 2024[7]).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also currently developing its own digital platform “e‑consul”, with the aim of digitalising the provision of consular services. Upon availability of financial and technical support, there may be scope to integrate “e‑consul” with Diia and other state registries. This can help Ukrainians located abroad access services available in Ukraine, including special programmes for housing restoration, state employment services, and any other type of support that may also help prepare their return.

There is a strong potential for developing pre‑return support abroad, including by mobilising private and non-profit sector in host countries

Current pre‑return support systems to help displaced Ukrainians prepare for their return in a structured and informed way remain insufficiently explored. Significant potential exists to equip Unity Hubs abroad, and the UGC organisations with practical toolkits on return options, guidance on security, housing, employment, schooling, and available benefits before departure.

Moreover, whilst the operational models and financing of Unity Hubs are still being established, there is an opportunity to develop partnerships with the private sector and NGOs in host countries, including those run by the UGC, to expand and enhance available services. These services could include information provision, counselling on return options, legal assistance, psychological support, administrative help, security training, emergency medical response training, and other activities relevant to return and reintegration. Unity Hubs that enable service provision by the private sector and NGOs can achieve greater sustainability and improved service quality if such services are sourced through a competitive process, as demonstrated by the operational models of resilience centres already established throughout Ukraine.

Having these services in place now will be useful not only for displaced individuals who are considering spontaneous voluntary return, but also as future‑ready platforms for deploying more extensive support measures once the war of aggression ends, large‑scale repatriation programmes can be developed, and returns among second- and third-generation diaspora become more attractive. Such preparation will reduce uncertainty, improve confidence in return prospects, and prevent future delays once conditions allow for larger movements.

Existing information platforms could benefit from wider dissemination and better alignment

Between 2023 and 2025, the Government of Ukraine, with the support of several international organisations and NGOs, advanced the development of a number of information platforms specifically focussed on return. They typically include administrative roadmaps for return. However, awareness of these platforms among displaced persons remains low and can be strengthened. In the longer term, it is important to ensure that these platforms are continuously updated to provide reliable and up-to-date information on safety, housing, services, and employment opportunities, potentially linking them to resilience centres, local reintegration centres, future case management systems, and the Diia portal. Over time, they could also be complemented by pre‑return counselling and multilingual helplines.

Placing individuals’ security at the centre of return and reintegration policies

Ensuring equal protection and safety information for voluntary returnees can help reduce uncertainty and save lives

Ukrainians who remain in the country have developed various coping strategies to live with the threat and its consequences. In contrast, many displaced individuals, particularly those abroad, are not always aware of the most recent developments in safety practices or have not practised them. Knowing how to live with the threat could become an increasingly significant divide between Ukrainians inside and outside the country. In this context, it will become ever more important for Ukraine to support voluntary spontaneous returnees by guaranteeing equal access to protection measures (such as emergency alerts, shelters, civil protection programmes and life‑saving options) as the rest of the population, and timely information, both before and after their return.

One way to provide such support is by ensuring that clear information is available to all population groups, with specific targeting of returnees, on available life‑saving options; explicitly including returnees and displaced populations in the preparation of security plans and solutions (such as consulting and informing all population groups, including returnees, when designing and implementing civil protection programmes and evacuation plans, updating community safety protocols, ensuring returnees are registered in local emergency systems); and by offering pre‑departure training on safety, security, and life‑saving emergency techniques.

Safety of returns involves more than the absence of active hostilities

Safety encompasses multiple aspects of physical security. Demining, restoring essential services, and demonstrating a firm commitment to rebuilding are key indicators of readiness for return. Ongoing efforts in these areas should be systematically monitored and clearly communicated, as awareness of progress helps displaced persons make informed and voluntary decisions about safe return, both internally and from abroad. A continued commitment to transparency on progress in these areas will become increasingly important in the longer term, once active hostilities have ceased and larger-scale return to the most affected areas becomes feasible.

Clear recovery benchmarks grounded in trust and transparency will be essential for wider returns

In the immediate aftermath of the end of the war of aggression, it will be necessary to establish well-defined frameworks for return and reintegration. Official assessments of safe return areas (developed in line with IASC Durable Solutions Indicator Library: see also Box 1.1) will have to align with displaced persons’ own perceptions of safety. Engaging communities, supporting go‑and-see visits, and sharing returnee experiences can help build confidence in the safety of return.

Social cohesion is central to safety, unity, and inclusion for all

Even if physical risks are addressed, returnees may choose not to return or may leave again if they feel excluded, discriminated against, judged, or not accepted in their communities. Social cohesion among returnees and stayers should be assessed and strengthened alongside other security concerns, serving as a foundation for lasting reintegration and recovery. Strengthening legal protections against discrimination, particularly on the basis of displacement history, would help build trust and reinforce social stability. Ensuring non-discriminatory access to housing, employment, education, and health services, as well as non-discrimination regarding military service, is critical to enable returnees and internally displaced persons to reintegrate on fair terms.

Promoting community dialogue, shared initiatives, and public awareness campaigns that explain the importance of reintegration for Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction and highlight the contributions of returnees to rebuilding their communities. In the longer term, it may be necessary to envisage a prohibition of discourse that stigmatises displacement history, and have public campaigns that can foster understanding between returnees, the UGC, and those who remained, helping to reduce stigma and build stronger, more united communities.

In the longer term, it will become increasingly important to monitor public attitudes among non-displaced Ukrainians to identify emerging risks of misunderstanding or resentment and to ensure that policies and communication remain balanced and responsive.

Making decent affordable housing a driver of integration, return and reintegration

Making housing central to integration, return and reintegration requires further action, and current conditions favour necessary reforms

Housing, after security, is one of the key outcomes affecting persons with any type of displacement history. It is the main precondition for integration of IDPs, and a decisive factor affecting return and the success of reintegration.

The Ukrainian state has established several national programmes to assist with the housing situation of the population (eRecovery (eVidnovlennya)/HOME), including programmes that target IDPs (Shelter (Prykhystok); eOselya; housing credits; rental subsidies; direct housing acquisition). No state programme targets the housing needs of EDPs or returnees, though these groups are eligible to take part in eRecovery (eVidnovlennya)/HOME and qualify for housing programmes for IDPs if they register as such upon return.

Moreover, to address the growing housing challenges, Ukraine has begun developing a nationwide housing strategy as part of the Ukraine Facility and the national reform plan. In July 2025, the Law “On the Main Principles of Housing Policy” was approved in its first parliamentary reading. If adopted, it will launch a comprehensive housing reform. The housing reform presents a key opportunity to improve housing access for internally displaced persons and other vulnerable groups, and align reconstruction efforts with long-term return and reintegration goals.

Strengthening tenants’ rights has the potential to support both integration of IDPs and reintegration of returnees, and help decrease involuntary departures

Ukraine can take advantage of the housing reform to regulate and stabilise rental market prices, as well as strengthen tenants’ rights. Clear and enforceable rules on rent levels, contract duration, and eviction procedures should be established with the aim of improving predictability and reducing discrimination, including against individuals with a displacement history. Secure and affordable rental housing is a basic condition for the integration of internally displaced persons and the sustainable return of those coming from abroad, while also strengthening social cohesion within communities.

Developing a sustainable and inclusive model of affordable social housing is essential

While lack of housing and its affordability is a mounting concern, social housing was underdeveloped in Ukraine even prior to the war. Responding to the needs of IDPs and preparing for future returns can be used as one of the motivations to develop a modern affordable social housing model, built on a strong legal and institutional framework. In this model, social housing would not be treated as a temporary post-crisis response but as a lasting component of Ukraine’s recovery and social policy. The model should embed principles of inclusiveness for Ukrainian non-displaced populations, IDPs, and current and future returnees.

The model of social housing should also embed self-financing mechanisms. For example, introducing a revolving fund scheme that pools initial donor contributions and gradually reduces reliance on external support would sustain the system financially over time and ensure that currently available donor funds are used efficiently. It would also help in moving away from programme‑based, one‑off approaches to housing more generally. Public-private partnerships can also be considered.

Integrating social housing into broader recovery and urban development strategies would also help stimulate local economies, create jobs, and expand the supply of housing in a sustainable way. A well-designed model could become a permanent social policy instrument that supports reintegration and contributes to more resilient and inclusive communities.

Flexible certification of ownership will facilitate access to housing recovery and compensation

Given the widespread destruction and damage to housing, many displaced persons struggle to provide standard proof of ownership. Instituting alternative forms of certification, such as attestations by local authorities, recognised landlords, sworn affidavits, or certified service provider statements, would make it easier for affected households to claim compensation and begin reconstruction. Such flexibility would accelerate recovery and reduce the risk of exclusion for those without formal documentation. However, flexibility must be accompanied by fair appeal procedures and clear safeguards to prevent misuse or fraud.

There is room for improving accessibility of housing recovery and compensation programmes

While there is generally good awareness about existing housing recovery and compensation programmes, some groups, especially returnees, have awareness and accessibility gaps. Strengthening local information campaigns, deploying mobile or community-based assistance services, and simplifying application procedures can help ensure that vulnerable groups are not left behind in the recovery process. Transparent communication on eligibility and procedures will also increase trust and uptake among potential beneficiaries, while access from abroad can help prepare returns.

Integrate housing reconstruction with livelihood recovery

In light of ongoing insecurity, prioritising housing (re‑)construction in safer areas that offer viable employment opportunities and access to essential services can support both long-term (re‑)integration and sustainable return.

Looking forward, when the war of aggression is over, and return to currently dangerous and occupied areas becomes possible, strategic alignment of housing investments with local economic development plans will become essential to ensure that rebuilt communities not only provide shelter but also create pathways to sustainable livelihoods and long-term economic stability. Such an integrated approach will reduce the risk of secondary displacement and ensure that public investments in housing contribute to broader recovery objectives.

Making employment a foundation for integration, return and reintegration

Improving awareness and access to existing programmes can be beneficial to those who are most in need, especially IDPs

Just as with housing, decent employment opportunities are a key driver of return and a cornerstone of sustainable integration and reintegration.

Ukraine has introduced many programmes to support the employment of IDPs, including incentives for employers to hire IDPs, employment of IDPs on public works, granting targeted vouchers for retraining, providing direct training, providing targeted grants for self-employment and business creation, and some specific programmes targeting IDP women. Currently, there are no dedicated state programmes targeting the employment of EDPs or returnees, though the latter are eligible to participate in general employment support schemes open to all Ukrainians and register as unemployed with the State Employment Service of Ukraine. If they return to a location other than their pre‑displacement home and register as IDPs, they may also access employment programmes specifically tailored for IDPs.

Scaling up successful programmes targeting IDPs’ skill acquisition and retraining could be useful as well. Such scaling up should be accompanied by improving awareness about existing support programmes and access to them, with particular attention to women and individuals in small towns and rural areas. Complementing these programmes with other measures, such as transportation, high-quality secure childcare and after-school options, would be of particular relevance to IDP women lacking family support. Ensuring transparent selection of candidates can also help further enhance trust in these programmes.

Continue empowering women to overcome displacement challenges

Given the gendered nature of displacement, future employment and training policies should be designed and implemented in line with the OECD Recommendation on Gender Equality in Education, Employment and Entrepreneurship and the OECD Recommendation on Gender Equality in Public Life, which call for removing gender-specific barriers to labour market participation and applying gender mainstreaming across all policy areas. Numerous targeted programmes for employment and reskilling of women in Ukraine during the war have already shown their value in allowing women to gain access to employment generally, but also in what was considered as traditionally male‑dominated professions. Sustaining diversity of women and men across occupations and sectors even after the war will be a significant driver of inclusive recovery.

Employment support for those returning from abroad should prioritise linking them with job opportunities before return

Returnees from abroad often face distinct challenges that require a different approach. For many, the decision to return depends on whether they can secure a job before departure.

Creating clear employment pathways for those still abroad will be essential to support planned and sustainable returns. The State Employment Service, in co‑operation with consulates, Unity Hubs, and the Diia platform, could facilitate access to information on available jobs, training opportunities, and labour market needs for those who contemplate return.

Employers, both public and private, will play an important role in fostering return and reintegration

When conditions allow, encouraging returns with “employment contracts in hand”, where private employers in Ukraine would offer written contracts to potential returnees even before return, could not only enable displaced Ukrainians to come back but also increase the likelihood of their successful and lasting reintegration. Public institutions and public sector enterprises could lead by example, demonstrating how early engagement with potential returnees can strengthen both confidence and outcomes. In most countries around the world, it is standard practice for labour migrants to secure a written employment contract prior to departure. Because return after prolonged displacement is akin to a new migration, this can be used as a model to support migration back to Ukraine.

Promoting recognition of skills, professional qualifications and experience gained abroad is another measure that can facilitate the employment of returnees

Many externally displaced persons have acquired new skills, professional qualifications, and professional experience while abroad. Facilitating the recognition of these credentials and prior learning is essential for enabling their effective reintegration into Ukraine’s labour market. Ukraine has already taken steps to align its National Qualifications Framework with the European Qualifications Framework, which provides a strong foundation for cross-border recognition. However, challenges remain in the recognition of training acquired in non-European countries, skills acquired in the workplace, as well as emerging forms of certification such as micro-credentials. Informal recognition by employers of skills and work experience gained abroad should also be encouraged, supported by awareness-raising among businesses and local authorities and leading by example from publicly owned enterprises. Ensuring that both formal and informal learning are acknowledged will allow Ukraine to benefit fully from the human capital developed during displacement and contribute to a more inclusive and skilled recovery.

Collaboration with host countries on dual intent approaches to support human capital investments aligned with Ukraine’s needs should be further explored

As many Ukrainians remain displaced in OECD countries, host governments continue to play a key role in supporting their integration and preserving their human capital as an expression of solidarity with Ukraine. Stronger co‑operation with host countries is therefore needed to ensure that investments in displaced Ukrainians abroad also align with Ukraine’s long-term recovery and labour market needs.

This co‑operation should focus on enabling displaced Ukrainians to rebuild livelihoods while large‑scale returns remain difficult, without creating barriers to eventual return. Joint efforts could include determining priority areas for skills and training investments that are relevant both for host-country economies and for Ukraine (including sectors that are essential for Ukraine’s recovery, such as construction, engineering, energy, health, IT and the green transition), ensuring mutual recognition of qualifications and skills, supporting Ukrainian language acquisition and training in OECD countries for younger learners, safeguarding the portability of social protection, exploring mobility solutions that allow for flexible cross-border movement, and supporting and strengthening Ukrainian Unity Hubs that are hosted abroad. Structured dialogue on these issues should be strengthened, including through existing fora such as the Skills Alliance for Ukraine and other initiatives, which provide an opportunity to co‑ordinate and translate a shared vision into actions.

There is scope to expand sustainable workplace upskilling and reskilling opportunities and to strengthen the role of businesses in facilitating returns

Reskilling and upskilling are essential elements of employment support. The Ukrainian Government has launched and supported numerous initiatives in this area, including through the Skills Alliance for Ukraine, initiated at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in 2024.

While these initiatives have enabled many workers to upgrade their skills, the scale of the need and the rapid pace of labour market change mean that ad hoc training programmes are insufficient. The government and training institutions alone cannot meet the full demand for skills development. Mobilising employers to contribute to skills provision remains a challenge, as many perceive it as a financial burden. At the same time, workers often cannot afford training costs or the loss of income that would result from taking time away from even lower-skilled employment.

The forthcoming Employment Strategy that Ukraine is preparing could provide an opportunity to move progressively away from fragmented projects towards a system of self-sustaining, nationwide mechanisms that support continuous skills development and retraining. Such a system could also foster an environment in which reskilling and upskilling are routinely provided at the workplace. Public and private employers should be incentivised to invest in workplace training, including as a pre‑hiring mechanism, while workers need to be motivated to participate in such training and recognise its value.

A range of policy tools can be explored to achieve this, including financial incentives such as wage and training subsidies, tax incentives, and loans at preferential rates. Other instruments may include individual learning account schemes that are transferable across jobs and open to all workers, including own-account workers, or payback contract clauses that allow employers to recover part of their investment in training if a trained employee leaves shortly after completing the training. In addition, employers could be encouraged to regard investment in skills, including those of IDPs, and current and future returnees, as part of their corporate responsibility and as a long-term investment in productivity and resilience, in line with the Human Capital Resilience Charter adopted by Ukraine.

Supporting the return of Ukrainians with tertiary education requires longer-term efforts to increase the attractiveness of Ukraine’s research and innovation sectors

Given the large number of Ukrainians abroad with tertiary education, including those employed in research and innovation, Ukraine has a strong interest and the potential to capitalise on its global research community. Existing national initiatives such as research grants from the National Research Foundation of Ukraine, collaboration programmes with host countries on grant and mobility schemes for researchers, and emerging research clusters and specialised laboratories that aim to attract returning scientists and foster collaborative innovation have the potential to serve as “magnets” for talent. Strengthening and expanding these mechanisms in line with a broader innovation vision for the future of Ukraine, increasing investment in research activities, enhancing the recognition of foreign academic and research experience and achievements, and improving the overall economic attractiveness of the research and innovation sector are all avenues to be further pursued.

Enhancing public services to support reintegration

There is an opportunity to build local reintegration hubs and other support structures on the existing structures of other public service provision

As the displacement is prolonged, reintegration support will be increasingly needed upon return. Such support can build on the existing network of in-person Administrative Services Centres (TsNAP), which might need to adapt their capacity to the new population by ensuring they function as accessible one‑stop shops for housing, social protection, civil registry, employment, health and legal aid throughout the return and reintegration journey for both IDPs and returnees from abroad. Their services can be complemented with NGO and international partner support, alongside digital self-service options, to maximise reach. In the longer term, investing in developing the capacity and skills of local staff so that these centres can provide consistent, high-quality support for returnees during their reintegration will be increasingly relevant. Existing resilience centres can also be leveraged to provide targeted psychological support to returnees.

The Diia electronic portal and its mobile application have been able to deliver a high number of online services to citizens including during the war, with over 1.5 million users a day in 2023 (OECD, 2024[7]). It has integrated new features to support displaced populations, such as applying for social benefits for IDPs, and can continue to expand online services to adapt their capacity to the needs of returnees and for those who envisage return.

More generally, service accessibility for returnees and the UGC, as well as for IDPs, should be situated within the broader framework of the 2024 OECD Recommendation on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services, which recognises the right to “access services equitably”, and stresses inclusive design of public administrative services, accessibility and participation (OECD, 2024[8]).

For returning children, facilitating rapid and inclusive access to education can help families make decisions to return for families, and also help ensure smoother reintegration

In view of the massive displacement of children, Ukraine undertook several measures to preserve their learning, including developing the All-Ukrainian Online School, and a special curriculum for children displaced abroad known as the Ukrainian Studies Component. All children who were forced to relocate and study abroad retain the right to re‑enrol in Ukrainian schools upon their return. To determine the appropriate grade level, Ukrainian schools are advised, through the methodological recommendations developed by the Ministry of Education and Science, to consider academic results from host country schools, provided the student presents an official certificate of attendance and achievement. Children who studied abroad but did not take subjects included in the Ukrainian educational curriculum, or who are unable to present documentation confirming their studies, may undergo an annual assessment before the start of the new school year, or in some cases, during the school year.

The implementation of these rules remains sometimes challenging in practice, as return to schools may be accompanied by administrative burdens, delays in assessments, and what can be perceived as excessive demands to meet educational standards. During displacement, most host countries took significant steps to facilitate the rapid enrolment of Ukrainian children in their education systems, often waiving documentation requirements altogether, enrolling children in the corresponding class in the middle of the academic year without additional exams, and providing language support. As families prepare for return, they are likely to expect a comparable level of flexibility and responsiveness in Ukraine. Ensuring that these expectations are met will help maintain confidence in public institutions, support a positive return experience, and foster long-term reintegration.

This requires enabling returning externally displaced children to enter school quickly at the appropriate level without unnecessary barriers or requirements to repeat years. Allowing temporary presumptions of validity for low-risk documents with follow-up checks can help minimise delays in access to education. In the longer term, schools should also aim at provide bridging support to help returning pupils adapt to curricular differences and language shifts after years abroad.

For returning adults, recognition of foreign educational credentials can enable continuity of academic studies and careers upon re‑entry

The recognition of foreign educational qualifications in Ukraine is aligned with the Lisbon Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications concerning Higher Education in the European Region (1997) and is administered through the ENIC Ukraine centre. Even prior to the war, Ukraine had concluded bilateral agreements under this framework with seven European countries to ensure recognition or establish equivalence of diplomas.

Recognition of foreign educational documents is a critical instrument for supporting the return and reintegration of students and adults, as it enables continuity of academic studies and careers upon re‑entry. There is significant scope to strengthen this mechanism by increasing awareness of recognition procedures among Ukrainians abroad, as well as expanding the network of bilateral agreements. These measures would reduce administrative barriers and facilitate smoother transitions for returnees, thereby reinforcing human capital recovery and labour market integration.

Continuity of healthcare for those returning from abroad can be enhanced

Facilitating the transfer of health records and ensuring uninterrupted access to long-term treatment, medication, and specialised care as soon as returnees re‑enrol in the health system can be a pre‑condition for return for some groups of returnees. Over time, it will become increasingly necessary for health services in Ukraine to be well equipped to recognise treatment plans and prescriptions issued abroad and ensure that returning patients can continue their care without administrative delays or duplication of tests. Special attention should be paid to individuals with chronic or mental health conditions who may have received new diagnoses while displaced.

Achieving this will rely not only on Ukraine’s preparedness but also on constructive co‑operation with host countries. The OECD countries are currently working to enhance the cross-border transfer of electronic health records, and Ukraine could explore closer co‑operation with host countries within these initiatives to facilitate the secure exchange of health documents with European partners and ensure continuity of care for returnees, in line with the Recommendation of the OECD Council on Health Data Governance.

Progressively switch to needs-based rather than status-based solutions

Because vulnerabilities exist also among non-displaced populations, it is important to progressively shift from status-based to needs-based approaches in the provision of public services, as a way to properly address all vulnerabilities, strengthen social cohesion and prevent tension between different population groups.

In the medium to long term, returnees and internally displaced persons should not be perceived as receiving preferential treatment compared with non-displaced populations who may also face hardship. Targeted assistance should focus on needs specific to displacement, while broader programmes should remain inclusive and equitable.

When conditions permit, consider introducing phased or temporary return options during the recovery to support gradual reintegration

Looking forward, once the security situation allows, a phased approach to return may be more realistic than immediate permanent resettlement in areas heavily affected by destruction or with limited access to services. Allowing displaced persons to maintain connections in both their place of displacement and their community of origin, sometimes referred to as “dual anchoring” or double residency, can help them test conditions before fully resettling. Flexible administrative arrangements, such as temporary residence registration and partial portability of benefits, would make it possible for families to move gradually while retaining access to essential rights and support. This approach would reduce the risk of failed or premature returns and promote more stable and sustainable reintegration over time.

Designing repatriation programmes in co‑operation with host countries can strengthen recovery and social cohesion in Ukraine

Once the security situation allows for larger-scale returns from abroad and repatriation programmes can be envisaged, an important question will arise regarding how host countries can support these returns. Unlike assisted voluntary return schemes, which typically provide individual financial assistance to returnees, Ukraine should consider, in co‑operation with host countries, developing return support packages aimed at the communities receiving returnees. Such an approach could leverage financial assistance to generate broader community-level recovery benefits, foster stronger engagement from host countries, and promote social cohesion between returnees and those who remained.

To achieve this, careful attention will be required in designing transparent and accountable mechanisms for channelling such support. One possible avenue could be through the DREAM platform, but other channels should also be explored. Preparatory work could already begin to develop appropriate models and programmes jointly with host countries.

Unlocking the full potential of engagement with the Ukrainian global community

Strengthening engagement with the UGC is essential for allowing Ukrainians abroad to remain an integral part of the country’s reconstruction and its future

The Ukrainian state recognises the vital contribution of the Ukrainian global community to the national resistance, as well as its potential to preserve Ukrainian identity, promote and advocate for the Ukrainian cause abroad, and support the rebuilding and development of Ukraine.

Since 2004, Ukraine has had a legal status of “foreign Ukrainians”, which can be granted to persons of Ukrainian origin. It serves as an instrument for fostering return, particularly among those with strong cultural or familial links to Ukraine. However, awareness of this status and its uptake remain limited.

In late 2023, the Ukrainian Government appointed its first Ambassador-at-Large for the Global Ukrainian Community, with the aim of enhancing co‑operation with Ukrainian communities abroad and strengthening their support for Ukraine. More recently, it has also begun to use the term “Ukrainian global community” more proactively in political discourse, marking an important shift in communication strategy. This approach seeks to encompass all Ukrainians living abroad, regardless of their migration histories. In 2025, a Law on Multiple Citizenship was adopted with the objective of maintaining and deepening ties with the diaspora.

Several other initiatives, however, including the adoption of the State Strategy on the Ukrainian Global Community, developed throughout 2024, had not yet materialised at the time of writing this report. Moreover, a more systematic and strategic approach from the Ukrainian Government will be necessary to fully harness the UGC’s potential as a long-term partner in national recovery and development.

Institutionalising the UGC’s representation and fostering dialogue can send a strong signal recognising the UGC as an integral part of the Ukrainian nation

Sustaining engagement with the UGC requires reciprocity, regular dialogue, and visible inclusion of the UGC’s priorities within national strategies. One meaningful way to strengthen bridges between Ukraine and its global community is to establish structured and regular channels for consulting the UGC in national policymaking and recovery planning. As a possible long-term option, contingent on feasibility, political consensus and implications for trust, Ukraine could consider introducing the necessary legal changes to enable formal political representation for the UGC in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine by allowing candidates to stand for election as a Member of Parliament while maintaining residence abroad; and reserving seats in parliament for elected members from the UGC.

Formal participation in decision making processes would strengthen ownership, build trust, and ensure that UGC perspectives are reflected in national priorities. These measures would also underscore that meaningful contribution to Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction does not necessarily require physical return but can take many forms of engagement from abroad.

The UGC’s investment potential remains underutilised

Many UGC members contribute financially and through in-kind support to the military effort, humanitarian aid, and investment. Yet these resources often flow through fragmented channels and may not reach their full potential. Establishing transparent, well-governed financial instruments, such as diaspora bonds, crowd-investment schemes, and SME co-financing facilities, can make these contributions even more productive and sustainable. Opening at least part of the DREAM platform to private and crowdfunding investment from abroad could provide a unified channel for aligning individual and community contributions with national recovery and reconstruction priorities.

Making better use of “foreign Ukrainian” status could help unlock its full potential

The existing status of “foreign Ukrainians” could be used more strategically, serving as a platform for structured engagement or, when safety conditions allow, for facilitating return visits, exchanges, and participation in civic and cultural initiatives in Ukraine. More can be done to raise awareness of the status and the advantages associated with it, while simplifying and digitalising the acquisition process to make it more accessible. In the longer term, the “foreign Ukrainian” status could also provide a formal basis for political representation and deeper institutional co‑operation with the diaspora, or facilitate the simplified acquisition of multiple citizenship.

Once conditions allow, UGC skills, expertise and professional networks can be further mobilised

To capitalise on the UGC’s skills and expertise, Ukraine could envisage establishing a voluntary “Diaspora Skills for Recovery” registry to match expertise with national and local needs. Expanding short-term fellowships, expert missions, and secondments to Ukraine, complemented by remote mentoring, research collaboration, and advisory opportunities for those unable to return physically, can help channel the UGC’s willingness to contribute into tangible recovery and reintegration outcomes, while reinforcing two‑way exchanges of knowledge and innovation between Ukraine and its global community.

Summary of the recommendations

Strengthening governance and monitoring

Short-term priorities, when feasible and if resources allow:

• Establish a permanent co‑ordination institution with a clear mandate, sufficient capacity and resources to oversee return and reintegration efforts and to oversee accountability mechanisms across the relevant authorities.

• Enhance interministerial collaboration and co‑ordination with local authorities, clarifying institutional mandates and responsibilities for IDP support, return, reintegration, and engagement with the Ukrainian global community.

• Better differentiate, in legal strategic documents and policy, distinct needs and pathways of internally and externally displaced persons and returnees, recognising that they need differentiated support related to the specificities of their displacement.

• Adopt long-term planning to support spontaneous voluntary returns and reintegration, acknowledging that return, reintegration, and engagement with the Ukrainian global community are long-term generational processes.

• Enforce existing legal mechanisms to deregister IDPs who no longer require support.

• On the basis of the existing administrative digital registry for IDPs, create a single digital registry including returnees and “foreign Ukrainians”, integrated with Diia platform.

• Adopt standardised statistical definitions of “returnee”, “integration” and “reintegration” to strengthen policy coherence and monitoring.

• Develop a monitoring framework with clear statistical indicators to inform return and reintegration policy, in line with the international statistical standards and practice established in this area.

Medium to long-term priorities:

• Transition from short-cycle donor funding to multi-year, predictable financing mechanisms, including dedicated budgetary allocations for return, reintegration, and engagement with the UGC.

• Encourage donors to align with national priorities and contribute to long-term financing instruments.

• Ensure that future action plans have measurable indicators of progress towards tangible outcomes of different population groups.

• Institute regular review and evaluation processes to ensure that programmes remain effective and responsive to evolving needs.

Supporting potential returnees before their return

Short-term priorities, when feasible and if resources allow:

• Establish comprehensive pre‑return counselling services and tailored support through Unity Hubs and diaspora organisations.

• Develop operational models for Unity Hubs abroad, drawing on the experience of resilience centres in Ukraine, to allow for broad partnerships with the private sector and NGOs, including those from the UGC.

• Upon availability of financial and technical support, advance the development of “e‑consul” platform, with the view of digitalising the provision of consular services and pre‑return counselling; as well as the platform’s integration with Diia and other state registries.

• Increase awareness of existing digital platforms providing information and administrative roadmaps for return, and ensure they are regularly updated.

Medium to long-term priorities, including when security conditions for promoting returns are in place:

• Implement “return readiness” assessment frameworks in collaboration with host countries hosting significant Ukrainian populations.

• Link existing information platforms on return options with resilience centres, local reintegration centres, and future case management systems.

• Develop, jointly with host countries, return “go-and-see” visit programmes, without loss of legal status and financial support abroad, to enable potential returnees make informed decisions about return.

• Collaborate with host countries to design repatriation plans and programmes, including community-based programmes to support returnees, aligned with Ukraine’s recovery and social cohesion needs.

• Develop, in partnership with host countries, future mobility schemes that allow flexibility rather than forcing individuals to choose between permanent settlement in host countries and returning to Ukraine.

Placing individuals’ security at the centre of return and reintegration policies

Short-term priorities, when feasible and if resources allow:

• Ensure that voluntary spontaneous returnees enjoy protection equal to that of stayers, providing information on available life‑saving options, pre‑departure training on safety and security, and explicit inclusion in local security planning.

• Reinforce anti-discrimination frameworks, by expanding them to include displacement history as prohibited grounds and promote social cohesion through inclusive communication and the prohibition of discourse that stigmatises displaced persons, returnees and non-returnees.

Medium to long-term priorities, including when security conditions for promoting returns are in place:

• Communicate progress on demining and restoring essential services in heavily affected areas.

• Establish clear recovery benchmarks to define what constitutes a safe return.

• Encourage community-based initiatives that foster social cohesion among groups with different displacement histories.

Making decent affordable housing a driver of integration, return and reintegration

Short-term priorities, when feasible and if resources allow:

• Strengthen legal protections for tenants to prevent discrimination, unjustified evictions, and contract insecurity.

• Introduce measures to stabilise the rental market.

• Develop a legal framework for inclusive social housing, embedding self-financing mechanisms.

• Improve accessibility and public awareness of housing recovery and compensation schemes.

• Introduce flexible certification procedures for property ownership with appropriate safeguards and appeals mechanisms to support housing recovery and compensation during reconstruction.

Medium to long-term priorities, including when security conditions for promoting returns are in place:

• Integrate housing reconstruction with livelihood recovery by prioritising rebuilding in areas with viable employment opportunities and economic potential.

• Pay sufficient attention to building affordable social housing stock.

Making employment a foundation for integration, return and reintegration

Short-term priorities, when feasible and if resources allow:

• Scale up successful retraining and reskilling programmes for internally displaced persons.

• Enable remote access to the State Employment Service for Ukrainians abroad through consulates, Unity Hubs, and digital platforms such as Diia.

• Strengthen co‑operation with host countries to operationalise dual intent approaches that balance socio‑economic integration abroad with maintaining ties to Ukraine, notably supporting skills development in sectors essential for Ukraine’s recovery, including construction, engineering, energy, health, IT and the green transition; and exchanging information between SES services in host countries and Ukraine.

• Create an environment for self-operating sustainable skills development in the workplace.

• Strengthen co‑operation with host countries and their research communities with regards to Ukrainian researchers, including through grants, stipends, dual affiliations to help displaced Ukrainian researchers continue their activity while maintaining ties with Ukraine to facilitate their return when the security situation allows.

Medium to long-term priorities, including when security conditions for promoting returns are in place:

• Promote employment contracts signed before departure to enable planned and sustainable returns. and encourage private and public employers to lead by example in this area.

• Promote linking job placement and training opportunities with housing support for IDPs and returnees.

• Expand existing retraining and reskilling initiatives to include returning Ukrainians from abroad.

• Together with host countries, leverage the role of private-sector employers of host countries to hire, train, and support intra-company cross-border mobility for Ukrainians displaced abroad.

• Strengthen the attractiveness of Ukraine’s research and innovation sectors, by expanding grant opportunities for “foreign Ukrainians” and returnees, including through donor funding, recognising and valuing foreign academic achievements, creating conditions for thriving innovation hubs and research clusters, and developing frameworks for talent mobility.

• Address structural barriers to employment, including access to secure quality childcare, transport, and formal job opportunities.

Enhancing public services to support reintegration

Short-term priorities, when feasible and if resources allow:

• Leverage the Diia portal and improve its integration with other digital services, in order to enable access to services in Ukraine for those who are displaced abroad; information sharing on return; and collecting information on their needs.

• Establish local reintegration hubs using existing structures, such as Administrative Service Centres and resilience hubs, as accessible one‑stop service centres for displaced persons and returnees.

• Ensure wide implementation of re‑enrolment procedures to facilitate quick access to education for children returning from abroad.

• Increase awareness about possibilities and procedures to recognise tertiary education documents in Ukraine among Ukrainians abroad.

• Continue expanding the network of bilateral agreements for mutual recognition of secondary and tertiary educational documents.

• Complete the alignment of the National Qualifications Framework with the European Qualifications Framework; promote the recognition of professional skills and qualifications acquired abroad, including informal recognition; continue expanding the network of bilateral national, sectoral and occupational agreements for mutual recognition of skills.

• Develop healthcare continuity protocols, including transfer of medical records and recognition of foreign prescriptions.

Medium to long-term priorities, including when security conditions for promoting returns are in place:

• Shift progressively towards needs-based assistance programmes, ensuring equitable and transparent service provision.

• Support phased or temporary return arrangements (“dual anchoring”) in areas with significant damage, ensuring portability of social benefits and services during transitional periods.

• Collaborate with host countries on dual tax and social security systems and portability of social benefits, such as pension contributions.

Unlocking the full potential of engagement with the Ukrainian global community

Short-term priorities, when feasible and if resources allow:

• Adopt a national strategy to strengthen engagement with the Ukrainian global community.

• Establish transparent and well-governed dedicated financial instruments that can facilitate the Ukrainian global community’s investment in Ukraine’s recovery, building on international practices of diaspora-supported investments.

Medium-to long-term priorities:

• Consider the necessary legal changes to enable UGC representation in parliament by allowing members of the Ukrainian global community to stand for election to the Verkhovna Rada, and reserving seats for UGC representatives.

• Simplify and digitalise procedures for accessing “foreign Ukrainian” status and increase public awareness of its benefits.

• Mobilise the UGC’s skills and networks through voluntary registries and knowledge exchange platforms.

• Expand fellowships, facilitate expert missions and professional engagement by UGC members in Ukraine.

References

[2] EGRISS (2020), International Recommendations on Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (IRIS), adopted by adopted by the United Nations Statistical Commission (Decision 51/116).

[3] EGRISS (2018), International Recommendations on Refugee Statistics (IRRS), adopted by the United Nations Statistical Commission (Decision 49/115).

[7] OECD (2024), Public Administration in Ukraine: Assessment against the Principles of Public Administration, SIGMA Monitoring Reports, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/078d08d4-en.

[8] OECD (2024), Recommendation of the Council on Human-Centred Public Administrative Services, OECD/LEGAL/0503, Compendium of Legal Instruments of the OECD, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0503.

[4] OECD (2024), Return, Reintegration and Re-migration: Understanding Return Dynamics and the Role of Family and Community, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/625fb5e6-en.

[6] OECD (2011), Society at a Glance 2011: OECD Social Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/soc_glance-2011-en.

[1] OECD (forthcoming), Public Governance Review of Ukraine.

[5] OECD/European Commission (2023), Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2023: Settling In, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1d5020a6-en.

Notes

← 1.  From the first day of Russia’s offensive in February 2022, the OECD has maintained the position that these actions are an illegal act of aggression. According to the OECD Guidelines on Language, the terms to be used as first reference are “Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine” or “Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine”. Subsequent usage in the same content can be simplified, to refer to “the war in Ukraine”, without prejudice or change of intended meaning. The OECD’s established guidelines reflect the position of its member countries and may not fully align with the Ukraine’s legal acts, which use the term “the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine”. The terms used in this report follow the OECD guidelines.

← 2.  There are also Ukrainians forcibly displaced to Russia, including prisoners of war, as well as unlawfully deported civilians and children. The authors of the report acknowledge the urgency of repatriating these individuals to Ukraine. The policies for doing so, however, were beyond the scope of this report.

← 3.  This wide range of estimates reflects the different ways in which various organisations that collect statistics on returnees define what constitutes a return.