This chapter provides a brief overview of the economic context in which the COVID-19 pandemic emerged, as well as the health and socio-economic impacts of the pandemic and the trends in international development co-operation and humanitarian assistance when the crisis emerged. It offers an introduction to the evaluation approach and methodology, and presents the COVID-19 Global Evaluation Coalition, a project launched by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and partners to help consolidate lessons from the pandemic for future crises.
Strategic Joint Evaluation of the Collective International Development and Humanitarian Assistance Response to the COVID‑19 Pandemic
Abstract
The novel Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has resulted in millions of deaths and a global crisis that disrupted lives and economies around the world (Our World in Data, 2024[1]; Gill and Schellekens, 2021[2]).1 The pandemic triggered an unprecedented response as communities, governments, international organisations, and private sector actors worked to address the health impacts and mitigate the economic and social fallout of containment measures.
In 2020 as the pandemic spread, international development co-operation and humanitarian assistance surged, as countries and agencies worked together to address urgent humanitarian and health needs and reduce the impacts on long-term sustainable development goals. Countries worked together to provide support where needed and deployed resources at an unprecedented pace. Ultimately, income level was not closely correlated with country outcomes – with some low-income countries responding effectively (The Independent Panel, 2021[3]). International co-operation and assistance played a positive role in those successes. In many ways, the crisis showed the potential of international development and humanitarian assistance to respond at speed and scale to reduce human suffering – even while illustrating its limitations in the face of the broader response and ultimately concluding that this potential was not fully met.
This evaluation analyses the international co-operation and humanitarian assistance provided during the crisis with the goal of contributing to the global development community’s learning. It focuses on understanding how international co‑operation – both humanitarian and development assistance – responded to the COVID-19 crisis from 2020 to 2022 (the emergency phase). The emphasis is on the management and delivery of international assistance, and the extent to which it benefitted people as intended. It covers all types of international assistance, including South-South support, triangular co-operation and support not reported to the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which tracks funding from governments and philanthropies for eligible countries.
While exceptional in many ways, the crisis presents a valuable learning opportunity for co-operation during crises and for “normal times”. The pandemic crisis changed some of the ways development and humanitarian partners operated and demonstrated both effective and less effective ways of working together, co-ordinating actions and deploying resources. Operating in crisis mode resulted in innovations and a willingness to try, learn and adjust.
This opening chapter considers the context of the evaluation, including the economic setting, and an overview of the health and socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is followed by a discussion of the humanitarian and development co‑operation landscape into which the pandemic arrived at the end of 2019. It concludes by outlining the goals of the evaluation and the approach taken, which reflect this context.
The following chapters present the findings of the strategic evaluation, firstly examining the overall international co-operation response to the pandemic, then considering this in the light of the four evaluation criteria: relevance, coherence, effectiveness and efficiency. The report concludes with a synthesis of the key lessons as well as the benefits these can bring to development co‑operation moving forward.
At the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the global economy was already grappling with significant challenges, including limited fiscal space of many government budgets, rising inflation, mounting economic vulnerabilities and rising public debt. In 2019, global debt, comprising both public and private sectors, reached USD 197 trillion, an increase of USD 9 trillion from the previous year, with the global average debt-to-GDP ratio rising to 226% (IMF Blog, 2021[4]). This substantial debt burden constrained many countries' abilities to respond effectively to economic shocks including that created by the COVID crisis. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported that in 2019, nearly half of the low-income countries assessed were either at high risk of or already experiencing debt distress (IMF, 2020[5]).
The onset of the pandemic and containment measures then led to a sharp contraction in economic activity, exacerbating these vulnerabilities. Lockdowns and disruptions to global supply chains resulted in plummeting tax revenues, a decline in export earnings and falling foreign direct investment (Moosa and Merza, 2022[6]). Global trade volumes shrank by 5.3% in 2020 (WTO, 2021[7]), while international tourism collapsed, with arrivals falling by 74%, devastating economies reliant on the sector (UN Tourism, 2021[8]). Research in other fields continues to explore the efficacy of the pandemic response, and the policy implications, including reflections on trade-offs. An illustrative example came from the case study research in Cambodia, where interviewees reflected on the trade-offs made: imposing closures to save lives from COVID-19 put lives at risk from other threats, including gender-based and intimate partner violence.
Emerging markets suffered massive capital outflows, estimated at USD 83 billion in March 2020 alone, as investors sought safe havens in advanced economies (Batini, 2020[9]). These economic shocks deepened fiscal pressures, as governments increased spending rapidly to respond to the pandemic, forcing many governments to increase borrowing, pushing global debt levels even higher, while increasing related costs.
Despite global health and economic risks, from an historic perspective, the world was well-positioned to respond effectively to the pandemic (e.g. record low poverty; technology advances; improved health system capacities). And yet, the overall international response failed to prevent large scale loss of life and devastating secondary effects.
Both the SARS-CoV-22 virus itself and the associated containment and mitigation measures had profound impacts on the health and well-being of populations worldwide. Seven million deaths were reported worldwide, although excess mortality estimates suggest the true toll likely exceeded fifteen million (OXFAM International, 2022[10]; Our World in Data, 2024[1]; Gill and Schellekens, 2021[2]).3 As of May 2025, over 777 million cases of COVID-19 had been confirmed globally (WHO, 2023[11]).
There was a significant variation between countries in terms of mortality rates, and the timing of different waves of illness and total number of deaths attributed to the pandemic. There was also a marked variation between countries within the same income group.4
Though some countries’ health systems pivoted to the provision of telehealth to replace in-person consultations, this was not sufficient to prevent large-scale backlogs in healthcare services in many countries (Dorn et al., 2023[12]). Health service disruptions affected routine vaccinations, with many LMICs experiencing a decline in coverage for routine immunisation levels. From 2019-2021, the number of zero-dose children,5 globally, increased by an estimated 40% (Kaur et al., 2023[13]). South and Southeast Asia experienced particularly acute declines in routine immunisation coverage (Rachlin, Danovaro-Holliday and Murphy, 2022[14]). Most children who were affected lived in LMICs (Gill and Schellekens, 2021[2]).
The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic went far beyond health, impacting multiple areas of society and the economy. From March 2020, the crisis saw widespread global socio-economic disruptions, with lockdowns and other containment measures negatively impacting global growth projections, threatening many small and medium-sized businesses, and increasing levels of unemployment. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), no country was spared, with gross domestic product (GDP) declining sharply in advanced, emerging-market and developing economies (IMF, 2020[15]). In total, 3.3 billion individuals in the global workforce were estimated to be at risk of losing their livelihoods, with jobs in the service sector, tourism and informal sectors particularly at risk.
The pandemic had far-reaching impacts on fiscal space, with the effects varying by countries’ capacities to access capital during the crisis and implement economic rescue packages. The pandemic response triggered the worst global recession since the Second World War, contracting the world economy by 3.1% in 2020 alone (World Bank, 2023[16]). Governments implemented unprecedented fiscal measures, with global stimulus packages totalling over USD 17 trillion by the end of 2021 (IMF, 2022[17]). The US federal government alone invested an estimated USD 4.6 trillion domestically in its COVID-19 recovery (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2023[18]).
Human development was severely affected, reversing decades of progress in education, healthcare and income. The pandemic overwhelmed many national health systems and significantly disrupted essential primary care services. By the end of 2021, essential health services had been disrupted in nearly every country. In 2022, the United Nations reported that the COVID-19 crisis had led to a decrease in immunisation coverage and an increase in the overall number of deaths from tuberculosis and malaria (UN, 2022[19]). Severe disruptions in education systems worldwide deepened a global learning crisis, and progress towards poverty reduction reversed, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean (Sánchez-Páramo et al., 2021[20]). The Human Development Index (HDI) recorded a decline for the first time since its inception in 1990, and progress towards the achievement of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) slowed, and in some cases reversed course (UNDP, 2022[21]).
The socio-economic effects of the crisis deepened many pre-existing inequalities and vulnerabilities both within and between countries. The COVID-19 disease itself along with the secondary effects of the crisis response had disproportionate effects on different people in each country. Certain populations experienced higher rates of COVID-19 infection, hospitalisation, morbidity and mortality, with the over‑60s and those with certain medical conditions at higher risk of becoming seriously ill.
In terms of secondary effects, women, who make up an estimated 70% of global health and social care workers, were disproportionately affected (UN Women, 2021[22]). Barriers in access to financial resources and healthcare, mobility options and decision-making spaces further exacerbated the disproportionate impact of the pandemic on women (CBi, 2021[23]). Women also faced job losses to a greater extent than men (ILO, 2021[24]). Moreover, a 30% increase in reported cases of gender-based violence (GBV) was observed during the crisis (UNFPA, 2022[25]). The gendered impacts of the pandemic are said to have far-reaching consequences that are further amplified in contexts of fragility, conflict and emergencies (UN Women, 2021[22]).
Children were also significantly affected, including through the death of caregivers, widespread closure of schools and childcare centres and long-term limitations of their outdoor activities (see Box 1.1). People with disabilities also faced unique threats to their rights and wellbeing during the crisis.6
Source: Our World (2025[26]), Total confirmed COVID-19 deaths and cases per million people, https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cumulative-deaths-and-cases-covid-19?time=2020-01-22..2023-01-03.
While often described as being less vulnerable to the COVID-19 disease, children in all countries were significantly affected, in particular by the secondary socio-economic impacts and mitigation measures. Children and families in the poorest countries were most at risk. Key pandemic effects included:
pushing more households and children into poverty
intensifying the hardships of poor children
exacerbating the learning crisis (including school closures)
threatening child survival and health
increasing child malnutrition
reducing access to life-saving vaccines
reversing progress in the fight against HIV
mounting risks of violence, exploitation and abuse
putting more girls and boys at risk of child marriage.
Source: UNICEF (2022[27]), ‘’COVID-19 and Children: UNICEF Data Hub’’, https://data.unicef.org/covid-19-and-children/.
The COVID-19 pandemic unfolded within an already complex international development and humanitarian landscape. The advent of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the signing of the Paris Agreement, and the emergence of the Grand Bargain in 2016 marked a shift towards a more diverse and fragmented development co‑operation environment with increasing engagement from non-DAC members and new financial mechanisms, including climate funds. In parallel, mounting geopolitical tensions, populist movements and domestic funding challenges in OECD countries reshaped the priorities and structures framing international aid. The increasing frequency of climate-related shocks and natural disasters impacted countries’ growth and development prospects and was jeopardising hard-won gains, increasing food insecurity, health risks and vulnerability (OECD, 2019[28]).
The COVID-19 crisis not only tested but also exacerbated these pre-existing challenges, placing extraordinary pressure on global health systems, economic structures and development financing.
The move away from an outdated paradigm of wealthy, western nations as benevolent donors and the global south as passive recipients was already changing well before the pandemic (OECD, 2019[28]). The crisis confirmed this shift, and the role of major countries of the global south, including the People’s Republic of China (hereafter ‘China’) and South Africa, brought to the forefront the multidimensional nature of risks, with all countries experiencing need, and support flowing in multiple directions.
Shifts in global wealth, politics and power contributed to further complexity, bringing a diversity of perspectives, principles, programmatic approaches and financial mechanisms into the development landscape. Trust in governments and institutions was plummeting, and populism, protectionism and exclusive nationalism were on the rise (Bieber, 2020[29]; Foundation for European Progressive Studies, 2020[30]; Williams, Kestenbaum and Meir, 2020[31]; Bernes T, 2020[32]; OECD, 2019[28]). The advent of climate funds and rising climate finance introduced new funding streams and governance structures, reshaping financial flows and influencing both development and humanitarian priorities. For partner countries, the growing diversity of development providers and finance flows created greater choice.
This increasingly crowded space and the diversity in partners’ geopolitical, humanitarian and economic interests increased the political stakes in international co-operation for both providers and partner countries. Many of these trends were accelerated by the pandemic.
International development assistance had consistently increased since the 1960s, keeping pace with overall growth in the gross domestic product (GDP) of provider economies (OECD, 2024[33]), falling only slightly in the 1990s, but otherwise serving as a stable external resource for developing countries even during crises, relative to foreign direct investment and private flows (OECD, 2024[33]).
However, many targets related to development finance, including the commitment to spend 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) on development assistance, were not being met. Before the pandemic, only Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, the Republic of Türkiye (hereafter “Türkiye”) and the United Kingdom were meeting the international target of spending 0.7% of GNI on ODA (OECD, 2019[28]).
Other key trends prior to the crisis included a rise in the proportion of ODA commitments to humanitarian assistance and a growing share of bilateral support channelled through multilateral organisations (OECD, 2023[34]). There was also an increase in the use of loans for development assistance and a decline in the use of grants, despite growing levels of indebtedness in ODA-recipient countries (Dodd, Breed and Knox, 2021[35]). Development spending had also come under increasing pressure due to new climate finance commitments, rising humanitarian needs and in-donor refugee costs (due to an increase in displacement).
As early as the end of 2019, development actors, including South-South providers, members of the Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), multilateral development banks, and UN agencies, began to take note of the emerging pandemic and to understand its potential implications for developing countries, which were at risk due to vulnerabilities such as limitations in health workforce capacity and health systems, as well as inequalities in access to medical supplies and materials (Chancel and Voituriez, 2021[36]).7
The first response task forces were convened in early 2020 with many development and humanitarian institutions quickly establishing crisis response mechanisms and developing response plans and scenarios. Statements of support and commitments for assistance emerged quickly, and many of these included an intention to target and prioritise those countries considered most affected or most at risk (CIKD, 2023[37]; OECD, 2020[38]). These vulnerabilities were understood not only in terms of general vulnerabilities related to income levels and fragility, but also the spread of the COVID-19 virus, capacity of health systems and exposure to the secondary economic effects, such as economies reliant on tourism.
Evaluating the contribution of international assistance to overall development results has long been a priority area of action for both provider and recipient countries, as well as other development and humanitarian actors. Evaluations produce evidence that can help increase the effectiveness and results of interventions, and – in the context of international co-operation – also provide a basis for mutual accountability.
In 2020, the COVID-19 Global Evaluation Coalition (hereafter referred to as the “Coalition”) was established to promote adaptation of evaluation methods and processes as well as to provide credible evidence to inform international co-operation responding to the COVID-19 crisis (Box 1.2). This strategic, joint evaluation of the crisis response concludes the Coalition’s work, and fills a gap in understanding the overall role of international co-operation in the crisis to identify lessons.
The COVID-19 Global Evaluation Coalition project was launched in 2020 by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Network on Development Evaluation (EvalNet) along with the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG), the Evaluation Co-operation Group (ECG), and evaluation units from partner countries (non-DAC members). The Coalition comprised more than 60 participating institutions (see Annex A).
The Coalition’s purpose was to help ensure that lessons were learned and that the global development community delivered on its promises. This collaborative project aimed to provide credible evidence to inform the international co‑operation responding to the crisis and subsequent recovery. The evaluation and learning work were carried out in a modular and phased approach, culminating in this report.
1.4.1. Gaps in the evaluation landscape
Globally – as well as nationally – various pieces of research and evaluations have looked at the broader pandemic response efforts. Williamson et al describe how the pandemic “highlighted profound weaknesses in the global governance of health; inadequate preparation, co-ordination, and accountability hampered the collective response of nations at each stage” and called for major changes to the global health architecture to mitigate the health and socioeconomic damage of future global health threats (Williamson et al., 2022[39]).
A range of other reviews of the overall pandemic response – from the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations, the Group of 20 (G20), and the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response (The Independent Panel, 2021[3]) – echo these findings, providing important lessons for international co-operation efforts (Box 1.3). This context limited the potential for international development and humanitarian assistance to achieve many of its objectives and provides an important backdrop for interpreting the findings of this evaluation, which focuses on international assistance.
International development organisations have also conducted a variety of evaluations and internal reviews of their respective crisis response efforts, including thematic evaluations and evaluations of particular response mechanisms. In 2020, the OECD began tracking the crisis responses from development institutions and evaluation plans related to COVID-19 and carried out an initial mapping of COVID-19-related evaluations (Johnson and Kennedy-Chouane, 2021[40]), which found that most evaluations focused on individual programmes or institutional performance within UN agencies or multilateral development banks. Less work had been done to examine the response of bilateral providers, particularly non-DAC members or the overall response of national governments, despite the latter being the primary drivers of country-level outcomes. An update evaluation landscape in 2022 confirmed these findings and the persistent gap in cross-cutting analysis, especially in developing countries (Lagoa, 2022[41]).
During 2020-2022, DAC peer reviews and peer learning exercises supported the exchange of experience and early lessons learned from crisis-related international assistance to support the ongoing response. The Coalition drew on initial reviews and evaluations in its 2021 study “The COVID-19 pandemic: How are humanitarian and development co-operation actors doing so far? How could we do better?” (Johnson and Kennedy-Chouane, 2021[40]), which focused on the institutional aspects of the early response to identify emerging lessons, which were fed into the ongoing response.
Despite the relatively large number of reviews carried out, no evaluation had examined the collective effort across development actors, leaving gaps in knowledge regarding critical aspects of the crisis response – such as the overall outcomes in a particular country. This evaluation helps to fill these gaps. It responds to the request of Coalition participants for a system-wide perspective, which was initially expressed by participants in 2020 and confirmed during a series of learning workshops held in late 2021.
It also responds to the joint commitment of the OECD DAC to “learn lessons from the crisis and … use our experience to inform policy choices during the recovery to fortify efforts to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” (OECD, 2020[42]).
As summarised by an expert commission convened by The Lancet in 2022, the multiple failures of international co-operation include:
the lack of timely notification of the initial outbreak of COVID-19
costly delays in acknowledging the crucial airborne exposure pathway of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, and in implementing appropriate measures at national and global levels to slow the spread of the virus
the lack of co-ordination among countries regarding suppression strategies
the failure of governments to examine evidence and adopt best practices for controlling the pandemic and managing economic and social spillovers from other countries
the shortfall of global funding for low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs), as classified by the World Bank
the failure to ensure adequate global supplies and equitable distribution of key commodities—including protective gear, diagnostics, medicines, medical devices, and vaccines—especially for LMICs
the lack of timely, accurate, and systematic data on infections, deaths, viral variants, health system responses, and indirect health consequences
the poor enforcement of appropriate levels of biosafety regulations in the lead-up to the pandemic, raising the possibility of a laboratory-related outbreak
the failure to combat systematic disinformation
the lack of global and national safety nets to protect populations experiencing vulnerability.
Source: (Williamson et al., 2022[39])
1.4.2. Evaluation purpose and use
The evaluation – launched in 2022, conducted in 2023-24 and completed in 2025 – was timed to build on the body of institutional, thematic and global evaluations that had been completed and to extract broader lessons. It focuses on coherence and overall results, which were beyond the scope of individual studies.
The evaluation has three objectives:
to document the international co-operation efforts to support the pandemic response efforts in partner countries, including support for equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines and vaccinations
to answer evaluative questions of the relevance, coherence, efficiency and effectiveness of international assistance and co-operation during the crisis
to generate lessons and good practices for governments, communities, development agencies and stakeholders, which will ultimately improve the effectiveness and impact of international co‑operation and future crisis responses.
Learning from such experiences is key to ensuring the preparation of the global community to respond to future crises, as well as improving the effectiveness of co-operation in “normal” times.
The evaluation also seeks to understand the performance of DAC members against the crisis response intentions articulated in the April 2020 DAC Joint Statement (OECD, 2020[42]) and the November 2020 DAC High-level Meeting Communiqué (OECD, 2020[43]), which included calls for a collective and coherent response, support for equitable access to vaccines, and protection of ODA volumes.
The evaluation approach reflects the global reach of the COVID-19 crisis, the broad scope of the evaluation, the extent of evaluative work already available and the range of actors involved.
1.5.1. Evaluation approach
It adopted a modular, non-experimental case-based approach. Four preparatory modules – a synthesis of evaluations (Module 1), a study of philanthropic responses (Module 2), a set of provider cases and a set of recipient cases (Modules 3 and 4) – create the evidence blocks for this final global report. The evaluation was carried out collaboratively with Coalition participants, OECD staff and an external team of consultants (see Annex B for a full description of the methodology, data collection, case studies and limitations).
1.5.2. Evaluation scope
The strategic evaluation assesses the international development co-operation and humanitarian assistance provided to ODA-eligible countries (partner countries) from January 2020 to December 2022, covering the emergency phase of the pandemic during which most assistance was provided. Given the far-reaching effects of the pandemic, nearly all elements of international support in 2020-2022, except for major conflict or disaster response assistance, are considered relevant for understanding the crisis response and are therefore in scope.
The evaluation examines the collective response through the lens of the criteria of relevance (responsiveness to needs and priorities), coherence (alignment of action across policy areas and across actors), effectiveness (achievement of objectives and results) and efficiency (use of resources and timeliness).
The evaluation gathered evidence to answer the following six overarching questions:
Descriptive: How did national governments and development and humanitarian actors respond to the COVID-19 pandemic?
Relevance: To what extent did COVID-19 support meet partner countries’ needs and priorities, including those of the most vulnerable?
Coherence: To what extent did responses align to ensure coherent approaches at global and country levels?
Effectiveness: What are the early (up to 2022) results of the collective response to COVID-19?
Efficiency: To what extent were funding and programming decisions and interventions timely and informed?
Learning: What good practices, innovations and lessons emerged from the collective response to COVID-19?
These six overarching evaluation questions, and a set of sub-questions, framed the evaluative analysis, and assessment of the policy and programmatic intentions of actors were structured under each criterion.
The term “collective response” is used throughout this report to refer to the entirety of actions undertaken by development and humanitarian actors including bilateral development agencies (hereafter referred to as “bilateral providers”), United Nations agencies, multilateral institutions and non-governmental actors in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic in partner countries.
The scope of the evaluation includes all international assistance (including support not measured by the OECD) provided in 2020-2022, grouped into three broad conceptual categories:
1. adjustments made to internationally funded development and humanitarian interventions already in place at the outset of the pandemic to adapt to or provide continuity in the evolving context
2. new COVID-19-specific support to the health sector and other directly impacted sectors including social protection, which were tagged8 using a COVID-19 purpose code or key word in the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database – the most comprehensive database available on international development and humanitarian support (Box 1.4.)
3. all other assistance provided from 2020-2022, which, although not specifically focused on the COVID-19 pandemic, is considered relevant for understanding the overall response effort.
Assistance includes ODA (i.e. grants and concessional loans), other official flows (i.e. non-concessional loans and financing) that were provided through development co‑operation modalities, and non-official flows from philanthropic foundations that report to the OECD. It includes bilateral, trilateral (triangular) and multilateral co-operation, as well as other forms of co‑operation such as South-South co‑operation, to create a full picture. For private and official providers that do not report to the CRS, available data from other sources (UN studies, providers’ own reports, news articles, etc.) were used where possible.
The global COVID-19 crisis affected all countries, including provider countries, and resulted in a substantial amount of international assistance both between and across countries of different income groups. While assistance received by countries not eligible for ODA – such as Czechia and Italy – was not within the scope of this study, the multi-directional nature of the response should be acknowledged.
The evaluation does not focus on the performance of individual partner governments’ responses to the pandemic in their own countries, or policy measures such as border closures or national policy responses such as lockdowns, containment measures, school closures or vaccine mandates. Rather, when referred to, these are used for contextual purposes, with the evaluation looking at how international partners supported national efforts. It also does not examine medical aspects, such as vaccine efficacy.
1.5.3. Data collection and analysis
Building on an initial mapping, the OECD identified a total of 178 publications, which were synthesised in early 2023 – forming the foundational evidence base for the evaluation (Schwensen and Schiebel Smed, 2023[44]). The synthesis focused on the key questions of coherence and co‑ordination; flexibility and adaptation; timeliness; innovation; localisation; vaccine equity; and the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.
Case studies – of both providers and recipients of development assistance – were the second key source of evidence. Case studies were selected to provide a mix of characteristics across key elements of the response and the pandemic impacts. They were used to provide contextual detail and help explain trends or findings from the other modules (see Annex B) and furnish illustrative and descriptive examples that support the key findings emerging from the aggregated analysis to triangulate findings and inform lessons. The case studies include a mix of country-led reports and evaluations, and research caried out by the OECD or Coalition participants specifically for this joint evaluation.
The evaluation includes case studies of the totality of assistance received during the COVID-19 crisis in Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Georgia, Kenya, Lebanon, and Nicaragua and a global study of Large Ocean States or Small Island Developing States (SIDS) as a group. Country case studies were used to understand how development and humanitarian actors worked together in different contexts, focusing on the interplay between international partners and national governments.
These cases were complemented by an in-depth analysis of provider experiences, including the international assistance of China, France, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain and the United States, examining priorities, types of co-operation, funding, and programming. This analysis identified factors (positive or negative) that affected the responsiveness and adaptability of programming, as well as the mechanisms that were in place to co-ordinate efforts, internally and with other actors. Evaluation reports of other bilateral providers, as well as UN agencies and multilateral development banks, contributed to this analysis as well.
This evaluation report synthesises and triangulates evidence from each of the previous modules, together with the analysis of CRS data and additional document review and interviews (Box 1.4). To analyse the data across the four modules, the evaluation team developed an expansive coding framework, which was based on the six evaluation questions and 17 sub questions and used MAXQDA software tool to analyse the data. Data were triangulated through the cross-refencing of data sources; team analyses and “sense-making” sessions. Findings were validated with the evaluation manager, quality assurance lead, and the Steering Committee, and through learning events involving more than 100 stakeholders in 2024-2025.
1.5.4. Evaluation management, conduct and limitations
The five-year evaluation process was managed by the OECD and conducted by Coalition participants, OECD staff and a team from IOD Parc. It was guided by Coalition participants through a representative Steering Group (Annex A) with inputs from members of the DAC Network on Development Evaluation.
The evaluation’s broad scope and distinct objective meant that it could not (and did not attempt to) look at the specific performance of individual countries or actors, nor assess the effectiveness of individual interventions. The evaluation applied principles of appreciative inquiry to systematically identify and understand what worked well, in which contexts and why. This approach was most suitable given the unprecedented nature of the crisis and the focus of the work on learning and aimed at increasing openness and frankness among interviewees.
The evaluation does not assess the global pandemic response as such, but focuses only on international development co-operation and humanitarian assistance, which are ultimately a relatively small part of the picture, both in terms of finance volumes and compared to other policy measures.
Trends in development and humanitarian assistance from 2016-23 were examined to provide context for understanding policy and behavioural changes in response to the crisis. However, the evaluation did not examine the longer-term effects and economic recovery from 2023 onwards.
This strategic joint evaluation was designed to fill a specific, shared learning need, and had a number of limitations in terms of data availability, overall approach, reliance on already completed evaluations, and implementation (Annex B). While the evaluation looks at private philanthropies (i.e. those that report to the OECD), coverage of the role of the broader private sector is limited. The evaluation does not cover international assistance provided by individuals, on which there are not consistent data available.
Despite the complexity, limitations in data, and breadth of the evaluation, there was a consistently high degree of convergence across evidence sources on common themes, issues and challenges, which supports the credibility of these findings and lessons. Notably, across a range of evaluations with different methodological approaches, many common findings emerged. These have been triangulated with evidence from the case studies and additional desk research to reach the conclusions presented here.
What is the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS)?
The OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database collects data on official development assistance (ODA) and other flows to developing countries. The CRS database provides the most complete data available for tracking development assistance, including ODA and other official flows (OOF). Since 2018, the CRS database includes assistance provided by 39 private foundations (private philanthropy for development) including donor-reported information on the recipient’s location, sector and purpose, and the implementing agency of philanthropic grants (OECD, 2023[34]). Seventeen non-DAC providers currently report on ODA flows to the OECD on a disbursement basis. Thirteen reported on COVID-19-related spending in 2020-2021. Variation in reporting, especially among non-DAC members, limits the comparison; however, some interesting trends can still be deduced.
How is COVID-19 support measured?
Contributions to the COVID-19 response are tracked in two ways in the CRS database:
The “COVID-19 control” purpose code was introduced in 2020 and can be assigned to “all activities related to COVID-19 control, e.g. information, education and communication; testing; prevention; immunisation, treatment, care” (OECD, 2020[45]). Support for development or distribution of vaccines, as well as for personal protection equipment (PPE) and COVID-19 tests would all fall under this purpose code.
The #COVID-19 keyword tracks the multifaceted pandemic response beyond direct disease controls. The keyword #COVID-19 is used for activities across any sector that “have the principal objective of supporting control of the COVID-19 pandemic and the response to its socio-economic impacts”, and that “would not have taken place if not for responding to the COVID-19 pandemic” (OECD, 2020[46]).
How were CRS data used in this evaluation?
CRS data covering all assistance between 2016 and 2023 were used to examine trends and how providers adjusted spending to respond to the crisis starting in 2020. The data were looked at by:
sector and provider – and aggregated by country receiving assistance (i.e. by income group, fragility, land-locked, Small Island Developing State [SIDS], and geographic region)
channels (multilateral, bilateral, non-governmental organisations) and
type of funding (grants, loans, concessional and non-concessional).
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← 1. Data gathered on deaths during the pandemic indicate that the actual number of deaths from COVID-19 was significantly higher than reported. According to Oxfam, the lack of testing and underreporting were especially high in the poorest countries. Their modelling (using measures of excess deaths) estimates that by 2022,19.6 million people had died due to COVID-19. On a per capita basis, deaths in low- and lower-middle-income countries were 31% higher than high-income countries, and for every death in a high-income country, an estimated four other people died in a low- or lower-middle-income country (see https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/covid-19-death-toll-four-times-higher-lower-income-countries-rich-ones).
← 2. SARS-CoV-2 is the name of the virus responsible for COVID-19 disease, COVID-19 being the designation of the new strain that emerged in 2019.
← 3. It is important to exercise caution when interpreting the available data on COVID cases and deaths and to acknowledge widespread underreporting of pandemic case numbers and deaths due to data paucity, a lack of testing capacity, difficulties in tracking death causes in challenging settings, politically motivated undercounting, and limited health system resources (see Endnote 1). In this evaluation case numbers and COVID-attributed deaths are used to look at the overall impacts of the pandemic, as well as to understand the outcomes of the pandemic response and to compare between countries.
← 4. Global mortality rates and the total number of deaths attributed to the pandemic decreased over time due to the reduced severity of newer variants, improved treatment approaches, shifts in the affected population towards younger cohorts, higher COVID-19 vaccination rates (in high-income countries), population immunity from prior infections, and hospitals becoming gradually less overwhelmed (see https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/total-covid-cases-deaths-per-million).
← 5. Zero-dose children are defined as those that lack access to or are never reached by routine immunisation programmes. They are operationally measured as those who did not receive their first dose the diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis (DTP) vaccine, https://www.who.int/data/gho/indicator-metadata-registry/imr-details/7792.
← 6. Further analysis is planned to identify and share lessons on disability inclusion and intersectional approaches, and the role they played in an effective crisis response.
← 7. Country vulnerabilities to the pandemic have been extensively analysed elsewhere, and are varied across all income groups, not just among ODA-recipient countries.
← 8. From an initial analysis of reporting of development assistance to the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) and analysis by several DAC members, it was clear that the use of the COVID-19 keyword (and to a lesser extent the purpose code that was developed to track new COVID-19-specific funding) were used somewhat inconsistently across provider institutions. This reflected different strategic approaches, the timing of funding decisions, and other factors such as institutional mandates, access to pandemic-related funding mechanisms, and the overall priorities of the reporting funder. Further, given the far-reaching effects of the pandemic, it was clear that useful lessons could be learned not only the use of funds specifically tagged as “COVID-19-related”, but also from how existing programmes and partnerships were adjusted and adapted. As a result, the scope of the evaluation was defined to cover all assistance in 2020‑2022.