Infrastructure and connectivity play a crucial role in fostering economic growth and regional integration by enhancing transport, energy and digital networks. This chapter explores the extent to which the Western Balkan economies, in comparison with the EU, have developed the infrastructure that serves as a foundational driver of economic growth. It first assesses the density of road and rail infrastructure and then delves into the performance of energy infrastructure, focusing on power losses and the cost of electricity. Finally, it analyses the level of development of digital infrastructure.
Economic Convergence Scoreboard for the Western Balkans 2025
Abstract
While the Western Balkan economies have made some notable strides in improving infrastructure and connectivity (IC), the region still lags behind the EU. Figure 2.1 presents each economy’s performance alongside the seven key indicators on IC development used to monitor progress and calculate scores. The average regional performance for each indicator is also shown.
Note: The scores – both overall and for individual indicators – were calculated to reflect each economy’s performance relative to the EU average, which is set at 100. The exact values for each indicator are presented in the graphs within the subsequent analysis section. For more information about the calculation of the scores, as well as the overall methodological approach, please consult the Methodology Annex.
The overall regional trend is positive, with the region slightly narrowing the gap with the EU by nearly six points between 2014 and 2023. However, with a score of 39 IC is the second lowest-scoring cluster. Among the Western Balkans, Montenegro is positioned as the regional leader, while Albania ranks lowest.
Over the last decade, the Western Balkan economies have invested significant resources in upgrading road infrastructure; however, it remains relatively underdeveloped compared to EU averages, with average road density at about 23% of EU levels. In contrast, until recently, railway transport has not been sufficiently considered in investment plans, leading to a deterioration of the railway network and a continuous decline in freight transport, which accounts for less than 5% of the EU average. The economic returns from transport investment projects also raise concerns given shortcomings in the related policy frameworks, especially regarding the transparency of project selection.
In parallel, the Western Balkans have made substantial investments to close the gap with the EU in digital infrastructure, achieving convergence in mobile cellular penetration across most economies. However, gaps persist in the development of high-speed networks, as the region's average broadband speed is less than 50% of the EU average. Furthermore, making these high-speed networks financially accessible to Western Balkan consumers while extending coverage to rural areas remains a key challenge.
After decades of underinvestment, the energy infrastructure gap has become critical in the region, as evidenced by the high levels of power losses. However, despite increasing inefficiencies generated by the ageing energy infrastructure, the reliance on domestic coal coupled with substantial fossil fuel subsidies have kept electricity costs relatively low in most of the region, although EU accession prospects will put increasing pressure on the sustainability of low electricity prices.
Infrastructure and connectivity are essential for accelerating economic convergence. Well-developed transport, energy and digital infrastructure facilitate trade, reduce production costs, and create a more competitive and integrated market, fostering long-term economic growth.
The insufficient quality and coverage of core public transport infrastructure can be a significant obstacle to higher economic growth and faster income convergence, as inadequate transport networks can severely constrain the connectivity of producers and consumers to global and regional markets. In the Western Balkan economies, road infrastructure is less developed than in the EU, with an average density of 38 km per 100 km², compared to 168 km in the EU (Figure 2.2). Montenegro stands out with an average road density of 63.4 km in 2020-23, which, as in the other economies, has remained unchanged since 2014-16.
There are lower population densities in the Western Balkans compared to the EU, averaging 85 vs. 112 inhabitants per km2 (World Bank, 2025[1]),1 and the region’s mountainous topography limits the potential for dense networks. As a result, complete convergence in road densities towards the EU cannot be expected. However, the infrastructure gaps remain evident. Even when compared to neighbouring EU economies with roughly similar geographical and population characteristics, such as Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece and Romania, which have an average road density of 69 km per 100 square kilometres, the Western Balkan average is still half (OECD, 2025[2]).
Km per 100 km2 area
Note: Data are unavailable for Bosnia and Herzegovina (2014, 2015, 2022, 2023).
Sources: (OECD, 2025[2]). Data for Albania sent by INSTAT to the OECD. Data for Kosovo sent by KAS to the OECD. Data for Montenegro sent by MONSTAT to the OECD.
Over the last ten years, the Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF)2 has provided substantial financial resources to connect the region to the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T).3 In the years following the launch of the WBIF, the Western Balkan economies have achieved notably high levels of investment4 in road infrastructure, even exceeding those seen in the EU. North Macedonia, Albania, Serbia and Kosovo have dedicated more than 1% of their GDP annually since 2019 to road infrastructure, compared to an EU average of 0.6% (OECD, 2024[3]). In particular, Serbia more than tripled its investment spending between 2013 and 2022, from EUR 273.5 million to EUR 791.3 million, while North Macedonia nearly doubled its spending, rising from EUR 90.5 million to EUR 161.7 million (OECD, 2024[4]).5 Regarding maintenance spending,6 available data indicate increasing efforts in most Western Balkan economies, albeit to varying degrees. Serbia has provided the most maintenance spending, increasing from EUR 126.5 million in 2013 to EUR 318.0 million in 2022 (OECD, 2024[4]), reaching 0.67% of GDP in 2022 compared to 0.28% in the EU.7 Spending has also risen in Kosovo and Albania, but efforts remain below the EU average at respectively 0.19% and 0.14% of GDP. In North Macedonia, annual spending remained below EUR 10 million over 2013-22 and stood for only 0.04% of GDP in 2022, posing challenges to the sustainability of road infrastructure.
Despite these efforts, road density in the Western Balkans has not increased, with investments primarily focused on upgrading existing roads rather than constructing new ones. Funding by international financial institutions has been mostly earmarked for transnational corridors and the rehabilitation of rural roads rather than the expansion of local road networks. Between 2009 and 2023, some 843 km of roads were upgraded in the region through the WBIF, while only 178 km were built (WBIF, 2024[5]).8
Slow project implementation processes and bureaucratic hurdles contribute to delays in transport infrastructure development. Most road extension projects in the region suffer delays of over two years following their approval (OECD, 2024[3]). This is particularly pronounced in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where co-operation challenges between state and entity-level institutions further impede progress.
Despite significant investments in transport infrastructure over the past decade, economic gains may remain limited due to inadequately developed selection criteria for transport projects. Across the region, there is scarce evidence that infrastructure investments are systematically assessed against a comprehensive set of economic, social and environmental criteria. Non-transparent procurement practices pose an obstacle to transport infrastructure development by undermining cost-efficiency and, ultimately, public trust. For instance, in North Macedonia, the State Audit Office9 identified a lack of transparency in the selection process of the 73 transport infrastructure projects funded by the WBIF (Gallop, 2024[6]).
Rail has the potential to contribute significantly to the growth of a competitive and green economy by enabling a sustainable and seamless mobility network. Although the rail infrastructure gap with the EU is less pronounced than the gap for roads, the trend remains unfavourable for Western Balkan economies, with rail density not improving in any economy (Figure 2.3). The regional average stands at 2.2 km per 100 km² in 2020-23, down from 2.4 km in 2014-16, which is less than half the levels of the EU (5.1 km). Notably, the Western Balkan average reduction has largely been driven by decreases observed for Serbia and Albania, with railway densities dropping from 4.3 km and 1.2 km in 2014-16 to 3.7 km and 0.8 km in 2020-23, respectively.
As discussed with road density, challenging topography and low population densities makes full convergence with the EU unlikely for rail density; however, even compared to neighbouring EU economies with similar characteristics, the infrastructure gap is visible. The average rail infrastructure density in Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece and Romania reached 4.3 km per 100 km² in 2020-23, which is around two times higher than the Western Balkan average.
Km per 100 Km2 area
Note: Data are unavailable for Kosovo (2014, 2015, 2023).
Source: (Eurostat, 2024[7]).
As with roads, rail infrastructure development faces implementation challenges. In addition, railways have suffered from continuous structural disinvestment, as investment in road infrastructure has overshadowed rail spending (WBIF, 2024[5]). In 2022, available data for Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia indicated that investment in rail amounted to, respectively, 8.5%, 14.4% and 25.8% of investment in road infrastructure (OECD, 2024[4]), compared to the EU average of 50% (OECD, 2024[3]).
This lack of investment, especially in maintenance, has led to the deterioration of railways and is thus a primary cause of decreasing rail density in some of the region’s economies. Only 15% of the overall investment earmarked for the maintenance of the TEN-T was realised in 2023 (Transport Community, 2023[8]). Due to a lack of funding, maintenance operations are fragmented and often focus on isolated sections of the railway instead of promoting comprehensive network improvements.10 Underinvestment in maintenance has also been aggravated by a staffing shortage across all railway segments, from operations to management, which has contributed to the further degradation of the railway infrastructure (Transport Community, 2023[8]).
However, a shift towards investments prioritising rail transport is expected as part of implementation of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans 2021-27 (WBIF, 2024[5]). While only one transport infrastructure project related to rail infrastructure under the WBIF framework has been successfully implemented over the last ten years,11 railways are expected to be rehabilitated along key corridors in the period 2024-30,12 with plans for 196 km in Albania, 192 km in Serbia, 101 km in Kosovo, 88 km in North Macedonia and 74 km in Montenegro (WBIF, 2024[5]).
The underdevelopment and deterioration of rail infrastructure in the Western Balkans have led to the underutilisation of railways for freight. From 2020 to 2023, an average of 722 million tonnes of goods were transported per km of railway in the region, accounting for only 4% of the EU average level of 16 billion tonnes (Figure 2.4). Serbia, despite being the regional leader, saw a 15% decline in freight volumes between 2014-16 and 2020-23, reaching just 15% of the EU average. Freight volumes transported by rail account for only about 1% of EU levels in Montenegro and a mere 0.1% in Albania and Kosovo.
Millions of tonnes of goods transported per km of railway
Note: Data are unavailable for Albania (2014, 2015), Kosovo (2014), Montenegro (2021, 2023) and North Macedonia (2023).
Sources: (Eurostat, 2024[9]). Data for Albania from (INSTAT, 2024[10]). Data for Kosovo from (KAS, 2024[11]). Data for Montenegro from (MONSTAT, 2024[12]). Data for Serbia from (SORS, 2024[13]).
The large decline in railway freight transport in the Western Balkan economies can be attributed to the lack of new investment and maintenance, which causes indirect losses from underperformance and traffic disruptions, resulting in low competitiveness compared to freight transport on roads (Transport Community, 2023[8]).
The lack of competitiveness of railway freight transport is demonstrated by the fact that large portions of both the core network and the comprehensive network, which includes secondary connections, do not meet European technical standards for freight transportation.13 These technical standards encompass the total weight, train speed and maximal train length that rail tracks can bear, as well as the traffic managing systems of the existing infrastructure.14 In 2023, an estimated 42.5% of the core and 46.3% of the comprehensive networks were in poor or very poor condition (Transport Community, 2023[8]). Moreover, about 85% of both the core and comprehensive networks in the Western Balkans could not bear an operating speed of 100 km per hour (km/h) and over, leading freight transport services in the region to operate at an average speed of close to 50 km/h (Transport Community, 2023[8]).
In addition to the factors mentioned above, economic activity in the Western Balkans is largely oriented towards services and small-scale manufacturing, which limits the economic returns on large rail infrastructure investments. However, if industrial policies across the region were to promote more advanced manufacturing or support the development of heavy industries, the lack of rail transport could become a significant bottleneck to growth and competitiveness.
Power losses reflect the quality of the energy infrastructure, showing to what extent businesses can rely on a reliable and affordable energy supply. In 2020-23, an average of 13.5% of the total energy injected into the distribution and transmission grids was lost in the Western Balkans – more than 2.5 times that of the EU (5.3%) (Figure 2.5). Despite progress over the last decade, Kosovo (24.5%) and Albania (21.2%) underperformed over the period 2020-23, while only Bosnia and Herzegovina (6.4%) exhibited power loss levels comparable with the EU average.
Percentage (of total energy injected into distribution and transmission grids)
Notes: OECD imputations for 2020 values for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia. For more details on this process, please refer to the Methodology Annex. Data are unavailable for Bosnia and Herzegovina (2021, 2022, 2023), Montenegro (2021, 2022, 2023), North Macedonia (2021, 2022, 2023) and Serbia (2021, 2022, 2023).
Sources: (CEER, 2017[14]; 2020[15]). Additional data for Albania from (Energy Regulatory Authority, 2023[16]). Data for Kosovo sent by KAS to the OECD.
The energy sector in the Western Balkans is characterised by ageing infrastructure, which generates significant power losses that disrupt production processes, creating additional costs for businesses. Like transport infrastructure, regional energy infrastructure has been deteriorating following insufficient investment efforts, leading to widespread power losses due to technical losses.15 Apart from Albania, all Western Balkan economies primarily rely on thermal-powered plants (TPPs) to generate electricity, with the share exceeding 60% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and North Macedonia, and reaching 90% in Kosovo (OECD, 2024[3]). However, most regional TPPs are outdated: as of 2023, around 50% of the installed generation capacity was more than 35 years old, while the lifetime duration of TPPs is estimated to be around 40 years (CEPS, 2023[17]). As a result, power plants are operating below their intended capacity, resulting in increasingly frequent technical malfunctions and occasional blackouts. However, plans are underway to modernise the region's energy infrastructure, stemming from the allocation of EUR 500 million to the WBIF through the Energy Support Package for the Western Balkans adopted in 2022.16 The WBIF plans to install 1 910 megawatts (Mwt) of capacity in the region between 2024 and 2030, while 187 Mwt was installed between 2009 and 2023. The plan also includes upgrading 657 km of electricity transmission lines, a significant increase from the 165 km completed between 2009 and 2023 (WBIF, 2024[5]).
Outdated energy consumption metering systems and unbilled usage contribute to non-technical losses,17 which are estimated as the difference between the total amount of energy fed into the distribution system and the total amount of energy metered (CEER, 2020[15]). Across the region, smart grids are not fully deployed, although efforts are underway in Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia (EIB, 2024[18]). In Kosovo, a significant share of non-technical losses stems from the unbilled energy in the northern municipalities, which are, due to the current political situation, treated as power losses (CEER, 2020[15]).
High electricity prices can undermine businesses' competitiveness by raising production costs, affecting their competitiveness in regional and global markets. On average, expressed in purchase power parity (PPP), electricity costs for businesses in the Western Balkans were about 30% higher than EU levels in 2020-23 (USD 0.26 vs. 0.20 per kilowatt hour [kWh], respectively), but the regional average remains elevated largely due to North Macedonia, which experienced a 73% increase in prices over the ten years to 2023, reaching USD 0.45 per kWh in 2020‑23 (Figure 2.6). Kosovo stands out with an electricity cost 10% below the EU average (USD 0.18), closely followed by Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which exhibit costs comparable to the EU.
2021 USD per kWh in PPP
Notes: Average electricity price (excluding all taxes and levies) for non-household consumers for consumption between 500 MWh and 19 999 MWh). OECD imputations for 2016 value for Albania. For more details on this process, please refer to the Methodology Annex.
Source: OECD calculations based on (Eurostat, 2024[19]).
The Western Balkans heavily relies on domestic energy resources for electricity production, which has largely shielded the region from shocks in global energy markets following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A prime example is lignite, a locally abundant fossil fuel, which plays a dominant role in several economies of the region: in 2020, lignite accounted for 95% of electricity generation in Kosovo and 70% in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiEPAG, 2023[20]). The exception in the region is North Macedonia, where energy dependency stood at 63% in 2023, similar to that of the EU. This dependency coincided with a dramatic 2.4-fold increase in electricity prices between 2021 and 2022, which even threatened the financial stability of the Macedonian electricity utility.18
Although inefficiencies in ageing energy infrastructure, reflected in high power losses, exert upward pressure on electricity costs, substantial financial support for coal-based electricity has so far limited prices increases. Between 2021 and 2022, direct subsidies for coal reached EUR 180 million in the region, with the bulk of this financial support in Serbia (EUR 98 million) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUR 70 million) (Energy Community, 2023[21]). Moreover, Western Balkan economies support power-sector state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through public financing, including loans from state-controlled institutions and state-guaranteed loans. In 2019, state guarantees for coal-based electricity generation totalled nearly EUR 1.2 billion in Serbia and EUR 742 million in Bosnia and Herzegovina (OECD, 2022[22]). However, EU accession prospects increasingly challenge the prevalence of state-aid allocated to coal-based electricity production. Existing EU state aid rules, along with the EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS), would substantially increase the costs of coal-based electricity production in the Western Balkans, necessitating a shift in financial support towards the creation of low-carbon electricity generation capacities.
Beyond the environmental impact, high levels of fossil fuel subsidies also lead to a misallocation of investment and labour, undermining long-term competitiveness and growth prospects. These subsidies send distorted market signals, incentivising pollution intensive and inefficient industries, and potentially diverting labour away from more productive sectors. The Western Balkan economies have yet to fully liberalise energy markets and establish cross-border trading, leaving untapped potential for reducing electricity prices. After joining the Energy Community,19 the economies committed to restructuring their national electricity companies to liberalise the electricity market. Up until 2022, Serbia was the only Western Balkan economy to operate a day-ahead market, although it remains not fully liberalised, with the market operator still under the authority of the Ministry of Energy (BiEPAG, 2023[20]). However, 2023 saw significant progress towards establishing free electricity markets across the region, with Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia launching new day-ahead electricity markets, all of which have been operating continuously since their inception. Further advances came in early 2024 with the opening of the Albanian electricity market branch in Kosovo, leaving Bosnia and Herzegovina as the only economy in the region without an organised day-ahead market for electricity.20
Mobile cellular penetration is a basic pillar of connectivity, reflecting the extent to which consumers and businesses can access and use mobile technology and services. The Western Balkans has mostly achieved convergence with the EU in terms of mobile cellular penetration, reaching 99.2% of EU levels in 2020-23 (compared to 94.8% in 2014-16) (Figure 2.7). The number of subscriptions in the region has gradually increased, rising from an average of 116.2 per 100 inhabitants in 2014-16 to 121.8 in 2020-23, while the EU average has remained stable at 123 subscriptions. Montenegro stands out with 184.4 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in 2020-23, an increase from 161.0 in 2014-16. In contrast, mobile cellular penetration has declined in Albania by 16.0%, in North Macedonia by 7.8% and in Serbia by 6.2%.
Number of subscriptions per 100 inhabitants
Note: Data are unavailable for Montenegro (2022), North Macedonia (2022) and Serbia (2022, 2023).
Sources: (World Bank, 2025[23]). Additional data for Albania from (ARKEP, 2018[24]; 2021[25]). Additional data for Bosnia and Herzegovina sent by the Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the OECD. Additional data for Kosovo sent by KAS to the OECD.
Over the past decade, the cost of mobile services has negatively affected mobile cellular penetration in the region. In the absence of comparable data for the region, the Broadband Pricing Index (BPI) composite indicator21 may serve as a proxy for the cost of mobile services. This shows that prices in the Western Balkans in 2022 were approximately 17% higher than in the EU, with North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina seeing price gaps of 35% and 31%, respectively (RCC, 2023[26]). However, the implementation of the Regional Roaming Agreement (RRA) in July 2021 was a milestone in reducing mobile broadband costs by introducing roaming-free arrangements. In the second half of 2021, total voice call volumes increased by 50% compared to the first half of the year, while data roaming traffic more than doubled (RCC, 2022[27]). Notably, Serbia and North Macedonia saw significant increases in average data service consumption, with increases of 4.5 and 2.9 times, respectively.
The development of broadband infrastructure has also been crucial for driving mobile cellular penetration, particularly because contracts related to 5G technologies have enabled growth in mobile subscriptions. Nevertheless, most Western Balkan companies lack the scale needed to provide citizens with ubiquitous access to 5G broadband, which hinders the creation of a new demand cycle in the mobile telecommunications market and prevents the region from approaching EU coverage standards, which stood at 81% of the population in 2022 (European Commission, 2023[28]).22 This is particularly visible in Albania and North Macedonia, which simultaneously exhibit the lowest download speeds and the lowest mobile cellular penetration in the region.23
High-speed networks are essential for supporting the development and adoption of advanced technologies, enabling more efficient data sharing and communication, and ultimately boosting productivity. The Western Balkan economies have made substantial strides in enhancing their digital infrastructure, with average download speeds rising to 32.5 megabytes per second (Mbps) in 2020-23, four times higher than in 2014-16. This now represents 47% of EU levels, an increase from 37% in 2014‑16 (Figure 2.8). Serbia leads the region, with the average download speed reaching 62.4% of the EU average in 2020-23, while Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania lag behind at 35.7% and 24.6%, respectively.
Mean download speed in megabytes by second
Note: OECD imputations for 2016 for all economies. For more details on this process, please refer to the Methodology Annex.
Source: (Cable.co.uk, 2024[29]).
In line with the Gigabit Society targets,24 the Western Balkan economies have invested significantly in developing high-speed networks, leading to the emergence of fibre to the premises (FTTP) technology25 in the region. As of 2022, 33.1% of households in the Western Balkans used FTTP technology, up from 29.2% in 2021; however, these figures remain far below the EU average of 56.4% in 2022 (Eurostat, 2024[30]).
To close the gap with the EU, the Western Balkans must address the challenge of the geographical coverage of existing infrastructure. About 40% of the region’s population resides in rural areas, notably above the EU average of 24% (World Bank, 2024[31]). To extend the coverage of the high-speed network infrastructure, supported by EU and donor funding through the WBIF, many economies in the region are either implementing (Kosovo and Serbia) or preparing (Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia) high-speed network development projects targeting rural areas (see the Digital Transformation chapter for more details). Additionally, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia have made strides in establishing broadband mapping to guide the development of these networks and prioritise underserved regions (OECD, 2024[3]).
The Western Balkan economies have yet to encourage private investors to expand the digital infrastructure due to barriers that increase the costs of deploying high-speed communication networks. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia have yet to transpose the European acquis regarding the reuse of existing physical infrastructure from utility companies to deploy high-speed telecommunications networks under the most cost-effective conditions (OECD, 2024[3]).26 Overall, the full transposition of the European acquis from the EU Connectivity Toolbox and the recent Gigabit Infrastructure Act in the Western Balkan economies will be crucial for boosting regional private investment in high-speed infrastructure.27
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[1] World Bank (2025), Poulation Density (people per sq. km of land area), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.POP.DNST (accessed on 14 April 2025).
[31] World Bank (2024), Rural Population (% of Total Population), World Bank, Washington DC, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.RUR.TOTL.ZS (accessed on 16 January 2025).
← 1. Due to data unavailability for Kosovo, the population density calculation uses data from the last census, estimating the total population at 1.6 million inhabitants in 2024 (KAS, 2025[35]).
← 2. The WBIF is a joint initiative of the EU, international financial institutions (Council of Europe Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank, KfW, World Bank and Agence Francaise du Development), bilateral donors and the governments of the Western Balkans. It supports socio-economic development and EU accession across the Western Balkans through the provision of finance and technical assistance for strategic investments, particularly in infrastructure, energy efficiency and private sector development. Financial support of EUR 1 billion was earmarked for infrastructure investment over the period 2015-20 under the Instrument for Pre-Accession framework (IPA) II. This initiative was followed by the adoption of the Economic and Investment Plan in October 2020, which allocated EUR 9 billion under the IPA III 2021-27 framework. Finally, an additional EUR 3 billion has been allocated to the WBIF after the adoption of the New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans (European Commission, 2023[33]).
← 3. The TEN-T network consists of three layers: the core network, the extended core network and the comprehensive network. The core network includes the most important connections between major cities and nodes and must be completed by 2030. The extended core network needs to be completed by 2040. The comprehensive network connects all regions of the EU to the core network and needs to be completed by 2050.
← 4. Investment expenditures denote capital expenditure on new road infrastructure or the extension of existing roads, including reconstruction, renewal (major substitution work on existing infrastructure that does not change its overall performance) and upgrades (major modification work improving the original performance or capacity of the infrastructure). Infrastructure includes land, permanent way constructions, buildings, bridges and tunnels, as well as immovable fixtures, fittings and installations connected with them (signalisation, telecommunications, toll collection installations, etc.) as opposed to road vehicles.
← 5. The data are expressed in euros, 2015 prices.
← 6. Maintenance expenditures are non-capital expenditures to maintain the condition and capacity of the existing road infrastructure. This includes surface maintenance, patching and running repairs (work relating to the roughness of carriageway’s wearing course, roadsides, etc.).
← 7. EU countries with available data are Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, North Macedonia, Netherlands, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Sweden.
← 8. Over 2009-23, two cross-border bridges have been built: the first one at Gradiška on the Sava River, connecting Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, and the second connecting Albania to Montenegro across the Buna river.
← 9. The State Audit Office (SAO) is an independent audit institution of the Republic of North Macedonia. It aims to inform the competent authorities and the public about audit findings identified with performed audits.
← 10. This fragmented approach hinders the implementation of the Transport Community Rail Action Plan, which advocates for more sustainable and cost-effective strategies in the long run.
← 11. The project has been conducted in Serbia, see: www.wbif.eu/project-detail/PRJ-SRB-TRA-007.
← 12. Corridor VIII and Corridor X are pan-European corridors for transport flows. Corridor VIII connects Albania and North Macedonia with Bulgaria, and Corridor X connects Serbia and North Macedonia with Greece and Central Europe.
← 13. The legal foundation governing the establishment of the Indicative Extension of the TEN-T Core and Comprehensive Rail Network to the Western Balkans is established in Regulation No 1315/2013, last updated in 2019. This regulation outlines a comprehensive, long-term strategy for the creation of a unified Trans-European transport Network (TEN-T), encompassing all modes of transportation infrastructure, with a particular focus on railways.
← 14. The European TEN-T standards for railway freight transport are related to: 1) axle load: freight lines must bear 22.5 tonnes axle load by 2030; 2) line speed: freight lines must allow 100 km/h by 2030; 3) train length: freight lines must allow for 740 m trains by 2030; and 4) European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS): core network to be equipped with ERTMS by 2030 (Transport Community, 2023[8]).
← 15. Technical losses in energy refer to the energy lost during the process of transmission and distribution through the power grid, primarily due to factors such as equipment inefficiencies.
← 16. The second part of the package, consisting of the remaining EUR 500 million in grants, is dedicated to advancing the Western Balkans’ energy transition, efficiency and independence, see: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ac_23_3196.
← 17. Non-technical losses can be thought of as electricity that is consumed but not billed. The three main types of non-technical losses are energy theft, errors in unmetered supplies and conveyance errors.
← 18. The Macedonian electricity utility Elektrani na Severna Makedonija (ESM) faced a large liquidity gap following the record prices of energy imports. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) had to intervene with a EUR 100 million loan to help ESM maintain its financial resilience and continue to provide its essential services (Mirbabaeva, 2023[34]). The other Western Balkan economies heavily rely on local energy resources to produce electricity. Albania and Montenegro rely on hydroelectricity, whereas Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia rely on lignite. Notably, these latter three economies rank among the world’s top 10 economies regarding the share of lignite in electricity production, at 95%, 70% and 68%, respectively, in 2020 (BiEPAG, 2023[20]).
← 19. The Energy Community is an international organisation that brings together the European Union and its neighbours to create an integrated pan-European energy market. The organisation was founded by the treaty establishing the Energy Community, signed in October 2005 in Athens and in force since July 2006. The key objective of the Energy Community is to extend EU internal energy market rules and principles to economies in South East Europe, the Black Sea region and beyond on the basis of a legally binding framework. For more information, see: www.energy-community.org/aboutus/whoweare.html.
← 20. While an advanced stage of development has been reached in Republika Srpska, progress in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina remains ongoing, and there is currently no market in the special district of Brčko, which benefits from an exception.
← 21. The Broadband Price Index (BPI) measures the level of prices of representative baskets of fixed (13), mobile (12) and converged broadband (9) offers. Prices of 34 broadband consumption baskets that include different services (standalone broadband, double play, triple play and quadruple play services) and different speeds are included in the BPI calculation. A higher score means lower broadband prices. For more information, see: https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/redirection/document/88557.
← 22. No data available for the Western Balkan economies, but available evidence indicates that 5G coverage is low. For example, see: https://seenews.com/news/serbia-to-launch-5g-auction-in-q4-2025-1261994.
← 23. The rise of over-the-top (OTT) applications such as Viber that do not require a SIM card has notably contributed to the decline in the mobile cellular penetration indicator, particularly in Albania (United Nations, 2022[32]). Indeed, the mobile cellular penetration indicator includes all mobile cellular subscriptions that provide voice communication but excludes those that offer only data services.
← 24. The Gigabit Society targets are to ensure that very-high-capacity connectivity (above 100 Mbps) reaches citizens and businesses by 2025, and that 1 Gbps (Gigabytes per second) reaches them by 2030.
← 25. Fibre to the premises (FTTP) technology is a high-speed internet connection that uses optical fiber cables to deliver internet service directly to a building or home, providing faster and more reliable broadband than traditional copper lines.
← 26. See the “Directive 2014/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on measures to reduce the cost of deploying high-speed electronic communications networks”. For more information, see: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/61/oj.
← 27. The EU Connectivity Toolbox is a set of best practices for timely rolling out 5G and fast broadband. On the one hand, the measures help network operators reduce the cost of deploying networks. On the other, Member States can use these measures to give operators access to the spectrum they need to rollout 5G and to encourage operators to further invest in 5G coverage. The Connectivity Toolbox is the result of exchanges between Member States, in cooperation with the Commission, following the Commission’s Recommendation. For more information, see: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/connectivity-toolbox.
The Gigabit Infrastructure Act entered into force on 11 May 2024 and will be fully applicable in November 2025. The act updates the rules to ensure faster, cheaper, and more straightforward rollout of Gigabit network installations, addressing the main hurdles, such as expensive and complex procedures for network deployment. For more information, see: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/gigabit-infrastructure-act.