This chapter provides the overall context for the evolution of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) since its launch in 2023 as a multidimensional connectivity initiative aimed at strengthening multimodal transport, energy connectivity and digital infrastructure across three strategically linked regions. It outlines the governance framework established by IMEC signatories and examines how geopolitical developments have reshaped the corridor’s initial configuration and exposed key vulnerabilities. The recent events have both highlighted the challenges facing the initiative and reinforced its underlying rationale, bringing renewed attention to IMEC’s potential to enhance trade, improve supply-chain resilience and promote deeper economic integration.
Measuring Connectivity across the India‑Middle East‑Europe Corridor
Abstract
Launched in 2023, the IMEC initiative at first envisaged a linear route from India, through the Middle East, to Europe. During the G20 Indian Presidency, the “Memorandum of Understanding on the Principles of an India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor” was signed on 9 September 2023. The eight signatories – the European Union, France, Germany, India, Italy, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the United States of America – “commit to work together to establish IMEC to stimulate economic development through enhanced connectivity and economic integration between Asia, the Arabian Gulf, and Europe” (IMEC MoU, 2023[1]).
IMEC was conceived as a geographically predetermined trade route based on maritime, rail and road networks, supported by electricity and digital systems. The initial concept foresaw two main corridors: the East corridor connecting India to the Arabian Gulf via maritime routes, and the North corridor connecting the Gulf countries to Europe via “a railway that, upon completion, will provide a reliable and cost-effective cross-border ship-to-rail transit network to supplement existing maritime and road transport routes.” (IMEC MoU, 2023[1]). The MoU mentions two additional countries, Israel and Jordan, which are indispensable to enable the route. In parallel, the initiative envisages the deployment of electricity interconnections, digital communication cables and pipelines for the transport of clean hydrogen. Together, these elements define IMEC as a multidimensional project encompassing multimodal transport, energy connectivity and digital infrastructure. The overall aim is to “increase efficiencies, reduce costs, enhance economic unity, generate jobs, and lower greenhouse gas emissions – resulting in a transformative integration of Asia, Europe and the Middle East” (IMEC MoU, 2023[1]).
IMEC has progressively evolved towards an institutionalised governance framework. In 2025, the IMEC signatories established a co-ordinating body – the IMEC Steering Committee – and several working groups to address the full range of technical, design, financing, legal and regulatory aspects of IMEC. They nominated special envoys, sherpas or focal points, representing the participating countries and organisations: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for France and Italy, the National Security Council (NSC) for India and the United States, the Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy for Germany, the Ministry of Energy for Saudi Arabia, and the Ministry of Investment for the United Arab Emirates. The European Commission is represented by both the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) and the Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf (DG MENA). The IMEC Steering Committee has met four times (August 2025 in Delhi; October 2025 in Brussels; March 2026 in Trieste; and June 2026 in Marseille) with the participation of most signatories.
IMEC is moving from a high-level political commitment to an increasingly structured implementation process coordinated by a governing body and working groups. The five established technical working groups, each co-chaired by two signatories, cover the following items: strategy, co-ordination and studies; transport; energy connectivity; digital connectivity; and financing – though not all are fully functioning. Additionally, a private-sector led initiative, the IMEC Ports Club, was launched in Delhi in early October 2026, to strengthen co-operation between key maritime hubs and support the alignment of port development strategies along the corridor. This initiative underlines the importance of private sector engagement in IMEC and will allow the assessment of its functional capacity, based on port capacity, hinterland access and network resilience. The EU-India Summit held in January 2026 in Delhi, which called for the successful conclusion of negotiations of the India-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA), gave a new momentum to IMEC, providing a strong foundation for its implementation.1 The US Eastern Mediterranean Gateway Act aims at supporting the role of Eastern Mediterranean countries (Cyprus, Egypt, Greece and Israel) as a strategic gateway in IMEC, as well as the 3+1 initiative with Greece, Israel, and Cyprus.2 The increased attention given to corridors is noteworthy, reinforcing the strategic role of IMEC, as exemplified by the “New G7 Approach to Economic Corridors” issued in April 2026, which mentions IMEC as a key corridor and calls for enhanced partnerships based on common principles. (G7 Presidency: France, 2026[2])
Geopolitical events initiated an evolution of IMEC towards expanded regional participation and its transformation into a “network of corridors”. Since its inception, the corridor’s initial configuration was disrupted by major events: the 7 October terrorist attacks and their repercussions, the evolving conflict in the Middle East, the constraints to exports through the Strait of Hormuz, and the tensions in the Bab al-Mandab Strait with Houthis’ attacks on cargo vessels and recently on Saudi Arabia. These events have emphasised the vulnerability of global supply chains and highlighted the strategic importance of diversified transport options.
Maritime freight costs, especially insurance costs, rose sharply and transport and logistics patterns across the region have shifted. Thousands of trucks have been crossing the Arabian Peninsula, to the north towards Türkiye and Europe, but also to the west and the Red Sea to avoid the Bab al-Mandab Strait and reach the Suez Canal and the Ports of Aqaba and Eilat. This has led to congestion at border crossings, underscoring the crucial challenge of cross-border co-operation along IMEC. Some ports saw a major increase in traffic, from Salalah, Duqm and Sohar in Oman, or Fujairah and Khor Fakkan in the UAE, to Eastern Mediterranean ports such as Beirut and Latakia.3 This has highlighted the need for IMEC to reinforce port capacities and complementarities in Eastern Mediterranean countries, and strengthen insufficient rail networks, as well as logistics and transshipment hubs, in the Middle East.
The crises in the region are therefore contributing to the emergence of alternative and complementary routes, away from the initial IMEC configuration. Countries in the region are now considering further investments in roads and railways and there are already some projects under discussion that accelerate the IMEC agenda. Examples include the agreement signed in April 2026 between Jordan and the UAE to build a railway of 360 km between the Jordan mines and the Port of Aqaba, and the agreement between Oman and the UAE, ratified in September 2026, to link Abu Dhabi and Sohar through a 238-km railway. Reviving the historic Hejaz Railway, which linked Damascus to Medina in the early twentieth century, is also being discussed. To this end, at its June 2026 meeting, the Steering Committee decided to launch an IMEC label for selected projects to foster co-ordinated and sound infrastructure deployment. The IMEC initiative’s evolution from its original linear configuration towards a flexible network of corridors is a pragmatic response to changing regional conditions. This is also supported by recent trade agreements, which inter alia seek to enhance soft connectivity. Notably, the 2025 UAE-Jordan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement contains provisions on customs facilitation, potential recognition of authorised operator programmes, and co-operation on the use of digital tools, and the EU-India Free Trade Agreement, expected to be signed in 2027, includes chapters on customs, trade facilitation and digital trade (see Chapter 3).
In line with these developments, interest in IMEC has grown beyond its initial signatories and original partners, Israel and Jordan. Already, these two countries, which are both mentioned in the MoU but are not signatories, have requested formal membership, and Jordan has established an Inter-Agency IMEC Task Force and is positioning the Port of Aqaba as a key IMEC hub.4 Since the European Commission signed the MoU, some European countries have expressed willingness to join, or at least become associates or partners, in IMEC. Greece has nominated a special envoy; Cyprus also designated an IMEC representative and launched the “Friends of IMEC” group with EU IMEC members and those interested to join (to date, this includes Greece, Croatia, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia); Croatia actively participates in key IMEC events; and Malta is showing increased interest. Egypt has also requested to take part in IMEC, receiving support from France, Italy and the European Commission.5 Lebanon is moving in the same direction to position the Beirut and Tripoli ports in emerging IMEC configurations. A first technical meeting on IMEC, led by the Minister of Public Works, took place in June 2026 (Daily Beirut, 2026[3]). Oman is de facto becoming a key component of the corridor network with three particularly relevant ports facing the Indian Ocean, Sohar, Duqm and Salalah. To overcome the lack of port-to-rail capacities, railway construction projects are emerging, such as the Hafeet rail connection between Abu Dhabi and Sohar.6 Syria could also emerge as a relevant transit country given the increased use of its ports since February 2026, though contingent on its economic and political stability. Already in 2025, CMA-CGM and DP World signed 30-year concession agreements with, respectively, the ports of Latakia and Tartus to support their modernisation and expansion.7 Other countries and ports could also, in the medium term, be associated with IMEC, when presenting alternative economically viable gateways.
Finally, linkages and synergies with adjacent corridors could be further explored, as requested by neighbouring countries. In particular, the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), linking the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas,8 the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and the Middle Corridor, connecting Central Asia to Europe (OECD, 2025[4]) (OECD, 2026[5]), the Western Balkans-East Mediterranean Corridor, the Scandinavian-Mediterranean Corridor, the Baltic-Adriatic corridor, as well as East African connections through the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Corridor, the Northern Corridor and the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor, have potential to complement and multiply the impact of IMEC. A thorough analysis of the links between these corridors and their major ports and IMEC would be relevant, as the widening scope of IMEC reinforces its role as a platform for regional and interregional co-operation, leading to its increasingly common designation as a “network of corridors”.
With the objective of becoming an integrated, trans-continental corridor for trade, clean energy, and digital connectedness, IMEC offers many potential benefits:
Enhanced trade: IMEC could reduce transport times and logistics costs between India and Europe, as well as regionally within the Middle East, through increased port capacities, improved port-to-rail and road integration, and more efficient multimodal transport systems with efficient logistics hubs. By connecting major production and consumption centres, the network of corridors may facilitate greater trade flows and improved market access.
Greater supply-chain resilience and diversification for economic security: By offering alternative trade routes that bypass traditional chokepoints and congested maritime corridors, IMEC could contribute to more resilient and diversified supply chains in response to geopolitical and economic disruptions.
Stronger economic co-operation and integration: Through shared infrastructure investments, co-ordinated and harmonised trade facilitation measures and policy co-ordination, IMEC, especially under its expanded new configuration, may deepen regional economic ties between participating economies and foster closer co-operation across the trade, energy and digital sectors, enhancing local value addition.
Green energy and digital connectivity’s improvements: Beyond transport infrastructure, the remaining two dimensions of IMEC aim to support the development of electricity interconnections, lay foundations of clean hydrogen supply chains, and create digital communication networks, contributing to energy security and digital integration frameworks.
Connectivity as an enabler for development: IMEC presents substantial economic benefits for the participating countries, their port hinterlands and their neighbours. Through its multimodal connectivity, IMEC encourages improved integration between the signatories and with neighbouring countries, generating positive externalities for regional economic development and integration. The recent crises have accelerated the move towards more diversified and secure trade routes that will better connect the countries, enhance their respective comparative advantages, and potentially increase prosperity, stability and peace in the region.
To ensure the coordinated and effective development of IMEC, dedicated studies are needed to assist signatories, participants and partners. Some countries and think tanks have already produced comprehensive studies, some of them not public (for example the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France and Egis (Ministère de l’Europe et des Affaires Étrangères de la France et Egis, 2025[6]), the German Energy Agency (Dena) (German Energy Agency (Dena), 2025[7]), ISPI (Italian Institute for International Political Studies, 2026[8]) (Valeria Talbot, 2026[9]), ORF with regular articles, ECES (Nilanjan Ghosh et al., 2025[10]), the Atlantic Council (Afaq Hussain and Nicholas Shafer, 2025[11]) (Afaq Hussain and Maisoon H. Kafafy, 2026[12]) or RIS (Research and Information System for Developing Countries, 2025[13]). With this report, the OECD contributes to enhancing the understanding of IMEC’s opportunities and challenges, support informed decision-making, strengthen trust and partnerships, and promote a coherent and co-ordinated approach to the future development of IMEC.
References
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← 1. The Joint European Union-India Comprehensive Strategic Agenda, endorsed at the Summit, calls for deepened strategic collaboration under IMEC “to diversify trade routes, reduce strategic dependencies, promote regional integration, and future-proof supply chains, including support to infrastructure development, maritime, rail, digital, and energy” (European Commission, 2026[14]).
← 2. The bill calls for institutionalising strategic dialogues with IMEC and regional partners, and for supporting cross-border infrastructure projects and energy interconnectors. The legislation had advanced through congressional committees (including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June 2026) but still needs to be signed.
← 3. Syria’s maritime trade has been increasing since February 2026. Lloyd’s List Intelligence data (Lloyd’s List Intelligence, 2026[15]) shows cargo-carrying vessels made 92 traceable calls to Syria’s Banias, Tartous and Latakia ports in July, up 338% from 21 calls in July last year.
← 4. The Joint Statement of the EU-Jordan Summit, held in Amman on 8 January 2026 (Council of the European Union and Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2026[16]), underlines Jordan's importance in the development of IMEC and mentions that the EU will explore ways to further enhance secure and resilient connectivity in Jordan. The country also organised a conference on “Beyond Hormuz: Jordan as an Anchor of Broader Middle East Integration” on 15 June 2026, positioning itself as a central component of IMEC. The relevance of the Port of Aqaba, not initially along the route, is also growing due to the regional tensions.
← 5. At the June 2025 summit “For a Better Connected Mediterranean”, organised in the margins of the 3rd UN Oceans Conference (UNOC), France, Italy and the European Commission for the Mediterranean expressed support for incorporating Egypt into IMEC (Elysée, 2025[17]). The Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES) also proposed an IMEC derivative (IMEC-E), building on the development of Egypt’s high-speed electric train network, logistic corridors, and the Saudi-Egypt Golden Bridge project (train ferries crossing the Red Sea from Jeddah to Egypt) (Nilanjan Ghosh et al., 2025[10]).
← 6. On 3 September 2026, Oman ratified an agreement to develop a rail connection with the UAE. Implemented by Hafeet Rail (a joint venture between Etihad Rail (UAE), Oman Rail, and the Emirati sovereign wealth fund Mubadala), this 238-km railway line will connect Abu Dhabi to Sohar at an estimated cost of USD 2.5 billion. It will facilitate passenger transport and cut freight transit times between Sohar and Abu Dhabi from the five to eight hours required for transport by road to approximately one hour and 40 minutes by rail – a 70% reduction in travel time (Service économique régional, 2026[18]).
← 7. CMA CGM Group accelerates launching the second phase of Latakia Port Expansion Project in Syria (CMA CGM, 2025[21]) Tartus Port - Syria Port Operations (DP World, 2026[19]).
← 8. The Three Seas Summit on 28-29 April 2026 in Dubrovnik resulted in a Declaration by the 13 members of the Initiative (EU countries located between the Adriatic, Baltic, and Black Seas) committing to the expansion of partnerships with economic corridors adjacent to the Three Seas region, namely the Trans-Caspian Corridor and IMEC (Three Seas Initiative, 2026[20]).