This chapter reviews Kazakhstan’s enforcement of competition law, mainly public, as there have been no criminal cases so far, focusing on the two‑stage process of investigations and administrative proceedings. It also covers the use of notifications to pre-warn firms of potential anticompetitive conduct, administrative procedures and fines, structural remedies, judicial review, the leniency programme, and criminal liability provisions.
OECD Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy: Kazakhstan 2025
Abstract
Kazakhstan’s public enforcement of competition law consists of two main stages. The first stage is the investigation procedure which is carried out by the Agency. If a competition law violation is found during an investigation, the Agency can begin the second stage – the administrative offence procedure. This procedure is carried out either by the Agency itself or by the court, depending on the case. Judicial review of the decisions adopted during or at the end of both stages is possible. Depending on the decision, different courts have competence to review decisions.
5.1.1. Notification of the presence of signs of a competition law violation
In some cases, the Agency may bypass formal investigations and instead issue a notification when it detects signs of a potential competition law violation. This early-warning tool allows firms to voluntarily stop the suspected conduct without facing sanctions. Notifications can stem from complaints, referrals, media reports, or the Agency’s own market analysis (Box 5.1). This approach reflects a shift toward preventive, soft-law enforcement, but it also stems from capacity constraints. With many resources dedicated to non-enforcement tasks—such as price regulation, commodity monitoring, and privatisation oversight—the Agency’s ability to conduct formal investigations is limited. While notifications offer a pragmatic solution, they risk leading to underenforcement.
The number of issued notifications peaked in 2020 and then declined (Figure 5.1). According to the Agency, the reason for the decline is stricter control over issuance of notifications by the Agency’s regional offices. In the period between 2017 and 2022, the highest number of notifications related to concerted practices (38%), followed by the abuse of a dominant or monopoly position (23%) and anti-competitive agreements and actions by public authorities (23%). Figure 5.2 presents the structure of issued notifications per violation.
Scope
Notifications are not permitted in cases involving cartels, other horizontal agreements, or abuse of dominance involving monopoly high or low prices. These require immediate investigations.
For other violations—such as vertical agreements, concerted practices, unfair competition, and abuses of dominance (except pricing abuses)—a notification is mandatory before an investigation, as per the Order of the Minister of National Economy.
If the firm does not cease the infringement within 30 calendar days, the Agency may initiate an investigation. Extensions of up to 30 days are possible if justified, and firms must report their compliance. If they fail to comply, the Agency must decide within ten working days whether to investigate. Repeat violations within one year of compliance trigger automatic investigations without a new notification. Notifications can be appealed, but as of 2024, appeals no longer suspend the 30-day compliance period.
Limits
Clarifying the evidentiary threshold for issuing a notification versus initiating an investigation could enhance legal certainty.
Rebalancing enforcement priorities, particularly by reducing the Agency’s non-core tasks, may allow for more robust use of formal enforcement tools.
Assessing the effectiveness of the notification regime in practice—including rates of compliance, recurrence, and deterrent effect—could support decisions on whether this soft approach delivers sufficient deterrence.
Note: See section 7.3. for other proactive measures, such as warnings, anti-monopoly compliance and preliminary review of agreements.
Source: Article 199 of the Entrepreneur Code. Order of the Minister of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 30 November 2015, no. 745. OECD analysis..
Source: Annual reports from the Agency
While the adoption of the notification system has contributed to market entities ceasing competition law violations upon receiving a notification, it has also, in the view of OECD, undermined the enforcement of competition law. A lot of resources are dedicated to issuance of notifications (rather than conducting investigations). It also undermines the deterrent effect, as firms will almost always have an opportunity to cease their actions upon receiving a notification and thus escape liability. Furthermore, a notification enables the market entities to be aware that they are being scrutinised by the Agency, giving them the opportunity to conceal or destroy evidence.
5.1.2. Investigation procedure
The Entrepreneur Code authorises the Agency to conduct investigations and make and issue decisions based on their results.1
Competition law enforcement covers restrictive agreements, abuse of dominance or monopoly, unfair competition, and anti-competitive actions by public authorities. In contrast, merger control follows a separate procedure due to its distinct nature. 2
Investigations are led by the Department of Investigations at either the central or regional level, with complex cases typically handled centrally. Sectoral departments conduct preliminary market analyses, which are reviewed by the Methodological Council. 3 If approved, an investigation is launched. Sectoral teams collect data and perform most analytical work, while the Investigation Department co‑ordinates and compiles the findings. Given its broad responsibilities, limited staffing, and reliance on other departments for analysis, the Investigation Department appears overstretched—an issue likely linked to the previously noted duplication of tasks.
Initiation of the investigation
The Agency can initiate the investigation on the following grounds:
information provided by state authorities indicating a violation of competition law
complaints of individuals or market entities indicating a violation of competition law
detection of potential violations of competition law by the competition authority in the course of its activities (so-called ex officio investigation)
information from mass media
failure of a market entity, state body, local body, or an organisation vested with functions of regulating activities of market entities to notify the competition authority on the presence of signs of competition law violations within the established timeframe.
The decision to initiate an investigation conducted by the Agency’s central office, as well as the issuance of the corresponding order, is made by the Chairperson (in territorial divisions, the decision to initiate an investigation is issued by the Head of the division). In the Chairperson’s absence, the acting Deputy Chairperson performs this function. The same order authorises designated officials to conduct the investigation.4 In addition, the Chairperson or their deputies, if there are sufficient grounds to indicate signs of a violation of competition legislation, may issue a directive to territorial divisions to conduct an investigation.
An investigation may only be launched following a market analysis and the issuance of a notification that the undertaking has failed to act upon. The sole exception applies to hard-core horizontal and vertical agreements, for which investigations can begin immediately if a violation is suspected. For all other restrictive agreements, concerted practices, and abuse of dominance or monopoly, a prior market analysis by sectoral departments is required. Only after this step—and an unheeded notification—can the Department of Investigations proceed. It appears the Agency largely relies on external complaints rather than acting ex officio.
Investigations are initiated by executive order,5 which specifies: (i) the investigation’s subject, (ii) the grounds for initiation, (iii) signs of a possible violation, (iv) start and end dates, (v) the lead investigator, and (vi) participants’ rights. 6 A copy of the order must be sent to the subject within three working days. In suspected cartel cases (e.g. price fixing, bid rigging, market division, output restrictions, or collusive boycotts), the order is delivered at the time of the investigation to prevent tampering with evidence. 7
The subject of an investigation may appeal the order. However, since 2024, such appeals no longer have suspensive effect. 8,9
Participants in the investigation
Various persons and entities may participate in investigations of potential competition law violations. The main participants are:
the lead investigator (an authorised official of the Agency), and
the subject of the investigation (an individual or legal entity under investigation).
Additional participants include:
complainants (those who filed the original complaint)
interested persons (individuals or entities whose rights or legitimate interests may be affected), and
witnesses or experts as needed.
Participants have procedural rights throughout the investigation.10 They may access case materials (excluding confidential information and trade secrets), make copies, present and examine evidence, ask questions, file motions, and provide explanations or arguments. They may also review motions submitted by others and raise objections.
Collection of information and evidence
After launching an investigation, authorised Agency officials collect and assess evidence. This includes statements from the subject, complainant, interested parties, and witnesses, as well as expert opinions, material evidence, and other documents. Evidence may take any form, including photos, audio, and video recordings. 11
During the course of an investigation, the authorised officials act independently in choosing the method of obtaining information, gathering and recording evidence, making decisions on the appointment and conduct of expert examinations, deciding to suspend the investigation, and initiating administrative proceedings in cases of failure to provide information, or in the event of incomplete, false, or inaccurate information being submitted. At the same time, the decision to extend the investigation is made by the Chairperson, or, in their absence, by the Deputy Chairperson acting in their capacity.
Agency officials have broad powers to obtain evidence. 12 They may request written information from state and local authorities, access premises, involve specialists from other bodies, and appoint experts. They can also request information directly from the subject, through both standard requests and more invasive measures such as unannounced inspections (dawn raids, Box 5.2).
1. An order to conduct an investigation is delivered, and the rights of the market entity and the officials of the antimonopoly authority are explained;
2. The staffing schedule is requested;
3. Employees are interviewed, with the interviews recorded in a protocol;
4. Employees’ work computers are inspected, with the inspection recorded in a protocol, indicating the number and volume of electronic files obtained, or the names of the documents;
5. Paper documents are examined, and copies are made, with the inspection of the premises documented in a protocol;
6. Upon completion of these actions, if necessary, a written request is additionally issued for the provision of further information.
In general, the number of staff participating in the inspection depends on the size of the company and on the number of companies being inspected.
Source: Information provided by the Agency.
Requests for information, documents, or explanations—whether oral or written—are mandatory for public authorities, businesses, legal entities, and individuals. These requests may include commercial or trade secrets; only banking, insurance, and securities secrets are exempt. Under Article 162 of the Code on Administrative Offences, failure to comply or providing incomplete, inaccurate, or false information is punishable by a fine. Prior to 2015, officials could enter business premises but lacked enforcement powers (OECD, 2016[3]). Legal amendments granted authority to inspect documents, make copies, and record evidence (e.g. photos, audio, video). Obstructing access is also punishable under Article 162. In addition to inspections of premises and physical documents, the officials of the Agency have the power to access the information systems and other electronic media, inspect them and make copies from the databases.
However, dawn raids are permitted only in cartel cases, where the executive order may be delivered at the time of inspection. In all other cases, prior notice is required—diminishing their effectiveness due to the potential for the destruction of key evidence. Since 2015, the use of dawn raids in cartel investigations has increased (see Figure 5.3). However, the high number reported annually suggests that Kazakhstan’s definition of a dawn raid may differ from that in other jurisdictions.
Source: Data provided by the Agency.
If, during the investigation, the Agency’s officials obtain information constituting commercial, official, and other secrets protected by law, they are prohibited by law from disclosing such information, except in cases established by laws.13 If any evidence points to potential competition law violations of another market entity, the Agency can also start an investigation of that market entity.14 It is noticeable that the Agency cannot impose any interim measures, which may weaken the outcome of the overall investigation.
A short timeframe for investigations
The investigation period is strictly determined by law. In 2016,15 the term was extended from two to three months, still a rather short period. The Agency can, however, extend the investigation for an additional two months.16 Thus, a five-month period is the maximum duration of an investigation in Kazakhstan. The average duration of the investigation is approximately four months, which the same as in the EAEU, but this is hardly conducive to a thorough investigation. Shorter timeframes are likely to reduce the quality and depth of the supporting economic analysis. In most OECD jurisdictions, investigations of complex cases can take years, a stark contrast to Kazakhstan’s rigid timeframe regulation.
The investigations can only be carried out on working days from 9.00 to 18.00. Only in exceptional cases can the employees in the public sector work outside this timeframe, requiring prior agreement for instance to work after 18.00 hours or on weekends, to finish an investigation.
The Agency is allowed to temporarily suspend the investigation in a few pre-determined cases.17;18 When the reason for the suspension ceases, the investigation must resume within three working days.
Draft conclusion and the Conciliation Commission
Based on the results of the investigation, the Agency prepares a draft conclusion, which is sent to the subject of the investigation at least 30 calendar days before the end of the investigation.19
The subject of investigation is entitled to submit the draft conclusion to consideration by the Conciliation Commission within 20 days. The institution of the Conciliation Commission was introduced with the adoption of the Entrepreneur Code (1st antimonopoly package) and was envisaged as a consultative and advisory body (Box 5.1). However, the Commission does not have any settlement powers.
Composition
The Conciliation Commission under the Agency consists of no more than nine members, including among them the Chair of the Agency, the deputy, the head of the sectoral department (depending on the relevant product market) and an independent expert put forward by the subject of the investigation.
If the investigation is related to the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan, there is a distinct configuration of the Conciliation Commission. In this case, the Conciliation Commission will have eight members, four of whom are from the Agency, while the other four will be from the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Separate rules govern its functioning as well.1 To date, this configuration has not met yet.
Functioning of the Conciliation Commission
The function of the Conciliation Commission is to consider the draft conclusion on the results of the investigation of competition law violations and make comments and recommendations. It scrutinises the draft conclusion from the aspects of completeness and quality of evidence. It cannot propose a settlement.
The Conciliation Commission reaches decisions by a simple majority, each member having one vote. In case of a tie, the vote of the Chair of the Agency is decisive.
1. Order of the Minister of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 27 February 2017, no. 86.
Source: Regulations on the Conciliation Commission, Order of the Chairman of the Agency for the Protection and Development of Competition of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 1 June 2023, no. 137/NK.
5.1.3. Conclusion of the investigation
The investigation is concluded when the lead investigator signs the conclusion on the results of the investigation. A copy of the conclusion is sent to the subject of the investigation no later than three working days from the date of signing.
Based on the results of the investigation, the Management Board of the Agency may take one of the following five types of decisions: (i) termination of the investigation, (ii) issuance of an order to eliminate competition law violations, (iii) initiation of an administrative offense case, (iv) compulsory divestiture, and (v) transfer of materials to law enforcement agencies.
The Agency does not have powers to enter into settlement with the parties. However, the ability to settle cases before they go to court can often be a resource saving tool for agencies, as highlighted by OECD competition roundtables (see Box 5.4).
Settlements offer competition authorities a pragmatic alternative to full litigation, enabling faster resolution of cases while preserving enforcement effectiveness. When facts are clear and parties are co-operative, settlements can deliver timely remedies, reduce administrative burdens and enhance resource efficiency.
Authorities benefit from reallocating investigative capacity to more complex cases, while businesses gain legal certainty and avoid prolonged proceedings. However, the use of settlements must be carefully designed to safeguard transparency, consistency and deterrence. Clear procedural rules, public disclosure of decisions and oversight mechanisms are essential to maintain accountability and public trust.
Jurisdictions vary in their approach: some integrate settlements with leniency or commitment procedures, while others apply them informally. The OECD encourages the development of guidelines and international dialogue to promote convergence and share best practices.
Source: OECD (2021[4]), “Competition Enforcement and Regulatory Alternatives”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 258, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d9a9c703-en.
In administrative matter, the Agency, represented by the Chair or Deputy Chairs (whether at the central office or at the regional office) is authorised to decide on the following types of cases (Article 713 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Republic of Kazakhstan):
initiation of an administrative offense case
termination of the investigation (I suppose if it finds no evidence of an infringement)
issuance of an order to eliminate competition law violations
Impose compulsory divestitures, or
transfer of materials to law enforcement agencies (I suppose for formal criminal prosecution).
Termination of the investigation
Firstly, the Agency can terminate the investigation. Termination is possible on the following grounds:20
absence of competition law violations in the actions of the subject of the investigation
liquidation of the legal entity that is the sole subject of the investigation
deregistration of a branch of a legal entity that is the sole subject of the investigation
death of an individual who is the sole subject of the investigation
expiration of the statute of limitations for the imposition of an administrative penalty
enactment of a judicial act which makes conclusions on the presence or absence of a competition law violation in the actions of the subject of the investigation.
Issuance of an order
Secondly, the Agency may issue a binding order to market entities requiring: (i) cessation of competition law violations and elimination of their consequences, (ii) restoration of the original condition (restitutio ad integrum), or (iii) termination or amendment of contracts that violate competition law. 21 An order must identify the market entity, describe the established violation(s), specify required actions, and set deadlines for compliance and reporting. Such orders are signed by the Chairperson of the Agency when issued by the central office, or by the Head of the territorial/regional division when issued at the regional level. The Agency monitors execution. 22
Non-compliance or incomplete execution is subject to a fine under Article 162 of the Code on Administrative Offences. Additionally, under Article 226 of the Entrepreneur Code, the Agency may file a court claim to enforce the order.
The Agency may reconsider an order, upon request or ex officio, in the following cases: (i) unknown and unknowable facts at the time of issuance leading to an unlawful or unjustified order, (ii) reliance on inaccurate information, (iii) violation of Kazakh legislation, or (iv) need for grammatical or arithmetical correction. The Agency may uphold, amend, cancel, or reissue the order. The applicant’s position cannot be worsened as a result. 23
Administrative offence procedure
Thirdly, the Agency can initiate an administrative offence procedure which can, ultimately, result in the imposition of an administrative penalties. The law defines administrative offences, penalties imposed for their commission, as well as a special procedure in which they are imposed. Such cases are handled by the Chairperson or the supervising Deputy Chairperson at the central office, and by the Head of the territorial division or their deputy at the regional level (see section 5.1.5).
Structural remedies
Fourthly, in cases of repeated findings of abuses of a dominant or monopoly position, structural remedies may be imposed to promote competition. These can take the form of divisions of a market entity or spin-offs of one or more structural subdivisions into a separate legal entity. After 2016, the use of structural remedies was reduced to the abuses of a dominant or monopoly position only.24 This seems to strongly limit the deterrent effect of the sanctions available to competition law enforcement.
A compulsory demerger may be imposed when a market entity twice in a calendar year has been found administratively liable for an abuse of a dominant or monopoly position and still keeps committing actions restraining competition (Article 231). In other words, two findings of administrative liability do not suffice – the continuation of actions is necessary.
The Agency cannot impose a compulsory demerger on its own but must file a claim in court. Two conditions must be cumulatively met: (i) there are no technological interrelations between structural subdivisions, and (ii) there is an opportunity of independent activities in the relevant product market for the new entity resulting from the demerger. The judgment must be executed by the firm’s owner(s).
The Agency can also transfer materials acquired and produced during the investigation to the law enforcement agencies for a pre-trial investigation, if the findings of the investigation procedure suggest that a criminal offence had been committed. Criminal liability will be examined in detail in section 5.3.
From 2016 to 2023, the number of investigations initiated and conducted has, on average, decreased, as shown by Figure 5.4 The reason behind this trend might be the increasing use of notifications which, if executed in time, supposedly eliminate the need for conducting an investigation. Indeed, a drastic fall of the number of investigations between 2016 and 2019 corresponds to an increase in the number of notifications issued during the same period. On the other hand, as discussed, the Agency also appears to be spending an increasing amount of time and resources on activities unrelated to competition law enforcement, including price regulation and price controls, which significantly detract from the resources available to conduct investigations.
Note: If the number of investigations resulting in finding a competition law violation is not given in the annual reports, it is calculated by subtracting the number of terminations from the total number of investigations conducted.
Source: Annual reports of the Agency.
Most investigations in the period between 2018 and 2023 were conducted for restrictive agreements (30%), followed closely by the abuse of a dominant or monopoly position (25%) and anti-competitive agreements and actions of public authorities (25%) (Figure 5.5). While concerted practices represent a large share of all issued notifications, they constitute a relatively small share of investigations (12%), mostly because these appear to be mainly related to bid-rigging offenses. Unfair competition is not among enforcement priorities for the Agency, as less than ten cases of unfair competition are, on average, investigated annually. They may also be discontinued after the next monopoly package.
Source: Annual reports of the Agency.
The trends in investigation decisions, presented in Figure 5.6 show that the number of order issuances or administrative offence procedure initiations are decreasing proportionally to a decrease in the number of investigations. In fact, 93% of the decrease in order issuances or administrative offence procedure initiations can be explained by a decrease in the overall number of investigations.
Note: Due to some data missing, some of the recent trends are not visible.
Source: Annual reports from the Agency.
5.1.4. Administrative offence procedure
After finding a competition law violation, the Agency can initiate the administrative offence procedure. The notion of an administrative offence, specific administrative offences, as well as the authorised body and the procedure for considering these cases, are determined by the Code of Administrative Offences.25
In Kazakhstan, administrative liability is imposed on a person who committed an administrative offence defined, in line with the principle of legality, in the Special Part of the Code of Administrative Offences. Both natural persons and legal persons can be liable for an administrative offence committed in the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
A person found liable for an administrative offence in a special administrative offence procedure is given an administrative penalty. The main administrative penalties are: (i) a warning, (ii) an administrative fine, and (iii) an administrative arrest. Other available administrative penalties include suspension or prohibition of activities, deprivation of a special right, forced demolition, confiscation etc. For each administrative offence, the law provides limits within which an administrative penalty can be imposed.
Criminal liability takes precedence over administrative liability. If a commission of an administrative offence entails elements of a criminal offence, criminal liability is pursued exclusively.
Source: Articles 41 and 42 of the Code of Administrative Offences.
Chapter 14 of the Special Part of the Code of Administrative Offences addresses violations in entrepreneurial activity, including breaches of Kazakhstan’s competition law. These range from anti-competitive agreements, concerted practices, abuse of dominance or monopoly, unfair competition, and unnotified or unapproved economic concentrations, to non-compliance with remedies or orders, failure to provide accurate information, and anti-competitive actions or inaction by state and local bodies. Violations are punishable primarily by administrative fines.
Only market entities are subject to administrative liability; managers and directors cannot be held simultaneously liable under the law. Administrative liability is subject to limitation periods. While most offences expire two months after commission, competition-related offences are subject to extended periods: one year for individuals and five years for legal entities.26
Cases of administrative offences in Kazakhstan are considered either by courts or authorised state bodies. The Code of Administrative Offences determines the competence of one or the other body for each individual administrative offence.27
Competition-related administrative offences are not uniformly considered by either authorised state bodies or courts. The law authorises the Agency to consider most of these administrative offences, while some of the gravest violations of competition law are left for courts to decide.
The courts consider cases of restrictive agreements, concerted practices, abuses of a dominant or monopoly position and non-compliance with restrictions for state monopolies.28 These cases are considered by the judges of specialised district courts and equivalent courts for administrative offences.29
All other cases, such as unfair competition, execution of economic concentration without prior approval and failure to comply with an order of the Agency or provide full and accurate information, can be considered by the Agency itself (Box 5.5). In particular the Chair of the Agency, Deputy Chairs, as well as heads of regional offices and their deputies.30 Unfortunately, according to the Agency, there are no statistics of administrative cases compiled by the Agency and its regional offices.
Administrative offence procedure
The administrative offence procedure has, according to established legal theory, four stages: (1) initiation of the administrative offence case, (2) consideration of the case, (3) appeal and review of the case, and (4) execution of the decision (Tukiev, 2020[58]).
1. Initiation of the case: The grounds for initiating the administrative offence procedure are a direct detection of the facts by the authorised official, materials received from law enforcement agencies, other state and local bodies, reports and statements from individuals, legal persons or media, and detection by automated measuring devices. The authorised official examines the obtained information for signs of an administrative offence and then initiates the proceedings by preparing a protocol on an administrative offence. The protocol includes basic information on the alleged perpetrator and administrative offence in question. Alternatively, the prosecutor also has the power to issue a decree to initiate a case on the administrative offence.
2. Consideration of the case: The protocol or the prosecutor’s decree is sent to the court or an authorised state body, depending on the administrative offence in question. Regardless of whether the case is considered by the official of the authorised body or by the judge, the procedure is in its foundations rather similar. The case should be considered within 15 days from the receipt of the protocol. The official or judge leads the proceedings, including announcing the protocol and hearing the arguments from the person against whom the proceeding is conducted. If the official who drew up the protocol is present, he or she can also give explanations of the administrative offence. After consideration, the official or judge issues a decree either to impose an administrative penalty or to terminate the proceedings.
3. Appeal and review of the case: The decrees of the authorised body or the court on the administrative offence can be appealed to a superior body. When a decree on the administrative offence was adopted by an authorised state body, the appeal is considered by a superior state body, whose decree can be challenged in court. When a decree on the administrative offence was adopted by the court, the appeal is considered by a court of higher instance, i.e. the appellate courts. The appeal can be submitted by a person against whom the proceeding is conducted, an injured party, as well as the prosecutor, and has a suspensive effect, preventing an execution of an administrative penalty imposed in the decree. Ultimately, the case could be considered by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
4. Execution of the decision: A decree on the imposition of an administrative penalty usually enters into force after the expiration of the term for appealing the decree or, in case of appeal, upon issuance of a decree on appeal. After entering into force, it must be executed. Kazakhstan’s law distinguishes between voluntary and compulsory execution. For instance, the execution is deemed voluntary, if an administrative fine is paid no later than 30 days from the date of the decree’s entering into force. On the other hand, the execution is compulsory, when an administrative fine is collected without consent of the concerned person – either by deduction from income (for individuals) or by withdrawal from a bank account (for legal entities).
Source: Code of Administrative Offences; Tukiev, A. (ed.) (2020[5]), Scientific and practical commentary on the Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Administrative Offenses (article-by-article); Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan, https://zakon.uchet.kz/rus/docs/T2000000005.
The administrative offence procedure in competition-related administrative offences follows the general framework. The administrative offence procedure is initiated after the conclusion of the investigation procedure. In fact, the protocol must be drawn up immediately after a decision was made in the investigation procedure.31 The lead investigator is responsible for preparing the protocol. This does not only apply to cases considered by the Agency but also to cases considered by the court.32 After the consideration of the case (either by the Agency of the court for administrative offences), a decree is adopted and, if administrative liability is established, an administrative penalty in the form of an administrative fine is imposed on the liable market entity. In absence of appeal, the decree is executed either voluntarily or by compulsion. In case of appeal, the effects of a decree are suspended until the decision of the appeals court.
5.1.5. Administrative penalties
Administrative fines
The administrative penalties for all competition-related administrative offences are monetary sanctions, and most of them take the form of administrative fines. The law determines the fine to be paid for a particular competition law violation. The court for administrative offences has no margin of discretion when issuing administrative fines – it must apply a predefined formula from the Code of Administrative Offences.
Administrative fines are not uniformly defined for all competition-related administrative offences. Most fines are defined as a multiple of a monthly calculation index (MCI), e.g. 1 600 monthly calculation indices. The MCI is approved annually by the law on the republican budget and amounts to 3 692 KZT in 2024.33 As a rule, this is not considered good practice, as it makes the fines difficult to understand ex-ante and therefore have less of a deterrent effect.
In contrast, the fines for monopolistic activity (restrictive agreements, concerted practices, and abuses of a dominant or monopoly position) are defined as a certain percentage of the revenue (income) obtained by the market entity “as a result of carrying out the monopolistic activity”. The law does not, however, define what exactly this revenue is.
When determining fines, the Code of Administrative Offences distinguishes between individuals, non-profit organisations, small, medium, and large enterprises, and adjusts the level of the administrative penalty accordingly. For instance, non-compliance with an Agency’s order results in a fine of 50 MCI for individuals, 100 MCI for small enterprises and non-profit organisations, 360 MCI for medium enterprises, and 1 600 MCI for large enterprises. There may also be mitigating or aggravating circumstances to determine the level of the fine.34 Aggravating circumstances include carrying out an offence (e.g. monopoly high prices) in times of natural disasters and other emergencies. A somewhat peculiar case is if an administrative offence is committed by a group of persons is always, in itself, an aggravating circumstance.35
The use of the MCI, and varying fines for the size of the enterprise is not considered good practice. It lacks transparency for firms and imposes uncertainty on market players. Fines should be calculated on the base of the party’s turnover and regardless of size, legal form, etc. Some of the criteria discussed in the paragraph above could be part of the aggravating/attenuating circumstances and with additional percentages imposed for aggravating circumstances. Fines also need to be at a level that would act as a deterrent to market players, which does not currently seem to be the case (Table 5.1).
Note: The administrative fines are calculated using the monthly calculated index (MCI) from 2024.
Source: Code of Administrative Offences.
Statistics on fines issued
The cumulative amount of administrative fines issued annually was decreasing up to 2020 when the trend shifted (Table 5.2). A downward trend could be explained by a decrease in the overall number of investigations which was due to an increased use of notifications as a preventive instrument. The recent upward trend in the cumulative amount of fines issued certainly cannot be explained by strengthened enforcement as Kazakhstan relies increasingly on preventive (soft law) instruments. The increase in issued fines appears to stem from targeting large enterprises.
KZT and USD in current value, 2023 and 20241
Note: 1. The table shows the fines in nominal values. Fines are calculated as a certain multiple of the MCI index which already takes into account inflation. Fines in EUR and USD were calculated using the 31 December exchange rate for each year. Historical rates are available at: www.currency-converter.org.uk/currency-rates/historical/table/USD-KZT.html. 2. “Monopolistic income” refers to the revenue or profit unlawfully obtained as a result of engaging in monopolistic or anticompetitive conduct, including prohibited agreements, coordinated actions, or abuse of dominant market position. Under Kazakhstan’s Code on Administrative Infractions (Articles 42–45 and 159), fines are considered the primary administrative sanction, while the confiscation of monopolistic income is an additional sanction. Confiscation entails the compulsory and non-repayable transfer of such unlawfully earned income to the state, applicable for a period not exceeding one year.
Source: Information provided by the Agency. The statistics show that the enforcement of fines is relatively high. In 2022 and 2023, 90% and 93% of administrative fines were collected, respectively.
Confiscation of monopolistic income
In cases of restrictive agreements, concerted practices, and abuses of a dominant or monopoly position, the law envisages an additional administrative penalty – confiscation of monopolistic income. It can never be the main administrative penalty but is imposed in addition to the administrative fine.36
The Entrepreneur Code defines monopolistic income as income obtained by a market entity as a result of carrying out monopolistic activities (i.e. restrictive agreements, concerted practices, and abuse of a dominant or monopoly position). Up to one year’s monopolistic income can be confiscated.37 Upon confiscation, monopolistic income becomes the property of the state.38 Confiscation of monopolistic income can only be imposed by the court.
The 2016 Peer Review noted that the law operates with two very similar categories: monopolistic income (for the purposes of confiscation) and income obtained as a result of carrying out the monopolistic activity (for the purposes of the administrative fine). Although the purpose of each category is different,39 the distinction between them is not clear.
The notion of monopolistic income, although defined for specific competition law violations, is difficult to apply. It might be challenging to distinguish between total income obtained from restrictive agreements or concerted practices and other income obtained by the market entity in the same time period. Further, the calculation of benchmark prices for comparison with monopoly high prices or monopsony low prices relies on several assumptions, for instance the level of necessary profits. Kazakhstan’s law attempts to artificially determine the level of competitive prices. In contrast, there is no consensus in the economic literature on what competitive prices are and how they can be determined.
Return of assets to state ownership
While administrative penalties, such as fines and confiscation of monopolistic income, are determined by legislation as a consequence of an administrative offence, another invasive sanction has been used in practice in recent years. In some cases of abuse of a dominant position, particularly in relation to monopoly high prices, the Agency imposed a sanction of return of the assets to state ownership (see Box 5.6 for examples). Thus, the shares in some companies who were found to have abused their dominant position or immovable property owned by such companies have been transferred (partly in or full) to the state. Since 2022, approximately 65 billion KZT (125 million EUR) of assets has been transferred to state ownership as a part of this practice.
This practice suggests that nationalisation has become a sanction for abuses of a dominant position of privately-owned companies. Not only is this problematic in terms of private property and is not in line with international practice, but it also opposes Kazakhstan’s efforts to privatise its heavily state-influenced economy. Moreover, OECD has not been able to identify the legal basis for such invasive measures. In international practice, companies found to have abused their dominant position are fined in accordance with a framework similar to Kazakhstan’s. However, companies are not nationalised simply for violating competition law.
In 2022, the Agency investigated monopolisation in the parking market in Almaty and found that two companies, Almaty Spetstekhparking Service LLP and (30% owned by Almaty) and Alan Parking LLP (fully privately owned), abused their jointly held dominant position. The Agency fined both companies and full ownership of the companies was given to Almaty.
In 2021, the Agency found in an investigation that Eurotransit Nur Zholy LLP, a transportation company, had a dominant position and abused it by setting monopoly high prices (as the price of transportation services increased from 1.2 million KZT to 1.4 million KZT per round trip. The Agency, as a part of the sanction, ordered a transfer to state ownership of a land plot of 3.6 hectares, including a transportation and logistics complex valued at KZT 5.7 billion (around EUR 11.5 million at the time).
In 2023, the Agency investigated TEK Kazakhstan and fined the company for abusing its dominant position by setting monopoly high prices for diesel fuel storage and dispensing. In addition to the fine, fuel bases (valued at around KZT 39 billion or EUR 77 million) were transferred to state ownership.
Sources: Gurzhiy, T. (2023[6]), ТД «ТЭК Казахстан» обвиняют в монопольно высоких ценах на услуги, https://kz.kursiv.media/2023-02-13/ttgr-monopolist/.; Agency for Development and Protection of Competition of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2024[7]), АЗРК ВОЗВРАЩАЕТ АКТИВЫ НА МИЛЛИАРДЫ ТЕНГЕ И УКРЕПЛЯЕТ КОНТРОЛЬ ЗА МОНОПОЛИЯМИ, https://bit.ly/4kQDHcW; PostFactum.kz (2022[8]), Became the property of the city, https://postfactum.kz/en/obshchestvo/219-became-the-property-of-the-city#:~:text=damage%2C%20the%20Akimat%20of%20Almaty,the%20ownership%20of%20the%20city; Shyngyssov, A. and A. Kornilova (2025[9]), Kazakhstan intensified antimonopoly regulation efforts throughout 2024, https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2025/01/kazakhstan-intensified-antimonopoly-regulation-efforts-throughout-2024.
5.1.6. Judicial review
The enforcement procedure is broken up into two separate procedures: investigation procedure and administrative offence procedure. This duality is reflected in the judicial review system as well.
Judicial review of investigation decisions
The orders of the Agency adopted in the course of the investigation procedure can be appealed in the specialised inter-district administrative courts. They include initiations of the investigation and the final conclusions of the investigation. The majority of decisions that are appealed are decisions related to cases of horizontal agreements and abuses of a dominant or monopoly position. Vertical agreements, on the contrary, represent only a small fraction of court cases.
Article 230 of the Entrepreneur Code provides grounds for appeal: (i) failure to identify all circumstances which are relevant to the case, (ii) failure to prove the circumstances which are relevant to the case and recognised as ascertained, (iii) inconsistency of the conclusions stated in the decision with the circumstances of the case, and (iv) violation or incorrect application of the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan.
The courts overturn the decisions of the Agency for various reasons. In the past, most cases were overturned on procedural grounds and, while the Agency is trying to reverse this trend, procedural violations still represent a large group of court cases. There are a few types of procedural errors:
Non-compliance with statutory deadlines for market analyses and investigations: set at three months, extendable once by two months. Given the complexity of cases, these short deadlines frequently result in procedural violations. For example, in the case against BASF Central Asia LLP, the court annulled the decision solely because the investigation exceeded the legal timeframe. To prevent such formalistic annulments, it would be more appropriate to either extend or eliminate these statutory deadlines, allowing the Agency to set internal, non-binding timeframes.
Another recurring procedural breach is initiating investigations without first completing a market analysis, as required by law. In such cases, the investigation order is unlawful, rendering any findings invalid.
A third category of procedural error concerns how market analyses are conducted. Courts give significant weight to the Agency’s own methodology, and any deviation may render the analysis inadmissible. In the Stroykonstruktsiya JSC case, the court ruled that each methodological step must be followed in order and without omission.
Substantive and evidentiary shortcomings have also led to more decisions being overturned, particularly concerning market definition and economic analysis used to establish anti-competitive conduct. In 2021, over 60% of cases were decided in favour of plaintiffs. This judicial scrutiny has, however, driven improvements in the Agency’s analytical quality and a reduction in procedural errors.
Note: Table does not sum to 100%.
Source: Information provided by the Agency.
The Agency acknowledges that court rulings have helped refine its practices, as evidenced by a new, dedicated department studying court cases. However, the Agency also reports finding judicial approaches rigid at times. For example, the Agency reported to the OECD that courts often reject economic analyses that use innovative methodologies rather than those explicitly prescribed by law. Given that different markets may require different analytical approaches, courts should assess all economic analyses on their evidentiary value. Judicial training could help bridge this gap.
Kazakhstan’s legislation does not specify a standard of proof in competition cases, nor has case law established one. Judges exercise discretion in determining whether a case is sufficiently proven. While judges acknowledge that stronger economic analysis improves evidence quality, they emphasise that they are required to assess all economic analyses presented in a fair manner and determine if they demonstrate anti-competitive effects.
Since the pandemic, administrative court hearings, including competition cases, are conducted online as part of Kazakhstan’s judicial digitalisation efforts. While cost-efficient, online hearings may be inadequate for evaluating evidence, particularly witness credibility, where in-person interaction could be beneficial. About 50% of antitrust cases heard by specialised inter-district administrative courts are appealed to oblast (regional) courts.
The timeframe for judicial review seems reasonable. Cases before the first instance are generally reviewed within three months, cases on appeal are adjudicated in two months, while cases before the Supreme Court last six months. Cases with longer timeframes are possible but rare.
The Agency is represented in court by the Department of Investigations of the central office and the Investigations Departments of the regional offices.
Judicial review of administrative offence decisions
While the decisions of the Agency in the course of the investigation are contested before the specialised inter-district administrative courts, the administrative penalties are generally imposed by the courts, namely the courts for administrative offences. Such decisions can be appealed in line with the Code of Administrative Offences. Appeals are made to the appellate courts; in Kazakhstan, these are regional (oblast) courts.
5.1.7. Leniency programme
Kazakhstan formally has a leniency programme. However, at the time of writing this had never been used and no case has ever been initiated based on a leniency application. The first version of Kazakhstan’s leniency programme only covered confiscation of monopolistic income but not the administrative fines.40 In 2015,41 an extension was made to include leniency from all types of administrative penalties, including administrative fines (OECD, 2016[3]). Since then, the leniency programme has remained unchanged.
Article 159 of the Code of Administrative Offences stipulates that a market entity that committed an administrative offence in the form of a restrictive agreement or concerted practice shall be released from administrative liability if four cumulative conditions are satisfied:
1. at the time, when the market entity applied for leniency, the Agency must be unaware of such restrictive agreement or concerted practice, and not have been informed from other sources
2. the market entity takes measures to cease its participation in the restrictive agreement or concerted practice
3. the market entity reports all available information about the restrictive agreement or concerted practice throughout the course of investigation
4. the market entity voluntarily compensates any damages to consumers arising from the restrictive agreement or concerted practice.
Kazakhstan’s leniency programme applies to all restrictive agreements and concerted practices. In international practice, leniency programmes are often applied only to hard-core cartels, while their use for vertical agreements is rare and limited to most severe infringements (Ysewyn, 2024[10]). Further, the Kazakh leniency programme does not make any distinctions between market entities and thus applies equally to market entities who initiated a restrictive agreement or concerted practice and market entities who were invited to participate.
The leniency programme covers full administrative liability for the first company to come forward. The market entity coming forward with the relevant information on an anti-competitive agreement or concerted practice is granted full exemption from administrative penalties, including both administrative fines and confiscation of monopolistic income. This is more benevolent to market entities than some jurisdictions in which “only” a reduction of the fine is possible. On the other hand, leniency is available only to the first company which notifies the Agency of the unlawful conduct, and not to any others.
Since the administrative offences relating to restrictive agreements and concerted practices are considered by the court, granting the application under the leniency programme will also be assessed by the court. In the past, the courts had discretion whether to grant the exemption or not.42 In 2015, the provision was amended,43 and the courts are now required by law to grant the release from administrative liability if the four conditions are satisfied. This approach should contribute to a more predictable leniency programme.
Leniency programmes are a key tool for detecting and deterring cartels, allowing firms to self-report their involvement in anti-competitive agreements in exchange for immunity or reduced fines. Contrary to the practice in Kazakhstan, competition authorities do not usually need to be entirely unaware of a cartel's existence in order for a leniency application to be accepted. In most jurisdictions, including those of the European Union and the United States, firms may apply for leniency even when the competition authority is already in possession of some information about the suspected infringement or has initiated an investigation.
The decisive factor in such cases is not the authority's prior awareness, but rather the applicant’s ability to provide evidence that materially strengthens the case. In particular, to qualify for full immunity, the applicant must typically be the first to submit information that enables the competition authority to either conduct a targeted inspection (such as a dawn raid) or establish an infringement it could not have proven otherwise. If the authority has already launched an investigation or conducted dawn raids, the applicant may still benefit from a reduction in fines if it submits evidence that represents "significant added value" to the case.
This approach is clearly articulated in the European Commission’s 2006 Leniency Notice, which provides that immunity from fines may be granted to the first undertaking to submit evidence that allows the Commission to carry out a targeted inspection or to find an infringement of Article 101 TFEU (European Commission, 2006[66]). Similarly, under the U.S. Department of Justice’s Corporate Leniency Policy, leniency is still available to firms that come forward after an investigation has begun, provided that they are the first to confess and co‑operate fully with the authorities (U.S. Department of Justice, 2024[67]).
Case law confirms this interpretation. In the BASF and Others v Commission case (Joined Cases T-101/05 and T-111/05), the General Court of the European Union examined a situation where multiple leniency applications were submitted in connection with the same cartel. The Court clarified that the value of the evidence submitted by each applicant must be assessed in the context of the authority’s existing knowledge and that only the first applicant to provide decisive information enabling enforcement action could claim immunity (ECLI:EU:T:2007:380). This principle ensures that firms are incentivised to come forward promptly and with high-quality evidence, even in the later stages of an investigation.
Thus, while early disclosure remains the best way for cartel participants to secure full immunity, leniency regimes remain accessible—and strategically valuable—even after a competition authority has initiated inquiries.
Source: European Commission (2006), Notice on Immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases (OJ C298/17), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52006XC1208%2804%29; DOJ (2024), Antitrust Leniency and Procedures, https://www.justice.gov/atr/leniency-policy; General Court of the European Union (2007), BASF AG and Others v Commission, Joined Cases T-101/05 and T-111/05, ECLI:EU:T:2007:380.
Kazakhstan has yet to receive a single leniency application, suggesting the programme is ineffective. One reason may be the strict requirement that all four conditions be met. Unlike in many jurisdictions, Kazakhstan’s law implies that leniency is unavailable if the Agency had prior knowledge of the offence, even if no formal investigation has begun. This is not the case for instance in the European Union or in the United States (Box 5.8). This uncertainty may deter firms from applying, fearing self-incrimination without protection. Additionally, the requirement to voluntarily compensate consumers is impractical: the law provides no guidance on calculating damages or identifying affected consumers, often a complex task depending on the product market.
A leniency policy is most effective when antitrust offenders face credible threats of detection and substantial penalties, and when, at the same time, the process for self-reporting is transparent and predictable, with tangible benefits in the form of immunity from criminal prosecution. While leniency imposes significant co‑operation obligations on applicants, the benefits should be such that a market entity or an individual involved in illegal activity should always seek leniency (U.S. Department of Justice, 2023[11]).
In Kazakhstan however, the leniency programme only applies to administrative liability, but does not protect the applicant from criminal liability. Moreover, the applicant may still be prosecuted under other offenses, for instance under public procurement rules. These factors are likely to account for the absence of leniency applications in Kazakhstan, even in a context of a global decline of 65% in leniency applications between 2015 and 2021 (OECD, 2023[12]). 44
Predictability is essential for an effective leniency programme. Firms are unlikely to apply unless they can anticipate a clear outcome. Although Kazakhstan’s legal framework offers no discretion in granting exemptions from administrative liability, the absence of established practice creates uncertainty. This lack of precedent discourages applications, which in turn perpetuates the gap in practice. Targeted advocacy is therefore vital to raise awareness not only of the programme’s existence but also of its predictable enforcement. Removing the requirement for voluntary consumer compensation could further enhance clarity and encourage applications.
Further, the Agency notes that market entities are often not aware that they are in violation of competition law until an investigation begins. At that time, leniency application is no longer available. This suggests that the Agency should devote more resources and time to competition advocacy, so that market entities will be aware of their obligations under competition law and, consequently, of the fact that their actions might be violating it. Alternatively, the Agency should consider removing this criterion which is not common in other jurisdictions (Box 5.8).
Lastly, “socio-economic, personal, demographic, and cultural factors, beyond the control of competition authorities, play a major role in the decision to apply for leniency” (OECD, 2023, p. 28[12]). It cannot be excluded that these factors importantly contribute to the absence of leniency applications in Kazakhstan.
5.2.1. Criminal liability for competition law violations
While competition law violations generally trigger liability for an administrative offence, some of the gravest competition law violations, as perceived by the Kazakhstan’s legislator, can result in criminal liability. In such cases, criminal liability takes precedence over administrative liability. Thus, criminal sanctions, instead of administrative penalties, are imposed on the market entity.45
In line with Article 221 of the Criminal Code,46 market entities can be criminally liable for the following violations of competition law:
price fixing
establishing or maintaining monopoly high prices or monopoly low prices
establishing, by a market entity with a dominant or monopoly position, restrictions on the resale of goods on the basis of territory, the circle of buyers, terms of purchase, quantity or price
division of product markets by territory, assortment of goods, volume of their sale or purchase, circle of sellers or buyers
other actions aimed at restricting competition, if they have caused major damage to a citizen, organisation, or the state, or are associated with extraction of income by a market entity on a large scale.
The first four cases are very explicit, while the last one seem to serve as a general clause and reflects how Kazakhstan perceives grave competition law violations. It defines them in two ways. First, grave competition law violations are the ones that cause major damage to a citizen, organisation, or the state. Major damage is defined through a pecuniary threshold as the amount which is 2 000 times higher than MCI (for damage to a citizen), or as the amount which is 10 000 times higher than the MCI (for damage to an organisation or the state).47 In 2024, the damage caused to a citizen must have exceeded KZT 7 394 000 (USD 15 751) and damaged caused to an organisation or the state must have exceeded KZT 36 920 000 (USD 78 647).
Second, grave competition law violations are the ones that enable market entities to extract income on a large scale, i.e. income, the amount of which exceeds 20 000 times MCI.48 In 2024, the lower threshold for large income extracted was KZT 73 840 000 (USD 157 294). It is unclear what type of income is considered under this provision – total income, monopolistic income, or some other form of income.
Kazakhstan’s Criminal Code considers these competition law violations to be among the most serious criminal offences and hence designates it under the notion of a “crime”,49 which is relevant for the range of criminal sanctions that can be imposed. Most notably, imprisonment is possible for “crimes” but no other criminal offences. The criminal sanctions available for competition law violations are the following:
fines: monetary penalty calculated as a certain multiple of the annual MCI50
correctional labour: monetary penalty executed as a monthly deduction from the salary of the convict51
community service: public works not requiring any specific qualification, organised by local executive bodies
restriction of freedom: probationary control of the convict at his or her place of residence, in addition to compulsory work52
imprisonment: isolation of the convict in prison.
The Criminal Code sets criminal sanctions alternatively and in ranges (for instance, a range of possible fines, imprisonment terms) which enables flexibility in imposing sanctions that are tailored to a particular case.
There are different sanctions envisaged for different aggravated modalities of the criminal offence: (i) standard offence, (ii) repeated offence and offence committed by using an official position, and (iii) offence committed in a criminal group or committed with the use of violence, destruction of property or threat of such action. Table 5.4 summarises the criminal sanctions imposed for each of these modalities.
Source: Criminal Code.
Prior to 2017, no exemptions were possible from criminal liability. In 2017, however, an amendment was adopted53 which provides an exemption to a person who had committed this criminal offence for the first time and voluntarily compensates the damaged caused. This exemption is quite broad and does not resemble the leniency exemption from administrative liability. It applies to all competition law violations, not only restrictive agreements and concerted practices. Further, no co-operation or provision of information to the Agency is required. In this regard, the exemption does not stimulate market entities to disclose restrictive agreements or concerted practices, since they are, as first-time offenders, eligible for a criminal liability exemption in any case, provided that they compensate the damage caused.
Other exemptions from criminal liability are of more general nature and include active repentance, fulfilment of all the conditions of the procedural agreement, expiry of the statute of limitations etc.
5.2.2. Criminal enforcement practice
The Agency does not have any powers in criminal law enforcement. If, during an investigation, the Agency finds indications that the competition law violation contains elements of a criminal offence, it must transfer materials acquired and produced during the investigation to the law enforcement agencies for a pre-trial investigation.54 If the law enforcement agencies find sufficient evidence for criminal prosecution, they move forward with the pre-trial investigation. If not, they send the case back to the Agency for administrative offence proceedings.
The competent body for investigating cases under the Article 221 of the Criminal Code is the Financial Monitoring Agency.
According to the Agency, there have been cases in which market entities were convicted under criminal liability, but they did not provide the OECD team with any examples. No executive of a market entity has ever been held criminally liable for competition law violations of the market entity in question.
References
[7] Agency for Protection and Development of Competition (2024), Anti-competitive agreement between KTZH-Cargo Transportation and Hill Corporation Too Ltd., https://www.gov.kz/memleket/entities/zk/press/news/details/695805?lang=ru.
[6] Gurzhiy, T. (2023), ТД «ТЭК Казахстан» обвиняют в монопольно высоких ценах на услуги, https://kz.kursiv.media/2023-02-13/ttgr-monopolist/.
[2] Kazakhstan (2024), Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in Kazakhstan: 2023, https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/AR(2024)47/en/pdf.
[1] Kazakhstan (2023), Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in Kazakhstan: 2022, https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/AR(2023)47/en/pdf.
[12] OECD (2023), “The Future of Effective Leniency Programmes: Advancing Detection and Deterrence of Cartels”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 299, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9bc9dd57-en.
[4] OECD (2021), “Competition Enforcement and Regulatory Alternatives”, OECD Roundtables on Competition Policy Papers, No. 258, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d9a9c703-en.
[3] OECD (2016), Competition Law and Policy in Kazakhstan: A Peer Review, Competition Law and Policy Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/08f78cd0-en.
[8] PostFactum.kz (2022), Became the property of the city, https://postfactum.kz/en/obshchestvo/219-became-the-property-of-the-city#:~:text=damage%2C%20the%20Akimat%20of%20Almaty,the%20ownership%20of%20the%20city.
[9] Shyngyssov, A. and A. Kornilova (2025), Kazakhstan intensified antimonopoly regulation efforts throughout 2024, https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2025/01/kazakhstan-intensified-antimonopoly-regulation-efforts-throughout-2024.
[13] Starosolsky, G. (1950), “Basic Principles of Soviet Criminal Law”, North Carolina Law Review, Vol. 28/4, pp. 359-374, https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?params=/context/nclr/article/1793/&path_info=27_28NCLRev359_1949_1950_.pdf.
[5] Tukiev, A. (ed.) (2020), Scientific and practical commentary on the Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Administrative Offenses (article-by-article), Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan, https://zakon.uchet.kz/rus/docs/T2000000005.
[11] U.S. Department of Justice (2023), Frequently Asked Questions About the Antitrust Division’s Leniency Program, https://www.justice.gov/atr/leniency-policy.
[10] Ysewyn, J. (2024), “Leniency”, The Competition Law Dictionary, https://www.concurrences.com/en/dictionary/Leniency-programme (accessed on 13 December 2024).
← 1. Article 216(1) of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 2. For details, see section 4.5.
← 3. The Methodological Council consists of the Chief Economist, representatives from the Department of Investigations and representatives from the Analytical Centre for Competition Development.
← 4. Note that in Kazakhstan, the terms “Investigator”, or “Head Investigator” do not exist. The correct use is “Authorised official from the Agency”.
← 5. Article 216(3) of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 6. Article 218(3) of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 7. Article 216(4) of the Entrepreneur Code. This exception was not present in Kazakhstan’s competition law in the earlier stages and was only introduced with the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 5 May 2015, no. 312-V ZRK.
← 8. Article 216(5) of the Entrepreneur Code. This special provision takes precedence over the general provision of the Administrative Procedural and Process-related Code according to which appeals have a suspensive effect.
← 9. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 6 April 2024, no. 71-VIII ZRK.
← 10. Article 220 of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 11. Article 219 of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 12. Articles 90-7 and 221 of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 13. Article 90-8 of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 14. Article 217(3) of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 15. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 28 December 2016, no. 34-VІ ZRK.
← 16. Article 218(4) of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 17. Article 222 of the Entrepreneur Code: the reasons are: (i) another case being considered by the Agency, court or criminal prosecution which might be relevant for the investigation, (ii) another investigation being conducted by the Agency in relation to the same market entity, (iii) the need for an expert examination, or (iv) the need for conducting a market analysis.
← 18. While the first three instances were already present in the 2008’s Law on Competition, the fourth instance only exists from 2016’s 2nd antimonopoly package.
← 19. Article 224 of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 20. Article 223 of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 21. Article 226 of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 22. Article 227 of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 23. Article 228 of the Entrepreneur Code.
← 24. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 28 December 2016, no. 34-VІ ZRK.
← 25. Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 5 July 2014, no. 235-V ZRK.
← 26. Article 62 of the Code of Administrative Offences.
← 27. Article 682 of the Code of Administrative Offences.
← 28. Article 684 of the Code of Administrative Offences.
← 29. Note that courts for administrative offences are not the same as administrative courts. The former consider claims made by the state against individuals (administrative offences), while the latter consider claims made by an individual against the state (judicial review of administrative decisions).
← 30. Article 713 of the Code of Administrative Offences.
← 31. Article 806(3) of the Code of Administrative Offences.
← 32. Article 804(1)(51) of the Code of Administrative Offences.
← 33. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 5 December 2023, no. 43-VIII ZRK.
← 34. Article 55 of the Code of Administrative Offences.
← 35. Article 57 of the Code of Administrative Offences.
← 36. Article 42 of the Code of Administrative Offences.
← 37. Article 159 of the Code of Administrative Offences.
← 38. Article 45 of the Code of Administrative Offences.
← 39. Confiscation of monopolistic income is intended to prevent the perpetrator to obtain any gains from unlawful actions, while an administrative fine is intended to sanction the perpetrator.
← 40. Article 76 of the Law on Competition (The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 25 December 2008, no.112 – IV).
← 41. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 5 May 2015, no. 312-V ZRK.
← 42. See e.g. the original version of the Code of Administrative Offences: Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 5 July 2014, no. 235-V ZRK.
← 43. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 5 May 2015, no. 312-V ZRK.
← 44. For instance, overreliance on leniency programmes while neglecting other detection tools cannot be applicable to Kazakhstan because there are no leniency applications to rely on in Kazakhstan. Further, both settlements and private enforcement can generally impact the incentives of enterprises to submit a leniency application, but, again, not in the case of Kazakhstan where private enforcement and settlements are not possible.
← 45. In fact, the provisions for all administrative offences related to monopolistic activity include a phrase “if these actions do not contain any signs of a criminal offense”. It follows that criminal liability trumps administrative liability.
← 46. Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 3 July 2014, no. 226-V ZRK.
← 47. Article 3(1)(38) of the Criminal Code.
← 48. Ibid.
← 49. A “crime” is a culpably committed socially dangerous act for which the most invasive criminal sanctions can be imposed (Article 10 of the Criminal Code). This definition is heavily influenced by Soviet criminal law in which criminal liability was based on ‘social danger’ of the committed criminal offence (Starosolsky, 1950[13]).
← 50. Article 41 of the Criminal Code.
← 51. Article 42 of the Criminal Code.
← 52. Article 44 of the Criminal Code.
← 53. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 3 July 2017, no. 84-VI.
← 54. Article 224 of the Entrepreneur Code.