Chapter 2 discusses how transport infrastructure can be used both as a target for and a facilitator of violence by government forces and militants. The chapter first shows that, while the benefits of well-developed transport infrastructure are well recognised, they are not distributed equally across the region. North African countries and Cabo Verde have a longer, denser, more decentralised, and better maintained road network than West African countries. The chapter then shows that the ability to move freely across long distances and control movement has become one of the key components of the armed conflicts affecting the region. Both state and non-state actors have established road checkpoints to conduct identity checks and extract resources from passengers. In such an asymmetrical conflict, jihadists have proved much more mobile and flexible than regular forces. However, governments’ attempts to limit insurgent movements have often led to disastrous consequences for the local economy and food security. Mobile military campaigns based on drones and airstrikes have also inflicted civilian casualties in both the Central Sahel and the Lake Chad region.
Roads and Conflicts in North and West Africa
Abstract
North African countries and Cabo Verde have a longer, denser, more decentralised, and better maintained road network than West African countries.
An extensive road network enhances sovereignty by allowing military forces to be projected far away from the main political centre, while preventing the development of safe havens in remote regions.
The ability to move across long distances and control movement has become one of the key features of asymmetrical warfare in North and West Africa.
Insurgents tend to rely on mobile and flexible vehicles and light weapons, while government forces increasingly use fixed military bases and heavily armed convoys.
The analysis of the relationships between armed conflict and transport infrastructure must necessarily consider the historical conditions under which the current network has developed. The following sections argue that the structure of the North and West African transport networks has undergone major transformations since the beginning of the 20th century. For historical reasons, these networks have taken different forms on either side of the Sahara. The North African transport network is much denser, better maintained and less fragmented than that of West African countries, which remains particularly sparce. The regional specificities of the North and West African networks affect the competition for the control of transport infrastructure between state and non-state actors and contribute to the emergence of different patterns of violence.
Transport infrastructure has long been recognised as a key factor in human development. A dense and extensive infrastructure network improves accessibility by providing equitable access to a wide range of social, health and economic services that would otherwise be out of reach of local populations (Neutens, 2015[1]), both within and between urban agglomerations (Oviedo and Sabogal, 2020[2]). Transport infrastructure benefits both rural and urban areas by enabling producers to reach agricultural markets in a timely manner and, in return, facilitating the distribution of seeds, fertilisers and other farm inputs in rural areas. Poor road accessibility, on the contrary, limits the ability of rural producers to sell their stocks at the most convenient time, seriously hindering social and economic development in rural areas and leading to higher prices for final consumers.
The key role of accessibility has sparked renewed policy interest in large transport infrastructure investments, contrasting with the scepticism towards transport that characterised much of the structural adjustment era in Africa (World Bank, 2010[3]). This “re-enchantment with big infrastructure” (Nugent, 2018[4]) is fuelled by a boom in primary commodity prices and the development of modern technologies that can reduce trade frictions and corruption, such as One Stop Border Posts implemented by regional organisations in several parts of Africa (OECD, 2019b[5]).
While the benefits of a well-developed transport infrastructure are widely recognised, they are not distributed equally across North and West Africa. Significant differences can be observed in the length, density, structure and quality of road networks across countries (Map 2.1). North African countries and Cabo Verde have longer, denser, more decentralised, and better maintained road network than West African countries (Table 2.1 CIA (2024[6]). These variations correlate with their higher levels of human development and urbanisation. National variations may also reflect the unique shape, size, and population distribution of each country. Elongated countries with high population densities, such as Benin and Gambia are likely to have a dendritic network organised around a central trunk, unlike large and sparsely populated countries such as Chad.
Source: Authors based on Michelin data made available by Müller-Crepon et al. (2021[7]).
Comparing countries based on their density of roads per square kilometre makes little sense where most of the population is either concentrated in cities or moves nomadically, as in Mauritania, Libya, and northern Mali, Niger, and Chad (OECD/SWAC, 2014[8]). Rather, the most distinguishing factor to compare road networks is their condition. Poorly maintained roads increase transport costs, make agricultural products more perishable, shorten the operational life of trucks, cause more accidents and reduce social interactions between communities. Paved roads represent a much larger share of the national network in North African countries (83%) than in West African countries, where they remain scarce (17%). Significant variations can be observed across countries south of the Sahara (Figure 2.1). Paved roads represent at least 30% of the network in Cabo Verde, Senegal and Nigeria, but less than 10% in Sierra Leone, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Cameroon and Chad. Nigeria may have the largest road network in West Africa with an estimated 195 000 kilometres of paved and unpaved roads in 2019, but a significant portion is currently deteriorated due to poor maintenance (ICRC, 2017[9]). In Ghana, only 40% of the road network was considered to be in “good” condition by the Ministry of Roads and Highways in 2015, with the largest proportion of roads in “poor” condition located in the Brong Ahafo, Accra and Eastern Regions (Government of Ghana, 2019[10]).
Source: CIA (2024). Various years.
Colonisation radically transformed the transport architecture of West Africa following a well-known sequence of transportation development (Taaffe, Morrill and Gould, 1963[11]). Building on a few scattered ports and trading posts along the Gulf of Guinea, colonial powers developed railway lines and roads from the seacoast to the interior of the continent (Debrie, 2010[12]). These lines of penetration were designed for political and military control, mineral exploitation and agricultural production. Their expansion contributed to the rapid economic development of colonial cities such as Accra, Abidjan and Lagos, and to a process of port concentration, as colonial trade was channelled through a few ports such as Sekondi-Takoradi in Ghana or Port-Harcourt in Nigeria. Smaller feeder roads were built to reach agricultural and mining zones, both on the coast and in the hinterland, leading to the emergence of secondary urban centres, which often replaced less strategically situated precolonial markets (Howard and Shain, 2005[13]). Numerous rail projects were designed from the late 19th century to the end of the Second World War to link the two shores of the Sahara across French Africa. However, none came to fruition (Map 2.2).
Source: adapted from OECD/SWAC (2014[8]) by the authors with permission.
The territorial division of the region into competing colonies further encouraged the development of transport infrastructure for political motives, particularly between coastal and Sahelian countries. In the Sahel, France broke with older commercial logics by developing a major axis between Dosso in Niger and Kandi in Benin, which allowed to export cash crops produced in the east of the country through the port of Cotonou rather than through British-controlled Nigeria (Walther, 2008[14]). Similar decisions were made in today’s Ghana, where Britain extended the Eastern Trunk Road connecting Ho to Yendi and Bawku, following the 1956 British Togoland status plebiscite (Nugent, 2019[15]). The colonial road network was deliberately reoriented towards Accra to prevent the diversion of cocoa produced in eastern Ghana through the port of Lomé in French-controlled Togo.
The postcolonial period did not radically depart from the transport logics implemented during the colonial era. Apart from Nigeria, where Kaduna has developed as a hub, the structure of the regional railway network remains dominated by single lines connecting the coast to the interior. Crucial international links, such as the one between Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey have been abandoned or remain incomplete (Map 2.3). In Niger, the section built by the Bolloré Group from Niamey to Dosso in the mid-2010s (145 km) to connect with the coastal region through Parakou is not operational.
Source: OpenStreetMap (2024[16]).
In some countries, the rail infrastructure inherited from the colonial period has slowly deteriorated. In Senegal, much of the recent investment has been directed towards developing a regional express train in the capital city region, discontinuing regional links between Dakar, Saint-Louis and Linguère, as well as international connections with Mali. While the Senegalese government announced a plan in 2022 to rehabilitate the first half of the line leading to Tambacounda (Government of Senegal, 2022[17]), there have been no international passenger trains operating between Dakar and Bamako since 2010 (Figure 2.2). Further east, the Nigerian government has announced the construction of a rail link between Kano and Maradi in the Republic of Niger through Daura, Katsina, and Jibiya (284 km). This crucial infrastructure aims to connect two regions of Hausaland that share a long tradition of commercial relations but lack major transport corridors. The political crisis following the military coup in Niger in July 2023 does not seem to have slowed down the project. In March 2024, Nigeria’s Ministry of Transportation announced that it had secured USD1.3 billion to complete the project (Reuters, 2024[18]).
Source: Steven Radil, 2024.
Along the Gulf of Guinea, the road network was developed to support the expansion of agriculture frontiers, provide access to mining areas, and facilitate oil production. A dense network of feeder roads was built in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria to develop cash crop plantations in previously forested areas (Kalischek et al., 2023[19]). The latest stage of this process is evident in Ghana today (Asibey et al., 2020[20]), where the development of a dense network of small roads connecting major axes to plantations and mining sites has led to rapid deforestation in the Ashanti, Ahafo, and Western regions (Walther et al., 2020[21]). Most of the road accessibility gains of the last decade are concentrated in these regions, contributing to deepening regional disparities between the rapidly developing south of Ghana and the north of the country (Map 2.4).
Note: Green areas correspond to the regions accessible in less than 4 hours in 2019 and not in 2010.
Source: Walther, Nugent and Goewey (2024[22]), reproduced with permission.
Accessibility remains a critical issue within urban agglomerations as well. In most countries in the region, rapid urbanisation has placed immense pressure on transport systems, leading to challenges such as increased emissions, pollution, and congestion (Stokenberga et al., 2024[23]). As cities grow, residents who rely on public transportation struggle to access essential services such as markets, healthcare, and schools (Acheampong and Asabere, 2022[24]). Those who can afford cars enjoy better access but at the cost of exacerbating environmental issues. In Ghana, recent studies indicate that accessibility to markets remains problematic for many urban dwellers living far from the core business areas and/or with limited means to dedicate to transportation (Anderson et al., 2024[25]). In cities like Accra and Kumasi, addressing these challenges requires identifying accessibility gaps, bringing services closer to residents, improving infrastructure for mass transit and active modes, and integrating a gender lens in transport planning (Box 2.2).
A significant portion of Accra’s population cannot access essential services within a reasonable walking distance: 61% of residents live in areas where it is impossible to reach a market within a 30-minute walk (Map 2.5). Moreover, accessibility is far from homogenous across Accra’s urban landscape, as seen with the variation in walking times to markets. Identifying these gaps is a first step towards anticipating mobility challenges and planning future interventions. Additionally, the expansion of residential areas without the co-location of essential services, especially in peripheral areas, has widened accessibility gaps. Therefore, informal settlements located in the historic centre of Accra can often access some essential services within a 15-minute walk (e.g., healthcare facilities, primary schools, markets), while those in newly urbanised areas struggle. Better integration of transport and land-use planning is needed to ensure services are closer to where people live and to improve economic opportunities. Furthermore, most roads in peripheral areas are unpaved, hindering the extension of popular and public transport networks and making walking difficult. Investing in infrastructure for mass transit, walking, and cycling can improve accessibility and reduce road congestion. Finaly, women, particularly those in low-income groups, face greater mobility challenges, often chaining trips to fulfil professional and caregiving roles via walking and minibuses, which are, in many areas, the least accessible modes. Transport systems should be designed to accommodate these needs, for example, by placing bus stops near schools and offering fare structures that consider dependents.
Source: Anderson et al. (2024[25])
Note: Accra is divided into 500 metre grid cells. A dark green cell indicates that no markets can be reached within a 30-minute walk from that cell, considering the condition and connectivity of the road network. Conversely, lighter blues and pink indicate areas where individuals can reach one or more markets on foot within the designated 30-minute timeframe.
Source: Anderson et al. (2024[25]), reproduced with permission.
Historically, the development of an integrated transport system in the Sahel was much slower due to the lack of roads and railways, long distances between cities, and low population densities. Sahelian countries tried to address these weaknesses by implementing three related sets of initiatives: the construction of a “unity” road connecting the capital to its eastern peripheries, the densification of the road network in the “valuable” southern regions, and the development of transport corridors towards the Gulf of Guinea (Debrie, 2007[26]).
Unity roads. The road network inherited from the colonial period remained primarily focused on capital cities in the decades following independence (Lombard and Ninot, 2010[27]). In the late 1960s, very few paved roads connected Dakar, Nouakchott, Bamako, Ouagadougou, Niamey, and N’Djamena to other cities in the country (Map 2.6). Since French colonial conquest proceeded from the Atlantic Coast to Lake Chad in the east, the capital cities of the Sahel were in the western part of the colonies, leaving much of the rest of the country poorly connected (Debrie, 2007[26]). The only exception was Burkina Faso, as its capital city, Ouagadougou—being the capital of the Mossi Empire—was located in the centre of the country prior to colonisation.
To foster national cohesion after independence, Sahelian countries embarked on the construction of a series of road corridors connecting their capitals to their eastern peripheries. In the Western Sahel, Senegal connected Dakar to Matam on the Senegal River (530 km). Mauritania built the Route de l’Espoir (1 100 km) to connect Nouakchott with the secondary centres of Aleg, Kiffa, and Néma. This road, which bypassed the fertile region of the Senegal River, was primarily a political project to connect the Moorish populations of the Hodh region to Nouakchott (Antil and Choplin, 2003[28]). Its main impact has been to settle nomadic populations in new towns or relocate existing villages (Retaillé, 1995[29]). Further east, Mali developed Route Nationale 16 between Sevaré and Gao in the late 1970s (570 km), while Niger built Route Nationale 1, also known as the Route de l’Unité, to link Niamey to the precolonial centres of Maradi and Zinder, ending in N’Guigmi in the Lake Chad region (1 200 km).
Develop “valuable” regions. To promote economic development, Sahelian countries also invested in smaller roads, particularly in the most productive agricultural regions of the country, located in the south. These new roads usually bisected the west-east corridors of “national unity”, as in the Maradi and Zinder regions in Niger or in the Senegal River Valley, where Mauritania started the construction of a paved road from Aleg to Bogué finally connecting Kaedi to the rest of the country in the 1990s. Several major roads were also built to exploit natural resources, as in Niger, where the Uranium Highway (RN25) connecting Arlit to Agadez was paved in the mid-1970s (240 km). Much of the investments went to roads rather than railways, except for the Nouadhibou-Zouerate railway in Mauritania.
Source: Lombard and Ninot (2010[27]), using Michelin data. Adapted by the author and reproduced with permission.
New transport corridors. The fact that Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger are landlocked, and therefore highly dependent on coastal countries for their imports and exports, complicated the process of regional integration after independence. To encourage exports, Sahelian countries and regional economic organisations kept investing in major road corridors connecting their capital cities to the Gulf of Guinea. These investments contributed to stimulate the growth of dozens of border markets, such as Gaya and Malanville between Niger and Benin, which served as hubs for local agricultural products and manufactured goods. Countries such as Benin, Gambia, and Togo benefited from the development of regional trade and transformed into entrepôt economies, where a significant part of national imports was illegally re-exported to neighbouring countries (Golub, Mbaye and Igué, 2019[30]).
Despite these investments, the West African road network remains sparse and fragmented. More than 60 years after the independence of Chad, Mali, and Niger, there are still no paved roads linking Bardaï, Kidal, Timbuktu, or Bilma to the rest of the country (OECD, 2019a[31]). The structural adjustment faced by West African countries in the 1980s further exacerbated the lack of maintenance of transport infrastructure until the early 2000s. The upkeep of these emblematic stretches of road, and of the transport architecture, has long been a problem. In the absence of maintenance, many strategic roads remain in a state of serious disrepair, making Africa one of the most expensive regions in the world for conducting business (World Bank, 2020[32]).
Route Nationale 7, for instance, through which Niger’s uranium is exported, remained in a poor state for more than a decade from Dosso to the Benin border until it was rehabilitated in 2023. In Mauritania, it was not until the reopening of the border between Morocco and Mauritania in the early 2000s that the country’s second-largest city, Nouadhibou, was finally connected to Nouakchott by a tarmac road in 2004 (Antil and Choplin, 2003[28]) (Map 2.7). The construction of this 470 km long road has led to a significant increase in the number of vehicles traveling between Mauritania’s two largest cities and has encouraged the establishment of permanent settlements, thanks to the new economic opportunities and deep-water wells available along the route (Seneh and Steck, 2011[33]) (see Box 2.3).
Source: Mareï and Lombard (2024[34]), reproduced with permission.
Over the past 60 years, infrastructure has served as the backbone of Mauritania's economic and territorial development (Map 2.7). In 1961, Nouakchott, the capital created at the time of independence, became the bridgehead of the national network. Very quickly, its port was used for national imports of manufactured and agricultural products, while the port of Nouadhibou was mainly used for fishing and the export of iron ore. From the new capital, the country's main roads run in three main directions.
A North-South coastal route forms the link between Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal. Four years after independence, the southern section linking Nouakchott to Rosso on the Senegal River was the first project financed by the World Bank in the country. At the time, it marked the hold of the Senegalese economy over Mauritania. In contrast, the northern section to Nouadhibou remained the missing link in the national network for a long time. Its asphalting was completed in 2004, paving the way for massive imports from Morocco. These flows are helping to diversify the Mauritanian diet, thanks to the fruit and vegetable shops and markets that have sprung up in Nouakchott.
The Route de l'Espoir crosses the south of the country from west to east, as far as the gateway to Mali. Boutilimit was reached in 1976, Kiffa in 1978 and Néma in 1981. The road underlines Mauritania's growing link with the Malian economy. Near the autonomous port of Nouakchott, two warehouses belonging to Entrepôts Maliens en Mauritanie manage the flow of goods between the two countries, in particular imports of food products such as wheat, palm oil and sugar, as well as exports of Malian cotton. The road has led to the displacement of populations towards the southern borders, where the main exploitable agricultural areas are located, and has enabled the Mauritanian state to stabilise the nomadic populations of the south. This route is also used to reach the Senegal River valley. From Aleg, on the Route de l'Espoir, the road joins the river at Boghé, then continues to Kaedi, Sélibabi and Maghama, and on to Rosso.
The road between Zouerate and Tindouf in Algeria is part of the country's economic and political history. Located at the northern tip of Mauritania, this new tarmac road passing through Bir Moghreïn could compete with the coastal route from Morocco and thus intensify trade with Algeria. At Zouerate, it joins the railway line linking the Kédia d'Idjil mines to Nouadhibou, operated by the Société Anonyme des Mines de fer de Mauritanie, which became the Société nationale industrielle et minière (SNIM) after its nationalisation in 1974.
The network of roads and their extension to the borders underline the power of transport infrastructure to structure the Mauritanian landscape, developed in line with political interests.
Author: Nora Mareï for this publication.
North African countries have embarked on ambitious sector-based infrastructure plans to develop their national road networks, modernise their ports and airports, and build rail links over recent decades. In Morocco, the government has heavily invested in a modern high-speed train network between Casablanca and Tangiers, a rapidly expanding highway network connecting most regions of the country, and major ports. Further east, Algeria has launched a highway modernisation programme that includes a major corridor between the Moroccan and the Tunisian borders, completed in 2023 at a cost of USD 11 billion (East-West Highway, 1 216 km). Tunisia plans to modernise its rail network, with investments expected to reach USD20 billion by 2030. A significant share of the allocated budget is dedicated to building a new suburban railway line in the Tunis area and improving train connections between the capital region and its peripheries (Railwaypro, 2023[35]).
Most new road projects have been suspended in Libya since the early 2010s due to political instability and the security risks faced by construction companies. In particular, the project to develop a modern coastal road between Ras Jedir, on the border with Tunisia, and Musaid, on the border with Egypt (1 800 km), was put on hold. The Libyan Coastal Highway, which runs along the entire east-west length of the Libyan coast, was used and damaged by both government forces loyal to Gaddafi and anti-Gaddafi rebels during the First Libyan Civil War (2011) to control Ajdabiya, Bin Jawad, Bregga, Sirte and Ra’s Lanuf, among other coastal cities. This major axis closed in 2019 following Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s offensive against Tripoli, which resulted in cutting off Sirte from Misrata, and only reopened with difficult in 2021. The disruption of the road network had significant consequences for the Libyan economy, leading to shortages of food supplies, medical equipment, and fuel. The absence of a functional coastal highway also forced travellers to seek alternative roads across the desert, where they faced long delays and the risk of being kidnapped or robbed by militias. In recent years, Italy has expressed interest in reviving the Friendship Treaty signed in 2008 with Libya and funding the construction of a modern coastal highway (Africa Confidential, 2023[36]).
North African countries have also developed a well-maintained transport network in their Saharan peripheries, contrasting with the sparse network implemented by West African countries south of the Sahara. These investments are motivated by economic and political reasons. On the one hand, the Saharan peripheries of North African countries contain vast natural resources, often located in extremely remote areas, hundreds of kilometres from the coast (Map 2.8). Exploiting oil, natural gas, water, and phosphate requires the development of a transport system that combines roads, pipelines, airports, railways, and conveyer belts. On the other hand, transport projects are also being used by North African countries to assert their influence in the region, particularly vis-à-vis their southern neighbours, with whom they remain poorly connected.
Source: USGS, Mineral Resources Data System (2024[37]).
Source: adapted from SWAC/OECD (2014[8]) by the authors.
In Algeria, significant road investments have been made to connect the Mediterranean coast to the oilfields in the east. The impact of these Saharan projects on cities near mining infrastructure has been profound. In the oases between Ouargla and Toggourt, new markets have opened for garden produce and animal products due to their proximity to Hassi Messaoud. Algeria has also completed the first segment of the trans-Saharan Highway through In-Guezzam on the Nigerien border (2 350 km). In March 2023, Algeria announced the construction of a road linking the town of Tindouf to the mining town of Zouerate, 890 km further south. Built by Algerian companies, this new axis will eventually connect Algiers to Nouakchott, competing with the coastal highway that links Algiers to Dakar. Once completed, this new road corridor, built across some of the most inhospitable regions of the world, will be one of only three trans-Saharan paved roads between the Atlantic Ocean and the Nile.
Transport infrastructure is not only a source of economic development. As the next section shows, it can also become both a target and a facilitator of political violence. On the one hand, militants often attack major roads, train stations, airports, and ports, to disrupt state forces and civilians. On the other hand, both state and non-state actors use transport infrastructure to project power and establish territorial control. The two dimensions of transport infrastructure are interrelated: an expanding transport infrastructure provides a growing number of potential targets for militants wishing to paralyse the state, while also offering the state further opportunities to reach previously remote regions and secure its territory. Military checkpoints established along major road axes illustrate this process: as the state builds more checkpoints to monitor and restrict the movement of militants, it also creates a growing number of stationary targets for their attacks (Russell and Radil, 2022[38]).
Existing research on the diffusion of political violence suggests that access to the road network plays a crucial role in shaping the geography of both government and insurgent activities (Tollefsen and Buhaug, 2015[39]; Müller-Crepon, Hunziker and Cederman, 2021[7]). From the state’s perspective, the existence of an extensive road network enables military power to be projected far from the main political centre (Buhaug and Rød, 2006[40]). A dense network of roads helps to strengthen sovereignty by facilitating the movement of troops and equipment between military bases, while preventing the establishment of safe havens in the state’s peripheries.
These ideal conditions are, however, rarely met in African countries, where low population densities, considerable distances between cities, and a fragmented transportation infrastructure inherited from the colonial era have long prevented the state from exerting effective territorial control. Only in the Great Lakes region and the Ethiopian highlands have states managed to exercise durable control over their peripheries (Herbst, 2014[41]). The provision of transport infrastructure can become a major political issue in countries where voters hold the government accountable for its performance in providing reliable roads. In Ghana, local communities frequently protest against poor road conditions under the slogan “No Roads, No Vote” (Ghana Business News, 2023[42]). Poor road conditions also significantly affect the government’s ability to respond to an insurgency in a timely manner by slowing the movement of regular forces and making them more vulnerable to attack along road corridors.
Research in conflict studies has highlighted that the lack of an extensive road network can be detrimental to successfully countering insurgent movements and restoring peace (Unruh and Shalaby, 2012[43]; Ali et al., 2015[44]). In Sub-Saharan Africa, regions with poor road infrastructure are more likely to experience conflict following droughts compared to regions that benefit from a dense road network (Detges, 2016[45]). In northern Mali, for example, the Tuareg rebellion and Jihadist insurgency that emerged in the early 2010s took control of the main cities and roads within weeks. These highly mobile fighters overcame Malian regular forces, who had long relied on fixed military bases and local tribes to supplement their lack of mobility (Pérouse de Montclos, 2021[46]).
The fragile coalition of secessionist rebels and Jihadists that overtook northern Mali in 2012 relied on controlling a group of small cities and the routes connecting them, rather than seizing territory. The starting point of the Malian Touareg rebellions and the birthplace of Iyad Ag Ghaly, the current leader of the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), was Kidal in Adrar des Ifoghas. While demographically small, Kidal is connected to Timbuktu, Bourem, Gao, and Ansongo along the Niger River, providing access to the trans-Saharan routes (Map 2.10). This network of cities is complemented by border towns such as Bordj Badji Mokhtar, al-Khalil, Tessalit, and Tin Zaouaten, which have long provided logistical support to northern traffickers, rebels, and religious extremists (Scheele, 2012[47]; OECD/SWAC, 2014[8]).
Source: Adapted from OECD/SWAC (2014[8]) by the authors.
Insurgents can also exploit the road infrastructure to expand their territorial control. Dowd (2024[48]) shows that proximity to roads correlates with violence against civilians by non-state actors in Africa. Roads facilitate insurgent relocations to isolated hot spots, while also increasing competition for military resources and targets between them (Zhukov, 2012[49]). The road infrastructure is also perceived as a target in itself by insurgents, who can more easily attack regular forces, destroy logistical convoys, detonate Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and impose embargoes on cities along road corridors (Iweze, 2020[50]). Modelling the location of IEDs in Baghdad in the mid-2000s, Braithwaite and Johnson (2015[51]) demonstrate that violence is most likely to occur in areas with a higher density of roads. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Salvi, Wiliamson and Draper (2020[52]) show that over 62% of all battle events occur within 5 km of a major roadway. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Jihadist insurgents follow a similar logic in West Africa. In 2022, insurgents affiliated with Al Qaeda attacked a 150-vehicle convoy delivering supplies to the besieged city of Djibo, killing at least 37 people (van der Weide, 2022[53]).
Another strand of the literature has explored how the structure of the road network itself could influence the extent to which it serves as a magnet or as a conduit for violent activities such as sabotage, terrorism, and insurgencies (Mattsson and Jenelius, 2015[54]). This approach focuses on determining whether violent attacks are more likely to occur in locations connected through multiple road links or in locations that act as a bridge between disconnected parts of the network (Prieto-Curiel et al., 2022[55]). Centralised transport networks organised around a few key nodes are typically more susceptible to disruption than decentralised networks that rely on multiple redundant connections (Zhang, Miller-Hooks and Denny, 2015[56]). Figure 2.3 illustrates how removing a single node can potentially disrupt a highly centralised network, while leaving a decentralised network largely unaffected.
Transport networks in which inter-regional flows pass through a handful of cities are particularly vulnerable, as the nodes acting as gateways cannot be replaced. Using a global database covering 46 civil conflicts across 32 states between 1989 and 2015, Hammond (2018[57])shows that violence tends to concentrate in locations that have both a high degree and betweenness centrality in the road network. These nodes of the road network are heavily fought for because they control access to other regions within the state. In Africa, Prieto-Curiel et al. (2022[55]) demonstrate that cities located on the periphery of the road network are disproportionately affected by political violence: civilians living in remote cities are four times more likely to die from a violent attack than those in central cities, where government forces can intervene more rapidly.
For both government forces and insurgents, roads represent a unique opportunity to tax goods and people (Schouten, 2022[58]). Roadblocks and other impediments to trade are particularly numerous in “infrastructural frontiers” such as the Sahara and Congo basin, where myriad state and non-state actors compete for the control of the resources that transit through the road network (Schouten et al., 2022[59]; Strazzari, 2015[60]). In West Africa, checkpoints manned by customs agents, the police, municipal officials, and transport unions can be found along most roads (Choplin and Lombard, 2010[61]), reducing road accessibility by up to 40% along certain trade corridors (Walther et al., 2020[21]). In Nigeria, the proliferation of checkpoints observed on major road corridors in the last decade has also become an economic opportunity for corrupt officials to extract bribes under the pretext of fighting terrorism. State counterinsurgency forces have transformed into “highway robbers in the guise of neutralising Boko Haram’s movements” (Agbiboa, 2022[62]). Armed bandits have also multiplied the number of roadblocks in the hope of robbing and kidnapping traders, and steal agricultural products, which are resold on markets by intermediaries (ACLED and GITOC, 2024[63]).
In the Central Sahel, Jihadist organisations have set up irregular checkpoints on major road corridors to conduct identity checks, loot private vehicles and extract bribes from passengers (Nsaibia, Beevor and Berger, 2023[64]). Checkpoints can serve a dual function for jihadists – imposing their own checkpoints can provide sources of power and revenue, while removing other conflict actors’ checkpoints established by security forces, or bandits could be a way of wooing civilians. By controlling roads, jihadists have opportunities to frighten, extort, and coerce civilians, and build state-like powers by providing alternative security, implementing predictable taxation schemes, and imposing themselves as regulators of movement and commerce.
In Nigeria, northern states introduced a ban on commercial and private motorcycles to prevent Boko Haram from conducting drive-by shootings. The ban affected the livelihoods of thousands of moto-taxis (abacha) drivers across the region, reduced the mobility of urban dwellers, and forced farmers to walk long distances to markets. Many of the young abacha drivers, in search of a living wage, joined Boko Haram or moved to other states, yet another example of mobility in this process. The decision to restrict movements between cities around Lake Chad to prevent violent attacks from Boko Haram also led to disastrous consequences for the local economy (Agbiboa, 2022[62]). As fish, cattle, and cereals can no longer circulate across northern Nigeria and the surrounding countries, trade has been brought to a standstill, aggravating an already challenging food security situation around Lake Chad.
The ability to move freely across long distances and control movement has become one of the key components of the armed conflicts affecting the region (Retaillé and Walther, 2013[65]; Beevor, 2023[66]). From the government’s perspective, counter-terrorism operations have adopted two contrasting approaches. In the years immediately following the start of the Boko Haram insurgency, the Nigerian forces adopted a resolute, mobile approach to the conflict. In 2015, they launched a series of military campaigns with the Multinational Joint Task Force that relied heavily on airstrikes, mobile patrols, and control of the major road corridors. However, these heavily mechanised operations killed civilians without restoring peace in the region and resulted in a large and politically unacceptable number of soldier casualties.
In recent years, as troops’ willingness to fight insurgents quickly declined, the Nigerian military withdrew its soldiers from forward posts and gathered thousands of troops and civilians in “supercamps,” leaving Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) to fill the void left by regular forces in the countryside. The conflict in Mali has followed a similar pattern. In 2013, the Serval Operation in Northern Mali by French forces was based on small and mobile military forces that quickly expelled or killed the Jihadists from their main strongholds. In the years following Serval, the Barkhane Operation led by France remained focused on monitoring, controlling, and preventing mobility. This approach was conditioned by the size of the region and the limited number of foreign troops involved, making it impossible to exert territorial control over such vast areas. In comparison, United Nations peace-keeping operations relied much more on stationary troops, large garrisons, and heavily armed convoys.
In such asymmetrical conflicts, the Jihadists have proven much more mobile and flexible than regular forces. Using motorbikes provides them with greater speed and agility compared to militaries that tend to travel by road in armoured vehicles, giving them the advantage of surprise. Key examples of such dynamics include attacks by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (IGSS, now known as the Islamic State – Sahel Province, or ISSP) on military camps at I-n-Delimane, Mali, in November 2019 and I-n-Atès, Niger, in December 2019. Both camps were in remote areas: I-n-Delimane is north of Mali’s National Route 20, approximately 160 km east of Gao, and I-n-Atès is 5 km from the Malian border in the Tillabéri region, near the village of Tongo Tongo, where ISSP attacked Nigerien and U.S. forces in 2017 (Map 2.11).
The geography appears to have given ISSP attackers on motorbikes and trucks a significant advantage. It is reported that 500 fighters arrived by motorbike and pickup truck to I-n-Atès in the evening, destroyed the camp’s signal transmission centre, and then stormed the rest of the camp (Armstrong, 2019[67]). To raise an alert and summon reinforcements, soldiers from I-n-Atès had to make their way to Ayorou, the nearest significant military base and administrative centre, 70 km away as the crow flies. The logistical and transportation difficulties involved in getting aid contributed to the high death toll at I-n-Atès – 71 soldiers – and the long duration of the attack (RFI, 2019[68]). Such high-casualty attacks on the military, meanwhile, had national political repercussions, contributing to a nationwide sense of insecurity; the authors of the July 2023 coup in Niger cited I-n-Atès and other incidents as pretexts for their takeover. Such attacks also contributed, particularly on the Malian side of the border, to the broadening of the Islamic State’s sway in the sub-region, as soldiers were targeted and intimidated.
Sources: Authors based on Michelin and IGN maps.
To some extent, jihadists’ agility on the ground is counterbalanced by militaries’ advantage of airpower. An Islamic State attack on Chinagodrar, another Nigerien military outpost close to the Malian border, killed 89 soldiers in January 2020, coming as a bloody sequel to the I-n-Atès attack. The Chinagodrar assault was repelled in part with the help of French airpower (Le Monde, 2020[69]). Chinagodrar is located on a main route, National Route 24, but this “better” location from a road infrastructure perspective did not prevent mass casualties.
At the same time, as the example of Chinagodrar shows, given jihadists’ element of surprise, air power often comes into play only once a ground attack is well underway, and thus may prevent some further casualties but does not necessarily prevent the attacks themselves. Meanwhile, airstrikes in general are often a blunt tool. As the military historian S.L.A. Marshall (2000[70]) once wrote; “air power unsupported by the forces of the battlefield is a military means without an end”.
Over the last 15 years, the Nigerian military has repeatedly targeted Boko Haram and ISWAP camps in the Lake Chad region without regaining deep control on the ground. Airstrikes can also produce unintended civilian casualties and corresponding political backlash, as the French learned when they mistakenly hit a wedding north of the Gandamia Massif in central in Mali in 2021 and killed 22 people (UN, 2021[71]). Drone surveillance, meanwhile, continues to have significant limitations in the Central Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin given the vast extent of the conflict zones, the difficulty in distinguishing jihadists from non-combatants, and complications with intelligence-sharing among states. In August 2024, 21 people, including at least 11 children, were killed by drone strikes launched by the Malian army in the northern town of Tinzaouatene (Le Monde, 2024[72]).
As the previous sections make clear, transport infrastructure is not only a critical part of economic development but also of political security. Furthermore, transport infrastructure can be both a target of and a facilitator for violence. This causality dilemma limits the value of conventional scientific analyses when it is unclear which factor should be considered the cause and which the effect. Nonetheless, there are approaches that offer promise in better understanding the interactions between transport infrastructure and political violence. Central to this report is the use of a spatial perspective to examine the variability of the relationships across the larger study region. In support of this approach, the report also seeks to disaggregate this variability over time, by the types of actors, and by the types of transport infrastructure involved in the region’s violence.
This report begins by addressing a central question: What is the overall spatial relationship between the locations of violence and the region’s transport infrastructure? While it is expected that violent events are closely co-located with road networks, there may be significant variation between North and West Africa, or between Saharan, Sahelian, and coastal regions. The relationship between transport and violence can also vary across countries, between border and non-border areas, or between urban and rural settings, which a spatial perspective can uncover. Applying the principles of spatial analysis, the report describes these relationships across multiple scales and geographies, offering meaningful insight into why the typical cause-effect approach is not suited for this important policy issue.
Following from the spatial analysis described above, the report takes on several additional questions. For example, how do the relationships between infrastructure and violence change over time or by the type of infrastructure present? Which kinds of political actors have targeted infrastructure and how do their tactics vary by location and over time? And how have states responded to these challenges? These questions are addressed in the remaining chapters of this report and the answers form an important region-wide context for scientific and policy audiences interested in better understanding the complex relationships between political violence and transport infrastructure.
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