This chapter outlines the evolution of ASEAN Member States’ regulatory environment for digital trade, benchmarking the region against international best practices. The chapter shows the strong heterogeneity in regulatory approaches and underscores the areas where different AMS can undertake targeted reforms to help boost digital trade.
Digital Trade Review of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Abstract
ASEAN’s digital trade rulebook remains uneven, resulting in different operating conditions across markets. In 2024, the OECD Digital Services Trade Restrictiveness Index shows an almost 14-fold gap in barriers between the least restrictive (the Philippines) and the most restrictive AMS (Lao PDR).
Barriers to digitally enabled trade span multiple policy areas. Beyond measures affecting data flows (see Chapter 3), these include deviations from international frameworks for electronic transactions (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia), restrictions on payments (Lao PDR, Cambodia, and to a lesser extent in Indonesia, Viet Nam, Singapore), barriers related to ineffective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights (Lao PDR, Malaysia), and those related to performance requirements, limitations on downloading/streaming and commercial/local presence requirements (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Viet Nam, Cambodia).
Regulatory fragmentation is rising within the region and globally, raising compliance burdens and increasing the cost of operating internationally to the particular detriment of smaller firms which are key throughout AMS.
Key areas for domestic regulatory reform in services supporting digital networks include: Telecommunications services (Viet Nam, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Indonesia); computer services (Lao PDR, Myanmar, Cambodia, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam); distribution services (the Philippines), logistics (Viet Nam, Lao PDR), postal and courier (the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand); broadcasting (the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam); and motion pictures and sound recording (Brunei Darussalam, Viet Nam, Thailand).
AMS have made strong progress modernising trade facilitation (TF) as reflected in rising OECD TF Indicator scores. However, further automation and streamlining of trade documents and procedures is needed, particularly in Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar. Regional initiatives (e.g. the ASEAN Customs Transit System and the ASEAN Single Window) are key, closing remaining rollout gaps and strengthening technological and regulatory interoperability is needed.
Tariffs and the number of non-tariff measures (NTMs) on goods essential for the digital transformation remain relatively high in some AMS. Joining the WTO Information Technology Agreement (ITA) and its expansion would reduce tariffs by between 2.5 percentage points (Indonesia, Viet Nam) and almost 8 percentage points (Cambodia) with sizeable effects on imports for Cambodia (2‑3%) and Myanmar (3‑5%), particularly for personal phones, computers, and capital goods. Ensuring NTMs remain transparent, predictable, non-discriminatory and aligned with internationally agreed standards and agreements (e.g. WTO Agreements on TBT and SPS) would help remove unnecessary trade barriers.
Enhancing digital trade and maximising the benefits of digitalisation depend also on the existence of an enabling regulatory environment that promotes open markets, greater competitiveness, and innovation. In this context, a better understanding of the potential regulatory gaps and areas for domestic reforms can help support ASEAN Member States’ (AMS) participation in digital trade.
2.1.1. Digital trade restrictiveness varies significantly across policy areas and AMS
The domestic regulatory environment for digital trade varies widely across AMS. In 2024, the OECD Digital Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (DSTRI) shows an almost 14-fold gap in the size of domestic regulatory barriers between the least restrictive (the Philippines) and the most restrictive AMS (Lao PDR) (see Box 2.1 for further information about the DSTRI).
Digital Services Trade Restrictiveness Index by ASEAN Member State and category, 2024
Note: The sample period of the DSTRI starts in 2014. This analysis therefore shows the development of a country’s domestic regulatory environment over the last ten years. DSTRI scores for Myanmar were not available at the time of writing.
Source: Digital Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (DSTRI) (2024).
Barriers to digital trade are particularly high in Lao PDR and Cambodia: with DSTRI scores of 0.54 and 0.41 in 2024 (Figure 2.1). Indonesia (0.31) and Brunei Darussalam (0.27) follow, with around half the restrictiveness of the most stringent AMS yet still exceeding both ASEAN and OECD averages. In an intermediate position are Viet Nam (0.23) and Singapore (0.18), with regulatory environments significantly below the ASEAN average but still more restrictive than the OECD average. Best performers are the Philippines (0.04), Thailand (0.08), and Malaysia (0.09), all of which offer regulatory conditions for digital trade that are less stringent compared to the OECD average.
The OECD Digital Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (DSTRI) measures cross-cutting barriers affecting digitally enabled trade. It includes five broad areas: infrastructure and connectivity, electronic transactions, e-payment systems, intellectual property rights, and other barriers to digital trade (Figure 2.2). It is updated annually and covers over 100 countries for the period 2014 to 2024.
The DSTRI is a composite index taking values between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating an open regulatory environment and 1 a completely closed one. At the time of writing, it covers all AMS analysed in this report except Myanmar (and Timor-Leste).
Source: DSTRI (2024), and Ferencz (2019[1]) for the DSTRI methodology.
Barriers related to communication infrastructure and connectivity
In the majority of AMS, except Malaysia and the Philippines, one of the most pronounced barriers relates to infrastructure and connectivity. This category captures measures concerning cross-border data flows and data localisation (which are addressed in greater detail in Chapter 3), and regulations related to interconnections among network operators deviating from best practices.1
Most AMS follow best practices in regulating how telecommunication services providers interconnect and requiring vertical separation in the form of accounting, functional, and/or legal activities in concentrated markets. However, regulatory frictions emerge in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Singapore, and Thailand. Cambodia and Lao PDR’s markets are characterised by a significant degree of market concentration, yet conditions on interconnection among services providers fall short to take such market features into account. This concerns Cambodia’s fixed line market and Lao PDR’s mobile and fixed-line markets, which feature the presence of a dominant firm. Moreover, Cambodia also lacks an established competition law or competition authority to efficiently address market dominance. By contrast, Singapore’s and Thailand’s mobile markets do not feature a dominant market player or high market concentration. However, mandatory interconnection (Singapore) and accounting separation for specific services (Thailand) may create additional costs for providers.
Barriers affecting electronic transactions
Service providers in some AMS also face restrictions on electronic transactions. Many have national contract rules that deviate from internationally standardised frameworks. As of November 2025, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, and Viet Nam have not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, which enhances legal certainty for digital trade transactions (see Box 2.2).2
Although Viet Nam has not ratified the Convention, its Civil Code gives international treaties precedence in case of differences with its domestic law, likely preventing restrictions for services providers.3 Despite not ratifying the Convention, some elements of UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce (1996) are in place in Brunei Darussalam and Cambodia: Brunei Darussalam’s Electronic Transactions Act (2004, revised in 2008) incorporates the Model Law’s core principles, while Cambodia signed the Model Law in 2019.
The UN Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts (New York, 2005) updates and complements the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (UN CISG) to remove obstacles related to the use of electronic communications in international contracts and establish equivalence between electronic and traditional paper-based equivalents.
The Electronic Communications Conventions also builds upon earlier instruments, in particular the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures.
Further barriers include Indonesia’s online tax registration and declaration, which is limited to residents, raising compliance costs for foreign providers. Commercial presence is also required to obtain trade licenses, including in e-commerce (Trade Act No. 7/2014). In Brunei Darussalam and Cambodia, common laws protect trade secrets or know-how, but regulations explicitly safeguarding confidential information are not yet in place.4
Measures related to payment systems
Barriers affecting payment systems are present in Lao PDR and Cambodia, and to a lesser extent in Indonesia, Viet Nam, and Singapore. In Lao PDR, access to electronic payment services is limited by business licencing requirements (e.g. mandatory shareholding by Lao nationals, the appointment of a Lao director, and minimum registered capital thresholds).5 In addition, Lao PDR has not yet established national payment security standards, which are essential for promoting trust in online transactions. In Cambodia, international payment settlement is restricted to authorised intermediaries – which must be permanently established banks in the country,6 and third-party processors face restrictions on the provision of payment transactions like remittance by mobile phone (Prakas on Third-Party Processor, 2010, Article 3).
In Indonesia and Viet Nam barriers take the form of foreign ownership limits and restrictions on voting rights for payment service providers (Indonesia),7 and restrictions on opening local payment and/or saving accounts (Viet Nam).8 In Singapore, restrictions on internet banking limit the amount that can be stored in and transferred from e-wallets.9
Despite these domestic regulatory barriers, ASEAN-wide efforts are underway, including with foreign partners, to support a more seamless operation of cross-border instant payment systems (IPS) based on linkages that enable faster and lower cost payments (see Box 2.3).
ASEAN Member States (AMS) have made substantial progress in adopting cross-border instant payment systems (IPS) through 21 operational linkages both bilaterally among AMS, such as the Thailand-Singapore PromptPay-PayNow linkage, and with key economic partners, such as Japan, India, and Hong Kong, China (ASEAN Secretariat, 2025[2]).
Furthermore, the collaboration between ASEAN Member States and the Bank for International Settlements Innovation Hub on the so-called “Nexus Global Payment” aims to extend such bilateral linkages into a multilateral payment framework. The initiative standardises connections among IPS by allowing the operator to make a single connection to the Nexus platform, thereby enabling its payments system to access to all other countries on the network (Bank for International Settlements Innovation Hub, 2024[3]).
Barriers to the effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights
Barriers related to ineffective protection and enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) exist in Lao PDR and Malaysia. Lao PDR protects IPR through basic principles to comply with international treaties or agreements. While Lao PDR is a party to international treaties like the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (joined in 2012) and the WTO TRIPS Agreement (full application since 2016), it is not yet a party to key WIPO treaties, such as the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) or the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). Joining the WCT would strengthen the protection of works and authors’ rights in the digital context as well as of computer programmes and compilations of data. Ratifying the WPPT would support the rights of performers (actors, singers, musicians, etc.) and producers of phonograms (persons or legal entities that take the initiative and have the responsibility for the fixation of sounds) who operate in the digital sphere.
Malaysia’s Copyright Act of 1987 (amended in 2022) may impose differential treatment on the protection of copyrights and related rights for foreign right holders compared to national treatment due to the requirements related to qualifying for IPR protection.
Other barriers to cross-border digital trade
Other barriers to cross-border digital trade primarily take the form of performance requirements, limitations on downloading and/or streaming, and commercial or local presence requirements. These measures account for a significant share of the DSTRI scores of Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Viet Nam, and Cambodia, and, to a lesser extent, of those of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore.
In Brunei Darussalam, certain provisions of the Broadcasting Act grant the government wide discretion over decisions concerning the content of foreign broadcasting services, creating uncertainty and potential barriers for foreign providers.10 Moreover telecommunication services providers must maintain a registered office in the country to obtain a business license, effectively requiring commercial presence. Foreign firms seeking to obtain web domains (.bn or com.bn) must hold a locally registered trademark, which requires maintaining a local address.
The Indonesian Ministry of Trade issued Regulation No. 31 in October 2023 that introduced more transparent rules for e-commerce and measures aimed at strengthening consumer protection. From a trade perspective, however, several provisions may create barriers for foreign firms. These include local presence requirements obliging foreign e-commerce operators to have a representative office in Indonesia (e.g. applies to providers having conducted transactions with at least 1 000 consumers within a year; having delivered at least 1 000 packages to consumers within a year; or having at least 1% of domestic internet users or visitors over the course of one year). Both domestic and foreign e-commerce platforms must also apply a minimum sales price of USD 100 per unit for imported final goods and prioritise the commercialisation of domestically produced goods and services. The rules also limit e‑commerce sales by social media platforms.
Further constraints arise from requirement for telecommunications providers to limit access to websites listed on the Ministry’s “TRUST+Positif List”.11 Finally, Indonesia’s regulation for applying customs duties could pose additional restrictions on digital trade if the WTO e-commerce Moratorium is not renewed (see Box 2.4) as was the case at MC14.
Indonesia’s established legislation “MOF Regulation No. 190/PMK.04/2022” lays the ground for applying customs duties on digital goods, including software, electronic data, multimedia, which are delivered via electronic transmissions. As these tariffs are set to zero, the regulation has not, up to now, violated the existing WTO Moratorium on applying customs duties on electronic transmissions. Section 4.5 discusses in more details the importance of the WTO e-commerce Moratorium for ASEAN Member States.
In Viet Nam, some regulations may create frictions for firms to participate in digital trade. Since 2019, the Cybersecurity Law (24/2018/QH14) requires providers of telecommunications or internet services that handle users’ private information to establish a branch or representative office in the country. Moreover, the Law on Advertising (16/2012/QH13)12 imposes Vietnamese-language requirements for advertising content and broadcasting activities. While not mandatory, the Law on Technology Transfer (2018) promotes the use of local software and technology transfer.
In Cambodia, online service providers and intermediaries require an established local business entity to obtain a business licence (Sub-Decree No. 134 (2020) on the implementation of the e-commerce law). Furthermore, obtaining Cambodian domain names, such as com.kh or net.kh, require a local business presence and the registration with the Ministry of Commerce (see Guidelines for the online application for Domain Name System Registration).
In Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore, restrictions mainly relate to commercial presence requirements (Malaysia, the Philippines),13 local presence obligations14 (the Philippines, Singapore),15 limitations on downloading and streaming content (Singapore’s Broadcasting Act (2004, amended in 2023)), and licencing criteria linked to shareholding in local companies (Malaysia’s Licence Application Procedure and Criteria of 2018 (updated in 2019)).
Digital fragmentation is growing globally and in the region
Beyond the level of existing barriers (as captured above), regulatory heterogeneity, that is, differences in regulatory frameworks across markets, can dampen economic activity. When businesses face varying regulations across different markets, exporting becomes more complex and costly.
Against a backdrop of rising global digital fragmentation, ASEAN exhibits a relatively high and growing degree of intra-ASEAN regulatory heterogeneity (Figure 2.3a). Digital fragmentation is currently higher within ASEAN than with respect to non-ASEAN partners, affecting the ability to scale regionally.
Regulatory heterogeneity is most pronounced in the case of Lao PDR with respect to other AMS and international partners (Figure 2.3b). Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand exhibit relatively low levels of regulatory fragmentation with major trading partners outside of the region. Overall, the lack of a clear pattern underscores the significant fragmentation confronting firms across the ASEAN region.
Note: “Intra-ASEAN” heterogeneity refers to the average of ASEAN Member States (AMS) country pairs. “ASEAN vs. ROW” (Rest of world) is calculated taking the average of all pairs of AMS and non-ASEAN countries. “World” refers to the average of all country pairs included in the dataset. Values for the EU are derived by taking the average of all pairs of the respective country and EU Member States. The heterogeneity indices were calculated using the qualitative answers in the DSTRI. For further details on the methodology, see Nordås (2016[4]).
Source: Digital Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (DSTRI) Heterogeneity Indices (2025).
2.1.2. Digital network services also remain highly restricted, particularly in telecommunications
Services that ensure a reliable, fast, and affordable connection across digital networks are essential to a well-functioning digital economy and play a key enabling role for digital trade (OECD, 2024[5]). Telecommunication services provide access to network infrastructure for the transmission of data, sound and video, while computer services design and manage the software and computer systems that enable end-to-end communication.16
Broadcasting, motion pictures, and sound recording services have experienced significant transformation because of digitalisation, as digital platforms increasingly enable the consumption and sharing of videos, music, and other audio-visual or media content through streaming and downloading (OECD, 2024 (p. 43[6]) provides a description of these five digital network services). A domestic regulatory environment enabling the international flow of these services is crucial for firms to participate in digital trade. In this regard, OECD’s Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) provides a useful tool to measure sector-specific regulatory barriers across countries (Box 2.5).
AMS’ regulatory environment across these five digital network services is more restrictive than the OECD average, particularly in the telecommunications sector (Figure 2.4), which is analysed in the next subsection. Broadcasting activities stand out with a significantly more restrictive regulatory environment in the Philippines and Brunei Darussalam with STRI scores twice or 50% higher than the ASEAN average in 2024, respectively.
Motion pictures and sound recording services were particularly restrictive in Brunei Darussalam, Viet Nam and Thailand in 2024. In motion pictures, the ASEAN average STRI was about 0.21, compared with 0.49 in Brunei Darussalam, 0.32 in Viet Nam, and 0.28 in Thailand. In sound recording, the ASEAN average was 0.19, compared to 0.49 in Brunei Darussalam, 0.29 in Thailand, and 0.26 in Viet Nam.
The OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI)
The OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) provides comparable data on regulations affecting services trade across 51 countries and 22 sectors, covering the period since 2014. Updated annually, this database records laws and regulations enforced at the national level without considering free trade agreements or conditions applied on a preferential basis. Policy measures are scored on a scale from zero to one, where zero represents an open market and one a market completely closed to foreign services providers.
The regulatory information is organised under five policy areas:
Restrictions to foreign entry, including, inter alia, information on foreign equity caps, nationality and/or residency requirements for board of directors and managers, and foreign investment screening.
Restrictions on movement of people, encompassing key restrictions to the movement of foreign services providers such as quotas, labour market tests, limitations to duration of stay, and lack of recognition of foreign qualifications.
Other discriminatory measures, comprising discrimination of foreign services providers with respect to taxes, subsidies, and public procurement participation.
Barriers to competition, including information on anti-trust policy, government ownership of major services providers and whether these are exempt from competition law and price regulation.
Regulatory transparency, recording information on consultation and publication of laws and regulation prior to their entry into force, and excessive red tape in the form of burdensome administrative procedures related to obtaining a license or being granted a business visa.
Among the 22 sectors covered, most relevant for digital trade are telecommunications, computer services, broadcasting, sound recording, and motion pictures – which are grouped into the cluster “digital network services” – and distribution, logistics, courier, and transport services in the context of digitally ordered goods.
OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI), 2024 (or latest available year)
Note: STRI scores for Brunei Darussalam refer to the year 2023. STRI scores for Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar are only available for the telecommunication and computer services sectors as part of digital network services. For reasons of comparison, they are not included in this figure. ASEAN average refers in this figure only to the ASEAN Member States depicted in the graph.
Source: Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) (2024).
Barriers to telecommunication services
Barriers to the provision of telecommunication services remain relatively high in the ASEAN region compared with OECD averages. In 2024, ASEAN recorded an average STRI score of 0.45 out of 1 (down from 0.51 in 2014), indicating that its regulatory environment is almost three times as restrictive as the OECD average (0.17), which has marginally increased since 2014 (Figure 2.5). The most restrictive regulatory environment is observed in Viet Nam (0.71), Lao PDR (0.64), Myanmar (0.63), Indonesia (0.57), and Cambodia (0.48). In these countries, competition related barriers are most pronounced, contributing between 56% (for Cambodia) and 72% (for Indonesia) to their respective STRI scores (Figure 2.A.1).
By contrast, the least restrictive regulatory environments among AMS are found in Singapore (0.26), Malaysia (0.29), the Philippines (0.29), Brunei Darussalam (0.33), and Thailand (0.36). In these countries, barriers are a combination of competition-related impediments and restrictions on foreign market entry (Figure 2.A.1). The contribution of competition-related barriers ranges from 20% in Brunei Darussalam’s STRI score to 47% of Singapore’s STRI score, while contributions of foreign entry restrictions range from 36% of Singapore’s STRI score to 56% in Malaysia’s STRI score in 2024.17 18
The nature of these barriers varies significantly across AMS (see Annex B for a country-by-country discussion). Particularly, competition-related obstacles stem from the presence of state-owned firms, limited independence of regulatory authorities, and the presence of dominant services providers across all segments of the telecommunications market in Indonesia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Viet Nam. In other AMS,19 these barriers typically reflect two of those conditions, namely government ownership of major firms and the lack of an independent regulatory authority.
The significant reductions observed in Brunei Darussalam’s STRI score by more than half is a result of structural changes and regulatory reforms, which led to a significant easing in competition-related regulations in the telecommunications sector in 2020 (Figure 2.5). OECD simulations suggests that these reforms led to trade cost reductions of between 31% and 55% (Figure 2.A.2).
Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) of the telecommunication sector
Note: STRI scores for Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar refer to the year 2023 (latest available year) instead of 2024.
Source: OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) (2024).
Barriers in computer services
Barriers to the provision of computer services remain comparatively high in the ASEAN region when measured against OECD averages (Figure 2.6). In 2024, ASEAN recorded an average STRI score of 0.26 out of 1, reflecting modest improvements from 0.28 in 2014. While this decline signals gradual regulatory easing, the region’s computer services sector remains almost 50% more restrictive than the OECD average, which stands at 0.18 in 2024, up slightly from 0.17 a decade earlier.
This regional average masks substantial variation among AMS. The most restrictive barriers are found in Lao PDR and Myanmar, both with STRI scores of 0.34, followed by Cambodia (0.31), Thailand (0.30), Brunei Darussalam (0.28) and Viet Nam (0.26). At the other end of the spectrum, the Philippines (0.19), Malaysia (0.20), Singapore (0.20) and Indonesia (0.21) show relatively more open regulatory approaches.
These barriers mainly reflect regulatory differences across AMS, particularly concerning the movement of people and foreign market entry (Figure 2.A.3). Restrictions on the movement of people are most prominent in Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar, while market entry constraints are more significant in Malaysia, and the Philippines. In Singapore, Viet Nam, and Thailand both types of measures play an important role.
Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) of the computer services sector
Note: The figure shows the STRI score of 2014 and 2024 (or latest available year) by economy. Latest available year of STRI refers to 2023 for Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar. ASEAN average is based on the scores of 2023 for these countries instead of 2024.
Source: OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) (2024).
Digitalisation is also critical to how goods are traded. As online ordering grows, including through intermediary platforms, digitally ordered trade has expanded rapidly (OECD, 2025[8]). This includes a sharp rise in the number of small parcels crossing international borders (López González and Sorescu, 2021[9]). Understanding how ASEAN has been modernising and digitalising its trade facilitation efforts, and linking AMS reforms to performance as captured by the OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators (TFIs) can help target areas for improvement.
2.2.1. ASEAN’s going paperless efforts are underway
Despite technological progress, a large share of international trade transactions still relies on paper-based systems, creating inefficiencies and delays. Moving away from paper-based, analogue, trade towards a more digitised form of trade facilitation holds substantial benefits, including reduced trade costs, enhanced supply chain resilience, and improved regulatory compliance. This process of “going paperless” entails activities such as digitising trade documents, automating customs procedures, and establishing interoperable legal frameworks and data-sharing mechanisms across borders (OECD, 2025[10]). ASEAN has been making steady progress in these areas.
At the heart of ASEAN’s trade facilitation efforts is the digitalisation of trade documents such as e‑Form D, the ASEAN Customs Declaration Document (ACDD), and e-Phyto certificates, all of which help streamline customs processes and reduce transaction costs. However, the transition to fully digital, interoperable customs systems remains a work-in-progress due to legal, institutional, and technological disparities across the region. While some countries like Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia have established robust legal and operational regimes for e-signatures and digital authentication, other AMS have limited enforcement capacity, outdated legal provisions, and can lack technical expertise among regulatory actors (Isono, Prilliadi and Mahusin, 2025[11]).
Another barrier to a more seamless digital environment is the lack of mutual recognition of digital identities and e-signatures across borders. There is also evidence that customs officials in some AMS still prefer handwritten documents, even if electronic signatures are accepted (Isono, Prilliadi and Mahusin, 2025[11]).
Beyond this, ASEAN finalised the Guidelines of the Exchange of Information on E-Commerce Data between Customs and E-Commerce Operators. Notable progress was acknowledged by AMS Customs authorities in June 2025 (ASEAN, 2025[12]). These guidelines provide practical guidance for establishing co‑operative frameworks and data exchange mechanisms enabling customs to access advanced information for enhanced risk management and strengthened regulatory compliance (ASEAN, 2025[12]). This is a crucial step as it also builds the foundation towards realising broader integration under the upcoming ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA).
However, the ASEAN Single Window (ASW), agreed in 2003, holds great promise. It connects and integrates the National Single Windows (NSW) of all AMS, expediting cargo clearance via electronic exchange of trade-related documents and promoting economic integration (ASEAN, 2025[13]). The ratification of the Protocol on the Legal Framework to implement the ASW and the endorsement of the amended ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) Operational Certification Procedures (OCP) were all completed in 2017 (ASEAN, 2025[13]).
Since its full operation in 2019, all AMS have exchanged electronic data through the ASW, which included electronic Certificates of Origin (e-Form D) under ATIGA (Singapore Customs, 2025[14]; Medalla and Balboa, 2009[15]) and the ASEAN Customs Declaration Data (ACDD). Moreover, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand have put in place electronic Phytosanitary Certificates (e-Phyto), while Malaysia is still in the testing phase (Vietnam National Trade Repository, 2024[16]).
The implementation of ASW has significantly contributed to simplifying customs procedures, increasing transparency and reducing non-tariff barriers (Akbar, Mendoza and Febriansyah, 2025[17]). According to statistics cited by the Viet Nam National Trade Repository (2024[16]), its implementation has helped ASEAN businesses save more than USD 6.4 billion, reduced the average transit time of four days per transaction and facilitated the exchange of more than four million electronic documents. Beyond this successful implementation phase, AMS are currently exploring opportunities to further exchange trade-related documents with other trade partners, including Australia, China, Japan, Republic of Korea, the United States, and New Zealand which have expressed interest in co‑operation with ASEAN through the ASW environment (ASEAN, 2025[13]).
Despite significant progress, the initiative faces challenges related to technology synchronisation, due to differences in technology development levels among AMS, and regulatory harmonisation, due to inconsistent document processing procedures reducing the system’s effectiveness (Vietnam National Trade Repository, 2024[16]; Akbar, Mendoza and Febriansyah, 2025[17]). A lack of financial, human and technical resources in some AMS further exacerbates these issues.
Recognising some of these limitations, ASEAN has completed a ’New Generation ASW’ study in December 2024, outlining technical, legal, and policy frameworks to improve interoperability with digital systems of trade partners. In this context UNESCAP-ASEAN (2026[18]) notes that ASW interoperability discussions are underway with China, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the United States.
In addition, the ASEAN Customs Transit System (ACTS), launched in 2020, is a computerised system enabling goods to transit multiple AMS with a single customs declaration, avoiding repeated inspections and duties at the border (ACTS, 2020[19]).20 As of December 2025, ACTS is operational in seven AMS, including Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam (ASEAN, 2025[20]). In 2024, ACTS utilisation increased significantly by almost 300% compared to the previous year. However, in 2025, system utilisation declined by almost 60% This decrease was primarily attributed to the system downtime in one initiating participating AMS, and the concentration of ACTS movements on a single active trader. Discussions are now underway to expand ACTS to include multimodal transport. As an initial step, participating AMS are preparing to pilot the railway mode in 2026 along the ASEAN Express corridor connecting Lao PDR, Malaysia, and Thailand. In parallel, preparatory work is ongoing to support the remaining AMS, namely Brunei Darussalam and Indonesia to join the ACTS live operation with Malaysia in the Borneo Corridor. These efforts are also being aligned with ASEAN’s longer-term objective of exploring the potential for connectivity with neighbouring non-ASEAN countries. However, the implementation of ACTS has faced some challenges, including with respect to coordination between customs authorities and other national agencies, and the ACTS utilisation that remains relatively low.
2.2.2. Addressing trade facilitation challenges
Between 2015 and 2017, all AMS ratified the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), which officially entered into force in 2017.21 Since 2012, all have made significant improvements to their trade facilitation environment, as measured by the OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators (TFI) (Box 2.6).22 Singapore in particular stands out as a global top performer. Malaysia and Thailand also rank among top performers in the Asia-Pacific region. Other AMS, including Viet Nam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, and Cambodia have made rapid reforms but have slightly lower scores (Figure 2.7). Lao PDR and Myanmar have doubled their TFI scores, but remain the lowest ranked among AMS. Overall, the TFIs underscore the region’s dynamism, and the important progress made during the last decade (see also (OECD[21]), forthcoming).
Launched in 2013 and updated every two years, the OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators (TFIs) allow countries to better assess progress in their trade facilitation policy environment (OECD, 2025[22]). The OECD TFIs cover the full spectrum of border procedures for more than 160 economies.
The TFIs reflect not only the regulatory framework but also the state of implementation of various trade facilitation measures (OECD, 2022[23]). Overall, the indicators measure the extent to which countries have introduced and implemented trade facilitation measures by benchmarking performance relative to others. The TFIs take values from 0 to 2, where 2 designates the best performance that can be achieved. They cover 11 areas: A) Information availability; B) Involvement of the Trade Community (Consultations); C) Advance Rulings; D) Appeal Procedures; E) Fees and charges; F) Documents (formalities); G) Automation (formalities); H) Procedures (formalities); I) Internal border agency co‑operation; J) external border agency co‑operation; and K) Governance and impartiality.
Note: TFI indicators relevant for the process of “going paperless” are highlighted in bold, covering indicators (F) to (J).
Source: OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators.
OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators, 2012‑2024
Note: The graph shows the evolution of Trade Facilitation Indicators (TFI) scores by ASEAN Member State (AMS) in 2012, 2017 and 2024. The maximum score attainable is 22. A rise in global ranking indicates that an AMS has improved its global ranking, among the 163 TFI economies, since 2012, while a decline specifies that an AMS has lost in its global ranking. Singapore’s and Thailand’s global position declined from the 1st or 49th in 2012 to the 4th or 54th position in 2024.
Source: OECD Trade Facilitation Indicator database, 2025 (https://sim.oecd.org/default.ashx?ds=TFI).
Strong improvements in the ASEAN region are in the areas of information availability, simplification and harmonisation of trade-related documents, automation and streamlining of border procedures, and border agency co-operation (OECD, forthcoming[21]).23 However, ASEAN’s trade facilitation landscape varies significantly by policy area and AMS (Figure 2.A.5).
In the area of transparency and predictability (referring to indicators A, B, C, D, E), Brunei Darussalam, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and the Philippines are lagging. Trade facilitation efforts could focus on strengthening the involvement of the trade community (e.g. through consultations, by ensuring public comments are reflected in final measures), widening the availability of advance rulings on origin and valuation aspects, by implementing clear mechanisms for appeal procedures (e.g. through the publication of detailed procedural guidance online), and simplifying and streamlining fees and charges (e.g. by making electronic payment systems fully operational) ( (OECD[21]), forthcoming).
In the area of automation and streamlining of trade documents and procedures (indicators F, G, H) as well as cross-border and domestic border agency co‑operation (indicators I, J), digital tools can be particularly useful for efficiency improvements. In these areas, Brunei Darussalam (F), Cambodia (F, G, I), Myanmar (F, G, H, I, J), Lao PDR (F, G, H, I), and Thailand (I) stand out with scores below the ASEAN average, highlighting the need for further attention (Figure 2.A.6). Table 2.1 provides more detailed recommendations on how to improve in the areas of digitising trade-related documents (F), automating (G) and streamlining (H) border processes, as well as strengthening domestic (I) and external (J) agency co-operation.
Note: Letters F to J refer to the classification of OECD’s Trade Facilitation Indices.
Source: (OECD[21]), forthcoming.
2.2.3. Beyond the border: lowering barriers on services, supporting digitally ordered goods
Digitally ordered goods depend on a network of interlinked services. Distribution services, such as online wholesale and retail platforms, are the cornerstone of e-commerce, enabling firms to sell their goods on digital platforms. When digital orders translate into physical delivery of goods, the speed, reliability, and cost of cargo-handling and storage services, transportation, and courier services (particularly for parcels trade) become crucial determinants of firms’ competitiveness. An open and enabling regulatory environment for these services is therefore essential.
Distribution services (online wholesale and retail platforms)
However, the regulatory environment in AMS affecting distribution services – including online wholesale and retail platforms – remains more than twice as restrictive as OECD averages. This largely concerns restrictions on foreign market entry (Figure 2.8). Most AMS position around an STRI score of approximately 0.3, although Singapore stands out with a more open regulatory environment with an STRI score of 0.19, aligned with the OECD average (0.16 in 2024).24 In turn, the Philippines has an STRI score of 0.56 in 2024, underscoring the wide regulatory heterogeneity within the region.
Indonesia has been a top reformer in this sector, lifting restrictions on foreign market entry, resulting in halving the country’s STRI from 0.66 in 2014 to 0.35 in 2024. This includes reforms through the Investment Act of 2007, the Limited Liability Companies Act of 2007 in 2022, as well as the creation of the Positive Investment List in 2021.25 Despite this regulatory progress, significant limitations remain in place in Indonesia's distribution services relative to other AMS.
Logistics Services (cargo handling and storage, and warehousing)
The regulatory environment related to logistics, including cargo-handling and storage and warehousing, is also more restrictive across all AMS than the OECD average (Figure 2.8). Singapore and Malaysia are among the least restrictive in this area with Viet Nam and Lao PDR positioning among the most restrictive AMS, especially in cargo-handling services. Thailand’s storage and warehousing services also remain highly restrictive despite liberalisation efforts related to regulatory transparency (e.g. ability of interested persons to make public comments on new draft laws, and more transparent import clearance processes).26
Indonesia’s regulatory easing in 2021 and 2022 (through the Investment Act of 2007, the Limited Liability Companies Act of 2007, and the Positive Investment List) also positively affected the regulatory environment in the country’s two logistics sectors, making it the top AMS reformer in this area.
As regards to specific policy areas, regulations related to foreign market entry feature prominently in cargo-handling, and measures affecting regulatory transparency have the greatest impact in storage and warehousing services with little variation across countries.
Postal and courier
Postal and courier services are a key element of trade in parcels, acting as an indispensable mode of delivery of small consignments.
Yet, despite their central role, the regulatory environment for postal and courier services remains restrictive in most AMS, largely due to barriers for foreign firms on market entry (Figure 2.8). Singapore stands out as the most open market among AMS in 2024, with an STRI score of 0.22 – down from 0.24 in 2014 – aligning closely with the OECD average (0.22). Malaysia (0.25), Viet Nam (0.32), and Brunei Darussalam (0.34) follow, while the Philippines (0.41), Indonesia (0.39), and Thailand (0.38) position at the more restrictive spectrum of regulations in this sector.
Brunei Darussalam was the top reformer in this area, seeing its STRI score nearly halve from 0.6 in 2014 to 0.38 in 2024. The introduction of the Postal Services Order in 2023 played a key role in reducing market entry barriers for foreign firms in the sector.
Transport services
Transport services – whether by air, sea, or road – operate under varying degrees of regulatory restrictions. Air transport generally emerges as the most regulated sector across all three modes, while maritime transport being moderately open, and road transport usually stands out as the least restrictive of the three analysed sectors (Figure 2.A.4). Across those three sectors, the regulatory environment of AMS is on average more restrictive than the OECD average in 2024 except for the Philippines in air transport as well as Singapore and the Philippines in road freight transport services.
The Philippines was a top reformer in this area. Its Public Services Act of 202227 exempts air, road, and maritime transport services (among others), from the definition of public utility enterprises, thereby allowing full foreign ownership of domestic firms in these services, and replacing the previous 40% cap on foreign participation.28 In the same year, the Amendment to the Foreign Investment Act of 2022 excluded maritime and road freight transport, among other sectors, from the list of strategic industries, and thereby removed the screening requirements that had previously been applied to foreign investments in these sectors.29
In terms of policy areas, most restrictions concern foreign entry across all transport modes, while barriers to the movement of people also take a large contribution in maritime transport, and limitations to regulatory transparency in the road freight sector (see Figure 2.A.4).
Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI), 2014 versus 2024 (or latest available year)
Note: For Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar the STRI for courier services and distribution services are not available. For comparison reasons no ASEAN average is depicted. Latest available year of the STRI for available sectors refers to 2023 for Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar.
Source: OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) (2024).
ICT and related goods such as laptops, network equipment, mobile phones, semiconductors, and the cables and wires that connect these are the physical infrastructure that underpins digital transactions.30 Access to these goods is shaped, among others, by existing tariff and Non-Tariff measures (NTMs) (Ma, Shen and Fang, 2025[24]; Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan and Henn, 2018[25]; Ghodsi, 2024[26]; Maskus and Wilson, 2025[27]).31 A supportive trade environment for such goods is crucial for their affordability and to make the most of digital trade.
2.3.1. Reducing tariffs on ICT and related goods would significantly increase cost-efficient access to foreign markets
ASEAN offers a relatively favourable tariff environment for ICT and related products (covering UNCTAD’s ICT goods (Box 1.2), and products covered by the WTO Information Technology Agreements (Box 2.7)). In 2022, ad-valorem equivalent tariffs averaged 3.5%, which is about 30% below the global average of 5.2% (Figure 2.9). Intra-ASEAN tariffs of the covered products are close to zero owing to the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA).
The regional average masks substantial variation across individual AMS. At one extreme, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam provide almost duty-free access for ICT and related products. In Singapore, these products account for around 40% of total merchandise imports, underscoring a strong reliance on international markets. In the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand, tariffs are below ASEAN averages (and ICT and related goods represent 31% of total imports in Malaysia, 23% in the Philippines, and around 20% in Thailand). Tariffs in Indonesia and Viet Nam are slightly above ASEAN averages but below those of the rest of the world.32 In Myanmar, tariff levels are broadly in line with the global average, whereas Lao PDR and Cambodia exceed it, with average tariffs of almost 7% and 11%, respectively.
The WTO Information Technology Agreement (ITA 1) and its expansion (ITA 2) (Box 2.7) foresee duty-free access, on an MFN basis, to around 270 product codes (in HS2007) in “Attachment A”, covering around 80% of the product lines in the ICT goods list (based on own calculation, and UNCTAD (2015[28])).33 However, ITA1 and ITA 2 participation is uneven across AMS. As of November 2025, seven AMS, notably Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam, and Lao PDR had joined ITA 1, and five of them, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Lao PDR, also participated in ITA 2 (Table 2.2).
For those that have not done so already, joining the ITA and its expansion would translate into important tariff reductions: for Indonesia and Viet Nam of around 2.5 percentage points, and for Cambodia of almost 8 percentage points – 2 percentage points from ITA 1 and an additional 6 percentage points reduction from participating in ITA 2 (Figure 2.10).
Lao PDR, who joined both ITA agreements in 2022, can also expect sizeable tariff reductions from around 7% at present to about 2% once commitments are fully implemented. Myanmar follows with tariffs projected to fall on average from about 5% to 1.6% upon joining both agreements.
For those that are already members to the ITA 1, further tariffs reductions would arise from joining ITA 2. In Viet Nam and Indonesia there would be a 2.5 percentage points decline (from about 4% to around 1.3% and 1.5%). Upon full implementation of ITA 1 and 2 commitments, Thailand will reach an average tariff of around 1% and the Philippines of about 0.6%.34 Even though not a member of the ITA and its expansion, Brunei Darussalam provides for almost duty-free access to ICT and related products.
Simple average ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) tariffs and share of ICT/ITA imports in a country’s merchandise imports, 2022
Note: This graph shows ad-valorem equivalent tariffs (AVEs) on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) goods and Information Technology Agreement (ITA) goods in HS nomenclature 2007, including ex-outs by ASEAN Member State and the Rest of the World in 2022. Tariffs reflect averages across partner countries and goods, including zero trade flows. Lao PDR joined the WTO ITA and its expansion during the year 2022. The graph therefore captures the average tariff prior to ITA implementation. The size of the circle indicates the share of ICT/ITA goods in a country’s total imports in 2022.
Source: MacMap Tariff Data of 2022 (Guimbard et al., 2012[29]).35 List of 6-digit products (in HS 2007) are taken from UNCTAD (2007[30]) for ICT goods, from WTO/JOB(07)/96 (WTO, 2007[31]) for ITA 1 goods, from WTO (2015[32]) for ITA 2 goods.
Simple average ad-valorem equivalent tariffs (AVEs) on ICT/ITA products in %, 2022
Note: This graph shows average ad-valorem equivalent tariffs (AVEs) on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) goods and Information Technology Agreement (ITA) goods in HS nomenclature 2007, excluding ex-outs in the two simulation steps by ASEAN Member State in 2022. Tariffs reflect averages across partner countries and the entire list of ICT/ITA products in a rectangular panel (i.e. including zero trade flows). Lao PDR joined the WTO ITA and its expansion during the year 2022. The analysis therefore highlights the average tariff reductions that can be expected from this accession, as the tariff data for 2022 does not yet fully reflect the customs liberalisation of the same year.
Source: Market Access Map 2022, International Trade Centre, www.macmap.org (Guimbard et al., 2012[29]). List of 6-digit products (in HS 2007) are taken from UNCTAD (2007[30]) for ICT goods, from WTO/JOB(07)/96 (WTO, 2007[31]) for ITA 1 goods, and from WTO (2015[32]) for ITA 2 goods.
The 1996 Information Technology Agreement (ITA 1)
The ITA 1 was concluded in 1996 at the 1st WTO Ministerial Conference and formalised in a Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products. Participants agreed to eliminate and bind customs duties at zero on all listed products, incorporating these commitments into their WTO schedules. Because the ITA is a plurilateral agreement, its benefits extend to all WTO Members. As of 15 March 2024, ITA 1 has 84 Members, representing around 97% of global trade in IT products (WTO, 2024[33]).
The 2015 Information Technology Agreement (ITA 2): expansion of ITA1
The Ministerial Declaration on the Expansion of Trade in Information Technology Products of 16 December 2015 added a new list of IT products, including semi-conductors, optical lenses, and GPS navigation equipment.
HS products covered in ITA 1 and ITA 2
ITA 1 covers 112 products and ITA 2 covers 186 products at the HS6-level (HS2007) in Attachment A (WTO, 2007[31]; WTO, 2015[32]). Subset A – products in ITA 1 but not ITA 2 – includes 69 HS codes. Subset C – products in ITA 2 but not ITA 1 – includes 143 HS codes. Subset B includes 43 HS codes covered under both agreements: these codes were treated as ex-outs in ITA 1 (i.e. only partially covered 6-digit codes), but ITA 2 either redefined these ex-outs at the 8- or 10-digit level or expanded them to full coverage.
Membership to ITA 1 and ITA 2 by ASEAN Member States
Seven ASEAN Member States (AMS) participated in ITA 1, and five of these also joined ITA 2 (Table 2.2). Lao PDR joined ITA 1 and ITA 2 in January 2022.
Note: The agreements also include an “Attachment B”, listing goods without corresponding HS2007 codes. These products are excluded from the analysis, which focuses on product codes listed in “Attachment A”.
Sources: WTO (2017[34]) and (WTO, 2021[35]) for ITA 1; (WTO, 2015[36]) for ITA 2.
Tariff reductions associated with ITA membership can offer firms and consumers increased access to existing ICT and related products (“intensive margin”) and also to new product varieties (“extensive margin”) (Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan and Henn, 2018[25]; Mann and Liu, 2009[37]; Chochua and Iodice, 2025[38]). Access to these products has generally been associated with gains in export competitiveness and economic growth (see OECD (2022[39]) for the example of Brazil,36 and Yoon (2019[40])).
A partial equilibrium analysis, based on estimates of the tariff elasticity obtained from Fontagné, Guimbard and Orefice (2019[41]), suggests that Cambodia, Indonesia, and Myanmar would experience increases in ICT/ITA imports of between 0.07% (Indonesia) and almost 5% (Myanmar) 37 upon joining the WTO ITA and its expansion (Figure 2.12, see also Figure 2.A.8 for estimates including ex-outs).38 Annex 2.A provides more details about the analysis.
In the case of Cambodia, accession to both agreements would lead to increases in imports of between 2% and 3%.39 Accession to ITA 1 would primarily lead to an increase in imported personal computers while accession to ITA 2 would raise imports of capital and intermediate goods (Figure 2.A.9). In the case of Myanmar, imports were expected to increase by between 3% and 4.8% upon joining both agreements.40 Under ITA 1, imports of mobile phones would increase most, and in the case of ITA 2, it would be capital goods (Figure 2.A.9). In Indonesia, the impact of joining the expansion agreement ITA 2 on trade would be between 0.7% and 1.2%, with capital goods growing most. Viet Nam would see its ICT/ITA imports marginally increase by between 0.07% and 0.25% from joining ITA 2. This is largely because it is already a member to ITA 1 and currently grants duty-free access to around 88% of its ITA 2 imports (excluding ex-outs). 41
%-change in import values (intensive margin) of ICT/ITA goods by joining ITA 1 and ITA 2
Note: This graph shows the effect of tariff liberalisation in Information Technology Agreement (ITA) goods on ASEAN Member States’ existing import volumes (“intensive margin”). The simulation does not include ITA goods with ex-outs so that the effect can be considered a lower bound estimate of the simulation.
Source: Simulation based on trade elasticities obtained from Fontagné, Guimbard and Orefice (2022[42]; 2022[43]), imports (HS2007) from CEPII’s BACI database, and tariffs from Market Access Map 2022, International Trade Centre, www.macmap.org (Guimbard et al., 2012[29]).
2.3.2. ICT and related products are subject to a high number of non-tariff measures in some AMS
Beyond tariffs, ICT and related products are also subject to a range of non-tariff measures (NTMs). These stem from domestic regulations that can potentially affect traded goods through changes in quantities, prices or both, although not all NTMs result in additional trade costs (Box 2.8 provides more details on NTMs).42
The Philippines and Myanmar apply the highest average number of NTMs, with around 17 NTMs per technology product (at the 6-digit level), followed by Viet Nam (12 NTMs), and Cambodia (11 NTMs). These four countries exceed the OECD average. Looking more closely, this means that in Myanmar and Viet Nam around 90% of imports of technology products face more than 10 NTMs, in the Philippines three-quarters of imports and in Cambodia around 70% of imports (Figure 2.13). By contrast, Singapore stands out, applying only one NTM per product on average, such that over 90% of its imports of technology products enter the country without encountering any NTM (Figure 2.A.10).
In most AMS, these NTMs primarily take the form of Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), while Myanmar largely relies on export-related measures and Lao PDR makes greater use of price controls. Worth noting that the average number of NTMs per product, often referred to as the “prevalence ratio”, should not be interpreted as an indicator of regulatory stringency. Although a high number of measures applied to the same product could signal a more complex regulatory framework, the prevalence ratio mainly captures the extent to which NTMs are present at the border rather than how restrictive they are (OECD, forthcoming[44]; Disdier and Fugazza, 2019[45]).
Average number of Non-Tariff Measures per ICT/ITA product, latest available year*
Note: Average number of NTMs per product includes all products of the combined Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and Information Technology Agreement (ITA) lists, even if those are not imported (or exported in case of export-related measures (P)) by the country). It can be interpreted as an extended prevalence ratio, which originally is based only on imported products, see for more information Disdier and Fugazza (2019[45]). *Years refer to the latest available year by country published in the database: 2022 for Myanmar and Viet Nam; 2021 for Indonesia, Thailand, 2018 for Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. The figure shows the average number of Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs) of ICT goods in HS classification of the 2012 nomenclature. NTMs include horizontal and non-horizontal measures – affecting all HS codes at once and only ICT/ITA goods – and NTMs under full coverage – affecting a particular HS product fully including all its subcategories, see UNCTAD (2023[46]). Bilateral measures are excluded. The OECD average includes the European Union as a whole. For example, there are 279 ICT/ITA goods (in 6-digits HS2012 nomenclature) on which the Philippines applies a total of 4 919 NTMs as of the year 2018, meaning that ICT/ITA goods will face on average 17.6 NTMs. SPS measures on ICT goods primarily refer to Conformity assessments (A8) and Labelling, marking, and packaging requirements (A3) in UNCTAD’s international classification of Non-Tariff Measures (UNCTAD, 2019[47]). The analysis covers ITA products with ex-outs in HS 2012 nomenclature.
Source: TRAINS (2023[48]).
What they are and their potential trade effect
Non-tariff measures (NTMs) refer to policy measures other than tariffs or tariff-rate quotas. They can potentially affect traded goods through changes in quantities, prices or both, but do not necessarily result in welfare losses, unlike “non-tariff barriers” referring to a narrower term of measures which are considered of protectionist nature.
The WTO agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
The TBT Agreement of the WTO entered into force in 1995 with the purpose to assure that measures, including technical regulations, standards and conformity assessments, do not create unnecessary trade barriers while at the same time allowing Members adequate discretion in their regulations to protect legitimate policy interests. The agreement’s major objectives encompass the use of international standards in designing TBT (Article 2.4) and the encouragement of mutual recognition of conformity assessments between WTO Members (Article 6.3). It furthermore states that the same requirements must apply to domestic and imported products.
Note: The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) is the second international agreement on technical NTMs. However, SPS measures are mostly present on agricultural products and play only a limited role for Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and related products. Where applied, SPS measures on ICT goods primarily take the form of Conformity assessments (A8) and Labelling, marking, and packaging requirements (A3), as classified in UNCTAD’s Non-Tariff Measures framework (UNCTAD, 2019[59]).
Source: Disdier and Fugazza (2019[45]), otherwise specified in the text.
Overall, the analysis shows that ASEAN’s regulatory environment for digital trade remains uneven and fragmented, resulting in markedly different operating conditions across AMS. The OECD Digital Services Trade Restrictiveness Index highlights a wide dispersion in regulatory barriers. Beyond measures affecting the cross-border flow of data (Chapter 3), barriers remain on electronic transactions frameworks, payments, the ineffective protection and enforcement of intellectual property, and other requirements affecting market entry, including local presence requirements.
The analysis points to substantial scope for reforms to maximise digital trade. Priorities include easing restrictions in key enabling sectors such as telecommunications and computer services, alongside targeted reforms in distribution, logistics, postal and courier, transport, and selected digitally deliverable services.
In terms of trade facilitation reforms, the chapter underscores the strong progress made to date by AMS and highlights the importance of further efforts in the area of automation and streamlining of trade documents and procedures. Where regional efforts are concerned, there has also been strong progress. Closing remaining rollout gaps, strengthening technological and regulatory interoperability and improving inter-agency coordination and cross-border data exchange, including with external partners will be key to ensuring a more seamless ASEAN wide trade facilitation environment.
Finally, reducing tariffs on goods essential for the digital transformation, including through accession to the WTO Information Technology Agreement and its expansion, could lower input costs and support greater uptake of digital technologies amongst the population, thereby unlocking new sources of inclusive growth, particularly in economies where tariffs remain relatively high.
Composition of the Services Trade Restrictiveness Index of telecommunication by proportion of policy area in %
Note: Latest available year of STRI refers to 2023 for Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar. ASEAN average is based on the scores of 2023 for these countries instead of 2024. The figures show the contribution of each of the five policy areas of the STRI on the economies’ total STRI score in %.
Source: OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) (2024).
In Viet Nam, barriers to competition include the presence of state-owned firms in the sector (VNPT and Viettel are large market players owned by the Vietnamese government), the lack of an independent and autonomous regulatory body (the Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC) is in charge of policy-making and regulatory matters in telecommunications), and the presence of dominant service providers across all segments of the telecommunications market.
In Lao PDR, competition-related obstacles concern the presence of state-owned firms, holding top positions in the sector, including Lao Telecom (51% government ownership), TPLUS (fully government owned) and ETL (49% government ownership). Further obstacles include the absence of independence of the telecommunications regulatory authority from the state, and the presence of dominant service providers across all segments of the telecommunications market.
In Myanmar, competition-related obstacles include the presence of state-owned firms in the sector (Myanmar Posts and Telecommunications under the supervision of Ministry of Transport and Communications), the lack of independence of the telecommunications regulator from the government,43 and the presence of dominant service providers across all segments of the telecommunications market.
In Indonesia, competition-related obstacles include the presence of state-owned firms in the sector (PT Telkom Indonesia is a state-owned company that is also majority owner of PT Telekomunikasi Selular, or Telkomsel), the lack of independence of the Indonesian Telecommunications Regulatory Body (BRTI), and the presence of dominant service providers across all segments of the telecommunications market.
In Cambodia, competition-related obstacles concern the presence of a state-owned telecom company (Telecom Cambodia (TC)), which is the principal telecom company on fixed services, and lack of an independent regulatory body (the Telecommunication Regulator of Cambodia (TRC) acts on approval and under instructions received from the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications of Cambodia (MPTC)). Additionally, Telecom Cambodia (TC) is the dominant services provider in the fixed telecommunications market and there are no specific ex ante regulatory obligations in place to preserve competition in the market, such as wholesale access price regulation for passive and active products. Other barriers to competition include the absence of publicly available and legally defined procedures for granting contracts for the provision of universal telecommunication services, the lack of requiring number portability, the restriction to resale public telecommunication services, the requirement of approval by the TRC for transferring frequency licenses to other parties. General provisions also hinder competition, such as minimum registered capital requirements of around USD 1 000, creating entry barriers for small and medium sized firms.
In Thailand, both measures on foreign market entry and on competition can create impediments for foreign firms. Foreign entry is restricted due to, among others, foreign equity caps,44 limits on foreign acquisition of shares of publicly controlled firms,45 requirements on the number of board of directors and managers based on nationality (with a ratio of 3:4 for Thai nationals) and residency (at least 50% shall reside in Thailand),46 maximum of 49% of foreign ownership for real estate,47 and limitations on cross-border M&A in case of changes in the status of the Thai majority shareholding company into a foreign majority company.48 Competition-related barriers include, among others, the presence of a state-owned dominant telecommunications firm (the National Telecom Public Company Limited is owned by the Ministry of Finance), and the lack of independence of the regulatory body. Further measures include minimum capital requirements for foreigners planning to operate in Thailand,49 the lack of regulating number portability in the fixed-line market which would facilitate consumer choice and effective competition,50 as well as the prohibition on secondary spectrum trading.
Brunei Darussalam stands out among AMS with a decline of more than half of its STRI score (Figure 2.5), owing largely to structural changes and regulatory reforms, which led to a significant reduction in competition-related barriers in its telecommunications sector in 2020. The reforms led to an estimated reduction of almost half of trade costs in the country’s telecommunications sector, according to OECD simulations (Box 2.A.1 provides more details on the country’s restructuring of its telecommunication sector and the simulation exercise). Despite these reforms, remaining restrictive policies for competition include the presence of a state-owned telecom company, and the lack of independence of the regulatory authority from the state. Also, foreign market entry requirements remain high, among others, related to foreign equity restrictions, local presence and commercial presence requirements. Overall, Brunei Darussalam’s mobile market remains among the most concentrated ones in the ASEAN region. The distribution of market shares in Brunei Darussalam’s mobile broadband market remains highly concentrated, ranking among the highest in the ASEAN region (whose markets in turn tend to be already considered as highly concentrated, as elaborated in OECD (2023[49])).51 The operator “DST” accounts for a share of 68% of Brunei Darussalam’s mobile market, while the two other competitors “Progressif” and “Imagine” represent respectively 27% and 5% in 2022 (OECD, 2023[49]).
The telecommunications sector underwent structural and reform changes in 2020, resulting in reductions in competition-related barriers.
In 2020, the newly established Unified National Networks (UNN) – a state-owned network operator in Brunei Darussalam – took over all network infrastructure previously operated by the government-owned telecommunication operators DST, TelBru, and Progresif (WTO, 2024[19]). This consolidation created a national Single Wholesale Network (SWN) under UNN, with the goal to modernise the country’s telecommunications infrastructure and transform the traditional vertically integrated operators into retail market players with access to UNN’s network infrastructure, leading to more competitive and higher quality fixed and/or mobile broadband services nationwide (World Bank and ITU, 2022[50]).
The change in market structure was accompanied by regulatory reforms aimed at promoting efficiency and competition in the sector. In 2020 and 2021, Brunei Darussalam’s Authority for Info-communication Technology Industry (AITI) issued several codes under the Telecommunications Order (2001). These included, among others, the Competition Code (2020), which defines the duties of market players with Significant Market Power (SMP); the Tariff Code (2020), which establishes regulatory oversight by AITI regarding tariffs charged by SMP operators; and the Number Portability Code (2021), which sets standards to improve governance and efficiency on number portability processes (Number Portability Code (2021)).
These reductions in competition-related barriers contributed to a drop in Brunei Darussalam’s STRI score by more than half – from around 0.68 in 2019 to 0.33 in 2020 – and are associated with reductions in trade costs in telecommunication services by between 31% and 55% (Figure 2.A.2).
Source: The simulation exercise for trade costs is based on Benz and Jaax (2020[21]), and the estimation of the productivity effects on downstream industries is based on Chapter 4 in Benz et al. (2023[22]).
The Philippines’ telecommunications market is primarily characterised by measures restricting foreign entry and competition. Foreign equity caps continue to apply in the sector despite amendments to the Public Services Act in 2022.52 As telecommunications is classified as a critical infrastructure, foreign state-owned enterprises are prohibited from owning capital, and foreign nationals are not allowed to own more than 50% of capital unless the country of the foreign national accords reciprocity to Filipino nationals. Other restrictions are related to limits on foreign acquisition of real estate in the country (ownership of condominium units must remain above 60% in Filipino ownership, except for heritage properties)53, commercial and local presence requirements, as well as performance requirements. Competition-related hurdles concern, among others, the lack of independence of the telecommunications regulatory body “National Telecommunications Commission”, which is attached to the government-led Department of Information and Communications Technology, minimum capital requirements of USD 200 000 for foreign companies (the threshold is reduced to USD 150 000 if the foreign company provides advanced technology or employs at least 15 direct employees), and prohibitions on the resale of public telecommunications services both in the fixed and mobile broadband markets, except through licensed franchising.54
In Malaysia both foreign entry restrictions and competition barriers are primarily pronounced in the telecommunications market. Foreign entry barriers largely consist of foreign equity caps in both the fixed and mobile markets as part of licensing conditions (foreign equity participation is allowed up to 70%), nationality and residency requirements of company’s board of directors, as well as commercial and local presence requirements to obtain operating licenses in order to provide cross-border services. Competition-related barriers encompass, among others, the presence of a publicly-controlled firm (Telekom Malaysia is owned by around 29% by a government-owned investment fund), the lack of independence of the Appeal Tribunal from the telecommunications regulator and the right of the government to overrule the regulator’s decisions and designate three of the board members,55 as well as minimum capital requirements to obtain operating licenses thereby increasing entry costs.56
Singapore’s telecommunications sector operates in a regulatory environment characterised by competition and foreign entry barriers. Competition-related constraints include the government’s indirect control over major telecommunications operators. Through Temasek – a state-owned investment company – the government holds a majority stake in Singtel (at 51%) and fully owns the investment firm ST Telemedia (STT), which in turn has a majority stake in telecom operator StarHub. The government also retains influence in decisions made by the telecom regulator “Infocomm Media Development Authority” (IMDA) and maintains power to exempt persons from the provisions of the Telecommunications Act.57 Moreover, competition is distorted by the lack of a competitive process for awarding contracts for the provision of universal telecommunications services and by restrictions on spectrum usage. Foreign entry barriers include, for instance, residency requirements for board of directors and commercial presence requirements in order to provide cross-border services.
Composition of the Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) of computer services by proportion of policy area in %
Note: Latest available year of STRI refers to 2023 for Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar. ASEAN average is based on the scores of 2023 for these countries instead of 2024. The figures show the contribution of each of the five policy areas of the STRI on the economies’ total STRI score in %.
Source: OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) (2024).
Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI), 2014 versus 2024 (or latest available year)
Note: For Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar the STRI for the depicted transport sectors are not available. For comparison reasons no ASEAN average is depicted. Latest available year of the STRI refers to 2023 for Brunei Darussalam. The OECD average of the maritime transport sector does not cover Austria, Switzerland, Czechia, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovak Republic due to data availability. The OECD average of the rail transport sector does not include Iceland due to data availability.
Source: OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) (2024).
2 = maximum performance that can be achieved by area, 2012‑24
Note: 2 is the maximum performance for each of the three main policy areas (transparency and predictability; automating and streamlining documents and processes; border agency co-operation). Transparency and predictability are based on the average scores of TFI (A) Information availability, TFI (B) Involvement of the trade community, TFI (C) Advance rulings, TFI (D) Appeal procedures, and TFI (E) Fees and charges. Automating and streamlining trade-related documents and processes is based on the average of TFI (F) Formalities – documents, TFI (G) Formalities – automation, and TFI (H) Formalities – procedures. Border agency co-operation is based on the average of TFI (I) Internal border agency co-operation and TFI (J) External border agency co-operation.
Source: TAD/TC/WP(2025)12 “Advancing trade facilitation in ASEAN: Insights from recent OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators trends”, based on OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators (TFIs) database, 2025 (https://sim.oecd.org/default.ashx?ds=TFI).
OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators, 2017 versus 2024
Source: OECD Trade Facilitation Indicator database, 2025 (https://sim.oecd.org/default.ashx?ds=TFI).
Methodology
Changes in import values, denoted as , of importer country j, from exporter country i, of ICT and related products k (6-digit level), in the year 2022, are the product of the trade elasticity, indicated as , the simulated tariff reduction, denoted as and the import value, M, in year 2022 (equation 1).
(1)
with , where = 0 assuming a full tariff liberalisation, i.e. zero tariffs on ICT and related goods k.
Data
To estimate the potential effect of tariff reductions on a country’s import values of ICT and related products in the year 2022, the simulation draws on tariff-based product-level trade elasticities from Fontagné, Guimbard and Orefice (2022[43]), import values from CEPII’s BACI database (6-digit level HS 2007 nomenclature), and ad-valorem equivalent (AVEs) tariffs for the year 2022 from Market Access Map 2022, International Trade Centre, www.macmap.org (Guimbard et al., 2012[29]).
ICT and related goods, including ICT as well as ITA 1 and ITA2 products, initially cover 276 HS products in HS 2007 (6-digit level). Panel D shows the number of ITA goods, covering ITA 1 and ITA 2, which are not ICT goods (Figure 2.A.7). Panel E shows the number of ITA 1 and/or ITA 2 goods, which are also ICT goods. Panel F shows the number of ICT goods, which are not part of ITA 1 and/or ITA 2.
Source: List of 6-digit products (in HS 2007) are taken from UNCTAD (2007[30]) for Information and Communication Technology (ICT) goods, from WTO/JOB(07)/96 (WTO, 2007[31]) for Information Technology Agreement (ITA) 1 goods, and from (2015[32]) for ITA 2 goods.
The final dataset is a rectangular panel of 591 800 observations, consisting of the ten ASEAN Member States as importer j, 221 partner economies as exporter i, and 269 products of ITA 1 and/or ITA 2 and ICT goods as k, so that j=10, i=221, k=269. The following seven products were dropped from the initial product basket of 276 products as no corresponding HS 2007 nomenclature for the AVE tariffs in HS 2022 nomenclature could be attributed: 846900, 847310, 851950, 854050, 854072, 854150, 950410.
The simulation exercise uses only statistically significant sigmas and elasticities that led to positive estimates at the 6-digit level but were replaced by the average HS 4-digit specific heading, see Fontagné, Guimbard and Orefice (2022[42]).
Percentage increase in import values (intensive margin) of ICT/ITA goods by joining the WTO ITA and its expansion
Note: This graph shows the effect of tariff liberalisation in Information Technology Agreement (ITA) goods on ASEAN Member States’ existing import volumes (“intensive margin”). The simulation includes ITA goods with ex-outs so that the effect can be considered a higher bound estimate of this simulation.
Source: Simulation based on trade elasticities obtained from Fontagné, Guimbard and Orefice (2022[60]; 2022[61]), imports (HS2007) from CEPII’s BACI database, and tariffs from Market Access Map 2022, International Trade Centre, www.macmap.org (Guimbard et al., 2012[53]).
Note: These graphs show the share of Information Technology Agreement (ITA) imports by end-use category by actual imports of a country in 2022 (baseline), by the increase in imports upon joining ITA 1, and by the increase in imports upon joining ITA 2. HS6 product level codes were converted based on OECD BTDxE correspondence table from Bilateral Trade in Goods by End-use | OECD.
Source: Simulation based on imports (in HS2007) from BACI CEPII (2025), and trade elasticities by Fontagné, Guimbard and Orefice (2019[41]).
In % of Information and Communication Technology (ICT)/Information Technology Agreement (ITA) imports
Note: This figure is based on the latest available year published for each country in the database: 2022 for Myanmar and Viet Nam; 2021 for Indonesia, Thailand, 2018 for Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore. Non-tariff measures (NTMs) include horizontal measures (affecting all HS codes at once) and non-horizontal measures (affecting only ICT/ITA goods), and NTMs under full coverage – affecting a particular HS product fully including all its subcategories (UNCTAD, 2023[46]). Bilateral measures are excluded. The analysis covers ITA products including with ex-outs in HS 2012 nomenclature. The graph does not include export-related NTMs as it looks at the import-side only.
Source: TRAINS (2023[48]).
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← 1. This area also captures measures, which limit or block the use of communications services, including Virtual Private Networks (VPN) or leased lines (Ferencz, 2019[52]).
← 2. Thailand has ratified the UN Convention, which entered into force for the country in October 2025. For the Philippines the UN Convention entered into force in 2023. Singapore declared upon ratification: “The Convention shall not apply to electronic communications relating to any contract for the sale or other disposition of immovable property, or any interest in such property. The Convention shall also not apply in respect of (i) the creation or execution of a will; or (ii) the creation, performance or enforcement of an indenture, declaration of trust or power of attorney, that may be contracted for in any contract governed by the Convention.” For a status of countries’ participation in this UN Convention see: Status: United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts (New York, 2005).
← 3. Although Viet Nam has not signed the UN Convention yet, the country’s Civil Code (91/2015/QH13, adopted 24/11/2015, in force 01/01/2017, Article 4) implies that in case of differences between the provisions’ local law and the international treaties to which Viet Nam is a member of the same issue, the provisions of international treaties shall apply. Besides, Viet Nam is a contracting state of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG).
← 4. In Brunei Darussalam, anti-competitive disclosure of pricing and other information is regulated by the Competition Order 2015. In Cambodia, the Contract Law of 1998 may be used for non-disclosure agreements to maintain information in employment or other contractual relationships. At the time of writing, Cambodia has been working on a Draft Law on Trade Secrets.
← 5. The Law on Payment System (2018), and the Decision on Minor Payment Settlement System (2019) regulate digital payments and financial transactions in Lao PDR.
← 6. Payment systems are governed in Cambodia by the Law on Foreign Exchange (1997), the Law on Banking and Financial Institutions (1999), and the Law on Negotiable Instruments and Payment Transactions (2005).
← 7. In Indonesia, foreign ownership of payments companies engaged in clearing, settlement services, fund transfer, and debit transactions is capped at 20%. As of 2021, 85% foreign ownership is allowed in non-bank payment services providers but under the condition that 51% of shares with voting rights are owned by Indonesians. For non-bank Payment Services Infrastructure Providers, including a provider of clearing and settlement services, must as of 2021 have a minimum of 80% Indonesian shareholding, with 80% of the voting rights to be held by Indonesian investors. Further information can be found in BI Regulation No.18/40/PBI/2016 on Implementation of Transaction Processing (2016, Article 5(2)), BI Regulation No. 23/6/2021 on Payment System Providers (2021, Articles 19, 25), and BI Regulation No.22/23/PBI/2020 on Payment Systems (2021, Article 2016).
← 8. In Viet Nam, restrictions include that only firms established and operating under Vietnamese Law can open local payment accounts, resident permits of more than six months are required to open local term accounts., and only Vietnamese nationals can open local saving accounts, under the Circular of the State Bank of Vietnam (02/2019/TT-NHNN, Article 11(2)) providing guidelines for opening and maintenance of current accounts at payment service providers, under the Circular on Savings Account (48/2018/TT-NHNN, Article 3), and under the Circular on Term Deposit (49/2018/TT-NHNN, Article 3).
← 9. See under Singapore’s Payment Services Act 2019 (Section 24), the Payment Services Regulation 2019 (Section 18), and the Payment Systems (Oversight) Act 2006 (Part VII).
← 10. Besides, the Broadcasting (Code of Practice) Notification regulates in Brunei Darussalam the broadcasting of programmes.
← 11. For a more detailed analysis of Indonesia’s services sector please consult OECD (2024[5]) “Services Trade in Indonesia – Exploring patterns, policies, and reform scenarios”.
← 12. See also the Decree on elaboration of some Article of the Law on Advertising 181/2013/NĐ-CP.
← 13. Malaysia’s Companies Act 2016 (amended 2024), and the Philippines’ Corporations Act amendment of 2019).
← 14. Commercial presence requirements apply when a physical establishment is needed in the country, such as an agency or subsidiary. Local presence requirements apply when a smaller foothold is sufficient, such as a fiscal representative or a local box office.
← 15. The Philippines’ Amendment of the Corporations Act in 2019, and Singapore’s Companies Act 1967 (amended in 2021).
← 16. See OECD (2025, pp. 11-12[51]) for a definition of ICT services, encompassing telecommunication and computer services.
← 17. In contrast, restrictions to the movement of people, frictions to regulatory transparency, and other barriers are less pronounced in the region, contributing each on average with 8%, 3%, and 6% of the ASEAN STRI score, respectively (Figure 2.A.1).
← 18. These findings are aligned with those of the recent UNESCAP-ASEAN Digital Trade Regulatory Review (UNESCAP, ASEAN, 2026[18])
← 19. Cambodia’s telecommunications sector additionally features a dominant firm in some market segments (Annex B).
← 20. This allows a truck to travel from its point of loading to its destination in a different country with fewer obstacles and delays. Supported by the EU-ASEAN Regional Integration Support (ARISE Plus), the systems aim to increase the efficiency of moving goods across land transport routes, reduce transaction costs and movement time for businesses, and improve the prevention and detection of smuggling and fraud.
← 21. All ten AMS analysed in this review have ratified the WTO TFA in 2015 (Brunei Darussalam, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam), 2016 (Cambodia, the Philippines), or 2017 (Indonesia).
← 22. These findings are confirmed by the UNESCAP-ASEAN (2026[18]) review which finds that ASEAN’s overall trade facilitation implementation rate of 83% significantly outperforms the Asia-Pacific average of 70%.
← 23. At the time of writing, an OECD study is being conducted, in collaboration with the ASEAN Secretariat, looking more closely at the trade facilitation environment in AMS and the ASEAN region using insights from the latest OECD Trade Facilitation Indicators (OECD, forthcoming[21]).
← 24. Indonesia and Malaysia recorded an STRI score of 0.35 in 2024, followed by Viet Nam (0.32, Thailand and Brunei Darussalam (both 0.31).
← 25. Indonesia issued further amendments to the Limited Liability Companies Act and new investment rules at the end of 2025.
← 26. Laws are required to be published in the national gazette and the parliament provides a venue for public comments on new draft laws through the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E.2560 (2017) and Act on Legislative Drafting and Evaluation of Law B.E.2562 (2019). Furthermore, the Customs Act B.E. 2560 (2017) led to more transparency regarding customs clearance processes.
← 27. See “An Act Amending Commonwealth Act No. 146 otherwise known as the Public Service Act, RA No. 11659”, which was adopted on March 21, 2022.
← 28. Domestic services firms in these sectors include, for instance, for the maritime transport sector steamboat, or steamship line, ferries, small water crafts, and others engaged in the transportation of passengers or cargo, shipyard, marine railway, marine repair shop, public warehouse, wharf, or dock; for the road freight sector freight and/or passenger motor vehicles, with or without fixed route, freight or any other car service, express services; and for the air transport sector air carriers.
← 29. See Amendment to the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 [REPUBLIC ACT No. 7042], signed on 2 March 2022.
← 30. In this section ICT and related goods are defined as those in UNCTAD (2015[28]) and those covered by the WTO Information Technology Agreement (ITA) and its expansion.
← 31. Maskus and Wilson (2025[27]) is a useful reference for a discussion about the trade effect of Technical Barriers to Trade, which are major NTMs applied to ICT goods.
← 32. In Viet Nam these tariffs appear relatively high considering the country’s reliance on foreign markets for access to ICT and related goods, which accounted for around one-third of Viet Nam’s total imports in 2022.
← 33. For a comparison of coverage of ITA and ICT goods, see also OECD (2022[23]).
← 34. Despite Thailand’s and the Philippines’ membership to ITA 1 and ITA 2, the countries’ ad-valorem equivalent tariffs in 2022 are positive due to various reasons, including that tariff reductions may be phased-in and are therefore not reflected in the year 2022. See for instance the WTO Tariff and Trade Data Tracker indicating a positive MFN tariff for ITA products in 2022 for these two countries: https://ttd.wto.org/en/data/idb/. Similar conclusions are made by UNESCAP and ASEAN (2026[18]) under Figure 2.5.
← 35. Market Access Map, International Trade Centre, www.macmap.org.
← 36. While OECD (2022[39]) uses a general equilibrium model, this paper’s simulation is based on a partial equilibrium model using trade elasticities at the HS6-level from the literature (Fontagné, Guimbard and Orefice, 2022[43]), allowing a micro-level analysis of how specific product imports would change upon ITA accession.
← 37. These estimates are lower bound as the simulation does not consider the additional trade effects that might arise from customs liberalisation of product varieties that have not been imported before (“extensive margin”). Furthermore, they are also at the lower end of empirical results when compared to cross-country studies found in the literature. For example, Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan and Henn (2018[25]) estimate an increase in ITA imports of between 6% and 13% associated with MFN tariff elimination on ITA 1 products, where machinery products face one of the highest effects. Mann and Liu (2009[37]) estimate an increase in imports of around 14% following accession to ITA 1. Besides, a simulation exercise of Brazil joining ITA 1 and ITA 2 shows an increase in imports of electronic equipment of between 3% and 7.6%, and the country’s overall import demand of between 0.2% and 0.48% (OECD, 2022[39]).
← 38. Scenario 1, the more conservative simulation, assumes a tariff liberalisation on ITA products excluding ex-outs, while scenario 2, the less conservative simulation, assumes a tariff liberalisation on ITA products including ex-outs.
← 39. Increases in imports of ICT and related products consist of 1.2% under ITA 1 plus 0.8% under ITA 2 under the baseline estimation excluding ex-outs (Figure 2.12), and 1.8% under ITA 1 plus 1.3% under ITA 2 under the estimation including ex-outs (Figure 2.A.8).
← 40. Increases in imports of ICT and related products consist of 1.7% under ITA 1 plus 1.4% under ITA 2 under the baseline estimation excluding ex-outs (Figure 2.12), and 3.2% under ITA 1 plus 1.6% under ITA 2 under the estimation including ex-outs (Figure 2.A.8).
← 41. These findings are at the lower end of empirical results in cross-country studies found in the literature. For comparison, Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan and Henn (2018[25]) estimate an increase in ITA imports of between 6% and 13% associated with MFN tariff elimination on ITA 1 products, where machinery products face one of the highest effects. Mann and Liu (2009[37]) estimate an increase in imports of around 14% following accession to ITA 1. Besides, a simulation exercise of Brazil joining ITA 1 and ITA 2 shows an increase in imports of electronic equipment of between 3% and 7.6%, and the country’s overall import demand of between 0.2% and 0.48% (OECD, 2022[39]).
← 42. In contrast to NTMs, “non-tariff barriers” refer to a narrower term of measures, which are considered of protectionist nature.
← 43. The Posts and Telecommunications Department under the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MOTC) of the Union Government establishes and oversees the implementation of the national telecommunications policy, issuing regulations. The Department acts on approval and under instructions received from the MOTC. The Department enforces regulations relating to the operation and provision of telecommunications network and services (e.g. licensing, interconnection, tariffs, and dispute settlement).
← 44. See the Telecommunications Business Act 2001.
← 45. See the Budget Procedures Act 2018, Section 4.
← 46. See the Telecommunications Business Act 2001 (Chapter 1 Section 8), and the Public Companies Limited Act B.E. 2535 of 1992 (Section 67).
← 47. See the Land Code B.E. 2497 of 1954 (Chapter 8 Section 86, Section 96 bis) and the Condominium Act B.E 2522 of 1979 (Chapter 2 Section 19 bis).
← 48. See Telecommunications Commission on Criteria and Method of Merger & Acquisition and Cross-Shareholding in Telecommunication Business B.E. 2553 of 2010 (Section 2).
← 49. See Foreign Business Act B.E. 2542 of 1999 (Section 14).
← 50. By number portability is meant that final consumers are entitled to keep their telephone number when switching supplier of public telephone services. If number portability is regulated, the existing supplier is obliged by law to transfer the customer’s number to another company upon request from the customer.
← 51. According to OECD (2023[49]), the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) in South-East Asian telecommunications markets ranges from around 2 000 in Malaysia to over 5 000 in Brunei Darussalam. For context, the latest merger guidelines issued by the US Department of Justice (US DoJ, 2023[53]) classify markets with an HHI above 1 800 as highly concentrated. However, the OECD report (2023[49]), owing to its publication date, relies on the US DoJ’s Horizontal Merger Guidelines of 2010 (US DoJ, 2010[54]), which set a higher threshold of 2 500 for concentrated markets (see Footnote 15 in US DoJ (2023[53])). These US DoJ (2010[54]) guidelines were superseded with the publication of the US DoJ (2023[53]) guidelines.
← 52. See the “Republic Act No. 11659” of March 21, 2022, entitled “An Act Amending Commonwealth Act No. 146, otherwise known as the Public Services Act”.
← 53. See Republic Act No. 4726 of 1966 (Act to Define Condominium, establish requirements for its creation, and govern its incidents, Section 5).
← 54. See “An Act To Promote And Govern The Development Of Philippine Telecommunications And The Delivery Of Public Telecommunications Services (Republic Act No. 7925, Section 16).
← 55. Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (amended in 2005), Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (amended in 2022), and the Malaysia Federal Constitution 1957 (amended in 2022).
← 56. Licence Application Procedure and Licensing Criteria 2018 (updated 2019).
← 57. See Telecommunications Act of 1999 (amended in 2022, Sections 92, 96 and 77).