Egypt has made progress in strengthening its enabling environment for infrastructure financing and investment, yet further efforts could facilitate unlocking private capital, and support sustainable, long‑term growth. A predictable and transparent investment climate – underpinned by clear legal and regulatory frameworks, and improved governance of state‑owned enterprises – is essential to mobilising private investment and financing for large‑scale infrastructure projects. While reforms have enhanced market access and reduced administrative barriers, persistent constraints – including complex land‑acquisition rules, sector‑specific ownership restrictions, overlapping institutional mandates, and limited state‑owned enterprise (SOE) transparency – continue to weigh on investor confidence. Continued regulatory simplification, strengthened dispute‑resolution mechanisms, accelerated SOE restructuring and divestment, and greater clarity in land‑use procedures could attract more investment into sustainable infrastructure and ensure that Egypt’s infrastructure development is efficient, resilient, and aligned with national economic and climate objectives.
Mobilising Financing and Investment for Quality Infrastructure in Egypt
Abstract
Maintaining a robust enabling environment is essential for attracting and sustaining investments, especially for long-term and complex investments into infrastructure. A strong investment climate provides the stability and predictability that investors need to manage and mitigate risks, achieve returns, and commit to projects with long gestation periods. To address infrastructure gaps, an enabling environment should involve not only sound policy frameworks and financial incentives, but also effective procedures and governance, institutional capacity, and risk mitigations mechanisms. Promoting competition will ensure greater efficiency, cost effectiveness, technology transfers, and innovation which improve service delivery and pricing. Strengthening these elements is key to unlocking private capital inflows and ensuring infrastructure projects – whether economic or social – are sustainable, resilient, and aligned with national development strategies.
Beyond financial incentives, clear legal and regulatory frameworks are part and parcel of a strong institutional setting, as they ensure fair competition, investor protections, and dispute resolution mechanisms. With regards to infrastructure financing, transparent procurement processes are essential as large‑scale projects often entail complex contractual arrangements and long-term commitments. Optimising bureaucratic inefficiencies and improving co‑ordination among relevant public entities can further enhance investor confidence and yield smooth project implementation.
State‑owned enterprises (SOEs) can play an integral role in sponsoring, operating, and financing infrastructure assets, as well as fill investment gaps where private sector participation remains limited. In Egypt, SOEs have played a prominent role in the nation’s economy, especially in sectors like energy, transportation, and utilities. In Egypt, SOEs are an integral part of the infrastructure sector as all infrastructure and utilities are primarily owned and manged by SOEs emphasising the importance of their role when discussing mobilising private investment in infrastructure. While well-managed SOEs can mobilise public and private capital and enhance delivery of essential services, they can also crowd out private investment. This is especially the case in economies where SOEs enjoy preferential treatment, face limited market competition or operate under weak corporate governance and financial oversight.
Egypt’s infrastructure sector faces growing demands for economic growth and expansion driven by rapid population growth, urbanisation, and the need for more sustainable solutions. However, as the country seeks to address growing demands in sectors like energy, transport, and water management, financing these large‑scale projects remains a challenge. In a global environment where access to capital is increasingly competitive, the country faces obstacles such as the need for significant capital inflows, high debt burdens, and regional disparities in infrastructure access.
To address these challenges, Egypt has taken steps to create an enabling environment for investment by implementing structural reforms aimed at attracting both domestic and foreign capital. Policy measures have focussed on enhancing transparency, reducing investment risks, and fostering collaboration between the public and private sectors. By improving its regulatory framework, advancing public-private partnerships, and leveraging multilateral development banks for concessional financing, Egypt has expanded pathways for private sector involvement, which is essential to bridging the infrastructure financing gap.
For much of the last decade Egypt has consistently ranked as a top destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in the Middle East and North Africa. FDI trends indicate a steady increase in FDI stock since 2018 with the United Kingdom and European Union as the largest investors in the country (see Figure 3.1, Panel C). Although FDI inflows declined in 2011 due to political instability and economic uncertainty wrought on by the Araspring protests, Egypt has gradually recovered its attractiveness to foreign investors (see Figure 3.1, Panel B). However, when examining FDI as a percentage of GDP, FDI has constituted an average between 1% and 2% of the country’s GDP from 2020 to 2022–a 1% decrease from levels seen in 2016 to 2019 (see Figure 3.1, Panel A). This drop is due to the decline in investment during COVID‑19 pandemic and the subsequent disruption in economic activity. According to Central Bank of Egypt data as of FY2023/24 net FDI to GDP registered 11.7%, compared to 1.9% and 2.5% in FY2021/22 and FY2022/23 respectively, as a result of macroeconomic reforms and stabilisation. FDI in Egypt recorded a net inflow of USD 9.84 billion and USD 46.58 billion in 2023 and 2024 respectively. Their share was a percentage to GDP 2.5% and 11.9% respectively (Central Bank of Egypt, n.d.[1]).
The introduction of Egypt’s Investment Law of 2017 (Law No. 72/2017), along with other legislative reforms such as amendments to the Bankruptcy Law of 2018 (Law No. 11/2018), Companies Law of 2018 (Law No. 4/2018), and Customs Law of 2020 (Law No. 207/2020), were carried out with the intention to lift restrictions and improve the investment climate for foreign investors (OECD, 2024[2]). The 2017 Investment Law included provisions that would grant equitable treatment to foreign and domestic investors and protect invested capital against nationalisation and expropriation, as well as discriminatory or coercive measures (OECD, 2020[3]). Since the implementation of the Investment Law, FDI inflows have generally increased, experiencing a drop during the COVID‑19 pandemic before rebounding and surpassing pre‑pandemic levels shortly thereafter.
Moreover, macroeconomic reforms, backed by a three‑year IMF programme amounting to USD 12 billion, from 2016 to 2019, supported Egypt’s economic growth during that period (IMF, 2016[4]; ITA, 2022[5]). Additional reforms have sought to reduce current account deficits by boosting investor confidence, encouraging greater involvement from the private sector, addressing long-standing customs and trade policy shortcomings, supporting industrial modernisation, and increasing trade outflows (ITA, 2022[5]). In addition, structural reforms that target foreign direct investments are taking place to improve the business environment in Egypt (MPED, 2024[6]).This is in addition to the home‑grown national structural reform programme being implemented in the same time frame and continuing under more comprehensive national strategies in addressing various issues including FDI, employment, industrialisation, among others.
Egypt is also advancing the National Foreign Direct Investment Strategy for 2025‑2030. The strategy is designed to unify Egypt’s vision for FDI, sharpen sector focus, and translate opportunity into an actionable investment pipeline by identifying targeted sectors and assesses their readiness for promotion (Government of Egypt, 2025[7]; OECD, 2026[8]).
Financial incentives have also been introduced alongside ongoing legislative reform to lure foreign investment. Egypt’s Investment Law offers certain incentives, such as income tax exemptions and reduced customs duties, while new “special tax incentives” cover 35% to 55% of investment costs for FDI-financed (e.g. green hydrogen) and labour-intensive projects (OECD, 2024[2]). To further encourage investment, the government has activated its “Golden License”–an instrument that was previously unused under the Investment Law – and expedited the processing of special visas and permits to attract investment in select projects, including green and infrastructure projects (see Box 3.1 for more information on Egypt’s Golden License) (OECD, 2024[2]). These measures not only offer tax incentives and reductions in customs duties and fees but also facilitate the licensing and operational setup of new ventures or expansions.
Note: Due to data availability issues, FDI stock origins were estimated based on FDI inflows data published by the Central Bank of Egypt covering the 2012 to 2024 period. Total volume of FDI stock based on reported international investment positions.
Source: OECD (2024[9]), Towards More Sustainable Investment Frameworks: Evaluating the Feasibility of Sustainable Investment Facilitation Agreements with Southern Neighbourhood Countries, https://doi.org/10.1787/411468b9-en; OECD estimations based on FDI inflows data of the Central Bank of Egypt, World Bank, and the IMF Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Statistics (BOP/IIP).
Egypt’s “Golden License,” also referred to as the “Single Approval,” was established under the 2017 Investment Law (Law No. 72/2017). The license was designed to simplify the process for investors by integrating the required approvals for a project into a single approval issued by a Prime Ministerial decree. It seeks to streamline the entire project lifecycle for new projects that meet specific criteria, covering everything from land allocation and building permits to project operation and management (USDoS, 2024[10]).
Golden License holders benefit from tax incentives, reduced fees and customs duties, and other special in-kind incentives, such as special customs outlets for the import or export of project-related goods granted in the Investment Law (OECD, 2024[2]). The Investment Law also grants investors incentives including partial coverage of costs associated with utility connections, personnel training, and land allocation, among other benefits. Council of Ministers Decree No. 56 of 2022 regulates projects eligible for a Golden License and the requirements that must be met by those projects with eight requirements, of which two at least must be met by the project in order to obtain that license.
On 16 May 2023, following President El-Sisi chairing of the inaugural meeting of the Supreme Council for Investment, the Council approved 22 recommendations aimed at enhancing Egypt’s business and investment climate (USDoS, 2024[10]). Changes include amendments to the Investment Law, removal of restrictions to foreigners in commercial activities, as well as other reforms such as removing preferential treatment of state‑owned enterprises (SOEs). The Council decisions also led to the amendment of the Golden License significantly expanding its eligibility scope and introduced a suite of new incentives to attract foreign direct investment, particularly in priority industries such as fertilisers, natural gas, petroleum, and other energy sources (USDoS, 2024[10]). In July 2023, President El-Sisi ratified Law No. 160/2023, which amended the Investment Law and further expanded the Golden License programme under GAFI.
To support the program, GAFI developed the “Golden License Guidebook” to inform investors about eligibility conditions and application procedures for the program, encouraging them to apply for the license and its incentives online via the Egyptian Cabinet’s official website (OECD, 2024[2]). In parallel, GAFI launched the Golden License Electronic Platform in November 2023, accessible at www.goldenlicense.gov.eg. Upon implementation, Golden Licenses were mostly awarded to larger firms, but they are now being granted to a broader range of projects. As of February 2026, GAFI has issued 54 Golden Licenses.
Source: General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI); OECD (2024[2]), OECD Economic Surveys: Egypt 2024, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/af900de2-en; USDoS (2024[10]), 2024 Investment Climate Statements: Egypt, https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-investment-climate-statements/egypt/.
Previous efforts to streamline processes have taken place, and work continues to further improve regulatory procedures around the procurement of licenses and permits which remain complex, and prevailing regulations shielded incumbent firms from foreign competition (OECD, 2020[3]). Since 2022, the government has expanded business-related reforms and the use of the Golden License to better facilitate setting up and expanding businesses, including expedited approvals, tax exemptions and reductions, and enhanced access to government services. These measures aim to reduce bureaucratic hurdles and accelerate project implementation. It has also enacted measures allowing for more facilitation of investment procedures through the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) and the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI), among other government entities. In response to these challenges, in 2023, the Egyptian Government has taken steps to address the complex governance structure, overlapping laws, and multiple incentive‑granting bodies which challenged foreign investors’ ability to navigate and benefit from tax and non-tax incentives (OECD, 2024[2]). Since 2023, the Egyptian Government has taken steps towards removing preferential treatment for domestic investors, lifting restrictions on foreign ownership in several activities and granting more tax incentives to foreign investors. The government, in collaboration with the IMF, is also working on compiling a list of investment incentives it grants across different activities and sectors to assess and evaluate their effectiveness. In 2023, Law no. 160 was issued amending several provisions of the Investment Law No. 72 of 2017 to enhance the accessibility, flexibility, and impact of both general and special incentives. A new article added to the Investment law (11 bis) grants a cash investment incentive of 35‑55% of the value of taxes paid on income generated by qualifying industrial activities, provided that at least 50% of the investment is financed in foreign currency. This incentive is disbursed within 45 days of tax filing and is not considered taxable income.
To address licensing complexity, GAFI has initiated a licensing reform delivery programme combining (i) process re‑engineering of licensing procedures (simplifying steps, standardising requirements, and reducing processing time variability across authorities) and (ii) end-to‑end digital enablement through unified platforms. In parallel, the Economic Entities Platform1 is being implemented to integrate key entity lifecycle services (establishment, licensing, and post-establishment actions) and strengthening interoperability with competent authorities and core registries – supporting more predictable, transparent, and investor-oriented service delivery.
A number of tax reforms were introduced in an attempt to create a more transparent and investor-friendly business environment such as the replacement of multiple fees charged by various government agencies with a single unified additional tax on net profits to simplify the fee structure (expected to be 3% to 5% according to Cabinet statement. Egypt’s 2025 tax reform package (Laws No. 5, 6, and 7) introduced measures aimed at supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) with annual revenues up to EGP 20 million.
As part of Egypt’s broader strategy to improve the business climate and enhance investor confidence, the government – through the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI) – accelerated the digital transformation with automation of investor services, establishing a unified electronic platform that facilitates investors’ access to licenses and approvals. As of Feb 2026, the platform provides 566 services, including licenses, approvals, and permits required to conduct economic activities in Egypt. The fees can be paid electronically for 360 services, with ongoing work to the availability.
To further attract private capital, Egypt has revamped its investment institutional ecosystem by strengthening its investment promotion agency, GAFI, and establishing Special Economic Zones (SEZs), in addition to the investment zones, free zones and technological zones created by the Investment Law. SEZs operate with greater autonomy and offer specific incentives such as tax breaks and simplified regulations to create an investor-friendly landscape (see Box 3.2 on the Suez Canal Economic Zone). Meanwhile, GAFI plays a central role in investment facilitation and promotion by providing information to potential investors, facilitating interactions with government entities, and offering tailored incentives.
Inaugurated in 2015, the SCZone is a special economic zone spanning the 455km2 along the eastern and western banks of the Suez Canal. Since its establishment, it has served as one of the main projects driving economic growth and attracting foreign investment to Egypt. The USD 8.6 billion project is designed to upgrade and expand the 156‑year‑old waterway to increase global trade flows through six maritime ports, boost industrial growth and green hydrogen capabilities, and modernise Egypt’s economy.
Expanding Egypt’s renewable energy potential: Green Hydrogen
Egypt has been actively pursuing a comprehensive renewable energy agenda as part of its Green Investment Plan, focussing on green hydrogen. Despite the SCZone’s geopolitical, strategic, and economic importance as an investment hub, global macroeconomic disruptions and rising interest rates have led to capital fluctuations.
Investment incentives
Designed as a one‑stop-shop for foreign investors, the SCZone offers favourable conditions for foreign developers and private investors through mechanisms like the Golden License programme as well as through incentives stipulated in the Special Economic Zones Law (Law No. 83/2002) and Investment Law (Law No. 72/2017).
Although each special economic zone operates under a distinct customs and tax framework set by its board of directors and approved by the Minister of Finance, the Special Economic Zones Law outlines certain privileges, guarantees, and protections (e.g. safeguards against nationalisation), as well as exemptions for companies established and operating in these zones. For instance, regarding taxes, Special Economic Zones Law offers reduced corporate tax rates, exemptions from sales and indirect taxes, and duty-free importation of equipment, tools, raw materials, and intermediate goods.
Meanwhile, Egypt’s Investment Law establishes rules for domestic and foreign investments across four regimes: inland investment, investment zones, technological zones, and free zones. The SCZone’s special investment regime, combined with its diversified infrastructure project portfolio – which includes maritime ports, industrial zones, water treatment complexes, green hydrogen plants – reflects Egypt’s commitment to attracting sustainability-focussed investments. The range of infrastructure, commercial, and industrial projects in the SCZone is expected to contribute to local development efforts by creating an estimated 1 million jobs and residential complexes supporting nearly 2 million residents.
Previously, all foreign investors, were subject to a security screening and needed to obtain government approval on a case‑by case basis (OECD, 2024[2]), but this process was streamlined in 2023 for foreigners, limiting it to ten days, after which approval is automatically granted if no impeding issues are identified by Prime Ministerial Decree No. 1889 of 2023 which introduced a predictable timeline for security clearance procedures for foreign shareholders (OECD, 2024[2]).
One of the most pressing challenges facing investors in Egypt, however, relates to restrictions and barriers to investment in specific sectors – especially with regards to foreign ownership and land use. Sector-specific legislation imposes limitations on foreign-controlled firms’ entry and operations as well as restrictions on foreign ownership in a variety of sectors, ranging from maritime and air transport, construction and civil aviation to tourism services (OECD, 2020[3]; 2024[2]). For example, Egypt’s 1992 Construction Law (Law No. 104/1992) and 1998 Maritime Law (Law No. 1/1998) restricts foreign investment in these sectors to joint ventures with foreign equity not exceeding 49% and further restricts foreign participation in certain construction services to projects over USD 10 million (OECD, 2020[3]). Additionally, previous regulations stipulated importers had to be Egyptian nationals, but this restriction was later amended in FY 2023/24.
In November 2024, GAFI published the Unified Negative List of FDI Restrictions (GAFI, n.d.[11]), which outlines restrictions imposed on foreign investment in specific sectors of a special nature. This includes ensuring reviewing by all relevant authorities and the Cabinet of Ministers’ Advisory Board to ensure legal and regulatory alignment; and publishing them in Arabic and English on both GAFI’s official website and the Invest in Egypt platform.
Other recent legislative reforms include:
Law No. 173 of 2023 (Amending the Importers’ Register Law No. 121 of 1982) allows non-Egyptian majority ownership in companies registered in the Importers’ Register, which was previously limited to companies with at least 51% Egyptian ownership. Companies can remain on the register for up to 10 years, extendable once for an additional 10 years by decision of the Council of Ministers.
Law No. 11 of 2024 (Amending the Desert Lands Law No. 143 of 1981) grants foreign investors the right to own desert land for the first time, removing a longstanding barrier to land ownership. It resolves the inconsistency between the previous Desert Lands Law and Article 55 of Investment Law No. 72 of 2017, which guarantees all investors the right to acquire real estate to establish or expand their projects without discrimination. It also clarifies that foreign investors may now acquire land without being subject to Egyptian ownership thresholds, provided the land is used to conduct or expand business under the Investment Law.
Prime Ministerial Decree No. 1889 of 2023 introduced a more predictable timeline for security clearance procedures for foreign shareholders. The decree stipulates that relevant authorities must issue a security opinion within 10 working days; if no response is received within this period, implicit approval is assumed; and if approval is denied, GAFI or the Financial Regulatory Authority (FRA) must be officially notified to take appropriate action.
Presidential Decree No. 128 of 2022 exempts the cities of Sharm el-Sheikh, Dahab and the Gulf of Aqaba Tourist Area from the provisions of the Integrated Development Law in the Sinai Peninsula. Through GAFI as the facilitator of the approval chain, this decree intends to provide more flexible rules for land disposition and corporate structuring in these investment zones, while ensuring that national security and strategic oversight remain. It enables long-term arrangements of up to 75 years, recognises the ownership of constructed facilities by investors, and defines the roles of defense and intelligence authorities in approving investment-related transactions.
Source: Egyptian GAFI.
Egypt’s level of restrictiveness has continued to decline, reflecting steady progress in liberalising its investment regime. Egypt’s level of FDI restrictiveness in sectors such as construction, maritime, aviation and transportation remains higher than the OECD average as illustrated in Figure 3.2, Panel A (OECD, 2025[12]). These restrictions and regulatory barriers may stem from national security concerns, economic sovereignty policies, or the protection of domestic industries. When comparing to select regional peers such as Morocco, Algeria and Jordan, Egypt maintains relatively lower restrictions in most sectors, yet its construction sector remains an outlier with the highest level of regulatory constraints in the region. Figure 3.2, Panel 3, further underscores the extent of Egypt’s regulatory restrictiveness from a policy perspective.
Among select OECD economies and emerging markets in 2021, Egypt imposes particularly stringent foreign equity limitations, surpassing the levels observed by most countries bar Libya, the Palestinian Authority, the Philippines, and Jordan. While certain regulatory measures are intended to safeguard strategic industries and maintain state influence over key assets, the broader implications included reduced investor confidence, constrained capital inflows, and a less competitive business environment. Although Egypt’s overall FDI restrictiveness remains above both the OECD and non-OECD averages, its economy is not substantially closed compared to other observed countries.
There have been a number of reforms that the Government of Egypt has undertaken since 2015 but particularly since 2023 geared towards creating a conducive business environment. These reforms can be seen in the revised 2 017 investment law as well as legislative changes to the several laws including the Bankruptcy Law, Companies Law and Customs Law (OECD, 2024[2]). However, some sector-specific legislation imposes foreign equity restrictions and limits the entry and operations of foreign-controlled firms, particularly in sectors like civil aviation and tourism transportation (OECD, 2024[2]). In 2024 Egypt agreed with the International Finance Corporation (IFC) to offer 11 airports to the private sector for management and operation through PPPs opening the aviation sector to long term private investment.
Note: The OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index (FDIRRI) assesses regulatory restrictions in 22 economic sectors, categorised into four policy areas: 1) foreign equity limits; 2) screening and approval; 3) restrictions on key foreign personnel; and 4) other restrictions. Other important aspects of the investment climate (e.g. regulatory transparency, state monopolies, and any preferential treatment for selected investors, such as treaty-covered investors or those in special economic zones), as well as measures implemented for protecting the public order and essential security interests are not considered. Each policy measure is scored on a scale from 0 (fully open to FDI) to 1 (fully closed). The discriminatory nature of measures, i.e. when they apply to foreign investors only, is the central criterion for scoring a measure.
Source: OECD (2026[13]), OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index database and OECD estimations.
Access to land for investment projects can involve multiple competent authorities and procedures that vary by land type and location, with approximately 90 to 95% of the land being state‑owned, with over 40 laws and executive decrees dictating which government entities oversee specific lands, the conditions under which land can be disposed of, and who has the authority to decide on land use (OECD, 2020[3]). Restrictions on foreign ownership of land exist in agricultural and desert zones, border regions, and the Sinai Peninsula, although some projects in the Sinai are permitted so long as an Egyptian entity maintains a minimum 55% stake (OECD, 2024[2]). For example, Egypt’s Sinai Law (Law No. 14/2012), restricts real estate ownership in the Sinai to Egyptian individuals and fully Egyptian-owned companies, but allows foreign individuals and companies to obtain usufruct rights for a period of up to 75 years for investment or economic development, contingent upon obtaining various government approvals. Presidential Decree No. 128 was issued in 2022 exempting the cities of Sharm el-Sheikh, Dahab and the Gulf of Aqaba Tourist Area from the provisions of the Integrated Development Law in the Sinai Peninsula (General Authority for Investment and Free Zone of Egypt, 2025[14]). This decree introduces more flexible rules for land disposition and corporate structuring in high-potential investment zones, while securing national security and strategic oversight. The decree defines the roles of defence and intelligence authorities in approving investment-related transactions. It also reassigns application review and supervision responsibilities to GAFI and other competent authorities for the facilitation of investment in South Sinai.
The complexity and ambiguity surrounding land investment regulations in Egypt can affect greenfield investment. Cabinet Decree No. 2067 of 2022, the committee chaired by the Industrial Development Authority (IDA), with membership from the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA), the Ministry of Local Development and GAFI was formed to facilitate the immediate allocation of serviced industrial land to investors once the required documents and conditions are fulfilled.
The Industrial Development Authority manages industrial land allocation through the Egypt Industrial Digital Platform, which provides real-time access to available land plots. The platform presents detailed information for each parcel, including city, co‑ordinates, area, activity type, service connections, price per square metre, and the applicable disposal system (ownership or usufruct).
Prime Ministerial Decree No. 1670 of 2024 sets out procedures and payment options under the ownership-usufruct system. This decree introduced two payment models for ownership (including grace periods and instalment options) and clarified terms for usufruct agreements of up to 50 years, renewable under the Investment Law and other relevant statutes.
As of March 2023, foreign investors have been able to obtain Egyptian citizenship through Prime Ministerial Decree No. 876, which amended the 2019 Decree No. 3099, streamlining the citizenship application process (USDoS, 2024[10]). Investors who make an investment (e.g. purchase of state‑owned or private assets) of over USD 300 000 or a non-refundable deposit of a similar amount to the Egyptian Treasury are eligible for citizenship (OECD, 2024[2]). In theory, obtaining citizenship would indirectly enable foreign investors to bypass certain investment restrictions that apply to foreigners, such as the ownership of agricultural land – which is subject to certain conditions such as adherence to sustainable agricultural projects. However, it remains uncertain whether this citizenship would permit land purchases in restricted areas (OECD, 2024[2]). In any case, this solution is not viable for many. Other avenues for obtaining permanent residency include establishing an investment project, either solo or joint, worth at least USD 350 000 with a USD 100 000 deposit at the Central Bank, or by making a non-refundable deposit of USD 250 000 (USDoS, 2024[10]). Alternatively, investors can also make a refundable USD 500 000 deposit in a zero‑interest account at an Egyptian bank, which is returned in local currency after three years (USDoS, 2024[10]).
SOEs play a large role in the Egyptian economy. The socialist-oriented policies that followed independence in 1952 led to the nationalisation of natural resources and strategic assets, resulting in increases in public spending on sectors including health, education, and infrastructure to further industrialise the nation (Raballand et al., 2015[15]). While Egypt underwent a period of economic liberalisation, known as Infitah or “Open Door Policy,” starting in 1974 and adopted several reforms in the subsequent decades, the state’s role in the economy remains prominent. These SOEs operate across various sectors such as electricity, aviation, banking, housing, petroleum, agriculture, textiles, chemicals, mining, transport, construction, tourism, pharmaceuticals, and food processing.
SOEs traditionally own and manage all infrastructure assets in Egypt. Recently the private sector has been involved in public infrastructure through PPPs and operation and maintenance arrangements. Over the years, SOEs have faced challenges in financing and operations, prompting the government to implement a comprehensive reform programme as part of its broader national economic reform agenda, with support from the IMF program. As these reforms are implemented, the need for larger investment in infrastructure to preserve existing assets and create new ones highlights the need to enable private investment in infrastructure, in collaboration with the SOEs, and to expedite the restructuring of SOEs to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of infrastructure assets.
The Egyptian Government fully recognises the large presence of SOEs in economic activity in Egypt, which is not an objective in itself. Rather, it reflects the aim to achieve social, strategic, and economic goals of the country, where and if necessary, and the objective to end this involvement when the goals are met. The recurring crises that the Egyptian economy has experienced necessitated, at times, the State’s involvement in protecting Egyptian citizens from the crises’ implications.
Following the 2011 revolution, the State expanded its economic presence to stabilise the economy amid low growth, declining FDI and tourism, rising unemployment, and balance‑of-payment pressures. Building on this, the government adopted three main directions to restore growth and resilience, which included injecting government investments to support economic activity; implementing national projects to stimulate growth and launching structural economic reforms to improve competitiveness and advance sustainable development.
To address the strong presence of SOEs in the economy, Egypt is embarking on several reforms to reduce SOEs influence and to transition from previously established benefits to SOEs in the domestic market that include preferential treatment and certain privileges bestowed upon them, which include exemptions from income tax, real-estate tax and VAT as well as exemptions from paying fees, fines, or service charges (Thiemann, 2024[16]). SOEs comprise of different types of legal forms where the state may have an ownership stake and include public business sector companies, public sector companies, joint venture (JV) companies, and companies in which the military has an ownership stake.
As part of the national reform programme, Egypt has committed to policies that promote private sector investment by reducing the privileges granted to SOEs, such as preferential tax treatment and exemptions from legal requirements (Saleh and Cotterill, 2024[17]). Additionally, the government has pledged and is implementing reforms to expand private sector investment in the economy aiming to create new investment opportunities and increase employment as part of this programme (Government of Egypt, Ministry of Finance, 2025[18]).This includes removing non-tax preferential treatment as well which includes SOEs’ preferential access to land, subsidised energy, and “soft loans” from state‑owned banks that private competitors cannot access.
Law No. 159/2023 was issued, aiming to revoke the preferential treatment applied to SOEs, excluding military-owned firms or companies engaged in military actions and activities necessary for defence, national security, and basic utility services (Thiemann, 2024[16]). This measure reflects the broader rationale of the law, which aims to promote competitive neutrality. SOEs that do not engage in economic activities remain outside the scope of the decree, consistent with their non-commercial role. Exemptions may also continue to apply where justified by national security, ensuring that essential public functions are preserved without undermining the overall objective of competitive neutrality (Government of Egypt, Ministry of Finance, 2025[19]).
In implementation of the 2023 law, the government has committed to publishing a report on institutional changes and procedures to secure the collection of taxes from SOEs, in addition to the amount collected as a result of the removal of special tax privilege from each type of tax (CIT, VAT, other), and projected collections on these taxes in FY2025/26 (IMF 2025). In October 2025, the Minister of Finance announced that a total of EGP 67.3 billion in various taxes has been paid by SOEs for 2 024 in the first implementation of Law 159 (Ministry of Finance, 2025[20]).
This legislation was coupled with a new State Ownership Policy (SOP) –first introduced in December 2 022 and subsequently updated as part of its implementation progress in 2024 and 2025 (Government of Egypt, 2023[21]). The SOP sets out the government’s rationale for state‑ownership in broad terms, outlining reasons to reduce, maintain or even increase the state’s share in specific activities, specifically for strategic reasons. Beyond national defence, “strategic” activities include activities in sectors like agriculture and food processing, energy, housing, transport, publishing, education and health. At the end of 2025, an update was presented to the Supreme Committee on the Implementation of the State Ownership Policy which is still under review and consultation until its launch at the end of the first quarter of 2026.
In addition to defining the role of the government in the economy and each sector, the SOP outlines a divestment programme featuring several models for divestment. The policy also includes indicators to measure the private sector’s expansion in the economy and economic activity, such as its contributions to investment, employment, credit growth and exports. The government also agreed with the IMF to establish an indicator related to divestment from entities present in the non-strategic sectors identified in the SOP (Government of Egypt, 2025[22]). The government aims to increase the private sector’s share of total investment to 70% by 2030 (Government of Egypt, 2026[23]).
The State Ownership Policy document represents a strategic framework aimed at strengthening the role of the private sector in the economy and achieving a balance between public and private investments, thereby supporting economic growth. To monitor progress in implementing this policy and ensure the achievement of its intended objectives, the Information and Decision Support Center has developed in co‑ordination with the IMF a performance index to track implementation outcomes, attract investment, and identify gaps that require corrective action. The performance index is a quantitative index issued on a semi‑annual basis and is composed of three main pillars: monitoring the implementation of the document, progress in improving the business climate and overall economic impact.
Source: Egyptian Cabinet (2025[24]), State Ownership Policy Implementation Performance Index – Issue 1, https://www.idsc.gov.eg/Official%20Documentation/details/11157.
The annual SOE report published in August 2025 indicated that there are 561 companies distributed among 18 sectors and owned by 45 different government entities, including some governorates (Government of Egypt, 2025[22]) Around 31% of SOEs in the database are in the manufacturing sector, 13% are in administrative and support services, 17% in financial, insurance, and real estate sector, 9% in transport and storage, 7% in retail and wholesale trade, 6.7% in construction and 6.6% in CIT sectors. Four ministries including the Ministry of Public Business Sector, Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, through the National Investment Bank (NIB), Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Communities and Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade own 57% of SOEs in the database. According to the report, the state holds majority ownership of 75% or more in 257 companies (46% of total number of companies) and 65% of SOEs are profitable. A 2024 World Bank study notes that 72% of the SOEs in Egypt operate in competitive sectors, which is the highest percentage among peer economies in the region (Morocco, Oman, Jordan, Djibouti, Tunisia), indicating overlap between SOE activity and areas typically served by the private sector raising competitive neutrality concerns (World Bank, 2024[25]). The Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) was established under Law No. 3/2005 on the Protection of Competition and the Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices to monitor the market and regulate large economic players, but it was often unable to fully regulate or control mergers or market consolidation, particularly concerning SOEs (OECD, 2024[2]). Recently, the ECA law and executive regulations were amended, empowering the ECA to enhance its monitoring capabilities and its ability to block monopolistic practices and alliances, whether they occur domestically or involve international entities with a local presence. ECA approval is now necessary prior to conclusion of mergers or acquisitions in the Egyptian market.
Another policy that Egypt could pursue is asset recycling of infrastructure assets, which would sell profitable brownfield, mature assets to finance greenfield infrastructure assets, which could lead to quicker financial opportunities.
At the end of 2024, the government announced plans to accelerate the divestment process and is preparing several companies in multiple sectors for full or partial sales. These sales are intended to occur either through initial public offerings (IPOs) on the stock market or direct transactions with strategic investors. Among the companies identified for divestment, at least four are owned by the military.
The State Ownership Policy outlined three main forms of future state involvement in SOEs: i) remain in sector while maintaining or reducing public investments; ii) remain in sector while maintaining or increasing public investments; and iii) exit the sector within three to five years. The August 2025 SOP update indicated the government intends to exit (within three to five years) 12 companies, reduce or maintain ownership in 16 companies, and maintain or increase ownership in 7 companies. The government has set out several models for divestment:
full privatisation or sale of a majority stake to a strategic investor or in the stock market via an initial public offering (IPO)
offering a minority stake up to 45% of the company to a strategic investor or in the stock market
capital increase offered to the private sector to dilute public sector ownership
self-financed improvement of the company without involving an investor, for an interim phase as preparation for partnership with the private sector
establish new companies [special purpose vehicles (SPVs)] to manage the execution of improvement or development projects
merge with sister companies
execute projects with the private sector that do not include a direct sale, e.g. revenue share agreements or management contracts
liquidation as a last resort if other options fail or are not possible.
The State Ownership Policy identifies partnerships with private sector investors as the preferred method of divestment, particularly in key infrastructure or strategic sectors where maintaining government control is essential. Most state‑owned entities will likely be sold to strategic investors. A number of SOEs, however, will require significant financing for new projects that involve technology transfer. In such cases, capital increases from the private sector are prioritised. For example, Aluminium Company is seeking partnership with private sector investors who have technical expertise for a project to double the current capacity 320 tons/year to reach 600 tons/year within an estimated capital expenditure of USD 1 billion.
For distressed firms in strategic sectors, such as those involved in import substitution or state‑owned hotels which face substantial debt burdens, state preference will be given to specialised international investors. These distressed firms would then be restructured through the creation of a new company, or special purpose vehicle (SPV) designed to introduce both technical and financial capacities. Each case will be evaluated on a case‑by-case basis.
The Supreme Committee for SOP Implementation, chaired by the Prime Minister, was established in the Cabinet to oversee the update and implementation of the SOP. The Cabinet’s Information and Decision Support Centre (IDSC) collaborated with the Committee and other government entities to develop a unified database of all SOEs. This database aims to support divestment programme and improve governance of SOEs to analyse the data and determine the government’s role in these companies. The World Bank and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) are serving as the government’s strategic advisors. The IFC, in particular, is collaborating with the Government of Egypt on the privatisation of the majority of all state‑owned airports through long-term partnerships with the private sector, aiming to attract greater investment and improve operational efficiency.
In February 2023, a list of 32 companies was announced to offer their shares either through public listings on the stock exchange, to strategic investors, or via a combination of both, starting from the first quarter of 2023 to the end of the first half of 2024. The list included companies spanning several sectors including banking, insurance, energy, and petrochemicals. The initial timeline for execution was postponed from June 2023 to June 2024. In August 2023, three additional companies were added to the list: the Eastern Company for Tobacco, the Arab Company for Pharmaceuticals and Chemical Industries (ACDIMA), and the Egyptian Company for Tourism Resorts.
Divestment efforts are also taking place through the Sovereign Fund of Egypt. According to the SOP August 2025 update report, between March 2022 and February 2024, stakes in 13 companies were offered for sale in collaboration with the Sovereign Fund for a total value of USD 5.1 billion. The sale included a portfolio of seven historic government-owned hotels and shares in six listed companies. The following phase of the divestment programme targeted exits from assets including a wind farm, two banks and 4 companies with some transactions executed and others still in the pipeline. Three transactions were executed until mid‑2025, including a stake in a company for USD 0.625 billion in October 2023 and stakes in a bank and a company for USD 0.142 billion until 2025, raising total divestment proceeds in the period March 2022 to June 2025 to USD 5.862 billion from 16 companies. This compares with the target of USD 12.2 billion from the divestment of 23 companies, banks and assets. The government will also hire investment advisors for a subset of the deals, the completion of which will signal concrete progress toward achieving their divestment goals according to the agreed benchmarks under the ongoing IMF reviews (IMF, 2025[26]). It is also working with the IFC to complete the first of several transactions to offer concessions in 11 airports, in addition to other transactions. The government is expected to generate an additional USD 3 billion from divestment until the end of the IMF reviews by the end of 2026.
Law no 170 of 2025 on Regulating State Ownership in Companies marks a milestone in the implementation of the State Ownership Policy and the broader agenda to strengthen private sector participation in Egypt’s economy. This legislative framework regulates implementation of a system to govern the presence of state‑owned companies in economic activity according to specific criteria and determining the most appropriate paths for divestment or partnership with the private sector. The law relates to companies that are wholly or partially owned by any public entity and the companies that are wholly or partially owned by these state‑owned companies or any stakes in companies. The law does not apply to stakes owned by public insurance companies or companies that have a strategic or national objective as specified by a Cabinet decree.
Key provisions of Law no 170 of 2025 include:
The Gatekeeper Clause: Government entities and economic authorities are legally prohibited from establishing or investing in any company operating in activities the state has decided to exit.
Mandatory Approval: Even for sectors where the state remains, entities must not establish or invest in any company unless they receive written authorisation from the Central Unit.
Monitoring & Compliance: The Companies Register and GAFI are mandated to monitor compliance during the company registration process and must notify the Unit of any violations.
Binding Authority: The Unit’s recommendations, once approved by the Cabinet, are binding on all relevant entities.
The law also establishes a centralised unit within the Cabinet to implement the State Ownership Policy according to specific binding plans and schedules in co‑ordination with the entity that owns the SOE to ultimately encourage the private sector in economic activity, develop and improve SOEs, based on sector and market studies, take inventory, monitor, and propose timelines for state withdrawal from selected sectors, while ensuring a clear separation between ownership and management. Recommendations of the unit are presented to the Economic Ministerial Committee before referral to the Cabinet and once approved by the latter the recommendations are binding to the relevant entities and state representatives. Government entities and economic authorities should refrain from establishing any company unless authorised in writing by the unit based on market studies that justify establishment of a new entity and on the categorisation of the SOP for the role of government in any given sector. Relevant entities such as the Companies Register and GAFI should monitor adherence to these regulations when companies are being created and should notify the unit of any violation. In October 2025 the Prime Minister appointed the head of the SOEs Unit and it has commenced its operations.
According to Law 170 the State‑Owned Enterprises Unit will be responsible for:
implementing the State Ownership Policy according to specific plans and targets and monitoring adherence of government entities to their relevant plans
preparing periodical reports on progress with the implementation of the SOP to be presented to the Cabinet
proposing the suitable methods to encourage the private sector according to sectoral needs and the appropriate legal frameworks, amending them if needed
proposing legal frameworks, procedures, and strategic plans to improve performance and maximise returns on state‑owned assets
developing a comprehensive database of all state‑owned enterprises (SOEs) and identifying the economic feasibility justifying continued state ownership in addition to preparing detailed reports and information memoranda for each company to guide strategic decisions and attract potential investors or partners
classifying SOEs into categories: retention and development, maximising returns, or partial or full divestment, in line with State Ownership Policy in co‑ordination with the owning entities and preparing annual lists of potential divestments according to the sectoral studies, identifying the method of divestment and of merging SOEs if needed for efficiency objectives
proposing legal frameworks, procedures, and strategic plans to improve performance and maximise returns on state‑owned assets
defining governance standards and recommending board restructuring plans to ensure effective implementation of SOP plans while monitoring the performance of executive teams against quantitative targets
evaluating company performance based on key performance indicators (KPIs)
endorsing the choice of investment banks and financial advisors identified to manage transactions in co‑ordination with the owning entities. Reviewing the analytical bases for fair value assessments prepared by independent financial advisors in accordance with domestic and international standards
co‑ordinating with the relevant entities to implement the societal community engagement strategy to increase awareness about the SOP and its plans.
In February 2026, a Cabinet change abolished the Ministry of Public Business Enterprises, moving the supervision of holding companies and their affiliate SOEs to the newly appointed Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs who oversees the restructuring of economic authorities. The Deputy PM and the SOE Unit are responsible for monitoring the SOEs restructuring and divestment according to the newly revised SOP and SOE reform plans. Future ownership arrangements should aim to align with the internationally accepted OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State‑Owned Enterprises.
The updated second edition of the State Ownership Policy document is being reviewed by the Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly, to enhance the role of the private sector in promoting sustainable economic growth, job creation, and competitiveness. It includes divestment and restructuring of state‑owned entities, implementing asset governance, and introducing integrated institutional frameworks for monitoring and evaluation (Government of Egypt, 2026[27]).
Integrity of processes and governance can lead to trust in infrastructure projects and avoid adverse downstream effects such as misappropriation of resources, delays, inflated project costs, and ultimately poor-quality infrastructure (Zhang et al., 2023[28]). Systemic factors can compromise integrity and contribute to low levels of trust in government and the rule of law, raising the level of uncertainty and its negative impact on the business climate (Schoeberlein, 2019[29]). In general, a lack of transparency will result in uncertainty of processes and costs and will manifest as a negative factor for investors.
Since its launch in 2016, Egypt Vision 2030 (Government of Egypt, Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, 2023[30]) has placed an emphasis on promoting integrity, good governance, and transparency through institutional reforms and strengthening its anti-corruption framework, as well as governance and partnerships. Through participatory decision making at both the national and local levels, it aims to combat corruption and improve citizens’ services. Key measures include the adoption of the Civil Service Law (Law No. 81/2016), the 2017 Investment Law, and legislation such as the Prevention of Conflict of Interest Law and the expansion of the Administrative Control Authority’s (ACA) mandate to include corruption prevention in the public sector (OECD, 2020[3]). Other initiatives include judicial reform, developing social accountability systems, automation of services to reduce corruption in addition to the establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Academy to train civil servants and raise awareness about transparency and integrity in public service delivery, the digitisation of public services, and the creation of Investment Service Centres to improve efficiency and transparency for investors (OECD, 2020[3]).
At the end of 2022, the Egyptian state launched the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (2023‑2030), which was based on five strategic objectives:
1. An efficient and effective administrative body that provides distinguished services to citizens and investors
2. A legislative and judicial structure that supports the fight against corruption and achieves speedy justice
3. Anti-corruption and law enforcement agencies
4. A society that is aware of the dangers of corruption and is able to combat it
5. Effective international and regional co‑operation in the fight against corruption
In 2023, the Egyptian Government cracked down on building violations and suspended granting new licenses pending a review of violations, only allowing in early 2024 a reconciliation process of minor violations that can be remediated.2 As part of the new government programme presented by Prime Minister Madbouly to Parliament on 8 July 2024, the government outlined its vision for the period from FY 2024/25 to FY 2026/27. The government programme focusses on four pillars: strengthening national security, enhancing individual well-being, developing a competitive and investment-friendly economy, and promoting political stability and national unity. Consequently, the government vowed to present a new Local Government law (Municipalities Law) to address challenges at the governorate level and issues related to inadequate performance (Abdel Razeq, 2024[31]) as well as tackle pressing issues such as rising prices and inflation, market regulation, and power outages (Government of Egypt, 2024[32]).
This renewed focus on governance and economic reform underscores the importance of efficient public systems in achieving the government’s objectives. One such system is public procurement, which plays a central role in the public investment and development of national infrastructure. Transparency, in the form of publicly available information and data related to a country’s public procurement processes and awards, is crucial for analysts, investors, and other private stakeholders to gauge the prevalence of direct awards and non-competitive bidding and understand how these practices have evolved over time (Youssef, Kumar and Rahman, 2020[33]).
The Ministry of Finance published basic financial statements of the public sector business companies for FY2022/23. In addition, the General Authority for government Services and the Ministry of Finance published on their respective websites an inaugural monthly report in September 2024 of the procurement activity of 31 of the largest economic authorities (EA) and SOEs. For procurement awards from June – August 2024, listing the deals, mode of transaction (direct order/ limited tender, etc.), number of offers submitted, date of checking tenders, award date, selected company, value of tender, duration of contract (IMF, 2025[26]). A public portal is currently being developed under the General Authority of Government Services to enhance transparency in procurement processes. The portal will publish procurement opportunities, award decisions, and procurement plans, and collect information on project benefits and costs, bidder participation, delivery models, pre‑selection criteria, bid evaluation results, and total project cost. Procuring entities are also required to assess risks across the full lifecycle.
As part of the governance and financial restructuring of state entities the government established a committee to reform and restructure economic authorities (EA), working on the portfolio of 59 EAs to increase their efficiency and effectiveness through restructuring to maintain, merge, liquidate or convert into a public authority or holding company. According to the Egyptian Cabinet the committed decided in December 2 025 to maintain 39, liquidate 4, merge 7, and convert 9 EAs into public authorities. The EA budgets have been integrated with the main State Budget under the Unified Budge law as part of the fiscal restructuring reforms.
Based on Cabinet decree No. (739) of 2024, a committee was formed to review the ceiling of public investments and their governance. The ceiling is set by the decree at EGP 1 trillion with the committee compiling investment plans details for FY 2024/25 for all government owned entities at that have ownership of 50% or more to ensure adhere to the ceiling restriction. In addition, this committee is tasked with enumeration, auditing, and following up on the structure and investments in companies. It is headed by the Accountability State Authority (ASA) and includes members from several entities and ministries, including the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development.
Following this Cabinet decree, a Technical Secretariat of the Public Investment Governance Committee was formed (decree number (960) of 2024 issued by the President of the Administrative Control Authority (ACA). The Technical Secretariat is hosted by the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, with members from the Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Finance and ASA, and it meets regularly to enumerate the structure of these companies and follow up on their investments, as this data is now being tracked since July 2024, through the electronic system for Planning and Monitoring at the Ministry.
Since 2015, Thailand has adopted CoST (The Infrastructure Transparency Initiative) Infrastructure Data Standard, which promotes data transparency and disclosure in infrastructure projects. CoST is a cross-government platform that involves other actors including the private sector and civil society in promoting transparency in infrastructure development. It is global initiative with 15 participating countries spanning four continents that aims to improve transparency and accountability in public infrastructure. CoST’s approach features four elements: multi-stakeholder working, disclosure, assurance (i.e. review of disclosed data), and social accountability. CoST’s multi-level approach limits corruption, inefficiency and mismanagement across the project cycle and increases the benefits arising from infrastructure investment. In 2020, Thailand’s Ministry of Finance confirmed USD 360 million in cost savings between 2015 and 2020 as a result of the deterrent effect of the CoST approach. This has led to lower contract prices and a more efficient use of public money. The adoption of CoST Infrastructure Data Standard in Thailand has inhibited misbehaviour in procurement and strengthened bidding competition, as proposals and the delivery of projects are subject to greater scrutiny.
Source: OECD (2021[34]), OECD Implementation Handbook for Quality Infrastructure Investment, https://doi.org/10.1787/479131b2-en.
The Egyptian Competitive Authority (ECA) has been actively enforcing Egypt’s 2005 Competition Law (Law No. 3/2005), investigating public and private operators. In 2017, the ECA conducted its largest investigation into bid-rigging concerning public tenders for governmental and university hospitals, involving seven major suppliers in Egypt specialising in medical equipment for heart and chest surgeries (OECD, 2024[2]). The Central Auditing Organisation (CAO) provides additional oversight, auditing government contracts and procurement post-transaction to ensure adherence to procurement legislation. There is ECA and CAO supervision, both pre‑ and post-transaction, with CAO reports serving as the pending action. Egypt’s Public Contracts Law (Law No. 182/2018) and the law Regulating Partnership with Private Sector in Infrastructure, Services and Public Utilities (Law No. 67/2010) stipulate competitiveness when allocating projects and tenders to public or private counterparts. Under the agreement with the IMF, the CAO reports are to be published within a specific timeframe following the end of the fiscal year to ensure transparency and accountability following the audit of the state entities’ budgets (OECD, 2024[2]).
There are other institutions mandated with similar responsibilities related to oversight, regulation, and management of key sectors, including international trade, governance, and financial systems. These include the Central Agency for Organisation and Administration (CAOA), the General Authority for Financial Supervision, the General Organisation for Export and Import Control (GOEIC), and the National Institute for Governance and Sustainable Development (NIGSD is a para-public economic body under the supervision of the Minister of Planning and Economic Development). While their respective mandates differ and do not primarily focus on anti-corruption efforts, these entities contribute to ensuring compliance with regulations, facilitating trade processes, and supporting governance frameworks across various sectors.
In 2024, the legislation governing economic courts was amended to allow the referral of more commercial disputes to these specialised courts to expedite their resolution.
The revised 2017 Investment Law (Law No. 72/2017) introduced new extrajudicial channels for resolving commercial disputes for both foreign and domestic investors, including mediation (OECD, 2024[2]).
Article 85 established the Ministerial Committee for Investment Disputes Resolution to settle disputes arising between investors and state entities.
Article 88 established the Ministerial Committee for Settlement of Investment Contract Disputes, which focusses on disputes relating specifically to investment contracts to which the state or its affiliated entities are a party.
Articles 83‑84 established the Grievance Committee, tasked with considering grievances submitted by investors against administrative decisions issued under the Investment Law.
Each committee has a specific jurisdiction, and the law was designed to avoid duplication or institutional conflict.
While these channels are supported by the Investment Dispute Resolution and Investment Contracts Dispute Resolution centres within GAFI, including a Grievance Committee, the Egyptian Government also established a Ministerial Committee on Investment Disputes Resolution and another on Investment Contracts Dispute Resolution (OECD, 2024[2]). The introduction of several committees and actors makes it difficult for investors to identify the appropriate acting body, thereby leading to delays in dispute resolution and project overruns (see Box 3.6 for insights on how infrastructure deployment in Chile has been driven by strong institutions, transparent public investment processes, and cost-benefit analysis, with reforms to limit contract renegotiations and strengthen governance). Currently the committees exist to address dispute resolution, but the reinstating of the Ministry of Investment in the July 2024 cabinet overhaul will facilitate communication and dispute resolution with investors.
Since the early 1990s, Chile has successfully deployed infrastructure on a significant scale that has supported rapid economic growth largely by strengthening its institutions and the quality of public administration. The Chilean National Investment System (SNI) has established a number of well-institutionalised processes that ensure value for money and transparency in the use of public investment. One of them is the social cost-benefit analysis (CBA) process that is a core element of project evaluation. Key components of the social cost-benefit analysis process include a simple and clear target rate of return, well-documented methodologies for conducting CBA, and a clear institutional division of roles between project development, evaluation, and approval. In addition, the country has a long history of inter-ministerial committees that bring together government institutions, civil society, experts and others to develop policies with supports from various actors, promoting dialogues between central and local actors.
Chile has also adopted reforms that address the challenge of repeated renegotiations. In 2010, Chile reformed its PPP law in order to make it mandatory to bid out any additional work on a project and prohibit the concessionaire from participating in the new contract. In addition, the law established an independent board, the Panel Técnico de Concesiones (Technical Panel for Concessions), to review renegotiations and resolve conflicts between the contracting authority and the private party. This reform has resulted in a significant reduction in renegotiated cases during the construction phase.
Source: OECD (2021[34]), OECD Implementation Handbook for Quality Infrastructure Investment, https://doi.org/10.1787/479131b2-en.
Several public authorities and ministries are involved in ensuring good governance and public integrity. Institutions like the Administrative Control Authority (ACA) play a central role in monitoring and enforcing anti-corruption measures. The ACA serves as Egypt’s independent general oversight body, exercising administrative, financial, and criminal control over public bodies. It is dedicated to combating corruption, addressing obstacles to justice, co-formulating and implementing national anti-corruption strategies, and raising awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption. There are other institutions mandated with similar responsibilities, granted with varying tasks and specialisation. Lack of centralisation can be counterproductive, as it can create challenges around achieving transparency in administrative policies. Other institutions include the Accountability State Authority (ASA) which focusses primarily on financial oversight and also contributes to the implementation of certain aspects of the national anti-corruption strategies.
According to responses received from the Ministry of Local Development and Environment, the Cabinet of Ministers is taking steps to improve governance and transparency and reduce overlap between agencies. Digitisation efforts are underway to enable better tracking and accountability, further promoting transparency. For instance, a unified digital system has been introduced in the New Administrative Capital to facilitate digitisation and seamless data exchange between ministries. To support these initiatives, collaboration mechanisms have been implemented across institutions. Dedicated units and departments have been established in all ministries, operating under the same governance framework, which is technically supervised by the ACA while remaining administratively accountable to their respective ministries.
As of 2020, public entities are obliged to establish a dedicated governance and compliance unit responsible for internal audits and monitoring of procurement (OECD, 2024[2]). Additionally, under its agreement with the IMF, the Ministry of Finance has started to regularly (i.e. monthly) publish government procurement contracts above EGP 20 million on its website (OECD, 2024[2]). This is in parallel with the releasing of annual reports detailing overdue payments between the Ministry of Finance and public entities within 90 days following the conclusion of each fiscal year (OECD, 2024[2])
Note: The numbering in the recommendation column reflects the numbering applied in list of policy recommendations in Section 1.6.
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← 1. Process re-engineering and the Economic Entities Platform includes: A) Process re-engineering of licensing procedures (BPR), End-to end mapping and simplification, standardised requirements and service design, time and service level standardisation, risk-based controls, digital readiness and automation, inter-agency co-ordination, outcome monitoring.
← 2. In December 2023, the Government of Egypt ratified the Construction Violations Reconciliation Law (Law No. 187/2023), repealing a previous law, Law No. 17/2019, and legalising several categories of informal housing and construction. In line with Law No. 187/2023 and its accompanying executive regulations, the government – through the Ministries of Planning, Economic Development (MPED), Ministry of Housing, Utilities & Urban Communities (MHUUC) and Local Development (MLD)–launched an electronic system for reconciliation in May 2024 that seeks to streamline applications and enhance service delivery.