This chapter reviews key substantive areas of Kazakhstan’s competition law, including restrictive agreements (both horizontal and vertical), concerted practices, abuse of dominance, merger control and unfair competition. The chapter further addresses specific provisions governing the conduct of public authorities and the public procurement process. It also analyses the ways in which anti-competitive behaviour is defined and prohibited, evaluates the effectiveness of legal exemptions, and considers enforcement patterns by the national competition authority, as well as the extent to which Kazakhstan’s framework aligns with international standards.
OECD Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy: Kazakhstan 2025
Abstract
It is generally accepted that the one of the basic objectives of competition law is to promote the efficient allocation of resources by protecting competition in markets. Several jurisdictions also add other objectives, such as the promotion of SMEs, disadvantaged ethnic groups, regional development, decentralisation, pluralism, and social progress (OECD, 2016[1]). Some jurisdictions, for instance South Africa, have a public interest clause in their competition law.
Article 160 of the Entrepreneur Code sets out the objectives of Kazakhstan’s competition law, with the primary goal being the protection of competition. The law defines competition as a “state of affairs in which independent actions of market entities effectively limit the ability of each other to unilaterally influence the general conditions of circulation of goods in the relevant commodity market.” This refers to a market environment where no single entity can dominate or distort market conditions. Other objectives include creating and maintaining favourable conditions for fair competition, ensuring effective market functioning, economic unity, free movement of goods, and freedom of economic activity. The law also aims to restrict monopolistic activities and prevent competition law violations.
While these objectives are mainly economic, some provisions suggest additional, unstated goals. For example, certain practices are exempted if they support SME development. Moreover, the Agency's enforcement practice shows a focus on consumer protection, especially against high prices, using competition tools to scrutinise and regulate price increases. These broader goals go beyond the typical scope of a competition authority and may divert resources from core functions better handled by other agencies. Although the Entrepreneur Code frames competition law objectives in economic terms, the Agency's operations are also shaped by short-term priorities set by the President in policy documents, orders and decrees (Box 4.1). The President retains a large influence on the aims and direction of competition policy and in particular on the functioning of the Agency. This can also raise questions about the de facto independence of the Agency (see Section 3.1.8).
Recent developments in competition policy in Kazakhstan have been influenced by several significant documents and legal acts. In 2022, the President adopted a decree introducing the ‘Concept of Protection and Development of Competition in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2022–2026’. It identifies the main problems contributing to the distortion of competition and proposes solutions to achieve a healthy competitive environment. The decree lists the following priorities to ensure the protection of competition, including:
ensuring access to essential facilities
reducing administrative and economic barriers to entry
ensuring equal access of business entities to state support measures
reducing the share of market entities with state participation
improving mechanisms for protection and development of competition, and
elimination of obstacles of switching.
In May 2024, the President proposed new measures to further liberalise Kazakhstan’s economy, some of which were directly related to the protection and development of competition. These include the completion of the privatisation process and the prevention of an increase of state-owned enterprises, improvement of competition in financial markets, equal access to state support measures for private entrepreneurship and further measures in certain sectors, such as fuel and energy.
Only a few months later, on 30 July 2024, the President adopted a National Development Plan of the Republic of Kazakhstan until 2029. The plan emphasised the continuing need to encourage fair competition and argued for the introduction of a proactive competition policy that would abandon punitive methods and move to the use of “soft law” tools. Among the policy priorities, the decree notes equal access to infrastructure, implementation of the principle of competitive neutrality, reduction of state participation in several commodity markets (e.g. telecommunications, rail and air transport, energy) and privatisation.
Sources: Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 22 June 2022, no. 938; Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 8 May 2024, no. 542; Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 30 July 2024, no. 611.
Kazakhstan’s competition law prohibits restrictive agreements and concerted practices. Previous versions of the law did not differentiate between restrictive agreements and concerted practices, nor between different types of restrictive agreements. The 2013 reform1 introduced a difference in treatment between horizontal and vertical agreements and a distinction between restrictive agreements and concerted practices. This approach was also adopted by the Entrepreneur Code in 2015.
In its current version, Article 169 of the Entrepreneur Code covers three groups of restrictive agreements:
horizontal anti-competitive agreements which are treated as restrictions by object (Paragraph 1)
vertical anti-competitive agreements which are treated as restrictions by object (Paragraph 2)
other (horizontal and vertical) anti-competitive agreements (Paragraph 3).
4.2.1. Horizontal agreements
According to Article 168 of the Entrepreneur Code, horizontal agreements are anti-competitive agreements between market entities that are competitors2 or potential competitors.3 The legal treatment of horizontal agreements differs based on the content of the agreement in question.
Article 169(1) prohibits horizontal agreements that “lead or might lead” to one of the following five consequences: (i) price fixing, (ii) bid rigging, (iii) market sharing, (iv) output restriction, or (v) collusive boycotts. Such agreements are recognised by law as “cartels”, i.e. hard-core restrictions of competition. These are considered prohibitions by object, and do not require an analysis of anti-competitive effects. The Entrepreneur Code stipulates that there are no exemptions to these agreements. In other jurisdictions, a per se prohibition of agreements on price fixing, bid rigging, market division, output restriction and collusive boycotts is common. This approach was introduced into Kazakhstan’s competition law with a reform in 2013. Earlier, all agreements were subject to an analysis of anti-competitive effects.
The 2013 reform also defined horizontal agreements as agreements which “infringe upon consumer rights” as per se offenses, without having to also demonstrate anti-competitive effects. Thus, violations of competition law could also be established solely based on (a perception of) infringements of consumer rights. OECD (2016[2]) rightly notes that the law confused the protection of consumer welfare with the protection of legal rights of individual consumers. With the adoption of the 2015 Entrepreneur Code, the formulation “infringe upon consumer rights” was removed, in line with the OECD recommendation.
Not all horizontal agreements belong to the five categories above and are therefore not considered restrictions of competition by object. Such horizontal agreements are covered in Article 169(3), which prohibits other agreements between market entities that “lead or might lead to restriction of competition”. Some illustrations, provided by the law, include agreements on discriminatory treatment of market entities, unjustified output restrictions, unjustified price discrimination, restriction of market access and tying and bundling. The list is non-exhaustive and other agreements restricting competition are covered. These horizontal agreements constitute restrictions of competition by effect and require an analysis of their anti-competitive effects. Consequently, the law also allows for potential efficiencies arising from such horizontal agreements to provide grounds for a defence (see section 4.2.4).
A large share of cartel cases in Kazakhstan relate to bid rigging. While cartel provisions cover collusion between competitors in public procurement, Kazakhstan introduced a new competition law violation in 2018 that prohibits actions of public procurement organisers, procurement operators and tender operators aimed at co‑ordinating the activities of suppliers and bidders in a public procurement procedure (see more in section 4.7.2).
The Agency monitors signs of potential bid-rigging by collecting data on tenders. Some triggers may be if several tenders are won by the same company, if a certain number of companies appear to be taking turns to win bids, if there are bidders present who have never submitted a bid before, and the time difference in bid applications. Once such signals have been detected, the Agency examines the bids looking for further evidence, such as similarity of bids, spelling errors, calculations etc., IP addresses, email addresses and other evidence of connections between bidders. Box 4.2 illustrates some cases of bid-rigging.
Bid-rigging in the market for pharmaceutical logistics (2024)
In 2020 and 2021, the Agency investigated potential bid-rigging in public procurement of storage and transportation services for medicines and medical devices, procured by an SOE, SK-Pharmacy. The investigation concerned three companies, namely LLP “Kazakh Pharmaceutical Company Medservice Plus”, LLP “STOPHARM”, and LLP “AK NIET”. The investigation showed that these companies colluded by dividing the market regionally (through applying for particular lots with no overlap) between 2017 and 2020 and agreed on the prices in these tenders. The Agency also found that the companies previously submitted bids for regions that they later ceased to pursue. The court affirmed the Agency’s analysis and evidence and sanctioned the companies (Table 4.1).
Bid-rigging in the market for construction and installation works (2021)
In 2021, the Agency launched an investigation concerning potential bid-rigging in a public procurement tender for construction and installation works for a project in the East Kazakhstan region. In particular, the Agency found a bid-rigging cartel between companies LLP “Tereze” and LLP “Elkhon”, according to which LLP “Elkhon” appeared to bid and to compete with LLP “Tereze”, ensuring that the procurement process was formally considered valid, but with no intention to do so. The Agency substantiated its claims with the fact that bid submissions were made with a short time difference, both companies’ tender documentation was prepared by the same person, and that there was corporate affiliation between the companies. In 2024, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan threw out the case, affirming the lower courts’ judgments to annul the Agency’s decision on technical grounds, as the courts found that the investigation report did not reflect the stages required for conducting a market analysis and was, in this sense, incomplete. This is a frequent incidence in Kazakhstan (Section 5.1.7).
Source: Court judgments no. 7528-24-00-3/13280 (15 April 2024), no. 7528-24-00-3/13301 (17 April 2024), and no. 7528-24-00-3/13291 (18 April 2024); Supreme Court judgment no. No. 6001-23-00-6PP/3 (26 April 2024).
4.2.2. Vertical agreements
Article 168 of the Entrepreneur Code defines vertical agreements as anti-competitive agreements between non-competing market entities, one of which purchases the goods (potential buyer) and the other provides the goods (potential seller).
While the 2008 Law on Competition required the analysis of anti-competitive effects of all vertical agreements, the 2013 reform introduced a policy shift. Some vertical agreements were prohibited per se, while others still required an effects analysis. The Entrepreneur Code followed the latter approach.
Accordingly, Article 169(2) of the Entrepreneur Code prohibits as restrictions of competition by object the following vertical agreements:
agreements that lead or might lead to the establishment of the resale price of goods (with the exception of the maximum resale price of goods)
agreements that provide the buyer with an obligation not to sell goods of a market entity that is the competitor of the seller (with the exception of agreements on the organisation of sale of goods under a trademark)
agreements that provide the seller with an obligation not to sell goods to a market entity that is the competitor of the buyer.
The 2013 reform introduced a per se prohibition, which did not allow any exemptions in case of potential efficiencies arising from these types of agreements. This was found by the OECD (2016[2]) to be too strict, as it might suppress vertical agreements that are efficiency enhancing. Thus, the OECD recommended a rule of reason approach, weighing pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects of the vertical agreement in question. The Entrepreneur Code partly complies with this recommendation in the sense that it allows an efficiency defence. However, prohibition of these agreements as restrictions of competition by object remains (and so an analysis of anti-competitive effects is still not required).
Vertical agreements outside the scope of Paragraph 2 are covered in Article 169(3) of the Entrepreneur Code, as in the case of horizontal agreements (see above). Such vertical agreements constitute restrictions of competition by effect. Consequently, the law also allows for potential efficiencies arising from such horizontal agreements to be argued.
Vertical agreement between KTZ Freight Transport and Hill Corporation
In 2024, the Agency investigated and found a vertical agreement between KTZ Freight Transport (customer) and Hill Corporation (supplier), according to which the KTZ Freight Transport adopted discriminatory practices in its tender process to exclude alternative locomotive motor oil suppliers from participating in the process as potential suppliers in favour of the Hill Corporation.
The basis for initiating the investigation was information received from state authorities indicating a violation or signs of a violation of the legislation of the competition law. The investigation revealed that various discriminatory methods were applied during the tender process to eliminate alternative suppliers from participating in the procurement: in the tender, an additional requirement was imposed for the completion of operational testing; however, the testing periods varied between suppliers (HILL – 4 months, Lukoil – 15 months).
After the application, additional documents confirming the ability to deliver the product under DDP conditions (i.e. availability of a filling station at railway stations) were requested from potential suppliers (excluding HILL).
Hill Corporation and KTZ Freight Transport challenged the results of the investigation in court, but the courts affirmed the Agency’s findings. The case materials were transferred to law enforcement authorities for the initiation of a pre-trial investigation. The case is currently being considered for criminal liability.
Source: Information provided by the Agency; Agency for Protection and Development of Competition (2024[3]), Anti-competitive agreement between KTZH-Cargo Transportation and Hill Corporation Too Ltd. https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/zk/press/news/details/695805?lang=ru.
4.2.3. Co-ordination of economic activities by a third party
Article 169(5) of the Entrepreneur Code also prohibits the co-ordination of economic activities by a third party that leads to any of the consequences listed in paragraphs 1, 2 or 3. The co-ordination of economic activities is understood as the “co-ordination of actions of market entities by a third party who is not in the same group of persons with one of these market entities and who does not operate in the commodity market(s) in which the actions of market entities are coordinated”. According to the Agency, they have never had any cases involving a trade association, and this article has not been used in previous case work.
4.2.4. Exemptions for anti-competitive agreements
The “efficiency” exemption
Article 169(8) of the Entrepreneur Code provides for an exemption from anti-competitive agreements. Such agreements will be allowed if the following conditions are cumulatively satisfied:
the agreement does not impose restrictions on market entities that are not necessary to achieve the objectives of the agreement
the agreement does not create an opportunity to eliminate competition in the relevant commodity market
the agreement leads or might lead to one of the following: (i) assistance in improving the production, (ii) stimulation of technical (economic) progress, or (iii) increase of competitiveness of the goods produced
consumers receive a proportionate part of the benefits obtained from the agreement.
The 2013 reform excluded the possibility of applying the “efficiency” exemption to per se prohibited vertical agreements. The OECD (2016[2]) to found this to be too strict, as it might prevent efficiency enhancing vertical agreements. The Entrepreneur Code now allows this exemption for all vertical agreements. On the other hand, the Entrepreneur Code excludes cartels (paragraph 1) from this exemption. Thus, agreements on price fixing, bid rigging, market division, output restriction, or collusive boycotts cannot put forward an efficiency defence.
The intellectual property exemption
Article 169(7) provides for an exemption for the exercise of exclusive rights in relation to intellectual activity and other equivalent means of individualisation of a legal entity or goods. This exemption is applicable to all anti-competitive agreements and covers the exercise of all forms of intellectual property rights, including trademarks and commercial names.
For a long time, Kazakhstan’s competition law categorically exempted agreements relating to the exercise of intellectual property rights. In its 2016 Peer Review, the OECD recommended the exemption to be included in the general framework for exemptions, as these types of agreements can be harmful to competition. A case-by-case analysis of their anti-competitive effects and benefits was proposed as more adequate.
In the 2016 amendment of the Entrepreneur Code4, agreements relating to the exercise of intellectual property rights are exempt from the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements, “provided that such agreements have not led or may not lead to the restriction or elimination of competition”.
The “group of persons” exemption
Article 169(6) of the Entrepreneur Code exempts anti-competitive agreements between market entities within the same “group of persons,” as such entities are considered a single economic entity. Although the Code defines this group broadly,5 only two types qualify for the exemption: (i) entities where one controls the other, and (ii) entities under common control.
“Control” means the ability to determine decisions of another entity, either through: (i) owning over 50% of voting shares, (ii) performing executive functions, or (iii) having the right to dictate economic activity or issue binding instructions. This exemption is absolute, except in cases of bid-rigging. Agreements within a group of persons that involve bid-rigging are not exempt, preventing abuse of the group structure to circumvent competition rules.
An almost per se exemption of groups of persons from the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements is questionable. Although it is true that a group of persons can simply represent an alternative organisational structure to a single integrated company, this is not always the case. A better approach would be a case-by-case assessment covering how much control one market entity has over another, how aligned their interests are and how they conduct themselves on the market (Van Cleynenbreugel, 2011[4]). Only when a group of persons is established based on these criteria should the exemption apply.
“De minimis” exemption
There is no general “de minimis” exemption from the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements in Kazakhstan’s competition law. The only “de minimis” exemption applies to vertical agreements, with the exception of vertical agreements considered as restrictions of competition by object (Paragraph 2). Other vertical agreements (Paragraph 3) can be exempted from competition law scrutiny if the share of market entities in one commodity market does not exceed 20%. The exceptions include vertical agreements relating to complex business licenses (franchising), public-private partnerships, including concessions, and procurement of goods. Unlike many OECD countries, Kazakhstan does not allow a “de minimis” exception for horizontal agreements (excluding hard-core cartels).
4.2.5. Statistics on restrictive agreements
Restrictive agreements represent between one-quarter and one-third of decisions by the Agency. As illustrated by Figure 4.1, around 40 decisions are generally issued per year, with 2023 being an outlier. Bid-rigging cases constitute a large share of restrictive agreement cases (in 2023, their share was 50%).
Source: Data provided by the Agency.
4.3.1. The notion of a concerted practice
Kazakhstan’s competition law prohibits concerted practices aimed at restricting competition. The notion of concerted practices has changed through time, rising from three practices in 2008 (Law on Competition) to six in 2016. According to Article 170(2) of the Entrepreneur Code, the existence of six elements is required cumulatively to establish a concerted practice:
1. the actions of market entities restrict competition
2. the result of the actions corresponds to the interests of each of the market entities
3. the actions of market entities are known to each of them in advance (by means of public statement or public placement of information)
4. the actions of each of the market entities are caused by the actions of other market entities
5. the actions of market entities are not a consequence of circumstances that equally affect all of these market entities, and
6. the minimum aggregate share of market entities in the relevant product market is 35% and the minimum share of one market entity is 5%.
Prior to the 1st antimonopoly package, a defining element was the requirement of “parallel actions of market entities performed within a three-month period and as a result of which each of the market entities received a benefit that was otherwise not expected”. This enabled the competition authority to focus on parallel price increases without the need to prove co‑ordination or collusion. This price control approach was very controversial and OECD (2016, p. 108[2]) advised against it, as it did not necessarily tackle hard-core cartels. In the 1st antimonopoly package, this requirement was eliminated, which enables the competition authority to focus more on co-ordination rather than on price control. It does not seem that this is the case. OECD found that price control is still very prevalent and is incorporated in standard competition tools as well. Thus, parallel price increases without justification in costs are deemed by the Agency to constitute a concerted practice, hence the recommendation from the 2016 Peer Review still holds.
Concerted practices are prohibited if they are aimed at restricting competition. Examples, provided by the law, are (i) fixing prices and other terms of purchase or sale, (ii) unjustified output restriction, (iii) unjustified refusal to deal, and (iv) application of discriminatory conditions to equivalent contracts. Table 4.2 provides some statistics.
Source: Information provided by the Agency.
Retail fuel suppliers’ case
During an investigation conducted in 2018, the Agency established that retail fuel supply companies (LLP “Sinooil,” LLP “Helios,” LLP “KazMunayGaz Onimderi,” LLP “GazProm Neft-Kazakhstan,” and LLP “Novaya AZS”) unjustifiably and simultaneously increased fuel prices during the period from August 2016 to February 2017. The Agency found no objective reasons for the price increase, and therefore classified the price increase as concerted actions. Moreover, materials obtained during the investigation indicated that the purchase price had decreased and that there were significant stockpiles. Thus, three entities raised prices for the first time in October 2016, with two of them doing so on the same day.
The court upheld the Agency’s position and recognised the companies as administratively liable.
LLP “Sinooil,” LLP “Helios,” and LLP “Novaya AZS” were held administratively liable, with confiscation of monopolistic income. The case against LLP “KazMunayGaz was closed.
Source: Information provided by the Agency.
4.3.2. Exemptions for concerted practices
Two possible exemptions are provided by the Entrepreneur Code.
“De minimis” exemption
The “de minimis” exemption is already included as a defining element of a concerted practice, stating that the minimum aggregate share of market entities in the relevant product market is 35% and the minimum share of (at least) one of the market entities in question is 5%. From this requirement it can be inferred that the exemption applies (i) to actions of market entities who, in aggregate, have market shares below 35% in the relevant product market and (ii) to actions of market entities, who, individually, all have market shares below 5%. The cumulative threshold requirement allows, hypothetically, for an exemption of an action of market entities who have an aggregate market share substantially higher than 35% but all have individual shares of less than 5%. The exemption is not rebuttable: if “de minimis” is satisfied, there is deemed to be no concerted practice, regardless of effects.
There are further issues in relation to the thresholds. The aggregate market share of 35% appears to be very high, as it allows exemption of co‑ordination of one-third of market entities in the relevant product market (horizontal concerted practices). In the European Union, for instance, the threshold is 10% for horizontal concerted practices, (substantially lower than Kazakhstan’s 35% exemption)6; and 15% for vertical restricted practices (Box 4.5).
In Kazakhstan, it is not clear how this threshold is applied to vertical concerted practices since market entities in question do not compete in the same relevant product market. A distinction between horizontal and vertical concerted practices would be useful to define the “de minimis” exemption.
Summary of vertical agreements under de minimis
Market share thresholds (De Minimis Notice – 2014/C 291/01)
Vertical agreements (between non-competitors) are exempt from Article 101(1) if each party's market share on the relevant market does not exceed 15%. If parties are actual or potential competitors, the lower 10% threshold applies. These thresholds apply to the relevant market(s) affected by the agreement.
Hardcore restrictions exclusion
Even if market shares are below the thresholds, de minimis does not apply if the agreement contains hardcore restrictions (as defined under the VBER).
In vertical agreements, hardcore restrictions include:
Resale price maintenance (fixing minimum or fixed resale prices).
Territorial/customer restrictions (restricting passive sales into other territories/customers).
Restrictions on cross-supplies among distributors in a selective distribution system.
Restrictions on online sales that unduly limit access or visibility.
Legal effect
Agreements falling under the de minimis thresholds and free of hardcore restrictions are not considered to restrict competition appreciably, so Article 101(1) TFEU does not apply.
These agreements do not need to be exempted under Article 101(3) because they are not caught in the first place.
Interaction with the vertical block exemption regulation (VBER)
The VBER (Regulation (EU) 2022/720) offers a safe harbour up to a 30% market share for both supplier and buyer.
If market shares exceed 15% but are below 30%, and no hardcore restrictions are present, the VBER may apply instead of relying on de minimis.
Source: De Minimis Notice – 2014/C 291/01.
Paragraph 4 exemption
Article 170(4) of the Entrepreneur Code provides an exemption for concerted practices between market entities within the same group of persons, provided the practices aim to:
Improve production through the introduction of advanced technologies, standardisation, quality control systems, or environmental protection—on the condition that consumers receive a proportionate share of the resulting benefits;
Support the development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); or
Develop and apply standardisation documents.
This exemption is unusual in its structure, as it combines two distinct types of exemptions into one: the “group of persons” exemption and the “efficiency” exemption. Each has a different rationale. The “group of persons” exemption treats intra-group agreements as internal co‑ordination within a single economic entity, similar to a vertically integrated firm. The “efficiency” exemption, by contrast, applies to agreements that generate pro-competitive benefits sufficient to outweigh any anti-competitive effects.
It seems counterintuitive that entities within a group of persons can freely enter into restrictive agreements, yet require additional justification—namely, the production of specific efficiency benefits—for concerted practices. Given that restrictive agreements and concerted practices are functionally similar in their effects on competition, this divergent treatment lacks a clear justification.
Harmonising the exemption criteria for restrictive agreements and concerted practices would improve the coherence and consistency of Kazakhstan’s competition law framework.
4.4.1. Definition of a dominant position and monopoly position
Dominant and monopoly positions are defined in Article 172(1) of the Entrepreneur Code: they correspond to the ability of a market entity or several market entities to control the relevant product market, including to exert a decisive influence on the conditions of circulation of goods.
The rules on establishing a dominant position are incorporated in the Entrepreneur Code and replicated in the Agency’s Methodology for analysing the state of competition in product markets.7 The law introduces several structural presumptions of dominance, building on market shares as indicators in the relevant product market. Both single and joint dominance are considered. The methodology further specifies the analytical approach to establishing dominance, mainly relying on the Lerner index.
Structural presumptions
The Entrepreneur Code sets market share thresholds that establish a presumption of dominance in the relevant product market. While economic analysis should support the determination of dominance, the Agency relies heavily on these structural presumptions. Notably, some—such as the presumption of dominance for market shares of 50 % or more—are irrebuttable and require no economic analysis. Such irrebuttable presumptions are generally considered poor practice in competition law and should be avoided.
Market share is calculated as the ratio of a market entity’s sales volume to the total volume of the relevant product market, which includes the sales of all market participants. 8
According to Article 172(3) of the Entrepreneur Code, an entity with a market share of 35 % or more may also be individually recognised as dominant if the following three conditions are met:
the entity can unilaterally determine prices and exert decisive influence over general conditions for the circulation of goods
there are economic, technological, administrative, or other barriers to entry in the market
the entity’s ability to exert such influence has lasted for a certain period.
Market entities may also be found jointly dominant (Article 172(4)). Two or three entities with the largest market shares are jointly dominant if their combined share is 50 % or more; four entities are jointly dominant if their combined share is 70 % or more.9
Additionally, the following three conditions must be satisfied:
the relative size of shares of market entities is unchanged for a long period of time (at least 1 year)
the product sold or purchased by market entities cannot be replaced by another product during consumption
information on the price and (or) terms of sale is available to an indefinite number of people.
A market entity cannot be found dominant if its market share does not exceed 15%. This provision serves as a safe harbour to jointly dominant market entities but does not apply to individual dominance. There, a threshold of 35% is typically used, meaning that a 15% market share will hardly be relevant in terms of establishment of a dominant position.
Apart from the dominant position, the law also defines the monopoly position. Natural monopolies, state monopolies, market entities with special rights, and market entities having 100% share in a relevant product market are all recognised as having a monopoly position.
Analytical approach
The Methodology for analysing the state of competition in product markets further introduces an alternative way of establishing a dominant position by means more thorough economic analysis. It emphasises particularly two indicators – market concentration indicators and the Lerner index.
Kazakhstan uses two market concentration indices. The concentration ratio (CR) is calculated as a ratio of sales by the largest market entities to total sales in the relevant product market. Typically, the concentration ratio for three or four largest market entities is calculated (CR3 or CR4). The Agency uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) which is calculated as the sum of squares of the market shares of all market entities in the relevant product market. The methodology instructs that it is possible to use these indicators of market concentration to make a preliminary assessment of the degree of monopolisation in the market. It sets the following thresholds for highly concentrated markets: CR3 is between 70% and 100%%, CR4 is between 80% and 100%, and HHI is between 2 000 and 10 000. In OECD countries, the HHI is used more often with thresholds being rather similar.10
The second indicator which may be used to establish a dominant position is the Lerner index, which measures the percentage markup of price over marginal cost: L = (P–MC)/P. The methodology considers markets on which a dominant enterprise operates to have a Lerner index ranging between 0.8 and 0.9. A monopoly market is deemed to have a Lerner index close to 1.11 In practice, however, the Agency does not use the Lerner index.
Furthermore, the analytical approach to establish dominance remain purely theoretical, as the Agency relies seemingly exclusively on structural presumptions. Using these indices and other analytical approaches could contribute to better quality of decision-making and is to be encouraged.
4.4.2. Assessment of a dominant or monopoly position
Until 2017, Kazakhstan’s competition authority administered a State Register of Market Entities Occupying a Dominant or Monopoly Position (later denoted as “Register of Dominant Undertakings”). If the competition authority, typically as a result of a market analysis,12 had found a market entity to have a dominant or monopoly position, it was listed in the Register of Dominant Undertakings. Enrolment served as sufficient evidence of dominance in the cases of alleged competition law violations. No new analyses of the product market were necessary, and evidence of inaccuracies or changed circumstances in the product market provided by the market entities were irrelevant. Additionally, enrolment triggered reporting obligations and obligations for merger notifications regardless of the thresholds under the general framework (OECD, 2016[2]).
The Register of Dominant Undertakings was very controversial. Its rigidness meant that the competition authority did not conduct case-by-case analyses of the product market, resulting in potential misrepresentation of the economic reality in cases of alleged competition law violations. Thus, the OECD (2016[2])recommended the abolishment of the Register of Dominant Undertakings. Kazakhstan complied with the recommendation and abolished the register on 1 January 2017.13
Currently, the assessment of a dominant position must be conducted in each individual case in line with the Methodology for analysing the state of competition in product markets. The Methodology stipulates an 8-stage market analysis (see section 7.2), determining: (i) criteria for interchangeability of goods, (ii) boundaries of the product market, (iii) time interval for the study, (iv) composition of market entities operating in the product market, (v) volume of the product market and market shares, (vi) state of the competitive environment in the product market, (vii) barriers to entry and other obstacles for activities of market entities, and (viii) conclusions based on the results of the analysis. Within this market analysis, the relevant indicators should be calculated and the economic conditions on the market are assessed. However, our findings from discussions with the Agency as well as stakeholders indicate that structural presumptions relating to the assessment of the market share are predominantly used as criteria for establishing dominance.
Another important point is that the courts may not find in favour of the Agency if their own 8-Stage analysis as outlined in the Methodology has not been followed to the letter (see Section 4.4.1). Methodologies published by the Agency are binding in court in Kazakhstan. A practice which greatly hampers both the development of new analytical techniques (which may not be recognised in court), and prevents the Agency from adapting their processes to the case in hand. Using guidelines would be a better, more flexible and useful option.
4.4.3. Abuse of a dominant or monopoly position
Article 174 of the Entrepreneur Code defines abuse of a dominant or monopoly position as actions or omissions of market entities that “have led or lead to restriction of access to the relevant product market, prevent, restrict or eliminate competition and (or) infringe upon the legal rights of a market entity or an indefinite number of consumers”. Such abuse of a dominant or monopoly position is prohibited.
The definition of abuse appears overly broad, covering not only actions or omissions that restrict competition but also those that infringe the legal rights of market entities or consumers—even without a competition restriction. This conflicts with the core objective of competition law, which is to promote economic efficiency, not to protect individual legal rights. Infringements of such rights typically fall outside the scope of competition law and should be addressed under other legal fields, such as commercial or consumer protection law.
The law provides a non-exhaustive list of 12 examples of abusive conduct, namely:
establishment or maintenance of monopoly high and low prices, or monopsony low prices
establishment of different prices or different conditions to equivalent agreements with market entities or consumers without objectively justified reasons
restrictions on the resale of goods
making the conclusion of an agreement conditional upon the assumption of additional obligations that do not relate to the subject matter of the agreement
unjustified refusal to conclude an agreement with individual buyers, if the product can be produced or supplied, or non-response to an offer to conclude such an agreement in a 30-day term
making the sale conditional upon the acceptance of a restriction on purchasing competitor’s products
unjustified reduction or termination of production and (or) supply of goods, when there is demand and the goods can be produced
withdrawal of a product from circulation, if the result of such withdrawal is an increase in price
imposition of economically or technologically unjustified and unrelated terms of the contract
creation of barriers to entry or exit
economically, technologically or otherwise unjustified establishment of different prices for the same product, and the creation of discriminatory conditions
failure to provide equal access to essential facilities.
According to the Agency, around 30 investigations of abuse of a dominant or monopoly position are conducted annually. This is a striking number, given that the number of abuse-of-dominance cases in OECD countries is exceedingly small. One reason for this is the way the Agency receives information. Most cases are initiated based on complaints, often relating to unilateral price increases by large companies. The fact that there are so many abuses of dominance cases annually in Kazakhstan might, on the other hand, suggest that Kazakhstan has either a (too) extensive abuse of dominance framework or its application in practice is based on low evidentiary standards that are not difficult for the Agency to meet. Below, some of the most frequent types of abusive conduct are analysed – monopoly high prices, monopoly low prices and monopsony low prices.
Monopoly high prices
The Entrepreneur Code defines abusive “monopoly high prices” (or excessive prices) as a price set by a market entity with a dominant or monopoly position, if this price exceeds both (i) the sum of costs and profits necessary for the production and sale of a product and (ii) the price formed in the conditions of competition in the relevant product market or a comparable product market (Article 175). Monopoly high prices include price increases (in case of unchanged costs and market conditions) and price stagnation (in case of cost decreases and changes in market conditions that warrant price reductions).
The concept of monopoly high prices is an attempt to capture excessive prices. OECD (2012[5]) emphasises that excessive prices are a controversial issue in competition policy. Thus, some jurisdictions do not hold firms liable for excessive prices at all, while others address such cases with caution and restraint. Two of the main reasons for the reluctance of competition authorities to interfere are the expected self-correcting nature of the markets, as well as the difficulty of assessing what constitutes an excessive price. Consequently, competition authorities often focus more on exclusionary abuses of dominance.
Jurisdictions that do scrutinise excessive prices use different methodologies, such as comparison of prices, profitability, or price-cost markups (OECD, 2012[5]). Kazakhstan’s approach is defined by the Methodology for identifying monopoly high (low) prices.14 The competition authority must analyse the dynamics of prices and outputs of products. The process begins by comparing the alleged monopoly price with others in the same product market. If that is not possible, comparisons extend to comparable markets, domestically or abroad. If no valid comparison exists, the authority must assess production costs and necessary profits, though the latter is harder to determine. The Methodology specifies that profit assessments should consider factors like investments, risk levels, collective agreements, and contractual obligations with state bodies. While the methodology outlines a step-by-step process, the Entrepreneur Code mandates these criteria be met simultaneously.
Moreover, it is unclear what constitutes abusive conduct. There is no definition of what a benchmark or counterfactual competitive price should be in the Methodology. Further, while costs may be calculated with some precision, the correct or acceptable “necessary level of profits” is very difficult to establish. This was highlighted both by the Agency and by stakeholders. This creates an unpredictable environment regarding the liability for monopoly high prices.
Moreover, it seems from the Agency’s practice (Box 4.6) that monopoly high prices are in fact used as an instrument of price control, as the Agency seems to take simple price increases as an indication of monopoly high prices. The competition authority should mainly focus on the exclusionary abuses and rely on the monopoly high price provisions only when they are associated with other elements that lessen competition, such as high entry barriers (OECD, 2012, p. 49[5]).
Thermal coal prices: Bogatyr Komir LLP
An example illustrating monopoly high prices is a case concerning thermal coal prices. Based on a market analysis of the coal market, the Agency issued an order to initiate an investigation over Bogatyr Komir LLP over alleged monopoly high prices. The Agency substantiated its claim by the fact that the company, holding the market share of over 80%, increased its thermal coal prices from August 2022 to December 2022 and the rate of price increase was higher than that of other competitors. However, the administrative court struck down the order as unlawful and, inter alia, argued that the Agency failed to conduct a proper pricing analysis, including the analysis of costs and market-wide trends. Additionally, the court decision emphasised that many competitors’ prices were actually higher in December 2022. The appellate (oblast) court confirmed the administrative court’s ruling.
Prices of concrete: Stroykonstruktsiya JSC
In another case, the Agency alleged Stroykonstruktsiya to have set monopoly high prices between January and May 2021, as the company’s price for concrete was the highest among market entities. The administrative court annulled the Agency’s decision, and the regional court affirmed this ruling. The courts argued that the Agency failed to complete a market analysis prior to initiating an investigation. Relating to monopoly high prices, the courts found that some competitors actually charged higher prices than Stroykonstruktsiya JSC. Moreover, the court noted that the Agency failed to provide documents to prove that the price exceeded the production and sales costs, and the price formed under competitive conditions.
Source: court rulings provided by the Agency.
Monopoly low prices
Similarly to monopoly high prices, “monopoly low prices” (better known as predatory prices) are also seen as abusive and prohibited in Kazakhstan’s competition law. Article 175 defines a “monopoly low price” as a price set by a market entity with a dominant or monopoly position, if this price is either (i) lower than the price set in the same product market by a market entity that is not part of the same group of persons as the market entity with a dominant or monopoly position, or (ii) lower than the actual costs for the production and sale of a product. The two thresholds are stated alternatively in the law. Monopoly low prices include price reductions (in case of unchanged costs and market conditions) and price stagnation (in case of cost increases or changes on market conditions that warrant price increases).
Competition law typically recognises predatory pricing as an abuse of dominance. Kazakhstan’s concept of monopoly low prices, however, does not simply reflect the predatory pricing rationale and would appear to be much broader in scope. Under Kazakhstan’s competition law, a price set by a market entity holding a dominant or monopoly position can be deemed a monopoly low price, simply if that price is lower than the price set by any competitor (excluding market entities in the same group of persons). In terms of predatory pricing, this provision is highly overinclusive, as it also appears to include low prices arising from cost-saving efficiencies. If, for instance, a market entity holding a dominant position, benefits from economies of scale and is able set a lower price as a result of such a cost advantage, such a price might constitute a monopoly low price under the law. It is well established in OECD jurisdictions that competition law should not protect competitors (OECD, 2005[6]). Kazakhstan’s approach appears to do exactly that.
Defining a monopoly low price can also be done via costs, which is also a more common approach to establishing predatory prices. In this definition, a monopoly low price is a price below the amount of actual costs for the production and sale of a product. As OECD (2005, p. 20[6]) noted, different jurisdictions use different price-cost tests for analysing predatory pricing cases. As a relevant threshold, below which the price must drop, short-run marginal cost, average variable cost, average total cost, or average avoidable cost15 are used. Kazakhstan’s law uses the “actual cost” threshold. The Methodology for identifying monopoly high (low) prices provides a clarification on this terminology. Actual costs take into account renumeration expenses, depreciation charges, expenses for payments of borrowed funds, and the expenses directly related to the production and sale of goods. Thus, the term “actual cost” seems to cover total costs.
Network television cable operator case
In 2018, the Agency carried out an investigation concerning a cable television operator JSC “AlmaTelecommunications Kazakhstan”. The Agency had received a complaint from a competing firm, LLP “RT” which stated that JSC “AlmaTelecommunications Kazakhstan” had been working with consumers to terminate contracts with other cable operators and conclude contracts with JSC “AlmaTelecommunications Kazakhstan” at a 50% discount.
The Agency established that JSC AlmaTelecommunications Kazakhstan held a dominant position in the market for paid television channel distribution services via cable networks in the city of Kokshetau. According to the Agency, its investigation revealed that during the period from 30 November 2016 to 30 December 2017, the company set monopolistically low prices by offering consumers the “Prosto TV” package at a promotional price of KZT 850, while competitors charged KZT 1 400.
These prices forced a competitor, LLP “Kokshetau Telesputnik”, to exit the market. The investigation established that the production and total cost of the price for newly connected subscribers under the promotion exceeded the price for the same service package before the promotion was launched. There were no prerequisites for a price reduction.
An analysis of financial and economic activity showed that JSC “AlmaTelecommunications Kazakhstan,” despite incurring losses from the sale of the “Prosto TV” package, launched the promotion and lowered the price.
The Agency’s findings were affirmed by the court. By court decision, JSC “AlmaTelecommunications Kazakhstan” was held administratively liable under Article 159, Part 3 of the Code of Administrative Offenses and was issued an administrative penalty in the form of a fine exceeding KZT 4 million. Additionally, monopolistic income exceeding KZT 3 million was confiscated.
Source: Information provided by the Agency.
Monopsony low prices
Article 176 of the Entrepreneur Code defines a monopsony low price as one at which a product is acquired by a market entity holding a monopsony position if: (i) the price enables the buyer to earn additional income by reducing production or sales costs at the seller’s expense, or (ii) the price is below the sum of the seller’s production and sales costs plus a required profit. A monopsony position is defined as a buyer holding at least a 70% market share.
This definition again reflects the Agency’s preference for using structural presumptions, relying solely on market share thresholds, rather than an economic analysis of buyer power. In contrast, OECD jurisdictions generally assess monopsony power—the ability to depress prices below competitive levels—through economic evidence, mirroring the treatment of monopoly or dominant positions (OECD, 2009, p. 34[7]).16
The scope of the monopsony low price provision is also overly broad. Because the conditions are phrased disjunctively, any price reduction that lowers buyer costs “at the expense of the seller” may qualify as abusive. As nearly all price reductions impact sellers, this could effectively ban any negotiation and de facto forces buyers with monopsony status to accept any price offered by sellers. While exercising monopsony power does involve reducing prices below competitive levels, not all such reductions are inherently abusive. Moreover, once monopsony power is exercised, prevailing prices already reflect that power, making it difficult to identify a reliable competitive benchmark.
As OECD (2009, p. 10[7]) notes, competition authorities should focus on conduct that creates, enhances, or maintains buyer power and leads to anticompetitive effects, such as reduced efficiency or consumer harm. Broader regulation of buyer power, particularly absent clear harm, may be more appropriate for sectoral or consumer protection regulators.
Price control powers
Kazakhstan’s competition law provisions on monopoly high and low prices, and monopsony low prices are overly broad, also covering some forms of pricing conduct that are not typically addressed by competition law. This de facto provides the competition authority with a powerful tool to exercise price control.
The OECD Peer Review (2016[2]) already noted that price control mechanisms only tackle symptoms of dominance, such as high prices, while they do not address the underlying reasons (for instance, exclusion of competitors, or high barriers to entry). Thus, the OECD recommended a shift in focus from attempting to control prices to addressing exclusionary practices. Today, the broad concepts of monopoly high and low prices and monopsony low prices still provide the competition authority with substantial powers to controlling prices. Business stakeholders also confirmed this. Hence it would appear that the Agency is still engaged primarily in price control activities, and the 2016 recommendation has not been implemented.
Equal access to essential facilities
Failure to provide equal access to essential facilities is also defined as a type of abuse of a dominant or monopoly position since 2022.17 Prior to that, Kazakhstan’s competition law had no explicit reference to the essential facilities doctrine.
An essential facility as a product or an infrastructure facility owned or operated by a dominant or monopoly market entity, and without which other market entities cannot produce or sell their product in the relevant or adjacent product market (Article 176-1). For the product or infrastructure facility to qualify as an ‘essential facility’, the following conditions must be satisfied:
duplication is not possible or economically feasible due to technological features
the holder of the essential facility has the right to possess, use and dispose of the relevant product or infrastructure facility
the holder of the essential facility does not have any material barriers that would prevent them from granting access to the relevant product or infrastructure facility
an unjustified denial of access to the essential facility will have a negative impact on competition
access to the essential facility is not provided by means of exchange trading.
If the Agency identifies an essential facility in the process of conducting a market analysis, it publishes the decision and a list of all the holders of such essential facility. They are required by law to provide equal access to the essential facility to other market participants.
According to the Rules for equal access to essential facility,18 equal access can be granted upon a submission of an application by a market entity. The holders of the essential facility must accept applications annually. The application procedure, including the deadlines and submission form, is regulated. After receiving the application, the holder of the essential facility considers the application and issues a result of this consideration. One of three possible decisions can be made: (i) to conclude the contract on the terms requested, (ii) to conclude the contract on the terms proposed by the holder of the essential facility, or (iii) to refuse the conclusion of a contract. The only grounds for refusal are lack of availability of the essential facility or lack of infrastructure necessary to provide access. Disagreement with the decision can be disputed before the Agency and the court.
4.4.4. Statistics on abuse of a dominant or monopoly position
On average, the Agency issues over 20 decisions on abuse of dominance cases a year (with 2020 being an outlier), representing between 15% and 22% of all cases. This is a stark difference from most OECD jurisdictions that only prosecute a few cases per year given the normal length and complexity of these types of cases. This may be a result of the very short deadlines for an investigation which enables the Agency to conduct several cases every year, in comparison to other jurisdictions. Kazakhstan sets short timeframes for market analyses and investigations; hence it is not so surprising that the number of abuses of a dominant or monopoly position cases is so large compared to other jurisdictions.
Source: Data provided by the Agency
4.4.5. Conglomerates
The Agency has the power to analyse and monitor conglomerates.
Kazakhstan’s definition of conglomerates diverges from the standard understanding—firms operating in different, possibly unrelated, product markets. This is a new concept in Kazakhstan’s competition law which was introduced in 2024.19 Article 172-1 of the Entrepreneur Code defines a conglomerate as a market entity or a group of persons holding a dominant or monopoly position in both the relevant and adjacent product market. Some market entities, such as bank holdings, are exempt from this definition. OECD (2020[8]) defines conglomerates more broadly, including firms whose products may be complements, weak substitutes, or unrelated. However, this broader definition does not imply that conglomerates are inherently more likely to breach competition law or require closer scrutiny.
The definition of conglomerates in Kazakhstan’s law deviates from the general understanding of conglomerates as firms operating in different product markets, adjacent or not. OECD (2020[8]) noted that the conglomerate products can be complements, weak substitutes or completely unrelated products, hence adopting a much wider definition than Kazakhstan. This does not suggest, however, that more extensive monitoring is warranted, as it cannot be presumed that conglomerates are more prone to competition law violations than other market entities.
Kazakhstan’s Entrepreneur Code requires the Agency to maintain a state register of conglomerates, published online. A market entity is designated a conglomerate based on an analysis of its activities across relevant and adjacent product markets. The register records the firm’s various activities and its market shares in each. However, as market shares are dynamic, the accuracy of this information diminishes over time. The law does not specify how long an entity remains on the register, nor under what conditions it may be removed. While the Agency states that registration can be appealed in court, no such mechanism is codified in law.
Designation as a conglomerate grants the Agency wide monitoring powers, including the right to conduct studies on production, pricing, and profitability. 20 It can collect data from state bodies and directly request information from conglomerates. This information may be used to identify potential monopoly high or low prices, monopsony low prices, or other abuses of dominance. 21
It is notable that Kazakhstan created this register only a few years after abolishing the Register of Dominant Undertakings. Unlike its predecessor, the conglomerate register does not establish dominance but enables targeted surveillance. However, the rationale for treating conglomerates differently from other large firms is unclear. While the Agency admits that conglomerates are not typically subject to special competition oversight internationally, it views them as particularly harmful, owing to their market concentration, barriers to entry, and alleged state favouritism. 22
This regulatory shift followed the President Tokayev’s 2022 address, where he called for enhanced scrutiny of conglomerates’ transactions, including checks for non-market pricing, and urged their regulation under a special antitrust law. Consequently the Entrepreneurial Code was amended to provide the Agency with the authority to analyse and monitor the activities of conglomerates.23 According to the Agency, the approval of the register by the Agency serves as a regulatory tool that defines the list of companies subject to conglomerate analysis and monitoring. The Agency argued that in the absence or elimination of such a register, it would be unclear to whom the above-mentioned authority would apply as companies themselves would not be aware of the obligations imposed on them. While the register provides predictability on the subjective scope of application of the law, it raises questions as to the need to maintain the register up to date and possible exposure of the Agency to litigation in case firms disagree on their inclusion in the register. For this reason, other jurisdictions, do not rely on registers to monitor conglomerates. Lacking a well-defined justification for using registers to monitor conglomerates, the register should be replaced by a clear set of principles that businesses can use to self-asses if they are subject the legal prescriptions on conglomerates and the Agency should investigate compliance on a case-by-case basis.
4.5.1. Concentration control regime
Kazakhstan’s concentration (merger) control aims to prevent the emergence of monopolies or restrictions of competition. In recent years, the concentration control regime has been relatively stable in terms of its legal framework.
There are five types of economic concentration recognised in Article 201 of the Entrepreneur Code that trigger obligations under the merger control regime:
1. corporate reorganisation in the form of a merger or an acquisition
2. acquisition of more than 50% of voting shares of a market entity, if the acquirer controlled 50% or less of the voting shares prior to the acquisition
3. acquisition of main production assets and (or) intangible assets of another market entity, if the book value of that property exceeds 20% of the book value of all main production assets and intangible assets of that market entity
4. acquisition of rights in another market entity that allow giving binding instructions and exercising control over its business activities, including (from 2024 onwards24) negative control, i.e. ability to block a decision by means of veto or a similar mechanism
5. appointment of an individual to executive bodies, boards of directors, supervisory boards or other management bodies of two or more market entities, allowing them to control the decision-making in those market entities.
The merger regime has two pillars, one for ex-ante merger control, which requires a prior notification of an economic concentration to the competition authority to be effective. The second pillar is ex-post merger control. Market entities are required to notify the competition authority of the transaction after its execution, no later than 45 calendar days after completion.
Prior to 2024, ex-ante merger control was required for economic concentrations of type 1–3, while ex post merger control applied to economic concentrations of type 4–5.25 However, the 2024 amendments to the Entrepreneur Code26 moved the economic concentration of type 3 (purchase of main production assets or intangible assets) to the ex-post merger regime (Article 201(8)). However, the implementation of this reform was poorly carried out because Article 200(1), which states that the economic concentration of type 3 falls into ex-ante concentration control, was left intact. Thus, today’s concentration control regime for economic concentrations of type 3 is unclear, as there are conflicting provisions in the Entrepreneur Code, classifying it both into ex-ante and ex-post concentration control.
A reversal of a consummated merger is likely to be highly difficult. Hence, ex-post regimes are becoming increasingly rare in most OECD jurisdictions. Kazakhstan on the other hand has increased instances of ex-post merger control by also moving the acquisitions of production assets into the ex-post regime. It is unclear why the Kazakh authorities prefer this approach, and in particular, why share acquisitions are treated differently to asset acquisitions.
The notification obligation under Kazakhstan’s concentration control regime is triggered based on a threshold value, calculated by a pre-set formula: namely ten million times the monthly calculation index (MCI) established as of the date of submission of the notification application. MCI is approved annually by the law on the republican budget and amounted to 3 692 KZT in 2024 (Table 4.3).27 The threshold value applies to respectively the book value of assets of the reorganised market entity, the acquirer, or the market entity whose shares are being acquired, or the aggregate volume of sales of these entities in the last financial year exceed the threshold value.
Using a formula like this makes it difficult for firms to work out whether they are required to notify their acquisitions. Notification requirements need to be transparent, objective and clear to market players. They can be established as a threshold value related to the turnover or asset values of the merging parties, the combined market share, or the value of the transaction (in the case where market shares may be low).
Note: The threshold in million EUR was calculated using the December 31 exchange rate of each year. The March 31 exchange rate was used for the period between January and March in 2020 and 2022.Exchange rates were obtained from https://www.xe.com/currencytables/.
Source: MCI data obtained from https://uchet.kz/stavki/MRP.
The Entrepreneur Code also provides some exemptions from the concentration control regime:28
acquisition of shares by financial institutions, if it is carried out for the purpose of their subsequent resale and provided that the financial institution does not receive voting rights
appointment of a bankruptcy administrator
transactions within one group of persons
transactions provided for by the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan, decrees of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and resolutions of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
While the first three exemptions are not deemed to be economic concentrations, the last exemption covers mergers that are otherwise exempt. This provision was introduced in 2015 and is aimed at reducing the administrative burden, eliminating duplicative procedures, and ensuring legal certainty in the implementation of decisions made at the level of the highest state bodies. However, such preferential treatment in terms of merger control is not in line with competitive neutrality, as advocated by the OECD (2024[9]). It also opens the door for the authorities to override the nation’s competition law. According to the authorities, it was introduced in 2015 to facilitate transactions conducted by market entities that are partially owned by the state (ALRUD Law Firm, 2019[10]).
4.5.2. Notification and review procedure
A merger notification29 must be filed by the relevant market entity. If more than one market entity is a party to the transaction, the notification can be filed by one of them on behalf of the other parties to the transaction.30 There is no fee payable for the notification submission (Aequitas Law Firm, 2022[11]). All notifications are submitted digitally. We noted that there were no fast-track or simplified options for mergers that would not pose competition problems. These exist in several other jurisdictions, including the EU and the UK.
The law specifies the list of documents that must be submitted together with the notification.31 They generally include information about the transaction (parties, main conditions, price or cost), names and addresses of the market entities involved, production and sale quantity, export, import and certain transaction specific information (such as a draft charter of the newly merged market entity). The list used to be more extensive, resulting in a substantial informational burden on market entities, often leading to rejections by the competition authority due to insufficient information. Hence, (OECD, 2016[2]) recommended to reduce the information requirements for the initial stage of the investigation. In 2020 and 2024, amendments to the Entrepreneur Code abolished some items, for instance the lists of board members and forecasts of production and sale.
The review procedure depends on whether the concentration control is done ex-ante or ex-post. Annually, around 90 notifications are filed for ex-ante concentration control (see Figure 4.3) and around 25 for ex-post concentration control.
Ex-ante concentration control
Upon receiving a notification for ex-ante merger, the competition authority verifies the completeness of the documents that were submitted, and the formal requirements and must inform the applicant within five working days (before 2024: ten calendar days) whether the notification is accepted or refused.32 From the date of acceptance, the competition authority then has 15 working days (before 2024: 30 calendar days) to consider the economic concentration on substantive grounds. This corresponds to the Phase I review in which the Agency (i.e. Department of Economic Concentration and Control of SOEs) assesses whether parties to the transaction operate in the markets of substitutable products or in adjacent markets. If there is no substitutability and adjacency found, the Agency issues an approval without a detailed market analysis. If there is substitutability and/or adjacency, a sectoral department within the Agency carries out a market analysis. The market analysis corresponds to the Phase II review. The 15-day deadline is suspended during the market analysis. Altogether, Phase I and Phase II can last a maximum of 12 months.33 Before 2024, no maximum period was provided by the law. In practice, the duration of a Phase II review does not exceed three months.
In recent years, the trend of competition law enforcement, and in particular since the 2024 amendments,34 has been to reduce the timeframe for merger review. This may severely limit the Agency’s ability to fully assess the potential economic effects of a merger. It is unusual to have only 15 days for the Phase I review, which may explain the rather simplistic reasons for deciding whether there are competition concerns or not. The Agency has pointed out that this rule is the same for all administrative procedures in Kazakhstan, which stipulates that applications to the public service must be treated within this timeframe of 20 days. However, this is a further argument in favour of separating out and codifying Kazakhstan’s competition law regime, to enable the particular treatment required for competition law cases, which cannot be considered on an equal footing with other public administration cases such as applying for paperwork or dealing with parking violations.
In terms of staff allocation, the Phase I review is carried out by a single individual within the Department of Economic Concentration and Control of SOEs. While the Agency assures that the current workload is manageable, as this specialist does not carry out market analysis, it is nonetheless an unusual approach and gives rise to concern. Given the yearly amount of ex-ante notifications filed, very little time could be allocated to each case. Moreover, this may explain the simplistic decisions on whether there are grounds to pursue a deeper analysis or to clear the merger. After the Phase II analysis, the competition authority must make a formal decision either (i) to give an unconditional approval to the economic concentration, (ii) to approve the merger subject to certain conditions, such as remedies or obligations that eliminate or mitigate the negative impact of the concentration, or (iii) to prohibit the merger with a reasoned opinion.35 The decision is sent to the applicant within three working days after its adoption and is valid for one year. If one year lapses without a transaction, a new notification is required.
The competition authority has the power to review its decision on approval or prohibition of economic concentration in three cases: (i) if disqualifying circumstances become known within three years after the decision; (ii) inaccurate information provided by the applicant; and (iii) non-fulfilment of the requirements and obligations that served as conditions for approval to an economic concentration. Based on the review, the competition authority can leave the decision unchanged, change or repeal the decision or make a new decision.
Source: Data provided by the Agency.
The number of notifications in the ex-ante concentration regime is relatively stable with an average of 90 submissions a year (Figure 4.3). Most mergers are approved unconditionally, while approvals with remedies and prohibitions are exceedingly rare. 2020 seems to have been an outlier with respect to both approvals with remedies and prohibitions. In recent years, it has been common to have between none and one case, where an economic concentration was prohibited.
Source: Data provided by the Agency.
Ex-post concentration control
The ex-post concentration control process differs. Upon receiving a notification, the competition authority assesses whether the transaction restricts or could restrict competition. If so, it orders the transaction's cancellation (e.g. return of acquired assets, resignation from the board position), which must be executed within 30 calendar days; otherwise, the authority may take legal action against the market entity. If no anti-competitive effects are found, the authority takes no action, and after 30 calendar days from receiving the notification, the economic concentration is deemed to be effective ipso iure.
According to the Agency, ex-post cancellation of an economic concentration has only been used once. In 2018, the Agency issued an order to annul a transaction involving LLP “KazMunayGas Onimderi” (hereinafter – the Partnership). According to the notification, the Partnership concluded a Commission Agreement in October 2018, with sole proprietor “Ali”. Under this Agreement, the Partnership authorised sole proprietor “Ali” to act on its behalf and at its expense in relation to operations at a gas station.
However, based on the conducted analysis, the Partnership was found to be dominant in the sale of AI-95 gasoline and diesel fuel, and in accordance with the Entrepreneurial. Owing to these circumstances, the transaction was annulled.
The ex-ante merger review in Kazakhstan involves four stages:
Verification of Documentation: Upon receiving a notification, the Agency verifies the completeness and accuracy of the submitted documents. Incomplete or inaccurate notifications are rejected and not assessed on substantive grounds.
Market Analysis: The Agency analyses the competitive conditions in the relevant product market(s) in accordance with the official Methodology. 1This includes defining product substitutability, identifying the relevant market and timeframe, mapping market participants, calculating market size and shares, and drawing conclusions. If the combined market share of the merging parties is 35% or less, the merger is cleared unconditionally. If it exceeds 35%, the review continues to the next stage.
Source: Methodology for assessing economic concentration in commodity markets.
Assessment of Competitive Impact: The Agency calculates four indicators of potential competitive harm: aggregate market share, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), barriers to entry, and the Lerner Index. If any indicator exceeds the Methodology’s thresholds, a structural presumption of harm is triggered. The Methodology does not clarify whether one indicator alone is sufficient or whether some indicators carry more weight.
Final Decision: Based on the previous stages, the Agency either clears the merger (with or without conditions) or prohibits it.
Ex-post Assessment
The ex-post assessment procedure differs slightly. After verifying the documentation, the Agency examines the agreements and related materials of an already executed transaction to assess its potential to restrict or eliminate competition. The Agency then issues a decision to approve or reject the concentration. To date, no concentration has been rejected ex post.
Note: 1 See the analysis under 4.4.1. and 4.4.2.
Source: Order of the Minister of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 14 December 2017, no. 416.
4.5.3. Remedies
The competition authority may approve the merger subject to remedies which aim to eliminate or mitigate the negative impact of the economic concentration. The law acknowledges both structural and behavioural remedies and mentions, in a non-exhaustive list, the following remedies:36
division of a market entity or separation of a legal entity from it;
sale or transfer of property and other rights to third parties;
restrictions of remedies;
separation of management functions of market entities that are a part of the same group of persons;
production and sale of goods, direction of investments, and other behavioural requirements;
non-discriminatory access to the goods of the market entity.
In the past, Kazakhstan’s competition authority did not seem to be very active in terms of imposing remedies. In nearly all cases, where the former KREMZK conditionally approved an economic concentration, the same remedy was imposed – to refrain from anti-competitive practices in the relevant product market (ALRUD Law Firm, 2019[10]). In a more recent merger in the telecoms sector, a more tailored remedy was adopted, and the Agency has shown more willingness to diversify its remedies in recent years, for instance, pricing obligations (e.g. prohibition of price increases), obligations to sell an asset to competitors, restrictions on sale of an asset to competitors, restrictions on opening new stores, requirement to submit acts of anti-monopoly compliance for approval to the Agency. Licencing restrictions have not been used in practice yet.
The 5th antimonopoly package (2022)37 provides market entities with an option of engaging a trustee to assess their compliance with the imposed remedies. A trustee is an independent expert with scientific or practical knowledge who conducts an expert evaluation of the fulfilment of remedies. The competition authority is expected to maintain a register of trustees.38 If relevant, the firm would conclude a contract with the trustee and bear all the costs associated with the evaluation. The standard form of this contract was also approved in 2022 by the Agency.39 After assessing remedy compliance, the trustee is obliged to submit an expert opinion to the competition authority. Moreover, no remedies have as yet been subject to supervision by a trustee and the OECD team was not able to meet with an appointed trustee.
Kazakhtelecom’s acquisition of Kcell (2018)
In 2018, Kazakhtelecom JSC, a large state-controlled telecommunication company, acquired Kcell, the largest mobile operator in Kazakhstan at the time. While Kazakhtelecom was the largest fixed telephone network operator, it also held a 49% share in Mobile Telecom-Service, the third largest mobile operator in Kazakhstan. The acquisition was scrutinised by KREMZK, as the effect of the transaction might substantially impact competition in the telecommunication sector. KREMZK ultimately cleared the acquisition, however it conditioned its approval to several remedies. For instance, KREMZK required the creation of new service lines, broadening areas with 4G coverage and implementation of 5G services. Interestingly, in 2023, the Agency amended the remedies and added another remedy – a divestiture of Kcell’s subsidiary KazNet Media.
CAF Holding’s acquisition of KAZPHOSPHATE (2023)
In 2023, the Agency approved an acquisition of 100% of shares in KAZPHOSPHATE, a company operating in mining and processing of phosphate rock. The Agency conditioned the approval on several remedies: (i) adoption of an external act of anti-monopoly compliance approved by the Agency, (ii) conclusion of a Strategic Partnership Agreement with the Ministry of Industry and Infrastructure Development, (iii) compliance with the memorandum signed with the Ministry of Agriculture and (iv) provide semi-annual reports to the Agency about compliance with the remedies.
Source: ALRUD Law Firm (2019), Merger Control in the CIS and neighbouring countries: overview of the developments and trends, https://alrud.com/upload/alrud-brochures/Merger_control_in_the_CIS_and_neighboring_countries_overview_of_the_developments_and_trends.pdf; Reuters (2018), Kazakhtelecom buys 75 pct stake in Kcell from Telia, Turkcell, https://www.reuters.com/article/markets/kazakhtelecom-buys-75-pct-stake-in-kcell-from-telia-turkcell-idUSL8N1YH16S/.
4.5.4. Special concentration control regime for financial institutions
Kazakhstan’s concentration control generally applies to all sectors equally. There are, however, certain special provisions that apply to economic concentrations related to financial institutions. Thus, financial institutions are governed by the general concentration control framework only to the extent that there are no special provisions on the matter. If there are, they take precedence over the general regime.
Special provisions exist in relation to notification thresholds. Financial institutions are obliged to submit a notification of an economic concentration if the value of assets of the amount of equity capital of the financial institution exceed the threshold established jointly by the competition authority and a body authorised for the regulation and supervision of financial markets and institutions,40 namely the Agency for Regulation and Development of the Financial Market. Table 4.5 presents the special thresholds for financial institutions.
Source: Joint Order and Resolution on approval of the asset value and equity value thresholds, exceeding which requires consent for economic concentration involving financial organisations (dated 15 May 2009, no. 138-OD).
While there is a separate Methodology for assessing economic concentration in financial markets,41 the assessment resembles the general framework. The competition authority conducts a market analysis, calculates the indicators of restriction of competition and ultimately adopts a decision either to approve or prohibit the economic concentration. Some indicators are, however, different. For instance, if the aggregate share of participants in the economic concentration is 50% or more, this indicates restriction of competition that the economic concentration might cause.
The decision adopted by the competition authority must be sent not only to the applicant but also to the Agency for Regulation and Development of the Financial Market.42 The two agencies co-operate through information sharing and joint analyses, however decisions on economic concentrations are adopted solely by the competition authority.
Unfair competition provisions have long been a part of Kazakhstan’s competition law. After the provisions of the 1998 Law on Unfair Competition43 had been integrated in the Law on Competition in 2008, the changes were rare. Notably, the 5th antimonopoly package (2022) aligned the definition of unfair competition with the EAEU Model Law on Competition.
Article 177 of the Entrepreneur Code provides a general clause of unfair competition. It defines unfair competition as any action of a market entity or several market entities aimed at obtaining advantages in entrepreneurial activities which (i) is contrary to the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan, business customs, good faith, reasonableness, and fairness, and (ii) has caused or may cause damage to other market entities (competitors) or their reputation. In comparative context, such a general clause is relatively standard.
The law further lists actions which are recognised as examples of unfair competition and thus do not require the assessment under the general clause. There are 15 examples of unfair competition in the Entrepreneur Code today and include, among others:
discreditation of a market entity
unlawful use of a trademark, brand, company name or other means of individualisation of goods, works or services
copying the appearance of a product
undue use of other market entity’s goods
false, unfair, and inaccurate advertising
incorrect comparison of own and competitor’s goods
bribery of an employee of the seller or buyer
undue use of trade secrets
creation of barriers to changing a supplier
call for the termination of the contract with a competitor.
In line with the general clause, it does not suffice that an action is aimed at obtaining unlawful advantages but the action in question has caused or may have caused harm to other market entities. If this condition is not met, the action does not constitute unfair competition, but it can still be reviewed under consumer protection legislation.
Source: Data provided by the Agency.
Between 20 and 25 decisions are issued annually by the Agency concerning unfair competition (Figure 4.5). In recent years, unfair competition has not been a priority for the competition authority. This is reflected by less enforcement practice compared to other competition law violations. During the January 2025 fact-finding mission to Kazakhstan, the Agency informed the OECD of its intention to remove unfair competition cases from its jurisdiction, leaving it exclusively to private enforcement. Practices in OECD jurisdictions differ but there are some countries that leave the enforcement of unfair competition provisions exclusively to civil disputes (e.g. Germany and Slovenia).
Competition law provisions relating to restrictive agreements, abuse of dominance, concentration control and unfair competition apply to all market entities, including state-owned enterprises. However, they do not apply to anti-competitive conduct (agreements or actions) carried out by public authorities. In many post-communist countries, due to strong and extensive state control, competition authorities are nevertheless assigned the power to investigate potential anti-competitive conduct by public authorities (OECD, 2016[2]; Petr, 2022[12]). Kazakhstan is one of these jurisdictions.
4.7.1. Anti-competitive agreements and actions of public authorities
Article 194 of the Entrepreneur Code prohibits anti-competitive actions of public authorities in implementing their functions that have led or may lead to restriction or elimination of competition. These include actions by state and local executive bodies, as well as organisations assigned with state functions of regulating market activities and can be carried out by means of various actions, adoption of acts or decisions. The law already lists some examples of anti-competitive actions by public authorities:
restrictions on the creation of the market entities
unjustified obstruction of the activities of a market entity
restrictions on free movement of goods and on the right of the market entity to sell goods
instructions concerning priority supply of goods for certain customers or priority purchase of goods from certain sellers
restrictions on the market entity’s choice of suppliers
actions aimed at increasing, decreasing or fixing prices
actions aimed at market division
creation of barriers to entry and barriers to exit, as well as pushing market entities out of the market
creation of discriminatory conditions, including providing benefits to a certain market entity relative to its competitors
direct or indirect coercion of market entities to priority conclusion of contracts, priority sale to certain customers or priority purchase from certain sellers
failure to provide market entities equal access to state support measures for private entrepreneurship,44 for instance by limiting access to state support measures for new market entities, levying fees not provided by legislation, or co‑ordinating the activities of recipients of state support measures.
Article 194 also prohibits agreements between public authorities or between them and market entities, if they led or may lead to restriction or elimination of competition. However, there are exemptions. Anti-competitive agreements are allowed to “protect the constitutional order, public order, human rights and fundamental freedoms, public health and public morals”. Further, they are also allowed if ordered by the President of Kazakhstan, for instance to “support the economy and stimulate business activity and employment”. In such instances, there are no restrictions to the adoption of anti-competitive measures.
In 2024, the Agency conducted an investigation into the Ministry of Industry and Construction of the Republic of Kazakhstan (the Ministry) for its potential preferential treatment of a specific market entity based on a complaint from a competing firm. The complaint concerned a violation of Article 194 of the Entrepreneurial Code related to anti-competitive actions (inaction) by the Ministry in failing to include certain blocks (areas) in East Kazakhstan Region into the State Subsoil Fund Management Program (SSFMP), which led to a restriction of competition.
The Ministry did not include in the SSFMP the blocks recommended by the Competent Authority, thereby restricting access to exploration of solid minerals and eliminating the possibility of exploiting these areas on a competitive basis. Moreover, the Ministry subsequently issued an exploration licence for solid minerals for part of the territory requested by the Partnership for inclusion in the SSFMP to another party — as a subject of industrial-innovative activity — without including these areas in the SSFMP.
An order was issued to the Ministry requiring the development and adoption of necessary regulatory legal acts governing the procedure for including subsoil plots into the SSFMP by the end of 2024.
Source: Information provided by the Agency.
The powers of the Agency with regard to public bodies are similar to cases of anti-competitive conduct by market entities. The Agency can carry out an investigation, issue an order to refrain from such anti-competitive conduct, as well as initiate an administrative offence procedure and impose an administrative fine on the public official (see Chapter 5 on enforcement).
Cases on anti-competitive agreements and actions of public authorities are one of the largest groups of competition enforcement in Kazakhstan and total over 40 cases annually (Figure 4.6).
Source: Data provided by the Agency.
4.7.2. Public procurement procedures
As a part of the 3rd antimonopoly package,45 a special competition law provision concerning anti-competitive actions in public procurement was introduced. While bid rigging is already prohibited as a horizontal agreement and recognised by the law as a cartel, the new Article 169-1 prohibits actions of public procurement organisers, procurement operators and tender operators, aimed at co‑ordinating the activities of suppliers and bidders in a public procurement procedure, if these actions lead or may lead to restriction or elimination of competition.
This provision is narrower than Article 194 in the sense that it only applies to public procurement but is at the same time wider because it does not only apply to public authorities but also other entities in the public sector, and even some private entities. The following entities all fall into the category of public procurement organisers:
state bodies and institutions (with the exception of the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan)
state-owned enterprises and legal entities with voting shares of 50% or more being owned by the state
national holding companies and legal entities with voting shares of 50% or more being owned by the national holding companies (with the exception of legal entities owned by the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan)
subsoil users engaged in mining at large mineral deposits
natural monopolies whose tariff had been approved using the cost method (with the exception of natural monopolies of small capacity).
Procurement and tender operators provide organisational and technical support for conducting the public procurement procedures, particularly by using trading or informational systems, commodity exchanges or other platforms.
References
[11] Aequitas Law Firm (2022), Antitrust Regulation in Kazakhstan: Basics About, https://aequitas.kz/upload/files/brochures/2022/AE_Antitrust_Regulation_in_Kazakhstan_2022_new.pdf.
[3] Agency for Protection and Development of Competition (2024), Anti-competitive agreement between KTZH-Cargo Transportation and Hill Corporation Too Ltd., https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/zk/press/news/details/695805?lang=ru.
[10] ALRUD Law Firm (2019), Merger Control in the CIS and neighboring countries: overview of the developments and trends, https://alrud.com/upload/alrud-brochures/Merger_control_in_the_CIS_and_neighboring_countries_overview_of_the_developments_and_trends.pdf.
[9] OECD (2024), Competitive Neutrality Toolkit: Promoting a Level Playing Field, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/3247ba44-en.
[8] OECD (2020), “Conglomerate Effects of Mergers”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 250, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5d906463-en.
[2] OECD (2016), Competition Law and Policy in Kazakhstan: A Peer Review, Competition Law and Policy Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/08f78cd0-en.
[1] OECD (2016), “Independence of Competition Authorities - From Design to Practice”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 195, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ea9749e1-en.
[5] OECD (2012), “Excessive Prices: Key findings, summary and notes”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 121, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/8e1fd82e-en.
[7] OECD (2009), “Monopsony and Buyer Power : Key findings, summary and notes”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 98, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/36a2b824-en.
[6] OECD (2005), “Predatory Foreclosure: Key findings, summary and notes”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 51, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0c62774b-en.
[12] Petr, M. (2022), “To what extent might (and should) competition law apply to public authorities?”, Institutiones Administrationis – Journal of Administrative Sciences, Vol. 2/1, pp. 67-84, https://doi.org/10.54201/iajas.v2i1.38.
[4] Van Cleynenbreugel, P. (2011), “Single Entity Tests in US Antitrust and EU Competition Law”, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1889232.
← 1. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 6 March 2013, no. 81-V.
← 2. A competitor is understood as a “market entity who is in a state of competition with other entities of the relevant market due to the fact that it produces and (or) sells the goods in the relevant commodity market that is similar or interchangeable with the goods of market entities”.
← 3. A potential competitor is understood as a “market entity that has the ability (owns equipment, technology) to produce and (or) sell the goods that is similar or interchangeable with a competitor's goods but does not produce and does not sell it in the relevant commodity market”.
← 4. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 28 December 2016, no. 34-VІ ZRK.
← 5. See Article 165 of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 6. See the notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice) (2014/C 291/01).
← 7. Order of the Chair of the Agency for the Protection and Development of Competition of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 3 May 2022, no. 13.
← 8. Ibid.
← 9. The rules are modified in case of financial institutions. Two or less financial institutions are deemed dominant if their aggregate share is 50 % or more. Three of less financial institutions are deemed dominant if their aggregate share is 70 % or more.
← 10. The HHI is used most frequently in merger analyses. For instance, the US Merger Guidelines suggest that markets are highly concentrated at the HHI of 1 800, while the EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines use the HHI of 2 000, an approach used by Kazakhstan as well.
← 11. Section 65 of the Methodology for analysing the state of competition in product markets.
← 12. Rules for Inclusion and Exclusion of Market Entities from the State Register of Market Entities Occupying a Dominant or Monopoly Position in Regulated Markets. Order of the Minister of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 30 November 2015, no. 740.
← 13. Article 324(2) of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 14. Order of the Minister of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 4 May 2018, no. 173.
← 15. The average avoidable cost is the sum of all costs that a firm can avoid by not producing a certain quantity of output (i.e. variable costs and product-specific fixed, but not sunk, costs), divided by the number of units produced.
← 16. Monopsony power can be measured by a Buyer Power Index (BPI): , where VMP is the value of the marginal product and w is the factor price.
← 17. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 3 January 2022, no. 101-VII ZRK.
← 18. Order of the Chair of the Agency for the Protection and Development of Competition of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 13 June 2022, no. 15.
← 19. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 6 April 2024, no. 71-VIII ZRK.
← 20. Order of the Chair of the Agency for the Protection and Development of Competition of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 24 June 2024, no 4.
← 22. Ibid.
← 23. Address of the Head of State Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to the people of Kazakhstan dated 1 September 2022.
← 24. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 6 April 2024, no. 71-VIII ZRK.
← 25. See Article 200(1) and Article 201(8) of the Entrepreneur Code, prior to the 2024 amendment.
← 26. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 6 April 2024, no. 71-VIII ZRK.
← 27. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 5 December 2023, no. 43-VIII ZRK.
← 28. Article 201(2) and (4) of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 29. Kazakhstan’s competition law distinguishes between two terms: ‘petition for consent to an economic concentration’ applies to ex ante concentration control, while ‘notification’ applies to ex post concentration control. In line with established terminology, this report will use the term ‘notification’ for both types, while explicitly emphasising, whenever necessary, which type of concentration control it concerns.
← 30. Article 202 of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 31. See articles 204 and 207 of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 32. Article 205 of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 33. Ibid.
← 34. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 6 April 2024, no. 71-VIII ZRK.
← 35. Article 208 of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 36. Article 208 and 210-1 of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 37. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 3 January 2022, no. 101-VII ZRK.
← 38. Order of the Chairman of the Agency for the Protection and Development of Competition of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 29 March 2022, no. 5.
← 39. Order of the Chairman of the Agency for the Protection and Development of Competition of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 4 April 2022, no. 6.
← 40. Article 201(5) of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 41. Order of the Minister of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan of 29 December 2017, no. 442.
← 42. Article 208 of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 43. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 9 June 1998, no. 232.
← 44. State support measures for private entrepreneurship is a system of state measures to stimulate private entrepreneurship by means of financial, property, infrastructure, institutional and non-financial support (Article 93 of the Entrepreneur Code).
← 45. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 24 May 2018, no. 156-VІ ZRK.