This chapter analyses the current policies and practises related to cultivating a culture of integrity in the public sector in Kazakhstan and provides recommendations to strengthen integrity standards and their implementation. It addresses the need for providing further guidance and training on ethical behaviour to public officials. The analysis calls for setting public integrity standards for managing conflict of interest and strengthening the asset and interest declaration system. Finally, the chapter recommends ensuring strengthening the framework for whistleblowing.
OECD Integrity Review of Kazakhstan
Advancing Integrity for Economic Development
Abstract
Promoting integrity in the public sector calls for approaches that go beyond laws and regulations but focus on cultivating a culture of integrity in the public sector. Fostering a culture of integrity requires efforts to define expected standards of conduct for public officials and provide guidance and training on how to implement these standards in day-to-day decision-making, especially on how to deal with ethical dilemmas and situations of conflict of interest. Additionally, monitoring the implementation of standards in daily practice is required to ensure compliance and provide safe mechanisms for reporting suspected violations of standards of conduct.
Economic growth and several public sector reforms in Kazakhstan over the last years have significantly strengthened institutions in the country (OECD, 2017[1]). Additionally, the adoption of the Law on Combating Corruption and the Law on Civil Service in 2015 have brought the country closer to international anti-corruption and integrity standards (OECD, 2017[1]). However, the evolving political context, coupled with high corruption risks, underscores the need to prioritise the development of a strong culture of integrity within the public sector and across society. Moreover, as quasi-public sector entities constitute a significant part of the economy of Kazakhstan, efforts to cultivate a culture of integrity and the appropriate laws and regulations on anti-corruption and integrity could be extended to this sector.
Conflicts of interest are a major matter of public concern worldwide. A public sector that works closely with the business and non-profit sectors gives rise to new forms of conflicts between the private interests of public officials and their public duties (OECD, 2012[2]). When such conflict-of-interest situations are not properly identified and managed, they can seriously endanger the integrity of public sector organisations and result in corruption (OECD, 2012[2]).
Indeed, while it can be expected that public officials’ private interests will at times compete with the public interest, and in that sense, having “conflicts of interest” is a normal part of public duty, it is imperative that private interests do not improperly influence the performance of official duties and responsibilities and they are adequately managed (OECD, 2004[3]). Therefore, acknowledging that conflicts of interest will arise and having clear rules and guidelines in place to prevent and manage conflicts of interest is essential for public officials to uphold public integrity in their role. Conflicts of interest do not equate corruption if they are adequately identified and managed. As such, they require different institutional frameworks and responses than those dealing with potential corruption cases.
Kazakhstan could strengthen the framework for managing conflicts of interest through recourse and disciplinary actions
The definition of conflict of interest in Kazakhstan is provided under Article 1(5) of the Law on Combating Corruption (2015) and Article 1(17) of the Law on Civil Service (2016).1 Both laws stipulate that a conflict of interest is a contradiction between the personal interests of a public official and their official duties, where their personal interests may result in non-performance and (or) an improper performance of their official duties. However, while the Law on Civil Service only applies to civil servants, the Law on Combating Corruption applies to “persons holding a responsible civil service position, persons authorised to perform public functions, persons equated to persons authorised to perform public functions” (Government of Kazakhstan, 2015[4]). Consequently, the requirements on conflicts of interest included in the Law on Combating Corruption apply to a person performing managerial functions in a quasi-public sector entity (as they fall under the concept of “a person equated with persons authorised to perform public functions”), deputies of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan, judges of the Constitutional Court, the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Republic of Kazakhstan, as well as to persons holding political public office (ministers, akim and their deputies, as well as other persons). Under both laws, the disclosure of conflicts of interest is mandatory. When a public official becomes aware of a conflict of interest, they are required to notify their immediate supervisor or manager in writing. The immediate supervisor or manager is then required to take timely action to prevent or resolve the conflict of interest. Policy options to manage conflicts of interest in both laws include transferring the duties of the public official with the conflict of interest to another public official, changing the duties of the public official with the conflict of interest, or taking other measures to eliminate the conflict of interest (OECD, 2017[1]).
Considering the above, the Kazakh legal framework defines circumstances and relationships that can lead to conflict-of-interest situations for public officials and establishes the obligation to manage them in line with the criteria established by the OECD Public Integrity Indicators.2 This being said, the existing provisions offer only a general definition of conflict of interest. Furthermore, the range of possible options for managing the conflict of interest could be broadened to adequately address different types of conflict of interest and the level of their severity.
The relevant legislation also outlines the administrative steps in the event of a conflict of interest in detail. In the event of a conflict-of-interest situation, the immediate supervisor or management of the organisation is obliged to take appropriate measures in a timely manner to prevent and resolve the conflicts of interest. The options provided in the legislation for mitigating conflicts of interest include a removal of the public official from the performance of official duties, a change of job duties, or taking other measures to eliminate the conflict of interest. A failure to take measures to prevent and resolve known situations of conflict-of-interest is the disciplinary responsibility for the public official, their immediate supervisor and the leadership of a state body.
Kazakhstan’s current legislative measures provide a general framework for managing conflicts of interest, but there is still room for improvement. For example, ongoing amendments to the Law on Combating Corruption aim to strengthen these provisions by enabling the annulment of contracts determined to have resulted from a conflict of interest (Government of Kazakhstan, 2015[4]). Undoubtedly, this is a positive step towards strengthening the integrity framework in Kazakhstan and addressing the present gaps in the Law on Combating Corruption.
In addition, Kazakhstan could consider expanding the definition of conflict of interest and how to address conflict of interest by:
Differentiating between the types of conflicts of interest—perceived, potential and real—that public officials may encounter (Box 3.1). There should also be a requirement for the Authorised Ethics Officer to be informed of all perceived, potential and real conflicts of interest and the plan for mitigating them. The provision should make it clear that in case of doubt on whether a conflict of interest exists or how to manage or prevent the conflict of interest, the Authorised Ethics Officer within the institution must be consulted. If doubts still exist afterwards, the Civil Service Agency or the Anti-Corruption Service can provide advice.
Providing clarity that the definition of conflict of interest covers various typologies of conflicts of interest—nepotism, favouritism, amongst others—to ensure these are properly identified, disclosed and managed. Favouritism is a broad concept referring to situations where public officials who exercise decision-making authority show preferential treatment or awarding privileges to individuals based on personal preference and/or affection. Often, in such instances, specific public spending (e.g. grants, awards or contracts) benefits their families, friends or associates. Nepotism, as a specific type of favouritism, should be understood as a typology of potential high-risk areas for conflicts of interest and covered by the conflict-of-interest framework (World Bank/OECD/UNODC, 2020[5]). Nepotism towards family or close relatives is also a typology of conflict-of-interest situations and perhaps an even more salient problem as it is less visible and more socially accepted than general favouritism itself.
Expanding the range of possible responses to conflict-of-interest situations and providing regulations depending on the type of conflict of interest and the severity in case of breaches. This could include a broader range of sanctions and disciplinary actions together with suitable and satisfactory resource mechanisms which are currently limited.
Introducing a requirement to submit interest declarations (see also the section below). Currently, public officials are only required to declare assets, and to notify their direct supervisors, or the management of the body they work for, of a conflict of interest, or its possible emergence, as soon as they become aware of it. Beyond the ad hoc declarations, requiring disclosure of personal relationships could reveal red flags indicating potential, real or even perceived conflicts of interests that should be properly managed by public officials.
Ensuring consistency in conflict-of-interest provisions in the Law on Combating Corruption and the Law on Civil Service for any proposed changes.
Including the above recommendations under the envisioned reform process of the Law of Combating Corruption (or in a future reform process) would help giving public officials greater clarity over the rules and standards related to integrity.
A perceived (or apparent) conflict of interest exists where it appears that an official’s private interests could improperly influence the performance of their duties, but this is not in fact the case. For example, the senior official who owns shares in XYZ corporation may have made formal internal administrative arrangements, which are not known to the public at large but which are satisfactory to the official’s organisation, to stand aside from all decision making in relation to the contract for which XYZ corporation is competing, in order to resolve the conflict.
A potential conflict of interest occurs where a public official holds a private interest which would constitute a conflict of interest if the relevant circumstances were to change in the future. A potential conflict of interest rests on the idea of foreseeability – e.g. there is the possibility that the official’s private interest could lead to a conflict should their public duty and private interest collide in the future. For example, where a MP is a practising lawyer, and their firm is employed to provide advisory services to the government, there is a potential conflict if the MP is part of the team providing advisory services.
A real (or actual) conflict of interest involves a situation or relationship which can be current or may have occurred in the past. For example, an MP personally owns shares in ABC corporation, while that company is in the process of competing for a contract to supply the government with services, can be said to have an ‘actual’ conflict of interest if the official concerned is involved in any aspect of decision making in relation to the contract.
Sources: OECD (2012[2]), OECD Integrity Review of Brazil: Managing Risks for a Cleaner Public Service, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264119321-en; OECD (2004[3]), Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service: OECD Guidelines and Country Experiences, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264104938-en.
Kazakhstan could develop a risk-based approach and strengthen capacities to manage conflict of interest
Currently, Kazakhstan’s legislation contains a broad definition of conflict of interest and does not differentiate between the different types which may occur in everyday work. Additionally, there is a lack of identified positions or sectors within the public service where conflicts of interest, if not identified and appropriately managed, are more likely to pose integrity risks. During interviews with officials, it was noted that specific risks exist within the quasi-public sector of Kazakhstan, the agencies tasked with anti‑corruption responsibilities and the procurement sector.
Kazakhstan is encouraged to develop a comprehensive risk-based approach across the public sector, including for quasi-public sector entities to identify and manage conflicts of interest more effectively. By strategically identifying and addressing high-risk areas, this approach will enable Kazakhstan to target resources where they are most needed. This targeted approach will not only enhance the management of conflicts of interest but also create a stronger deterrent against corrupt practices. It would be beneficial to define those areas that are most exposed to risks emerging from conflicts of interest to prioritise new regulations, guidance, and prevention efforts.
This could include developing tailored guidance on the different types of conflict of interest that may occur, presenting the range of possible responses depending on the type and severity. Providing practical guidance to manage conflicts of interest, like it exists in OECD countries such as France (Box 3.2), is an important element of an effective conflict-of-interest framework.
In France, the Law 2013-907 of 11 October 2013 on transparency in public life defined “conflict of interest” as “any situation that causes interference between a public interest and public or private interests, which is likely to influence or appear to influence the independent, impartial and objective performance of a duty”. The Law provides a set of actions people covered by this Law are expected to follow when they find themselves in such a situation, as well as obligations regarding the declaration of interests and their submission to the High Authority for Transparency in Public Life.
Moreover, taking into account the fact that the concepts of “conflict of interest” and illegal taking of interest can be difficult to assess, the High Authority for Transparency in Public Life (Haute Autorité pour la Transparence de la Vie Publique, HATVP), responsible for controlling the integrity of the highest-ranking French public officials, published two comprehensive guides on conflicts of interests for public organisations and public officials. The guides present the High Authority's doctrine on the risks of conflict of interest, particularly between public interests, and offer a summary of the ethical procedures that mark the career of a public official or civil servant.
Note: For additional information, please refer to Guide déontologique Manuel à l’usage des responsables publics et des référents déontologues and Guide déontologique II Contrôle et prévention des conflits d’intérêts.
Sources: OECD (2012[2]), OECD Integrity Review of Brazil: Managing Risks for a Cleaner Public Service, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264119321-en; French Government (2013[6]), Loi n° 2013-907 du 11 octobre 2013 relative à la transparence de la vie publique, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000028056315/.
In addition, Kazakhstan could consider strengthening organisational capacities for managing conflicts of interest arising ad hoc. Given their role in ensuring compliance and providing advice to public officials on the application of integrity standards, Authorised Ethics Officers (Box 3.3) would be well-placed to take on a more prominent role in managing conflicts of interest at organisational level. However, OECD interviews showed that Authorised Ethics Officers have limited experience in dealing with conflicts of interest, partly because very few instances of conflict of interest are brought to their attention. To strengthen the role of Authorised Ethics Officers in this area, several steps could be taken:
Public officials could be required to report any real, potential or perceived conflict of interest arising ad hoc to the Authorised Ethics Officer who could then advise the official and their immediate supervisor or manager on the course of action to take.
Public organisations could assess whether their Authorised Ethics Officer has the adequate capacities to assist public officials in managing conflicts of interest and make adjustments as needed, also considering the specific risks that organisations and public officials may be exposed to. Currently, the majority of the 731 Authorised Ethics Officers are employees holding senior positions who perform this function on top of their other responsibilities while only around 37 officials perform the function on a full-time basis.
Authorised Ethics Officers could be trained on the identification and management of conflicts of interest to enable them to raise awareness and support the effective management of conflicts of interest within their organisation.
The Ethics Commission, together with Authorised Ethics Officers, could develop practical guidance for specific sectors and officials that are particularly vulnerable to risks emerging from conflict of interest. As an example, guidance could be developed to support procurement officials in managing conflict of interest and complying with existing regulations by providing them with pamphlets, manuals, or videos on conflict-of-interest situations specific to their area of work. It would be beneficial to include material on how such officials at risk could identify and manage conflict-of-interest situations.
According to the Law on Civil Service (2015) and Decree No. 153 of the President dated 29 December 2015 "On measures for further improvement of ethical norms and rules of conduct of civil service of the Republic of Kazakhstan", the Authorised Officer for Ethics in Kazakhstan (Authorised Ethics Officer) is a public official who carries out activities to ensure compliance with the norms of official ethics and prevention of violations of the legislation on public service, anti-corruption and the Code of Ethics of Public officials, as well as advising public officials and citizens within the scope of their functions.
Authorised Ethics Officers perform the following functions:
1. provide advisory assistance to public officials on compliance with the requirements of the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the areas of public service, anti-corruption and the code of ethics
2. promote compliance by public officials with restrictions and prohibitions established by laws
3. consider, on behalf of the management of the state body in which he works, the appeals of individuals and legal entities on the facts of violation of the norms of official ethics by public officials
4. promote the formation of a culture of relationships that corresponds to generally accepted moral and ethical norms in the team
5. in cases of violation of the rights and legitimate interests of public official, take measures aimed at their protection and restoration
6. monitor compliance with the norms of official ethics by public official
7. inform the management of the state body about cases of failure by the heads of structural divisions of state bodies to take appropriate measures on the facts of violation of the norms of official ethics
8. in cases of violations by public officials of the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the areas of public service, anti-corruption and the Code of Ethics, analyse the causes and conditions that contribute to the commission of offences and make recommendations to the management of the state body to eliminate them
9. interact with civil society institutions and government agencies in order to prevent violations of the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the areas of public service, anti-corruption and the Code of Ethics, as well as the formation of a positive image of the public service
10. conduct explanatory work with public officials on an ongoing basis on compliance with the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the areas of public service, anti-corruption and the Code of Ethics
11. in accordance with the procedure established by law, appeal to the relevant officials with a proposal to consider the responsibility of public officials who have committed a violation of the norms of official ethics
12. carry out other activities in order to prevent violations of the norms of official ethics.
Currently, there is one person in each state body at the central and local level in Kazakhstan performing the function of an Authorised Ethics Officer. The majority of the 731 Authorised Ethics Officers are employees holding senior positions who perform this aspect of their function on top of their other responsibilities while only around 37 officials perform the ethics function on a full-time basis.
Sources: Kazakhstan’s responses to the OECD questionnaire; Government of Kazakhstan (2016[7]), Law on Civil Service of the Republic of Kazakhstan, https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/Z1500000416; Government of Kazakhstan (2015[8]), Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated December 29, 2015 No. 153 on Approval of the Regulations on the Ethics Commissioner, http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/U1500000153.
Kazakhstan could strengthen the graduated system of applying effective, dissuasive and proportionate sanctions to uphold conflict-of-interest standards
In addition to setting clear standards regarding conflict of interest and mechanisms to manage conflict-of-interest situations, the enforcement in case of violations must be provided to sustain the credibility of standards in place. International standards usually refer to effective, dissuasive, and proportionate sanctions. Sanctions are:
effective if they are enforceable and properly address the offense in question
dissuasive if they have a sufficient deterrent effect
proportionate if they consider and correspond to the nature and gravity of the offense.
Having a graduated system of sanctions can help ensure that misconduct is addressed in a proportionate way. A system that only envisages criminal sanctions, for example, may result in only the most severe conflict of interest situations being addressed while other situations, although potentially damaging to the public interest and public trust, go unaddressed.
Sanctions can take the form of disciplinary measures, civil and administrative penalties, criminal penalties, reputational sanctions, sanctions for specific actions (e.g. sanctions for parties associated with conflict of interest violation, sanctions for failure to submit asset or interest declarations), sanctions related to failure to report and resolve a conflict of interest, sanctions for private individuals and entities, and sanctions related to the effective enforcement of the conflict of interest regulations.
While Kazakhstan has a graduated set of sanctions in place regarding violations of obligations to submit asset declarations (see section below), the effectiveness of sanctions regarding other breaches could be improved. Failure to take measures to prevent and resolve known situations of conflict-of-interest results in a disciplinary responsibility for the public official, their immediate supervisor and the leadership of a state body. At the same time, the current legislation does not provide for a mechanism for cancelling decisions made in situations of conflict of interest. The disciplinary liability imposed on managers and civil servants is in most cases disproportionate to the advantage gained due to the assumption of a conflict of interest. For example, contracts can only be revoked if the conduct of the public servant concerned equals to a criminal offence. The lack of proportionality discourages proactively managing conflict of interest, as the only potential risk would be disciplinary proceedings, while large contracts awarded based on decisions made in situations of conflict of interest may remain in place.
To design an effective conflict-of-interest management framework, Kazakhstan could refer to examples from countries that have introduced a graduated system of sanctions for conflict-of-interest violations (Box 3.4).
In Brazil, minor penalties, such as written monition and suspension for up to 30 days, can be applied after a formal inquiry has been concluded, and in accordance with principles of due process of the law. Middle to senior level managers usually possess the legal authority to enforce these sanctions. Only senior authorities (usually ministers or equivalent, or the board) can apply the most serious sanctions reached under the temporary administrative disciplinary process commission proceedings.
For economic fines in Brazil there are two sorts of penalties: Restitution of damage caused by the accused: if the damage is already quantified, the civil servant that caused the damage will respond to a process called “Tomada de Contas Especial”, or TCE (special accounts taking) to indemnify the loss incurred by the administration. It does not constitute a disciplinary process and does not require previous disciplinary measures.
Loss of salary(ies) as a result of a penalty of suspension: if the civil servant is penalised with suspension, he/she will not receive the wages corresponding to the suspension period. At the authority’s discretion, this penalty can be converted into a fine of 50 % of the salary, in which case the civil servant will have to report for work as usual. The amount due is directly deducted from pay and can be divided in monthly instalments on request.
Sources: OECD (2017[9]), OECD Integrity Review of Mexico: Taking a Stronger Stance Against Corruption, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264273207-en; World Bank/OECD/UNODC (2020[5]), Preventing and Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Public Sector: Good Practices Guide, http://unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2020/Preventing-and-Managing-Conflicts-of-Interest-in-the-Public-Sector-Good-Practices-Guide.pdf.
The Academy of Public Administration could provide supplementary guidance to the Code of Ethics for Civil Servants in clear and accessible language
Codes of conduct and ethics are valuable tools to guide behaviour. Codes of conduct typically clarify expected standards and prohibited situations, whereas codes of ethics identify the principles and values that should guide behaviour and decision-making (OECD, 2020[10]). In practice, countries often choose a hybrid version between codes of ethics and conduct, which contains both general values and explicit rules for expected behaviour (OECD, 2020[10]). Beyond complementing legal integrity frameworks, codes of conduct play an important role in guiding public officials through legal grey areas, such as ethical dilemmas, and serve as a reference point in situations involving conflicts of interest.
In Kazakhstan, the Code of Ethics for Civil Servants (hereinafter the “Code”) was approved by Presidential Decree 153/2015, replacing the previous Code of Honour (Government of Kazakhstan, 2015[11]), and was recently updated by Decree 814 of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, dated 22 February 2022. This revised version of the Code is clearer concerning the civil service’s role in society, namely ensuring the satisfaction of the public interest in the best and most effective way, and the Code includes as one of its objectives the aim to create a high culture of integrity in the civil service. Additionally, the Code presents and defines the main principles of the public service (Box 3.5) and outlines broad guidelines for civil servants' behaviour, encompassing their conduct during and outside duty hours, in official interactions with colleagues, and when delivering public speeches, including media appearances. Chapter 3 of the Code consists of 20 standards of professional ethics of civil service, which outline expected behaviour by civil servants.
The Kazakh Code of Ethics for Civil Servants presents and defines six ethical principles of public service:
conscientiousness
honesty
fairness
openness
politeness
customer focus.
Source: Government of Kazakhstan (2015[11]), Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated December 29, 2015 No. 153 on Approval of the Ethical Code of Civil Servants of the Republic of Kazakhstan, http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/U1500000153.
The Code has an extensive scope of application, as it is mandatory for all civil servants of the central state and local executive bodies, including administrative civil servants appointed by local representative bodies or elected in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The Code does not apply to those who do not hold a civil servant status as provided by the Constitution, constitutional laws and/or other legislative acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan, including people under an employment contract by labour legislation, such as expatriate employees of state bodies.
Updating the Code of Ethics for Civil Servants in 2022 was a positive step forward. Indeed, including principles and providing definitions aimed at ensuring a common understanding of expected behaviours aligns with international good practices that recognise the need for clear values to guide civil servants' behaviour, actions, and decisions. However, in addition to overarching values, behavioural evidence has shown that it is also essential to provide meaningful and relatable guidelines and examples in clear language to help translate the generally formulated values into civil servants’ daily activities, reaching ethical and lawful decisions under more specific circumstances (OECD, 2018[12]).
In 2024, the Academy of Public Administration published a Commentary on the Code of Ethics. The Commentary provides explanations for each paragraph of the Code of Ethics. As a follow-up step, the Academy could provide supplementary guidance on how the six (6) ethical principles of public service included in the Code can be applied to civil servants’ daily choices and actions. The Australian Public Service Commissioner’s Directions 2022 provide a good example of this approach by setting out requirements for upholding each of the Australian Public Service Values (Box 3.6).
In addition to the Code of Ethics for Civil Servants, there are also specific standards of conduct for members of the Kazakh legislative and judicial branches. Members of Parliament have separate ‘Rules of parliamentary ethics’ provided for by the ‘Regulations of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan’. These rules provide standards of conduct by which Members of Parliament should be guided both in the exercise of and outside their official duties (Republic of Kazakhstan, 1996[14]). Similarly, judges have a Code of Ethics that were adopted by the VII Congress of Judges of the Republic of Kazakhstan on 21 November 2016. The Judge Code of Ethics recognises the important role that public trust in the judicial branch plays in modern democratic societies and provides expectations of conduct by current and retired judges (Republic of Kazakhstan, 2016[15]). Finally, employees of law enforcement agencies, civil protection bodies and state courier/field services have an ethical code adopted by Presidential Decree No. 81 of 2 January 2023. This code includes five (5) ethical principles -i.e. honour, high morality, compassion, self‑discipline and kindness- that should guide law enforcement activities as well as standards of conduct for employees of law enforcement agencies, civil protection bodies and state courier/field service and for senior officials (Republic of Kazakhstan, 2023[16]).
The Australian Public Service Commissioner’s Directions 2022 set out the scope and application of the six Australian Public Service Values—Impartial, Committed to Service, Accountable, Respectful, Ethical, and Stewardship. These directions set out requirements for individual employees in upholding each of the Australian Public Service Values, having regard to an individual’s duties and responsibilities. For example, directions on the ‘Committed to service’ value, include, among other things:
being responsive to Ministers, including being knowledgeable about the Government’s policies and understanding the relevant issues and options, the Government’s objectives and the environment in which it operates.
engaging effectively with the community and providing responsive, client‑focussed service delivery
providing appropriate and accessible information to clients and the community about rights and entitlements, and the process for gaining access to them
ensuring that decisions and interactions with clients are objective and impartial, and in accordance with Government policy
encouraging innovative thought and supporting innovative solutions
supporting collaboration and teamwork, both within an Agency and with other agencies and the wider community
identifying and managing areas of potential risk
pursuing and supporting training and development to improve capability.
Source: Australian Government (2022[13]), Australian Public Service Commissioner’s Directions 2022, https://www.apsc.gov.au/working-aps/commissioners-directions.
Having specific codes of ethics and/or conduct tailored for different categories of public officials is a good practice as it allows to consider that public officials work in various contexts, perform different activities and may face various ethical dilemmas and conflict-of-interest situations. In Kazakhstan, the Rules of Parliamentary Ethics, the Judge Code of Ethics and the code of ethics of employees of law enforcement agencies, civil protection bodies and state courier/field service provide standards of conduct adapted to the specific activities and integrity risks each category of public officials may face.
However, the standards of conduct for both Members of Parliament and judges would benefit from being complemented with overarching values for the entire public service against which these public officials could evaluate their everyday choices and actions. To that end, Kazakhstan could consider including key values in both the Rules of Parliamentary Ethics and the Judge Code of Ethics. Examples of public service values from other countries could serve as inspiration (Box 3.7).
Revision of the Australian Public Service (APS) values
In the past, the Australian Public Service had a set of 15 Values. However, in 2010, the Advisory Group on Reform of the Australian Government Administration released its report “Ahead of the Game”, which recommended that the APS values could be revised, tightened, and made more memorable to be more effective in driving change. Following a process of consultation, the values were updated to the following five: Impartial; Committed to service; Accountable; Respectful; and Ethical. In 2022, the Government committed to including Stewardship as an APS Value as an initiative of APS Reform Priority One: ‘An APS that embodies integrity in everything it does.’ Following further consultation, the new Value commenced in December 2024."
The Colombian Integrity Code
In 2016, the Colombian Administrative Department of Public Administration initiated a process to define a General Integrity Code. Through a participatory exercise involving more than 25 000 public servants through different mechanisms, five (5) core values were selected: Honesty; Respect; Commitment; Diligence; and Justice. In addition, each public entity has the possibility to integrate up to two additional values or principles to respond to organisational, regional and/or sectorial specificities.
Note: APS values apply only to employees and agency heads of the APS; they do not apply to judges or parliamentarians.
Sources: Australian Government (2020[17]), APS Values, https://www.apsc.gov.au/working-aps/information-aps-employment/aps-values; Government of Colombia (n.d.[18]), Código de Integridad, https://www.funcionpublica.gov.co/web/eva/codigo-integridad.
The Civil Service Agency could apply a behavioural insights lens to identify concrete actions aimed at ensuring that integrity standards translate into desired behavioural change and organisational cultures of integrity among civil servants and public officials
Behavioural insights (BI) are lessons derived from the behavioural and social sciences, including psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience, organisational and group behaviour (OECD, 2019[19]). Public bodies around the world are increasingly using BI to make better public policies based on evidence of the actual behaviour and biases of citizens and businesses. BI can strengthen integrity and anti-corruption policies by considering how people actually behave, rather than just relying on traditional approaches like increasing controls and sanctions.
The OECD has developed a five-stage BASIC toolkit (Figure 3.1) for applying behavioural science to public policy issues:
Behaviour: the aim of the first stage is to identify behaviours that should be targeted to address a policy problem.
Analysis: understand the drivers and barriers of the target behaviours through behavioural science.
Strategies: design or inform a policy solution with the support of behavioural science.
Intervention: based on a suitable experimental design, conduct a pilot initiative to measure the impact of the behavioural strategies.
Change: The last step involves considering how to use and scale up experimental findings for long‑term change, while continuously monitoring and evaluating the impact of the intervention.
Source: OECD (2019[19]), Tools and Ethics for Applied Behavioural Insights: The BASIC Toolkit, https://doi.org/10.1787/9ea76a8f-en.
Kazakhstan could apply the OECD BASIC toolkit to adjust the communication around and reinforce the implementation of Code of Ethics’ principles in practice. Conversations during the fact-finding mission revealed that ethical standards are often perceived as a formality and not taken seriously. Different communication approaches around these standards can influence their implementation in practice. An example of applied behavioural insights in the Slovak Republic demonstrates the effect of such an approach in practice (Box 3.8).
Under its Anti-Corruption Policy for 2019-2023, the Slovak Republic made corruption risk management a cornerstone of its strategic efforts to combat corruption and promote public integrity. The OECD BASIC toolkit has been applied to address the challenges in implementing corruption risk management practices from a behavioural perspective and proposes concrete avenues for increasing communication about corruption risks in the Slovak public administration.
In line with the BASIC framework, the first step consisted of a diagnostic analysis to better understand the behaviours that affect corruption risk management in the public administration of the Slovak Republic, and the barriers and enablers of these behaviours. Applying behavioural science to public policy starts by asking which mechanisms drive behaviour in a specific context. Asking these questions in the context of public integrity helps to identify the behaviours that contribute to or impede progress toward public integrity, yet it also takes a step further to analyse and understand the mechanisms behind the drivers and barriers of these behaviours. The lack of communication about risks was identified as one of the principal behaviours preventing a more effective risk management system in the Slovak Republic.
Two behaviourally informed strategies were designed to increase risk communication. The effects of these two strategies were tested in an online randomised controlled trial. In addition, the relationships between the likelihood of communicating a risk and several secondary outcome variables, such as psychological safety, knowledge on the reporting channels and trust, were also explored. The results indicate that exposing employees to examples of exemplary leadership and social norms can increase the likelihood of communicating a corruption risk. Feeling generally safe when communicating about risks, having hiring responsibility, and having trust and knowledge of reporting channels also play an important role in improving risk communication.
Source: OECD (2024[20]), Improving Corruption Risk Management in the Slovak Republic: Results from a 2023 Experiment in Applying Behavioural Insights to Public Integrity, https://doi.org/10.1787/45f8d2e0-en.
The Academy of Public Administration could reinforce integrity education for public officials by designing more practical and tailored training elements on management of conflicts of interest and ethical dilemmas
Setting clear integrity standards and ensuring their relevance for public officials are the first steps towards building an integrity culture in the public sector. However, developing codes of ethics and/or conduct is not an end in itself. Effective implementation and a real behavioural change require raising awareness about integrity standards, building capacities to implement them, and providing guidance and consultation mechanisms to facilitate their implementation in day-to-day activities (Box 3.9). Indeed, by receiving relevant training and well-designed guidance, public employees are being equipped with the necessary knowledge and appropriate skills to effectively manage integrity issues. To successfully cultivate commitment among public officials, individual capacities should be developed to ensure high motivation and proper ethical behaviour to carry out public responsibilities in the public interest (OECD, 2020[10]).
The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity calls on adherents to:
“provide sufficient information, training, guidance and timely advice for public officials to apply public integrity standards in the workplace, in particular through:
- Providing public officials throughout their careers with clear and up-to-date information about the organisation’s policies, rules and administrative procedures relevant to maintaining high standards of public integrity.
- Offering induction and on-the-job integrity training to public officials throughout their careers in order to raise awareness and develop essential skills for the analysis of ethical dilemmas, and to make public integrity standards applicable and meaningful in their own personal contexts.
- Providing easily accessible formal and informal guidance and consultation mechanisms to help public officials apply public integrity standards in their daily work as well as to manage conflict-of-interest situations.”
Source: OECD (2017[21]), Recommendation of the Council on Public Integrity, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0435.
Countries can use several tools and mechanisms to provide information, training, and guidance to public officials on integrity. To be effective, awareness-raising activities and capacity-building programmes should be tailored to the specific needs and be designed and implemented by considering the following elements: content, timing, targeted audience, and delivery methods (OECD, 2020[10]). Moreover, international good practices suggest that integrity training should be integrated into the broader skills development framework of any public service and be provided both as part of the pre-appointment/induction process of newly appointed public officials and regularly as part of on-the-job training to address new integrity challenges or to refresh knowledge (OECD, 2020[10]). Additionally, it is beneficial to build integrity training programmes using various training methods to make them engaging, relevant and interesting for public officials (OECD, 2020[10]).
In Kazakhstan, civil servants undergo mandatory and optional training, retraining and advanced training at the Academy of Public Administration (or other educational organisations in the case of advanced training), to increase their knowledge and skills on existing standards of public ethics and conflict-of-interest management. Trainings are also provided by the Academy’s regional branches to promote integrity and ethical behaviour at all levels of government. In particular, retraining courses are mandatory for persons who first entered the administrative, civil service of Corps “B” and for persons appointed for the first time to a senior administrative position of Corps "B", while advanced training is mandatory for administrative civil servants at least once every three years (Republic of Kazakhstan, 2015[22]).
Some of the topics for advanced training and retraining offered by the Academy include:
anti-corruption management and compliance - 24 academic hours
integrity. anti-corruption culture - 24 academic hours
professional image and ethics of civil servants - 24 academic hours
anti-corruption compliance - 24 academic hours
anti-corruption management system - 24 academic hours
competence development: integrity - 24 academic hours
ethics in public service - 72 academic hours
applied aspects of anti-corruption policy (distance course) – 72 academic hours
anti-corruption culture and integrity - 6 academic hours. this discipline makes part of a 120‑academic‑hour retraining course for those appointed to a managerial position, and it provides information on ethics as the basis of good and anti-corruption behaviour, as well as on preventing conflicts of interest
ethics and integrity - 4 academic hours
additionally, specific lectures on ethics are included in some of the programmes of advanced training seminars (e.g. seminar "The listening state: the effect of communication with the population").
Within the framework of these advanced training and retraining courses, the Academy and its regional branches have trained more than 1 700 civil servants. For instance, in 2022, 23 employees attended the course "Integrity. Anti-corruption Culture", and 35 employees attended the course "Ethics and Image of a Civil Servant." According to the National Report on Combating Corruption 2023, around 4 000 civil servants received advanced training on anti-corruption (Antikor, 2024[23]).
However, interviews with public officials showed that public employees in Kazakhstan rarely raise conflict-of-interest issues or seek advice from the Authorised Ethics Officer. To effectively prevent and manage conflicts of interest, public officials must be aware of the existing policies and have the skills necessary to identify and manage them. Moreover, evidence has shown that training activities should not only focus on familiarising public officials with the relevant rules and laws on integrity and anticorruption but also provide decision-making tools to help public officials manage challenging ethical dilemmas that they may face in their workplace (OECD, 2018[12]). In this sense, designing and implementing practical trainings that focus on developing capacities, attitudes and behaviours in response to potential integrity issues rather than focusing on imparting knowledge about integrity standards, rules and procedures, could also be beneficial in cultivating a culture of integrity. By encouraging official’s active participation in the trainings (e.g. identifying integrity and ethical issues in specific situations and discussing how to address and avoid them), countries can promote the development of essential knowledge and skills to manage integrity issues appropriately.
The Academy of Public Administration could enhance practical training on ethical dilemmas and conflict of interest management to strengthen ethics, integrity, and anti-corruption skills. Kazakhstan could develop relevant case studies and scenarios to foster ethical reflection and discussion. Training should also provide practical guidance on identifying, preventing, and managing conflicts of interest (see Box 3.10 for more on ethical dilemmas training).
In the dilemma training offered by the Agency for Government Employees, public officials are given practical situations in which they face an ethical choice, and it is not clear how to best resolve the situation with integrity. The facilitator encourages discussion between the participants about how the situation could be resolved to explore the different choices. As such, it is the debate and not the solution, which is most important, as this will help the participants to identify different values that might oppose each other.
In most training courses, the facilitator uses a card system. The rules are explained, and participants receive four option cards with the numbers 1, 2, 3 or 4. The dilemma cards are then placed on the table. The dilemma cards describe the situation and give four options on how to resolve the dilemma. In each round, one of the participants reads out the dilemma and options. Each participant indicates their choices with the option cards and explains their motivation behind the choice. Following this, participants discuss the different choices. The facilitator remains neutral, encourages the debate and suggests alternative options of how to look at the dilemma (e.g. sequence of events, boundaries for unacceptable behaviour).
Dilemma situations could cover the themes of conflicts of interest, ethics, loyalty, leadership etc. The training and situations used can be targeted to specific groups or entities.
For example: “You are working in Internal Control and are asked to be a guest lecturer in a training programme organised by the employers of a sector within your realm of responsibility. You will be well paid, make some meaningful contacts and learn from the experience. Do you accept?”
Source: Vlaanderan (n.d.[24]), Informatie Voor HR-Professionals, https://www.vlaanderen.be/informatie-voor-hr-professionals.
Additionally, the Academy of Public Administration could tailor integrity training to the needs of specific target groups (e.g. junior public officials, public officials in managerial positions, or public officials in high-risk positions). Trainings that are well aligned with the day-to-day reality of public officials faces a lower risk of being perceived as naïve or being seen merely as a formal requirement (OECD, 2018[12]), while creating space for officials in similar positions to share experiences, challenges, solutions and support, therefore enhancing awareness raising and co-operation.
Many countries around the world have introduced systems of asset and interest declarations for public officials. By promoting transparency, disclosure helps to strengthen accountability mechanisms and safeguards against undue influence on policy makers and policy-making processes. Moreover, implementation of asset and interest disclosure mechanisms helps prevent and detect unethical behaviours and abuse of power in the public service, as well as risks of money laundering and corruption (Rossi, Pop and Berger, 2017[25]). Clearly defined objectives pursued by asset and interest disclosure and verification processes are essential to ensure their effective implementation. Some disclosure mechanisms aim at detecting illicit enrichment, others at preventing conflicts of interest, and some serve both purposes (OECD, 2020[10]). These systems typically contain various elements, including the information to be disclosed, the scope of declarants, intervals of disclosure, methods of submission (paper or electronic), validation and verification, publication of information, as well as investigation and sanctions.
In Kazakhstan, the disclosure system set out in the Tax Code and the Law on Combating Corruption is primarily focused on detecting unjustified wealth and illicit enrichment, but is not geared toward the prevention, reporting and management of conflict-of-interest situations. Kazakhstan could therefore implement several measures to improve its current system, including broadening the scope of disclosures, strengthening verification and the graduated system of sanctions, and introducing disclosures of non‑financial interests.
Kazakhstan could broaden the scope of application and the content of financial disclosure forms to further enhance the detection of unjustified wealth and consider introducing disclosures of non-financial interests to strengthen the prevention of conflicts of interest
Kazakhstan has a system of financial disclosure for public officials that is based on two types of declarations: i) a declaration of assets and liabilities, and ii) a declaration of income and property, which has been gradually introduced since 2021 (Government of Kazakhstan, 2024[26]). The general framework for both types of declarations is set out in the Tax Code, whereas the Law on Combating Corruption specifies their application for its own purposes. The latter law requires the submission of a declaration of assets and liabilities from candidates for public office, including the Presidency of the Republic, members of parliament and malishkats, akims and members of local self-government bodies as well as their respective spouses. Declarations of income and property apply to a wider group, including persons holding a civil service position and their spouses, persons authorised to perform public functions and their spouses, officials and their spouses, persons equated to persons authorised to perform public functions and their spouses. It should be noted that since 1st January 2025, a declaration of income and property is mandatory for all Kazakhstanis, realising the final stage of the creation of a universal income declaration system. The system has been rolled out since 2021 for the stated purpose of combatting the shadow economy and corrupt practices, and to strengthen the role of the government in ensuring the collection of taxes and other obligatory payments to the budget (Government of Kazakhstan, 2024[26]).
According to the Tax Code, declarations of assets and liabilities are to be submitted by in-scope individuals when the obligation first arises and thereafter ad hoc when changes in assets occur. Regular reporting is a possibility if specified in relevant laws, noting that the Law on Combating Corruption does not require regular reporting for its purposes. Declarations of income and property are to be submitted annually. Both sets of declarations can be submitted electronically via the eGov.kz portal and the eGov mobile app, but hard copies are also accepted. Interviews with tax officials indicate that in practice, 97 % of declarations are submitted electronically due to the convenience of the automatically pre-populated format.
Four years following the introduction of declaration of income and property in 2021, it may be opportune for Kazakhstan to assess the effectiveness of the disclosure system to combat corruption, with a view to identifying areas for improvement. First, Kazakhstan could consider streamlining the declaration of assets and liabilities and the declaration of income and property, currently submitted via two separate forms (form no. 250 and form no. 270), potentially into one single submission (OECD, 2024[27]). Indeed, the information to be disclosed in the two declarations overlaps to some extent, but not entirely: Both declarations cover items such as property in foreign states, shares in foreign companies and money in foreign bank accounts, digital assets, investment gold and notarised debt. The declaration of assets and liabilities further includes shares in residential buildings or housing construction, derivative financial instruments, objects of intellectual property and cash. The declaration of income and property in turn focuses on the acquisition or alienation of these items (except for cash) and related expenses, which should, in theory, allow for tracking over time. The declaration of income and property also foresees the disclosure of taxable income. Collecting all the information in a single form could improve the efficiency submission and processing of declarations, by avoiding double reporting and reducing the burden both on declarants and the responsible authorities.
Second, Kazakhstan could review the categories of declarants under the Law on Combating Corruption, to ensure at-risk positions are appropriately covered. In most OECD countries, public office holders with important decision-making powers, including Members of government (such as Ministers), members of parliament, high-ranking judges and top-tier civil servants (e.g. Secretaries-General) are legally required to disclose their private interests (OECD, 2024[28]). While the obligation for candidates for elected office to submit a declaration of assets and liabilities in Kazakhstan is aligned with this practice, the Law on Combating Corruption does not specify whether “persons who are candidates for a public position or a position related to the performance of public or equivalent functions” (Government of Kazakhstan, 2015[4]) include high-ranking judges and top-tier civil servants. Furthermore, Kazakhstan could consider expanding the scope from spouses to other family- and household members, such as dependent children if they own assets and liabilities. Indeed, mechanisms to track the financial assets and interests of not only public officials but also their family- and household members can help prevent concealment of assets under the names of family members, spouses or other individuals (OECD, 2011[29]).
Third, Kazakhstan could assess whether the scope of information to be declared is appropriate to reliably detect unjustified wealth. Proper wealth monitoring is possible only when the declared information truthfully reflects all the substantial income and assets, and fluctuations thereof (OECD, 2011[29]). The categories of assets, the amount of information and level of detail that an official may be required to disclose vary from country to country depending on the objectives of the disclosure system and the framework governing the conduct of public officials. However, most countries require a combination of the following information: movable and non-movable assets, liabilities, financial and business interests, and information on the sources and values of income (OECD, 2023[30]). As real control, and use, of assets regardless of the nominal owner may show hidden ownership or lifestyle not commensurate with their position or income, disclosure of beneficial ownership of assets should extend to all types of tangible or intangible property and income (OECD, 2023[30]).
Even though in Kazakhstan the financial disclosure requirements cover a reasonably broad range of information, applicable restrictions, requiring assets only to be disclosed if the rights and (or) transactions on them are subject to state or other registration, pose a series of limitations. While this means that relevant data is directly available to tax authorities from the relevant registries and does therefore ease the burden on declarants, data in national registers may have gaps or contain errors, and the declarant is not obliged to check the accuracy of the registered data. It also means that declarations only provide partial information, which poses a challenge in terms of transparency and bears the risk of non-declaration of assets, in particular those abroad (OECD, 2024[27]). Thus, a more effective approach would be to make all real estate or vehicles, regardless of their location or formal registration, be mandatory for inclusion in the form (OECD, 2024[27]). Categories of assets could also be further expanded, possibly to include:
gifts and sponsored travel, including disclosure of the identification details of the legal entity or individual who was the source of the gift, or sponsored travel
national and foreign bank accounts and safe deposits boxes (vaults) to which the declarant or family members have access, even if formally opened by another person
blind trusts, as these are often channels used to evade tax as well as launder proceeds of corruption
loans given or received, including to/from private individuals
deferred corporate rights (e.g. options to purchase shares) and investments regardless of their form
non-taxable income, e.g. from inheritance or welfare benefits
non-financial interests, notably contracts with state entities of the declarant and family members or companies in their control, prior employment, and any link with legal entities and associations (e.g. membership in governing bodies).
In addition, Kazakhstan could strengthen the disclosure of expenditures above a certain threshold. This is essential to track significant changes in wealth by comparing income, savings and expenditures over time. Expenditures should cover not only acquisition of assets but also payment for services and works (OECD, 2023[30]). Moreover, the threshold for declaring cash could be lowered. Currently, the threshold is at the equivalent of EUR 63 500, i.e. “10 000 times the monthly calculation index” of EUR 6.35 (KZT 3 450) (Government of Kazakhstan, 2015[4]). This is for example about 20 times higher than the corresponding threshold in Georgia (Government of Georgia, 2015[31]). As a result, any declarant could justify unexplained expenditure by claiming that it was financed by undeclared sources of cash.
Furthermore, while the Kazakh declaration system may well serve the purpose of detecting illicit enrichment, it does not allow for the detection of non-financial interests that have the potential to influence the discharge of official duties. In Kazakhstan, the Law on Combating Corruption (Art. 15) obliges in-scope officials to notify their supervisor or the organisation’s management, of a conflict of interest or its possible emergence, as soon as they become aware of it (Government of Kazakhstan, 2015[4]). While such ad hoc reporting is important to allow for the management of conflict-of-interest situations (real, potential or perceived) as they arise, it is not sufficient to provide for the systematic management of conflicts-of-interest.
In line with international good practice, Kazakhstan could introduce interest declarations from high-ranking public officials and civil servants, at a minimum before taking office, at regular intervals during, and upon leaving office, to foster a proactive approach to managing of conflicts of interest (see also section above). Information could be collected on contracts with state entities of the declarant and family members, prior employment, any link with legal entities and associations (e.g. membership in governing bodies), as well as any unpaid activities (OECD, 2023[30]). Information on relevant interests could be reported either as part of the existing declarations that Kazakh officials are subject to, or via a separate submission. According to global trends and best practices in other countries, it is advisable to combine the declaration of interests with the declaration of assets to avoid multiple declarations and eliminate duplication. A lot of information in the declaration of assets (e.g. on the source of income) is also important for managing conflicts of interest and therefore it is advisable to combine them in one document (OECD, 2024[27]). Either way, the process could be centralised to ensure uniform handling of interest declarations or decentralised to facilitate monitoring by superior officials or bodies (OECD, 2011[29]). When filling out a form as part of a conflict-of-interest management regime, an official must take stock of their own and their family members’ interests, evaluate these interests in light of their duties and decide whether any additional steps ought to be taken to manage any conflicts of interest. In Lithuania, for example, officials are required to identify any “close persons or other persons he/she knows who may be the cause of a conflict of interest” in the opinion of the person concerned (OECD, 2023[30]). This initial self-assessment should generate requests for assistance to those who provide advice and guidance on managing conflicts of interest (OECD, 2023[30]).
Kazakhstan could clarify institutional responsibilities and develop a risk-based framework for the verification of declarations of assets and liabilities and declarations of income and property
For declarations of assets and liabilities and declarations of income and property to serve as a basis for identifying potential illicit enrichment, verification needs to be conducted effectively, independently, and regularly. The Kazakh Tax Code (Art. 19) specifies that the tax authorities are entitled to verify the accuracy of information about property reflected in declarations of assets and liabilities in the context of a tax audit (Government of Kazakhstan, 2017[32]). However, relevant legislation does not specify the institutional responsibilities for verification of declarations of assets and liabilities and declarations of income and property for individuals that are in the scope of the Law on Combating Corruption. Relevant laws also remain mute on the procedure and extent of verifications, or the share of declarations verified each year compared to the overall number of declarations submitted. In practice, reviews of declarations are being carried out by the tax authorities with the aim establishing compliance with the Tax Code. However, basic checks may be adequate for verifying the timeliness and general consistency of information contained in all declarations, but risk being insufficient for in-depth verification of declarations of public officials (GRECO, 2024[33]; OECD, 2024[27]).
To ensure the effective verification of declarations of assets and liabilities and declarations of income and property for public officials, Kazakhstan could clarify institutional responsibilities and establish a robust mechanism of verification. Beyond the desk checks carried out by the tax authorities, an institution could be mandated to carry out in-depth verifications of declarations of officials with a view to ensuring compliance with restrictions under the Law on Combating Corruption. Regardless of the institutional set‑up chosen, the responsible agency should be granted the necessary powers to carry out in-depth verifications, be independent and adequately resourced, including the necessary financial resources, staff capacity and technical skills.
The ability to cross-check data from different sources is essential for effective in-depth verification, as it allows for the identification of manifest discrepancies, inaccuracies and omissions. While in many countries, some useful data sources – including property land and vehicle registries – are publicly available, others – such as company securities registries, data from foreign and domestic banks or other financial institutions – may require enabling legal provisions, as well as special collaboration arrangements. In this sense, an effective verification process – and potential further investigation– depends on an effective collaboration between the controlling agency(ies) and other institutions (OECD, 2023[30]). This may include criminal investigative bodies equipped with the legal means to obtain information from various sources (OECD, 2011[29]).
In Kazakhstan, challenges around the operational co-operation and sharing of data have been highlighted by GRECO in relation to law enforcement agencies (GRECO, 2022[34]). GRECO found that the Anti‑Corruption Service and the Financial Monitoring Agency could intensify their exchange of information, and that the database of bank accounts owned by the Tax Authority should be more easily accessible for these bodies. Kazakhstan has taken positive steps in this direction, including by allowing for information constituting tax secret to be made available to law enforcement agencies upon request, authorised by an investigating judge or prosecutor. Moreover, the financial intelligence unit of the Agency for Financial Monitoring has been granted full online access to the information systems of the State Revenue Committee, including information on declarations of individuals, thus providing the opportunity to check declarations of assets and liabilities, as well as declarations of income and property in accordance with the requirements of the Law on Combating Corruption (GRECO, 2024[33]). Building on these developments, Kazakhstan could explore further opportunities to enhance co-operation and data sharing of institutions involved in the verification of declarations of assets and liabilities and declarations of income and property, taking inspiration from practices in other countries such as France, Moldova or Timor-Leste (Box 3.11). In addition, co-operation with relevant international institutions and counterparts may facilitate knowledge sharing and support the development of specific institutional and legal standards (OECD, 2023[30]).
In addition to access to data and inter-agency co-operation, Kazakhstan could develop a comprehensive framework for verification of declarations of public officials. Given the large volume of declarations received by Kazakh authorities under the Tax Code, Kazakhstan could consider establishing a framework for (automated) risk or “red flag” analysis to filter declarations and prioritise in-depth verification by ranking declarations according to their risk level (see Box 3.12). The goal of automated risk analysis is not to establish that a violation occurred but to raise “red flags” that the responsible government agency could then review through the verification process. This helps focus the agency’s limited resources on the verification of high-risk declarations and can remove discretion, minimise manual processes, and improve the system’s impartiality and credibility (Kotlyar and Pop, 2021[35]).
There are different approaches that can be taken when defining risk indicators or “red flags”, which could be based on high-risk status or function of the declarant (e.g. politically exposed persons, decision-makers, directives or officials involved in public procurement processes, etc.), missing data (e.g. no real estate owned), data inconsistencies (e.g. the value of asset acquisition in one declaration does not match the sale value of the same asset in the next declaration), or irregular data values (e.g. any asset acquired above the annual salary or above a specified percentage of the annual salary of the declarant) (Kotlyar and Pop, 2021[35]). External sources, such as media reports, also may point to at-risk individuals or at-risk situations and can be used to inform the risk analysis. Once the appropriate indicators are determined, rules need to be defined that assign each risk indicator a weight to take account of its risk level. The risk level reflects the probability of the risk indicator occurring in the context of illicit enrichment, false information in the declaration, conflicts of interest or unjustified wealth, and other corruption or related offenses (such as violation of rules on incompatibility, gifts, postemployment restrictions) (Kotlyar and Pop, 2021[35]). Any draft risk analysis framework should be piloted to find out how many declarations are flagged and make adjustments to the thresholds defined by risk indicators to reach an appropriate, workable number of flagged declarations (OECD, 2017[36]).
An emerging trend in asset declaration legislation is the exchange of data with financial intelligence units (FIU). In Europe, France is a good example. Since 2016, the revised Article L.561‑31 of the French Monetary and Financial Code mandates the French FIU “to transmit information: [...] to the High Authority for Transparency in Public Life" for the exercise of its mandate.
Direct access to banking data is also an important feature. For example, Article 32 para. 3 of the Moldovan Law 132/2016 empowers integrity inspectors to “request from any natural or legal person governed by public or private law, including financial institutions” the information and documents necessary in the process of controlling assets and personal interests. Similarly, Article 46 of Timor-Leste’s new Asset Declaration Law 7/2020 “ensures access by the competent authority to [...] information held by banks and other financial institutions, in particular bank accounts, account balances and bank statements”.
Sources: French Code monétaire et financier; Moldovan Law 132/2016; Timor-Leste Law 7/2020; presentation of the International Treaty at the COSP 2021.
The automated risk analysis limits the number of declarations that undergo the more labour-intensive manual verification and focuses such verification on high-risk declarations. The automated risk analysis is both a prioritisation and detection tool. It helps prioritise the verification of numerous declarations. In addition, it can be used to better detect violations following the risk indicators identified by the analysis. The automated risk analysis helps to remove or limit the discretionary decision-making concerning the targets of verification. General considerations include:
Use of a risk-based approach to trigger and prioritise verification when inherent risks are found in the disclosure form, such as the position/duties of the declarant. Systems which automatically trigger the verification on formal grounds (e.g. late submission) are ineffective as they overburden the verification agency. This is especially relevant for systems where the number of disclosures is substantial and not matched with the resources to verify them.
When the number of mandatory verifications is substantial, the verification agency has to prioritise its work by focusing on high-risk declarations. Such prioritisation should be transparent and based on clear criteria limiting discretionary decision-making. The system may categorise declarations submitted by certain top officials as high-risk by default. This will give credibility to the system and avoid focus on low-level officials or petty inconsistencies.
External signals (e.g. media reports, complaints of citizens or watchdog non-governmental organisations (NGOs), referrals from other authorities) should take priority. The agency should verify them if they give rise to a substantiated suspicion of irregularity. Anonymous reports about verifiable facts should also be included.
The verification should include IT solutions that automate certain operations. Such solutions can perform a risk analysis of each declaration, compare several declarations of the filer or compare with declarations of similar filers. Applying analytical software to the disclosure data can help to find patterns that can be then used to develop red flags for future verifications.
Cross-checking disclosures with other government held registers and databases is an important element of the verification that effectively uses government data. The system can also automate such cross-checks and perform them shortly after the declaration is filed or even at the time of the submission.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Kotlyar, D. and L. Pop (2021[35]), Automated Risk Analysis of Asset and Interest Declarations of Public Officials. A Technical Guide, https://star.worldbank.org/publications/automated-risk-analysis-asset-and-interest-declarations-public-officials.
Once the framework for risk analysis has been established, standard procedures should be developed to make verification operational. This is important to ensure that the process is carried out consistently and effectively over time, and regardless of any potential challenges regarding institutional responsibilities, technical (IT) expertise, or human or financial resources. Documenting the standard steps can also facilitate awareness and co-ordination among the oversight agencies (OECD, 2017[36]). Manuals should detail the framework for automated risk analysis and set out the steps to follow once a declaration has been flagged through the system, including clear instructions on when a full audit would be triggered, or declarants be kept under “special vigilance”. For example, once two or more risks are identified above a certain threshold, or when specific red flags are raised, this could give rise to in-depth verification (OECD, 2023[30]). The manual could also include the notification of prosecutors and other authorities when necessary (OECD, 2017[36]).
Finally, publishing information from asset declarations for public scrutiny can have a deterrent effect and promote integrity and trust in the public administration (Kotlyar and Pop, 2021[35]). It also enables stakeholders to notify responsible authorities of suspected wrongdoing for further verification and potential investigation, or advocate for new approaches in the verification of declarations. Disclosures should strive to provide maximum transparency, while ensuring the protection of privacy of declarants (ReSPA, 2014[37]). In Kazakhstan, the Law on Combating Corruption makes “information disclosed in declarations” by senior officials “subject to publication […]. The list of information subject to publication is determined by the authorised body for combating corruption” (Government of Kazakhstan, 2015[4]). However, declarations are not publicly available at the time of writing, and thus Kazakhstan could change this situation in the future. It should also be noted that transparency concerns not only the declarations as such, but also the status of verification (case statistics) and compliance with filing requirements. Regarding the latter, Kazakhstan currently only publishes the tax numbers of officials who have filed their declarations and could therefore consider publishing the names of (senior) officials who have not done so on time, to encourage compliance.
Kazakhstan could lower the threshold for confiscation and review the range of offences related to declarations of assets and liabilities and declarations of income and property with a view to strengthening the graduated system of effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions
Compliance with requirements for the disclosure of income, assets and liabilities is key to have a well-functioning asset declaration system. To encourage compliance, it should be clear what the rules are, what the offences are and on what grounds sanctions can be expected. The Law on Combating Corruption (Art. 11) establishes administrative and disciplinary liability for violation of declaratory obligations. Sanctions include the cancellation of registrations of candidates for elected office, the refusal to grant appropriate powers to public officials, as well as liabilities under the Code of Administrative Offenses (Government of Kazakhstan, 2015[4]). According to the Code on Administrative Offences (Art. 272), “providing incomplete, inaccurate information in the declaration of assets and liabilities, the declaration of income and property and the declaration of individual income tax, will lead to a warning, except in cases that entail the registration of taxes and other obligatory payments to the budget”. Repeated actions in relation to the administrative violations described above that are committed within one year from the application of the sanction will lead to the imposition of administrative fines of three monthly calculation indices (equivalent to EUR 19) (Government of Kazakhstan, 2015[38]). In addition, Article 218-1 of the Kazakh Criminal Code provides for a fine of up to 3 000 monthly calculation indices (ca. EUR 19 000) for concealment of illegally acquired assets through “knowingly unreliable, incomplete or distorted information” in asset declarations (Government of Kazakhstan, 2014[39]).
Regarding confiscation, the Law on the Return of Illegally Acquired Assets to the State deals with “assets of unexplained origin” and “excess income”. However, the law applies confiscation only to “persons who own, use, possess or control [...] assets the total value of which is equal to or exceeds thirteen million times the monthly calculation index”, i.e. around EUR 100 million (Government of Kazakhstan, 2023[40]). It is probably fair to say that this threshold is unparalleled in the world, and 1 000 to 10 000 times higher than any other existing threshold, leaving aside countries with no threshold at all. It appears unjustified and significantly restricts the scope of such confiscation to only the wealthiest individuals. Therefore, while essential features of a graduated system of sanctions are in place, Kazakhstan could consider considerably lowering significantly lower the threshold for the application of confiscation and review the range of offences related to the declarations of assets and liabilities and declarations of income and property with a view to providing for effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions, both for the violation of declaratory obligations, as well as for irregularities detected as a result of verification. Should Kazakhstan introduce disclosures of non-financial interests for the purposes of strengthening the prevention and management of conflicts of interest among public officials, a graduated system of administrative and disciplinary sanctions for the violation of declaratory obligations should also be applied to these disclosures, complementing the sanctions already in place for violations of standards on conflict of interest that are discussed in the section above.
The OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity highlights the need for clear rules and procedures for reporting suspected violations of integrity standards as a key component of the public integrity system (OECD, 2017[21]). As such, whistleblowing is an essential means of detecting and preventing corruption, fraud and other forms of wrongdoing. Unlike witness protection systems, which focus on protecting those testifying and providing information in a criminal trial, effective whistleblowing systems provide channels and protection for reporting related to the workplace and professional activities on a range of wrongdoings, including criminal, civil and administrative.
Effective frameworks for whistleblowing typically encompass:
clear reporting channels
clearly defined and guaranteed types of protection of whistle-blowers, including prohibition of formal and informal work-related sanctions
appropriate reviews and compliance investigations in the case of reports of wrongdoing (OECD, 2020[10])
awareness-raising measures.
In the legislative framework on whistleblowing is set out in the Law on Combating Corruption (Art. 24), which establishes obligations to report corruption through internal and external channels, obligations for authorities to follow-up on reports received, as well as protections for whistleblowers. In recent years, Kazakhstan has undertaken steps to improve its whistleblowing framework. This has included legislative reforms aimed at facilitating reporting of corrupt acts, including by introducing a system of rewards, and improving protections for whistleblowers against retaliation. This section examines the improvements made and discusses options for further strengthening the whistleblowing framework in Kazakhstan, including by improving reporting channels, further strengthening protections and raising awareness.
To encourage whistleblowing, Kazakhstan could allow for anonymous reporting and the Anti-Corruption Service could develop standard reporting procedures
Clearly defining channels of disclosure helps facilitate reporting, as it allows whistleblowers understand how to raise concerns and thus increases comfort about coming forward. Effective channels for disclosure also allow the designated authorities to receive and act upon reliable and relevant information about wrongdoing, ideally before serious harm has been done. Offering a combination of internal and external channels for disclosure gives whistleblowers more confidence that there is an appropriate reporting option for the circumstances of their case. Internal disclosure is an important part of maintaining an open organisational culture, as it encourages workers to engage in dialogue about integrity in their organisations, provides relevant information to responsible functions about workplace culture and behaviours, and contributes to early and effective resolution (OECD, 2020[10]). External channels provide whistleblowers with an alternative if, for instance, appropriate action has not been taken internally, they have reason to believe that they would be reprimanded by their organisation’s internal mechanism, they think their anonymity or confidentiality cannot be guaranteed, or there is an imminent threat or emergency which internal channels may be unable to address (OECD, 2016[41]).
Kazakhstan has established two channels of reporting for whistleblowers: within the organisation (internal) and to the competent authority (external). As the external reporting channel, the Anti-Corruption Service receives reports in writing, through its unified call centre, as well as the e-government portal eGov.kz. As per the Law on Combating Corruption, internal reports are made to the management of a state body or other employer. The Law on Civil Service (Art. 52) establishes a corresponding obligation for civil servants (Government of Kazakhstan, 2016[7]). It stipulates that should a civil servant have information about an act of corruption, they must take necessary measures to prevent and terminate such a situation, and immediately inform a superior in writing. A civil servant is also obliged to immediately inform the indicated persons and bodies in writing if they have been subjected to attempts of corruption. The management of the state body is obliged, within a month from the date of receipt of such information, to take relevant measures, including by organising inspections and sending appeals to authorised bodies. The management of the state body is obliged, within a month from the date of receipt of such information, to take relevant measures, including by organising inspections and sending appeals to authorised bodies.
While internal reporting is thus foreseen under the law, there is little clarity around the details of the reporting procedure and processing of written statements submitted to superiors (GRECO, 2024[33]). While procedures have been established for the prosecution authorities and information materials prepared for anti-corruption activists, they have no direct relevance to the procedures for reporting corruption at the workplace (GRECO, 2024[33]). This, in turn, may discourage individuals from coming forward and lead to inconsistent, or insensitive, handling of reports. The Anti-Corruption Service could therefore take steps to ensure that the internal reporting system is clear and easy to use in practice, including by developing guidance manuals on the establishment of internal reporting channels, as well as standard procedures for the reporting and follow-up by employers, to encourage internal reporting. The key features of internal reporting procedures outlined in the EU Whistleblowing Directive provide a good example in this regard (Box 3.13).
Article 9 of the EU Whistleblowing Directive sets out key features of the procedures for internal reporting and follow-up, including the following:
(a) channels for receiving the reports which are designed, established and operated in a secure manner that ensures that the confidentiality of the identity of the reporting person and any third party mentioned in the report is protected, and prevents access thereto by non-authorised staff members
(b) acknowledgment of receipt of the report to the reporting person within seven days of that receipt
(c) the designation of an impartial person or department competent for following-up on the reports which may be the same person or department as the one that receives the reports and which will maintain communication with the reporting person and, where necessary, ask for further information from and provide feedback to that reporting person
(d) diligent follow-up by the designated person or department referred to in point (c)
(e) diligent follow-up, where provided for in national law, as regards anonymous reporting
(f) a reasonable timeframe to provide feedback, not exceeding three months from the acknowledgment of receipt or, if no acknowledgement was sent to the reporting person, three months from the expiry of the seven-day period after the report was made
(g) provision of clear and easily accessible information regarding the procedures for reporting externally to competent authorities pursuant to Article 10 and, where relevant, to institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union.
Source: EU (2019[42]), Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the Protection of Persons who Report Breaches of Union Law, European Union.
Unlike the EU Whistleblowing Directive, which encourages whistleblowers to first use internal reporting channels where they can reasonably be expected to work, the Kazakh legal framework does not explicitly establish a hierarchy of reporting channels. This makes sense in the Kazakh context, where trust in public institutions has been volatile, as demonstrated for example by the January 2022 protests, and where there is limited clarity around the functioning of internal reporting. For the same reasons, Kazakhstan could consider revisiting rules under the Criminal Code (Article 181), whereby an anonymous report of a criminal offence cannot serve as a reason to start a pre-trial investigation (Government of Kazakhstan, 2014[43]). Under those provisions, receiving Kazakh authorities have the right to dismiss anonymous disclosures without further analysing them and/or requesting additional information from the sender. While the EU Whistleblowing Directive does not oblige Member States to impose anonymous reporting, around half of the countries that have transposed the Directive still do so (EC, 2024[44]), including Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden (Transparency International, 2023[45]). The option of anonymous reporting can encourage reporting by enabling individuals who would not do so otherwise for fear of negative consequences or that insufficient care will be taken to protect their identity.
Kazakhstan could further strengthen rights and protections for whistleblowers, supported by effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions against acts of retaliation
Effective protections against retaliation include effective, proportionate, and dissuasive sanctions, along with clear measures of support to reassure prospective whistleblowers that they will be protected if they make a report. They also mean those who suffer detriment linked to reporting can receive appropriate redress. Retaliation for whistleblowing can include, inter alia, dismissal, demotion, salary reduction, lack of promotion, transfer to a different position, psychological pressure, mobbing, exclusion, or the stripping of security clearance. A broad range of remedies enable an appropriate response to the kind of retaliation suffered and the damage caused and ensure relief and compensation for all the whistleblower’s losses. Where possible, remedies should allow the whistleblower and other protected persons to be restored to a situation that would have been theirs had they not suffered retaliation.
Kazakh authorities have recognised that the lack of protections at the workplace and uncertainty of public officials of losing their jobs have been major obstacles for whistleblowers to come forward, and that effective legal protections for those reporting corruption outside the criminal process have been lacking (GRECO, 2024[33]). To address these shortcomings, Kazakhstan has introduced a series of amendments into the Law on Combating Corruption in 2023. Amongst other things, the Law now stipulates that:
persons reporting acts of corruption or otherwise facilitate the fight against corruption are entitled to State protection
any employment disputes involving whistleblowers are to be examined by a collegial body, with the mandatory participation of a representative of the competent anti-corruption body
disciplinary sanctions, dismissal or transfer to another position of a whistleblower without a recommendation of a disciplinary commission or other collegial body are prohibited
the competent anti-corruption body is to be informed of the decision taken by the collegial entity within three days and, if it disagrees with the decision taken, it should notify the prosecution or labour inspection of the violation of rights and legitimate interests of the employee within two days upon receipt of the decision (similar guarantees are provided to those who report possible corruption through external channels)
superiors of persons reporting acts of corruption, as well as other competent bodies, are to conclude a non-disclosure agreement with the whistleblower, the breach of which carries criminal liability, and ensure that the information about reporting remains confidential
further protection measures aimed at ensuring their personal safety are accessible to whistleblowers in the context of criminal proceedings (Government of Kazakhstan, 2015[4]).
To support implementation of these new protections, notably the introduction of non-disclosure agreements, the Anti-Corruption Service disseminated information among its territorial branches in 2023, and the topic was also covered in the media. The Agency further designated the officials, at central and local levels, authorised to conclude non-disclosure agreements. As a result, some 40 such agreements had been signed by 2024 (GRECO, 2024[33]).
The 2023 amendments constitute an important step to strengthen protections against retaliation and thus encourage whistleblowing in Kazakhstan. Building on these positive developments, Kazakhstan could take further measures to strengthen the rights and guarantees for whistleblowers.
First, Kazakhstan could consider broadening the definition of wrongdoings, the disclosure of which would qualify for whistle-blower protection in both the Law on Combating Corruption to cover reported corruption-related offences that are not corruption offences, i.e. violations of rules regarding prevention and settlement of conflicts of interest, filing declarations of assets and interests, violation of other anti-corruption restrictions established by law (OECD, 2024[27]) including any violation of the lobbying and influence-related rules and standards. Taken together, this would encourage the prevention of undue influence in general, not just corruption, in the public service. In addition, legal provisions on the protection of journalists’ sources of information could be introduced in the legal framework. By court request, journalists currently can be obliged to disclose their sources, with no clear limitation period.
Second, Kazakhstan's legislation does not only apply to persons reporting corruption offences at their place of work, but to any person who has information about a corruption offence being prepared, being committed or has been committed. Kazakhstan could consider clarifying the personal scope of the law, by narrowing it to persons who report wrongdoing in their professional capacities and that protections are primarily aimed at preventing various forms of retaliation and harassment in the workplace (OECD, 2024[27]).
Third, Kazakhstan could expand the range of prohibited retaliations against whistleblowers. International standards such as the EU Whistleblowing Directive stress that any direct or indirect act or omission taken, encouraged or tolerated in a work-related context which causes the whistleblower detriment should be prohibited (EU, 2019[42]). Kazakhstan’s legislation currently covers actions taken by the manager or employer, including disciplinary sanctions, dismissal or transfer to another position. However, it is not clear whether other actions, such as bullying, ostracism, or reputational damage, are also prohibited and so legislation could be amended to ensure that they are.
Fourth and final, Kazakhstan could introduce a system of effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for engagement in retaliatory acts and behaviours, as well as remedies where detriment has occurred. This could include compensation for the financial loss and personal harm suffered by the injured party, as is done in some OECD countries, such as Austria and Spain. It could also include intermediary remedies during the appeal procedure, such as the possibility of seeking interim relief, access to independent advice or free legal aid (GRECO, 2024[33]). Finally, whistleblowers should be exempted from civil and criminal liability, including for defamation and breach of confidentiality or statutory secrecy provisions (OECD, 2016[41]).
The Anti-Corruption Service and the Academy of Public Administration could increase awareness of the whistle-blower framework
Raising awareness and ensuring familiarity with existing legislation, reporting channels and protection is crucial for the robust functioning of the whistle-blower framework. The Anti-Corruption Service and the Academy of Public Administration could raise awareness of its existing provisions and develop agency-level implementation measures so that individuals have confidence in the protection, reporting and follow‑up procedures that are stipulated in the legislation. This awareness would empower public officials to make informed decisions, engender trust in the system's efficacy, facilitate timely reporting and resolution of misconduct, and ultimately contribute to a culture of accountability, prevention of violations, and consistent implementation across diverse sectors. Developing a systematic approach to information and awareness raising could not only enhance familiarity with existing protections and channels but also raise awareness more broadly in society about the measures through which individuals can report on corruption. Good practice from OECD countries on awareness-raising measures can be found in Box 3.14.
In the Slovak Republic, the Office for the Protection of Whistleblowers conducted a comprehensive awareness-raising campaign from September to December 2022 to better inform the public about whistleblowing and the role of the Office. The tagline “Speaking up is golden” is a spin on the phrase “silence is golden” and is intended to encourage Slovak citizens to raise integrity concerns. The national campaign included over 186 outputs on all traditional and social media, encompassing public debates, talk shows, concerts and a podcast called “The Unsilentables”. The Office was mentioned 508 times in the media. It enlisted national figures, such as the president of the police and Slovak celebrities, to act as champions of the campaign. In 2023, the campaign won the Association for Public Relations of the Slovak Republic’s Prokop award for best Slovak public relations project in the public sector category.
Results from opinion surveys conducted by the Office in January 2022, November 2022, and May 2023, indicate a positive and lasting impact of the campaign, in terms of citizens’ perceptions of whistleblowing, identification of the Office and its role, and their willingness to report corruption.
In May 2023, 66 % of Slovak citizens surveyed perceived a whistleblower as ‘positive’ or ‘very positive’, compared to 61 % in November 2022 and 58 % in January 2022. Demand for whistle-blower protection stabilised at 77 %, compared to 79 % in November 2022.
20 % of Slovaks are aware of the existence of the Office and its role as a public institution for whistleblower protection. Awareness stabilised after it had previously risen from 11 % (January 2022) to 19 % (November 2022).
When asked to whom they would be willing to report corruption or fraud if witnessed at the workplace, most respondents selected their employer. The Office however is making progress, with almost two-fifths willing to report to them.
Source: Adapted from input shared by the Office for the Protection of Whistleblowers of the Slovak Republic.
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← 1. Some methods to resolve conflict of interest are established by other legislative acts, in particular, the Civil Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Law on State Property regarding the transfer to trust management of the property of a public official, as well as the Administrative Procedural Code.
← 2. See OECD Public Integrity Indicators: Regulatory framework for transparency in lobbying, conflict-of-interest and political finance, https://oecd-public-integrity-indicators.org/indicators/1000097/subindicators/1000402.