This chapter assesses the transport infrastructure that could underpin the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), focusing on ports, railways, roads and border-crossing points. It finds that the corridor benefits from significant existing port capacity, extensive road networks and major planned investments in ports and railways across Europe, the Middle East and India. However, major transport challenges remain, notably the absence of seamless rail connections across the Middle East, border-crossing inefficiencies and exposure to maritime chokepoints. Overcoming these constraints will be critical for IMEC to operate as an efficient and resilient multimodal corridor.
Measuring Connectivity across the India‑Middle East‑Europe Corridor
Abstract
The India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) aims at connecting European Union ports in the Mediterranean with ports in West India through inland transport in Middle East countries, bypassing other routes such as the Suez Canal, the Cape of Good Hope and, to a certain extent, the Strait of Hormuz.
Trade in goods is expected to increase among these regions in the coming years, underscoring the importance of increased transport capacity, but also resilience to external shocks. The Suez Canal has long provided a shorter alternative to the Cape of Good Hope route but traffic through the Canal is vulnerable to disruption. The recent blockage of the Strait of Hormuz and the disruptions in the Strait of Bab al-Mandab also underscore the exposure of trade routes to geopolitical disturbances.
Following the signing of the IMEC Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) during the 2023 Indian G20 Presidency, countries have entered into additional agreements seeking to strengthen co-operation and trade. The Inter-Governmental Framework Agreement (IGFA), signed between India and the UAE, seeks to enhance collaboration in the fields of ports, maritime transport, and logistics (Colombo Gazette, 2024). The two countries further agreed on the UAE-India Virtual Trade Corridor, a digital trade initiative launched in 2024 to modernise and simplify bilateral trade. In addition, India agreed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU in January 2026, following almost 20 years of negotiations. Once ratified, the agreement will allow the removal of trade barriers, simplify procedures, strengthen supply chain resilience, and create new trading opportunities (European Commission, 2026[1]).
For the EU, the corridor represents an additional opportunity to diversify its access to energy resources from the Middle East. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent sanctions, the EU has experienced disruptions in oil and gas supply. This, in turn, has driven up electricity prices, affecting overall inflation and industrial output. In 2026, oil and gas supply was further affected after the closure of the Strait of Hormuz following the escalation of the conflict in the region. In this context, IMEC presents a potential solution for the EU to improve access to energy commodities and strengthen supply chain resilience, while benefiting Gulf countries and India by enhancing their connectivity to larger consumer markets.
However, substantial infrastructure gaps must be addressed before its benefits can materialise. The viability of the corridor will depend on how well it can link maritime operations with inland transport, the quality and connectivity of inland transport infrastructure, and its overall logistics performance.
This Chapter provides an overview of the transport infrastructure along IMEC, examining existing assets and planned developments. It identifies key challenges, including fragmented rail networks, port imbalances, and border inefficiencies, while considering the corridor’s broader regional impact. It focuses on nine countries, namely the MoU signatories along the corridor, except the EU and the United States (France, Germany, India, Italy, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), the two non-signatory countries mentioned in the MoU (Israel and Jordan) and Greece. Due to its geographical position, Germany is not extensively covered by this Chapter.
IMEC could largely rely on existing transport infrastructure but further developments would be needed to make it a multimodal, resilient and efficient corridor. Overall, port capacity along the corridor is considerable, however, it should be further increased to avoid potential bottlenecks. Some governments have already announced expansion projects that are expected to strengthen maritime operations and improve network performance but a co-ordinated approach could help address regional imbalances.
Inland transport will play a central role in the corridor but its quality and characteristics vary widely across regions. The EU has a dense and highly interconnected cross-border road and rail network, allowing for seamless transport and enabling Northern European countries, such as Germany, to access IMEC through well‑established logistics chains to the Mediterranean. In India, robust national infrastructure supports transport to and from ports on the country’s west coast and facilitates efficient inland connections.
For IMEC countries in the Middle East, enabling an efficient inland passage presents a twofold challenge. Rail networks are not yet interconnected across borders, limiting the potential for seamless and less carbon-intensive multimodal transport. Regional road infrastructure is in better condition and can support freight movements, but border crossing points remain the most significant barrier to efficient road transport. Security checks, limited processing capacity, back‑to‑back transshipment practices and non‑harmonised documentation undermine the seamless flow of goods. Enhanced co-operation will be essential to improve connectivity and strengthen logistics performance across the inland segment of the corridor.
Maritime transport
Maritime connectivity and installed capacity
IMEC’s maritime dimension relies on two shipping corridors. One route connects Southern Europe with ports in the Levant, while the second provides onward links from the Arabian Peninsula to India’s west coast. Together, these maritime segments account for more than half of the corridor’s total length, and their efficiency will highly depend on the ports they connect (see Annex 3.A for data on 20 ports relevant to IMEC).
India has the strongest maritime container activity and port capacity among IMEC participants, followed by the UAE and Italy, according to UNCTAD’s revised Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI). This indicator reflects a country’s integration into container global maritime networks, available Twenty-foot-Equivalent Units (TEU) capacity and the size of vessels that a country´s ports can accommodate (UNCTAD, 2026a). Figure 3.1 provides the LSCI evolution of the countries, including Germany. Jordan ranks lowest on this indicator; however, its role in maritime transport within IMEC is expected to remain limited, despite Aqaba port’s growing role. This boost in trade in the Gulf of Aqaba could also have benefits for the port of Eilat. Israel follows with a relatively lower liner shipping connectivity, reflecting fewer scheduled container ship calls and lower annual deployed container capacity. However, the ports of Haifa and Ashdod, with spare capacity and planned expansion, are key Mediterranean gateways to the corridor’s inland section.
2006 = 100, IMEC subsample
Source: UNCTAD, 2026.
Port-level connectivity and performance are captured by the Port Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (PLSCI) and the Container Port Performance Index (CPPI) (UNCTAD, 2026b; World Bank, 2025). While the PLSCI mirrors the LSCI at the port level, the CPPI provides a specific assessment of ship turnaround times at ports (see Box 3.1 for more detailed information). Relevant ports in IMEC can be grouped into four categories:
Piraeus (Greece), Khalifa (UAE), and Mundra (India) stand out as well-connected, with high container capacity and operational efficiency.
Dammam (Saudi Arabia), Genoa and Pra’ (Italy), Jebel Ali (UAE), and Marseille-Fos (France) exhibit strong connectivity and substantial TEU capacity but do not score as well on efficiency according to the CPPI. The World Bank identifies modern terminal equipment, increased handling capacity and improved multimodal links as key factors that typically contribute to higher CPPI performance.
Haifa (Israel), Jubail (Saudi Arabia), Mumbai (India), and Savona Vado Ligure (Italy) show lower connectivity to global container liner shipping networks but relatively strong efficiency levels. This combination suggests an opportunity for these ports, as efficient operations could enable them to attract additional investment and transport activity through emerging transport corridors such as IMEC.
Other ports like Ashdod (Israel), Kandla (India), Thessaloniki (Greece) and Trieste (Italy) rank relatively lower in both indices.
The Liner Shipping Connectivity Index and the Port Liner Shipping Connectivity Index measure how well countries and individual ports are integrated into global liner shipping networks. Both indices are useful for policymakers as diagnostic tools to determine connectivity gaps, conduct competitiveness analysis, and inform infrastructure planning. They are built considering the following components: the number of scheduled ship calls per week, total scheduled annual deployed capacity, the number of regular liner shipping services, the number of liner shipping companies that provide services, the size of the largest ship deployed, and the number of other countries (or ports) connected to the country.
The Container Port Performance Index measures the time container ships spend in ports, serving as a valuable proxy variable for port efficiency. It is also very useful for competitiveness and sustainability assessments, as turnaround times provide a closer look into logistics costs and greenhouse gas emissions. The index is based on granular Automatic Identification System (AIS) data, combined with operational information on port calls and vessel characteristics.
It should be noted that these indicators primarily capture containerised maritime transport and container-vessel operations and therefore do not provide a comprehensive picture of a port's connectivity or performance across all types of maritime cargo. In particular, other segments of maritime transport, including dry bulk, liquid bulk, energy cargoes, general cargo and, where applicable, Ro-Ro traffic, are not fully reflected in these measures. This is particularly relevant for multipurpose ports that handle a diverse range of cargoes. Consequently, these indicators should be interpreted as measures of container liner shipping connectivity and container-port performance. There are currently no similarly established, internationally comparable indicators providing an equivalent measure of connectivity across other cargo segments.
Source: UNCTAD, 2026a, 2026b; World Bank, 2025
The installed container port capacity highlights notable imbalances between regions (Figure 3.2):
In the Mediterranean, the combined total annual container capacity of the European ports of Genoa and Pra’, Marseille, Piraeus, Thessaloniki, Trieste and Savona Vado Ligure equals 16.5 million TEU per year. Israel’s ports of Ashdod and Haifa have a combined capacity of 5.7 million TEU. It should be noted that the European figure is concentrated in a relatively small number of multi-purpose ports: while Piraeus and the Ligurian port cluster account for the bulk of containerised capacity, ports such as Marseille-Fos, Trieste, and Thessaloniki handle significant volumes of other cargo types alongside containers. Across Europe more broadly, ports that specialise predominantly in containerised freight are concentrated in north-western countries, most notably Belgium and the Netherlands.
In the Arabian Sea, the combined capacity of relevant ports in Saudi Arabia and the UAE (34.7 million TEU, including the ports of Dammam, Jubail, Jebel Ali, Fujairah, and Khalifa) is almost twice as high as that of western India (20.3 million TEU, including the ports of Mundra, Kandla, and Mumbai). Such heterogeneity in available port capacity across regions can lead to bottlenecks and reduced trade performance, particularly when freight throughput approaches capacity.
A similar assessment for other types of cargo is essential to anticipate potential imbalances along the corridor, although current capacity and throughput data are not consistently available, highlighting the need for a more comprehensive analysis.
TEU million/year
Source: ITF (based on the most recent open-source data for each port).
Port infrastructure by region
Europe has a diverse portfolio of ports with varying characteristics, providing multiple entry points for international trade. In France, the Port of Marseille-Fos is the country’s largest port and benefits from strong connections to inland waterways, as well as rail and road networks. In Italy, the Port of Trieste occupies a strategic location, serving as a key gateway to Austria, Germany, and countries along the Baltic-Adriatic Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) corridor, and offering significant capacity for liquid bulk, as well as other cargo types. In addition, the ports of Genoa, Pra’, Savona and Vado Ligure provide an entry point to the western Alpine region and are well connected to each other and to Italy’s rail infrastructure. In Greece, the port of Piraeus offers one of the largest container-handling capacities in the region and is directly connected to the national rail and road network, enabling onward links to Bulgaria and Serbia. The ports of Thessaloniki and Alexandroupolis stand out as additional potential gateways in Greece.
Israeli ports currently provide sufficient capacity for national demand and planned expansion could accommodate increased freight volumes under IMEC. The ports of Haifa and Ashdod are efficient and well-connected to the national rail network. However, depending on traffic growth, there may be potential concerns about future port capacity. For now, Israel has approximately 2.6 million TEU of immediately available spare capacity (Annex 3.A). Planned capacity expansion at these ports, alongside expansion to additional Mediterranean gateways, can mitigate the capacity imbalance.
Ports in Saudi Arabia and the UAE would benefit from stronger rail connections to fully support the IMEC’s objectives. In Saudi Arabia, ports along the Persian Gulf are well integrated with domestic population and production centres, yet rail links with neighbouring countries remain underdeveloped. In the UAE, Persian Gulf ports such as Jebel Ali and Khalifa are highly efficient and combine large handling capacity with advanced operations but they remain dependent on maritime access through the Strait of Hormuz. The Port of Fujairah, the only major UAE port on the Indian Ocean, provides an important alternative route, although its handling capacity is lower than that of Jebel Ali or Khalifa.
The disruption to traffic through the Strait of Hormuz highlights capacity constraints on the inland links connecting Fujairah to ports on the west coast. These events underscore the vulnerability of Gulf trade routes and the strategic importance of diversifying access points. In this context, extending IMEC towards Oman could enhance both capacity and resilience, while planned rail and road connections between Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman would further strengthen international connectivity across the region (Box 2.2). Increased inland access to the Red Sea would also circumvent disruptions in the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
Ports on India’s west coast are expected to face growing capacity pressure as trade volumes increase. The ports of Kandla, Mumbai and Mundra are positioned as key gateways under IMEC thanks to their strong rail and road connectivity to the industrial regions of Maharashtra and Gujarat. However, their capacity utilisation is already relatively high. On average, these ports operate with a container volume-to-capacity ratio of around 0.8, meaning that they are using already 80% of their total capacity. Given projected economic and population growth, current capacity levels are unlikely to be sufficient to accommodate rising transport demand. Expanding existing facilities and developing additional ports, like the Vadhavan Port, will therefore be necessary to ensure that India’s maritime segment does not hinder trade with the Middle East and Europe.
Oman plays an important role in international trade flows and regional geopolitics. The country benefits from direct access to the Indian Ocean, bypassing both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and is well integrated into the regional economy while maintaining an independent foreign policy. These characteristics make Oman a distinctive actor in the region and provide it with a strategic advantage compared to other Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries. As a result, Oman’s participation in IMEC could contribute not only to deeper regional co-operation but also to greater resilience of the corridor to transport disruptions. Recent disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have further highlighted the strategic value of Omani ports, which provide direct access to the Indian Ocean and could strengthen IMEC’s resilience by reducing reliance on more vulnerable Gulf routes.
Omani ports offer a secure gateway for exports from neighbouring countries and combine available capacity with high operational efficiency. Annex 3.A provides detailed information on volume-to-capacity ratios, as well as PLSCI and CPPI indicators. The port of Salalah is the largest in the country, handling the bulk of Oman’s international trade and serving as a major transshipment hub for the region. Salalah is well-connected to global shipping networks according to the PLSCI and stands out for its operational performance, ranking 15th globally in the CPPI and ahead of most ports in the region. The port of Sohar also performs strongly in terms of connectivity and efficiency and retains substantial spare capacity. Finally, the port of Duqm, located in the centre of Oman’s coastline, hosts the country’s largest deep-water terminal. The inauguration of its third terminal in 2026 added container handling capacity and reinforced Duqm’s position within Oman’s port system. Oman’s connectivity is expected to increase through major port and rail investments. The Port of Sohar is set to expand through a USD 400 million logistics terminal developed by Asyad and CMA CGM (CMA CMG, 2026[2]), which will increase cargo handling capacity, strengthen links to regional and international trade corridors, and deepen integration with global shipping networks. In parallel, the 238 km Hafeet Rail project will connect Sohar to the UAE rail network (Khitam Al Amir, 2026[3]), significantly reducing freight transit times to Abu Dhabi and enhancing multimodal connectivity between Omani ports, Gulf markets and wider international supply chains. Future connection to other Gulf countries through the GCC Railway is expected to further strengthen its role as a regional gateway
Oman’s geographic position, port capacity and operational efficiency position it as a strategic gateway for IMEC. By mitigating exposure to key maritime chokepoints, Omani ports could enhance the resilience of the corridor. This potential will depend on effective integration with regional transport networks and IMEC’s broader cross-border logistics framework.
Source: Ministry of Transport Communications and Information Technology of Oman, 2025; UNCTAD, 2026b; World Bank, 2025
Inland infrastructure
IMEC’s viability will depend heavily on the quality and connectivity of its inland transport networks. Infrastructure in terminus countries (i.e., France, Greece, India and Italy) will be essential to ensure a steady flow of goods along the corridor, while the inland transport segment in the Middle East will form the backbone of the multimodal corridor, linking the two maritime sections. However, connecting Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE will represent a major challenge, as existing infrastructure is not yet fully adequate for the expected freight volumes, and current logistics performance may undermine the corridor’s potential.
Railways
Rail networks in terminus countries provide strong connectivity between IMEC-relevant ports and national markets (Figure 3.3). EU countries exhibit high network density, supporting domestic transport and offering well-established links to neighbouring countries that may benefit from enhanced trade with India and the Middle East. For instance, Germany, the only IMEC signatory EU country not located directly on the corridor, can nonetheless access Marseille-Fos (France) and Trieste (Italy) via existing trans-European rail links. India also benefits from extensive rail networks, enabling efficient distribution of goods between its west coast ports and the rest of the country.
In contrast, rail infrastructure in the Middle East remains insufficient for continuous cross-border transport and future expansion of traffic growth. As shown in Figure 3.3, existing railways do not support transnational freight movement across the region. Israel has a modern rail infrastructure, however, rail lines primarily run north-south, connecting major coastal cities such as Haifa, Tel Aviv and Ashdod. Links to inland cities near the country’s borders, such as Jerusalem and Beit She'an, do not extend further into the West Bank or Jordan, underscoring Israel’s high national rail coverage but lack of international connections.
Jordan’s rail system was originally designed to connect Amman with Syria in the north and Aqaba in the south. However, rail transport in Jordan has recently declined, as the new Aqaba port is not directly connected to the network, and the situation in Syria has affected trade with and through Jordan (JICA, 2018). There are also infrastructure technical incompatibilities between Jordan and its neighbours. Jordan uses a 1 050 mm gauge, which differs from the 1 435 mm standard gauge used in Israel and Saudi Arabia. Different rail track gauge, which is the smallest distance between a pair of rails, prevents integrated rail operations along IMEC.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, although not yet connected by rail, have compatible and relatively modern networks that can support IMEC’s objectives. Saudi Arabia’s network is designed to connect the ports in the Persian Gulf with major logistics and production hubs in the country, linking the ports of Dammam, Jubail and Ras Al-Khair with Riyadh and the mines in the north. Infrastructure is also in place for a future connection with Jordan through the North-South Railway, which currently connects Riyadh with Al Qurayyat. In the UAE, the Etihad rail runs east-west and connects major ports, logistics hubs and urban areas. On the UAE side of the border with Saudi Arabia, rail infrastructure is compatible with potential future cross-border connections.
Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE already possess the foundations for a rail system that could support IMEC. However, further investment will be required to connect existing national networks and build a functioning regional transport system. Jordan, by contrast, lacks rail infrastructure suitable for linking Israel and Saudi Arabia and uses a rail gauge non-interoperable with that of its neighbours. Thus, the country would require substantial investment to play an active role in IMEC’s cross-border rail transport.
Source: OpenStreetMap, ITF.
Highways and major roads
Road infrastructure across IMEC participating countries is generally more developed and interconnected than rail. High connectivity makes road transport a better-suited mode to support the corridor in the short to medium term. As displayed in Figure 3.4, terminus countries already benefit from extensive and high-quality road networks, while Middle Eastern countries have continuous road links that allow cross-border transport, unlike rail. Nevertheless, further investment will be required to increase capacity.
Israel’s road network is extensive and high-capacity, but east-west connections may need upgrading to accommodate growing trade flows. Highways 2 and 4 provide multi-lane corridors along the coastline, while Highway 6 runs parallel further inland. Highway 1 and 3 facilitates movement between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. However, the roads linking ports to the Jordanian border, such as Highways 71, 75 and 90, are primarily two-lane roads. These routes currently support national mobility but may require widening and safety and quality improvements if international freight flows increase under IMEC.
Jordan’s road network provides the essential backbone for north-south movements, yet cross-border freight operations may be constrained. Highways 15, 35 and 65 connect major urban centres and will be important for freight moving between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Additional horizontal links, Highways 5, 10 and 30, enable east-west movements, forming Jordan’s portion of the IMEC transit route. Although these highways generally offer two paved lanes in each direction, some sections lack adequate signalling and have uneven surfaces, which could undermine their reliability if freight volumes rise.
Saudi Arabia benefits from a well-developed and high-capacity highway network linking it directly to Jordan and the UAE. Highways 15, 65 and 85 provide strong connections to Jordan, offering well-maintained and properly signalised multi-lane corridors. To the east, Highways 10 and 95 ensure seamless transport between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, with two or three high-quality lanes supporting heavy freight movements and offering resilience along the IMEC route.
The UAE operates one of the most advanced road networks in the region, providing substantial capacity and redundancy. Highway E11 forms the country’s main east-west corridor, linking Ras Al-Khaimah with Dubai, Abu Dhabi and the Saudi border with 4 lanes in each direction. Parallel routes such as E311 and E611 add capacity and flexibility, strengthening the resilience of inland transport. The Port of Fujairah is connected to the west coast via Highways E102 and E84, which, despite having lower capacity than E11, still provide high-quality three-lane links capable of supporting growing freight demand.
Road transport offers greater flexibility, reliability and resilience, while rail provides economies of scale and lower emissions. Although initial IMEC configuration focuses on the future development of rail links in the Middle East, road transport will remain essential. Road is currently the dominant inland mode of transport across the region due to its extensive coverage and ability to serve both urban and remote areas. In comparison to rail, it is better suited for high‑value or time‑sensitive goods and is generally preferred for short and medium distances. The gradual expansion of rail infrastructure will complement road networks by enabling the efficient movement of bulk and other heavy freight over longer distances (ITF, 2022). As rail capacity grows, it can help ease pressure on road corridors, support more sustainable freight flows, and ultimately provide a competitive option for heavy‑load, long‑distance transport within the IMEC corridor.
Source: OpenStreetMap, ITF.
Inland transport logistics and border crossing points
A fully functioning IMEC corridor will require strong logistics systems to complement its physical infrastructure. Border procedures, customs operations, safety requirements and transshipment practices will ultimately determine how smoothly goods move along the corridor and are essential to ensuring efficient and predictable transport. Improving logistics performance in the Middle East segment will be particularly essential, as inefficiencies continue to affect cross-border goods movement within the region.
The World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (LPI) provides an overview of supply-chain systems quality based on assessments by logistics professionals. Figure 3.5 compares the LPI 2023 and its components for IMEC countries (World Bank, 2023). It evaluates countries across six dimensions, distinguishing between logistics inputs and outputs. The first group reflects regulatory and structural conditions, such as customs and border-management efficiency, the quality of trade- and transport-related infrastructure, and logistics service quality. The second group focuses on outcomes, including shipment arrangements, tracking and tracing capabilities, and delivery timeliness. The index supports the analysis of policy impacts and priorities, and is a key component of the OECD Economic Corridors’ Connectivity Scoreboard (OECD, 2026). The LPI complements the OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators (TFIs), which are used to assess the content and implementation of regulatory frameworks based on the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (see Chapter 3).
From 1=low to 5=high
Note: Data for Jordan refer to the LPI 2018.
Source: World Bank, 2023.
LPI scores reveal significant differences in logistics performance across Middle East IMEC participants. Germany and the UAE stand out with an overall score of 4.0, placing them among the world’s strongest logistics systems. The UAE performs consistently well across all six dimensions, with particularly strong results in infrastructure quality and shipment timeliness. It also records the highest customs and border-management efficiency in the region, comparable to that of France. Israel and Saudi Arabia follow, with LPI scores of 3.6 and 3.4, respectively. Israel’s performance is underpinned by high logistics competence and timeliness, while Saudi Arabia’s strong scores in infrastructure quality and timeliness reflect substantial investments for port capacity expansions and inland connectivity improvements. Jordan records the lowest LPI score among IMEC countries, driven primarily by weaker border management efficiency and difficulties in arranging international shipments. These disparities suggest that international logistics performance could become a constraint for IMEC unless addressed through targeted policies.
Border crossing points between Israel and Jordan and the West Bank and Jordan are relatively small and inefficient. The Jordan River Border (or Sheikh Hussein Bridge), the north-most crossing, handled 300 000 tonnes in 2016, almost twice as much as the second largest border crossing point, the King Hussein Bridge, which connects Jordan and the West Bank. Back-to-back transshipments are required at these border crossings, adding between 1.5 and 6 hours to border control routines. Discussions with Israeli and Jordanian forwarders, as well as with shippers in the West Bank, show that it takes 2 days to traverse the border into Jordan, drive through Jordan and cross to Saudi Arabia (JICA, 2018). Given the short distance in Jordan, this means that drivers spend more time at border crossing points than on the route. Improvements to the Jordan River Border crossing have been approved on the Israeli side of the border and are expected to reduce congestion and border crossing times within the next five to six years. A third border crossing further south, the Yitzhak Rabin/Wadi Araba Crossing, connects the Eilat and Aqaba areas, though it currently handles significantly lower traffic volumes than the other two border crossings. Figure 3.6 shows the most relevant road border crossings into Jordan and highlights Jordan’s central role.
Source: OpenStreetMap, ITF.
Road transport between Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE has become more efficient through the implementation of the International Road Transport Union’s (IRU) trade facilitation system. The International Road Transport (known as TIR, from its French initials) is the only universal customs transit system which allows trucks crossing through intermediate countries without being subject to a full border crossing clearance. This allows for great time savings as authorities check the vehicle’s external seals and the TIR Carnet without opening the cargo. According to IRU, this system cuts border crossing times by 92% and costs by around 50%. Israel is also TIR operational, but the country does not currently have a functional corridor with its neighbours.
Despite these gains, inefficiencies at border crossings remain. Border waiting times for petrochemical products between GCC countries were estimated at 13 to 23 hours for imports and 4 to 5 hours for exports due to non-harmonised customs procedures, regulatory changes and labour skills at border crossings (Gulf Petrochemicals & Chemicals Association, 2021). These figures reveal that procedural and administrative delays at the borders, rather than road quality, remain significant constraints to efficient transport in the Middle East. Recent data on road travel times in the Middle East are not available, highlighting an important evidence gap that requires further research to assess transport performance and to better evaluate the potential impact of IMEC.
To fully realise its vision as a maritime- and rail-based corridor, IMEC will require significant investment in port capacity, port connectivity and rail infrastructure expansion. This section, therefore, focuses on planned maritime and rail infrastructure, which together form the corridor’s core long-distance backbone. While road transport is expected to remain a key component of logistics for the corridor, particularly for first- and last-mile connectivity and regional distribution, it is treated here as a complementary mode rather than a separate focus of analysis.
Planned transport infrastructure projects along IMEC are expected to enhance port capacity and expand railway connectivity. Countries along the corridor have already committed funding for major upgrades, including port expansion projects in Europe, India, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which account not only for domestic demand but also for future transit flows. In parallel, the GCC has continued to advance plans for regional rail links between its member states, which would directly support IMEC and extend its reach within the region. Additional initiatives, such as Saudi Arabia’s planned Landbridge Project and the EU’s TEN-T, aimed to improve regional connectivity and transport resilience, will also contribute to the corridor’s long‑term development. Complementary quantitative analysis could provide estimates of the impact some of these projects will have on transport costs and times, while reviewing whether they address some of the existing transport challenges in the region.
Port expansions and new ports
Capacity and performance across IMEC-relevant ports are expected to strengthen in the coming years as a result of ongoing and planned expansions. Figure 3.7 presents an overview of ports relevant to IMEC, including existing ports with planned developments, new ports under construction, and potential gateways in neighbouring countries. Section 2.4. further examines the perspectives of possible participation of Cyprus, Egypt, Lebanon, and Oman in the corridor.
In France, the strategic programme Marseille Fos 25-29 aims to prepare the port for growing freight volumes. The project will also support the energy transition and enhance resilience to economic and environmental volatility. Part of this programme is the Fos 3XL project, which will expand capacity to 2.9 million TEU by 2031, improve operational performance across all traffic types and reinforce multimodal connections. In Italy, the port of Trieste is expected to add significant capacity through the opening of Pier VIII in 2027, enabling two 24 000-TEU vessels to berth simultaneously and expanding its current annual capacity of 1.2 million TEU. In Greece, the port of Piraeus, managed by the Chinese company COSCO, plans to construct a fourth pier, which would raise total capacity to 10 million TEU per year and consolidate its position as a major trans-shipment hub in the region. The port of Thessaloniki will also expand capacity through the extension of Pier 6; although smaller than Piraeus, it remains Greece’s principal export gateway and benefits from strong connections to neighbouring countries.
Israel is also moving ahead with projects to expand port capacity and enhance inland connectivity. The port of Haifa, one of the country’s main gateways, has been connected to the national railway network since 2025, enabling more efficient inland transport (Railway Supply, 2025). The port of Ashdod is undertaking modernisation initiatives to enhance operational performance (Nieves, 2025). The Ashdod Port Company has also announced an expansion of container storage facilities that will increase the port’s capacity by an additional 4 000 TEU.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE continue to enhance their already high-capacity, well-connected port systems. The six ports relevant to IMEC are well-connected to each country’s road and rail infrastructure, and ongoing development projects are set to further consolidate their role as key maritime gateways for the Middle East. In Saudi Arabia, the port of Dammam has completed the expansion of its second terminal, enabling two mega‑container vessels to berth simultaneously and increasing total capacity to 3.8 million TEU per year. In the UAE, the Khalifa Port in Abu Dhabi plans to expand one of its container terminals by 2028, a project that will double the terminal’s handling capability and raise the port’s overall container capacity to 10.5 million TEU per year (GCC Business Watch, 2025; Shipping Telegraph, 2025).
India’s expansion projects complete the set of port upgrades expected to shape IMEC’s future maritime capacity. In the Mumbai Metropolitan Region, the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Authority (JNPA) inaugurated India’s largest container terminal in 2025, raising its total handling capacity to 10 million TEU. Kandla Port’s capacity is expected to increase through the addition of 18 million tonnes of bulk and 2.3 million TEU of container capacity, supported by the construction of a new multi‑cargo berth and a container terminal. The Vadhavan Port project, located around 150 kilometres north of Mumbai, will provide a deep‑draft facility capable of accommodating larger container vessels. Planned to handle 15 million TEU per year by 2035, Vadhavan is expected to complement JNPA’s capacity, which is projected to reach its operational limits in the near future (CW Construction World, 2025; Sagar Vidya Kosh MoPSW, 2025).
Source: OpenStreetMap, ITF.
Rail infrastructure
Planned investments reflect differing starting points and strategic priorities across IMEC countries. In the EU, terminus countries are strengthening their rail systems within the TEN-T framework, improving connectivity with central and northern member states. India is similarly undertaking major upgrades to expand capacity and enhance the performance of its national rail network. In the Middle East, GCC countries are advancing regional rail integration by building on existing networks in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Israel is also investing in rail infrastructure to extend coverage within the country, particularly towards peripheral areas including the border with Jordan. However, none of the announced projects to date address cross-border rail connections on Jordan’s side of the border, which represents the most significant missing link in the rail chain of the IMEC initial configuration.
Within the EU, the TEN-T corridors are particularly relevant for IMEC. Together, this network connects IMEC‑relevant ports to major production and consumption centres across Europe and facilitates onward links to landlocked regions. The most relevant TEN-T corridors for IMEC with announced investments are:
The Mediterranean Corridor runs through Spain, France, Italy, Croatia, Hungary and Ukraine. Several projects are underway in France and Italy to improve connectivity along the corridor. A flagship initiative is the Lyon‑Turin cross‑border railway, which includes a 57.5 km base tunnel under Mont Cenis designed to shorten travel times and significantly increase freight capacity between France and Italy. Following the European Commission’s 2025 implementing decision, the project is expected to be completed by 2033 (Tunnel Euralpin Lyon Turin, 2025). Further west, the Montpellier‑Perpignan project foresees the construction of around 150 km of new track, with the objective of relieving congestion and expanding rail freight capacity along the French Mediterranean coast (SNCF, 2026).
The Scandinavian‑Mediterranean Corridor provides a critical north‑south axis linking southern European ports with central and northern Europe, but it continues to face structural bottlenecks at the Italy‑Austria border. The Brenner Base Tunnel is intended to address this constraint by creating a flat, high‑capacity rail link between Innsbruck and Fortezza, with wider benefits for freight flows towards Munich and Verona. The 55 km tunnel will allow longer and heavier freight trains to cross the Alps more efficiently, improving reliability and performance along the corridor (Galleria di Base del Brennero and Brenner Basistunnel BBT SE, 2026). Complementary investments are also planned further north, including works at the Fehmarn Belt crossing between Germany and Denmark.
The Western Balkans-East Mediterranean Corridor connects Greek ports with Central Europe and Türkiye, providing strategic access for several landlocked countries. This corridor supports north‑south flows between Germany and ports such as Piraeus and Thessaloniki. It is also essential for regional connectivity initiatives, such as the Three Seas Initiative, which aims to strengthen economic development and connectivity among countries between the Adriatic, Baltic and Black Seas. Beyond connectivity within Europe, the corridor serves as gateway for products coming from Asia, most notably through the Middle Corridor and the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor. The latter has been analysed through the OECD Economic Corridors’ Connectivity Scoreboard, as well as dedicated trade facilitation study assessing its potential and competitiveness in the region (OECD, 2025[4]). Given The Western Balkans-East Mediterranean Corridor importance, the Greek Ministry of National Economy and Finance launched a programme in 2025 to modernise rail links between Athens, Idomeni, Patras, Promachonas and Thessaloniki. The project focuses on upgrading signalling, telecommunications and traffic‑management systems to enhance efficiency, safety and interoperability along the corridor (Travel and Tour World, 2025).
India continues to strengthen its already extensive rail network through large‑scale capacity expansion projects. A key milestone is the completion of the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor, a 1 506 km electrified double‑track line connecting the port of JNPA with Dadri, near New Delhi. This corridor substantially increases rail freight capacity and supports the competitiveness of the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor. Looking ahead, the Ministry of Railways is planning the East-West Corridor, a 2 328 km rail link between Mumbai and Kolkata. This project intends to complement the Western and Eastern Dedicated Freight Corridors, enhance network resilience, and improve connectivity between India’s western and eastern ports and the hinterland. Additional projects under consideration include the East Coast Corridor and the North-South Sub‑corridor, which would further expand rail capacity and geographic coverage (Ministry of Railways, 2025).
In the Middle East, several rail projects were under consideration to improve regional connectivity but may fall short of delivering the continuous cross-border links required for IMEC. The proposed Gulf-Israel Corridor (also known as Peace Railway), which would connect Gulf countries with Israel through Jordan, has not gained sufficient political traction despite its potential economic benefits. The project also faces competition from alternative connectivity initiatives that bypass Israel, such as the revival of the Hejaz railway promoted by Türkiye. Figure 3.8 provides a closer look at the region and some of these key planned railway projects.
Source: OpenStreetMap, ITF.
The Connecting Israel programme aims to strengthen the national rail network by adding around 300 km of new lines and modernising existing ones to better connect peripheral areas. The programme is structured in three phases. In the central part of the country, a new rail line between Hadera and Lod is under construction to provide redundancy to the existing coastal route; it is expected to be inaugurated in 2026 and will increase both capacity and network resilience. In the north, a 54 km extension of the rail network will connect the city of Qiryat Shemona, close to the border with Lebanon. The rail connection between Haifa and Beit She’an towards the Jordanian border will also be upgraded from a single-track to a double-track railway, establishing a high-capacity, uninterrupted rail connection from the border to the port of Haifa. In the south, a new railway linking the city of Eilat to the national network will create a direct corridor between Israel’s main Mediterranean urban centres and the Red Sea. The Connecting Israel programme also contains technological upgrades, such as deployment of ERTMS (European Rail Traffic Management System) and enhanced cyber-related railway systems. It is currently expected to be fully completed by 2035.
Jordan has the potential to become a key logistics hub through targeted and well-coordinated investment projects thanks to its geographic position. In 2021, the government announced the Economic Priorities Programme 2021-2023, which includes a national railway project aimed at revitalising the rail sector. The project is structured around two main standard-gauge rail lines designed to ensure compatibility with neighbouring countries’ infrastructure. First, the North-South line would upgrade 509 km of existing track linking the new Port of Aqaba with the Ma’an Land Port, Amman and Mafraq, close to the Syrian border. This project would also revitalise part of the Jordanian section of the former Hejaz Railway, an Ottoman corridor that connected Istanbul to Medina. A railway co-operation agreement between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia includes exploring the potential restoration of the wider Hejaz Railway network, which could strengthen Jordan's rail connectivity with neighbouring countries and improve regional integration. Second, the East-West line, extending 380 km, would branch from Zarqa near the capital and connect the North-South corridor with the Iraqi and Saudi borders, integrating Jordan into a broader regional rail network. Beyond new rail infrastructure, the project also includes the development of two logistics centres in Mafraq and Amman (STRATEGIECS, 2021). According to government announcements, the railway project is expected to be completed by 2030, although delays remain possible (EMILECON, 2025). Indeed, part of the revitalisation of railways in Jordan is already underway. In 2026, Jordan and the UAE signed a USD 2.3 billion agreement to reconnect the phosphate mines and potash production to the new Aqaba port through a 360-kilometre railway.
GCC countries are advancing some of the most ambitious rail-connectivity projects in the region, laying the foundations for future cross-border co-operation. The planned GCC Railway, targeted for completion around 2030, is expected to strengthen national rail networks in Saudi Arabia and the UAE while extending 2 117 km rail links to Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman (Capriles, Valero and Fares, 2025). Several sections of the project are particularly relevant. These include the 785 km high-speed electrified rail line between Riyadh and Doha, intended to improve freight and passenger connectivity between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Another strategic component is the Hafeet Rail project, a 238 km link connecting the UAE’s Etihad Rail network with the Port of Sohar in Oman, which has attained 40% completion in September 2026. This connection will enable freight to reach Indian Ocean ports without transiting the Strait of Hormuz and will ease capacity constraints along the corridor between west UAE and the eastern port of Fujairah. In addition, the planned Saudi Arabia-Kuwait railway will establish a 650 km connection between their capitals and is expected to be completed by 2028 (Zainab Husain, 2025). Taken together, deeper rail integration among GCC countries could allow Gulf states to play a more active role in the development of IMEC and to engage more directly in trade exchanges with Europe and India.
In addition, Saudi Arabia has announced several large-scale projects to expand national rail coverage and create alternative freight corridors. Saudi Vision 2030 provides the overarching framework for these investments, with transport and logistics identified as key pillars to support economic diversification, growth and improved connectivity. Beyond projects linked to the GCC Railway, the government is promoting new railways to strengthen east-west integration across the country. The Saudi Landbridge project is a flagship initiative that aims to connect Dammam on the Persian Gulf with Jeddah on the Red Sea through a 1 400 km rail corridor. The project will link major ports on both coasts with logistics and industrial centres in the hinterland, improving connectivity for Saudi exports and enhancing the country’s role as a transit hub for international trade. By providing an overland alternative between the Red Sea and the Gulf, the Saudi Landbridge could help reduce reliance on the Bab al-Mandab Strait and will improve connectivity with Egypt when coupled with the Saudi-Egypt Golden Bridge project for train ferries. Other projects aiming at improving connectivity include the King Salman or Moses Bridge project, a 32-kilometres causeway connecting the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt to Saudi Arabia over the Strait of Tiran. These projects support more flexible routing options for Europe-Middle East-India trade, strengthening overall transport resilience in the region (Amit Yarom, 2025[5]).
Existing transport infrastructure along IMEC is not yet sufficient to allow for seamless multimodal transport. Rail infrastructure remains underdeveloped in much of the Middle East, and cross-border trade currently relies predominantly on road transport. In addition, the corridor will face constraints related to port capacity. While increased investment and stronger co-operation among interested countries could address some challenges, enhancing the corridor’s overall resilience and performance is likely to require broader regional engagement, which would only be achieved with the return of stability in the Middle East region.
Existing barriers and potential bottlenecks
A comprehensive review of existing and planned infrastructure would highlight several challenges that IMEC will need to address to become feasible and efficient. Already, these challenges can be grouped into two categories:
The first includes existing barriers, namely structural characteristics of transport and logistics networks that currently limit or hinder the movement of goods along the corridor.
The second category covers potential bottlenecks, referring to constraints that have not yet fully materialised but could emerge as traffic volumes grow and infrastructure plans are implemented.
Considering the infrastructure inventory compiled for the present study, three existing barriers to IMEC were identified:
Missing rail corridor in the Middle East: The most significant challenge IMEC faces is the absence of an interconnected rail network in the Middle East. The corridor aims to rely on rail to promote more sustainable inland transport and to capture efficiency gains for long-distance and heavy freight movements. However, no direct rail links currently exist between Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The GCC Railway is expected to connect Saudi Arabia and the UAE, supported by strong financial capacity but geopolitical tensions may delay its realisation. Rail connection between Israel and Jordan is still missing. Discussions on Jordan plans to extend its rail network towards Saudi Arabia are taking place, but no clear timetable or financing framework has been established to secure other cross-border connections.
Jordan’s incompatible rail network: Jordan requires significant investment to make its rail infrastructure compatible with that of its neighbours. Jordan’s railway uses a 1 050 mm gauge, non-interoperable with the standard gauge used in both Israel and Saudi Arabia. Future rail infrastructure development should go beyond the creation of a transit corridor linking Israel and Saudi Arabia through Jordan. It should also prioritise upgrades to the national rail network to ensure Jordan’s full integration into IMEC. Such integration will be essential not only to facilitate transit flows but also to support domestic exporters and importers and to retain value-added activities within the country.
Inefficient inland border crossings: Road border-crossing operations in the Middle East remain inefficient. Long queues, extensive security checks, back-to-back transshipment requirements and non-harmonised customs documentation all contribute to lengthy and unpredictable transit times. If IMEC is to provide a viable alternative to established east-west routes such as the Suez Canal or the Middle Corridor, participating governments will need to address these shortcomings. This will require greater harmonisation of customs procedures, targeted investments to expand capacity at border-crossing points, and increased use of automation and digital controls to streamline clearance processes.
In addition, planned infrastructure projects reveal three potential bottlenecks:
Reliance on the Strait of Hormuz: The most important bottleneck IMEC encounters, considering the current configuration of the corridor, is the passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Recent disruptions, including the severe disruption to shipping observed in 2026, have demonstrated how easily transport flows through the Strait can be constrained. (IEA, 2026[6]) The mere threat of attacks on vessels can have wide economic effects, particularly for Gulf countries and economies dependent on fossil fuel exports from the region. This has become a critical chokepoint for IMEC as the UAE’s only direct exit to the Indian Ocean, the port of Fujairah, lacks sufficient capacity to absorb all trade in the event of a disruption. To enhance the corridor’s resilience, policymakers and transport planners should therefore consider alternative gateways capable of bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. In this context, the participation of Oman would be particularly relevant.
Eastern Mediterranean ports’ capacity: With expected traffic growth through IMEC, Israeli ports are likely to face greater pressure. The ports of Ashdod and Haifa handle the majority of Israel’s maritime traffic and currently accommodate limited transit flows to Jordan. Under IMEC, transport volumes transiting through Israel are expected to increase substantially. At the same time, Israel’s population is projected to grow significantly in the coming decades, which may place additional pressure on maritime infrastructure. The Israel Ports Company has indicated that currently the ports of Ashdod and Haifa run at around half of their capacity, and therefore room exists for additional throughput. Expansion is also planned, providing a degree of flexibility when traffic volumes will increase. Moreover, which is currently being considered by the IMEC members, including other ports in neighbouring countries could further expand port capacity in the Eastern Mediterranean coast.
India’s port capacity: Throughput at ports along India’s west coast is approaching capacity limits. As in Israel, higher transit volumes associated with IMEC, combined with continued population and economic growth, may place additional pressure on maritime infrastructure that is already operating close to its limits. However, India counts with a larger number of ports that could complement those initially considered relevant for IMEC. The development of the new Vadhavan Port is intended to relieve capacity constraints at JNPA and accommodate future traffic growth. More broadly, India’s extensive coastline, diversified port system and inland transport network provide additional flexibility, allowing capacity to be expanded across multiple locations rather than relying on a small number of gateways.
Extended participation
A wider participation of countries in IMEC can prevent the potential bottlenecks. Neighbouring EU countries, primarily Greece, but also Cyprus, Malta and Croatia, could enhance connectivity with the EU internal market, but also support system resilience and provide for additional flexibility. Oman, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria could engage with or benefit from the corridor’s development, whether through complementary infrastructure, alternative maritime routes or improved regional connectivity. Overall, wider participation could enhance corridor resilience and strengthen IMEC’s strategic value for the region as a whole. The corridor will have positive spillover effects for countries close to it, as the corridor will increase their connectivity and will stimulate economic growth and production. Figure 3.9 portrays alternative additions to the original IMEC tracing to show how other countries can complement the corridor.
Source: ITF.
In addition to the nine countries covered by this Chapter, engaging with neighbouring states may bring specific benefits:
IMEC + Cyprus: Cyprus is at a crossroads between Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, giving it potential to serve as a transshipment hub for redistributing cargo from major international trade routes to smaller regional markets. Its membership in the European Union could facilitate seamless transport links with other IMEC countries, including France, Greece and Italy. The port of Limassol is the island’s main commercial port, handling the majority of maritime throughput. The port is undergoing several development projects, including an expansion of container storage capacity by 15% to 20%, as well as the construction of a new quay (Planet, 2025; Psara, 2025). In addition, the Eastern Mediterranean Strategic Triangle, an alliance between Cyprus, Greece and Israel, intends to increase linked nodes between Souda Bay in Crete, Limassol and Haifa.
IMEC + Egypt: Since the inauguration of the Suez Canal more than a century ago, Egypt has established itself as one of the most important gateways for east-west trade. The Canal enables vessels to transit between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, providing a direct passage that would otherwise require transshipment or lengthy detours. However, transit through the Canal has increasingly been affected by safety concerns linked to the Bab al-Mandab Strait (ITF, 2024). Enhanced co-operation between IMEC and Egypt could contribute to safer passage for vessels in the Red Sea, notably through the Saudi-Egypt Golden Bridge project and inland connections across Saudi Arabia. The construction of the Saudi Landbridge is expected to further improve such connectivity. Beyond the Suez Canal, Egypt also has several key ports. Port Said, located at the Mediterranean entrance of the Canal, handles several million TEU annually and serves as a major transshipment hub. The Port of Alexandria is the country’s primary gateway for general cargo, while Ain Sokhna Port, situated at the Red Sea entrance of the Canal, facilitates trade with the Middle East. Ain Sokhna plays a central role in the Canal’s logistics system, and its rapid expansion is expected to strengthen its position among the leading ports in the region (OECD, 2026[7]).
IMEC + Lebanon: Considering Lebanese ports could help address potential connectivity constraints when accessing the IMEC’s inland segment in the Middle East but also support the expanded functioning of IMEC. The ports of Beirut and Tripoli together handle almost 2 million TEU annually, in addition to several million tonnes of other cargo, and could therefore help relieve pressure on other Middle East ports. However, damaged transport infrastructure, the slow reconstruction of the port of Beirut, and reduced transit through the country’s southern border, limit Lebanon’s capacity to contribute to IMEC. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Public Works held a first technical coordination meeting on IMEC in June 2026, and investments to improve the capacity of port of Beirut are on-going, including a 100-million CMA-CGM investment commitment to multiply by three the port’s capacity agreed in September 2026. Despite limitations, IMEC could offer a framework for increased co-operation with Lebanon, aligning the interests of multiple countries and potentially contributing to greater regional stability over the longer term.
IMEC + Oman: As explained in Box 2.2, Oman’s participation in IMEC could significantly enhance the corridor’s resilience by providing direct access to the Indian Ocean and hence avoiding the Strait of Hormuz. Oman’s ports, notably Salalah, Sohar and Duqm, combine available capacity with high operational efficiency and could offer secure alternative gateways for regional and transit trade, despite lack of port-to-rail accessibility. By mitigating exposure to maritime disruptions and expanding port options in the region, Oman’s inclusion would strengthen IMEC’s flexibility and robustness, subject to effective integration with regional transport and logistics networks.
IMEC is expected to influence connectivity beyond its membership. To better understand these wider implications, in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy, the OECD conducted a scoping study on IMEC as a network impacting East Africa.
The six countries selected for the study - Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique - occupy an important position within the regional connectivity system, being located along the Western Indian Ocean and, in some cases, the Red Sea corridors. Kenya and Tanzania, in particular, function as primary multimodal hubs. Also, the selected countries combine different forms of exposure to the potential impact of IMEC: maritime gateways, landlocked corridor dependence, regional logistics hubs, mineral and agribusiness value chains, and strategic proximity to routes linking Asia, the Gulf and Europe.
Potential spillovers include improved access to IMEC-linked markets through reduced trade costs; enhanced strategic relevance of East African gateways supported by investments in ports and transport corridors; and stronger business and administrative practices resulting from the adoption of higher logistics, customs, digital, and sustainability standards. At the same time, stronger demand from India, the Gulf and Europe create opportunities for upgrading in sectors such as minerals, agribusiness, renewable energy inputs, and logistics services. These opportunities would also need to be assessed in light of potential implications for trade patterns, corridor competitiveness, regulatory alignment, and the concentration of activity along specific routes or nodes.
The analysis suggests that lower effective trade costs could strengthen trade links between the selected East African economies and IMEC partners, in line with evidence from major trade and connectivity initiatives. World Bank estimates for Belt and Road transport projects indicate that reductions in trade costs (up to 10%) along key corridors have been associated with measurable increases in trade flows (up to 4%), with larger gains observed when infrastructure investments are accompanied by complementary policy and regulatory reforms.
The implications of IMEC are likely to vary across the selected East African economies, depending on their connectivity, trade structures, and position within regional transport and logistics networks. Djibouti and Kenya are more directly exposed through their roles as logistics and maritime gateways. Ethiopia’s prospects depend to a large extent on the efficiency and reliability of external corridor access, particularly through Djibouti. Tanzania and Mozambique may see more gradual benefits through developments in port and corridor development, as well as stronger linkages in minerals, energy and agribusiness value chains. Eritrea retains strategic relevance along the Red Sea, although its ability to capture opportunities remains influenced by infrastructure constraints and the broader geopolitical environment.
The study highlights that the scale of potential benefits will depend not only on connectivity improvements, but also on countries' ability to leverage them through supportive trade, investment and business-enabling policies. To that aim connectivity investments should be linked to local value addition, supplier development and skills formation; and infrastructure planning should be guided by coordination with existing corridors to avoid unnecessary duplication and underutilised capacity.
As an emerging alternative trade corridor, IMEC has the potential to enhance transport connectivity, diversify routing options and strengthen the resilience of trade flows. The corridor could accommodate rising volumes of trade driven by economic growth, population dynamics and new bilateral agreements across three regions, while offering an alternative to existing east-west routes.
IMEC aims to achieve effective integration of maritime and rail transport, which together can deliver efficiency gains and support decarbonisation objectives. However, rail infrastructure in the Middle East remains underdeveloped, particularly for cross‑border operations. While several large‑scale projects are underway or planned, significant gaps persist, in particular the absence of a rail connection project between Israel and Jordan. Existing networks in these countries are incompatible and north-south oriented, and no clear commitments have yet been made to establish a cross‑border link, leaving a structural gap in the corridor’s inland leg. The EU and India already benefit from connections between relevant ports and inland consumption and production centres through robust rail infrastructure. The case of the European TEN-T network is a clear example of how IMEC could complement other national and regional corridors.
In the short to medium term, road transport will continue to play a central role in facilitating transit in the Middle East, reflecting its dominance in inland freight movements across the region. Road networks are generally extensive and physically connected across countries, although disparities in quality and capacity remain. More pressing than infrastructure constraints are operational inefficiencies at border‑crossing points. Long queues, extensive control procedures, back‑to‑back transshipment practices and fragmented customs processes reduce transport reliability and competitiveness compared with other east-west corridors. Addressing these issues through harmonised procedures, targeted investments in inland ports, and digital solutions will be essential for IMEC to function effectively.
Maritime infrastructure is well-positioned to support the corridor. Ports across Europe, the Middle East and India generally have sufficient capacity to meet current national demand and, in many cases, additional capacity to accommodate higher levels of traffic. Ongoing and planned port expansions, combined with improvements in hinterland connectivity, are likely to mitigate potential bottlenecks, particularly in Israel and on India’s west coast. At the same time, exposure to maritime chokepoints, notably the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab, remains a key strategic risk. In this context, the potential contribution of additional regional partners, especially Oman, could significantly enhance IMEC’s resilience by providing alternative gateways to the Indian Ocean. Additional key maritime hubs could be identified on the basis of functional connectivity, port capacity, hinterland access and network resilience, rather than solely by reference to the initial corridor configuration.
Overall, IMEC presents an opportunity to strengthen connectivity between Europe, India and the Middle East, but further in-depth analysis is required to assess its implications for transport connectivity, efficiency, and resilience. Data collection through surveys and stakeholder consultations could be instrumental in closing any existing gaps found in public sources. In particular, insights from port authorities, customs, and logistics service providers, among other stakeholders, could prove essential. The assessment could also consider shipping-service availability and the capacity of maritime operators to support scalability, route diversification and rapid reallocation of traffic under disruption scenarios.
Building on these foundations, a natural next step in the analysis could be forecasting regional trade and transport patterns among IMEC participants and provide scenarios, employing the ITF Global Freight Model. A baseline scenario would incorporate existing and committed infrastructure and national policy frameworks. More ambitious scenarios could also be tested and benchmarked against the baseline to quantify the impact of enhanced connectivity. This would enable an assessment of how flows may evolve under alternative scenarios reflecting policy choices, operational improvements and more ambitious infrastructure projects. The Model also allows for the identification of infrastructure gaps and bottlenecks to determine priority investments needed to sustain and enhance trade connectivity. In parallel, institutional readiness would be evaluated through the ITF Transport Policy and Performance Assessment Framework, assessing each country’s capacity to design and implement effective transport policies and governance arrangements.
A resilience perspective could be integrated throughout the analysis by examining the robustness of planned infrastructure under potential disruptions such as extreme weather events, collisions, natural disasters and external shocks. Particular attention would be given to the capacity of the system to absorb and redistribute demand across modes and complementing infrastructure networks as a response to disruptions. Based on these combined insights, targeted recommendations would be developed to improve infrastructure provision, operational performance, institutional frameworks, and overall system resilience, with validation through stakeholder engagement at the regional level.
Finally, a study can synthesise all analytical, modelling and policy findings into a comprehensive connectivity enhancement roadmap. This roadmap would outline a balanced set of measures, combining strategic investments in port, rail, road and intermodal capacity with operational, regulatory, and institutional improvements. It would provide a clear and actionable pathway for strengthening IMEC’s role as a competitive, efficient, and resilient multimodal corridor.
References
[5] Amit Yarom (2025), “Moses parts the Red Sea: Israel’s strategic challenges as new routes emerge”, Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/moses-parts-the-red-sea-israels-strategic-challenges-as-new-routes-emerge/ (accessed on 29 September 2026).
[2] CMA CMG (2026), Asyad Group and CMA CGM Group Initiate a Strategic Partnership to Enhance Maritime Connectivity and New Regional Trade Corridors Through a Multipurpose Logistics Terminal in Oman, https://www.cmacgm-group.com/en/news-media/asyad-group-and-cma-cgm-group-initiate-strategic-partnership (accessed on 29 September 2026).
[1] European Commission (2026), The EU-India trade agreement, https://commission.europa.eu/topics/trade/eu-india-trade-agreement_en, https://commission.europa.eu/topics/trade/eu-india-trade-agreement_en (accessed on 19 June 2026).
[6] IEA (2026), Sheltering From Oil Shocks, IEA, https://www.iea.org/reports/sheltering-from-oil-shocks (accessed on 29 September 2026).
[3] Khitam Al Amir (2026), “Oman-UAE rail link to begin trial operations in late 2027”, Gulf News, https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/oman/oman-uae-rail-link-to-begin-trial-operations-in-late-2027-1.500676388 (accessed on 29 September 2026).
[7] OECD (2026), Efficient and Sustainable Infrastructure in Egypt: Advancing Service Delivery, Green Transition and Private Investment, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d6e57f17-en (accessed on 6 July 2026).
[4] OECD (2025), Enhancing the Competitiveness of the Trans‑Caspian Transport Corridor in Central Asia, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f261e7fa-en (accessed on 6 July 2026).
Note:
TEU: Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit (unit of measurement of capacity of container ships and terminals)
V/C Ratio (Containers): Volume to Capacity Ration of containers (used to measure congestion)
CPPI Value: Container Port Performance Index created by World Bank and S&P Global Market Intelligence
PLSCI Value: Port Liner Shipping Connectivity Index created by UNCTAD
CPPI values can be negative as each year’s index is internally normalised with annual average equal to zero. PLSCI values are scaled relative to the mean of each component of the index, producing only positive numbers.