Public development banks (PDBs) are assuming an increasingly prominent role in the international financial architecture. In the wake of the major crises of the early twenty-first century, including the subprime financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, the climate crisis, and natural disasters, PDBs have emerged as essential institutions for financing economic resilience and supporting long-term development priorities, including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (OECD et al., 2024[1]; OECD et al., 2025[2]).
A key policy challenge is strengthening the role of PDBs in mobilising and channelling development finance towards global goals. Deeper and more effective co-operation among PDBs can help address this challenge (Marodon, Jacouton and Ploen, 2025[3]). Such co-operation can enable PDBs to leverage complementary resources and expertise, improve efficiency, strengthen links between international and domestic sources of finance, and support the development and financing of projects aligned with national priorities. Article 37(i) of the Sevilla Commitment, adopted in 2025, calls for stronger co-operation between PDBs to contribute more effectively to financing global goals and country-led development priorities. This issue is central to the implementation of country platforms, where PDBs – particularly national development banks (NDBs) – are expected to play a pivotal role as intermediaries for mobilising and channelling financing in support of national policy priorities.
The literature on PDB co-operation remains relatively recent, predominantly MDB-centred and skewed towards the analysis of financial interactions. Seminal contributions by (Marois, Steward and Marodon, 2023[4]; Marois et al., 2025[5]) have examined development finance relationships between MDBs and NDBs from the NDB perspective. These studies highlight the potential of development banks with an international mandate, including multilateral development banks (MDBs) and bilateral development banks, to support NDBs’ development finance mobilisation objectives by leveraging their financial capacity, technical expertise and convening power through multiple channels of collaboration. Most other studies adopt an MDB-centred perspective focused largely on financial instruments. They examine how MDBs support NDBs through credit lines, co-financing arrangements, guarantees and intermediary lending (Léon et al., 2025[6]). Although governance and operational asymmetries are widely acknowledged in the literature, technical assistance, policy dialogue, and other institutional interactions are mentioned only through illustrative examples. As a result, no unified framework systematically documents and compares channels of interaction across institutions and countries.
Many studies examine interactions between NDBs and major MDBs but rarely distinguish between multilateral and bilateral banks or examine their distinct approaches. Although research has clarified the scale and structure of MDB financing, less attention has been paid to how individual NDBs combine funding from multiple external partners and how these relationships shape their financing models. Some recent studies have begun to address these differences, including by examining NDB co-operation with bilateral development banks (Marois et al., 2025[5]). Nevertheless, much of the literature continues to treat MDBs as a broad category, with limited attention to how NDBs co-operate with different external partners, including bilateral development banks, or how these partners collaborate with one another to support NDBs. For example, MDBs and bilateral development banks may work together to support NDBs in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs), including through joint special purpose vehicles (SPVs).
MDB support is not evenly distributed across NDBs or countries. Instead, it tends to be concentrated among a relatively small number of large NDBs, with significant variation across regions (Léon et al., 2025[6]). This selectivity is further shaped by NDB-specific characteristics, including governance quality, financial soundness and the stability of business models, which influence NDBs’ ability to access financing from MDBs and bilateral development banks.
Beyond financial flows, existing work conceptualises MDB-NDB relationships as functionally complementary but structurally asymmetric (Marois, Steward and Marodon, 2023[4]; Léon et al., 2025[6]). Mapping exercises and surveys show that MDB finance plays a catalytic but circumscribed role in NDB balance sheets, with NDBs remaining primarily domestically funded through public capital injections, retained earnings, and both domestic and international bond issuance. MDB support is therefore complementary rather than dominant, and financial co-operation is typically structured around upstream capital provision by MDBs and downstream on-lending by NDBs at the domestic level (Marois et al., 2025[5]; World Bank Group, 2018[7]). Conceptual and political economy contributions frame MDBs as agenda setters that define standards, safeguards, conditionality and impact frameworks, while NDBs are positioned as domestic implementing institutions that adapt global agendas to national contexts. In this view, NDBs play a crucial role in translating international development and climate objectives into country-level projects, reinforcing a structural division of labour between global and national development finance institutions (Marois, Steward and Marodon, 2023[4]; Getzel and Gregory, 2024[8]).
Empirical studies further underline that relationships are often operationally MDB-led. Even in jointly financed projects, MDBs typically retain leadership over project design, procurement rules, safeguards, monitoring and reporting frameworks (Marois et al., 2025[5]; Shelepov, 2018[9]). At the same time, recent research highlights the important, and in some cases determining, role of NDBs in initiating and shaping collaboration with MDBs. The balance between MDB and NDB roles also varies across countries, reflecting differences in national institutional capacity and countries’ positions within the international development finance system. Comparative assessments of impact measurement and evaluation systems show that MDBs significantly shape how projects are designed and assessed, often imposing complex and heterogeneous requirements (Marois et al., 2025[5]). These governance and operational channels reveal that power asymmetries persist through standards, procedures and technical assistance, even as direct financial dependence on MDBs has declined.
Regarding the quality of MDB-NDB relationships in promoting sustainable development financing, the literature highlights significant shortcomings. Current MDB-NDB relationships are often misaligned with the urgency and scale required to meet climate and SDG financing needs, with studies arguing that it remains overly risk-averse, slow, and complex (Marois et al., 2025[5]). Other strands of the literature emphasise persistent fragmentation, insufficient scale, and co-ordination gaps across the public development bank system (Finance in Common, 2025[10]).
This paper examines patterns of co-operation between PDBs, highlighting both synergies and persistent gaps. It investigates the instruments and types of interaction – financial, technical and institutional – that characterise co-operation between PDBs, as well as the distribution of financial flows across partner institutions and sectors. It undertakes a cross-regional comparison of Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and emerging Asia. It also examines the sectoral and SDG priorities addressed through these interactions, identifies sectors or SDGs that may be underserved, and explores how non-financial and technical co-operation can pave the way for financial scale-up.
The main contribution of the paper is the development of a new typology of financial, technical and institutional interactions. This helps explain how partnerships form, evolve and scale over time. It expands the notion of interaction beyond financial instruments to include governance arrangements and technical co-operation, capturing both financial and non-financial channels within a single analytical framework. Moreover, by distinguishing between multilateral and bilateral banks, the study introduces a comparative perspective that remains relatively limited in the literature and enables an assessment of how different types of PDBs engage with NDBs through distinct instruments, sectors and institutional arrangements. Building on this analysis, the paper draws out key policy messages on PDB co-operation, focusing on how to strengthen partnerships, better align financing with national priorities, and improve the effectiveness of financial and non-financial co-operation (Box 1).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. It begins with a description of the methodology used to build the database. This is followed by an overview of interactions between NDBs and other PDBs across emerging regions, covering financial, technical and other forms of engagement. It concludes with key policy messages and priorities for future work.