Chapter 4 examines the changing geographies of violence in North and West Africa since 1997. The analysis of disaggregated conflict data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) project suggests that the region has experienced a contrasting evolution. While violence has plummeted north of the Sahara since the end of the Second Libyan War, West Africa is currently engulfed in an unprecedented wave of violence. Nearly 195 000 people have been killed in West Africa since the beginning of the Boko Haram insurgency in 2009. Much of the violence is concentrated in the Lake Chad region, across the Central Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, and western Niger), and in western Cameroon, where a poorly documented crisis has caused a record number of violent events in 2024. The Spatial Conflict Dynamics indicator (SCDi) developed by OECD/SWAC suggests that, while much of the violence remains clustered regionally, an increasing number of regions are affected by conflict, particularly in the Central Sahel. A new feature of the SCDi also shows that in just two years, one third of the conflict regions have experienced violence for the first time since the early 2000s and 8% have had ten or more years of conflict. This highlights how conflict is not only spreading to new locations in West Africa but also how persistent conflict can be once it has developed. The chapter also examines the current southward expansion of this violence from the Sahel to the north of coastal countries. In Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo, sporadic attacks are targeting security forces and civilians, especially in border zones, without necessarily taking the form of a clear front. The lack of a clear escalatory trend in these countries may mean either that jihadists are still in a building and recruitment phase, or that they view the coastal countries more as rear bases and buffer zones than as military targets.
Roads and Conflicts in North and West Africa
Abstract
Violence has strongly declined in North Africa following the end of the Second Libyan War, while intensifying and spreading in West Africa
Violence against civilians continues to increase in West Africa and should reach 10 000 victims in 2024 if the situation continues to deteriorate.
The Central Sahel and the Lake Chad regions remain the main epicentres of violence. For the first time since 1997, Cameroon is the second most affected country in terms of violent events, due to the conflict between Ambazonian separatists and the government.
The local SCDi metrics show that in just two years, one-third of the cells of the region experienced violence for the first time since the early 2000s and 8% have had ten or more years of conflict. This highlights how conflict is not just spreading to new locations but also how persistent conflict has tended to be over time in a place once it has developed.
Jihadists’ expansion to coastal countries does not take the form of a clear front progressing towards the Gulf of Guinea. Northern Benin and Togo appear particularly at risk, while northern Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana tend to be used as rear bases.
Political violence in North and West Africa has experienced a contrasting trajectory over the last couple of years (Figure 4.1). North of the Sahara, violence has plummeted to one of its lowest levels since the end of the second civil war in Libya in 2020. Fewer than 200 violent events resulting in 220 deaths were recorded in 2024 in the region, compared with 1 540 events and 3 650 deaths a decade ago. All types of violence have declined dramatically, including explosions and remote violence, which had peaked just before the signing of a permanent ceasefire between the Libyan National Army and the Government of National Accord in 2020.
Note: *2024 data are projections based on doubling of violent events through 30 June.
Source: Authors, based on ACLED data (2024a[1]). Data is publicly available.
This evolution contrasts starkly with the one observed south of the Sahara, where violence has never been so intense since detailed data was collected by ACLED in 1997. Nearly 195 000 people have been killed in West Africa since the beginning of the Boko Haram insurgency in 2009. If the situation continues to deteriorate, the conflicts that tear West Africa apart will result in 28 000 fatalities and 10 000 violent events in 2024. Violence against civilians is the most represented type of violent events with more than 5 000 incidents in 2024, compared with 610 in 2014. More than 10 000 civilians died in 2024 because of violence exerted against them by state forces, violent extremist organisations, militias, mercenaries, and rebel groups.
These catastrophic numbers suggest that the control of the civilian population has become the major objective of both government forces and their opponents. Battles between government and/or non-state actors are the deadliest form of violence with 13 482 victims in 2024—four times more than when the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin, JNIM), the leading coalition of jihadist groups, was formed in 2017 (Figure 4.2). The last four years have also seen an increase in remote violence and explosions in West Africa, a type of violence that was historically more prevalent in North Africa. Air strikes, drone attacks, and improvised explosive devices are now routinely used south of the Sahara.
Note: 2024 data are projections based on doubling of fatalities through 30 June.
Source: Authors, based on ACLED data (2024a[1]). Data is publicly available.
Violence is not just unevenly distributed across North and West Africa. In each region, violence tends to cluster in a few countries, reflecting the idiosyncratic nature of armed conflict and its local roots. 94% of violent events and 96% of fatalities observed from January 2023 through June 2024 occurred in just five countries: Nigeria, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, all located in West Africa (Table 4.1).
Notes: Data are available from 1 January 2023 through 30 June 2024. In countries with a ratio higher than 1, violence—measured in terms of violent events or fatalities—is higher than the share of the regional population would suggest. Population data are estimates as of 1 July 2024. While not formally part of the Economic Community of West African States, Cameroon is included in the analysis due to the conflict affecting its northwestern region.
Sources: Authors, based on ACLED (2024a[1]) and United Nations (2024[2]) data. ACLED (2024a[1]) data is publicly available.
The Central Sahel, which includes Mali, eastern Mauritania, western Niger, Burkina Faso, and the north of coastal countries (see Map 3.1), is the largest hotspot of violence in North and West Africa (Map 4.1). More than 21 000 people were killed in Burkina Faso, Mali and in the western part of Niger from 2023 to mid-2024, in 5 229 incidents. This represents more than half (53 %) of the victims and more than one-third (34%) of the incidents reported in the entire region. The three Sahelian countries most affected by the jihadist insurgencies have experienced a continuous increase in violence, which extends to a significant part of their national territory.
The most dramatic evolution is that of Burkina Faso, where more than 13 000 people were killed—nearly as many as in Nigeria over the same period, despite having a population ten times smaller. Violence is no longer limited to the Sahel, Est, and Centre-Nord Burkinabè administrative regions, as in 2021–22, but has engulfed nearly the entire country, including the regions bordering Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo in the south. In Niger, the jihadist insurgency is particularly intense in the Téra and Say Department situated west of the Niger River, and in the Tillabéri Department neighbouring Mali. The capital city of Niamey appears largely unaffected by violence, despite being increasingly surrounded. In Mali, the violence is particularly concentrated in the Inner Niger Delta and Dogon Country, as well as around Ménaka and Kidal.
The second hotspot of violence is in Nigeria (Map 4.1 and 4.2), with more than 5 300 events and 13 700 fatalities from January 2023 through June 2024. More than one-third of the events and fatalities observed in North and West Africa occur in this country. Nigeria is affected by several conflicts, including the Lake Chad insurgency led by Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) since the late 2000s, communal violence around the Middle Belt, violence against the government and oil companies in the Delta, and, increasingly, organised violence and banditry in the North-West (Madueke, 2024[3]; Ojewale, 2024[4])]. Due to the insurgency waged by Boko Haram and Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), Borno remains by far the most affected state in Nigeria, with 28 % of the national fatalities, the same proportion as the Northwestern states of Kaduna, Katsina and Zamfara combined.
This geography of violence mirrors the one observed in recent years, with one exception. For the first time since detailed data were collected in the late 1990s, Cameroon is the second most affected country in terms of violent events, with more than 3 700 incidents reported from January 2023 to June 2024. The country is facing two major conflicts: the jihadist insurgency led by Boko Haram and ISWAP around Lake Chad, and the so-called Anglophone Crisis, which pits the Cameroonian government against the Ambazonian separatist movement (ACLED, 2024b[5]). This poorly documented conflict is highly concentrated in the English-speaking Northwest and Southwest regions of the country (Map 4.3), which represent 71 % of the violent events and 64 % of the fatalities recorded by ACLED in Cameroon from 2023–2024. Cameroon is a rare example of conflict where the distribution of violence corresponds exactly to linguistic borders. While the number of incidents related to the Cameroon Crisis is very high, this conflict does not have the same intensity as other major conflicts in West Africa: the number of people killed (3 060) remains much lower than in Burkina Faso (13 054) and Mali (nearly 6 300) between January 2023 and June 2024.
Note: Data is available through 30 June 2024.
Source: Authors, based on ACLED data (2024a[1]). Data is publicly available.
Note: Data is available through 30 June 2024.
Source: Authors, based on ACLED data (2024a[1]). Data is publicly available.
Note: Data is available through 30 June 2024.
Source: Authors, based on ACLED data (2024a[1]). Data is publicly available.
The intensity of violence imperfectly correlates with the size of the population of each country. In other words, the most populated countries are not always the most violent, as evidenced in Table 4.1, which calculates the ratio between the proportion of events and fatalities in eight countries and their share of the regional population. A ratio above one indicates that more violence is observed in the country than what its population would suggest. The most dramatic examples of this evolution are Cameroon, Burkina Faso, and Mali, where events and fatalities are far more numerous than should be observed according to their population. Nigeria is, once again, an exception. In the most populated country of Africa, violence is slightly lower than what one would expect considering its population. These results must nonetheless be taken with caution, since the overall size of the Nigerian population is subject to uncertainty (the last census was conducted in 2006).
The expansion and intensification of armed conflicts in some parts of North and West Africa is examined using the Spatial Conflict Dynamics indicator (SCDi) that monitors the changing geography of violence in the region since the late 1990s (OECD/SWAC, 2020[6]; Walther et al., 2023a[7]). This indicator measures the intensity and spatial distribution of violence affecting each of the 6 540 cells of 50 km by 50 km that make up the region (Chapter 3). Cells can experience various levels of violence and a more or less clustered distribution of events, resulting in four types of conflicts: clustered high intensity, dispersed high intensity, clustered low intensity, and dispersed low intensity.
The SCDi shows that the number of cells classified as in conflict has continued to rise steadily between 2016 and 2022. In 2022, 706 cells were classified into one of the four SCDi conflict types, a 16% increase from 2021. In 2023, 685 cells were in conflict, a 3% decrease from 2022 (Radil and Walther, 2024[8]). The SCDi also suggests that much of the violence observed regionally is strongly clustered. The Arab Spring in North Africa marked the beginning of an overall downward trend in the proportion of clustered conflict cells, from 95 % in 2011 to 83% in 2023 (Figure 4.3). Yet, most of the violence still repeatedly occurs at similar locations, suggesting that violence has become entrenched across West Africa.
Source: Authors, based on ACLED data (2024a[1]). Data is publicly available.
Another worrying sign is that violence is becoming more intense regionally as it expands to previously unaffected areas: the proportion of cells that experience a low intensity of violence has declined from its peak of 70% in 2005 to 34 % in both 2022 and 2023. These results highlight the ongoing importance of low-intensity conflict as a marker of the spread of violence to new locations in West Africa. However, 66% of the 383 cells that experienced violence in 2022 or 2023 but were without violence the previous year were low intensity. In other words, when a cell fell into violence for the first time during these years, it typically did so by initially exhibiting low intensity event patterns within it. These new locations are situated on the edges of existing clusters of conflict cells in West Africa, especially in the Central Sahel and Nigeria, as well as in coastal countries along the Gulf of Guinea, most notably in Ghana and northern Benin. This confirms that the region’s conflicts expanded geographically in 2022 and 2023.
The SCDi reveals important findings regarding the geography of violence in the region.
The most dramatic situation can be found in regions where violence is both very intense and very clustered (Type 1). This is typical of the core of conflict regions, such as the Inner Niger Delta in Mali, Burkina Faso, and much of northwest, eastern and southern Nigeria. It has largely disappeared from Libya. It is in these areas that the largest number of civilian and military fatalities are reported.
Some regions are surrounded by areas where violence is still intense but less spatially clustered (Type 2). The western bank of the Niger River, between Ayorou and Say in Niger, is characteristic of this conflict type: jihadist groups are progressing in this region by attacking multiple locations. Other regions include the east of Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, some parts of the Lake Chad basin and of the Niger Delta in Nigeria.
Low-intensity and clustered violence is typical of regions in transition (Type 3), in which conflict can either dissipate or intensify. Episodes of violence are usually short-lived and followed by months or years of inactivity, as in the far periphery of major conflict regions (north of the Middle Belt in Nigeria for example).
Finally, in some regions, violence is both of low intensity and dispersed, which could mean that a conflict is lingering (Type 4). Outside Nigeria, this conflict type is usually found in isolation.
In the Central Sahel, the SCDi highlights that much of the political violence has moved from the Sahara, where the Malian conflict started, to the southern peripheries of the Sahel (Map 4.4). Most of Burkina Faso and a significant portion of western Niger are now affected by intense and highly clustered violence. Rural regions and small urban centres experience the most violence, while large regional centres and capital cities are spared (Radil et al., 2023[9]). The ruralisation of violence in West Africa contributes to creating an archipelago of large cities between which communication is increasingly difficult for government forces (OECD/SWAC, 2023[10]). In turn, the increasing isolation of large cities creates opportunities for violent extremist organisations to attack transport infrastructure. The fragmentation of the national territory of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger that results from this evolution reinforces the gap between the largest urban centres, where the political elite and most economic activities are located, and the rest of the country.
Source: Authors, based on ACLED data (2024a[1]). Data is publicly available.
The SCDi also highlights that the diffusion of violence from the Sahel to the north of coastal countries is not random. It follows national boundaries very closely, particularly in northern Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo, a region characterised by low population densities and an abundance of natural parks (Map 4.5). Border regions offer favourable conditions for extremist groups to spread south. In addition to being sparsely populated, these regions have also been historically marginalised by the state, both economically and politically. Jihadist groups exploit these weaknesses skilfully, by instrumentalising community grievances, settling local disputes, and regulating commercial flows. Their movement towards the south affects several regions simultaneously, depending on the local resources provided by each side of the border. In the Bawku region, for example, jihadist groups use the Ghanaian side of the border as a haven and commit their attacks in Burkina Faso (Salifu, Walther and Tanko, 2023[11]).
Source: Authors, based on ACLED data (2024a[1]). Data is publicly available.
The recent evolution of the SCDi also confirms that the conflict zones that have emerged in the Middle Belt, Delta, Northwest, and Lake Chad Basin since the 1990s have coalesced. In 2023, these conflict regions formed one gigantic cluster of violence that covers more than half of the country (Map 4.6). Violence is particularly intense and clustered in the core of the Nigerian conflict zones, such as between Abuja and Gusau, between Warri and Enugu, and around Maiduguri. These hotspots are surrounded by a ring of clustered and low-intensity conflict zones where violence could intensify. In the Lake Chad region, intense and clustered violence has spread across national borders from N’Guigmi in Niger to Maroua in Cameroon due to the Boko Haram/ISWAP insurgency. In the south, the Cameroon Crisis, while contiguous to conflict regions in Nigeria, has developed for internal reasons and is contained by national and linguistic borders.
Source: Authors, based on ACLED data (2024a[1]). Data is publicly available.
Overall, the recent evolution in West Africa reflects a continuation of the recent trajectories of violence (Figure 4.4). Clustered high-intensity (Type 1) cells remain the dominant type of SCDi category in 2023, with 62% of cells, followed by clustered low-intensity cells (Type 3, 21%). Dispersed low-intensity (Type 4, 13%) and dispersed high-intensity (Type 2, 4%) cells are far less represented. These results indicate that political violence is localised in the region and often driven by very local factors, such as political disputes between communities, access to shared natural resources or community grievances. If “all politics is local” in general, the SCDi suggests that it is especially true in West Africa (Radil and Walther, 2024[8]).
Source: Authors, based on ACLED data (2024a[1]). Data is publicly available.
One of the new features in the SCDi is the ability to track how conflicts have evolved in specific locations. The indicator can now easily identify locations that have become newly violent, including those experiencing violence for the first time in a generation. For example, out of the 685 cells recorded in one of the four SCDi conflict categories in 2023, 160 (23%) had shifted into conflict since the previous year. For 2022, the percentage was higher, at 32%. This means that over just two years, 383 cells fell into violence. As all but 26 of these new conflict cells were in West African states, this reflects the region’s ongoing and disturbing spread of violence in 2022 and 2023. The SCDi’s new years-in-conflict metric, which tracks how many of the past 20 years a cell has received an SCDi classification, shows an even more troubling trend: 16% of the cells in conflict in 2022 or in 2023 had no record of violence for the previous 20 years. In other words, the local SCDi metrics show that in just two years, one-third (32%) of the cells of the region experienced violence for the first time since the early 2000s.
These new conflict cells are not randomly or evenly distributed in West Africa. Map 4.7 shows that 260 (68%) of these locations are associated with ongoing conflicts in just four countries: Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria. However, 56 (11%) of these cells are located in five littoral states along the Gulf of Guinea. Of these, Benin and Ghana (20 cells each) recorded violence in the highest number of new locations, followed by Côte d’Ivoire (8), and Guinea and Togo (4 each). Most of the violent events in these five states from 2022 through 2023 were attacks against civilians (67%) followed by battles between armed groups (29%) and explosions or other forms of remote violence (4%). This is a disturbing trend given the ongoing concerns about the potential for violence to spread south from the Sahel to coastal states.
Note: The map shows cells in which conflict was observed for the first time in 2022 or 2023 that had not been conflictual the preceding year.
Source: Authors, based on ACLED data (2024a[1]). Data is publicly available.
Another feature of the new local SCDi metrics is the ability to consider whether conflict intensity and conflict concentration have increased against the historical norms in each cell. Map 4.8 and Map 4.9 show the 619 cells that had one or more years of conflict between 2003 and 2022. The local SCDi is calculated by comparing the intensity of violence in the most recent year (2023) with the average of the last 20 years, irrespective of whether violence has waxed and waned in each of the cell. The map highlights current conflicts, rather than past episodes of violence, such as the civil wars in Sierra Leone or Liberia, which have been very intense in the 1990s and early 2000s. In 2023, conflict intensity was higher than it was historically in 56% of the cells. This indicates that where violence was present in 2023, it intensified in that location when compared to past episodes of violence. The spatial distribution of the cells reflects the dynamics of armed conflicts: cells that experience a higher intensity of violence than their historical average demonstrate the localised nature of armed conflicts in the region (Map 4.7). In the Central Sahel, higher intensity can be found in regions such as the Liptako-Gourma and the Dogon Country that have been disputed for a long time, as well as in previously peaceful regions, on the periphery of major conflict zones, such as in Burkina Faso. In the Lake Chad region, much of the higher intensity zones are in rural and border regions, including in Niger and Chad. In Nigeria, the Middle Belt continues to be characterised by an increase in conflict intensity, as does the centre of the Delta region.
Note: The map shows cells that have a higher or lower intensity of conflict in 2023 than the average recorded locally from 2003-22.
Source: Authors, based on ACLED data (2024a[1]). Data is publicly available.
The local conflict concentration metric for 2023 trended towards more clustering than more dispersion: 54% of these cells had higher than average levels of clustering. This indicates that where violence was present in 2023, it was slightly more likely to be clustered in that location than in the past. The spatial distribution of conflict concentration follows a more obvious centre-periphery pattern than conflict intensity does. In the core of major conflict regions, violent events are more clustered than they were historically, while the expansion of armed conflicts is visible through dispersed patterns of violent activities (Map 4.9).
Note: The map shows cells that have a more clustered or more dispersed pattern of conflict in 2023 than the average recorded locally from 2003–22.
Source: Authors, based on ACLED data (2024a[1]). Data is publicly available.
The study of conflict intensity and concentration highlights the long-term persistence of conflict over many years in these locations, especially in the core conflict regions spanning the Central Sahel and Nigeria. In combination with the base SCDi metrics, the new local features highlight how conflict is not just spreading to new locations in West Africa but also how persistent conflict has tended to be over time in places once it has developed.
An expansion driven by localised factors
Sahelian jihadist organisations such as JNIM and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) have expanded into coastal West African countries in recent years (USIP, 2022[12]). In March 2024, for example, JNIM claimed to kill ten soldiers in an attack on an army post at Danderesso in Mali’s Sikasso region, close to the border with Côte d’Ivoire (RFI, 2019[13]). Jihadists expand faster in areas that share similar characteristics to those with the Sahel region. These include weaknesses in security forces, alliances with pre-existing illegal activities, economic incentives, and political instability, all of which contribute to the spread of various forms of religious extremism in the region. In southwestern Burkina Faso, where their expansion has been the fastest, “militants seized the opportunity to attack amid local instability and potential confusion among security forces” (Nsaibia, 2019[14]).
For many years, the southward expansion of extremist groups has been facilitated by the fact that security forces were either unprepared to counter them, or because their abuses led the civilian population to side with the insurgents (Amnesty International, 2022[15]). The military coups of 2020-23 have worsened the situation, by undermining intelligence and security co-operation between Sahelian and coastal countries and causing civilian casualties during military operations (Eizenga and Gnanguênon, 2024[16]).
In some regions, the southward expansion of jihadist groups has also benefited from pre-existing criminal activities (Barnett and Rufa’i, 2023[17]). A “jihadisation of banditry” is currently underway in some parts of the Sahel, such as southwestern Burkina Faso, where “militants may co-opt existing criminal networks by providing more advanced and heavy weaponry and hard currency to make inroads where they have a limited support base and presence” (Nsaibia, 2019[14]). A similar convergence between criminal groups and violent extremists has been observed in northwestern Nigeria (Madueke, 2024[3]) (Box 4.1).
As jihadists move to previously unaffected areas, they also better control the resources that transit across the region or are locally produced. In the Sahel, such resources include agricultural crops, gold, and especially cattle, which are particularly easy to move and resell. In the Mali-Burkina Faso-Côte d’Ivoire tri-border zone, these revenue streams have made extremist organisations more self-reliant (Eizenga and Gnanguênon, 2024[16]). Economic influence can create governance opportunities for jihadist organisations such as JNIM, which tend to deploy benevolent-seeming governance in areas where they have dominance, while resorting more to repression and brutality in contested areas (Nsaibia, Beevor and Berger, 2023[18]).
The factors that fuel this expansion defy generalisation at the regional level, however. They relate to very localised issues, such as land exploitation or political disputes over chieftaincies, which can easily be manipulated by Islamist groups (Soufan Center, 2023[19]). Therefore, the current expansion of jihadist groups does not take the form of a unified front moving ineluctably from the Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea. Rather, the diffusion of violent extremism occurs in a context characterised by multiple forms of insecurity.
Because the southward expansion of jihadist groups is a recent phenomenon, some potential factors remain poorly documented. For example, it remains unclear whether national politics – for example, dissent against longtime rulers – are key factors driving expansion. This silence is probably accurate, considering that the motivation to join extremist groups appears to be primarily local in nature rather than national. Second, the degree to which religiosity drives the expansion of violence remains poorly understood in this region, where jihadism is primarily a vehicle for conversion to a particular worldview rather than a venture focused on profit and governance.
In the current context of West Africa, it is not always easy to identify whether violent events are motivated by ideology or greed. Jihadists and bandits are not always allies, however. In central and southern Mali, JNIM expanded in part by defending loggers against bandits, which helped make the jihadist group palatable to local communities (Ani, 2024[20]). In Nigeria, too, bandits involved in criminal activities are reluctant to take orders from jihadists or to be associated with global jihadism (Barnett, Rufa’i and Abdulaziz, 2022[21]) while in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Côte d’Ivoire, alliances with jihadists could be a liability for artisanal gold miners (Hunter, 2022[22]). The lack of a clear nexus between crime and terror is explained by the fact that criminals are fundamentally motivated by different values than violent extremists. While the former use violence to enrich themselves, the latter seek to impose an ideology, religion, or ethnic identity through violent means.
For these reasons, the distinction between profit-driven organisations and value-driven organisations remains a valid one in West Africa (OECD/SWAC, 2021[23]). Even more importantly, policy responses to crime and political violence should build on different principles since the ultimate motivation to resort to violence for criminals and extremists has different roots. In other words, an insurgency motivated by the desire for sovereignty, or a new social order cannot be countered using the same tools as an organised movement fuelled by greed. This principle is not sufficiently taken into account in the responses adopted, such as the air campaign against armed bandits in northwestern Nigeria, which is not very effective against criminals but is also extremely deadly for civilians (HRW, 2023[24]).
Alliances between organisations motivated by greed and values occur in very localised conditions —for example, where criminals already control the local economy (Petrich, 2021[25]). Such alliances are more often temporary and opportunistic than symbiotic. Notwithstanding ideological differences, the potential for convergence of criminal and extremist groups depends on the possibility that they can both gain from combined operations, while simultaneously being able to control their own operational security. This appears very unlikely over the long term, since politically motivated groups seek legitimacy and/or political dominance, while criminal groups seek optimal “business” environments.
A southward expansion that varies across countries
The analysis of conflict data from ACLED over the last decade suggests an absence of a clear escalation in attacks across coastal countries. Sporadic attacks are targeting security forces and civilians, especially in border zones, against the backdrop of a deepening jihadist presence in the northern regions of coastal countries. The lack of a clear escalatory trend may mean either that jihadists are still primarily in a building and recruitment phase, or that they view the coastal countries as more useful as rear bases and buffer zones than military targets.
Significant differences can be observed in the intensity and forms of violence that have affected coastal countries in the last decade. Compared with the Central Sahel or the Lake Chad region, the number of violent events observed in coastal countries is still comparatively low and not all of them should be attributed to jihadism. Only 357 violent events were recorded in the most affected coastal countries in 2023, including 241 in Benin, 79 in Ghana, 12 in Côte d’Ivoire, and 25 in Togo. Estimates based on a doubling of violent events recorded through 30 June suggest that these countries will experience roughly 350 violent events in 2024, or seven times fewer than in Burkina Faso during the same period (Figure 4.5).
Note: *2024 data are projections based on doubling of violent events through 30 June.
Source: Authors, based on ACLED data (2024a[1]). Data is publicly available.
In Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo, only three subtypes of violence have caused more than 100 events since 2014: attacks against civilians (922 events), armed clashes (580), and abductions of civilians (183 ) (Figure 4.6). Remote violence and explosions are extremely uncommon. Furthermore, politically motivated violence, as recorded by ACLED, is a new phenomenon: nearly 80 % of all violent events (1 400out of 1 788) have occurred since 2020.
Attacks against civilians have increased over the last decade, principally in Benin and Ghana. This evolution masks significant differences across countries, however. In Benin, civilians are mainly targeted by jihadist militants operating in the departments of Alibori and Atacora, close to the border with Niger and Togo, where 68% of all violent events and 64% of all violence against civilians was observed from 2014-24. In Ghana, attacks against civilians are not particularly concentrated in the north. The four northern regions, which include Upper West, Upper East, Northeast and Northern, account for only 31% of the total number of violent events and only 24 % of violence against civilians observed since 2014. Violence against civilians is unrelated to jihadism: it results from chieftaincy disputes (as in the Bawku region), ethnic militias, violence committed by armed bandits in the Greater Accra region, and violence perpetrated by the police and the military.
The recent decline in the number of armed clashes in coastal countries is principally explained by the improvement in the security situation in Côte d’Ivoire. Militant violence has decreased in the northern part of this country following the government’s decision to strengthen security and promote social projects intended to alleviate poverty and youth unemployment (ICG, 2023a[26]). Northern Benin is currently the region that experiences the largest number of clashes between government forces and jihadist groups, particularly in the broader complex of natural parks called W-Arly-Pendjari (WAP).
Note: *2024 data are projections based on doubling of violent events through 30 June.
Source: Authors, based on publicly available ACLED data (2024a[1]).
Benin is by far the most affected country in terms of abductions, especially in the northern departments of Alibori and Atacora, which record nearly 80% of all such incidents since 2022. This evolution is primarily due to JNIM, which is involved in 59% of the abductions in Benin. The jihadist group has established a lucrative business of kidnapping that targets farmers, fishermen, imams, shopkeepers, and pastoralists. Civilians are kidnapped when they refuse to join JNIM, when found working in their fields, fishing in the rivers, hunting illegally in the natural parks, or travelling between markets. Civilians are also kidnapped because they are accused of collaborating with the authorities or for ransom. This latter case mainly concerns wealthy pastoralists, who can regain their freedom by asking their families to sell a few animals.
Jihadist strategies towards coastal countries
In Benin, jihadist attacks appear as an outgrowth of JNIM’s ambitions for territorial control in eastern Burkina Faso. As of early 2022, “the goal appeared to be to diminish the Beninese capacity to threaten JNIM’s Burkinabe bases,” but this goal soon shifted – “rather than pushing back the Beninese military, the [new] goal seems to be to create a giant buffer zone” (de Bruijne, 2022, p. 12[27]). Meanwhile, JNIM has reinforced its activities along the Niger-Benin border and in W National Park, a forest preserve spanning Burkina Faso, Benin, and Niger (Map 4.10 and Map 4.11). The park has proven vulnerable to jihadist expansion because of its topography but also because of opportunities to profit from resources such as gold and livestock, and to intervene in inter-communal and state-community conflicts over resource management (ICG, 2023a[26]). A confluence of interests can be observed between JNIM and smugglers in the WAP complex (the W-Arly-Pendjari natural site), with smugglers providing intelligence to JNIM so that the latter can target state agents and, in the process, give smugglers a freer hand (Nsaibia, Beevor and Berger, 2023[18]). Throughout the Sahel and the northern zones of coastal countries, JNIM’s purchases sometimes provide an influx of cash and elevate prices for fuel and motorbikes.
Source: Authors based on ACLED (2024a[1]) and UNEP-WCMC and IUCN (2024[28]) data. ACLED (2024a[1]) data is publicly available.
Source: Authors, based on ACLED (2024a[1]) and UNEP-WCMC and IUCN (2024[28]) data. ACLED (2024a[1]) data is publicly available.
It is still unclear whether jihadist expansion through Benin could spill over into northwestern Nigeria. De Bruijne and Gehrling (2024, p. 3[29]) note that “there are clear social links that facilitate cross-border exchange and real livelihood needs that create vulnerabilities to recruitment” between the two countries. Barnett and Rufa’i (2023[17]) similarly find that JNIM fighters are crossing into northwestern Nigeria through or from Benin and that some militants have relocated from northeastern Nigeria to the northwest. Caution should be used when describing jihadist goals and modes of operation in this region, however, with some devolving into opportunistic criminality —either instead of, or sometimes alongside, their militancy. Thus far, these alleged movements have not led to an increase in the number of violent events along the northern portion of the Benin-Nigeria border, which remains far less affected by violence than the south of Nigeria (Map 4.10 and Map 4.11)
Further west, northern Togo is also confronted with increasing Jihadism activities, as clearly shown on Map 4.11. In July 2023, a suspected JNIM attack killed at least twelve soldiers patrolling in the village of Sankortchagou, near the border with Burkina Faso (Lepidi, 2023[30]). This expansion remains less documented than in the other three coastal countries. Much writing echoes the factors mentioned for the coastal countries overall, including banditry, gold, drugs, arms, and fuel smuggling, which have the potential to aggravate the security situation and provide resources to militants (Africa Defense Forum, 2024[31]). Togo seems to function primarily as a transit zone for jihadists (KAS, 2022[32]).
Regarding Ghana, as of mid-2024, no actual jihadist attacks have occurred there. An attempted bridge bombing near Bawku in February 2024 was attributed to “criminals” but raised concerns about jihadist involvement (France24/AFP, 2024[33]). Caution should be exercised when assuming a robust jihadist presence there. The Bawku interethnic conflict, for example, is described by residents and local leaders as “a dispute with deep historical and political roots being fueled by partisanship, social media, and weapons proliferation” rather than creeping jihadism (Courtright, 2023[34]) (see Map 4.10 and Map 4.11). Similarly, jihadist presence in Ghana appears mainly connected to their military activities in Burkina Faso and it has been argued that “insurgents see their access to the country as a safe haven and smuggling route as too useful to destabilize with direct attacks” (Tanko and Courtright, 2024[35]). Meanwhile, “terrorism” is often framed by Ghanaian media as an external problem that is heading towards Ghana from the Sahel (Dan Suleiman, 2023[36]). Ghana being Anglophone may diminish JNIM’s recruitment prospects there (Moody, 2022[37]); that argument echoes hypotheses that the Francophone West Africa is more susceptible to jihadist mobilisation than other parts of the region (McCants and Meserole, 2016[38]).
Jihadist incursions into Côte d’Ivoire occurred against the backdrop of long-term economic growth, postwar recovery after the civil war that ended in 2011, and ties between President Ouattara and northern communities. This “relative calm” should not blind Ivoirian authorities to continued jihadist activities, for example involvement in gold mining and other illegal/irregular economic activities at Comoé Park (Assanvo, 2023[39]).
How far south will the Jihadists go?
The southward expansion of jihadists towards the Gulf of Guinea is a rather new phenomenon in West Africa, where most of the jihads that have developed historically since the early 18th century have been largely contained within the Sahel region (Miles, 2018[40]). While past jihads never reached the shores of the Gulf of Guinea, this historical reality hardly suggests that there is an enduring “jihad zone” that cannot affect modern coastal states.
The most vulnerable region to jihadist expansion appears to be the wide belt that extends from the west of Kankan in Guinea to Parakou in Benin. This vast periphery has few cities and low densities of population compared to both the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea (Map 4.12), a specificity explained by the fact that it was historically used as a reservoir of slaves by coastal and Sahelian precolonial entities. This sparsely populated region is scattered with national parks which could provide safe havens for violent extremists. The local population is predominantly Muslim (Map 4.13) and well connected to the Sahel, both culturally and economically, through numerous border markets and long-distance trade networks (Walther, 2015[41]).
Source: Authors based on WorldPop (2020[42]).
Further, despite its strategic location, the north of coastal countries remains poorly connected to the ports of the Gulf of Guinea. Investment in the transportation, education, and health sectors, for example, have historically been much lower than in the densely populated south (Walther, Nugent and Goewey, 2025[43]; OECD/SWAC, 2019[44]). If instrumentalised by jihadists, this lack of national integration between the north and south of coastal countries could become a threat to national security, especially if local stigmatisation pushes some Salafis and Fulani into jihadist arms, as observed in Central Mali today (Benjaminsen and Ba, 2019[45]).
Several factors could make the progression of jihadist groups more difficult further south, however, starting with the necessity of building local alliances. Jihadist groups are numerically small and rarely able to hold territory. One of their main strengths is the alliances they can establish locally, by persuasion, threat, or violence, with local leaders and marginalised communities (Thurston, 2020[46]). The extremists affiliated with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb who relocated from northern Algeria in the early 2000s developed extensive networks with local tribes in northern Mali, a process that took years and was facilitated by cultural, linguistic, and religious affinities across the two “shores” of the Sahara.
It is uncertain how this could be replicated along the Gulf of Guinea, a region that is vastly different from the Sahel from a linguistic and religious perspective. As jihadist groups move south, they will lose much of their ability to move undetected within the local population. Even in areas with a high share of Muslim population, ethno-cultural connections are not easily undone by jihadi rhetoric and propaganda. South of the Sahel, it is common to have families or larger groups where Christian and Muslim identities are mixed. Establishing durable bases and getting the support of villagers in regions that are predominantly Christian, or have a significant proportion of traditional animists, will remain an even more formidable challenge (Map 4.13).
Source: Authors based on Johnson and Grim (2008[47]).
In the southern region of coastal countries, the most likely scenario is a diffuse presence of isolated groups, involved in hit-and-run attacks against poorly defended civilians, rather than steady territorial expansion, as currently observed in the Sahel. This scenario would lead jihadists to expand south rurally without consolidating any serious urban areas and progressively contribute to forming a patchwork insurgency, rather than a single zone of dominance.
Governments’ responses
Ultimately, the expansion of jihadist groups deep in the south will depend on the timely and appropriate set of initiatives taken by coastal countries (Brottem, 2023[48]; Wilen, 2024[49]). Coastal countries are comparatively more capable of countering insurgents militarily than Sahelian countries and are in the process of establishing the foundations of a co-ordinated response to transnational terrorism. The most ambitious of these initiatives is the Accra Initiative established in 2017 (Birikorang and Abdallah, 2023[50]) between Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo (Mali and Niger are observers). More recently, the region has also been the focus of an Integrated Border Stability Mechanism for West Africa supported by the United Nations (2023[51])
These initiatives necessitate to implement reforms in the ways West African governments build and train their security forces, interact with civilians, and co-ordinate their counter-insurgency initiatives regionally (Boukhars, 2024[52]). The last couple of years show that this process is under way in the region: from Côte d’Ivoire to Togo, West African coastal states have adopted political, legislative, and operational frameworks to improve synergies between security forces, civil society organisations and populations, and local authorities (Box 4.2). As the Côte d’Ivoire example suggests, balancing military and social responses may be the very first step to adopt along the Gulf of Guinea to prevent, and contain, violent extremism.
In Benin, the government initiated in 2019 the process of developing a National Strategy for the Prevention of Violent Extremism. Since then, state authorities have established the High-Level Committee in charge of preventing violent extremism and the fight against border insecurity in 2019 and the Presidential Committee for External Inspection of the defence and security forces. They have also reinforced the capacity of the Agency for the Integrated Management of Border Areas, which creates income-generating activities and construct schools, and the National Peace Coalition. Benin has also launched several initiatives to improve economic and health conditions of communities in some of the most peripheral areas of the country. Finally, the African Parks Network has made efforts to address resentments by some local communities who see the network’s measures to safeguard biodiversity as detrimental to their livelihood.
Côte d’Ivoire has received the most praise for its response to the jihadist threat. The state has deployed an effective two-pronged approach focusing on security and development, allowing authorities to blunt the initial tempo of attacks that occurred in 2020-22 (ICG, 2023b[53]). Amid escalating tensions between Fulani herdsmen and the Coulango, Lobi, and Malinké, the Prefects were entrusted with creating framework for dialogue between the different populations. These include the Civil-Military Cells, Ethics Advisory Committees, and the Departmental Security Committees, which assemble military and prefects, local authorities, and community representatives.
In 2019, Ghana launched its National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism. The Framework builds on a four-tier strategy dedicated to preventing attacks, protecting civilians and responding to violent extremism. In 2020, Ghana also developed a National Security Strategy to identify threats and their security responses. These efforts have contributed to facilitate the co-ordination of the many actors involved in security in the country, from the Ministry of National Security to the municipal and district levels. Since then, Ghanaian authorities have deployed a multifaceted strategy that includes border control, regional co-ordination, special economic assistance to the north, and support to pastoralists. This comprehensive response to Jihadism appears to have helped prevent attacks (KAS, 2022[32]).
Ghana has also been very active on the regional and international scene. The Accra Initiative, which aims to prevent spillover of violent extremism and organised crime is headquartered in Accra and it is in the Ghanaian capital city that the United States and Germany announced a USD 40 million Coastal States Stability Mechanism to strengthen stability in Benin, Togo, and Ghana in October 2024 (B&FT, 2024[54]).
In Togo, the government established the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Prevention and Fight against Violent Extremism (CIPLEV) in 2019 as a model for co-ordinated effort among various ministries and representatives from the security forces, civil society, religious leaders, and local authorities. In 2021, the government initiated a National Strategy for the Prevention and Fight against Violent Extremism. CIPLEV, along with the prefectural and communal Committees for the Prevention and Fight against Violent Extremism, provides a practical opportunity to enhance community dialogues among security forces, local authorities, municipal actors, and young citizens as well as enhance nascent early warning systems.
Source: adapted with permission from Boukhars (2024[52]).
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