This chapter examines how changing information environments, declining trust and increasingly fragmented public debate affect governments’ ability to deliver reforms. It argues that public acceptability is becoming a critical condition for effective policymaking and that public communication has a role to play in supporting informed, constructive democratic debate. The chapter introduces a practical framework for communicating across divides, built on closer collaboration between policy and communication functions, deeper public listening and engagement, and the development of shared frames of reference that can help citizens navigate complex and contested policy issues.
Public Communication Handbook to Bridge Divides and Shape Better Policy
1. Communicating across divides: Why it matters for policy delivery
Copy link to 1. Communicating across divides: Why it matters for policy deliveryAbstract
Democratic societies depend on open and respectful debate, where people with different perspectives can express their views and concerns and engage with one another. Yet public discourse on major complex policy challenges, such as migration, the environment, fiscal sustainability, or defence, is increasingly being experienced as more fragmented and adversarial, making reaching consensus on policy decisions more difficult.1
Disagreement is a normal and constructive feature of democratic life. Democracy is designed precisely to manage disagreement through collective decision making (Dahl, 1962[1]). However, in the last few decades, oversimplified and adversarial narratives that are often detached from evidence and lived experience have become more prominent and made dialogue and compromise harder.
While the underlying factors driving recent changes in public debate remain to be fully understood, there is growing evidence of a shift in the nature and quality of public discourse (OECD, 2026[2]; Reuters Institute, 2025[3]). The ways in which the digital transformation has reshaped the information environment, including how information is produced, disseminated, and consumed, have played a significant role. Similar opinion faultlines increasingly recur across multiple issues, creating stable and polarised camps. This dynamic, often described as “sorting”, can reduce scope for compromise, reinforce “us versus them” thinking, and makes it harder for democratic institutions to mediate between competing interests (Iyengar et al., 2019[4]; Boxell, Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2024[5]).
This shift has major implications for governments’ ability to design reforms that people can understand, scrutinise, help shape and ultimately support. In this context, policy decisions are more likely to face public resistance, backlash and reversal, even if the underlying preferences are in fact more compatible than how they are portrayed in public and media discourse (OECD, 2025[6]).
This Handbook proposes a practical approach for communicators and policymakers working together to leverage effective, two-way communication to address challenges to constructive debate and strengthen the legitimacy and workability of policy decisions and reform. It draws on some of the most advanced communication and participation practices identified through nearly a decade of OECD analysis in the fields of public communication and open government more broadly. It is built on the premise that public communication should be grounded in transparency, participation, evidence, accountability and respect for legitimate disagreement.
1.1. Public acceptability is an essential condition for delivering reforms and keeping them on track
Copy link to 1.1. Public acceptability is an essential condition for delivering reforms and keeping them on trackGovernments today operate under intense and overlapping pressures. Alongside acute shocks, they must also confront longer-term structural challenges such as population ageing, weak productivity and growth, as well as environmental pressures, which all create new spending needs amid constrained fiscal space. Global crises, rapid technological change, rising public expectations, and persistent resource constraints are testing the ability of public institutions to deliver results and adapt at the speed citizens expect (OECD, 2025[6]).
As governments pursue necessary reforms, public acceptability has become a visible precondition for success (OECD, 2025[7]). This reflects both a normative and a practical imperative: reforms that proceed without public support risk losing democratic legitimacy, while low acceptability can undermine compliance and effective implementation (OECD, 2024[8]). Even where governments enjoy broad public backing, support for specific measures can remain fragile, especially where they involve visible costs, behavioural change, or difficult choices.
Structural reforms and transitions such as the green transition, labour market reforms, or fiscal adjustments often have uneven distributional impacts, affecting some groups, regions, or sectors more than others (Hodok and Kozluk, 2024[9]; Causa, Hermansen and Ruiz, 2016[10]). In some cases, the same groups may repeatedly bear the costs of successive reforms, contributing to perceptions of unfairness and risking greater resistance to change. Recognising these dynamics is essential for understanding public attitudes and for identifying where real or perceived material impacts give credibility to simplistic narratives.
In this sense, governments are increasingly exploring ways to support informed public debate and meaningful participation around policy choices (OECD, 2025[7]). Citizens expect to have a say in the decisions that shape their lives, and institutions need to communicate clearly how reforms are intended to deliver results, what evidence supports choices, and how fairness is ensured (OECD, 2024[8]). These reflect core principles of open and participatory governance, which OECD countries are increasingly embedding in their approaches to decision making (OECD, 2023[11]).
1.2. Contested and fragmented public debate is affecting governments’ capacity to deliver
Copy link to 1.2. Contested and fragmented public debate is affecting governments’ capacity to deliverPublic support for reforms is becoming harder to secure when policy debate is increasingly framed as conflict between opposing camps. When citizens see society as split into irreconcilable sides, the space for compromise narrows, political incentives harden, and institutional decisions are more readily viewed through a lens of group conflict (OECD, 2023[11]; Forrest and Daymude, 2022[12]). Often, people are not rejecting change itself but prioritising different policy objectives and experiencing trade‑offs differently, leading to incompatible expectations about what change should deliver.
This sense of shrinking common ground is driven by deep factors that vary across countries, such as polarisation, social and economic divides, and unequal access to reliable and accurate information (OECD, 2022[13]; UNDP, 2024[14]). The weakening of shared, factual reference points can deepen societal divisions and makes it harder to build understanding of policy challenges (OECD, 2024[8]). As discussed below, fringe views are often amplified in the digital sphere and their prevalence is routinely overestimated in public perception, creating the impression that societies are more divided than they are and that compromise is unattainable (Pew Research Center, 2022[15]; OECD, 2026[2]).
This perception gap makes it harder for governments to build shared understanding around policy choices and reduces the room they have to act decisively (OECD, 2025[6]). Consequently, communicators and policymakers must not only present strong technical arguments for reforms but also demonstrate a clear understanding of citizens’ values, group identities, concerns and priorities.
1.3. Governments are handling high-stakes reforms in contexts of low trust
Copy link to 1.3. Governments are handling high-stakes reforms in contexts of low trustMany governments are pursuing high‑stakes and long‑term reforms in contexts where confidence in public institutions is uneven and often fragile. Across 38 countries in the OECD Trust Survey, trust in national government stands at 40% on average (OECD, 2026[16]). Moreover, only 34% of respondents across OECD and accession countries believing that governments can balance the needs of different generations (OECD, 2026[16]), and around 40% considering it unlikely that governments would clearly explain how policy reforms affect them personally (OECD, 2024[8]). At the same time, having a voice clearly matters: those who feel “people like them” have a say in government decisions report much higher levels of trust in national government than those who do not (69% compared to 22%) (OECD, 2026[16]).
Low trust matters because it shapes how people interpret and judge policy choices. These conditions weaken the perceived legitimacy of reforms and amplify sensitivity to tensions across policies, for instance between stated objectives (e.g. making housing more affordable) and visible actions (e.g. lack of permitting for new housing supply), or between national and international commitments and their local impacts.
Trust in public institutions is closely intertwined with levels of trust between people themselves. As perceptions of societal division intensify and individuals come to believe that different groups hold irreconcilable values, they are less likely to expect institutions to balance competing interests fairly or to act for the collective good (Hye-Yon Lee, 2022[17]; Jabra et al., 2025[18]; Montoya et al., 2025[19]). People are more likely to trust institutions they see as neutral and rule-based. Conversely, trust in political and representative institutions is more volatile and attached to how the institutions mirror group dynamics in society (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008[20]; Hwang, 2017[21]).
1.4. Increasing fragmentation of online spaces amplifies the appearance of division
Copy link to 1.4. Increasing fragmentation of online spaces amplifies the appearance of divisionThe information ecosystem shaping interactions between governments, citizens and other societal actors has evolved in ways that make shared understanding and constructive debate on policy issues more difficult (OECD, 2026[2]; OECD, 2024[22]). In an increasingly algorithm‑driven environment, traditional mass media no longer play the gatekeeping role that once helped maintain common reference points on public issues. Instead, a more fragmented landscape of platforms and content creators who engage directly with increasingly distinct online communities has resulted in more personalised information exposure. These dynamics are discussed in more depth in the OECD’s report on Reforming Government Communication for the Age of Algorithms (OECD, 2026[2]).
Online platforms tend to privilege content that generates strong emotional reactions and user engagement, leading algorithmic systems to amplify conflictual or extreme content over more balanced or explanatory (Lewandowsky et al., 2020[23]; Levy, 2021[24]; Ognyanova et al., 2020[25]). Negative and conflict‑framed content can therefore attract disproportionate attention online, a pattern increasingly exploited by individuals and media outlets seeking visibility (Kim, Villanueva and Chen, 2023[26]; Radsch, 2023[27]). At the same time, economic pressures and competition from social media have pushed parts of the traditional news sector towards more sensationalist and opinion‑driven coverage in many countries (Milli et al., 2025[28]; Reuters Institute, 2025[3]).
Moreover, online platforms can be deliberately exploited through co-ordinated information manipulation and interference campaigns, including by foreign state actors or their proxies (OECD, 2024[22]). Such efforts often aim less to persuade audiences through coherent alternatives than to undermine trust, blur factual reference points, and amplify polarising narratives by leveraging algorithms and pre‑existing societal tensions. By inflating the visibility of extreme or conflict‑driven content, these practices can further complicate informed public debate and collective problem‑solving (OECD, 2024[22]; Reuters Institute, 2023[29]).
Overall, this amplification can distort perceptions of how widespread certain views actually are. It can also reinforce selective exposure, as people are repeatedly shown information that confirms existing beliefs and narratives (Reuters Institute, 2023[29]; UNESCO, 2023[30]). Nonetheless, across many issues, a sizeable “silent middle” holds more moderate views, expresses fatigue with conflictual discourse, and remains open to engaging with opposing perspectives (Pew Research Center, 2023[31]).
These dynamics complicate governments’ efforts to use social listening tools to understand public sentiment, as highly engaged content may not be representative of broader public views (OECD, 2026[2]). In a fragmented, attention‑driven information environment, this mismatch between visibility and representativeness makes it harder for governments to “cut through”, underscoring the need to adapt how they listen, engage and communicate rather than pointing to a deficit among citizens.
Box 1.1. (Why) has public debate become more difficult?
Copy link to Box 1.1. (Why) has public debate become more difficult?Societies are experiencing real divisions on many policy issues, but public debate dynamics can also make these divisions appear deeper than they are. This is partly because highly visible debate is not always representative of public opinion. A small number of very engaged, emotionally charged or fringe voices can receive disproportionate attention, especially online, while more moderate or uncertain views remain less visible. This can create a “perception gap”, whereby people overestimate the size, extremity or hostility of those who disagree with them (Pew Research Center, 2022[15]; Yudkin, Hawkins and Dixon, 2019[32]).
Perceptions of divisions and partisanship are growing in many OECD countries
Survey evidence suggests that this perception gap is visible across several OECD countries. In the United Kingdom, 84% of respondents say the country feels divided, while 64% describe “culture wars” as a serious problem. In Australia, 55% of respondents say the country has become more divided than five years ago, even though social cohesion indicators remain more stable than during pandemic lows. Across France, Germany, Poland and Spain, comparative research also finds a growing perception of division, particularly around cost-of-living pressures, migration and climate.
Partisanship equally affects trust in institutions and public information. The OECD Trust Survey shows that people who supported parties in government report substantially higher trust in national government than those who did not, 54% compared with 28%, a partisan trust gap of 26 percentage points (OECD, 2026[16]). Similar patterns can appear in perceptions of whether governments use the best available evidence, provide clear administrative information, explain the effects of reforms, or are open to inputs all of which are associated with trust in national government (OECD, 2026[16]).
Perceptions overshadow the true extent of disagreement
Perceptions of key policy questions are coloured by these dynamics: for instance, OECD research found that people disagree about the actual level of income inequality in their country, but they have more convergent views on what the ideal distribution of income should be. Similar patterns exist for example on perceived, actual and desired levels of migration. These findings show that today’s challenges stem from skewed perceptions that make groups appear further apart than they truly are. The tone of public discourse is increasingly to blame: for example, 74% in the United Kingdom agree that the media often makes the country feel more divided than it really is.
Several psychological and social mechanisms help explain why divisions can feel deeper than they are
Well‑documented behavioural and psychological dynamics, such as motivated reasoning, confirmation bias and conformity pressures, then lead people to discount counter‑evidence and to misread where the “centre” of public opinion actually lies. The following are especially salient:
Identity and group belonging. People often interpret policy issues through political, cultural or social identities. Strong identification with a group can create “us versus them” dynamics, encourage favourable views of one’s own group, and increase distrust of others (Tajfel and Turner, 1979[33]; Bakker and Lelkes, 2024[34]; Iyengar et al., 2019[4]).
Emotions and moral judgement. Emotions such as anger, fear, disgust or anxiety can shape reactions before deliberate reasoning takes place. They can heighten threat perceptions, encourage avoidance or confrontation, and make compromise appear morally unacceptable (Haidt, 2001[35]; Elad-Strenger, Proch and Kessler, 2019[36]; Berntzen, Kelsall and Harteveld, 2024[37]; Jost et al., 2017[38]; Wagner and Morisi, 2019[39]).
Cognitive biases. Motivated reasoning, confirmation bias and identity-protective cognition make people more likely to accept information that fits their existing views or group identity, and to discount evidence that challenges them (Kunda, 1990[40]; Wason, 1960[41]; Kahan, 2013[42]).
Social pressures and silence. Groupthink and conformity pressures can discourage dissent within cohesive groups, while the “spiral of silence” can lead people with moderate or minority views to self-censor, allowing vocal minorities to appear more representative than they are (Jannis, 1972[43]; Noelle-Neumann, 1974[44]).
1.5. Effective and impartial public communication can support shared understanding and constructive debate
Copy link to 1.5. Effective and impartial public communication can support shared understanding and constructive debateRebuilding shared understanding in today’s fragmented information environment and bridging deep social divides cannot be achieved through public communication alone. Nonetheless, communication remains one of the most effective levers governments have to make disagreement easier to navigate. When used strategically, it helps institutions understand what matters to people, explain complex choices, and sustain dialogue even when consensus is out of reach (OECD, 2026[2]; OECD, 2025[6]).
Today, people want to know not only what government is doing, but why, on the basis of what evidence, and how different options were weighed (OECD, 2021[53]; OECD, 2024[8]). Traditional top‑down communication to announce decisions taken is insufficient for these expectations. Moving beyond one‑way information provision towards listening and engagement is essential to building the shared ownership required to address complex policy challenges (OECD, 2017[54]; OECD, 2023[11]).
By clearly explaining trade‑offs, listening early to concerns, responding to feedback, and collaborating with other independent voices in society, governments can contribute to a constructive space for debate where diverse viewpoints can be voiced. In this sense, communication is not about “selling” reforms, but about giving people the clarity needed to assess options on their merits and understand how their perspectives are reflected in the process.
Importantly, the work described in this report precedes, rather than follows, policy decisions and helps to shape them for the better. It is the groundwork that paves the way to more responsive and legitimate policy reforms.
The approach described in this Handbook refers to the communication of public institutions as impartial and should be clearly distinguished from political communication. While political actors play a legitimate role in advocating for particular policy choices, the role of public institutions is to support informed and constructive debate by helping citizens understand the issues, evidence, and trade-offs at stake (Table 1.1). Before decisions are made at the political and legislative level, institutions act primarily as a convenors and facilitators rather than promoting a particular position. Once decisions are taken, institutions shift into their official communication role, explaining what has been decided, why, and how it will be implemented.
The distinction between public and political communication is not always clear-cut or fully observed in practice (OECD, 2026[2]). In many countries, communication around emerging policy proposals is led primarily by political actors seeking to explain and build support for their preferred course of action. This is a legitimate and essential feature of representative democracy. However, in increasingly fragmented information environments, debates can become highly contested and adversarial, raising the need for more constructive avenues for citizens to approach the problem, evidence, and perspectives.
Table 1.1. Public communication and political communication play distinct but complementary roles
Copy link to Table 1.1. Public communication and political communication play distinct but complementary roles|
Public communication |
Political communication |
|---|---|
|
Supports informed and constructive public debate around policy choices |
Builds support for a particular policy choice or political programme |
|
Focuses on explaining issues, evidence and trade-offs |
Focuses on advocating for preferred solutions |
|
Seeks to establish a shared understanding of the problem |
Seeks to persuade and mobilise support |
|
Acts as a convenor and facilitator of dialogue |
Acts as an advocate for a position |
|
Led by public institutions |
Led by political parties and elected officials |
|
Success is measured by understanding and quality of debate |
Success is measured by political support |
Source: OECD authors’ elaboration.
Embedding communication throughout the policy cycle, rather than confining it to the moment of announcement, allows institutions to clarify choices, anticipate misunderstandings, and support constructive discussion before decisions are finalised (OECD, 2023[55]; Macnamara, 2025[56]).
In practice, this means aligning communication with existing policy procedures, such as prioritisation and planning, problem analysis, options development, and formal consultation, so that communication supports clearer framing of issues and more effective delivery. Early collaboration between communication and policy teams allows institutions to identify emerging concerns, narrative trends, and tensions before they escalate, and to test and refine policy framings through iteration (Macnamara, 2023[57]).
Yet this kind of collaboration remains far from standard practice. According to the 2025 OECD Survey of Public Communicators, only 25% of communication teams are involved across the full policy cycle; most are brought in mainly at the announcement stage. Limited understanding of communication’s value among policymakers is the most frequently cited barrier (42%) for collaboration between disciplines, followed by late involvement in the process (26%). Strengthening this collaboration can help maximise the effectiveness of existing policymaking tools, ensuring that communication contributes not only to how policies are presented, but to how they are designed, tested, and refined.
Declining public confidence and resistance to change are prompting governments to adopt more people‑centred and responsive ways of working. The approaches proposed in this handbook are part of this broader shift. Grounded in open government principles of transparency, integrity, accountability, and participation, they support better communication and more meaningful public involvement in shaping change (OECD, 2025[6]; OECD, 2023[11]).
1.6. Communicating across divides: Overview of the approach
Copy link to 1.6. Communicating across divides: Overview of the approach1.6.1. What does “communicating across divides” mean in practice?
For the purpose of this Handbook, communicating across divides means leveraging public communication to help create and sustain a constructive space for policy debate on contested policy issues where different views can be expressed, evidence can be considered and trade-offs can be weighed. It does not mean requiring agreement, suppressing views of any kind or making communication a substitute for political choice. Rather, it supports policies that are more responsive to public concerns and more likely to command broad and lasting legitimacy.
There is no set threshold for identifying an issue as contested. Rather, the guidance in this Handbook is intended to support good practice across all policies, with institutions exercising discretion in determining when more thorough communication and engagement approaches are necessary, depending on early warning signs and the stakes involved.
In this approach, communicating across divides rests on two mutually reinforcing elements:
shared frames of reference that enable a more constructive way of discussing complex problems and clarifying trade-offs; and
concrete avenues for citizens to voice their preferences and shape policy.
When communication and policy work together, these two elements form a feedback loop that strengthens decision making. Effective and collaborative communication enables institutions to listen to public concerns, test policy ideas, and adjust proposals before positions harden. This helps policymakers improve policy design while giving citizens greater clarity about choices, trade‑offs, and constraints. This interaction is most effective when communication is embedded within core policy processes, helping to improve how problems are defined, options are assessed, and trade-offs are communicated and understood.
The approach proposed here is grounded in a genuine commitment to democratic debate and people-centred policymaking. It is not about persuasion or changing people’s views but is about fostering informed discussion, mutual understanding, and shared responsibility in order to surface workable compromises on complex policy challenges. It builds on other OECD efforts that emphasise designing policies and services around people’s needs, lived experiences, and real‑life interactions with government (OECD, 2024[58]), as well as approaches to participation that enable citizens not only to express their views, but to contribute to and influence decisions in a meaningful way (OECD, 2017[54]).
1.6.2. Who is this handbook for?
This Handbook is addressed equally to policy and communication officials in public institutions, since the approach depends on their collaboration across the full policy cycle. While many of the tools included require communication expertise, their value lies in being applied jointly with policy teams from problem definition through to design, implementation and adjustment.
OECD analysis consistently highlights the value of stronger collaboration between communication and policy functions, particularly in improving mutual understanding of their disciplines and strengthening how governments navigate complex reforms (OECD, 2026[2]; OECD, 2023[55]; Macnamara, 2025[59]). By bridging these disciplines, the Handbook aims to help public officials better understand how effective communication can support more constructive democratic debate and more resilient policy outcomes.
In addition, the Handbook is intended to contribute to the broader open government agenda. By connecting communication practices to principles of transparency, accountability and participation, it emphasises that communication is not a standalone function, but a core lever of responsive, participatory governance.
1.6.3. Conceptual foundations of the approach
People understand policy problems through overarching frames of reference
People and societies rely on frames of reference, or the narratives that convey them, to make sense of complex policy problems. These frames create order and meaning, especially in complex situations. However, they are mostly simplified and selective representations of reality that obscure complex causes and consequences of policy problems and choices (Mair et al., 2019[60]).
A narrative is a structured account that organises information, events or experiences to make sense of reality and convey a certain meaning. These frames of reference emphasize certain elements, omit others, and often link events across time to suggest causes and consequences. They convey values and assumptions, shaping how people interpret complex issues and influencing attitudes and behaviours (Dennison, 2021[61]) (see glossary of key terms on page 39).
This Handbook uses the term “frames of reference” as a broader level of communication than a narratives. Multiple frames of reference coexist and compete with one another within the same ecosystem. Once they are embedded in public discourse, these frames become the lens via which people interpret new information about a given issue. Certain frames become dominant references in public discourse and serve as the main entry-point for debate on the issue.
People are likewise more receptive to frames or narratives that reflect their core values, such as safety, fairness and honesty, and to those conveyed by voices they trust (Scharfbillig et al., 2021[62]). Policy issues often become contested not simply because the public lacks information, but because people interpret the same problem through different experiences, values, and expectations (Scharfbillig et al., 2021[62]). Communication adds value when it uncovers these deeper layers and improves understanding of how different people make sense of problems and solutions.
Broadening the frames of reference can help move debate beyond narrow, adversarial narratives
Simplistic frames can amplify divisions and reinforce a sense of “us versus them” (Seiger, 2025[63]; Dennison, 2021[61]). The more emotionally charged or value-laden an issue, the stronger the demand for narratives that justify positions. The more complex an issue, the greater the attractiveness of a simple explanation. In areas such as the green transition, migration, public budgets or housing, policy debates are shaped by longstanding frames of reference linked to identity, fairness, and status. These influence which aspects of an issue receive attention, how facts are interpreted or accepted, and how people weigh trade-offs well before concrete policy proposals emerge.
Specific narratives may be constructed intentionally or emerge organically from different societal or interest groups, often through a combination of both (Metropolitan Group, 2025[64]). Their impact depends in part on who amplifies them, including political leaders, media, community voices or other intermediaries.
When simplified or adversarial framings take hold early, they can narrow how problems are understood and make constructive debate harder to sustain. Public communication cannot undo these framings, but it can limit their traction by supporting alternative frames of reference that are accessible to wider groups of people, provide an entry point for diverging views to coexist and keep dialogue open.
These alternative frames of reference should by no means be understood as “government-approved” versions of reality, but as shared frames of communication based on evidence that allow more people to take part in the debate, make their concerns visible, and help institutions design policy around real needs rather than assumptions. As the guidance in this handbook explains, the role of public institutions is therefore not to make the government’s preferred solution the basis of public communication on contested policies, but to create the conditions in which open debate can lead to workable compromises which may diverge from the government’s initial stance.
The goal is not to get everyone to agree
Communicating across divides does not mean securing universal agreement, promoting centrism or silencing disagreement (OECD, 2020[65]; OECD, 2025[7]) (OECD, 2020[65]; OECD, 2025[7]; OECD, 2025[7]). Rather, it involves expanding, or where necessary protecting, the space for public debate in which differences can be understood and compromises explored. In this sense, resilient democratic systems rely on open debate, opportunities for meaningful participation in public life, and the ability and capacity to engage constructively across differences (OECD, n.d.[66]).
Communication cannot, and should not, aim to convert those with entrenched positions. Instead of seeking to “win” arguments, communicators can engage across the spectrum of views, supporting informed dialogue and negotiation, while recognising that some positions may never converge. The objective is neither stakeholder management nor persuasion, but enabling democratic, constructive exchange across differences.
The limits of fact-checking and debunking
While inaccurate or misleading information can pose real threats to information integrity and fuel adversarial narratives, correcting facts alone is rarely sufficient (Bruns et al., 2024[67]). When inaccurate claims align with people’s identities, values or worldviews, factual corrections often have limited impact and may even provoke defensive reactions (OECD, 2024[22]). This dynamic (sometimes described as a “fact‑checking paradox”) has been observed in several areas where disagreements are driven less by scientific evidence than by concerns about autonomy, fairness or distrust in institutions. The credibility of fact-checking can also be contested, as some audiences perceive fact-checkers as part of the institutions they distrust (Harvard Kennedy School, 2024[68]).
Given this context, the effectiveness of fact-checking and debunking (especially if it comes from government) varies across audiences and tends to resonate more with those already receptive to the fact-checker or their message, while having limited impact among more sceptical or polarised groups. Similarly, citizens interpret information through pre-existing narratives, meaning that facts that contradict those narratives are often discounted or reinterpreted (Re-imagine Europa, 2024[69]).
While factual corrections may not suffice to bring people around a shared understanding on a problem, verifiable evidence remains essential for maintaining the integrity of the wider information ecosystem (Bruns et al., 2024[67]). Even when corrections do not shift individual attitudes directly, they play a critical systemic role. Complementary approaches such as strategic “pre‑bunking”, which involves anticipating and addressing misleading claims before they spread, have also shown promise as part of a broader preparedness strategy (OECD, 2024[22]).
Ultimately, effective public communication requires pairing factual accuracy with communications that speak to how people understand issues, rather than relying on data and facts alone to shift deeply held beliefs.
Low trust in governments calls for alternative voices and bottom-up approaches
In contexts of low trust, official government communication alone may not reach or resonate with all audiences. People increasingly engage, often online, with voices such as community leaders, frontline professionals, experts, civil society organisations, creators and peer networks, whose perspectives may be seen as more relatable or credible than institutional messages (OECD, 2026[2]). In the right conditions, some of these intermediaries can help broaden the frames of reference and support constructive debate among their audiences. Institutions can further the goals in this Handbook by engaging them collaboratively – granted that collaboration is transparent, voluntary and respectful of their independence.
While governments can convene or support efforts to improve public debate, they should not use intermediaries as hidden channels for official messages. Collaboration with credible voices in this context is about supporting those broader frames of reference so that they help bridge divisions through amplification. This requires working with actors that are trusted across a wide spectrum of opinion, should be based on openness about roles, evidence and objectives, and should allow actors to interpret issues in their own words. Truly collaborative approaches can help shift communication away from top-down messaging toward a shared process of sense making, while preserving the autonomy and credibility of non-government actors.
By creating space for others to interpret, question assumptions and communicate in ways that resonate with their communities, these collaborations can strengthen the legitimacy and reach of public debate beyond official channels (OECD, 2024[8]; OECD, 2026[2]).
Understanding where people come from is key
The starting point for this approach is understanding citizens. This means listening carefully to what different groups think and why, including how existing frames of reference shape their views, and identifying the underlying concerns, values and perceived trade-offs that may open space for compromise. Efforts to bridge divides are unlikely to succeed without this deeper understanding of what motivates people beneath their stated positions (OECD, 2025[7]). It is often easier to identify what people oppose than what they might accept, which is why analysing the drivers of public backlash, resistance or “not in my backyard” reactions is essential to understanding what makes policy options socially acceptable.
Communication can help anticipate concerns and address misunderstandings, but it cannot compensate for weaknesses in policy design or address underlying distributional tensions; ultimately, communication cannot be better than the policy itself.
1.6.4. A three-pronged approach to communicating across differences
This handbook sets out a practical framework for public institutions to support constructive debate and responsive policymaking on contested policy issues, structured around three interlinked lines of action. These lines of action should not be read as linear steps in a sequence, but parallel and continuous areas of intervention. They make up three mutually reinforcing levers that link communication and policy action. The approach is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Joining up policy and communication across the cycle is about making public voices and dialogue an ongoing part of decision making, so institutions can draw the full value from communication. When policy and communication teams work together from the outset, governments are better placed to understand how people experience policy issues, identify barriers to acceptability, test options and refine solutions. This requires clear roles, routines and feedback loops across key stages of policymaking, combining policy leadership with communication expertise and strategic co-ordination. These arrangements make the other pillars actionable by ensuring that what institutions hear from the public, and how they frame debate, can inform more responsive, legitimate and durable policy outcomes.
Learning what people think goes beyond surface-level polling to understand how citizens make sense of issues, what values and experiences shape their views, and where there is room for compromise. This involves deeper public listening and analysis of dominant narratives to reveal concerns, trade-offs, and misperceptions that often sit beneath adversarial debate. Participatory processes complement these efforts by creating spaces for citizens to engage directly with complex topics, surface diverse perspectives, and help shape more informed decisions.
Supporting shared frames of reference focuses on developing constructive ways of talking about complex problems that move debate away from “us versus them” dynamics. In this context, the role of public institutions is not to push their own interpretations on the public, but to help broaden the frames of reference through which a policy issue is understood. These frames should allow diverse groups to engage with evidence, concerns and trade-offs, and provide a more credible entry point for constructive debate. Broader, shared frames of reference can act as a counterweight to narrow, simplified and antagonistic framings that often dominate debate across divides. Rather than persuading or simplifying, the aim is to acknowledge different perspectives, connect to shared values, and make room for informed public discussion. These shared frames of reference can then be amplified across the information space through transparent collaboration with a broad range of voices that speak to groups across a wide range of opinions and provide the opportunity for debate to take place based on collective ownership and legitimacy.
When executed in parallel, these lines of action put in place the conditions for more constructive debate upstream in the policy cycle, so that the debate can reveal where compromises are possible and inform decisions and how they are eventually communicated. By doing so the approach aims to reinforce a direct connection between citizens’ voices and policy decisions.
Figure 1.1. A three-pronged approach to communicating across differences
Copy link to Figure 1.1. A three-pronged approach to communicating across differences
Source: OECD authors’ elaboration.
The handbook articulates this approach through a set of practical “toolboxes” to operationalise each of the three main levers above. The toolboxes include guidance, checklists, and examples. Given the wide range of disciplines, methods and practices involved, the handbook does not attempt to provide an exhaustive guide of each but offers a list of further reading for communicators and policymakers who wish to explore specific methodologies or resources in more detail (Annex A).
1.6.5. Practical considerations for applying the handbook
Balancing long‑term work with rapid response
Policy environments shift quickly and unexpectedly. Crises, political shocks, or unexpected events can alter public sentiment overnight, surface and crystallise new narratives. Most of the actions outlined in this handbook focus on medium- to long-term efforts, in contrast to the short timeframes that can often characterise communication cycles. However, these actions lay foundations for greater resilience to sudden shifts, particularly if they develop strong insights and stable relationships in society that can be leveraged at short notice.
Public institutions will need to maintain a dual‑track approach that ensures rapid response and strategic adjustment without sacrificing sustained credibility and long‑horizon work. Close collaboration between disciplines advocated in this handbook can also serve to shield long-term communication efforts from swings in policy direction and help them recalibrate their actions to fit shifting priorities from the political level.
Working with different institutional capacities and resources
Not all institutions have the resources or specialist staff to pursue every element of this approach, which rests on the more advanced practices in the field of public communication. A scalable model is therefore essential. Even small teams can implement core practices such as basic discourse scanning, low‑cost listening exercises. All can work better across disciplines and earlier in the policy cycle. Even modest improvements towards the approaches and methods presented in this handbook can meaningfully strengthen communication effectiveness on contested issues.
Navigating political realities and wider societal dynamics
Applying this approach also requires acknowledging the broader political and social context. Communication should not aim to engineer opinion but to understand how views form and how policies can be made more legitimate and workable. Some actors may seek to exploit divisions or disrupt efforts to for constructive public debate, making it important to anticipate such dynamics and design processes that can withstand them. Many contested debates also reflect cultural, generational, and societal changes that have deep roots and which transcend specific problems. Communication that recognises these underlying dynamics is better placed to support constructive public reasoning.
What success looks like
The success of this approach should be assessed against specific and realistic objectives linked to the policy issue at hand. Its main indicator is whether public debate becomes more constructive, where people engage with evidence, trade-offs and different perspectives without disagreement being framed as irreconcilable conflict. This does not mean measuring the success of a reform itself, which depends on many factors beyond the scope of this Handbook. Evaluation should instead look for evidence of progress across the conditions the approach seeks to influence: the quality of debate, the depth of public insight, the extent to which this insight informs policy choices, the breadth of actors using the relevant broad frames of reference, to discuss the issues beyond government, and public understanding of the reasons, evidence and trade-offs behind decisions. The following are indicative macro indicators to assess:
Tone and quality of debate: evidence that discussion is becoming less adversarial and “us versus them” framing is limited to the fringes of the debate rather than the mainstream, with more space for evidence, nuanced accounts, trade-offs and respectful disagreement.
Depth and quality of public insight: stronger evidence on what different groups think, value, fear and may accept, including where views are misperceived, where concerns are material, and where compromise may be possible.
Influence on policy design: clear examples of public insight, engagement findings or narrative analysis shaping how problems are defined, options are tested, trade-offs are managed, or proposals are refined. Working methods and collaboration across disciplines improves.
Shifts in public attitudes on contested issues: measurable changes in perceptions of other groups, openness to compromise, understanding of trade-offs, perceived fairness, or willingness to engage with the policy question.
Non-government voices supporting shared frames of reference: a diverse range of voices, including civil society, experts, community leaders, frontline actors, professional groups or other trusted intermediaries supporting public debate on contested issues through their own interpretation of the evidence, trade-offs and concerns.
Public understanding of policy choices: evidence that people better understand the reasons for action, the evidence behind decisions, the trade-offs considered, and how different public concerns were weighed, even where they do not fully agree with the outcome.
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Note
Copy link to Note← 1. The notion of “divisive” content is not formally defined in a standardised way in academic literature or in any international agreements or frameworks. It is generally understood through the related concept of polarisation, referring to the process by which societies become more fragmented into groups with increasingly opposed positions and diminished understanding and empathy across group lines (Milli et al., 2025[28]; Vasist, Chatterjee and Krishnan, 2023[70]). In this perspective, content is typically considered “divisive” not because it reflects disagreement or minority views as such, but when it reinforces antagonistic group identities, amplifies hostility toward perceived “out groups,” or contributes to dynamics that weaken shared factual reference points, social cohesion, and the quality of democratic debate (UNDP, 2024[72]; European Parliament, 2025[71]).