Enhancing the resilience of the semiconductor value chain requires better and more granular data to allow policymakers to identify dependencies, bottlenecks, and help prepare for and react to potential disruptions in value chains.
This paper strengthens the evidence base for semiconductor policy by mapping global semiconductor wafer fabrication capacity by economy, process node density, process technology and business model. It presents the first analysis based on the OECD Semiconductor Production Database which was developed to help inform the OECD’s Semiconductor Informal Exchange Network (SIEN). The database compiles and harmonises data on global semiconductor wafer fabrication capacity using commercial datasets and OECD desk research, building on the semiconductor taxonomy developed in 2024 (OECD, 2024[1]) and contributing to better mapping of the global semiconductor value chain (OECD, 2025[2]).
The results show that global wafer fabrication capacity is concentrated in five economies. The People’s Republic of China (hereafter “China”), Chinese Taipei, Korea, Japan, and the United States account for nearly 90% of global capacity. Within these economies, capacity is further concentrated in a small number of firms, with the ten largest manufacturing companies accounting for around half of total global production capacity. Upcoming investments are heavily focused on the same major producing economies, suggesting that existing geographic concentration may persist. The distribution of capacity also differs significantly by chip type. For example, advanced logic and commodity memory are dominated by a limited number of highly specialised fabrication plants (fabs), while analog, mature logic, and power semiconductors are typically produced in fabs with mixed manufacturing capabilities.
The analyses in this paper also suggest limited substitutability of production between fabs. For example, a fab optimised for analog or power chips cannot produce advanced logic or memory chips. This structural rigidity creates bottlenecks in specific parts of the value chain, which in turn can amplify the impact of supply disruptions and limit the scope for remedial actions. Enhancing the resilience of the global semiconductor value chain therefore requires a shared understanding of where such bottlenecks lie and how interdependencies can be managed.
This paper shows that further work and better data are needed to adequately answer key policy questions and help policymakers assess dependencies, evaluate diversification strategies, or monitor long-term trends. Improving the quality, granularity, and reliability of semiconductor manufacturing data should thus be in the collective interest of all economies.
Taken together, the findings suggest several implications for future policy work. Co-operation among like-minded economies will be increasingly important to identify and address structural vulnerabilities along the semiconductor value chain, particularly in areas where production is concentrated. Jointly developing more reliable and policy-relevant data – through shared taxonomies, better industry engagement, and complementary national efforts – would help governments base their decisions on better evidence. Finally, exploring opportunities for greater geographic diversification, could contribute to reducing systemic risks and strengthening the overall resilience of the global semiconductor value chain.