This chapter analyses Kazakhstan’s efforts to cultivate a culture of integrity across the whole of society. This includes civil society and citizen engagement in developing, updating, and implementing the public integrity system, as well as efforts to raise public awareness and engagement with the private sector. The chapter highlights opportunities for raising awareness in society of the benefits of integrity, safeguarding the ability for non-governmental actors to support accountability and ensure effective provision of information.
OECD Integrity Review of Kazakhstan
Advancing Integrity for Economic Development
Abstract
Ensuring that a culture of integrity is shared and reinforced across society requires the government to make conscious and strategic decisions that promote shared ethical norms, principles, and values. Promoting a whole-of-society culture of integrity includes encouraging the private sector, civil society, and individuals to uphold public integrity values as a shared responsibility, including in their interactions with the public sector (OECD, 2020[1]). Toward this end, the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity highlights the importance of engaging relevant stakeholders in the development and implementation of the public integrity system, and of raising awareness in society of the benefits of public integrity and reducing tolerance of violations of public integrity standards (OECD, 2017[2]).
In Kazakhstan, the importance of promoting a whole-of-society approach has been emphasised in strategic policy documents on anti-corruption. Indeed, “changing values and increasing anti-corruption culture” is the first output area of the country’s Action Plan for the 2022-2026 Anti-Corruption Policy Concept. That said, while progress has been made in fostering a whole-of-society approach to integrity, the January 2022 protests, government reaction and continued limitations to civic space, media and freedom of speech point to the persisting legal, institutional and structural challenges. Ultimately, creating a culture of integrity across society in Kazakhstan can only be successful if stakeholder engagement, including that of the media, civil society organisations (CSOs), the private sector, and individuals, is anchored in a protected and promoted civic space that provides real opportunities to safely contribute to public decision-making and engage with the government. Supporting this space is a long-term project that requires sustained political support and space for participation.
Expanding on the progress made to date to promote a whole-of-society approach to integrity will require several reinforcing areas of engagement, including:
Safeguarding the ability for non-governmental actors, including the media, CSOs, and other stakeholders to increase government accountability. Promoting media pluralism and independence and preventing state censorship or interference are important considerations in this space.
Ensuring effective provision of information and engagement opportunities for stakeholders to implement and expand access via the Access to Information Law and improving the enabling environment for CSOs and individuals to participate in the policy making process.
Raising awareness in society of the benefits of public integrity. In part, this is conducted through more immediate efforts via public communication campaigns and targeted messages, as well as through awareness building via civic education.
Safeguarding the rights of actors that scrutinise and report on integrity breaches and support anti-corruption efforts throughout society, such as the media, CSOs, whistle-blowers, and individual protesters, is essential to expose corrupt behaviour and undue influence in public decision-making, as well as to improve the framework on transparency and integrity in decision-making.
Journalism is a critical tool for detecting and reporting cases of relevant violations, as it brings to light cases of fraud and abuse that may otherwise remain hidden. As such, journalists are amongst the most important actors in this space. Investigative journalism, in particular, contributes to transparency and accountability by exposing corruption, financial misconduct, and regulatory breaches. By providing verified information to the public, journalists help hold both public and private institutions accountable, making them key actors in the integrity system. Protected media freedoms are an essential component of democratic societies, as they allow for access to diverse sources of information and enable informed debate that facilitates stakeholder participation in public life and decision making. Media restrictions, including media concentration and monopolies, in contrast, can restrict debate on matters of public interest and impede transparency and accountability (OECD, 2022[3]) (OECD, 2024[4]). Media outlets and journalists also play an essential role in disseminating messages and reaching segments of the population the government may not be able to reach (OECD, 2021[5]). Media can inform public opinion on corruption matters generally by raising public awareness about corruption as a phenomenon, and educating the public on its causes, consequences, and possible remedies. This in turn can improve the policy dialogue around anti-corruption efforts (OECD, 2017[6]).
In Kazakhstan, the 2022-2026 Policy Concept notes that “the wide involvement of journalists and other media representatives in combating corruption will contribute to strengthening the active civic position of Kazakhstanis”. Nonetheless, media freedom in Kazakhstan is currently limited (Freedom House, 2024[7]). Media vibrancy slightly increased in the past two years, in particular with the adoption of a Law on Mass Media in June 2024, which supersedes the laws on media and on television and radio broadcasting. This new law introduced a “special status of a journalist aimed at increased legal guarantees and protections for journalists” (Government of Kazakhstan, 2024[8]). However, these improvements remain insufficient to reach the level of a somewhat vibrant media landscape (IREX, 2024[9]).
While the quality of information is improving, lack of media competition is a persisting challenge. Most media outlets are linked to the state, while dissenting and independent resources that adopt a more critical stance are rare in the media landscape. This undermines editorial independence and creates unfair competition in the media market. Freedom House observes that “while the constitution provides for freedom of the press, most of the media sector is controlled by the state or government-friendly owners, and the government has repeatedly harassed or shut down independent outlets” (Freedom House, 2022[10]). Furthermore, the Law on Mass Media has been widely criticised by CSOs, journalists and international media experts, as the law classifies online publications as mass media, requiring them to be registered with an authorised government body and have a physical presence in Kazakhstan, and introduce obstacles for the legal work of foreign correspondents in the country (IPI, 2024[11]; Human Rights Watch, 2024[12]). For its part, the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO, 2022[13]) noted that “state control of the media is an important concern; much more should be done to promote and ensure a sufficiently broad participation of various sectors, whether public or private, and of the larger civil society, including independent NGOs and media” (GRECO, 2022[13]).
Moreover, Article 11 of the Law on Mass Media defines “propaganda” as the spreading of false information, increasing the risks for journalists of facing abusive defamation or libel cases, in addition to the risk of charges under the slander and insult clauses in the Criminal Code. There are also concerns regarding the strict social media oversight, tightened in 2023 by the Law on online platforms and online advertising (Freedom House, 2024[7]) . In particular, Article 9 of the Law obliges the owners of online platforms, based in Kazakhstan, who have a daily average of over 100 000, to appoint a representative who will co-operate with the government to combat the spread of ‘false’ information” (Government of Kazakhstan, 2023[14]). OECD interviews confirmed the perception that the media continues to be largely seen as loyal to the government. Social media is a crucial venue for civil society actors to express themselves, though online platforms are also seen as being closely monitored by the government (Freedom House, 2023[15]). Increasing media independence will, over the long-term, enable journalists to fact-check statements and activities of government institutions and leaders, as well as monitor the implementation and impact of anti‑corruption policies, ultimately providing the public with a more accurate and informed assessment of integrity issues in the country.
Like the media and journalism, CSOs fulfil an important watchdog role in society (see section below). The threat of criminal liability for insult as well as for “inciting hatred (or) insulting the national honour and dignity of citizens” (Government of Kazakhstan, 2014[16]) has a potential damaging effect on the willingness of domestic CSOs to report on corruption. Furthermore, the government has extensive authority to block online content and can compel Internet Service Providers to restrict access to “unlawful materials” (Freedom House, 2023[15]). In interviews, stakeholders expressed the “chilling effect” that such government control has. Interviewees indicated that the perception exists across CSOs in Kazakhstan that they cannot fully participate in engaging on anti-corruption issues. Work on these issues is often funded by foreign donors, which increases vulnerability to accusations of representation of foreign interests.
The above-mentioned challenges illustrate that the media, journalists, and CSOs face considerable constraints in helping to fully develop a culture of integrity. To better safeguard those that scrutinise and report violations, the Government of Kazakhstan could adopt the following reforms: i) improve the enabling environment for civil society (see section below) ii) reform rules to promote and protect media pluralism and independence; iii) expand access to the Law on Access to Information for the media and include the right to anonymous requests to facilitate the work of investigative journalists and iv) amend the legal framework to protect journalists from abusive defamation or libel cases and prevent state censorship or interference. Increasing media independence will, over the long-term, enable journalists to fact-check statements and activities of government institutions and leaders, as well as monitor the implementation and impact of anti-corruption policies, ultimately providing the public with a more accurate and informed assessment of integrity issues in the country.
Kazakhstan could reform rules to promote and protect media pluralism and independence
Media outlets and journalists play an important role in shaping the perceptions of the public and of policy makers and can influence the policy-making process. The risk of media capture by owners of media outlets is magnified by a lack of media pluralism, which can have a significant impact on the inclusiveness and freedom of the public discourse (OECD, 2021[17]). Avoiding media capture and increasing media diversity call for increased transparency and public scrutiny of media ownership as an essential precondition for media pluralism, as well as for opportunities for the public to receive and evaluate relevant information and opinions that inform democratic life.
According to Freedom House, media independence is severely limited in Kazakhstan. Most of the media sector is controlled and heavily influenced by the state or government-friendly owners, leading to widespread self-censorship (Freedom House, 2022[10]). In the broadcasting sector, for example, the state controls television frequencies and owns most companies. One political party has an influential media holding, which is also financed from the state budget—leaving very little pluralism of opinions in the media. Content is usually tied to the political agenda of the ruling party and its leader, and there are no television channels that can create and distribute content as public broadcasters (Freedom House, 2022[10]; CMDS, 2019[18]). Furthermore, the 2024 Law on Mass Media grants the government the ability to conduct “mass media monitoring” to root out “propaganda and extremism”, without clearly defined these terms (Human Rights Watch, 2024[12]). In addition, state-run media enjoy preferential treatment in terms of state financing, have no restrictions on participation in the advertising market, and sometimes receive exclusive access to news sources in government parliament and other state bodies. In 2021, the State injected a record amount of funding – about EUR 130 million – into the media, comparable to the country’s advertising market, further distorting the media market as the government became the main advertiser (IREX, 2022[19]). On the other hand, independent media outlets have fewer opportunities to find advertising and develop financially sustainable content, making it difficult to compete with the leading state-controlled, state-supported media.
As a result, the State leads the information space, influencing content and dominating the presentation of news and analytics to the audience. To promote pluralism and the independence of media, the legal framework in Kazakhstan could be amended to enhance independence of broadcasters, both those that receive funding from the state and to guarantee independence of editors from publishers. The legal framework could also enhance transparency in media ownership. Box 4.1 provides examples in OECD countries that could serve as relevant examples for Kazakhstan.
Norway
Norway’s Media Liability Act seeks “to facilitate open and informed public debate by ensuring editorial independence” by mandating that publishers appoint an independent editor. Specifically, this means that the owner or company management “cannot instruct, or overrule the editor on editorial issues, nor can they demand to have access to…material before it is made available to the public.”
France
Media companies are required to disclose their three largest owners to the public, and must notify the media authority, the Superior Audiovisual Council (Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel) when the ownership or control reaches a threshold of 10 % or more. Information on the capital structure of publishers is available on the council’s website.
Germany
There are specific obligations to disclose ownership applying to the news media sector, commercial broadcasters, online media and the press. Political parties must disclose their involvement in media entities.
Portugal
The obligation to disclose ownership and financing of the media is set out in the Constitution, and monitoring it is the responsibility of the media authority.
Sources: Lovdata Foundation (n.d.[20]), “Chapter 3 Editorial independence”, https://lovdata.no/dokument/NLE/lov/2020-05-29-59/KAPITTEL_3#KAPITTEL_3; OECD (2021[17]), Lobbying in the 21st Century: Transparency, Integrity and Access, https://doi.org/10.1787/c6d8eff8-en.
Kazakhstan could expand access to the Law on Access to Information for the media and include the right to anonymous requests to facilitate the work of investigative journalists
Fair and equitable rules of access for all civil society actors, including the media, under the legal framework on Access to Information (ATI), are crucial. In Kazakhstan, Article 3(4) of the Law on Access to Information restricts application to mass media outlets, noting that the law shall not apply to the procedure for the provision of information to mass media outlets established by the Law on Mass Media (Government of Kazakhstan, 2015[21]). The latter provides for shorter terms of reply to the media’s requests of information (three days instead of 15 in the Access to Information Law, but with possibility of extension up to one month) (Government of Kazakhstan, 2024[8]). However, the regulation in the Mass Media Law is less specific and does not ensure the same level of guarantees as the Access to Information Law.
In the past, journalists and activists repeatedly issued open appeals to the country’s president, protesting restrictions of their rights to access information, physical access to the parliament and the government after the lifting of COVID-19 quarantine restrictions, and the improper classification of information by state bodies (IREX, 2022[19]). In September 2021, more than 400 Kazakh journalists published a statement to the President, the prosecutor general and the prime minister, expressing concern about the violation of their professional rights in terms of gaining access to information (IREX, 2022[19]; Freedom House, 2022[10]).
The OECD Integrity Scan of Kazakhstan recommended a single general regime for accessing government-held information, regardless of the requester (OECD, 2017[6]). For media to fulfil its role, it is therefore recommended that Kazakhstan improves media’s access to information under the ATI Law. To that end, the media’s access to information should not be excluded from the Law on Access to Information, as all that is related to access to information should be regulated in the same law. In addition, Kazakhstan could also consider including the right to anonymous requests in the law and developing the appropriate platforms for anonymous access.
Kazakhstan could strengthen protections for journalists from abusive defamation or libel cases and prevent state censorship or interference
The effectiveness of media detecting cases of corruption or undue influence is undermined if there is not sufficient protection of journalists and their sources from potential retribution. In Kazakhstan, despite the continuous influence of the state on the media ecosystem, there is a nascent emergence and development of independent internet resources, including a growing number of independent and reputable social media channels and websites, with independent editorial policies. An increasing number of bloggers publish budget investigations that influence spending decisions. International news can be found without difficulty, in a variety of formats and persuasions, and news is generally covered in context (IREX, 2022[19]).
Article 20(1) of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of speech and creative activities and prohibits censorship. The legal framework guarantees the protection of the right to freedom of speech, editorial independence, and protection of the activities of journalists. In practice, however, the government has been reported to have threatened journalists critical of the government, including through harassment, targeted intimidation, physical attacks, obstructing their work, and shutting down independent outlets (Freedom House, 2024[7]).
State interference is facilitated by strict media legislation. The rights and obligations of journalists accredited in Kazakhstan are regulated by the Law on Mass Media. While a special status for journalists was introduced in June 2024 to increase legal guarantees and protections for journalists, according to the law, journalists have the obligation to research, request, receive and disseminate information, and are granted access to government agencies and officials, as well as private sector organisations, in the course of their duties to provide information to the public. The law also stipulates that journalists can have access to all government documents and materials, except for those that are considered a state secret. They also have the right to check the trustworthiness of the information they receive. The law further states that journalists must not “disseminate information that does not comply with reality”. Prior to the publication of their work, they must consult with relevant government bodies or officials to confirm the accuracy of information. If they work for foreign outlets, they must acquire accreditation as foreign journalists. (Government of Kazakhstan, 2024[8])
According to Freedom House, the press in Kazakhstan is rated as “not free” (Freedom House, 2024[7]), and IREX’s Vibrant Information Barometer 2024 found that despite recent reforms, the state still leads the information space, influencing content and supporting self-censorship in the media and the Internet space (Table 4.1) All media, websites, and social networks are monitored, the State readily blocks any unwanted content, and Internet service providers (ISPs) may block content when directed by government agencies (IREX, 2024[9]).
While defamation was decriminalised in June 2020, libel remains an administrative offense and there is criminal responsibility for spreading knowingly false information and for insult. The Criminal Code provides for criminal liability for both slander and insult of the President and other officials, as well as for inciting social, national, tribal, racial, class or religious hatred (Government of Kazakhstan, 2014[16]):
Article 129 defines slander as the “dissemination of information that is known to be false and that smears the honour and dignity of another person or undermines his reputation”. Slander is punishable by a fine and by restriction of freedom or imprisonment for a term of up to two years if it is committed publicly or via the use of mass media.
Article 130 defines an insult as the “abasement of the honour and dignity of another person expressed in an indecent form”. If committed publicly or using the mass media or information-communication networks, insults can be punished by a fine or correctional labour (for a period of up to 180 hours).
Article 174 provides for criminal liability for “deliberate actions aimed at inciting social, national, tribal, racial, class or religious discord […] if these acts were committed in public or through the use of mass media, telecommunications networks and online platforms, as well as through the production or distribution of literature or other media”.
Article 274, on the dissemination of knowingly false information, remains a deterrent, regularly used by government agencies to control content on the Internet.
Article 423, related to the disclosure of data from pre-trial proceedings, is often used to deny journalists access to information, as it contains a rule that data from pre-trial proceedings or a closed trial may be disseminated only with the consent of the prosecutor or the person conducting pre-trial proceedings.
These laws have been applied to deter journalists from publishing what the government might consider offensive materials. Several journalists also found themselves subject to criminal prosecution for their work (IREX, 2024[9]). International media freedom CSOs have condemned the Kazakh authorities for pursuing such charges, which activists say is intended to curb dissent (Freedom House, 2024[7]). In addition to journalists, these articles also have a damaging effect on the willingness of domestic CSOs to report on corruption.
Source: IREX (2024[9]), Vibrant Information Barometer 2024 - Kazakhstan, https://www.irex.org/sites/default/files/VIBE_2024_Kazakhstan.pdf.
To enhance freedom of expression, and in line with the recommendations made in the Integrity Scan of Kazakhstan (OECD, 2017[6]), Kazakhstan could remove measures that result in censorship. Including by repealing criminal liability for libel and insult in the Criminal Code as the threat of criminal liability has been used to intimidate individuals and organisations from speaking out against corruption.
Ultimately, building a whole-of-society approach to public integrity requires proactive engagement, broad and diverse representation, and protected and promoted civic space in which the public can engage. To that end, Kazakhstan should consider repealing the provisions of the Criminal Code that can be used to intimidate individuals and organisations from speaking out against corruption and ensure that there is no room for arbitrary interpretation that could limit rights to freedom of speech, of peaceful assembly and of association (OECD, 2017[6]). Removing restrictions on civic space and in particular freedom of speech will be the most important, effective and longest-lasting reforms to promote stakeholder engagement.
Building a culture of integrity requires that individuals and organisations have the opportunity, as well as the trust and motivation, to engage directly with the government in developing, updating, and implementing the public integrity system. Effective engagement, conducted without fear of reprisals, is essential to building trust and ensuring whole-of-society engagement in anti-corruption activities. To that end, increasing transparency and engaging stakeholders are essential aspects to help ensure policymakers have a grounded and diverse understanding of the integrity challenges facing society, as well as in developing up-to-date and tailored solutions. Gathering information from stakeholders can also help to avert unintended impacts and avoid practical implementation problems (OECD, 2020[1]).
Furthermore, transparency provides citizens with the information they need to oversee and evaluate government decision making and public policies. Increasingly, OECD member countries are adopting proactive transparency measures to ensure that citizens get immediate access to public information and avoid the cost of engaging in administrative procedures to access the information. Citizen engagement can also create a shared responsibility for service delivery and a shared role for enhancing integrity. There are several ways to allow for stakeholder participation, where information is considered by the OECD as the first level of participation, whereas consultation and engagement provide for more advanced levels of participation (Box 4.2).
Stakeholder participation, as defined by the OECD Recommendation on Open Government, refers to all the ways in which stakeholders can be involved in the policy cycle as well as in service design and delivery, including information, consultation and engagement.
Information: an initial level of participation characterised by a one-way relationship in which the government produces and delivers information to stakeholders. It covers both on-demand provision of information and “proactive” measures by the government to disseminate information.
Consultation: a more advanced level of participation that entails a two-way relationship in which stakeholders provide feedback to the government and vice-versa. It is based on the prior definition of the issue for which views are being sought and requires the provision of relevant information, in addition to feedback on the outcomes of the process.
Engagement: when stakeholders are given the opportunity and the necessary resources (e.g. information, data and digital tools) to collaborate during all phases of the policy-cycle and in the service design and delivery.
Sources: OECD (2017[22]), Recommendation of the Council on Open Government, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0438; OECD (2022[23]), OECD Guidelines for Citizen Participation Processes, https://doi.org/10.1787/f765caf6-en.
Greater transparency and constructive stakeholder engagement in developing regulations and integrity initiatives can lead to higher policy compliance and acceptance, as well as greater equity in access to policymaking and service delivery. It can also help governments better understand and respond to citizens’ evolving needs and expectations, as well as develop innovative solutions to policy problems and their implementation. Such engagement is particularly effective when stakeholders feel that their views were considered; when they understand how their comments were considered; and when they feel they are treated with respect (Lind and Arndt, 2016[24]).
Kazakhstan’s legal framework for citizen and stakeholder participation has been improved significantly in recent years. Improving participation is also included in the 2022-2026 Policy Concept and its Action Plan. However, CSOs interviewed for this report mentioned that changes have been mostly cosmetic and procedural. They expressed their concern for the quality of the processes in recent years, as entities and individuals do not exercise significant influence over the outcome of participatory processes, they are called to participate in.
To ensure the effective information, consultation and engagement of stakeholders, Kazakhstan could therefore: i) ensure a more effective implementation and enforcement of the Law on Access to Information Law by setting up an independent oversight entity; ii) expand access to information for the media and include the right to anonymous requests to facilitate the work of investigative journalists; iii) improve the enabling environment for CSOs to ensure that participation is not obstructed; iv) increase opportunities for participation and transparency in regulatory and policymaking processes to help ensure more representative and effective laws; v) develop and implement a national strategy or guidelines to promote stakeholder engagement; and vi) improve opportunities for effective and transparent stakeholder engagement through the Public Councils.
Kazakhstan could increase transparency by putting in place an independent oversight entity to help implement and enforce the Law on Access to Information
Access to information (ATI) is a necessary precondition for democracy and a necessary legal foundation for transparency and accountability in policymaking (OECD, 2014[25]; 2016[26]). ATI is understood as the ability for an individual to seek, receive, impart, and use information effectively. It enables citizens and stakeholders to obtain information on the decisions that affect their everyday lives and fulfil their role as watchdogs over the proper functioning of government institutions. For these reasons, enabling the public’s right to know and the legal provisions to access information are significant instruments for combating corruption and undue influence in public decision-making.
In Kazakhstan, the right to access information held by public authorities and the right to information is guaranteed in Article 20(2) of the Constitution: “everyone shall have the right to freely receive and disseminate information by any means not prohibited by law. The list of items constituting state secrets of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be determined by law”. The Law on Access to Information aims to protect the public interest in the field of access to information, as well as meeting the needs of information users. Article 1(2) defines access to information as a “state-guaranteed, Constitution and law-enforced right of every citizen to freely receive and disseminate information using any means not prohibited by law”. Private companies who receive public funds or perform public functions also fall under the law. The law is applicable to both the national and subnational levels of government (Article 8). Furthermore, Article 2(2) of the Law provides that international treaties ratified by Kazakhstan dominate national laws in case of conflict, thereby formally ensuring that international rules on the right to information should apply in the country. Various provisions in the Law – including Article 7(1) – establish that everyone has the right to request and receive information. (Government of Kazakhstan, 2015[21])
In December 2020, amendments were made to the ATI law for the purpose of informing the public about draft normative legal acts. The law now requires that the public is notified via the websites of official bodies of the date of public discussions of draft normative acts.
Article 7 provides the right for information users to appeal against unlawful restriction of the right on access to information, as well as any actions (or inaction) of civil servants in this regard. The procedure of appeal is described in the Administrative Procedure Code of the Republic. Article 456-1 of the code provides for administrative responsibility for illegal restriction of the right to access information. In 2021, five such administrative offenses were registered, and, as a result, three people were brought to justice.
Although the adoption of the Law on Access to Information and the 2020 amendments are step toward strengthening access to information in Kazakhstan, concerns remain. According to the Global Right to Information (RTI) rating, Kazakhstan’s ATI law ranks significantly lower than the OECD average of 81, with a total of 60 points out of 150 possible, despite a high score in terms of scope and requesting procedures (Figure 4.1).
Diving deeper into the indicators of the RTI rating, the weaknesses of the legal framework in Kazakhstan are related to restrictions, exemptions, and contradictions with other legislation. The ATI law classifies information into three categories: public information, information that cannot be restricted, and information with restricted access. Article 5 establishes that “the right for access to information may be limited only by laws and only to the extent as necessary in order to protect constitutional and public order, human rights and freedoms, health and human morals”, which goes beyond the Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents (Tromsø Convention). Article 9.3 allows authorities to “deny access to information in cases and only on the basis of the laws of Republic of Kazakhstan.” Yet, it is unclear what laws this refers to, which creates confusion both for those requesting information as well as for those providing information. The reference to other laws is especially problematic since the ATI Law (Article 3.1) explicitly excludes from its scope information with restricted access. Article 1.8 defines information with limited access as “information that is classified as state secrets, personal, family, medical, banking, commercial and other types of secrets protected by law, and official information marked as ‘for official use only’ and/or confidential. The Rules for Classifying Information as Official Information of Limited Distribution, approved by the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan on June 24, 2022, No. 429, establish the procedure for classifying information as official information of limited distribution. Official information of limited distribution is determined by the degree of harm that could affect the observance of administrative procedures if the information is disclosed or lost. In practice, government agencies repeatedly classify information as “for official use”, effectively restricting access to information, which has become a key source of dissatisfaction among journalists and CSOs (IREX, 2022[19]; 2024[9]). Authorities have also been found to disregard deadlines for providing answers or turn to other laws for covering refusals of information requests, suggesting that enforcement may not be effective (IREX, 2022[19]).
Note: The maximum achievable composite score is 150 and reflects a strong RTI legal framework. The global rating of RTI laws is composed of 61 indicators measuring seven dimensions: Right of access; Scope; Requesting procedures; Exceptions and refusals; Appeals; Sanctions and protection; and Promotional measures.
Source: AIE/CLD (n.d.[27]), Right to Information Rating, https://www.rti-rating.org/, accessed on 5 February 2025.
These restrictions and exceptions undermine the effectiveness of the law by contradicting the basic principles of maximum disclosure and presumption of openness. For example, government agencies often refuse to release data on budget expenditures if the contract is concluded with a private company, citing confidentiality agreements (IREX, 2022[19]). This is contrary to international standards according to which any restriction should be proportionate and based on harm and public interest tests applied on a case-by-case basis. No category of information may be a priori excluded from the access.
According to Kazakh authorities, and as part of implementing Point 91 of the Action Plan for the Policy Concept of Legal Policy Development in Kazakhstan until 2030, a draft law on access to information and public participation has been developed and submitted to the Mazhilis (the law is still under discussion at the time of writing). The draft law proposes specifying in the Law on Access to Information that all information from state bodies is open, except in certain cases (state secrets, legally protected secrets, official use information). If adopted, the new law would introduce time limitations for restricting access to official information marked “for Official Use”: state bodies would be able to restrict access to information for a specified period and only to a portion of a document.
In addition, there is no administrative oversight body for appeals, any system of sanction or protection, or promotional measures. While the Ministry of Information and Public Development established a Commission on Access to Information, the Commission only has an advisory and consultative role. There are procedures on the Public Services and Online Information portal, as well as open sources of data statistics on the portal of National Bureau of Statistics, the e-procurement portal, and the state register of enterprises where one can find relevant information. These sources are widely used by journalists, bloggers, and activists.
To strengthen the oversight of the ATI law, the Commission on Access to Information could be transformed into an independent body. Kazakhstan could also consider clarifying the criteria for exceptions from access and clarify in the law the criteria for classifying information “for official use”. The Law could also specify clear public interest and harms tests to help guide public officials in applying exceptions. Lastly, an effective monitoring system could improve implementation of the law.
Kazakhstan could improve the enabling environment for civil society organisations to ensure that participation is not obstructed
The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan guarantees the freedom of association and assembly to all citizens. The Constitution also outlines the role of public associations in Articles 5 and 23. Article 5 states that public associations must be equal before the law and that unlawful interference in the affairs of public associations is prohibited, whereas article 23 allows citizens of Kazakhstan the right to form associations. The Law on Public Association (1996) regulates the status of non-governmental associations and organisations, such as political parties, trade unions, professional associations, cultural societies, and other associations formed by citizens in the exercise of their right to freedom of association with others. It also establishes the rules governing the creation, operation and dissolution of non-governmental associations and organisations, as well as their rights and responsibilities.
The willingness of the state to engage constructively with CSOs is essential to enable effective participation. Nevertheless, the Integrity Scan of Kazakhstan previously found that significant work was needed to ensure an enabling environment for civil society participation (OECD, 2017[6]). It was recommended that Kazakhstan consult with stakeholders concerning the Law on State Social Order, Grants and Awards for Non-Governmental Organisations to determine potentially adverse effects on the independence of CSOs. Indeed, this law has been criticised by domestic and international CSOs, who have expressed concern that it allows the government to close them at will. Domestic CSOs have criticised the law as a way for the government to favour pro-government CSOs and undermine those that are more critical of the State. Furthermore, civil society actors are heavily dependent on international grants, and organisations that receive international funds are subject to more stringent controls by the government. Interviews conducted for this report suggested that there is a perception that foreign funding increases the vulnerability of CSOs to accusations of representing foreign interests. The reactions to the government’s publication, in October 2023, of a list of CSOs receiving foreign funding echoed these concerns (Transparency International, 2023[28]). The complicated nature of reporting, bureaucracy, the lack of transparency and the risk of expensive fines are also challenges, particularly for smaller organisations.
According to Article 32 of the Constitution, citizens have the right to peacefully assemble without weapons, hold meetings, rallies, demonstrations, marches and picketing. The exercise of this right may be restricted by law in the interests of state security, public order, health protection, and the rights and freedoms of others. Article 14 of the Law on the Procedure for Organizing and Conducting Peaceful Assemblies in the Republic of Kazakhstan outlines ten specific grounds for refusing to hold peaceful assemblies within the prescribed timeframes. However, while efforts have been made to align the legal framework with the Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly developed by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, according to UN human rights experts, the government’s reaction to the January 2022 protests presented a risk of undermining civic freedoms, including the right to peaceful protest. Indeed, the use of force and use of the term "terrorism" to describe protesters “threatened the legitimate exercise of fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, and peaceful assembly and association” (UN OHCHR, 2022[29]).
Additionally, Article 174 of the Criminal Code provides for criminal liability for inciting social, national, tribal, racial, class or religious hatred. Additionally, CSOs in Kazakhstan have noted that Article 174 of the Criminal Code has been used by the authorities to suppress civil society criticism. The authorities routinely break up peaceful assemblies and detain their participants on the grounds of public order and security. The government’s extensive authority to block online content and compel internet service providers to restrict access to “unlawful materials” reportedly has a “chilling effect” on the work of CSOs (Freedom House, 2023[15]).
Therefore, Kazakhstan could examine current legislation and practices with regards to freedom of association and assembly to all citizens, as well as the distribution of grants through the Grant Operator (i.e. criteria, transparency of the process and funding, etc.). Kazakhstan could also consider implementing conflict of interest provisions and oversight measures to ensure that funds are distributed competitively and transparently and are not diverted to private interests. Reducing bureaucratic barriers to CSOs and promoting opportunities for highlighting issues and concerns, without fear of reprisal or silencing, will also help ensure that the public and civil society have the scope and opportunity to freely engage in integrity issues and hold government accountable.
Kazakhstan could increase opportunities for participation and transparency in regulatory and policymaking processes to help ensure more representative and effective laws
Transparency around, and engagement in, regulatory processes can play an important role in ensuring laws are designed in a way that captures needs from across society and can limit the risk of undue influence. In Kazakhstan, the Law on Legal Acts requires that draft laws and regulations should be accompanied by an explanatory note and a scientific expertise evaluation. The explanatory note must make explicit the need for and the objectives of the draft law, and the scientific expertise is conducted to assess the quality, relevance, timeliness, appropriateness of the project, to determine the potential effectiveness of the law and identify its possible negative implications. The drafters of the text define the scope of the analysis to be undertaken. Depending on the text, it can include legal and economic consequences analysis, anti-corruption analysis, legal analysis, environmental analysis, and/or financial analysis.
In addition, the Decree on Approval of the Rules of Legislative Work of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan (dated 29 December 2016 № 907) mandated the preparation of an advisory regulatory policy document to include the result of legal monitoring and public discussion of existing problems of state regulation. Notably, the Decree also requires the government to provide procedures for publication and discussion of the advisory document through enabling commenting on the government portal “Open NLAs”, public hearings, and debate. Based on the results of the public discussions, the state-developing body must draft and publish a summary. The public is also given the possibility to comment on draft regulations once they are uploaded on the website of the ministry in charge and on the Open Data Internet Portal. The drafting authority has ten days after closing the consultations to either implement the received comments or to justify their rejection.
The current framework for public consultations could be improved to yield more and better consultation inputs. It is particularly important to improve the consultation process of ministries with Public Councils. The consultation periods are short compared to OECD countries with mandatory consultation periods, with an average four to six weeks. Indeed, online consultations with the public still lack an explicit call for comments. For example, IREX notes that the population has a low interest in databases, and there is no culture or habit of sending requests or receiving and using information (IREX, 2022[19]). This means that procedures and processes that allow for participation may not be well enough known to all stakeholders.
In addition, for each type of public consultation, attention should be paid to not only fulfil formal consultation requirements but to actively reach out to all those concerned by the proposed regulation. Indeed, several entities interviewed for this report confirmed that certain procedures for consultation and participation have a purely consultative role, and inputs and initiatives are often ignored. Reports on public consultation could include at least a summary of the input received, with analysis and results. This principle applies more broadly to any form of participation. It is one of the Good Practice Principles for Deliberative Processes for Public Decision Making which public authorities commit to responding to or acting on recommendations at the outset of the process and follow up later with a progress report on implementation (OECD, 2020[30]).
Kazakhstan could improve opportunities for effective and transparent stakeholder engagement through the Public Councils
Kazakhstan has attempted to institutionalise stakeholder participation in the policy cycle through the creation of Public Councils, in which two-third of the seats are assigned to civil society and one-third to public officials. Suggestions by the Public Councils are advisory in nature, but public institutions are required to consider and respond to their input (OECD, 2020[31]). Specifically, Public Councils include consultative, advisory and supervisory bodies by Ministries, offices and agencies, local state administration bodies, etc. While the 2022-2026 Anti-Corruption Policy Concept notes that engagement will not be limited to the activities of public councils, it also calls for strengthening the role of Public Councils in the prevention of corruption and involving Public Councils in the process of internal analysis of corruption risks and monitoring the implementation of recommendations (Government of Kazakhstan, 2022[32]).
Nevertheless, “decision-making processes lack adequate public consultations and non-state actors, in particular the civil society and non-state media.” (GRECO, 2022[13]) In interviews with the OECD, CSOs noted that their participation in the reforms announced following the January 2022 protests was limited due to the time constraints and the speed with which reforms were proposed and announced. More broadly, OECD interviews suggested that some CSOs felt that their engagement efforts do not have clear impact. Particularly regarding the Public Councils, there was a sense that the government could be more transparent about why they take on certain recommendations and how organisations are selected to participate, as well as to standardise the usefulness, responsiveness, and transparency of Public Councils across government.
Clearer guidelines on how to conduct public consultation processes would also benefit Public Councils, and ultimately encourage stakeholder engagement in providing input into policymaking. To ensure that the consultation process is as inclusive and representative as possible, councils need to engage with all relevant stakeholders, as well as close the feedback loop by providing stakeholders with detailed feedback on the use of their comments and by following up on the implementation of the proposals made by Public Councils. Only by creating a responsive dialogue with the authorities can Public Councils serve their purpose of improving the accountability of public institutions in Kazakhstan (OECD, 2020[31]).
Cultivating a culture of integrity across society in Kazakhstan will demand high-level political support, public communication measures and civic education to build citizens’ understanding of the benefits of public integrity. Consistent and societal-level efforts to build awareness are important, given that when surrounded by a culture that justifies integrity breaches, evidence suggests that individuals are more tolerant of corruption breaches themselves (Gächter and Schulz, 2016[33]; Barr and Serra, 2010[34]; Fisman and Miguel, 2008[35]). Developing and implementing effective integrity policies therefore requires promoting public integrity norms and values and for the government to facilitate efforts to demonstrate societal commitment to addressing integrity challenges (OECD, 2020[1]).
In Kazakhstan, high-level officials, including the President, have publicly supported anti-corruption measures, and the anti-corruption strategies expressly note the creation of anti-corruption culture as a priority action. Already the former 2015-2025 strategy acknowledged that “without public support, anti-corruption measures carried out from above provide only a partial effect” and that “integrity should be the civic norm of every citizen of Kazakhstan (Government of Kazakhstan, 2014[36]).” However, there has not been any comprehensive evaluation of the 2015-2025 strategy, replaced by the 2022-2026 Policy Concept, to form a basis for more targeted efforts (see Chapter 2).
The 2022-2026 Policy Concept sets out a new commitment to systematise educational activities aimed at strengthening the culture of integrity in society. The Action Plan includes a section on increasing anti‑corruption culture. Specific actions include providing targeted information to citizens about their rights, as well as introducing integrity and anti-corruption culture in educational programmes at all levels of education. As discussed in Chapter 2, it will be important to set clear outcome-level indicators and monitoring the implementation progress of these actions over the period of the Action Plan.
The Anti-Corruption Service could develop a communications strategy to strengthen awareness-raising efforts
Broadly, governments benefit from transitioning away from tactical approaches and pursuing more strategic communication aims. Promoting such strategic efforts often benefits from the use of communication strategies – either whole-of-government or ministry-specific – as blueprints that can guide the execution of the function against its stated mandate (OECD, 2021[5]).
Awareness-raising campaigns are one of the primary methods by which governments can increase individuals’ understanding of public integrity issues, including more discreet forms of corruption and influence that do not equate to a bribe being requested or paid, including issues such as using public positions to advance private interests. These campaigns may seek to highlight a specific issue and reach a designated audience, whether internally within an organisation or group or externally to reach the wider society (OECD, 2020[1]). Ultimately, campaigns can increase the public’s understanding of integrity issues by fostering shared values and expectations and increasing individual buy-in to a culture of integrity (OECD, 2021[5]).
Governmental awareness campaigns can also be designed and implemented jointly with third parties and use diverse channels, such as radio, television, print and social media (YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, etc.) (OECD, 2020[1]). Box 4.3 shows an example from Greece of how the government developed a YouTube integrity campaign targeting youth.
To be effective, awareness-raising campaigns should not sensationalise the issue and instead employ credible and authentic evidence to clarify core messages (Mann, 2011[37]). also Ideally, such campaigns challenge the justification of unethical behaviour and create a link between one’s own integrity and the wider public benefit. Specifying the societal harm caused by corruption is important, given that the damage done often remains abstract and not directly linked to individual actions (Barkan, Ayal and Ariely, 2015[38]). Challenging these behavioural caveats requires linking awareness-raising to actual dilemmas where citizens understand how their actions can have a negative impact on the wider community.
The protests in January 2022 suggest that public awareness of corruption is not lacking; rather, the issue may be more related to the perception of how consistently corruption is tackled and how relevant the efforts are to people’s daily lives. Indeed, the wealth that the country’s political elite had allegedly amassed through corruption was a particular concern during protests (Transparency International, 2022[39]). To that end, efforts could focus on ensuring consistent enforcement and application of anti-corruption rules, as well as fairly and accurately portraying those efforts.
As part of an OECD project with Greece to increase integrity and reduce corruption in the country, the government developed the “be the change you want to see” campaign on YouTube in 2018. The campaign called on YouTubers, who are among the most influential figures among young people, to share their personal experiences of corruption.
The aim was to create authentic content that young people could easily relate to and that allowed them to engage with content creators, seen as ordinary people with common concerns and interests. Rather than focusing on the scale and scope of corruption, the goal was to engage young people in a conversation and emphasise that youth have the power and responsibility to change culture for the better.
The reaction to the blogs was positive and the campaign sparked great interest in this topic among young Greeks, reaching 78 % of 13- to 34-year-olds. The videos received 888 240 visits and more than 62 000 reactions.
Source: OECD (2020[40]), Engaging Youth in the Fight Against Corruption, https://web-archive.oecd.org/2020-11-18/486767-youth-anti-corruption-campaign.htm.
In Kazakhstan, the Anti-Corruption Service leads public communication around integrity issues. Notably, the Agency hired 400 Regional Information and Educational staff to promote broader coverage of the Agency's awareness-raising activities throughout the country. Early in 2020, the Agency initiated online educational and awareness-raising projects entitled “Adal kómek”, “Anti-Corruption Service News” and “Anti-Corruption Service Live”. By 2022, the initiative had held more than 18,000 online events, reaching more than 9.7 million people. Anti-Corruption Service News video news digests were posted on social networks, and Adaldyq Alańy programmes were broadcast on regional television channels. In addition, handouts and brochures, billboards, banners, video and audio clips were displayed throughout the country (GRECO, 2022[13]).
Moving forward, developing the Anti-Corruption Service communications strategy will be an opportunity to set a clear role for the awareness-raising function within the government. The strategy should consider target audiences, key messages, communication channels, and expected outputs; broadly, it should promote a whole-of-society understanding of integrity and shield the Agency from politicisation. Furthermore, feedback from the public and civil society partners on the development of the communications strategy should be collected transparently, and feedback on what was included should be provided.
Anti-Corruption Service could take an active role in highlighting the roles and responsibilities that citizens, CSOs and others play in upholding public integrity. Such awareness-raising efforts should respond to citizen’s views and be tailored to the target audiences, generate community responsibility, increase a sense of agency, and encourage action. For example, awareness efforts could focus not only on the threat posed by blatant and overt corrupt acts (bribery, etc.) as well as more discreet forms of corruption and influence, such as conflicts of interest and revolving doors. Sharing success stories from effective behaviour changes could highlight how ethical actions can help build trust between government officials and citizens.
The Anti-Corruption Service could strengthen and expand civic education efforts to promote integrity across society
The role of civic education is another long-term effort that governments must undertake to cultivate a culture of integrity. Engaging the school system is critical for inspiring norms for integrity at a young age, as the school system supports dialogue and exploration about how pupils can protect public integrity. Education for public integrity is concerned with inspiring ethical behaviour and equipping young people with the knowledge and skills to resist corruption (OECD, 2020[1]). Indeed, evidence suggests that civic education programmes can increase the likelihood of young people rejecting corruption in government, as well as diminish their likelihood of accepting or participating in law-breaking activities (Schulz et al., 2011[41]; Fraillon, Schulz and Ainley, 2009[42]). Many countries either mainstream public integrity values through the curriculum (either by integrating modules into existing courses and/or providing support through teacher manuals and additional materials), or they deliver public integrity education modules via the public integrity/anti-corruption body (OECD, 2020[1]).
In Kazakhstan, the 2022-2026 Policy Concept highlights the “fundamentally important role in the formation of the integrity system played by the education of the younger generation” (Government of Kazakhstan, 2022[32]).To this end, the Ministry of Culture and Sports, the Ministry of Education and Science, and the Anti-corruption Service have developed curricula and activities. For example, to introduce the subject in schools, the government integrated anti-corruption topics into the curricula of preschool and secondary education. The curricula aimed to promote the values of honesty and integrity in the educational materials for students in Grades 1-4. For example, topics included "Starting to Live Honestly" and the "Science of Conscience", which are aimed at formation of honesty and justice on the example of universal values. In the 2019-2020 school year, a one hour per week module focused on increasing the understanding of legal and cultural issues related to anti-corruption was introduced in Grades 9-10. Anti-corruption education in schools is also carried out via elective courses (such as the one hour per week "Integrity and Ethics" course) and other extracurricular activities, such as campaigns, conferences, round tables. The aim of these activities is to develop a negative perception of corruption in students and develop the ability to actively resist corruption.
The Ministry of Education and the Anti-Corruption Service could scale up the existing anti-corruption education programme for secondary students and implement it into the existing curricula. The Ministry of Education and the Anti-Corruption Service could also encourage universities to sign up to the Poznan Declaration, which aims at mainstreaming ethics and anti-corruption in higher education, and utilise the teaching resources made available by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Anti‑Corruption Academic Initiative (ACAD) and Education for Justice (E4J) to mainstream education about integrity and anti-corruption in university curriculum.
More broadly, the government should more clearly set out the objectives of this work, to set and monitor indicators and areas for further focus. Awareness raising could be diversified to address issues beyond bribery. The Ministry of Education, working with the Anti-Corruption Service, could develop an Action Plan for the creation and implementation of the education for public integrity materials. The Action Plan should identify the tasks, responsible institutions, expected outcomes and timeframe, as well as indicators to evaluate impact. The Action Plan could also expand on the design of the teaching and learning materials, the teacher training process, and integration and revision process. Finally, while awareness raising efforts are important to elevate expectations and improve behaviour, they must be coupled with real action on tackling persistent forms of corruption and reducing the implementation gap to help prevent public disillusionment and lowering trust in government.
The Anti-Corruption Service could strengthen guidance and support to the private sector to strengthen integrity
The role of governments in working with companies to uphold public integrity is recognised at the international level through conventions, standards, and related guidelines.1 Governments can support public integrity in companies by ensuring the relevant legislation is in place. This not only covers anti‑corruption measures, but also includes responsible business conduct, such as protecting human rights, the environment and consumer interests, and ensuring international labour standards, taxation standards, and corporate governance structures are in place (OECD, 2020[1]).
Governments pursue integrity in the private sector through legislation and oversight mechanisms to require and incentivise anti-corruption, as well as through the provision of policy guidance and the support for implementing an “integrity culture” in business. To support companies in mainstreaming public integrity compliance programmes into core business operations, governments could incorporate an “integrity culture” perspective into their guidance (OECD, 2020[1]). This entails moving beyond a focus on formal compliance, and encouraging companies to address the informal aspects of their organisational culture that could undermine public integrity, such as management example and commitment, rewards and bonus structures, organisational voice and silence factors, internal team dynamics, and external relationships with stakeholders (Taylor, 2017[43]). Table 4.2 provides further details on each of these factors.
Source: Taylor, A. (2017[43]), “The five levels of an ethical culture: How to build and sustain organizations with integrity”, https://www.bsr.org/reports/BSR_Ethical_Corporate_Culture_Five_Levels.pdf.
Research suggests improvement from the perspective of the private sector on the extent of corruption in Kazakhstan. Transparency Kazakhstan noted in 2021 that 46 % of entrepreneurs indicate a decrease in corruption in their village over the past year, and 8 % of business representatives faced the need to resolve the issue informally when contacting government agencies (down from 9 % in 2019). Furthermore, more than 80 % of the interviewed entrepreneurs believe that it is possible to develop a business in Kazakhstan without giving bribes (Transparency Kazakhstan, 2021[44]).
Article 16 of the Law on Combating Corruption provides a legal basis for integrity issues for business entities in Kazakhstan (Government of Kazakhstan, 2015[45]). Specifically, the law requires that organisations adopt anti-corruption measures, including:
establishing organisational and legal mechanisms to ensure accountability and transparency of decision-making procedures
observing the principles of fair competition
preventing conflicts of interest
adopting and complying with the standards of business ethics
taking measures to develop an anti-corruption culture
interacting with government agencies and other organisations on issues of corruption prevention.
The legislation also notes that standards for the prevention of corruption for business entities may be developed and adopted by associations of business entities (Kuatbekov and Bekmukhanbetova, 2022[46]). Notably, the state requires subjects of the quasi-public sector – which accounts for about 30-40 % of Kazakhstan’s gross domestic product (OECD, 2019[47]) – to define structural units to oversee compliance of the organisation and its employees with the anti-corruption legislation of Kazakhstan. Since 2023, the Anti-Corruption Service has the co-ordination responsibility for these units (see also Chapter 2). According to OECD interviews, the anti-corruption compliance service must be established by an internal act of the quasi‑public sector entity, and is required to exercise its powers independently of the executive body; officials of the quasi-public sector entity shall be accountable to the Board of Directors, Supervisory Board (if any) or other independent management body and shall be independent in ensuring compliance with the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Anti-Corruption.
Business entities that are not quasi-public sector entities have the right to create anti-corruption compliance services, though this is not an obligation. Furthermore, the government noted that amendments concerning the Anti-Corruption Service are under consideration by the Majilis concerning the approval of regulation on anti-corruption compliance and the provision of support for anti-corruption compliance services.
The 2022-2026 Policy Concept includes a section focused on the promotion of business integrity. The strategy highlights the importance of the voluntary implementation of anti-corruption standards, as well as of continuous training for employees. Specifically, the Action Plan of the strategy commits to the provision of training programmes for compliance specialists in the framework of postgraduate education; the provision of free anti-corruption training for employees of quasi-public and private sector entities; the elaboration of incentives (benefits, preferences, conditional discounts in public procurement and other support measures) for private business entities that have implemented and support anti-corruption standards; and the improvement of an open integrated register of business entities to promote transparency and accountability in the business environment. The system provides an opportunity for entrepreneurs to check their counterparties, to help verify their integrity and reliability.
A key partner is the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs (NCE, or Atameken), a non-profit organisation representing the interests of small, medium, and large businesses, covering all areas of entrepreneurship. The main task of Atameken is to protect the rights and interests of business and ensure the wide coverage and involvement of all entrepreneurs in the process of formation of legislative and other regulatory rules of business (Atameken, 2023[48]). The government notes that the NCE has established itself as a constructive platform for dialogue for the government. The NCE has also largely been supportive of the reforms and actions taken by the government, which reinforce the organisation’s Charter of Entrepreneurs of Kazakhstan on Anti-Corruption and the Code of Ethics and Business Conduct of Entrepreneurs. These documents are designed to ensure the voluntary commitment of business, aimed at implementing standards of business conduct, fair competition, friendly resolution of disputes, the implementation of mechanisms to prevent and fight corruption.
Moving forward, ensuring the adequacy of sanctions, as well as ensuring effective implementation of the initiatives will be important. Main challenges in the private sector include the lack of adequate sanctions and the governance of the large quasi-public sector, which is addressed in more detail in the 2024 OECD Review of the Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises in Kazakhstan (OECD, 2024[49]). The lack of independent verification of business integrity programmes – around which the Anti-Corruption Service is developing guidance – and the voluntary nature of such schemes for the private sector – remain limitations. Notably, regulations could be put in place to oblige companies contracted by the government to have a robust anti-corruption compliance programme.
The completion of the Anti-Corruption Service’s guidance for independent verification of the quality of companies’ business integrity programmes will also be important. Successfully achieving the objectives in the Action Plan, including identifying mechanisms to introduce benefits, preferences, and discounts in public procurement and other support measures for private businesses that have implemented and maintain anti-corruption standards will be useful. Broadly, the government could consider increasing incentives to companies to put in place policies on lobbying, political financing and post-public employment. Additional guidance for companies on establishing public integrity compliance programmes, including a focus on promoting an integrity culture, and on how separate regimes complement one another to avoid overlaps and gaps could be additional areas of focus.
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[44] Transparency Kazakhstan (2021), Monitoring the State of Corruption in Kazakhstan for 2020.
[29] UN OHCHR (2022), “Kazakhstan: UN experts condemn lethal force against protesters, misuse of term ‘terrorists’”, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/01/kazakhstan-un-experts-condemn-lethal-force-against-protesters-misuse-term.
← 1. See for example the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions; the 2009 OECD Recommendation for Further Combating Foreign Bribery; the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; the 2019 OECD Guidelines on Anti-Corruption and Integrity in State-Owned Enterprises; the United Nations Convention against Corruption; the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights; and the International Labour Organisation’s Tripartite Declaration.