Legal and strategic frameworks determine the purpose, priorities, and room for manoeuvre of development banks and development finance institutions (DFIs). Mandates, corporate strategies and key performance indicators (KPIs) shape whether mobilisation of private capital is treated as a core institutional function or remains peripheral. This chapter reviews how mobilisation features in mandates, strategies and KPI systems across institutions, and examines why static mandates, generic strategies and disbursement-focused performance metrics can limit responsiveness to the changing nature of the financing for development challenge. It then highlights emerging good practices – clearer mandate language, strategy refreshes that anchor mobilisation, and quantified KPIs that strengthen accountability – and the role of shareholders in driving alignment. The chapter concludes that coherent reform across mandates, strategies and KPIs are essential to embed mobilisation in institutional practice and to support delivery of development objectives.
Mobilising Private Capital for Growth, Resilience and Prosperity
Abstract
Mandates, strategies and key performance indicators (KPIs) guide the work of development banks and development finance institutions (DFIs). They signal purpose, organise priorities, shape culture, and define the institutions’ room for manoeuvre. Whether and how development banks and DFIs perform a mobilisation role depends on the degree to which their mandates, strategies and KPIs align with that objective.
This chapter presents evidence on the state of play of development banks and DFIs1 that feature or prioritise private capital mobilisation in their mandates, corporate strategies and KPIs. The chapter assesses how mandates, strategies and KPIs influence mobilisation efforts, and explores challenges to change these legal and strategic frameworks, then outlines emerging good practices to pursue their stronger alignment with the opportunity of mobilisation.
Mandates define the legal and strategic purpose of development banks and DFIs. Mandates are set out in legal frameworks such as founding legislation, articles of agreement, articles of association, or shareholder charters, which establish an institution’s role, scope of operations, permissible activities, and governance arrangements. Missions typically translate these mandates into non-legal language to communicate institutional purpose more broadly. Mandates can explicitly set out institutions’ function, often outlining operational tools to achieve set goals. As such, mandates are foundational to how institutions interpret and pursue objectives like private capital mobilisation.
Development banks and DFIs are generally established with a mandate to support growth, development and/or poverty reduction, although their geographic and operational scales vary (Table 3.1). Their mandates often incorporate national interests and alignment with their national development policy. Private-sector focused institutions, such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC) or bilateral DFIs, typically emphasise private-sector development as a driver of development. In addition, some development banks and DFIs specialise in particular sectors or target groups, such as the Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI, 2012[1]).
Notes: Italics added by the authors to mandates highlight references to capital mobilisation, including from private sources and/or other uses of financial resources.
Mandates profoundly shape the architecture and function of development banks and DFIs. They influence their operational focus, staffing profiles, internal incentives and other elements pertaining to operational systems and institutional culture (Chapter 5). Given their legal and political nature, mandates are typically long-standing and rarely subject to revision. Reforming mandates is often procedurally complex and politically sensitive – especially for multilateral institutions where diverse shareholder interests and consensus-based governance might limit the ability to reorient institutional purpose toward emerging priorities, such as scaling up private capital mobilisation.
Recent international reform initiatives highlight the importance of aligning institutional mandates with contemporary challenges. The Triple Agenda launched in 2023 calls for development banks to operate with greater ambition, capacity and efficiency to respond to the scale of developing countries’ needs (World Bank, n.d.[8]). In support of this, the G20-endorsed Comprehensive Roadmap for MDB Reform calls on development banks to strengthen mandate clarity, improve alignment with global challenges and institutionalise private capital mobilisation as a priority (G20 Independent Expert Group, 2023[9]) (G20 Brazil Finance Track, 2024[10]).
Institutional mandates also shape the scope and ambition of private finance mobilisation efforts. While the absence of explicit reference to mobilisation in a mandate does not in itself prevent development banks and DFIs from pursuing it, it can reduce the visibility of mobilisation as a priority, implying that there is no focus on, or demand for, accountability around mobilisation performance. Often, mandates emphasise other activities more explicitly – such as sovereign lending or direct project financing – which de-incentivise a systematic focus on mobilisation. Mandates thus serve not only as legal anchors, but also as signals of intent and shareholder priorities. In this regard, bilateral development banks often focus on providing sovereign debt to governments for public investment, given their sovereign finance orientation (Table 3.1). DFIs with private-sector mandates are typically set up to provide debt financing to private businesses. Common to both is that their financing predominantly takes the form of senior debt. Senior debt is key in directly covering financing gaps, but it has limited potential for mobilisation of private capital relative to other financing instruments and approaches (Chapter 4).
Mandates often provide broad strategic direction but rarely make private capital mobilisation a priority. Although their high-level formulations on growth, poverty reduction or regional integration give development banks and DFIs considerable flexibility, they seldom establish mobilisation as a function to achieve a given development objective. Where functions such as sovereign lending or loan financing are emphasised more concretely, the focus on mobilisation in the practice of development banking is reduced. A first step in assessing the alignment of development banks and DFIs is therefore to examine whether and how private capital mobilisation is embedded in mandates Figure 3.1 . Institutions vary significantly in this respect. Some reference the criticality of private capital and/or investment, but many do not. Among the MDBs reviewed, over 82% include a reference to private capital mobilisation in their mandates, reflecting their increasing focus on catalysing private investment in support of development objectives, including in response to the G20 Roadmap. IDB’s legal mandate for example is to facilitate private investment; and the mandate of IDB Invest is similarly to increase the flow of private capital into member countries. This is followed by bilateral DFIs, with four of the 17 researched institutions making explicit reference to private capital mobilisation.
Source: Data compiled from the official websites of the listed institutions and other desk research.
Divergence among development banks and DFIs further illustrates the uneven mandate foundation for private capital mobilisation. Among the 24 national and regional development banks reviewed, only two explicitly mention private capital mobilisation in their mandates (legal documents for five others were unavailable or inaccessible). None of the three bilateral development banks in the sample include such a reference (legal documentation could not be located for one bilateral development bank). The French government indicates that the quasi-mandate for private capital mobilisation applicable to Proparco, the private-sector arm of the Agence française de développement (AFD), might be progressively extended to all AFD Group activities and hence also to AFD itself (Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères, 2023[11]). However, many other development banks, particularly at the national and regional level, lack a clear legal basis or strategic imperative to systematically crowd-in private investment.
Many development banks and DFIs refer only generically to ‘resource mobilisation’ without distinguishing between public and private finance. For example, the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean (CAF), the Development Bank of Ethiopia, and the Vietnam Development Bank all reference mobilisation of financial resources in broad terms (CAF, 2015[12]); (Federal Demoratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2003[13]); (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2006[14]). While such language might implicitly cover private capital, it does not establish it as a clear priority.
By contrast, some development banks and DFIs make explicit reference to private capital in their mandates, sending stronger signals about mobilisation. For example, the Asian Development Bank (ADB)’s founding agreement calls on it “to promote investment of public and private capital for development purposes”; the IFC Article of Agreement direct it to “bring together investment opportunities, domestic and foreign private capital” into productive investments; the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) likewise commits to “mobilise domestic and foreign capital” to promote private sector development, particularly in small and medium-sized enterprises; FMO identifies private capital mobilisation as a core operational principle, expressing a clear commitment to “attracting as much additional private sector funding as possible” (FMO, 2023[15]); and the founding legislation of the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) enacted in 1997 explicitly mandates the mobilisation of both public and private resources to support economic development and regional integration (South African Government, n.d.[16]).
Mandates do not yet fully reflect the rising political emphasis on private capital mobilisation. This is less because they prohibit mobilisation than because they emphasise other functions more explicitly, which can de-incentivise systematic efforts and weaken accountability. Where formal legal revisions are not feasible or not the most effective, shareholders, development banks and DFIs can pursue complementary approaches such as interpretive guidance, shareholder declarations or strategic frameworks to recalibrate their focus without amending foundational charters. The next section turns to corporate strategies to assess whether and how institutions prioritise and operationalise mobilisation in practice.
Development banks’ and DFI’s corporate strategies are a critical bridge between their mandates and delivery. They provide a mechanism to translate institutional purpose into operational priorities, investment choices and resource allocation. Because they are typically board-endorsed and revised periodically, strategies also offer a more flexible means than mandates to reflect emerging priorities such as the growing urgency to mobilise private capital. If clearly defined and consistently implemented, they can embed mobilisation across institutional functions and enable accountability.
In recent years, an increasing number of development banks and DFIs have explicitly prioritised private capital mobilisation in their strategies. This trend indicates that strategies might indeed represent a more appropriate level than mandates to anchor emerging priorities such as private capital mobilisation. This trend is particularly pronounced among institutions operating internationally: all MDBs and bilateral development banks reviewed include explicit references to private capital mobilisation in their strategic frameworks. Similarly, all bilateral DFIs for which documentation could be found include private capital mobilisation as a strategic focus (strategy documents could not be identified for two bilateral DFIs). The picture is more mixed among regional and national development banks of developing countries: more than half of the institutions reviewed did not have publicly accessible strategy documents and only half of the remainder explicitly refer to private capital mobilisation.
Shareholders are often pivotal in steering institutions towards stronger private capital mobilisation. Replenishment processes often require development banks and DFIs to refresh their strategies, providing shareholders a direct opportunity to embed mobilisation objectives. For example, during the 2023 strategy refresh of British International Investment (BII), the United Kingdom reaffirmed BII’s catalytic mandate, explicitly embedding private capital mobilisation as a core development objective within its revised impact framework. More broadly, the UK’s industry-led Emerging Markets and Developing Economies’ Investor Task Force, which has broad buy-in from the Treasury and the Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office and aims to leverage the City of London’s expertise (IIGCC, 2025[17]), and Germany’s Acceleration Dialogues and High-Level Friends Group on Private Finance offer examples of initiatives to scale up private capital mobilisation by enabling development banks and DFIs.
However, the depth and clarity of these strategic commitments vary significantly (Table 3.2). Many institutions refer to mobilisation only in general or aspirational terms, often framing it within broader efforts to engage the private sector. As a result, mobilisation can remain disconnected from planning, investment decision-making and pipeline development. For instance, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) reference private capital mobilisation more prominently but without clear operational focus on the private sectors. In many of these cases, mobilisation is not defined as a distinct strategic goal, nor supported by concrete implementation plans. While inconsistencies between strategies and operational planning are not uncommon, development bank practitioners, experts and donor shareholders highlighted these inconsistencies as a key issue to strengthen development bank efforts to increase private capital mobilisation. Because mobilisation requires cross-departmental co-ordination, upstream engagement and pipeline development as well as risk-sharing approaches, the absence of clear strategic direction can quickly result in fragmented and ad hoc efforts.
A smaller group of institutions explicitly position private capital mobilisation as a core strategic objective, sometimes identifying it as a standalone priority or institutional function. AFD Group’s 2025-2030 Strategy, for example outlines becoming a mobilisation platform as one of four key strategic commitments (AFD, 2025[18]), while FinDev Canada identifies mobilisation as a priority under its Growing the Business strategic pillar (FinDev Canada, 2024[19]). The IDB Group’s 2024–2030 Institutional Strategy exemplifies this trend, coupling a new impact framework with a USD 3.5 billion capital increase for IDB Invest and a scaled-up, catalytic business model for IDB Lab, thereby anchoring mobilisation and impact more explicitly into the Group’s strategic and operational orientation (IDB Group, 2024[20]). These differences in strategic framing are critical, as they influence how mobilisation is prioritised internally and operationalised through planning and resource allocation.
However, most strategies fall short of being actionable because they lack targets, timelines and indicators. Without clear metrics, even well-articulated ambitions can fail to guide decision making or influence institutional behaviour. Defining targets and indicators for mobilisation is a delicate undertaking that needs to balance different aspects and objectives (Box 3.2). The absence of such metrics is common across strategies and is particularly constraining for mobilisation as it weakens accountability to shareholders and reduces incentives for staff to prioritise mobilisation relative to disbursement volumes. Insights obtained through consultations confirmed that implementation in such cases is often left to individual departments or project teams, without a coherent institutional framework to ensure consistency or scale.
Institutional KPIs serve as mechanisms to translate strategy into action and to track progress. When applied to mobilisation, KPIs provide staff and leadership with clear incentives, improve organisational accountability and enhance learning about what works. The relevance of KPIs was also highlighted by the G20 Roadmap, which encourages MDBs to introduce clearer KPIs to track progress on mobilisation and to reflect these objectives in institutional strategies and accountability frameworks.
Development banks and DFIs traditionally rely on indicators such as commitment or disbursement volumes to assess performance, reflecting their core operational focus on direct lending. This reliance on disbursement or commitment-based indicators is central to understanding why private capital mobilisation struggles to gain traction in performance systems of development banks and DFIs. These metrics, while important, often reinforce business models centred on balance-sheet deployment rather than catalytic capital mobilisation. For example, the EBRD historically used Annual Bank Investment (ABI) – a measure of direct investment commitments – as its primary financial performance metric. However, an internal evaluation in 2020 found that this approach reduced the strategic relevance of mobilisation. Because staff incentives were tied to maximising ABI, efforts to crowd-in private finance were frequently delayed until internal lending targets were met (EBRD Evaluation Department, 2020[28]). This misalignment between institutional objectives and performance incentives illustrates a broader challenge: without dedicated KPIs for mobilisation, development banks and DFIs can struggle to embed mobilisation into their culture and day-to-day operations. As such, evolving performance systems to include mobilisation metrics is essential to reorienting institutional behaviour toward leveraging, not just deploying, capital.
MDBs show the highest level of alignment: More than half of those reviewed include defined targets for private capital mobilisation (Figure 3.2). Bilateral DFIs follow with almost half of those reviewed having targets for private capital mobilisation in place. MDBs’ progress reflects important advances made under for instance the G20-endorsed Comprehensive Roadmap for MDB Reform, which has pushed for clearer targets and accountability on mobilisation within corporate scorecards (G20 Brazil Finance Track, 2024[10]). For example, the African Development Bank (AfDB)’s 2016-2025 Results Measurement Framework set a target of mobilising an average of XUA 6.4 billion from private sector entities (AfDB, 2017[29]). ADB, in its Corporate Results Framework 2025-2030, has set a target of USD 13 billion annually in private sector financing by 2030, including at least USD 4.5 billion in direct capital mobilisation, with progress tracked through corporate and departmental-level targets. FMO committed to doubling its mobilisation portfolio by 2030, with the target including mobilisation in project-level scoring tools (FMO, 2022[30]). Proparco was likewise assigned a quantified leverage target by its shareholder, requiring it to mobilise at least one euro of private capital for every euro of its own commitments by 2025 (Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères, 2023[11]).
In contrast, none of the bilateral development banks included in the review has published explicit private capital mobilisation targets, and documentation on KPIs was not available for two of the three (Figure 3.2). It is unclear whether these institutions lack KPIs on mobilisation altogether or whether KPI frameworks are not publicly accessible. This distinction is important as the absence of published performance systems might point to broader issues around institutional ambition, accountability and transparency. Among regional and national development banks of developing countries, no institution was found to have defined specific targets for private capital mobilisation. While DBSA did previously have a mobilisation/catalysation KPI (Box 3.1Box 3.1), this was removed (DBSA, 2023[31]) (DBSA, 2024[32]). The documentation that could be identified for this report, while particularly limited for bilateral development banks, and regional and national development banks of developing countries, supports the finding that integration of mobilisation into institutional performance systems remains limited.
Source: Data compiled from the official websites of the listed institutions and desktop research.
Some institutions are adopting more structured and accountable approaches to private capital mobilisation, introducing dedicated targets and KPIs alongside traditional performance indicators. EBRD positions mobilisation as a strategic enabler in its 2026-2030 Strategic and Capital Framework (EBRD, 2025[33]). It introduced a floor of EUR 5 billion for Annual Mobilised Investment (AMI), alongside commitments to expand its mobilisation toolkit and pilot operational innovations such as originate-to-share models and portfolio-based transactions, supported by internal incentives and organisational change. Similarly, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) adopted a Strategy on Mobilising Private Capital for Infrastructure, which outlines a phased engagement approach (from partnering with private actors to market creation), paired with dedicated monitoring systems (AIIB, 2018[21]). A complementary technical note expands on the strategy by identifying barriers, detailing financial instruments and partners, and underscoring the importance of aligning institutional culture and incentives (AIIB, 2018[22]).
Other institutions are also operationalising mobilisation through embedded metrics. IDB Invest introduced mobilisation KPIs in 2016, now tracking both long-term commitments (targeting USD 3.0 billion) and long-term core mobilisation (targeting USD 4.1 billion, comprising third-party financing and risk transfers). DBSA is an early mover in this space: with strong shareholder backing, DBSA initiated a strategic shift to reposition itself as a catalytic financier, embedding mobilisation into its institutional model through strategy, KPIs and tailored financial practices (Box 3.1). These efforts illustrate how reforms can translate into measurable outcomes, although challenges with attribution and metric design persist.
In 2014, South Africa’s National Treasury, as DBSA’s shareholder, launched a strategic repositioning to enhance the bank’s impact. Recognising the limitations of DBSA’s balance sheet in addressing South Africa’s infrastructure financing needs, the bank pivoted from acting primarily as a direct lender toward playing a more catalytic role focused on mobilising public and private capital.
Strategic and operational changes
This institutional transformation was underpinned by a series of financial and operational reforms:
New performance metrics – A KPI on the value of third-party funds catalysed was introduced into the corporate scorecard, weighted at 10%, with clear ownership assigned to departments and regular target tracking to reinforce accountability.
Shift in disbursement pressure – By lowering direct disbursement targets, DBSA created space to focus on upstream project development, early-stage risk taking and programmatic approaches better suited to the increased focus on attracting additional investment.
Adjusted financial return expectations – Return on equity targets were revised downward (from 7.5% in 2014/15 to 4.5% in 2020/21, in ZAR), enabling the bank to pursue higher-risk, higher-impact investments aligned with its catalytic objectives.
Instruments and delivery models
Mobilisation was further enabled through the establishment of tailored vehicles and instruments:
A dedicated blended finance vehicle co-financed by the GCF providing subordinated debt and credit enhancements to mobilise private capital for infrastructure projects.
– DBSA contributed to the development and implementation of the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme by providing financing and de-risking projects at early stages, helping to establish markets.
Institutionalisation through strategy
Mobilisation objectives were also formalised in institutional strategies and internal systems:
Strategy positioning – Mobilisation was prioritised in corporate strategies and annual plans as a core delivery mechanism for infrastructure development.
Incentive alignment – Executive and departmental performance reviews incorporated mobilisation metrics, reinforcing cross-institutional accountability.
Challenges and learning
Over time, DBSA’s efforts contributed to embedding mobilisation into the bank’s institutional identity and business model. However, the bank moved away from using the specific KPI on catalysation in recent years, partly in response to concerns from South Africa’s national accounting office about the difficulty of attributing causality in mobilised finance. This illustrates both the potential of institutional reform to drive mobilisation outcomes and the practical complexities of measuring and sustaining those outcomes in performance frameworks.
The importance of clear corporate targets is acknowledged as a basis for benchmarking performance and integrating into operations, although defining appropriate targets requires careful calibration. Target setting must balance ambition with institutional context and guard against adverse incentives. Mobilisation indicators such as leverage ratios can be misleading and risk perverse incentives (if applied without nuance), while broader measures of market development could provide a more accurate picture of long-term catalysation. Box 3.2 explores these issues.
Setting clear and measurable targets can guide development banks and DFIs toward stronger mobilisation outcomes and signal strategic intent. To be effective, targets must be context-specific and well-designed to avoid unintended consequences, such as undermining development impact or additionality. Mobilisation itself can also be understood as a development outcome contributing to wider impact.
Cautions around leverage-based KPIs
Leverage ratios (private finance mobilised per unit of official development finance) are common but imperfect indicators:
Geographic and access concerns – Most mobilisation occurs in middle-income countries due to more favourable investment environments. In contrast, Low-Income Countries (LICs) and fragile contexts face greater structural barriers. A narrow focus on high leverage might disincentivise engagement where finance is needed most.
Misalignment with additionality – High leverage ratios do not always mean high leverage, but could indicate redundancy and lack of additionality of official development finance: small shares of public finance might stay in transactions alongside private investment that would have occurred anyway. This would result in particularly high observed leverage ratios, but constitute a de facto opportunity cost and inefficient use of these resources. Conversely, in more challenging contexts, catalytic support might achieve lower leverage ratios but greater transformational value.
Towards a more nuanced approach
Mobilisation should be understood as part of a broader market-building effort. While specific transactions can mobilise finance in the short term, true catalysation unfolds over time through repeated interventions that gradually increase commercial participation and reduce reliance on public finance. Assessing this evolution, e.g. based on observing reduced concessionality and overall shares of official development finance over time in given sectors and jurisdictions (with a focus on eventual full exit), can serve as one way to better capture the impact and purpose of mobilisation (OECD, 2018[42]).
The need for harmonised metrics
Lack of common definitions and indicators hinders learning and comparability across institutions. Developing standardised mobilisation metrics is essential to track progress, identify good practice and ensure accountability. Ongoing international processes are working toward improved frameworks for measuring both mobilisation and catalysation.
A further challenge is the limited integration of mobilisation efforts and targets with other, potentially core objectives of development banks and DFIs, such as development, poverty reduction or infrastructure. In many institutions, mobilisation is treated as a standalone function rather than embedded into the design of country and/or sectoral strategies, investment planning and project pipeline development. This limits the ability to mobilise private capital at scale and reduces the strategic coherence and impact of interventions. For example, some development banks and DFIs include mitigation and resilience objectives in their strategies but do not specify how these goals will be supported through private capital mobilisation, constraining their ability to align financing structures with impact ambitions.
The limited use of KPIs and their limited integration with broader objectives of development banks and DFIs illustrate why mandates and strategies alone are insufficient to scale up mobilisation efforts. Stronger performance frameworks backed by clear metrics can ensure that private capital mobilisation is embedded across the functions of development banks and DFIs, and treated as a core part of development banking practice.
Private finance mobilisation is increasingly seen as critical to achieving global development objectives, but many development banks and DFIs are not yet equipped deliver on that ambition. Across many institutions, mandates have not evolved to reflect the growing importance of mobilisation. Where private capital mobilisation is not formally recognised as a core function, institutions might lack the authority, incentives and accountability mechanisms to pursue it systematically. They are not directed toward a stronger mobilisation focus and continue to focus on direct financing – especially sovereign or senior debt lending – without sufficient emphasis on crowding-in additional private capital. Where shareholder expectations are unclear or contested, strategic inertia can limit institutions’ ability to adapt and innovate. Some shareholders, such as the UK, have begun to push back against this, calling more explicitly for increased crowding-in of private capital.
Even when mobilisation is referenced in strategic frameworks, these commitments are frequently broad and lack specificity on delivery models, resourcing or performance tracking. This weak strategic alignment creates a cascade of institutional constraints. Mobilisation efforts might be siloed or under-resourced, accountability to shareholders weakened and opportunities for systemic innovation missed. Without clearer signals from governance bodies and stronger institutional direction, private capital mobilisation risks remaining a rhetorical ambition rather than an operational priority.
Legal mandate reform, while important, may not always be immediately feasible. In such cases, shareholders and institutions can use complementary or interim approaches – such as interpretive guidance, shareholder declarations, or updated strategic frameworks – to recalibrate institutional priorities without amending foundational charters. These measures can be more agile levers for aligning the focus of development banks and DFIs with the mobilisation imperative.
Even when mobilisation is referenced in strategic frameworks, these commitments are frequently broad, lacking specificity on delivery models, resourcing, or performance tracking. This weak strategic alignment generates a cascade of institutional constraints: Mobilisation efforts may be siloed or under-resourced, accountability to shareholders diminished and opportunities for institutional learning and systemic innovation missed. Consultations conducted for this report suggest in many cases, progress on mobilisation is frequently driven by individual champions or project-specific opportunities, rather than institution-wide systems, guidance, or incentives anchored in strategic or legal frameworks.
Despite these limitations, clear signals of progress are emerging. Several development banks and DFIs have begun to reposition private finance mobilisation within their strategic frameworks, often in response to shareholder direction, capital replenishments or shifts in political priorities. IDB Invest, FinDev Canada and AFD Group have integrated mobilisation more explicitly into their strategic frameworks. In parallel, growing attention to the mobilisation agenda has spurred the introduction of new instruments, partnerships and dedicated vehicles, particularly in areas such as infrastructure and SME development. There is also a growing emphasis on programmatic and portfolio-based approaches, which seek to move beyond individual transactions and mobilise private finance at scale. Yet these initiatives often remain fragmented and opportunistic, lacking full integration into legal and strategic frameworks.
Shareholders often play an active role in this evolution in strategy. Several shareholders use strategy reviews and capital replenishment processes to signal priorities and steer institutions toward stronger mobilisation outcomes.
While strategic frameworks are a critical lever to signal institutional priorities, aligning strategy with mobilisation objectives is necessary but not sufficient. Without complementary reforms to financial models, instruments and operating systems, private capital mobilisation is likely to remain marginal to how most development banks and DFIs deploy capital. This chapter turns to these financial and operational drivers, analysing how capital structures, risk appetite and instrument design affect institutions’ ability to crowd-in private finance and deliver development impact at scale.
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[4] JICA (2002), Act of the Incorporated Administrative Agency-Japan International, https://www.jica.go.jp/joureikun/act/actdata/119000019/13000412601000000008_1757333554139.pdf.
[11] Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires étrangères (2023), , https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/orientations_cle017322.pdf.
[41] OECD (2019), Scaling up climate-compatible infrastructure Insights from national development banks in Brazil and South Africa, OECD.
[42] OECD (2018), Making Blended Finance Work for the Sustainable Development Goals, OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264288768-en.
[1] SIDBI (2012), THE SMALL INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT BANK OF INDIA (AMENDMENT) BILL, 2012, https://prsindia.org/files/bills_acts/bills_parliament/2012/Small_Industries_Development_Bank_of_India_(Amendment)_Bill,_2012.pdf.
[14] Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2006), DECISION On the establishment of the Vietnam Development Bank, https://en.vdb.gov.vn/Images/Documents/fc608831-f86b-4d1b-bbdd-c1d5231f19c8.pdf.
[16] South African Government (n.d.), Development Bank of Southern Africa Act 13 of 1997, https://www.gov.za/documents/acts/development-bank-southern-africa-act-13-1997-25-apr-1997.
[6] TDB (2017), Charter of the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank, https://www.tdbgroup.org/wp-content/uploads/documents/Charter_Document_ENGLISH_15062017.pdf.
[8] World Bank (n.d.), The Triple Agenda: Strengthening MDBs for a New Era, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2023/10/09/strengthening-multilateral-development-banks.
← 1. The analysis is based on research of 55 multilateral, bilateral, regional and national development banks and DFIs (Annexes A and B).