This chapter reviews the institutional framework for competition policy in Kazakhstan, focusing on the evolution, organisational structure and mandate of the national competition authority, including its legal powers, internal organisation and regional offices. The chapter also considers the role of advisory bodies, such as the Public Council and the Council on Barriers. Finally, it provides an overview of Kazakhstan’s judicial system and the court-based model of competition law enforcement.
OECD Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy: Kazakhstan 2025
Abstract
3.1.1. Evolution of the competition authority
Kazakhstan’s competition authority has undergone substantial changes in the past 20 years. Its development in this time period can be best described by constant reorganisations, frequently altering its institutional position and structure.
Kazakhstan’s competition authority began as a government- or ministry-subordinate committee, undergoing frequent reorganisations in both structure and scope. It combined competition enforcement with responsibilities such as price regulation (later framed as “natural monopolies”) and consumer protection. In 1999, it became an agency but remained under government control.1 A significant shift occurred in 2003 when it was placed under the President’s direct remit, aiming to reduce government influence, but this was reversed in 2004, with enforcement returning to a government committee. 2
In 2014, competition enforcement and natural monopoly regulation were merged into the Committee of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Regulation of Natural Monopolies and Protection of Competition (KREMZK) under the Ministry of National Economy;3 consumer protection was added in 2017.4 In 2019, KREMZK was reorganised into three separate committees: the Committee for the Protection and Development of Competition and the Committee for Regulation of Natural Monopolies, both under the Ministry of National Economy; and the Committee for Consumer Protection, under the Ministry of Trade and Integration.5 Reform efforts began in 2015 with the President’s “100 Concrete Steps” action plan, which called in Step 53 for aligning the antimonopoly committee’s work with OECD standards.6
In 2020, the Committee for the Protection and Development of Competition was transformed into the newly established Agency for the Protection and Development of Competition, AZRK,7 which now enforces competition law in Kazakhstan. However, the Agency is generally not the final decision-maker in enforcement matters, as Kazakhstan mostly follows a court-based system. When the Agency identifies a competition law violation, such as a cartel or abuse of dominance, it must prosecute the case in court, where a judge imposes sanctions.
The Agency functions more like a regulator, overseeing competition, restricting monopolistic practices, and managing state monopoly activities. It reports directly to the President of the Republic (see section 3.1.8). As shown in Figure 3.1, the authority’s structure and institutional design have changed frequently over the past decade, often shifting focus toward internal and organisational matters, rather than focusing on competition law enforcement. A stable institutional framework will be crucial for enhancing its effectiveness going forward.
Source: OECD Secretariat based on publicly available legal acts of the President and Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
3.1.2. Responsibilities
The Agency enforces competition law in Kazakhstan, although final decisions are taken by the courts. It has the responsibility to detect, investigate and prosecute violations of competition law, review economic concentrations, adopt measures to prevent anti-competitive conduct, promote the development of fair competition, and engage in demonopolisation efforts.8
The powers of the competition authority are specified into detail in Article 90-6 of the Entrepreneur Code and in the Regulations on the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Protection and Development of Competition (hereafter “Regulations”).9 The competition authority has, inter alia, the power to:
implement state competition policy and exercise control over compliance with competition law
carry out inter-sectoral co-ordination and international co-operation in the field of competition protection
prevent and suppress anticompetitive agreements and concerted actions, abuse of dominant position and unfair competition
review applications for approval of economic concentration
suppress acts and actions of public authorities aimed at restricting or eliminating competition
conduct investigations into violations of competition law
impose minor administrative fines (e.g. if a market entity fails to notify the Agency in some matters, or fails to comply with remedies)
issue binding notifications on the presence of signs of competition law violations and orders during and at the end of investigations
analyse the state of competition in product markets
develop and approve methodologies for competition analysis
monitor and (in certain cases) regulate prices on commodity markets
monitor the provision of state support measures for private entrepreneurship
monitor the activities of state-owned enterprises
propose a transfer of state-owned enterprises to a competitive environment, and
disseminate information on the application of competition law in Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan’s competition authority is often assigned responsibilities that are only indirectly related to competition law. These have included supporting small businesses, administering natural monopolies, regulating prices in certain commodity markets and protecting individual consumer rights.
Despite the recommendations of the 2016 Peer Review, the Agency has only been partially purged of some of these responsibilities. Support of small businesses was removed from its powers in 2002, while the administration of natural monopolies and consumer rights were transferred to separate committees in 2019, when KREMZK was split up. Nonetheless, price regulation of several markets remains the responsibility of the Agency, while the line regarding the responsibility for natural monopolies appears somewhat blurred.
Moreover, there is a clear trend of assigning new responsibilities to the Agency which are only tangentially linked to competition. In 2020, the Agency was assigned the power to control the commodity exchanges and issue trading licences. In 2022, it was given the power of approving state support measures. In 2024, the functions of the National Privatisation Office were transferred to the Agency, and the Chair of the Agency acts as the head of the National Privatisation Office. This trend was best described by the Deputy Chair of the Agency stating that the Agency has shifted in recent years from focusing solely on competition protection to being an “economic regulator”, placing emphasis on regulation, “liberalisation” and privatisation of the economy. While the Agency seems to find these additional responsibilities a natural extension of its work, it raises concerns that they may detract from the Agency’s core responsibilities and purpose as a competition law enforcer. Based on the interviews with the stakeholders, our understanding is that there are no clear dividing lines within the Agency which assign clear responsibilities or Chinese Walls between these auxiliary functions and the core competition enforcement work. As the Agency is assigned more and more new responsibilities, it hence seems that the enforcement work is prioritised less than other tasks which are assigned directly by the President.
3.1.3. Internal organisation
According to Article 90-1 of the Entrepreneur Code, the competition authority consists of the central state body (central office) and 20 subordinate territorial subdivisions (regional offices). Despite this internal division, the competition authority is expected to function as a unified entity.
Management
The management of the Agency is carried out by the Chair who is responsible for the fulfilment of the tasks assigned to the Agency.10 The Chair organises and supervises the work of the Agency, gives instructions to employees, and conducts organisational and administrative measures for the implementation of the functions of the Agency, such as approving rules on structural and territorial departments of the Agency. Further, the Chair signs legal acts of the Agency and represents it in relations with state bodies and other organisations. The Chair is appointed by the President of the Republic, and there is no stipulated length of their mandate which is at the discretion of the President.
The Agency has three Deputies, one of whom is the First Deputy. Their powers are determined by the Chair of the Agency. Furthermore, the Agency has a Chief of Staff who is responsible for managing the Agency’s employees. The Chief of Staff has the power to appoint and dismiss heads of structural divisions and regional offices of the Agency (by agreement with the Chair), manage the disciplinary commission and all issues related to employment (leave, training, remuneration etc.).
The collegiate governing body of the Agency is the Management Board. It consists of the entire management of the Agency and makes decisions on the most key issues. It determines priorities in the formation and development of competition policies, makes decisions based on the results of Agency’s investigations of violations of competition law, approves the annual report on the state of competition in certain commodity markets and approves the regulations of the management. Although the formation of the Management Board was already envisaged in the Regulations in 2020, it began operating in November 2022.
In line with the Law on the Civil Service of the Republic of Kazakhstan,11 there are two categories of civil service – political and administrative civil service. The Chair of the Agency and the Deputies fall into the category of political civil service. They are appointed and dismissed by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan at his or her discretion. The appointment is made without a prior competitive process and a dismissal does not require any justification. The procedure of appointments and dismissals is not regulated. The term of office as not specified in legislation.
The administrative civil service has two subcategories. Managerial administrative civil service positions are defined as “corps A”, while other administrative civil service positions are defined as “corps B”. The Chief of Staff of the Agency falls into the “corps A” category and is appointed and dismissed by the Chair of the Agency. The term of the Chief of Staff as a “corps A” position is four years but can be extended for additional two years by the Chair of the Agency and for additional two years by the National Commission on Personnel Policy. The maximum term of a “corps A” official is thus eight years.
The Law on Civil Service includes rules on conflict of interest. These apply formally to political and administrative public servants. If a conflict of interest occurs, public servants are prohibited from exercising their official powers and must notify in writing their superior, who must take timely measures to resolve the conflict of interest either by transferring the executive powers to another employee or by changing the responsibilities of the public servant (see Box 3.1).
Central office
The central office is located the capital city of Kazakhstan, Astana. The organisational structure of the central office is complex. Upon the establishment of the Agency in 2020, it was divided into 16 structural units.12 Another four have been added since,13 so the Agency has 20 structural units today (Figure 3.2).
The Agency has several sectoral departments (e.g. for energy, financial markets, transport, social sphere, transport, and agriculture). These departments conduct sectoral economic analyses for the purpose of both investigations and concentration control. Generally, a market analysis conducted by a sectoral department precedes an investigation which is carried out by the Department of Investigations. Furthermore, sectoral departments monitor competition in respective markets, identify potential barriers to competition, perform regulatory assessments and propose recommendations to regulators. Many sectoral departments also carry out price regulation. Due to so many different, often not competition-related, responsibilities assigned to sectoral departments, the number of specialists working in sectoral departments is high, but only few carry out tasks that are directly related to competition law enforcement stricto sensu.
The Department of Investigations has two divisions – one for cartel investigations and another for other competition law violations. While 95% cases are investigated by regional offices, according to data provided by the Agency, the central office’s Department of Investigations often investigates the more complex cases. On the fact-finding mission to Kazakhstan in 2025, OECD found that there is a large burden on the Department of Investigations, resulting from several contributing factors, including high number of cases, lack of prioritisation practices, short investigation deadlines and an insufficient number of specialists in the department (only 12). This may be one of the reasons behind the Agency’s increasing trend of replacing competition enforcement with preventive measures (see also see also sections 5.1.1 and 7.3).
The Department of Economic Concentration and Control of SOEs has two main responsibilities – merger control and price regulation of state monopolies. While the name suggests that merger control is actually carried out in this department, the reality is that the department mainly carries out price regulation according to the interviews. Merger control in this department is reduced to Phase I review (conducted by only one specialist), while sectoral departments conduct Phase II review (so-called market analysis). It might be more efficient to have one department specialised for merger control without transferring tasks to sectoral departments, while allocating more, specialised staff to assess merger notifications.
The Department of Legal Regulation of Competition is responsible for analysing domestic competition legislation and court judgments. This helps the Agency to understand why some of its decisions had been overturned by the courts.
The Department of Digitalisation was established in 2024 with the goal to digitalise the operations of the Agency. Its tasks are to introduce digital technologies and information systems into the functioning of the Agency.
Source: Information provided by the Agency.
The Analytical Research Centre for Competition Development (ARC) was established to support the Agency’s analytical capabilities, but without being formally part of the Agency. Its work is however overseen by the Chief Economist, who does not have his own staff within the Agency. As such, the ARC staff serve to some degree as the office of the Chief Economist, but without belonging to its organisation. Its main tasks include conducting applied research, assessing the impact of regulatory instruments on competition (i.e. competition assessment), analysing and monitoring product markets, analytical support for the formation of competition policy, and popularising antitrust compliance (advocacy). The ARC works with the Agency on a case-by-case basis, and its empirical findings may be incorporated in the Agency’s conclusions. However, its effectiveness as a competition enforcement tool is hampered by the fact that the economic instruments available to enforcers must be pre-defined and established by the legal framework, otherwise there is a risk that the courts will not admit the economic evidence presented. This is a highly limiting factor to the current usefulness of the ARC’s contributions to the enforcement work of the Agency. Moreover, the fact that ARC does not formally belong to the Agency may limit the impact of its analyses.
The ARC collaborates with the sectoral departments. While the effort to improve economic analysis is commendable, it is questionable why this could not have been achieved within existing departments of the Agency that already do economic analysis, or by establishing a fully-fledged Office of the Chief Economist, to lessen the burden on sectoral departments. At present, there is a degree of overlapping between the Analytical Research Centre and the sectoral departments, such as sector analysis, leading to a duplication of tasks and inefficiencies. The full list of the ARC’s tasks is included in Box 3.1.
Main tasks of the ARC
The ARC carries out analyses with the following objectives: (1) to test and refine analytical approaches, including those of the OECD, CMA, FTC, DoJ, EC, and others; (2) to build a broader understanding of markets — not only from the perspective of competition, but also to comprehend the overall economic processes within markets.
Moreover, the Centre’s market analyses represent only a small part of its overall activities, which also include:
1. General research related to competition (for example, the relationship between competition and inflation in Kazakhstani markets, the methodology for determining marginal costs, etc.);
2. Competition impact assessment, including the use of standard OECD indicators (as provided under Article 83 of the Entrepreneurial Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Rules for Conducting Competition Impact Assessments);
3. Promotion of the antimonopoly compliance framework, as well as developing proposals for its improvement (there is a dedicated research project on this topic);
4. “Rapid analytics” for the Agency, involving urgent preparation of positions on various issues related to antimonopoly regulation;
5. Providing opportunities for additional training of Agency staff in various areas (such as Python, SQL, Power BI, econometrics, statistics, etc.), including through the involvement of external experts.
Source: The Analytical Research Centre for Competition Development (ARC).
In the 2024 “Decree on measures to liberalise the economy”,14 the President ordered the establishment of the National Office for Privatisation as an additional structural unit (an “Advisory Commission”) within the Agency. Its tasks include the analysis of existing state-owned enterprises, development of criteria for state assets subject to mandatory privatisation, formation of a list of candidate assets for sale, and monitoring the progress of privatisation. This is rather an unusual task for a competition agency, and furthermore requires particular skills and resources that are more typically found within the Treasury or the Prime Minister’s office. As a new, prioritised function, there is a real risk that the new area of responsibility for the Agency may detract from focusing on competition.
Regional offices
Besides the central office, the Agency is divided into regional offices. Upon the establishment of the Agency, there were 17 regional offices.15 Three additional departments were introduced in 2022.16 Hence, the Agency has 20 regional offices today – one in each of the 17 regions (oblasti) and in three cities, namely Astana, Almaty and Shymkent.
A regional office has similar responsibilities to the central office.17 It is managed by the Head of the regional office (“department”) who is responsible for the performance of the tasks assigned to the regional office. Their powers include organising and managing work in the department, issuing instructions, representing the department in relations with state bodies and other organisations, and imposing disciplinary sanctions on the department’s employees. The Head of the Department is appointed and dismissed by the Agency’s Chief of Staff in co-ordination with the Chair of the Agency. A regional office also has one Deputy who is appointed and dismissed in the same manner as the Head of the Department. The powers of the Deputy are determined by the Head of the Department. It is important to note that the Head of the Department and its Deputy do not fall into the “corps A” category.
The regional offices have a different structural division from the central office, as they have two structural departments – the Investigation Department and the Competition Development Department. The regional offices of Astana and Almaty have an additional Competition Protection Department.
Councils under the Agency
Under Kazakhstan’s law, public councils are established at ministries, public bodies subordinate to the President, as well as local government bodies. They serve as a consultative-advisory body and make recommendations that must be considered in the decision-making process.18 Public councils are meant to be a way of engaging stakeholders in policy-making.
The Agency has established the Public Council of the Agency. It has 12 members, including competition experts, lawyers, economics, and business representatives, chosen by an independent commission among received applications. The Public Council is expected to work as a consultative body to monitor the work of the Agency and to develop recommendations for improvements. Additionally, it is involved in reviewing draft legal acts related to the rights, freedoms, and obligations of citizens, in accordance with the “Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Legal Acts.” For instance, the proposals for regulatory acts are sent to the Public Council for discussion and its comments are sent back to the Agency for consideration. The Agency is not required to adopt Public Council’s recommendations, but it is required to issue a reasoned response to them. The OECD was notified by a stakeholder that the Public Council’s main function today is protecting consumers, and that some business representatives were no longer part of the current formation of the Public Council. The primary purpose of the Public Council’s activities is to express the views of civil society on matters of public significance.
Another council, established under the Agency, is the Council on Barriers (“Council for the Identification and Elimination of Market Entry Barriers”, Box 3.2). It is a permanent advisory body operating under the Agency at both the national and regional levels and consists of 12 business representatives alongside government representatives. The Council on Barriers focuses on identifying regulatory restrictions to entry into commodity markets, assessing their impact on the competitive environment with input from the expert community, and developing objective proposals to ensure the principles of “fair trade” are upheld in the relevant commodity markets. If the Council finds certain norms to be barriers to competition, it can send their proposal to eliminate such barriers to relevant government bodies. They must provide a reasoned opinion as to how they plan to address the barrier.
The division of tasks between the Council of Barriers and the Public Council is not entirely clear, and – as with many other functions within the Agency – there appears to be a degree of overlapping, while reporting lines are not entirely clear. For instance, with regards to competition assessment, there may be divergent views between the two Councils and the sectoral departments. Clear guidelines and reporting lines would greatly contribute to the efficiency of these various bodies and their outputs.
In 2020, based on the principles of crowdsourcing, the Council for the Identification and Elimination of Market Entry Barriers was established under the Agency for the Protection and Development of Competition of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The Council aims to identify and remove administrative, economic, and other barriers to entry.
The main objectives of the Council on Barriers are to develop proposals:
for reducing barriers to entry into product markets, and instruments of administrative and price regulation
for decreasing excessive regulation and/or state intervention, including restrictions on access to “essential facilities,” price distortions, and selective favouritism
for reducing the level of market concentration and increasing the number of competitive markets by decreasing the number of natural monopoly entities or those with special rights
for reducing the share of market participants with state ownership and improving the efficiency of state asset management
for developing small and medium-sized businesses and increasing their contribution to the country’s economy
for promoting commodity exchange trading and introducing transparent pricing mechanisms
for ensuring transparency and equal access to procurement by government bodies and state-owned market entities, and for increasing the share of procurement from private businesses (including small and medium-sized enterprises).
According to the Agency, in 2024, a total of 13 systemic barriers to competition development were eliminated. For example, one such barrier related to the unlawful refusals by essential facility owners to provide access to petroleum product volumes. In response, the Agency developed and introduced amendments to Order No. 15 of the Chairman of the Agency for the Protection and Development of Competition of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 13 June 2022, on the Approval of the Rules for Equal Access to Essential Facilities, which regulates the procedure for distributing available petroleum product volumes during periods of fuel shortage.
Source: Information provided by the Agency.
3.1.4. Human resources
Employee levels
As illustrated in Figure 3.3, the number of employees of the competition authority has been gradually growing since 2020, with a large increase in 2021/2022 as the Agency’s responsibilities were expanded, and three new regional offices were established.
The differences in competences of the competition authority throughout the years make any historical comparison prior to 2020 difficult. The most adequate comparison can be drawn between the Agency for Protection of Competition (2007–2013) and today’s Agency, since natural monopolies and consumer protection were not a part of its responsibilities then. Such a comparison shows that the number of employees has risen substantially – from 203 employees in 2013 to 391 in 2024 (Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2). The increase in the Agency’s staffing levels is due to the establishment of new territorial units — the Zhetysu, Ulytau, and Abai regions — where three territorial departments of the Agency were created, the establishment of the Digitalisation Department (an additional eight staff units were allocated), as well as the expansion of the functions and powers of the Agency.
The employee levels at the Kazakhstan’s competition authority appear high in comparison to the OECD average (Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3). That said, as uncovered in the interviews with staff members and stakeholders, a large share of the Agency’s efforts is devoted to non-core competition work, such as price monitoring, price regulation, oversight of commodity markets and natural monopolies (to mention a few), which no clear delineation between these tasks within the sector departments. This makes a more direct comparison of staff numbers difficult to establish.
Note: The peers’ group was built from the sample of jurisdictions reporting to CompStats, based on proximity of GDP per capita (jurisdictions that have a difference of less than EUR 3 000 vis-à-vis Kazakhstan’s GDP per capita.
Source: OECD CompStats and data provided by the Agency.
Note: The peers’ group was built from the sample of jurisdictions reporting to CompStats, based on proximity of GDP per capita (jurisdictions that have a difference of less than EUR 3 000 vis-à-vis Kazakhstan’s GDP per capita.
Source: OECD CompStats and data provided by the Agency.
Moreover, the Agency experiences a large turnover of employees. On average, 64 employees leave the Agency every year, a relatively stable number throughout the years (Figure 3.3). The reasons for the large staff turnover could be high workload, comparatively low salaries and limited social benefits relative to the private sector as well as other governmental bodies.19 While salaries for highly qualified employees are up to four times higher in the private sector, salaries in other parts of the public sector tend also to be higher due to the government bonus system.
The uncompetitive salary levels are reported by the Agency as one of the main reasons for the high turnover and make it very challenging for the Agency to recruit and retain highly qualified staff. The average monthly net salary of a competition specialist is KZT 260 000 (EUR 500; USD 520) and the average monthly net salary of the management is KZT 479 000 (EUR 921; USD 959). This compares with an average net salary in Kazakhstan in 2024 of KZT 281 973 (EUR 543; 564 EUR).20 Thus, the average salary of Agency employees is slightly above the national average, however many employees have much lower wages. The Agency reports that over the past three years, the lack of staff retention has become a serious or “systemic” issue that the Agency is trying to deal with.
Source: Data provided by the Agency.
According to the Agency, some measures have already been taken to improve the situation. In 2023, the Agency increased bonuses by 40%, but a proposed salary increase of 50% was finally not approved by the President.
High staff turnover has an impact on Agency’s work efficiency, not least because of the need to repeatedly train new employees. It is notable that the number of staff at the Agency has increased throughout recent years which, although partly corresponding to new responsibilities assigned to the Agency, might also have to do with the fact that more people are needed to perform the tasks that were previously performed by fewer, more experienced employees, who left the Agency. The priority for the Agency should be focusing on retaining the existing qualified staff.
Legal status of Agency’s employees
The Law on the Civil Service of the Republic of Kazakhstan distinguishes between “corps A” and “corps B” administrative civil service positions and applies different rules to each category. The Chief of Staff of the Agency falls under the category of “corps A”, while all other employees of the Agency, including the Heads of structural divisions and territorial departments of the Agency, fall into the category of “corps B” positions.
The employment of “corps B” civil servants is conducted through a competitive process. This process consists of five systemic stages: (i) publication of an announcement of the competition, (ii) admission of documents from persons who have expressed a desire to take part in the competition, (iii) review of documents of the participants in the competition, (iv) interview with the participants of the competition, conducted by the competition commission of the state body, and (v) decision made by the competition commission of the state body. The competition process can be general (i.e. anyone can apply) or internal (i.e. only civil servants of that state body and its departments can apply). Typically, a general competition process is organised for lower positions and in absence of participants in the internal competition.
Civil servants must perform their duties in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The efficiency and quality of their work is evaluated and can impact their remuneration, promotion, training, rotation and ultimate dismissal. For the exemplary performance of their duties, civil servants can be awarded with a one-time monetary remuneration, declaration of gratitude, honorary title or similar awards. They can be promoted to higher positions (with higher qualification and salary), taking into account their skills, merits and performance of their duties.
In addition to their monthly salary, the employees of public bodies of the Republic of Kazakhstan can receive bonuses. These are paid as a result of their effectiveness, taking into account several indicators, such as compliance with the law, exemplary performance, performance of urgent and unforeseen work, anniversaries, development of draft laws, conventions and agreements etc. Bonuses are determined by the head of the state body based on the results of the evaluation of the employee’s performance at the end of the year.
The grounds of dismissal from the civil service are listed in the Law on the Civil Service in Article 61. Some of these resemble general labour legislation, such as non-performance of duties, unsatisfactory result upon evaluation, conviction of certain criminal offences, submission of falsified documents or incorrect information upon entering civil service. Other grounds for dismissal are specific to public service positions, for instance loss of citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan or holding a citizenship of a foreign country, commission of a disciplinary offence discrediting the civil service and holding another public office. Other labour law grounds for dismissal also apply.
Public servants must take measures to prevent conflicts of interest. If a conflict of interest occurs, public servants are prohibited from exercising their official powers and must notify in writing their superior, who must take timely measures to resolve the conflict of interest either by transferring the executive powers to another employee or by changing the responsibilities of the public servant.
Sources: Article 27 of the Law on the Civil Service; Paragraph 7 of Chapter 2 of the Order of the Chair of the Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan for Civil Service Affairs and Anti-Corruption dated 21 February 2017, no. 40; Articles 28 and 29 of the Law on the Civil Service; Article 33 of the Law on the Civil Service; Article 35 of the Law on the Civil Service; Article 37 of the Law on the Civil Service; Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 29 August 2001, no. 1127; Article 51 of the Law on the Civil Service.
Trainings for employees
Civil servants are given different types of training. Every individual newly appointed to an administrative civil service position is required to undergo a “retraining” at the Academy of Public Administration. Other trainings include trainings on digital skills, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, business processes etc. The Agency also offers competition-related trainings. These are both of national and international nature. Employees attend seminars organised by the OECD Regional Centre for Competition in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, as well as seminars organised by competition authorities from different countries. The Agency admits that more trainings, particularly relating to digital markets, would be highly beneficial for its specialists.
3.1.5. Financial resources
According to paragraph 12 of Chapter 1 of the Regulations, the Agency’s activities are financed from the central budget. The budgetary resources represent the Agency’s sole and exclusive source of funding. The budget is determined on the basis of the limits of staffing of state bodies. It is formed for a 3‑fiscal-year period,21 approved by the Law on the Republican Budget and annually reapproved.
The budget of the Agency is not fixed. The Agency must annually apply to the Ministry of Finance, and to parliament for funding and, according to the Agency, it mostly receives budget requested, although not always. In 2024 for instance, the Agency did not receive the full amount it had requested, which required it to cut back on items such as equipment and administrative expenses, which may harm the ability to carry out investigations. Such randomness in budget allocation also undermines the stability of its functioning. The Agency is advocating for budget protection which would guarantee its financial independence.
Table 3.1 shows a generally positive trend in budgetary resources allocated to the Agency’s activities. However, compared to 2024, the Agency’s budget in 2025 was reduced by KZT 220 000 000 (EUR 423 892 or USD 440 882).
Note: The budgetary resources in EUR and USD were calculated using the December 31 exchange rate for each year. For 2025, the exchange rate for 28 February 2025, was used. The exchange rates were obtained from https://www.xe.com/currencytables/.
Source: Numbers provided by the Kazakhstan’s competition authority.
Most of Agency’s budget is used for salaries, while a smaller part covers administrative expenses (Figure 3.6). The trend in recent years has been in an increasing share of the budget used for salaries (72% in 2021 and 83% in 2024) and a decreasing share of the budget used for covering administrative expenses (28% in 2021 and 17% in 2024). Nonetheless, according to the Agency, the resources allocated for salaries are not sufficient to enable competitive salaries. This makes it difficult to recruit new highly qualified staff or retain existing employees.
Source: Data provided by the Agency.
A comparison of the Agency’s budget with the OECD average and the average of Kazakhstan’s peers shows that the Agency’s budget has been trailing, however the situation has improved, particularly in the past two years. While the budget in purchasing power parity is still substantially lower than the OECD and peers’ average (Figure 3.7), this does not account for size of the jurisdiction. However, taken as a ratio to GDP, the Agency’s budget appears to be closer to the OECD average (Figure 3.8). Even so, this may reflect the broad variety of tasks that the staff are asked to perform. Given these factors, the Agency should address the issue of ensuring budgetary stability. In addition, in light of the low salaries and difficulty with staff retention, salaries should be aligned with the other similar public service positions.
Note: GDP is expressed in PPP (Purchasing Power Parity). The peers’ group was built from the sample of jurisdictions reporting to CompStats, based on proximity of GDP per capita (jurisdictions that have a difference of less than 3 000 EUR vis-à-vis Kazakhstan’s GDP per capita.
Source: CompStats and the data provided by the Agency.
Note: Budget ratio is calculated as the budget (in EUR) divided by GDP at PPP, divided by 1000. GDP is expressed in PPP (Purchasing Power Parity). The peers’ group was built from the sample of jurisdictions reporting to CompStats, based on proximity of GDP per capita (jurisdictions that have a difference of less than 3 000 EUR vis-à-vis Kazakhstan’s GDP per capita.
Source: CompStats and the data provided by the Agency.
3.1.6. Digitalisation
The Agency initiated digitalisation of its operations in mid 2023. In 2024 Department of Digitalisation was established. While progress has been made, more can be done in terms of utilising technology to improve efficiency and quality. According to the Agency, all activities of the Agency are carried out on paper, “in a mechanical mode”. For example, competition assessments, investigations, the issuance of notifications, and administrative fines are still processed in hard copy. This, in turn, prevents the establishment of control and monitoring mechanisms over the timeliness of investigations, the enforcement of notifications, and so on.
Work is currently underway to develop the Agency’s digital ecosystem, including the integration of artificial intelligence technologies.
The Agency has 381 computers and 70 laptops, which generally covers the number of employees. However, during its fact-finding mission, the OECD found that not all employees have internet access from their workstations and that special permission is required for access. These restrictions are in accordance with national legislation on information security for government bodies and are aimed at preventing cyber threats. To ensure access to necessary online resources, the Agency has compiled a whitelist of permitted websites, including vetted foreign sources, which can be accessed for core Agency operations. Even so, the use of Internet is essential in today’s age, as it enables finding information rapidly and with low cost, including key information such as searching for case law to establish precedence or comparisons with other jurisdictions to support investigative techniques. Some staff have to use their phones for information searches which is both inefficient and carries potential security risks. Hence, access to Internet, and general computer literacy, should be improved for the efficient functioning of the Agency.
The Agency is advancing digitalisation through the development and testing . A test version of the “Information and Analytical System” has been launched to support market competition analysis. Integrated with the Government’s “Smart Data Government” system via the “eGov” portal, it provides online access to 89 government databases and enables consumer surveys and business entity requests to be distributed with one click, including mobile push notifications to company representatives. According to the Agency, this integration has reduced data collection time from over 30 days to 5–7 days, eased staff workload, and enabled more accurate market analysis. The system facilitates access to reliable, real-time data, helps identify relevant consumer and business groups, and supports the application of the Hypothetical Monopolist Test, thereby improving the quality of competition assessments.
The Agency is also developing an “Antitrust” Information Portal to fully digitise its operations. The portal will support internal monitoring, streamline work across structural and regional divisions, and serve as an electronic archive. It will digitalise processes such as competition assessments, investigations, notifications, and merger reviews, and enable electronic document approval and signing by management. The portal will also be integrated with law enforcement and judicial information systems. Once operational, it is expected to reduce staff workload, strengthen internal controls, and minimise paperwork.
Source: Information provided by the Agency.
Positively, the system for reviewing notifications of economic concentrations is already fully digitalised. It also uses a search information system “Ormek” for the monitoring of bid-rigging which helps identify signs of collusion in public procurement based on data such as email addresses, locations, IP addresses, and electronic signatures. Cartel enforcement strongly relies on “Ormek”.
3.1.7. Prioritisation and evaluation
Prioritisation
Owing to the numerous tasks of the competition authorities, priority-setting is required to determine the best use of their available (and often scarce) resources. Such prioritisation includes the formulation of strategic plans, allocation of resources across different areas of responsibility and prioritising individual cases. Supervision by another state body might constrain the ability of the competition authority to make priorities (OECD, 2016[1]).
In Kazakhstan, the high-level strategy for competition law and enforcement is set by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan in policy documents and decrees.22 However, these do not correspond to priorities enabling the competition authority to identify the most important cases to tackle, or how to prioritise the balance between merger control, anti-competitive investigations and advocacy. Rather, each new order or decree by the President, such as the establishment of the Privatisation Office, sets a new priority for the Agency.
The fact-finding mission to Kazakhstan in January 2025 revealed that there is no formal process in place within the Agency to prioritise its cases. The Agency is legally required to investigate all cases (e.g. every complaint that is submitted) under the current legal framework. However, even so, a point system can be put in place based on factors such as the type of infringement to be investigated, expected impact and outcome, extent of geographic market, available evidence and sector involved, which would help establish a hierarchy of cases and a methodology to prioritise the way the case load is addressed. Very short deadlines for market analyses (six months) and investigations (five months) might also be a natural consequence of such lack of prioritisation.
Every three years, the Agency designs a Development Plan which incorporates priorities set by the President in decrees. However, the Development Plan can also be an opportunity for the Agency, within its competences, to define its enforcement priorities. While the Agency does define the objectives in the Development Plan, these objectives remain very broad and can hardly be said to represent actionable priorities. The current Development Plan for 2023–2027 recognises the following objectives:
acceleration of entrepreneurial growth
“demonopolisation” of the economy
prevention, detection, investigation and suppression of violations of competition law
promotion of fair competition
regulation of economic concentration
ensuring open and efficient functioning of commodity exchanges and fair competition between exchange trade participants.
Evaluation
Within the framework of the Development Plan, the Agency conducts quarterly assessments of its activities. To measure its performance, the Agency uses different target indicators. In the Development Plan for 2020–2024, only one target indicator was used for each of the four objectives. The new Development Plan for the 2023–2027 period substantially extended the set of target indicators. Currently, the Agency’s performance in achieving the above mentioned five objectives is measured by 11 target indicators (Table 3.2).
Source: Development Plan 2023–2027.
Some target indicators used by the Agency appear unusual and little suited to measure its performance or impact. For instance, eliminating a set number of barriers to entry does not seem to be a helpful indicator, as such barriers first need to be identified and assessed as part of a regulatory impact assessment process. Although this exercise is supported by the Council for Barriers (Box 3.2), it seems highly unusual to establish a pre-ordained number of barriers to identify and remove. Similarly, many numerical or quantitative targets (such as the share of recommendations supported by the government) appear to be outside the Agency’s control. While the Development Plan is elaborated in collaboration with the Agency, its execution is nonetheless not fully within the control of the Agency. As such, the attaining or not the targets may not reflect the actual impact of the Agency’s work.
3.1.8. Institutional independence
Independence of the competition authority is perceived as central to the effective enforcement of competition law, as it enables the competition authority to make decisions on legal and economic grounds without the influence of political interests and considerations. The definition of independence and the means to achieve it are more complex issues. Since competition authorities operate in different political, social, administrative, legal and economic environments and they are assigned different responsibilities, there is no single model of independence. There are, however, various indicators that help with the assessment of the degree of independence enjoyed by the competition authority (OECD, 2016[1]).
OECD (2016[1]) identifies the following five elements of legal independence of competition authorities: (i) issues concerning top management, (ii) the status of the agency, (iii) resources, (iv) priority-setting and supervision, and (v) the objectives of competition law. The degree of independence of the Agency will be assessed according to these elements.
Issues concerning top management
As the ultimate decision-maker, the management of the competition authority needs to be protected from undue external (political and other) pressures. This might be achieved through rules on its nomination, appointment, term, and dismissal. The nomination and appointment processes need to be transparent and based on objective and qualitative criteria. Nomination commissions contribute positively to management’s independence. The term should be fixed, and longer terms are preferable. The threat of early dismissal is undesirable (OECD, 2016[1]).
In Kazakhstan, the appointments and dismissals of the Chair of the Agency and the Deputies are carried out by the President of Kazakhstan at their discretion, without stipulating any length of mandate. The procedures for appointment and dismissal are not pre-specified. Establishing clear rules for appointments and dismissals of top management can guarantee a higher degree of independence. This includes defining the necessary qualifications for the positions in top management of the Agency, and potentially assessed by an independent commission and the establishment of grounds for early dismissal. Moreover, although there is a code of conduct in place to prevent conflicts of interest, it is unclear to which degree it applies to very senior management.
The status of the agency
An important element of independence is the status that the competition authority enjoys within the government. Structural separation from the government provides greater independence from political influence and decreases the possibilities of political interventions (OECD, 2016[1]).
While KREMZK operated under the Ministry of National Economy which made it prone to potential political influence, the 2020 reform removed the powers of competition protection from the competences of the Ministry of National Economy and transferred them to the Agency which is directly subordinate and accountable to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The fact that the Agency is not a structural part of the government anymore does not, however, constitute proof of its independence. Other factors must be analysed to ensure that the de facto independence exists, including aspects such as independent budget resources (see below), or certainty about the duration of the Chair and Deputies’ mandates.
Resources
For the competition authority to function effectively and independently, sufficient financial and human resources are necessary. Financial resources are typically guaranteed through the national budget, which can raise concerns that budget allocation might potentially be used as an undue political pressure. Thus, independent sources of funding, at least partly, are highly desirable. Human resources are important for the functioning of the competition authority. Thus, merit-based recruitments are significant to obtain highly qualified staff, and the process of selection must be transparent and objective. Retainment of experienced staff is of great importance as well (OECD, 2016[1]).
The Agency is funded through the central budget (see section 3.1.5) and is consequently, regarding financial resources, fully dependent on the government. Since the government has the power to increase or decrease the Agency’s resources, its work may tend to adapt to government’s expectations, which can put its independence at risk. In its contribution to the 2023 OECD roundtable ‘The Optimal Design, Organisation and Powers of Competition Authorities’, Kazakhstan (2023[2]) acknowledged the need to ensure a higher degree of independence of its Agency through financial autonomy. Box 3.5 illustrates some examples from other jurisdictions where another source of funding of competition authorities is used.
While the competition authorities worldwide are typically funded through general public resources, some safeguards can be implemented to ensure a more stable funding:
The budget can be allocated on a multi-annual basis rather than annually.
Competition authorities can be funded partly from other resources, separate from the state budget (self-funding), for instance through:
fines imposed by competition authorities (noting that a conflict of interest might arise in this case)
a certain tax or contribution levied on undertakings
charges for certain services, e.g. merger filings.
Source: OECD (2016[1]), Independence of Competition Authorities - From Designs to Practices, https://doi.org/10.1787/ea9749e1-en.
Priority-setting and supervision
As mentioned, the priorities for competition policy are set in strategic documents announced by the President (see section 3.1.7) and then implemented in the Development Plan, adopted by the Agency. The Development Plan must be approved by the Ministry of National Economy and Ministry of Finance. The Agency is therefore able to shape priorities to a certain extent, but the main directions are given by the President. In terms of supervision, the Agency is accountable and must report to the President, however the reporting obligation does not suggest constraints in priority-setting. Given that the President has a significant influence over the functioning of the Agency, notably because presidential decrees set the agenda and prioritise the Agency’s work, including directing resources away from competition enforcement towards other tasks (such as privatisation), OECD questions whether the Agency truly enjoys de facto independence.
3.1.9. Transparency
The Agency communicates with the public through its official website and social media accounts, including Facebook, Instagram, Telegram and YouTube.
Decisions or case summaries by the Agency tend not to be published. A summary of the results of the investigation can be published as a press release on the Agency’s website, but this is not a regular occurrence. The market analyses done by the Agency are sometimes published in full on the Agency’s website, sometimes only in summary, and sometimes not at all. The lack of transparency in publishing decisions and (in certain instances) market analyses can create uncertainty and an unpredictable environment for market entities, whereas regular communications by the Agency would help establish a body of cases that firms could use as guidance for conduct and support the deterrent effect of the Agency’s work. Hence, the OECD Recommendation on Transparency and Procedural Fairness in Competition Law Enforcement [OECD/LEGAL/0465] recommends competition authorities to publish their decisions, subject to the protection of confidential information.
The Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Judicial System and Status of Judges of the Republic of Kazakhstan (later denoted as “Constitutional Law”)23 sets a three-tier court system. At the lowest instance are district courts and equivalent courts. They are general courts, but specialised district or inter-district courts also exist in some legal fields. Next, regional (oblast) courts serve as the courts of appeal. They have specialised panels for different categories of cases. At the highest level, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan is the court of cassation. Similarly, it has specialised panels for different categories of cases.
Importantly for competition law enforcement, the enforcement system is a court-based one. There are a few exceptions where the Agency is the decision-maker, but by far and large, Kazakhstan’s system is not an administrative system. This also matters in qualifying the role of courts, which are both the first instance decision-maker, as well as reviewers for appeal cases.
In administrative cases, the development of specialised administrative courts was a rather long process (Ablaeva, 2024[3]). After Kazakhstan’s independence, administrative cases were considered by district courts according to the rules of civil procedure, subject to certain exceptions. The adoption of the first Code of Administrative Offences24 gave the competence of considering cases of administrative offences to specialised administrative courts. As a result, first two specialised inter-district administrative courts were established in Astana and Almaty.25 In the following years, new courts were added. These courts were not administrative courts in the European tradition of administrative justice, since they considered claims made by the state against an individual (administrative offences) but not claims made by individuals against the state (LPRC, 2009[4]).
This framework was reformed in 2020 with the adoption of the Administrative Procedural and Process-Related Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan (later denoted as “APPR”),26 which regulates both administrative procedure and administrative legal proceedings, aimed at protecting individuals’ rights, freedoms and legitimate interests arising from public law relations. APPR envisaged specialised district courts and courts equivalent to them that would be entrusted with this task. Consequently, in 2021, the President issued a decree establishing 21 specialised inter-district administrative courts.27 They were formed in all of the regions and in the cities of Astana, Almaty and Shymkent. Additionally, existing administrative courts (which in fact considered administrative offence cases) were renamed as courts for administrative offences.
There are no specialised competition or economic courts in Kazakhstan. Competition-related cases fall under the jurisdiction of different courts, depending on the nature of the dispute in question. Firstly, the decisions of the Agency, particularly the ones made during an investigation, fall into the category of administrative cases and are therefore considered by specialised inter-district administrative courts. Secondly, some administrative offences related to competition law violations are considered by the courts for administrative offences. Thirdly, criminal and civil cases related to competition law violation are considered by the (general) district courts.
Before specialised inter-district administrative courts, the competition cases are considered by a single judge.28 The court has a certain number of specialised judges who hear competition cases. The appellate courts are regional (oblast) courts. Cases are decided by a collegium of at least three judges and there are specialised panels for administrative cases. The Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan serves as the court of cassation in competition cases. It makes decisions in a collegium and there is a specialised panel for administrative cases as well.
There are some judges specialised in competition law and there are occasional trainings, workshops and seminars organised for them by experts, including from the university and international organisations. These are ad hoc, and no formal training programme exists on a regular basis. The judges consulted for the Peer Review note that it would be beneficial to have regular trainings that would also study international practices.
The role of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan will change on 1 July 2025 when the decree of the President adopted in July 2024 comes into force.29 The decree amends the Constitutional Law and establishes three Courts of cassation – one for civil cases, one for criminal cases and one for administrative cases. As a result, the role of the Supreme Court will be reduced to ensuring the uniformity of judicial practice, but it will no longer serve as the court of cassation.
References
[3] Ablaeva, E. (2024), “Specialised Administrative Courts, Republic of Kazakhstan”, Bulletin of the Institute of Legislation and Legal Information of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Vol. 1/76, pp. 58-69, https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/spetsializirovannye-administrativnye-sudy-respubliki-kazahstan.
[2] Kazakhstan (2023), Optimal Design, Organisation and Powers of Competition Authorities – Note by Kazakhstan, https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2023)49/en/pdf.
[4] LPRC (2009), Prospects for the development of administrative-tort law (the law of administrative responsibility) in the Republic of Kazakhstan, https://lprc.kz/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Perspektivy-razvitiya-administrativno-deliktnogo-prava-_prava-administrativnoj-otvetstvennosti_-v-Respublike-Kazahstan.pdf.
[1] OECD (2016), “Independence of Competition Authorities - From Design to Practice”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 195, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ea9749e1-en.
← 1. Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 22 January 1999, no. 6.
← 2. Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 13 June 2003, no. 1107.
← 3. Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 6 August 2014, no. 875.
← 4. Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 10 July 2019, no 497.
← 5. Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 10 July 2019, no 497.
← 6. The 100 concrete steps set out by President Nursultan Nazarbayev to implement the five institutional reforms, 20 May 2015.
← 7. Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 8 September 2020, no 407.
← 8. Article 90-2 of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 9. Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 5 October 2020, no. 428. See Chapter 2 of the Regulations.
← 10. Chapter 3 of the Regulations.
← 11. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 23 November 2015, no. 416-V LRK.
← 12. Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 5 October 2020, no. 428.
← 13. Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 17 March 2022, no. 841; Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 1 March 2023, no. 134; Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 27 August 2024, no. 632.
← 14. Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 8 May 2024, no. 542.
← 15. Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 5 October 2020, no. 428.
← 16. Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 15 August 2022, no. 979.
← 17. Order of the Chair of the Agency for the Protection and Development of Competition of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 9 October 2020, no. 1-НҚ. The annex includes regulations on the regional offices of the Agency.
← 18. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 2 November 2015, no. 383-V ZRK.
← 19. The Agency noted in particular that the salaries in the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan are significantly higher.
← 20. Exchange rates were obtained https://www.xe.com/currencytables/. Data correct as of 28 February 2025.
← 21. The most recent is the Law on the Republican Budget for 2023-2025 dated 1 December 2022, no. 163-VII ZRK.
← 22. See Box 4.1. in section 4.1. for a description of recent high-level priorities.
← 23. Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 25 December 2000, no. 132.
← 24. The Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 30 January 2001, no. 155.
← 25. Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 9 February 2002, no. 803.
← 26. Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 29 June 2020, no. 350-VI ZRK.
← 27. Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 26 January 2021, no. 500.
← 28. Article 24 of the APPR.
← 29. Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 5 July 2024, no. 109-VIII.