Advancing the green transition is essential for reconciling robust economic growth with national and global sustainability objectives. This chapter explores the extent to which greening policies and initiatives in the Western Balkans have translated into convergence with the EU. Specifically, it examines efforts to accelerate decarbonisation, highlighting both achievements and ongoing challenges in reducing carbon emissions and increasing renewable energy capacity. In tandem, it assesses progress in enhancing resource efficiency and circularity, particularly in the management of key resources and waste, to foster the more sustainable use, consumption and production of resources across the region.
Economic Convergence Scoreboard for the Western Balkans 2025
Abstract
Although the greening cluster was the third strongest area of performance in the Western Balkans during 2020-23, progress has decelerated over the last decade. Figure 6.1 depicts each economy’s overall convergence in the greening cluster, with scores reflecting their relative distance from the EU average. It also breaks down the performance of the individual economies across six key indicators that measure progress in the green transition, along with the regional average for each indicator.
Note: The scores – both overall and for individual indicators – were calculated to reflect each economy’s performance relative to the EU average, which is set at 100. The exact values for each indicator are presented in the graphs within the subsequent analysis section. For more information about the calculation of the scores, as well as the overall methodological approach, please consult the Methodology Annex.
Despite being the third highest scoring cluster, the region reached only 47% of EU levels between 2020 and 2023. Moreover, the overall trend has been one of divergence, as the gap with the EU has grown by 11 points since 2014-16. This growing disparity reflects instances where convergence has lagged despite improvement – owing to the EU’s more rapid pace – and where performance has stagnated or even deteriorated. Of the five economies that experienced divergence rather than convergence, four recorded drops of more than 10 points in relation to the EU average. In contrast, Albania not only leads the region – surpassing the EU average in this cluster – but also stands as the sole economy to have gained ground in relation to the EU over the examined period.
The green transition across the Western Balkans is constrained by the slow pace of progress towards decarbonisation. The region’s CO2 emissions intensity is nearly double the EU average, and despite some advances, this gap with the EU continues to widen, driven mostly by the region’s continued heavy reliance on fossil fuels. Additionally, low levels of energy productivity – approximately 80% of the EU average – contribute to elevated emissions, highlighting inefficiencies in the region’s energy use. Nonetheless, efforts to transition towards renewable energy have intensified, with steady increases in installed capacity across the region, although certain sources, such as solar and wind, remain underutilised.
This sluggish progress on decarbonisation mirrors the limited advances in improving resource efficiency and circularity. Waste intensity in the Western Balkans substantially exceeds that of the EU, and the combination of rising municipal waste generation and insufficient prevention and treatment risks further widening this gap. Moreover, waste disposal in landfills continues to be a challenging issue, with rates more than 3.5 times the EU average due to limited capacity for separate waste collection and recycling. Similarly, water productivity rates remain at just 33% of EU levels, with inadequate infrastructure and high levels of pollution posing ongoing risks to the long-term sustainability of water resources.
Accelerating the green transition is crucial to ensuring that the economic growth and convergence of the Western Balkans with the EU is not only robust but also sustainable. As global markets increasingly prioritise decarbonisation, advancing green policies will be essential for the region to maintain competitiveness while addressing pressing environmental challenges to improve the well-being of citizens.
Between 2020 and 2023, the Western Balkans recorded an average CO2 emissions intensity of 0.26 kilogrammes (kg) per USD – more than twice the EU average (Figure 6.2). Albania is the top regional performer and the only economy to achieve emissions intensity levels below those of the EU. In contrast, Kosovo continues to exhibit the highest intensity in the region, although it has made considerable progress in lowering its levels since 2014-16. Yet, while all six economies succeeded in reducing their emissions intensity, these decreases fell short of the pace required to narrow the gap with the EU, resulting in further divergence.
CO2 emissions from fuel combustion (kg) per unit of GDP in 2021 USD in PPP
Notes: Data are unavailable for Bosnia and Herzegovina (2023), Kosovo (2014, 2023), Montenegro (2023), North Macedonia (2023), Serbia (2023) and the EU (2023). PPP = purchasing power parity.
Sources: (World Bank, 2025[1]). OECD calculations based on (IEA, 2024[2]) and (World Bank, 2024[3]) for Kosovo.
Given the role of emissions in driving climate change and the Western Balkans’ vulnerability to its impacts, climate change mitigation policies have gained momentum, increasingly focusing on emissions reductions through 2030 targets (OECD, 2024[4]). However, the region has faced significant delays in adopting and implementing National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs), which are essential for meeting these targets. As of February 2025, only Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia had successfully adopted NECPs.1
The region's high CO2 emissions are largely attributable to its heavy reliance on fossil fuels in energy production, with coal accounting for more than 60% of power generation in Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Albania stands out as an exception, relying exclusively on renewable sources. Across most of the region, this dependence on fossil fuels is reinforced by substantial subsidies and support measures, distorting energy markets: between 2018 and 2023, financial support and induced transfers2 allocated to fossil fuels totalled over EUR 15.5 billion, or approximately 2.2% of the region’s GDP (OECD, 2025[5]). For context, this represents more than half of the public spending on education, which averaged 3.7% of GDP over the same timeframe.3
Transport is another major contributor to carbon emissions and remains the fastest-growing source of greenhouse gas emissions (World Bank, 2024[6]). In 2023, the region had an average of 304 passenger cars per thousand inhabitants, which although well below the EU average of 570 still represents a 45% increase on 2015, outpacing the EU's 11% growth over the same period (Eurostat, 2025[7]). Economies like Albania and Kosovo have established strategic frameworks that integrate sustainable transport considerations and set emission reduction targets across various modes of transportation. Many economies have also introduced measures to promote low- and zero-emission vehicles, including tax exemptions and subsidies for the purchase of electric cars in Serbia and the construction of charging infrastructure in Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia (OECD, 2024[4]). Additionally, several economies in the region have promoted more sustainable urban mobility by encouraging greater use of public transport, such as Serbia's introduction of free transport in Belgrade, or by modernising existing systems, as seen in Kosovo’s introduction of electric buses and replacement of older buses in Pristina (Mullin, 2025[8]; OECD, 2024[9]). Yet, beyond these notable examples in urban centres, a pressing need remains for more investment and planning in sustainable public and rail transport (see the Infrastructure chapter for more details).
The slow progress on the carbon pricing across most of the region, reflected in the absence of carbon taxes for large industrial polluters, leaves businesses with little incentive to reduce emissions. While most economies have committed to aligning with the EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) and introducing carbon pricing instruments as part of their climate strategies, only Montenegro has implemented an ETS. For any planned carbon pricing mechanisms to be effective, the Western Balkans must revisit fossil fuel subsides and improve the alignment of fuel excise taxes with the EU.4
Carbon pricing is crucial not only for meeting climate goals but also for mitigating the impact of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).5 In the absence of domestic carbon pricing mechanisms, the CBAM is expected to heavily affect Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, given their export structures and the large volume of CBAM-covered goods. However, these economies remain ill-prepared for CBAM’s introduction, with limited efforts to equip the private sector for upcoming obligations.
Building on efforts to reduce emissions, the transition to renewable energy has become a pivotal focus for the Western Balkans. Between 2020 and 2023, the region’s average installed renewable capacity stood at 52% of total power capacity, slightly surpassing the EU average of 49.5% (Figure 6.3). Although these averages may seem comparable, the Western Balkans' figure is predominantly driven by Albania (96.4%) and Montenegro (78.7%), with the other economies in the region falling behind. For example, only 12.9% of Kosovo’s power capacity is from renewable sources. Moreover, while all economies have made some progress in recent years, the growth has been modest in comparison to the EU: the regional average increased by less than 5 percentage points in 2014-16, while the EU’s installed renewable capacity grew by 13 percentage points, contributing to a widening gap.
Percentage (of installed power capacities)
Source: (IRENA, 2024[10]).
Hydropower generation dominates the region's renewable energy capacity, representing 77.3% of total capacity in 2023, compared to just 16.9% in the EU (IRENA, 2024[10]). This disparity results in a significantly lower level of diversification in the Western Balkans than in the EU (Table 6.1). Growth in this installed capacity has largely been driven by preferential feed-in tariffs6 that primarily target small hydropower plants, although these mechanisms are now being phased out or discontinued (CEE Bankwatch Network, 2022[11]).
In percentage of total installed renewable power capacities
Notes: “Hydropower” excludes pure pumped storage; “Wind” includes onshore and offshore wind energy; “Solar” includes solar photovoltaic, concentrated solar power; “Bioenergy” includes solid biofuels, renewable waste, liquid biofuels and biogas.
Source: (IRENA, 2024[10]).
While the region possesses considerable potential for non-hydro renewables, growth in their capacity has been slow. By 2023, onshore wind and solar power production reached only 2% and 4% of their respective technical potential – the estimated maximum capacity for deployment based on natural resources, topography and technological limitations (IRENA, 2024[12]). However, there has been a growing shift towards expanding these sources, as evidenced by competitive auctions designed to promote their uptake and diversification.7 For example, in 2023, Serbia auctioned 400 megawatts (MW) of wind power and allocated 25.2 MW for four solar energy projects, while Albania held its first successful onshore wind auction (OECD, 2024[4]).
Further progress is hindered by the region’s strong economic reliance on fossil fuels, chiefly coal. Coal is widely perceived to be a cheap domestically produced option. However, this perception can be misleading, as ageing plants require costly retrofitting to meet environmental standards, and energy losses further increase production costs.
The large economic footprint of coal-related activities poses challenges to the phase-out of coal, with an estimated 138 000 jobs linked to coal mining and coal-based power generation across the region (Ruiz Castello et al., 2021[13]). A transition away from coal could lead to job losses of up to 1.3% of total employment in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 1.4% in Kosovo (Bechev, 2023[14]). The challenge is further exacerbated by insufficient social protection and adjustment support, such as labour market programmes to reskill workers for the green transition, which could help allay public concerns by ensuring a just phase-out.8
Decarbonisation and the increased generation of renewables can improve energy productivity, a key measure of how efficiently an economy utilises energy to produce goods and services. In the Western Balkans, energy productivity remained around 80% of EU levels for the period 2020-23 (Figure 6.4); however, it has either stagnated or declined – except in Albania – mirroring a similar trend within the EU. Economies with larger service sectors, on average, tend to perform better,9 as services typically consume less energy relative to output than the industrial sector. Albania stands out as the only Western Balkan economy exceeding the EU average, while Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo trail significantly, reaching only about half of EU levels at less than USD 7 per kg.
GDP per kg of oil equivalent consumption, in 2021 USD in PPP
Note: Data are unavailable for Bosnia and Herzegovina (2023), Kosovo (2023), Montenegro (2023), North Macedonia (2023), Serbia (2023) and the EU (2023).
Source: OECD estimates from (Eurostat, 2024[15]).
The Western Balkan economies have intensified their efforts to increase energy efficiency, driven by the adoption and development of new policies and legislation; however, strengthening legal frameworks remains a priority. In particular, the adoption of additional secondary legislation is needed to fully align with the EU and Energy Community acquis10 and ensure the effective implementation of commitments (OECD, 2024[4]).
A major challenge to improving energy efficiency is the inefficient heating of buildings, which accounts for over 40% of the region's total energy consumption (European Commission, 2022[16]). Many of these buildings rely on solid fuels (such as wood, lignite and coal) for heating and are poorly insulated. This is compounded by the fact that most were constructed before modern energy efficiency standards were established (OECD, 2022[17]). In response, the region is enhancing energy performance audits and certification systems for residential and commercial buildings, alongside developing long-term renovation strategies to improve energy efficiency. Serbia is the only economy in the region that has adopted a strategic framework to address this issue. Energy efficiency funds are emerging as key investment tools for improving the efficiency of both public and private buildings,11 with such funds already implemented in Kosovo and Montenegro and a similar initiative being prepared in North Macedonia (OECD, 2024[4]). The EU, through the Western Balkan Investment Framework, is further supporting energy efficiency efforts in multi-apartment buildings and older blocks of flats through dedicated support schemes (European Commission, 2022[18]).
Like energy productivity, water productivity – which measures the efficiency with which an economy utilises its water resources – in the Western Balkans has stagnated in relation to the EU, reflecting the region’s limited efficiency in utilising water resources. Between 2020 and 2023, the Western Balkans achieved approximately one-third of the EU’s water productivity, at a rate of USD 25.9 per cubic metre of total freshwater withdrawal (Figure 6.5). While this marks some improvement from the 2014-16 period (+USD 3.1 per cubic metre), convergence with the EU remains limited, as EU gains were significantly larger (+USD 9.0). Moreover, nearly all the improvement in the Western Balkan average is attributable to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which experienced a 58% increase in this indicator during the observed period. In contrast, North Macedonia, the region’s weakest performer, saw a decline of more than 40%, with its water productivity now at just 27% of the regional average and less than 10% of the EU average.
GDP per cubic metre of total freshwater withdrawal, in 2015 USD in PPP
Note: Data are unavailable for Bosnia and Herzegovina (2022, 2023), Kosovo (2021, 2022, 2023), Montenegro (2022, 2023), North Macedonia (2022, 2023), Serbia (2022, 2023) and the EU (2022, 2023).
Sources: (World Bank, 2024[19]). OECD calculations based on additional data sent by KAS for Kosovo, (World Bank, 2024[3]) and (European Environment Agency, 2024[20]).
One key driver of the notable differences between Western Balkan economies in water productivity is the varying degree of reliance on irrigated agriculture, a water-intensive sector that accounts for approximately 66% of freshwater withdrawals in upper-middle income countries such as those in the Western Balkans (Fujs and Kashiwase, 2023[21]). This dependence on irrigation is influenced by a range of factors, ranging from environmental conditions to infrastructural capacities. For instance, the region’s underperforming economies face rainfall patterns that are either low, as in Serbia and North Macedonia,12 or irregular, as in Albania (where only 20% of precipitation occurs during the summer months), which necessitates greater reliance on irrigation to maintain stable agricultural production (Sinha et al., 2022[22]). Together, these three economies account for 91% of the region's irrigated land, indicating a strong dependence on freshwater withdrawals. In contrast, the stronger performing economies, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, irrigate only a small fraction of their potential land (7% and 5%, respectively13). The topography of these economies also plays a role: both are characterised by predominantly hilly-mountainous terrain, which is better suited for crops such as fruits, vegetables and nuts rather than water-intensive crops such as cereals, resulting in limited or no irrigation.
High levels of water pollution also pose a challenge to further increasing water productivity by reducing the availability and quality of water for economic activities, particularly in the agricultural sector. The increasing use of pesticides and insecticides has exacerbated water contamination, harming ecosystems and reducing agricultural yields by degrading soil quality and introducing toxicity (OECD, 2024[4]). Although revised legal and policy frameworks across the region emphasise reducing groundwater pollution, underdeveloped treatment infrastructure has resulted in only 20% of wastewater being treated (WAREG, 2021[23]).
The region’s overall low water productivity is also linked to deficiencies in infrastructure. In agriculture, outdated and inefficient irrigation and drainage systems cause significant water losses through evaporation, runoff and seepage. These issues stem from factors such as the age of construction (given that many systems were built decades ago), lack of maintenance, and mismatches between farm structures and existing irrigation systems following land redistribution processes. This infrastructure problem extends beyond agriculture, also affecting public water supply and sanitation systems. Most Western Balkan economies face high water losses in distribution, with non-revenue water – which is water supplied into a distribution system but subsequently lost or unaccounted for – averaging between 55% and 67% of the total, which can lead to higher freshwater abstractions to compensate for these inefficiencies and meet demand (WAREG, 2021[23]).
Waste intensity, which measures the municipal waste generated per unit of GDP (in 2021 USD in PPP), reflects the interplay between economic growth, resource use and sustainability. In the period 2020-23, the Western Balkan economies exhibited relatively high waste intensity levels, with a regional average of 20.2 grams/USD, which was 1.5 times the EU’s average of 12.7 grams/USD (Figure 6.6). Variation among economies is relatively limited, with Kosovo reporting the highest figure at 21.7 grams/USD and Bosnia and Herzegovina the lowest at 17.8 grams/USD. However, the region’s average shows a slight decrease from 2014-16, driven by the significant reductions in waste intensity in both Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Municipal waste generated per unit of GDP, in grams per 2021 USD in PPP
Note: Data are unavailable for Bosnia and Herzegovina (2020, 2021, 2023), Kosovo (2014, 2016), North Macedonia (2016, 2023), Serbia (2023) and the EU (2023).
Source: (Eurostat, 2024[24]).
Despite generating less municipal waste per capita than the EU (386 kg between 2020-23, or approximately 75% of EU levels14), rising GDP per capita across the region (see the Context chapter for more details) – driven by higher disposable incomes – is leading to increased waste generation. Overall, per capita waste levels continue to grow: since 2014-16, waste per capita in the Western Balkans has risen by 42 kg, slightly exceeding the 37 kg increase observed in the EU (Eurostat, 2024[24]).
Actual waste generation in the Western Balkans may be higher than reported due to the lack of reliable data. In some cases, underreporting may result from inadequate monitoring and reporting mechanisms. Waste data may rely on estimates from municipalities or private companies or be derived from metrics such as population size. Several economies have taken steps to improve data quality, including the installation of weighing bridges in Albania to better track waste entering landfills and the introduction of electronic systems for waste data collection in Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia (OECD, 2024[4]; European Environment Agency, 2022[25]).
Despite rising waste levels, waste prevention and treatment practices remain insufficient. Incentives to reduce waste, such as “pay-as-you-throw” schemes, are either absent, as in Albania, Kosovo and North Macedonia, or largely ineffective (Korançe, Mahmutović and Midžić-Kurtagić, 2022[26]). Across most Western Balkan economies, awareness-raising initiatives aimed at educating citizens and businesses about waste prevention and sustainable consumption habits remain inconsistent. Serbia, however, has introduced measures to promote the sustainable use of resources from 2025 onwards.15
Meanwhile, there are positive signs pointing to the increased alignment of waste generation with circular economy principles to minimise waste and promote sustainable production and consumption practices. As of December 2024, five of the six Western Balkan economies have adopted circular economy roadmaps, reflecting growing regional commitment. Moreover, Montenegro and Serbia have launched dedicated policies and programmes to support businesses and local governments in transitioning to a circular economy.16 Recognising the private sector’s pivotal role in this transition, governments have provided targeted technical and financial support to help businesses adopt circular practices. Additionally, chambers of commerce in several economies, including Montenegro and Serbia, are establishing stakeholder platforms to raise awareness, build capacity and facilitate knowledge exchange (OECD, 2024[4]).
As municipal waste generation continues to rise, managing its disposal remains a pressing challenge. The share of municipal waste destined for landfills is more than 3.5 times that of the EU, making it the weakest area of performance within the greening cluster (Figure 6.7). Both the level and pace of convergence remain low, with landfill usage stagnating or increasing in five of the six economies between 2014-16 and 2020-23, in contrast to a nearly 4 percentage point decline observed in the EU. While North Macedonia appears to lead the region, this likely reflects its high percentage of waste with unknown treatment or storage (European Environment Agency, 2022[25]). Kosovo maintains the highest rate in the region at 99% of municipal waste disposed in landfills, showing minimal progress since 2014-16.
Percentage (of municipal waste)
Note: Data are unavailable for Bosnia and Herzegovina (2020, 2021, 2023), Kosovo (2014, 2016), North Macedonia (2016, 2023) and the EU (2023).
Source: (Eurostat, 2024[24]).
Inadequate infrastructure for sorting, collecting and recycling waste hampers efforts to reduce landfill disposal rates (OECD, 2024[4]). Despite legislation mandating waste separation at source in all six economies, the lack of infrastructure makes implementation inconsistent or impossible. In several economies, such as Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia, progress is limited to small-scale pilot programmes focused on collecting recyclable materials (e.g. paper, cardboard, plastics).
A chief obstacle to enhancing this infrastructure is the limited funding available, with municipal waste collection fees often failing to cover basic operational costs let alone the construction and maintenance of the necessary infrastructure. Furthermore, some waste collectors resort to illegal, “zero-cost” dumpsites, which remain widespread despite remediation efforts in economies such as Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia, further reducing funds for enhancing waste management systems (European Environment Agency, 2022[25]; OECD, 2024[4]).
As a result, the region continues to fall short of achieving the coverage and efficiency needed to achieve significant improvements in recycling rates. While all economies have outlined legal obligations and recycling targets within their relevant strategies, recycling rates remain low, dropping to as little as 2-3% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Serbia.17 In response to the lack of infrastructure for recycling, the informal sector has emerged as the primary actor responsible for collecting recyclable waste across the region (OECD, 2024[4]). While this informal system partially compensates for infrastructure gaps, it exacerbates challenges in data collection – making it difficult to monitor progress towards waste management targets – and it can lead to health and environmental hazards due to lack of equipment and training.
Extended producer responsibility (EPR) schemes have been proposed as an emerging solution to reduce landfill use and promote recycling by shifting the financial burden of waste management from the public sector to producers and consumers. EPR schemes are already in place in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, although further enforcement is needed to ensure their effectiveness.18 Kosovo and Albania have outlined plans to introduce such schemes in revised waste legislation (OECD, 2024[4]).19
References
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← 1. Although Montenegro has not yet officially adopted its plan, the final draft has been submitted to the European Commission Secretariat for review.
← 2. Induced transfers are estimated subsidies arising from regulatory interventions and price support policies that lower end-user prices compared to the actual cost of supply.
← 3. This figure is based on available data from Western Balkan economies for the period 2018-2022. The regional average was calculated as the unweighted mean across economies with available data; those with missing years were excluded from the calculation. Data for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia came from (World Bank, 2025[30]). Data for Kosovo are from (Kosova Education Center, 2021[32]). Data for Montenegro came from (ETF, 2024[33]). Data for North Macedonia are from (Shapkova Kocevska, 2023[31]).
← 4. It is worth mentioning that Serbia established a monitoring, reporting and verification system for greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources in 2021, which was a prerequisite for the implementation of an ETS. The issuance of emissions permits under this system is currently underway, and all submitted applications have been successfully processed, with 88 permits issued to date.
← 5. The CBAM imposes financial charges on certain imported goods, encouraging non-EU producers to adopt greener production methods. Acting as an import duty, it affects economies that export significant volumes of CBAM-covered products such as electricity, aluminium, iron and steel, hydrogen, cement, and fertilisers. The CBAM aims to drive transformations in the industry and energy sectors of trading partners. Mitigating strategies include emission reduction efforts by exporting companies, government support through incentives or financial assistance, and the introduction of carbon pricing mechanisms (OECD, 2024[4]).
← 6. Feed-in tariffs are policy mechanisms designed to encourage the adoption of renewable energy by providing guaranteed payments to renewable energy producers for the electricity that they generate and feed into the grid.
← 7. This expansion of auctions aligns with the broader trend of the region moving towards greater conformity with the EU’s Clean Energy Package, including the adoption of laws to promote renewable energy.
← 8. Several of the region’s economies have adopted just transition strategies, including Serbia’s 2019 Roadmap for a Just Transition, North Macedonia’s Roadmap for a Just Transition (adopted in 2023) and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s draft Roadmap for the Transition of Coal-Rich Regions (developed in 2023).
← 9. It is important to note that this trend is not universal, as other key factors, such as infrastructure quality and renewable energy consumption, can also play a role. For example, whereas North Macedonia and Montenegro have comparable levels of energy productivity, their economic structures differ. In the case of industry, the share (as a percentage of GDP) in North Macedonia in 2023 was 23.3%, while in Montenegro, this proportion was only 12.5% (World Bank, 2025[27]).
← 10. For more information on the Energy Community’s acquis, see: https://energy-community.org/legal/acquis.html.
← 11. While these energy efficiency funds are not exclusively dedicated to improving the efficiency of buildings, this does constitute a sizeable proportion of their portfolios. For example, North Macedonia’s fund has received financing of EUR 40.4 million to largely invest in public buildings, and Montenegro’s Eco Fund supports initiatives that enable both citizens and businesses to use solar panels to generate electricity and thus boost energy efficiency.
← 12. In 2024, North Macedonia and Serbia experienced the lowest levels of total annual precipitation in the region, registering 722 millimetres and 680 millimetres, respectively. This is far below the levels observed in other economies such as Montenegro (1 488 mm) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (1 133 mm) (Our World in Data, 2025[34]).
← 13. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, only 15 000 hectares of a potential 285 000 hectares are irrigated, and in Kosovo, only 20 000 hectares of a potential 280 000 are irrigated. For more, see the respective economy profiles in (OECD, 2024[4]).
← 14. For the period 2020-23, the region’s municipal waste generation averaged 386 kgs, ranging from 267 kgs in Kosovo to 513 kgs in Montenegro. In contrast, the EU average reached 521 kgs in the same period (Eurostat, 2024[24]).
← 15. On 20 February 2025, the Serbian government adopted the Waste Prevention Plan, which sets goals and priority areas for waste prevention, as well as measures for implementation for the period 2025-30.
← 16. Specifically, Montenegro launched its National Circular Economy Strategy 2021-25. In the case of Serbia, the new Circular Economy Development Programme for 2025-30 is currently under preparation, following the expiration of the previous programme (2022-24) at the end of 2024. The new programme is expected to be adopted by the end of June 2025.
← 17. Although recycling rates across the Western Balkans tend to be outdated and collected on an ad hoc basis, available figures place recycling rates in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia between 2‑3%. The specific estimates are as follows: 2.5% in Kosovo (KOHA, 2024[28]), 2.2% in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 3.0% in Serbia (CENER, 2023[29]).
← 18. Also of note, Serbia has taken significant steps in 2023 to strengthen the enforcement of EPR schemes. These measures include the adoption of the Sludge Management Programme for the period 2023-2032, as well as amendments to the Law on Waste Management. Additionally, Serbia has implemented legislation for managing specific waste streams and the regulation on the management of sludge from municipal wastewater treatment plants. Looking ahead, Serbia has plans to introduce a deposit return system for packaging waste in 2027.
← 19. In a related effort, Montenegro introduced a ban on single-use plastics and imposed new fees on plastic bags in October 2024 to reduce plastic waste generation.