This chapter examines the transformation of Colombia’s communication regulatory framework since the 2019 reform, which modernised sectoral governance through a convergent approach that increased the independence of the sector regulator (CRC). It explores the changes in the institutional setting for connectivity services and infrastructures, the evolution of competition policy and spectrum management, and the consolidation of universal service funding. The chapter highlights notable progress in enhancing regulatory quality through evidence-based decision making, transparency and stakeholder participation, while identifying ongoing challenges within each of these areas. It also looks at how Colombia’s communication sector institutional and regulatory framework has moved closer to OECD best practices. The chapter ends with reflections on the need to keep pace with the changing dynamics of Colombia’s connectivity landscape.
OECD Digital Connectivity Review of Colombia
Abstract
Law 1341 of 2009 (Government of Colombia, 2009[1]) sets out the legal and policy framework for Colombia’s communication. The law outlines principles and concepts related to the organisation of information and communications technologies (ICTs), including communication and broadcasting services. In 2019, Law 1341 was substantially revised through Law 1978, known as the “ICT Modernisation Law” (Government of Colombia, 2019[2]). The revisions made several key changes to modernise the sector, improving regulatory efficiency and further encouraging digital inclusion.
Colombia’s accession process to the OECD in 2020, becoming the organisation’s fourth Latin American Member, played a crucial role in shaping the reform agenda. The 2014 OECD Review of Telecommunication Policy and Regulation in Colombia (henceforth, “the 2014 Review”) outlined a series of recommendations aimed at enhancing regulatory quality, institutional co‑ordination and market efficiency (OECD, 2014[3]). In response to an important recommendation of the 2014 Review, Colombia created an independent communication regulator.
The reforms also prompted amendments to secondary legislation. The main Regulatory Decree, (“Single Regulatory Decree for the ICT sector in Colombia”, Decree 1078) of 2015 established the organisation, roles and co‑ordination mechanisms of the entities that make up Colombia’s ICT sector, (Government of Colombia, 2015[4]). It has been amended multiple times to reflect the updated framework. Among these changes, Decree 377 of 2021 (Government of Colombia, 2021[5]) established definitions, criteria and procedures for registration in the Single ICT Registry. Meanwhile, Decree 1079 of 2023 (Government of Colombia, 2023[6]) added Title 26, which sets conditions for providing community-based fixed Internet services. Additionally, Decree 1064 of 2020 (Government of Colombia, 2020[7]) carried out structural reforms within the Ministry of ICT (Ministerio de Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones, or MinTIC), enhancing its internal organisation and operational capacity.
Taken together, Law 1978 of 2019 and subsequent amendments to secondary legislation (henceforth, “the 2019 reform”), brought about two major changes. First, they restructured the institutional framework by redefining the functions, roles and governance of relevant authorities in the communication and broadcasting sectors. Second, they significantly modified the regulatory framework, affecting key areas such as competition, spectrum management and universal service funds.
This chapter analyses the institutional and regulatory developments in Colombia following the 2019 reform. In the first part, the chapter provides an overview of the institutional and regulatory framework, highlighting key authorities, their functions, governance and regulatory changes across policy areas. The second part identifies recent regulatory developments with the most significant impact on the sector's evolution. These developments are then analysed in more detail, emphasising the primary changes introduced by the reform and their implications for the sector, as well as the challenges ahead.
3.1.1. Institutional setting of Colombia’s communication sector
The institutional structure of Colombia’s communication and broadcasting sectors was significantly reshaped by Law 1978 of 2019. The most notable institutional changes included the dissolution of the National Television Authority (Autoridad Nacional de Televisión, or ANTV), which previously served as the regulator for television broadcasting, and the creation of a single converged and independent communication regulator. In addition, the reform also merged the two separate funds formerly dedicated to universal service provision of ICT and television (FonTIC and FonTV) into a single fund: the Unified ICT Fund (FUTIC). Managed by the MinTIC, this consolidated instrument became the main mechanism for financing digital policies.
Beyond these structural adjustments, the reform sought to address fragmentation, reinforce regulatory capacity and adapt governance structures to the dynamics of technological convergence. It redistributed responsibilities across institutions, clarified supervisory roles, and introduced new arrangements for funding and inter-institutional co‑ordination. Table 3.1 summarises the core competences and governance of the leading institutions following the 2019 reform.
Source: OECD based on Law 1978 of 2019 and Law 1341 of 2009.
Ministry of Information and Communications Technologies (MinTIC)
The MinTIC remains the primary policymaking authority for the ICT sector, responsible for closing the digital divide and guiding ICT-driven economic and social growth. The 2019 reform strengthened its role, giving it additional supervisory and licensing powers. In television broadcasting, for example, it assumed duties previously held by the ANTV.
The MinTIC kept its role in spectrum management and planning, while technical functions were delegated to the National Spectrum Agency (ANE). The MinTIC's functions in relation to spectrum are: i) assign spectrum usage permits; issue regulations, conditions and requirements to grant licences, permits and registrations for the use or exploitation of this resource; and ii) allocate spectrum.
The 2019 reform also enhanced its oversight capabilities through Decree 1064/2020, which clarified inspection and licensing duties. The MinTIC manages FUTIC, which finances universal service and public content projects. It continues to act as the principal authority for sanctioning regulatory non-compliance, albeit within relatively limited financial thresholds compared with other agencies.
Communications Regulation Commission (CRC)
The CRC was transformed into a converged regulator with an expanded mandate covering communication services, broadcasting, postal services and audiovisual content. The dissolution of the ANTV transferred regulatory and content-related responsibilities to the CRC, including oversight of free-to-air television, radio and informative pluralism. The reform also changed its governance: instead of a single board led by the ICT Minister, the CRC now functions through two Sessions: the “Communications Session” and the “Audiovisual Content Session” (ACS). Board members are appointed through a combination of government designation and merit-based public competitions. This structure has maintained continuity while acknowledging the distinctive nature of content regulation. The CRC is financially independent, funded through operator contributions and exercises authority in competition promotion, market regulation and user protection.
National Spectrum Agency (ANE)
The ANE continues to serve as the technical authority for spectrum planning, allocation and monitoring. Spectrum assignment or licensing is under the purview of the MinTIC. The 2019 reform reinforced the remit of the MinTIC, adding responsibilities previously held by the ANTV, notably broadcasting plans and technical charts. Although spectrum licensing for broadcasting remains with the MinTIC, the ANE sets technical parameters (i.e. maximum power of antennas or limits of human exposure to electromagnetic fields). It also issues rules for deployment of antennas and use of broadcasting spectrum. With regard to spectrum licence fees for the use of radio spectrum, the ANE submits a valuation proposal; however, the MinTIC ultimately decides the fee. In practice, this means the MinTIC not only reviews and approves the proposed valuation but may also determine a different fee based on public policy considerations.
Superintendence of Industry and Commerce (SIC)
The Superintendence of Industry and Commerce (SIC) remains the sole national competition authority in the country, overseeing antitrust enforcement, merger control and consumer protection across all sectors, including the ICT sector. The SIC also has powers in relation to the protection of personal data. Following the 2019 reform and the dissolution of the ANTV, the SIC assumed new responsibilities in the audiovisual industry, particularly regarding competition and consumer rights in television services. This expanded the SIC’s oversight into an area previously managed by sector-specific bodies, strengthening its role as a horizontal authority. Notably, its sanctioning capacity remains considerably higher than that of the MinTIC or the CRC,1 enhancing its deterrent power against anti-competitive practices.
National Planning Department (DNP)
The National Planning Department (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, or DNP) continues to perform its cross-cutting role in national economic and social planning, with no substantial modification of its core responsibilities. Its influence on ICT policy is exercised through the National Development Plan and the documents from the National Council for Economic and Social Policy (Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social, or CONPES). The most visible effect of the 2019 reform was institutional rather than functional: the DNP no longer holds a seat on the CRC board, which was reassigned to a presidential appointee, reducing its direct role in sector-specific regulatory governance.
3.1.2. Regulatory changes affecting the sector with the 2019 ICT Modernisation Law
The 2019 reform introduced a series of regulatory adjustments to modernise the sector, strengthen investment incentives and ensure that ICT services are delivered under conditions of greater efficiency and continuity. These changes affected licensing, spectrum management, universal service, public funds and the sanctions regime (Table 3.2).
Source: OECD based on laws, decrees and resolutions referenced in table.
One of the most visible modifications was to the licensing regime for communication services. The process was simplified, with general authorisation now becoming effective through registration in the Single ICT Registry (Registro Único de TIC or RUTIC), reducing administrative burdens and providing greater legal certainty for operators.
Spectrum management was another key area of reform. Law 1978 states that spectrum should be assigned “on the basis of technical and economic studies, in order to encourage competition, investment, social welfare maximisation, informational pluralism, non-discriminatory access, and to avoid monopolistic practices” (Law 1978 of 2019, Art. 11c). Moreover, following an OECD recommendation in 2014 (OECD, 2014[3]), the changes in the regulatory framework extended spectrum licence duration from 10 to 20 years, with possibility of renewal (Law 1978 of 2019, Art. 12). Extending spectrum licence duration creates stronger incentives for long-term investment in infrastructure. At the same time, new rules permitted part of the spectrum fees to be paid through build-out obligations, thereby linking fee payments to network expansion. The methodology for updating spectrum fees was also revised, and the conditions for assignment procedures were clarified to strike a balance between efficiency and service continuity.
Universal service obligations were expanded during states of emergency, recognising Internet access as an essential public service, with duties to ensure service continuity under these circumstances. The 2019 reform also permitted differentiated obligations for small providers and supported community initiatives to deliver fixed Internet services, acknowledging their role in expanding connectivity to underserved areas.
Public financing was streamlined by merging FonTIC and FonTV into FUTIC. This new fund combines resources from operator contributions, spectrum fees and fines. The scope of the Fund was expanded to support not only universal broadband access and public television, but also a broader range of projects. Later changes to FUTIC further expanded its role, enabling it to provide credit lines and targeted support to small Internet service providers (ISPs). Finally, the sanctions regime was strengthened. The 2019 reform raised the maximum fines for legal entities, enhancing deterrence to promote compliance with regulations and sector obligations.
Among the various regulatory changes introduced by Law 1978 of 2019 and subsequent legislation, six areas stand out as the most significantly affected and those with the greatest impact on the sector’s evolution. These areas include: i) the transformation of the CRC into a converged regulator with a higher degree of independence; ii) competition regulation; iii) spectrum management; iv) measures to ease infrastructure deployment; v) reorganisation of the universal service fund; and vi) measures for a stable and predictable regulatory framework. The following subsections examine these developments in greater detail, highlighting the main changes and their implications for sectoral governance, market performance and connectivity outcomes.
3.2.1. Towards a convergent regulator
The CRC is Colombia’s sectoral regulatory authority for communication, broadcasting, audiovisual content and postal services. Its role is to promote competition, prevent abuse of market dominance, regulate communication networks and services, safeguard user rights in these markets and protect informational pluralism.
The origins of the CRC can be traced back to the Telecommunications Regulation Commission (Comisión Reguladora de Telecomunicaciones, or CRT), established in 1994 at a time when regulatory functions were being transferred from ministries to specialised agencies. The CRT’s remit was limited to telecommunications, focusing on interconnection, tariffs and competition in fixed and mobile services. With the ICT Law of 2009, the body was restructured into the CRC, widening its scope to cover information and communications technologies more broadly and marking Colombia’s first steps towards regulatory convergence.
Law 1978 of 2019 marked a decisive shift in the CRC’s mandate. The CRC was designated as Colombia’s sole convergent regulator across communications, postal services, broadcasting and audiovisual content. Its mandate was expanded to include regulation of broadcasting networks and services – free-to-air, subscription television and radio – and oversight of audiovisual content, functions previously exercised by the ANTV.
The CRC issues rules on interconnection, infrastructure sharing, handset unlocking and service quality. It also has the authority to request comprehensive, accurate, truthful and timely information from providers of communication networks and services, as well as television and radio broadcasters to perform its functions. However, the CRC can only apply sanctions if a provider fails to supply the requested information or where the information submitted does not meet the required quality standards (Art. 22 Law 1341 of 2009). The remaining sanctions concern television content, particularly regarding matters of media pluralism and conduct that infringe the rights of families and children (Art. 22 of Law 1341 of 2009). The regulator still lacks any regulatory enforcement and monitoring powers. As was pointed out in the 2014 Review, enforcement and most sanctioning powers over the ICT sector still lie under the MinTIC’s remit (Art. 18 Law 1341 of 2009).
In addition, spectrum policy, which has important implications on communication market competition, has also remained under the MinTIC’s mandate with the technical support of the ANE for spectrum planning and allocation. The 2014 Review recommended that the ANE and all of its functions related to spectrum, along with spectrum assignment under the MinTIC’s mandate, be part of the new convergent and independent regulator (OECD, 2014[3]).
Governance structure of the regulator
The 2019 reform also reshaped the CRC’s governance. Before the reform, its board comprised the ICT Minister as chair, the director of the DNP and three presidential appointees. This composition raised concerns about the regulator’s independence. Indeed, OECD recommendations in 2014 noted how the Executive branch’s influence undermined regulatory continuity and independence of the CRC. It had called for an independent and convergent regulator.
Law 1978 of 2019 changed CRC governance to grant it more independence, while introducing a dual-session structure to address the needs of a convergent regulator. The Communications Session comprises five board commissioners: the ICT Minister (or Vice-minister by delegation), one commissioner directly appointed by the president, and three commissioners selected through a public competitive process. Commissioners of the Communications Session, except for the minister, serve non-renewable four-year terms and independently appointed members now form the majority.
The ACS was designed as the successor to the ANTV’s board. It consists of three board commissioners: one elected by public regional television operators, and two chosen through merit-based competitions conducted by universities. Of the latter, one commissioner represents civil society and the other the audiovisual sector. Commissioners of the ACS also serve non-renewable four-year terms.
The CRC enjoys administrative, technical, financial and budgetary autonomy, and its decisions are subject only to judicial review. This structure preserved continuity in content oversight, while increasing the independence and technical orientation of regulatory decisions.
Challenges of the governance structure of entities with mandate in the communication sector
Although there has been clear progress with the 2019 reform, the CRC still faces major challenges. Some issues were already identified in the 2014 OECD Review and remain only partly resolved, while others stem from the current internal and sectoral situation. The most important issues are outlined below.
Ensuring true regulatory independence of the CRC despite executive branch influence
Although the 2019 ICT Modernisation Law introduced governance reforms to the CRC’s board (i.e. dual sessions, merit-based selection for several commissioners, non-renewable four-year terms, etc.), there remains scope for influence from the executive branch. The presence of the ICT Minister (or Vice-minister by delegation) and a presidential appointee on the CRC’s board means that political actors still hold some formal role in decision making. This structure increases the risk that regulation could be influenced by political priorities rather than by purely technical or sectoral concerns.
Independent sector regulators are the norm across OECD Member countries and are associated with greater regulatory certainty, thus leading to stronger competition and investment in the sector. According to OECD’s Indicators on the Governance of Sector Regulators, the share of independent sectoral regulators is highest in the e-communications sector (93%). Only 3 of 38 OECD Member countries had attached communication regulators to their ministries in 2023 (Van Langen et al., 2025[8]). To function effectively, such communication regulators should be supported by a robust governance framework that ensures their effective operation, safeguards regulatory integrity, impartiality and independence, and enables them to fulfil their mandate (OECD, 2014[9]; OECD, 2021[10]).
In accordance with the OECD Recommendation on Broadband Connectivity, OECD Member countries should adopt and implement “robust legal and regulatory frameworks for connectivity in which decisions are made in an independent, impartial, objective (evidence- and knowledge-based), proportionate, and consistent manner and periodically reviewing those frameworks to ensure their continued adequacy and appropriateness and identify improvements where necessary” (OECD, 2021[10]).
OECD Best Practice Principles for the Governance of Regulators emphasise that a single, independent regulator should oversee the sector. Such a regulator should have commensurate powers to carry out its role and operational distance from government. Weakening regulatory independence risks deterring investment in high-quality connectivity. Thus, various measures should be taken to guarantee the distance between policymaking formulation and regulatory action, and to prevent any diminishment of independence (OECD, 2014[9]).
Good governance of the sector requires clear authority and political independence. Creating a single regulatory body to oversee the sector can avoid confusion and overlapping responsibilities. Such a body should be accompanied by governance that ensures its effective functioning, preserves its regulatory integrity and allows the effective achievement of its mandate. Moreover, it should have a high degree of independence, both from the entities it regulates and from the executive branch of government. This will provide greater confidence and trust that regulatory decisions are made with integrity.
Procedures for appointing the board of commissioners are just as crucial. Board appointments must be free from political interference by the government or its subordinate entities. Transparent mechanisms to elect the board are also key to ensure confidence in the regulator, its decisions and the regulatory regime. This also helps preserve a high degree of integrity through objective, impartial and consistent decision making. Considering the need to prevent undue influence and maintain trust in the regulatory regime, the selection of commissioners should be independent from any political influence from the government or any of its attached entities. Finally, the regulator should have adequate resources to fulfil its mandate. This is a key aspect to strengthen the independence and powers to implement regulation of the CRC.
Following its OECD Review, Mexico took positive steps towards creating an independent communication regulator that could hold lessons for Colombia. In 2013, following the telecommunication and broadcasting review for Mexico (OECD, 2012[11]), the country implemented 28 of 31 OECD recommendations through a constitutional reform of the telecommunication sector. This process established a strong, independent and convergent regulator, the Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT) (OECD, 2017[12]). Among the positive effects of the reform, the country witnessed over 93.9 million additional mobile broadband subscriptions over the 2013 (Q2)-2023 period – more than the entire population of Colombia and Peru combined. This was accompanied by sharp declines in mobile broadband prices in Mexico ranging from 69% to 85% (according to OECD price baskets) over 2013‑2023 (OECD, 2025[13]; OECD, 2025[14]). (OECD, 2025[13]; OECD, 2025[14])
Despite these positive effects, subsequent reforms undermined the regulator’s independence. In 2025, Mexico dismantled the independent regulator, reassigning its responsibilities to a newly created Telecommunications Regulation Commission (CRT). The CRT was an entity within the Agency for Digital Transformation and Telecommunications, part of the executive branch of the Government of Mexico. The stated rationale of this move was to streamline functions and lower administrative costs (OECD, 2026[15]). Unlike its predecessor the IFT, the CRT does not enjoy institutional independence: all its members are appointed by the President of Mexico and confirmed by a simple majority in the Senate (OECD, 2026[15]). This institutional change has raised concerns regarding the regulator’s independence and the implications for regulatory stability and predictability over the long term (OECD, 2026[15]).
Colombia has made laudable progress to increase the technical autonomy and institutional independence of the communication regulator. With the ICT Modernisation Law of 2019, three out of four board members of the Communications Session of the CRC are selected through a public, merit-based competition. This follows a widely advertised call for applications and a rigorous technical evaluation by the National University. However, as discussed in the 2014 Review (OECD, 2014[3]), the Colombian government should not have a seat on the CRC’s board, which is now the case of the Communications Session. This undermines the regulator’s independence.
Alternative approaches can allow presidential participation, while preserving the regulator’s independence. The direct appointment of commissioners by the president does not fully guarantee independence. Alternative approaches, however, can still allow presidential participation while ensuring that appointments are independent and based on merit. For example, the president could select commissioners from a shortlist of candidates chosen through an open, competitive process, as already contemplated in the 2019 law (OECD, 2019[16]).
Apart from independence from the government, regulators should also maintain independence from industry. As noted in previous OECD work (OECD, 2019[16]), the appointment of a commissioner of the ACS by regional public TV operators creates a potential conflict of interest: regulated entities would be selecting the appointee that regulates them. The ACS commissioner should possess expertise in broadcasting, but the selection should still adhere to the same transparent and merit-based procedure applied to the other commissioners (OECD, 2019[16]).
In sum, although the CRC is formally autonomous, the degree of independence from the executive branch can still be strengthened. First, it should be recognised that political appointees to the Communications Session risk the appearance of conflict of interest. Second, independence from sectoral players may be at risk through involvement of stakeholders in the ACS.
According to the OECD’s principles on decision making and ‑governing body‑ structures for independent regulators, representatives of the executive, who remain accountable to the minister, should participate in meetings of a regulator’s governing body only in a non‑voting capacity. This should take place solely when necessary and at the regulator’s invitation. Furthermore, to avoid conflicts of interest, the formal participation of stakeholders should be organised through structured engagement mechanisms, such as advisory or consultative committees, rather than through membership in the regulator’s governing body (OECD, 2014[9]).
Potential overlapping of responsibilities within the “converged regulator” due to the duality of boards within the two sessions
The ICT Modernisation Law establishes an unusual governance structure for a converged regulator by creating two parallel “sessions” with two distinct boards within the same regulatory body (Article 20): the ACS and the Communications Session (OECD, 2019[16]). On the one hand, the commissioners in the ACS are in charge of guaranteeing pluralism, and impartiality of information in audiovisual services, protecting competition and the rights of viewers. They can fine operators and TV licensees for violations of legal provisions protecting the rights of families and children. On the other hand, the commissioners of the Communications Session regulate the audiovisual content market, especially with respect to competition in the TV segment.
Having two boards in a converged telecommunication and broadcasting regulator has no precedent in OECD Member countries (OECD, 2019[16]). Some convergent and multi-sectoral regulators may have lower chambers dealing with competition (ex post enforcement) and regulation (pro-competitive ex ante measures), but a unified board meets in a plenary session (e.g. Spain). This “duality” of boards is particular to Colombia and raises operational challenges, calling into question the nature of a “true” convergent regulator in Colombia. On the one hand, within the Colombian context, having two boards allows the CRC to address communication market analysis separately from audiovisual content issues related to media plurality. On the other, it raises challenges as the Communications Session has remit in some issues related to content distribution, but not others, and vice versa when it comes to the ACS.
Some interviewed stakeholders argued that this peculiar institutional split of the CRC into two sessions was needed to guarantee “independence” from political interference of the ACS and preserve media plurality. This rationale could also be applied to the governance of the Communications Session in carrying out its main functions. The argument would become mute with a truly convergent regulator with one unified board fully independent from government. At present, both sessions present different challenges with regards to independence: the Communications Session is not entirely independent from the executive branch, and the ACS lacks independence from the entities it regulates.
Judicial review and its implications
CRC decisions are subject to judicial review. Affected entities such as operators, service providers and sometimes even civil society stakeholders may challenge CRC acts in court. While this oversight helps ensure legality, it also presents several risks. Court cases, whether they are public, administrative or constitutional, can often drag on for extended periods, undermining regulatory reliability for sector participants and increasing uncertainty about when regulatory decisions will take effect.
While judicial review of regulatory action is common across OECD Member countries, the tendency towards delay and increased judicial scrutiny in Colombia can hinder innovation. The anticipation of legal challenges may lead the CRC to avoid bold or innovative regulatory measures. This, in turn, can slow regulatory responsiveness and adaptation to new technologies or services, as well as its response to market developments. Additionally, the effectiveness of judicial review depends on the courts' ability to handle complex regulatory issues. This includes whether the courts have enough technical expertise and resources, and whether their caseloads are manageable. Slow adjudication risks diminishing the intended effects of regulation.
The CRC follows a meticulous methodology and stringent process to avoid its decisions being stopped by judicial review. Namely, it adopts a preventive legal approach when drafting its regulatory decisions, anticipating potential litigation to protect the institution’s interests. When disputes arise, the process typically begins with a mandatory conciliation request. The legal team presents the case to the internal Conciliation Committee, which decides whether to pursue a settlement. If conciliation fails and a lawsuit is filed, the legal team prepares the defence strategy. It drafts the response to the claim, and manages procedural challenges and evidence with internal review and, where necessary, external expert support. The responsible lawyer also prepares for and attends hearings; submits final written arguments after the evidentiary phase; and handles appeals or responses to appeals following the judgement, including at second instance.
The CRC’s success in judicial proceedings affirms the merits of this careful approach. According to the National Agency of Judicial Defense of the State (Agencia Nacional de Defensa Jurídica del Estado, or ANDJE), the CRC has a high degree of success in judicial review. Indeed, it had a 100% success rate in 2021, 2022 and 2023 (Table 3.3).
Source: CRC based on Defensa Jurídica del Estado (2025[17]), Informe de Litgiosidad, https://www.defensajuridica.gov.co/gestion/informes-de-litigiosidad/.
Although the CRC’s approach has led to successful outcomes in judicial review, it may inadvertently lead to a conservative approach to regulation. First, the exhaustive process may create incentives to avoid issuing complex or tricky regulatory measures with a high risk of being contested. Second, it may prolong the legal analysis to reduce the likelihood that regulatory review is halted. These two compounded effects could affect both the length and the content of regulations, creating incentives for a conservative approach to issuing regulation.
The delay of regulatory action stemming from this cautious legal approach affects market dynamics. A cautious legal approach can slow down or completely halt the design and implementation of regulatory action. Some stakeholders have highlighted concerns with respect to pro-competitive ex ante regulation. For example, the process to declare dominance in mobile markets started after the resolution of relevant markets by the CRC in 2017. However, the process was halted with the ongoing discussion of the ICT Modernisation Law in 2019. Claro was finally declared dominant by the CRC in mobile markets in 2021 (CRC, 2021[18]). However, the decision to date has largely been without ex ante measures to decrease market concentration.
Balancing regulatory certainty and innovation versus flexibility
The communication sector is rapidly changing, creating a need for clear and flexible rules. New players in the communication sector are investing in connectivity and having a more prominent role. These roles range from private equity, tower companies and wholesale fibre networks to satellite operators and large technology firms. In addition, OTT services play a larger role, and transformative digital technologies such as AI, cloud and the Internet of Things are becoming more prevalent. As this evolving digital context affects the connectivity ecosystem, the CRC must establish stable, predictable rules. These should allow operators and investors to plan confidently. At the same time, the rules should be flexible enough to adapt to technology developments and changing market structures.
In a welcome move, the CRC has created a formal environment for experimentation, but lessons learnt still need to be integrated efficiently into regulations. The CRC has initiated a regulatory sandbox to create flexibility for the implementation of projects that may generate social benefits (CRC Resolution No. 5980 of 2020 amended by CRC Resolution No. 7243 of 2023). Regulatory sandboxes offer the flexibility for selected firms to test innovative products or services with minimal regulatory requirements (Attrey, Lesher and Lomax, 2020[19]). These initiatives show promise, but their actual scope, geographic coverage, regulatory influence and integration into the broader regulatory system are still being tested. Ensuring that lessons from sandbox experiments are incorporated effectively into general regulation (without unnecessary delays) remains a significant challenge.
Building on its regulatory sandbox programme, the CRC could use the model to reduce barriers to entry and increase competition in the sector. The CRC’s regulatory sandbox programme has been one of the first initiatives of this type in Latin America. However, the CRC could expand on these initial steps to consider ways for sandboxes to engage more companies. In particular, sandboxes could experiment with projects that may further the deployment and usage of communication services in rural areas (e.g. community-led initiatives) (OECD, 2022[20]). Within the scope of the CRC’s mandate, regulatory sandboxes could test measures to reduce barriers to entry, such as promoting infrastructure sharing or strengthening access regulation. This would foster service‑level competition and ultimately pave the way for sustainable, infrastructure‑based competition.
Pluralism, oversight of content platforms and regulation of audiovisual content
The enlarged scope of the CRC has prompted legislation to help the regulator keep up with its new responsibilities. The CRC’s scope has expanded to include audiovisual content, free-to-air and subscription TV, radio, and oversight of broadcasting networks and content standards. In this context, it faces increasing demands to ensure impartiality of information, prevent ownership concentration, protect user rights and regulate content (including advertising and programming). It must also respond to challenges from online platforms and streaming services, many of which may not yet be fully covered by content regulation rules. Accordingly, Law 2489 of 2025 “establishes provisions for creating healthy and safe digital environments for children and adolescents”. It assigns responsibility to the MinTIC, in co‑ordination with the CRC, to define policies and regulations that ensure the safe use of ICTs for the benefit of children and young people.
Capacity in regulatory implementation
The CRC needs more administrative, technical and financial capacity to enforce its expanded mandate, especially in remote or underserved areas. The CRC must be able to monitor compliance, enforce build-out obligations, manage spectrum efficiently, and handle appeals, sanctions and quality standards. As the first priority, the CRC’s sanctioning powers should be broadened to include penalties related to compliance with all regulations under its mandate. As discussed in the previous sub-section (3.2.1 “Towards a convergent regulator”), within its mandate for communication services, the CRC has limited authority to impose sanctions. Its powers are essentially restricted to cases in which a provider fails to submit requested information or when the information provided does not meet the required quality standards. Without strong implementation capacity, even well-designed regulations may perform poorly.
3.2.2. Pro-competitive ex ante regulation
Competition remains one of the most pressing regulatory challenges in Colombia’s communication sector. The mobile market is highly concentrated, with one operator historically maintaining a dominant position. Concerns about market structure are heightened by the potential merger of the second and third operators, which could further reduce effective competition and reinforce market concentration. In this context, the design and application of competition regulation by the CRC is central to ensuring that consumers benefit from lower prices, better quality of service and innovation.
Pro-competitive ex ante regulation is the responsibility of the CRC, which can apply ex ante measures once a competition risk is identified. To this end, it first defines the relevant markets based on an analysis of demand substitutability. The CRC identifies the retail and wholesale markets and determines the services that comprise each of these markets.
For markets deemed susceptible to ex ante regulation, the CRC determines which operators hold a dominant position through a competition analysis. This analysis includes concentration indicators, operator market shares and market evolution trends. Based on these analyses, the CRC can impose the regulatory measures it deems necessary to remedy identified competition problems. It may also adopt individual regulatory obligations through administrative action (CRC Resolution No. 3510 of 2011, Article 8). Where retail market failures emerge, the CRC also studies the upstream wholesale input markets within those retail value chains. While the CRC declared Claro as dominant in 2021 (CRC Resolution No. 6380 of 2021), mostly no ex ante pro-competitive measures have been imposed.
Relevant markets susceptible to ex ante regulation
The CRC has updated both the list of relevant markets and which of them are susceptible to ex ante regulation. Beginning in 2009 (CRC Resolution No. 2058 of 2009), the process identified 15 relevant markets. Six of these markets were considered potentially subject to ex ante regulation: outgoing mobile voice, fixed‑mobile call termination (national), fixed‑fixed termination (municipal), mobile‑fixed termination (municipal), mobile‑mobile termination (national) and international long-distance termination (national). These provided the foundation for interconnection and termination regulation still in force.
Over time, the CRC has expanded and restructured the list. The most recent update (CRC Resolution No. 7424 of 2024) identified 23 relevant markets with 8 susceptible to ex ante regulation: mobile services; termination of calls including fixed‑mobile, fixed‑fixed, mobile‑fixed, mobile‑mobile and international long distance termination calls; wholesale access and origination; and wholesale data transport in 170 municipalities (Annex Table 3.A.1 in Annex 3.A and Table 3.4).2
Source: OECD based on CRC Resolution No. 7422 of 2024.
Declaring dominance and related regulatory measures
To date, among markets susceptible to ex ante regulation, the CRC has formally acknowledged a dominant operator in two of them. The first one is “outgoing mobile voice retail market” established in 2009 and later removed from the ex ante list in 2022. The second one is the “mobile services market”, established in 2017. In both cases, Claro (Comunicación Celular S.A., Comcel) was declared dominant.
The lengthy process to declare dominance in the mobile services is complete, only modest remedies have been imposed to curb market concentration. While the process to declare dominance in the mobile services market started in 2018, it was halted with the ongoing discussion of the ICT Modernisation Law in 2019. Finally, in 2021, the CRC declared Claro as a dominant player in this relevant market. However, to date, largely no ex ante remedies have been imposed on the dominant player with an impact to curb market concentration (see in the previous sub-section on “Judicial review and its implications”).
Some asymmetric measures placed by the CRC largely pre-date the 2021 declaration of dominance. The CRC issued regulations of on-net/off-net retail price differential and termination rates in 2012 and 2017, respectively. After 2021, the only ex ante regulatory measures issued by the CRC relate to gradually reducing mobile termination rates to a sender-keeps-all model in 2022. In 2024, it issued asymmetric measures on the dominant provider regarding access to passive infrastructure, which are quite common across OECD Member countries.
The CRC also issued symmetric measures to promote active sharing of mobile infrastructure more than a decade ago (CRC Resolution No. 4 112 of 2013) through national roaming regulations, or “national automatic roaming” (NAR). This regulation has been updated over time. The CRC introduced geographical segmentation of the wholesale roaming tariffs in 2017; as an update in 2024, it introduced differentiation by market power by municipality. As recommended in 2014 by the OECD, national roaming obligations should remain in force for a reasonable period with clear sunset clauses to encourage network deployment (OECD, 2014[3]).
Outgoing mobile voice (retail) market
In 2009, Claro was declared dominant in the national retail market's outgoing mobile voice (CRC Resolution No. 2062 of 2009 and CRC Resolution No. 2152 of 2009). The CRC identified competition problems such as network externalities, accentuated by on-net/off-net tariff differentiation. This opened the door for the CRC to impose asymmetric measures for the dominant operator and other measures for the rest of the firms, given their market position.
Regarding asymmetric measures, in 2009, the off-net tariffs for the dominant operator were limited in relation to inter-operator charges (CRC Resolutions No. 2066 and 2171 of 2009). Later, CRC Resolution 4002 of 2012 (as amended by CRC Resolution 4050 of 2012) regulated access and termination charges (by time and capacity). It also reinforced the rule that off-net tariffs could not exceed on-net tariffs.
In 2017, CRC Resolution 5108 introduced ex ante regulatory measures for mobile access and termination charges (voice, SMS and capacity), applicable to all operators. Limited asymmetries in termination charges were reserved only for new entrants (i.e. operators obtaining spectrum rights in International Mobile Telecommunications [IMT] bands for the first time, and with a sunset clause of five years).
Following a decade of declining termination charges, CRC Resolution 7007 of 2022 mandated the adoption of a sender-keeps-all regime (zero mobile termination charges) effective 1 May 2025. In practice, historical asymmetries in termination rates have progressively given way to symmetric regimes, culminating in the “sender-keeps-all” model. A judicial ruling (Council of State judgement of 21 November 2024) confirmed the validity of the “sender‑keeps all” model within the Colombian legal framework, provided that compensation mechanisms are available in cases of significant asymmetric traffic. In compliance with this ruling, the CRC issued Resolution 7753 of 2025 (CRC, 2025[21]). This resolution amended the access charge regime to reflect the court’s criteria, ensuring an appropriate balance between economic efficiency, competitive incentives and the long-term sustainability of the interconnection ecosystem.
This evolution is consistent with the OECD’s 2014 recommendation (OECD, 2014[3]) stating that asymmetric termination rates are difficult to justify and should be reduced towards long-term efficient costs. However, some stakeholders argue the CRC does not properly enforce the sender-keeps-all model regulation.
Mobile services market
The mobile services market has evolved significantly over the past decade. In 2017, Resolution 5108 of 2017 introduced “mobile services” as a relevant market (voice, SMS, MMS and/or mobile data), replacing the former differentiation of mobile Internet modalities. In 2021, Claro (Comcel) was declared dominant in this market (CRC Resolution 6146 of 2021), although no corrective measures were imposed; instead, the CRC left open the possibility of targeted regulation if competition weakened. In 2024, Resolution 7285 of 2024 imposed asymmetrical measures on the dominant provider focussed on passive infrastructure access: publication of reference offers (towers, masts, poles), quarterly reporting to the CRC on location, availability, excess capacity and non-discriminatory access to excess capacity on fair, non-discriminatory terms. Even in the case of transfer of infrastructure ownership, these obligations will remain in place.
National roaming
National roaming regulation, referred to as “NAR” in Colombia (roaming automático nacional),3 promotes sharing of active mobile network infrastructure among operators. This allows users of one mobile network to access voice, data and SMS services through another operator’s network in areas where their own provider has no coverage. In so doing, it expands service availability while encouraging more efficient use of networks.
NAR in Colombia serves a dual purpose: i) to extend coverage for end users, ensuring continuity in areas where their operator lacks infrastructure; and ii) to stimulate service-based competition, reducing the need for new entrants to make substantial initial investments. To achieve these goals, the NAR regulation establishes the technical conditions and remuneration arrangements applicable to national automatic roaming. This ensures that new mobile communication operators benefit from effective, transparent and non-discriminatory access to existing infrastructure. At the same time, incumbents optimise the use and amortisation of their assets.
In Colombia, national roaming regulations are measures applied to all operators issued under the powers for regulating essential facilities (as for submarine cables). As such, they are not part of the wholesale obligations that could be applied to dominant operators (i.e. the significant market power [SMP] framework). The NAR regulation requires any mobile network operator with a licence to use IMT spectrum to make its network available, upon request, to other mobile providers. This enables customers of the requesting provider to access voice, data and SMS services in areas where service coverage is unavailable. Access to roaming must be provided without discrimination and without any deterioration in service quality.
Over time, the scope of the regulation and the structure of national roaming wholesale tariffs have evolved. Between 2013 and 2024, the CRC issued several resolutions related to national roaming wholesale tariffs: No. 4112 of 2013, 5107 of 2017, 5827 of 2019, 6298 of 2021, 7007 of 2022 and 7285 of 2024.4 The regulatory regime designates NAR as an essential facility for providing mobile services in uncovered areas. The regulation also sets out the rights and obligations of operators requesting access, originating network operators (Proveedores de Red de Origen, or PRO) and those providing it; and visited network providers (Proveedores de Red Visitada, or PRV), together with the rules governing wholesale remuneration for access.
Commercial negotiation between the parties is the default method for determining the wholesale roaming tariff paid by the originating network provider (PRO) to the visited network provider (PRV). However, the CRC has set maximum wholesale tariffs (tariff caps), with their scope having gradually changed. When the national roaming regime was established in 2013, the caps were applied uniformly to all operators nationwide.
The first significant reform, introduced in 2017, implemented geographic segmentation, which has since become a key component of the regulatory framework. Under CRC Resolution 5107 of 2017, the general wholesale caps for national roaming related to voice and SMS services applied in municipalities where the requesting provider had deployed three or fewer sectors of 2G5 and 3G6 technologies, or none at all. With respect to data services, the same rule applied to municipalities with three or fewer sectors of 4G technology, or none. In this way, the applicability of the regulation depended partly on each operator’s own infrastructure rollout.
In addition to geographic segmentation, the 2017 amendment of the NAR regulation introduced differentiation based on operator type. The 2017 amendment set specific tariff caps for new entrants and operators with market power. The lower wholesale caps to operators awarded IMT spectrum for the first time were effective for up to five years from the date of the award. As of 24 February 2017, the wholesale tariff cap for voice services paid by new entrants (COP 11.43 per minute) was about 60% lower than that for established operators (COP 28.67). For data services, the 2017 cap for new entrants (COP 6.40 per megabyte) was approximately 46% lower than the cap for all operators (COP 11.87 per megabyte). In 2022, the CRC introduced a converging glide path of national roaming wholesale tariffs for all operators (CRC Resolution 7007 of 2022). By 1 January 2023, the tariff cap for data services stood at COP 9.93 per megabyte for all operators and COP 6.24 per megabyte for new entrants. This represented a 37% reduction, with a glide path converging to a single tariff of COP 3.19 per megabyte for all operators from 1 May 2025.
As a further step to 2021 to the update of national roaming regulation, the geographical segmentation of the NAR framework was refined in 2021 (CRC Resolution 6298 of 2021). As of 1 January 2022, wholesale tariff caps were applied in 460 municipalities based on criteria. These included the level of network deployment, traffic volumes, number of service providers present, and local socio-demographic and geographic conditions that restrict effective infrastructure-based competition in the provision of mobile services (CRC Resolution 5050 of 2016, Annex 4.8). Consequently, the applicability of the regulation no longer depends on the operators’ own investment decisions. Rather, it depends on the structural characteristics of each municipality. The list of municipalities is reviewed every two years; in all other areas, remuneration for access to the essential facility must be determined through commercial negotiation between operators.
In 2024, the NAR framework was further amended. The number of municipalities subject to regulated caps increased to 498 (CRC Resolution 7285 of 2024). Moreover, to ensure effective service-based competition, the CRC introduced an additional measure for municipalities where the visited network belongs to operators holding a dominant position, individually or jointly, in the “mobile services” market. In such cases, the applicable tariff is the final value of the glide path defined in the 2024 reform, specifically the tariff scheduled to take effect on 1 May 2025. This accelerated the glide path for dominant operators in the listed municipalities. For 2024, the tariff cap for voice services for dominant operators was COP 3.51 per minute (compared with COP 5.56 for other operators). For data services, it is COP 3.19 per megabyte (compared with COP 6.80). These caps were also lower than those available to new entrants nationwide.
The 2024 amendment of national roaming regulations also strengthened service obligations. The visited network must provide NAR on non-discriminatory terms within the requested geographic area and, when necessary, at a more detailed level than the municipality. At the same time, the originating provider must submit requests directly and include traffic projections for the following 12 months. Annex Table 3.A.2 in Annex 3.A summarises the evolution of wholesale tariff caps under the NAR regime. It distinguishes among caps applicable to all operators (with geographically restricted scope); caps applicable to operators with a dominant position in the mobile services market (with geographically restricted scope); and caps applicable to new entrants (nationwide scope and for five years from spectrum assignment).
The use of NAR has shifted notably in recent years. Following its launch in 2013, traffic initially expanded but then declined sharply. Between Q1 2022 and Q1 2023, national roaming for data, voice and SMS contracted by 75.5%, 72% and 76.8%, respectively. On the “source network” side, WOM accounts for the overwhelming majority of data routed via NAR (87.6%), with Movistar (12.5%), Tigo (6.8%) and Claro (0.6%) trailing (CRC, 2025[22]). On the “visited network” side, Movistar’s network carries the largest share of NAR data (47.4%), followed by Tigo-UNE (32.8%) and Claro (19.4%) (CRC, 2025[22]).
The highest volumes of NAR traffic are concentrated in Bogotá, followed by Medellín, Cali, Villavicencio and Cartagena. These five leaders are the main Colombian cities rather than rural areas where national roaming is intended to expand coverage of networks. However, all five cities recorded a decline of more than 80% in NAR traffic in the first half of 2023 compared with the same period in 2022 (CRC, 2025[22]).
The decline in NAR traffic may have several causes. The decline may be linked to the increased deployment of network infrastructure by these operators. WOM’s 4G network, for example, expanded by 29.4% between the first six months of 2022 and 2023 (CRC, 2025[22]). It could also be linked to the relatively high cost of unregulated roaming tariffs in these municipalities.
By contrast, in the 460 municipalities where the wholesale tariff took effect on 1 January 2022, data traffic increased by 23% between the first halves of 2022 and 2023. According to CRC data, the data increase was accompanied by more infrastructure deployment in these municipalities, particularly by WOM. This suggests that regulated NAR tariffs have not discouraged infrastructure investment (CRC, 2023[23]).
Claro has been the PRV of NAR services leading in usage revenues from 2019 to 2023. The leadership of Claro is predictable given its greater coverage across the territory. Regarding the other two operators, Movistar surpassed Tigo in revenue as a visited network provider in 2021. This follows a trend that mirrors the increase in payments made by WOM, which has Movistar as its main NAR provider.
The decline of NAR revenue for both Claro and Tigo began in 2022, coinciding with the implementation of CRC Resolution 6298. This resolution imposes tariff caps in the 460 selected municipalities identified by the CRC as lacking sufficient infrastructure-based competition. This may suggest that NAR use is high in these municipalities, and that the regulation effectively lowers roaming costs to encourage service-based competition. This is confirmed by the most significant drop in Claro’s revenue in 2024. Following the reduction in tariff caps for the dominant provider in the mobile market for the selected municipalities, Claro became the operator with the lowest NAR revenue (Figure 3.1).
On the other side of the market, payments by operators using NAR services show a different picture. WOM became the largest user of national roaming following its market entry in 2021. In 2022 alone, WOM reported total payments for NAR services of approximately COP 121 034 million (USD 28 million). This figure was 3.5 times greater than the combined payments of Tigo, Movistar and Claro in that same year. This extraordinary reliance on national roaming allowed WOM to quickly achieve nationwide coverage without waiting for the full deployment of its own infrastructure. Its reliance on NAR as an entrant in the market is to be expected, although a sunset clause on roaming regulation should encourage network deployment by all operators. Among the established operators, Tigo was historically the largest user of NAR, with its payments peaking around 2020. After that, its NAR usage began to decline steadily. Movistar displayed a similar pattern, but with a two-year delay: its payments increased until 2022 before starting to decrease in 2023. This staggered timing suggests both operators gradually reduced their reliance on national roaming as their own coverage became denser (Figure 3.2).
Note: NAR payments to visited network providers (PRV) equals to the sum of payments by originating network operators (PRO) pay to each PRV in Colombian pesos (COP). Figures have been deflated per year, using the OECD annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) (2025[24]) (based on 2024).
As of Q1 2022, given the modification of CRC Resolution 6333 of 2021, the visited network providers report information on the value paid.
Source: Based on OECD analysis of CRC (2026): Value Paid for National Automatic Roaming Reported by the Visited Network Provider, https://www.postdata.gov.co/dataset/4.
Note: Annual averages are considered. NAR payments by operators of originating networks (PRO) equals to the sum of the four main originating network operators (PRO) pay to all providers of “visited network” (PRV) in Colombian pesos (COP). Figures have been deflated per year, using the OECD annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) (2025[24]) (based on 2024).
As of Q1-2022, given the modification of CRC Resolution 6333 of 2021, the PRVs report the information on the value paid.
Source: Based on OECD analysis of CRC (2026): Value Paid for National Automatic Roaming Reported by the Visited Network Provider, https://www.postdata.gov.co/dataset/roaming-autom%C3%A1tico-nacional/resource/.
An analysis of the relationship between NAR average wholesale costs per megabyte and average retail revenues per megabyte shows a consistent imbalance across all operators (Figure 3.3). In every case, the average cost paid per megabyte for using visited networks has consistently surpassed their actual average revenue per megabyte. This is especially true for the three operators that depend most on NAR services (WOM, Tigo and Movistar).
The analysis suggests that, when relying on NAR, operators are unable to cover their average cost per megabyte through retail data revenues. This, in turn, indicates a structurally disadvantaged position for NAR users compared to the roaming service providers. The situation primarily affects Claro, which remains the main supplier of visited network capacity in the country (Figure 3.1).
For Tigo and Movistar, the widest divergence occurred in 2022, when the average NAR cost per megabyte was 8.1 times higher than the average retail revenue per megabyte. In 2022, the average NAR cost per megabyte was COP 17.99 compared to the average retail revenue of COP 2.23 per megabyte. The divergence between the two indicators was 7.8 times higher for Movistar (COP 18.54 vs. COP 2.38). For WOM, the greatest difference was observed in 2021, its first year of commercial operation. In that year, the NAR cost per megabyte was 7.4 times greater than the average retail revenue per megabyte (COP 9.88 vs. COP 1.33) (Figure 3.3).
Notes: Annual averages considered. As of Q1 2022, following the modification of CRC Resolution 6333 of 2021, it is the PRVs that report the information on the value paid. Information reported by ETB and Avantel was not considered. Average is weighted by traffic volume by operator per year. A regulated tariff cap for operators with significant market power in municipalities facing limited market competition takes effect from 2024 onward. Figures have been deflated per year, using the OECD annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) (2025[24]) (based on 2024).
Source: Based on OECD analysis of CRC (2026): Value Paid for National Automatic Roaming Reported by the Visited Network Provider, https://www.postdata.gov.co/dataset/roaming-autom%C3%A1tico-nacional/resource/.
WOM has enjoyed a lower average cost for roaming primarily because of lower initial tariffs that, in theory, have since expired. WOM’s average cost per megabyte for roaming has been markedly lower than those of Tigo or Movistar. These lower costs primarily reflect the lower tariff caps available to new entrants during the initial regulatory period rather than a lighter dependence on NAR in volume. In fact, during its initial market entry, WOM relied almost entirely on national roaming to reach end users, making the service an essential bridge for its rapid commercial rollout. WOM obtained its IMT spectrum licence in December 2019 (MinTIC Resolution 3078 of 2019). The 2017 amendment of the national roaming regulation provides a five-year sunset clause for new entrants acquiring spectrum (CRC Resolution 5107 of 2017). If this period begins when the initial spectrum licence was granted in 2019, then the NAR advantages should have expired in 2024.
Average NAR tariffs paid per megabyte have remained above the regulated cap for Tigo and Movistar since 2019 and for WOM during 2021‑2023. This indicates that these operators have mainly used national roaming services in municipalities not covered by the regulated framework, where prices are freely negotiated. The fact that NAR average costs per megabyte exceed average revenues per megabyte by such a wide margin reflects the relatively weak bargaining position of operators requesting NAR access compared to PRV.
The sharp decline in average NAR payments per megabyte after 2022 marks a turning point (Figure 3.3). This trend appears closely linked to the implementation of CRC Resolution 6298 of 2021, which replaced the former coverage-based segmentation criteria with a list of 460 municipalities. As noted earlier, these municipalities were selected based on criteria such as the level of network deployment; traffic volumes; the number of service providers present; and local socio-demographic and geographic conditions that restrict effective infrastructure-based competition in the provision of mobile services (CRC Resolution 5050 of 2016, Annex 4.8).
The reform seems to have increased the impact of the regulatory framework, pushing down NAR costs per megabyte to levels below the regulated tariff cap in 2024. The subsequent modification to roaming regulation further reduced the tariff cap applicable to dominant operators in these municipalities. This indicates that NAR average costs per megabyte are likely to continue to decline, a trend consistent with the sharp drop in NAR average revenues per megabyte reported by Claro in 2022 (Figure 3.1).
The national roaming framework remains a prominent feature of discussion in Colombia’s communication sector, notably within the context of the ongoing merger of Tigo and Movistar. In the context of proposed consolidation, WOM has argued that a merged entity should be required to offer roaming on fair terms, and with adequate capacity and coverage. This should apply for the period needed to complete network deployment, projected at five to seven years. WOM argues that the merger remedies should include low (cost based) regulated tariffs for national roaming tariffs across all geographic areas based on capacity (radio access network sharing). These would apply to the merged entity in its NAR offerings.
WOM’s position would involve a more stringent type of asymmetric regulatory measure that is not even applied to Claro, the declared dominant operator in the market. Nevertheless, this discussion highlights the important role of roaming regulation as a transitional measure. In this argument, roaming regulation ensures the continuity of service for end users while networks are being rolled out, in particular in rural municipalities. In so doing, it supports the availability of services where commercial incentives alone may be insufficient.
Challenges to ensure competitive communication markets
This evolving framework highlights both the strengths and weaknesses of Colombia’s competition regulation. The CRC has progressively adapted to sectoral developments, revising the definition of relevant markets and aligning more closely with international standards and practices. Nevertheless, several challenges remain, especially when it comes to issuing ex ante pro-competitive regulation and ensuring its proper enforcement.
The CRC has long identified the need to reduce market dominance in the sector. Through CRC Resolutions 2062 and 2152 of 2009 and Resolution 6146 of 2021, the CRC has recognised that one player has dominated the sector over the years. Indeed, more than a decade ago (2012‑2013), the CRC had already recognised that market dominance in the mobile sector – and measures needed to counter this dominance – was the most pressing issue facing the sector (OECD, 2014[3]). The CRC also expressed concern that this dominance in mobile voice could be leveraged over to mobile broadband services that grew rapidly.
Nevertheless, the last consistent ex ante measures issued by the CRC date to more than a decade ago (e.g. on-net/off-net retail regulation) and have not successfully curbed market dominance. The process for the SMP declaration of 2021 started in 2017: the mere declaration of dominance took four years. Therefore, one persistent concern is the lack of responsiveness in identifying dominant players and adopting remedies to address competition failures. In particular, the high concentration in mobile services continues to raise doubts about consumer choice and the scope for innovation, especially in the context of potential consolidation.
Colombia recently addressed the question of asymmetric termination rates, validating the “sender-keeps-all” model. One of the few asymmetric regulatory measures issued by the CRC has been on mobile termination rates (cargos de acceso). As highlighted by the OECD Review in 2014, asymmetric termination rates can cause traffic imbalances, and therefore inefficiencies. Consequently, the OECD had recommended that Colombia strive for rates that converge to long-run efficient costs that are extremely low (i.e. sender-keeps-all regime or termination rates of zero). Indeed, the market had begun evolving towards a “sender keeps all” scenario (zero mobile termination charges). In Colombia, CRC Resolution 7007 of 2022 laid the groundwork for such a “sender keeps all” regime, which was validated by the Council of State judgement of 21 November 2024. However, the regime only became effective in May 2025 after the revised criteria were incorporated into CRC Resolution 7753 (CRC, 2025[21]).
In the area of mobile broadband, the market has shown a high degree of concentration for more than a decade. However, the leading operator was formally designated as dominant in the “mobile services” market only in 2021. Furthermore, it was not until 2024 that a light form of asymmetric measures was imposed regarding access to this operator’s passive infrastructure. By contrast, other instruments, such as the regulation of charges for network use through NAR, have been applied symmetrically to all operators rather than targeted solely at the dominant player. A recent exception is the lower cap on tariffs for the dominant operator from 2024 onwards for the list of municipalities with regulated tariffs.
While the CRC has diligently analysed communication markets, it has imposed few ex ante measures. The CRC has identified dominance in the market and kept up with trends in the connectivity ecosystem. It has also studied the impact of emerging services such as OTTs and a regulatory sandbox programme to create flexibility for implementing projects that may generate social benefits. However, the traditional communication ex ante measures have taken much time to analyse for the few measures that have been imposed. Many have not come to fruition.
This delay in regulatory action has affected market dynamics and influenced discussions over the approved merger between Tigo and Movistar. For example, the proposals from the challenger firm with respect to proposed merger remedies seem to try to compensate for the lack of ex ante measures applied to the dominant player. Such measures, however, would apply to a “merged entity” with a lower market share and thus would not have been declared dominant by the CRC. The merger was approved in November 2025 with remedies imposed by the SIC. Following up on the implementation of remedies will be important to ensure healthy market competition. Consequently, the CRC’s key role in the sector to issue pro-competitive ex ante regulation will become even more crucial.
Two aspects, therefore, require reinforcement: achieving balance and safeguarding competition:
First, it is crucial to strike an appropriate balance between regulatory certainty and adaptability. Since the 2009 ICT Law and the 2019 reform, the Colombian framework has provided preventive tools to address dominance and foster competition. Their regulatory effectiveness depends on systematic enforcement and monitoring, as well as the timely implementation of measures that can prevent potential market failures from becoming rooted. At the same time, the CRC needs the technical capacity and regulatory flexibility to adapt regulations to emerging services, including OTT platforms, digital ecosystems and convergent services.
Second, it is equally important to adopt effective measures to safeguard competition. Even while maintaining proportionality as a guiding principle in the application of asymmetric obligations, the Colombian regulatory framework must be able to dismantle barriers to competition and address market failures at an early stage. Otherwise, these problems risk becoming entrenched, and thus harder to correct. Ultimately, this may harm both the quality and affordability of services for citizens.
In this context, the CRC should consider asymmetric measures applied to the dominant operator beyond to those limited to regulated access to passive infrastructure (CRC Resolution 7285 of 2024). Specifically, it should consider granting other operators access to additional parts of the dominant operator’s network. The terms for such an agreement should be approved by the regulator or sanctioned by a court, an approach often called wholesale access regulation (OECD, 2022[25]).
Wholesale access regulation: Experience across OECD Member countries
OECD Member countries have taken several approaches to promote broadband development and foster competition. These include promotion of common wholesale infrastructures with regulated or non-regulated wholesale access to increase competition at the retail level. Wholesale access regulation is defined as the mandatory offering by network operators of specific wholesale elements of their network to other operators (OECD, 2022[25]).
Wholesale access regulation is widely used as an ex ante pro-competitive measure to ensure competitive and efficient broadband markets across the OECD. It generally requires operators with SMP in identified relevant markets to provide other service providers with access to some parts of their networks on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. This can include access to physical infrastructure (duct, poles), passive wholesale products (such as fibre access or local loop unbundling), and active wholesale services (such as bitstream or virtual unbundled local access). The appropriate mix of remedies or obligations imposed on an operator with SMP varies across markets, depending on the degree of network competition and the pace of technological change (OECD, 2022[26]).
As the rationale for wholesale access regulation, wholesale fixed communication infrastructure, such as backbone, backhaul segments for fixed and mobile broadband access networks, exhibit high fixed and sunk costs, limited duplicability and strong economies of scale. These characteristics create structural barriers that make it difficult for competitors to deploy alternative infrastructure, especially in low-density areas. By allowing new providers to enter the market and offer services with significantly lower upfront investment, wholesale access regulation strengthens contestability and prevents the entrenchment of monopoly power, which is detrimental to consumers and innovation. However, because such obligations directly shape market dynamics and investment incentives, regulators should remain responsive to evolving competitive conditions through regular market analysis.
Wholesale access regulation is particularly important if insufficient infrastructure competition can hinder network deployment and development of high-quality, affordable broadband services for end users. Several OECD Member countries promoted infrastructure-based competition in the early 2000s, including through physical infrastructure access, to accelerate fibre deployment. Countries like Spain (Box 3.1) and Portugal did this through asymmetric wholesale access remedies (i.e. applied to the SMP only). Portugal initially focussed on regulating access to ducts, poles and in-building wiring, with plans to consider in a later phase potential asymmetric access regulation to fibre for operators holding SMP. Portugal imposed several wholesale access obligations on the companies of Altice Portugal, specifically to its fibre network to promote competition (ANACOM, 2024[27]).
Other countries, such as France, adopted symmetric regulation (i.e. applied to all operators) for fibre wholesale products based on geographical segmentation (OECD, 2022[26]). For example, the French communication regulator, Arcep, applied symmetric regulation for fibre wholesale products based on geographical segmentation, combined with co-investment incentives (mutualisation passive de la boucle locale optique combinée au co-investissement). Under this framework, the operator of a fibre cable must provide reasonable open access to other firms on non-discriminatory terms. In Canada, the largest fixed-line operators must provide competitors with workable wholesale access to their fibre networks. Additionally, Canada’s largest ISPs (including cable operators) must use their own networks to compete in the parts of the country that they have traditionally served. Israel has also applied wholesale obligations on the incumbent operator to allow access to its passive infrastructure (e.g. masts and poles), at a regulated rate (OECD, forthcoming[28]).
In line with the regulatory forbearance approach, wholesale access regulation tends to be applied only where and when it is needed, removing it when no longer necessary. This is typically achieved by segmenting the market and tailoring regulation to the competitive conditions of each segment (segmented regulation), including deregulation when relevant criteria are met. For example, Spain implemented fibre wholesale access regulation based on geographical segmentation between competitive and non-competitive areas (Box 3.1) (OECD, 2022[26]). The Spanish regulator identified different areas in light of the degree of competition based on the number of operators and their market shares in each local exchange, as well as the number of alternative future-proof networks. Nevertheless, these measures should be continuously re-assessed in light of market evolution and differing levels of competition across communications markets.
Several OECD Member countries have recently removed regulatory wholesale access obligations in certain markets or geographical areas, or adopted a lighter regulatory approach. These include Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, France, Italy, Korea, Latvia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. This trend is most apparent in wholesale access provided at a fixed location, which includes deregulation of wholesale broadband access for copper and fibre (FTTH) local loops (OECD, forthcoming[28]). In the European Union, 18 communication markets were subject to ex ante regulation 30 years ago. Today, only two wholesale markets remain: i) wholesale local access provided at a fixed location (e.g. copper, cable or fibre loops in the last mile); and ii) wholesale dedicated capacity (e.g. leased lines, dark fibre, etc.) (European Commission, 2020[29]).
Spain is one of the leading fibre connectivity markets in Europe and across the OECD. The share of fibre in total fixed broadband subscriptions in Spain rose from around 35% in 2016 to 89.3% in 2024 (OECD, 2025[14]), placing Spain among the top performers globally. This rapid expansion reflects a combination of strong private sector investment, sustained public support for deployment in rural areas and a strong wholesale access regulation framework.
Two regulatory measures have been key. First, third-party network access obligations on the formerly state-owned incumbent, Telefónica, were capped at 30 Mbps. This means that new entrants could use Telefónica’s network to deliver connectivity only up to those speeds. At the same time, Telefónica was obliged to sell active wholesale access (bitstream) at regulated pricing. Second, Telefónica was obliged to allow new entrants to use their ducts to build their own networks (passive wholesale obligations).
In 2016, after seven years of the initial phase of regulatory forbearance for fibre deployments, Spain applied fibre wholesale access regulation based on geographical segmentation of competitive versus non-competitive areas. Such segmentation considered the number of operators and their market shares in every local exchange, as well as the number of alternative next-generation access networks. Obligations in competitive areas related to the granting of access for Telefónica’s copper network and its passive infrastructure (ducts, manholes, posts, etc.). For non-competitive zones, Telefónica had to provide additional access to passive infrastructure requirements, a new virtual unbundled local access service to its fibre network. For the virtual unbundling of the incumbent’s FTTH network, Telefónica sets prices. However, CNMC controls this price, and Telefónica must fulfil a replicability test.
In 2021, the Spanish communication regulator relaxed the imposed obligations by deeming more geographical areas of the country “competitive markets”. In the relevant market of “local access provided at a fixed location” (market 3a/2014, current market 1/2020), CNMC identified 696 municipalities (amounting to 70% of the overall Spanish population) where competition in NGA lines is fully effective.
The result of these measures has been a rapid rollout of “fibre-to-the-home” (FTTH) connectivity across the country. Spain is also the first OECD Member country to fully switch off its copper network, underscoring the depth of its transition to fibre-based infrastructure.
Source: Government of Spain (2021[30]), Outreach Programme of Broadband of New Generation (PEBA-NGA) in the Period 2019-2021, https://avancedigital.mineco.gob.es/enus/Participacion/Paginas/Cerradas/PEBA-NGA-2019-2021.aspx; Based on OECD (2022[26]), Broadband Networks of the Future, https://doi.org/10.1787/755e2d0c-en; OECD Broadband Statistics, www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/broadband-statistics.html.
Co-ordination between ex ante competition regulation and ex post enforcement
Effective co‑ordination between the CRC and the SIC is essential, especially given the context of ongoing merger procedures that will affect the future of Colombia’s connectivity markets. Whereas the CRC is responsible for preventing failures through ex ante regulation, the SIC enforces competition law ex post. Clear institutional boundaries and robust co‑operation between the two bodies are vital to avoid regulatory gaps or duplication of effort.
Ultimately, the core challenge lies in achieving the right balance between regulatory certainty and adaptability. Colombia’s framework does provide preventive instruments, but their impact will rely on consistent market monitoring, close collaboration with competition authorities and a sustained commitment to proportionality in regulatory intervention.
3.2.3. Spectrum management
The use of radio spectrum in Colombia requires prior authorisation from the MinTIC. Spectrum licensing must be grounded in technical and economic studies. It serves policy objectives such as fostering competition and investment, maximising social welfare, ensuring pluralism and non-discriminatory access, and avoiding monopolistic practices (Law 1341 of 2009, Art. 11 and Art. 18.6, as amended by Law 1978 of 2019). The ANE plays a central technical role in spectrum planning, management and control, while the MinTIC grants and renews licences.
Spectrum allocation and assignment
Spectrum is primarily assigned based on objective selection processes, including auctions with multiple bidders. In rare cases, direct authorisation is still possible. However, the 2019 reform limited this option to temporary service continuity until a competitive process is completed (Law 1341 of 2009, Art. 72, amended by Law 1978 of 2019).
Recent developments suggest that the ANE is seeking a gradual shift towards greater flexibility in licensing. The ANE has also promoted initiatives to explore innovative uses of spectrum. These include community-based Internet in the 900 MHz band and the allocation of the 6 GHz band as unlicensed spectrum, which can both be used for low-power indoor Wi-Fi applications.
The ICT Modernisation Law provides for the exemption of some spectrum bands from payment to extend coverage in rural areas (Law 1978 of 2019, Art. 8), which could facilitate the creation of local community networks (OECD, 2022[20]). Moreover, in its five-year Spectrum Management Master Plan published in February 2022, the ANE acknowledges “non-traditional spectrum management models”. Among other things, it is considering spectrum sharing and its secondary use to promote community-led initiatives.
When it comes to prime spectrum bands for communication services, such as IMT, where demand exceeds supply, auctions remain the gold standard in OECD Member countries (OECD, 2022[31]). Moreover, OECD work has highlighted that legal certainty in licences, as well as licence duration and renewal process, all have an impact on the incentives to invest. Sufficiently long licence periods provide legal certainty and promote investment (OECD, 2022[31]). For capital-intensive endeavours, such as in the case of mobile broadband networks, exclusive rights in licences have also played an important role in fostering investment (OECD, 2022[31]). In fact, in its 2014 Review, the OECD had recommended increasing the licence duration period from 10 to 20 years, a change enacted with the 2019 reform.
Spectrum licence renewals
Spectrum licence conditions and renewal policies are within the purview of the MinTIC, with the technical advice of the ANE. On 19 October 2021, the MinTIC with support from the ANE, renewed Claro (Comcel) and Movistar’s (Telefónica Colombia) spectrum licences in the 1 900 MHz band (MinTIC Resolutions 2802 and 2803 of 2021). These renewals allowed both operators to continue offering mobile services while committing to upgrade their technology to enhance coverage and service quality. The resulting payments were directed to FUTIC. Both operators appealed the resolutions, prompting the MinTIC to review the renewal fees in co‑ordination with the ANE and the Office of the Comptroller General. The appeal review identified that the initial fees set by the MinTIC were high compared with international benchmarks. Consequently, the licence renewal fees for Claro and Movistar (Telefónica Colombia) were reduced by 19% (OECD, 2022[20]).
Between 2023 and 2024, around 66% of spectrum licences to use IMT spectrum for mobile services assigned were up for renewal. Through these licence renewals, the ministry had stated the goal to strengthen competition in the sector and generate coverage obligations to expand high-quality of mobile services in the country (MinTIC, 2020[32]). The spectrum licences covered crucial spectrum for mobile services, such as the 900 MHz band, Advanced Wireless Services (AWS), the 2.6 GHz band and the 850 MHz band, among others (Table 3.5). In October 2023, the MinTIC published Resolution No. 3947 of 2023, which formally opened and set procedures and requirements for participation in the assignment and renewal of spectrum use rights (MinTIC, 2023[33]). In 2023, the Colombian regulatory agenda included both renewal of existing licences and preparation for 5G spectrum assignments (i.e. the 5G multiband spectrum auction was held on 20 December 2023).
Note: The OECD exchange rate of COP 4 076.5/USD for 2024 was used.
Source: MinTIC (2024[34]), Final Audit Report: Communications Industry Management Process and Vice Ministry of Connectivity, articles-396739_documento.pdf.
The process for licence renewals is not transparent. OECD (2022[31]) highlighted that licence conditions and renewal policies should be clearly defined and articulated when awarding spectrum. However, there is regulatory uncertainty linked to how spectrum licences are renewed in Colombia. They may also be subject to political influence as they fall under the MinTIC’s remit. The conditions on how spectrum licence renewals are negotiated seem to be unclear. Furthermore, the methodology used by the ministry with the help of the ANE in their benchmarks to determine the licence renewal fees are not transparent.
Licence renewals should be transparent, while respecting the need to keep some information confidential. Transparency in licence renewals can be achieved by publishing the methodology for the valuation of the related spectrum. However, the MinTIC is not obliged to disclose the methodology in public consultations used to determine the value of spectrum. Moreover, licence payments should not be set at overly excessive prices. In other words, fees should not aim to maximise fiscal revenues but rather increase overall welfare in the country. This is especially vital given the positive spillover effects of connectivity to other sectors of the economy.
Spectrum licence fees and payment modalities
Spectrum rights include a financial contribution payable to FUTIC. After the reform, operators can meet up to 90% of these contributions through to-do obligations. In this way, spectrum fees are linked directly to coverage and connectivity goals (Law 1341, Art. 13, as amended by Law 2294 of 2023).7
In the 2019 spectrum auction process, the build-out obligations consisted of coverage obligations in several localities, typically in rural areas, and the percentage paid with these obligations exceeded 45% across all bands. This percentage fell to 20‑30% in the 2023 auction. However, the obligations were extended not only to population coverage but also to schools. This would include the fibre connection and the provision and operation of the school's local network, as well as coverage on primary and secondary roads. Table 3.6 outlines the spectrum licence final prices in the 2019 and 2023 spectrum auction processes, along with the corresponding payment modalities.
Note: “Total licence cost in COP millions” includes the payment modalities in cash and the built-out obligations. The OECD exchange rates of COP 3 281.1/USD for 2019 and COP 4 326.7/USD for 2023 were used. *”Build-out” or “to-do” obligations are understood as an alternative form of payment for the use of the spectrum consisting of the development of connectivity projects in rural, remote and vulnerable areas of the country through the deployment of communication infrastructure (MinTIC, 2021[37]; MinTIC, 2020[38]).
1. WOM was awarded a third 10 MHz block in the 2.5 GHz band, but withdrew its bid and was therefore fined COP 42 billion (USD 11 million).
Source: OECD based on: For the 2019 Auction: MinTIC (2020[39]), Auction Results Report, https://mintic.gov.co/micrositios/asignacion_espectro-imt/742/w3-propertyvalue-217982.html; Claro: MinTIC Resolution 331 of 2020 (700 MHz), MinTIC Resolutions 325, 326 and 327 of 2020 (2.5 GHz); WOM: MinTIC Resolution 330 of 2020 (700 MHz), MinTIC Resolutions 322, 328 and 329 of 2020 (2.5 GHz); Tigo: MinTIC Resolutions 332 and 333 of 2020 (700 MHz). For the 2023 Auction: MinTIC (2024[40]), MinTIC Resolution 496 of 2024 (3.5 GHz) (2024[41]); Tigo-Movistar: MinTIC Resolution 497 of 2024 (2024[42]); WOM: MinTIC Resolution 499 of 2024 (2024[43]); Telecall: MINTIC Resolution 498 of 2024 Telecall (2024[44]), https://mintic.gov.co/micrositios/asignacion-espectro-imt-2023/828/w3-channel.html (accessed on 15 December 2025). Claro: MinTIC Resolution 495 of 2024 (2.5Gz), https://mintic.gov.co/micrositios/asignacion-espectro-imt-2023/828/articles-334599_recurso_1.pdf; MinTIC (2024[41]), Claro: Resolution 496 of 2024 (3.5 GHz), https://mintic.gov.co/micrositios/asignacion-espectro-imt-2023/828/articles-334602_recurso_1.pdf; MinTIC (2024[42]), Tigo-Movistar: MinTIC Resolution 497 of 2024, https://mintic.gov.co/micrositios/asignacion-espectro-imt-2023/828/articles-334602_recurso_1.pdf; MinTIC (2024[43]); WOM: MinTIC Resolution 499 of 2024, https://mintic.gov.co/micrositios/asignacion-espectro-imt-2023/828/articles-384290_recurso_1.pdf; Telecall (2024[44]), Telecall: MinTIC Resolution 498 of 2024, https://mintic.gov.co/micrositios/asignacion-espectro-imt-2023/828/w3-channel.html.
The frequency assignment process for 5G in 2023 faced several issues that may explain the limited rollout of the technology in Colombia. WOM, which underwent financial restructuring in 2024, may delay fulfilling the obligations acquired with the MinTIC up to 18 years, according to its reorganisation agreement (SIC, 2025[35]). Additionally, Telecall allegedly breached two conditions of the radio spectrum usage licence: failure to submit the performance guarantee and non-payment of the first instalment of the financial compensation established in the licence (MinTIC, 2025[36]). According to the terms of the 2023 tender process, the company was supposed to start offering services by the end of 2024. Telecall announced plans to deliver 5G standalone technology and fixed wireless broadband. However, the company has not made the initial payment for the spectrum within the deadline, and network deployment has not begun. Telecall requested a review of the administrative processes initiated following the alleged licence infringement, and the MinTIC is analysing this request.
Operators may also opt for deferred payments, paying annual instalments for licence renewals. Decree 1078 of 2015 (Art. 2.2.2.3.6) established monetary updating mechanisms for such payments. However, MinTIC Resolution 3227 of 2023 introduced a uniform indexation factor. This aimed to ensure equivalence between current and future values, whether for monetary payments or obligations to perform. This resolution does not affect licences granted before 2023, leading to a coexistence of different indexation mechanisms, which, in turn, translates to different payments for similar spectrum. The ministry is also reviewing the fee structure for microwave links, which has been widely criticised as excessive, to incentivise deployment in rural areas.
Spectrum caps
Spectrum caps are common in OECD Member countries, where they are widely used as a tool to encourage entry and address situations of dominance (OECD, 2022[31]). On the one hand, larger players may have a strategic incentive to “hoard spectrum” to foreclose rivals and raise their costs. Therefore, spectrum caps serve to prevent incumbents from acquiring spectrum to foreclose or raise the costs of competitors. By balancing spectrum holdings, caps help ensure that enough competitors will have similar cost structures in the market. Spectrum caps may also help rebalance access to spectrum after a merger, for example. On the other hand, tight spectrum caps may penalise the most efficient operators that have acquired a large customer base due to providing better service. Such operators may need more spectrum for efficiency reasons (OECD, 2022[31]).
In Colombia, according to the MinTIC’s Decree 1078 of 2015, as amended by Decree 984 of 2022 and Decree 2248 of 2023, operators face limits of 50 MHz in low bands (<1 GHz), 100 MHz in mid-bands (1 GHz to 3 GHz) and 100 MHz in upper mid-bands (3 GHz to 6 GHz). Starting in 2023, the calculation of spectrum holdings has also accounted for spectrum assigned to entities under the operator’s corporate control or within its business group. This change aims to ensure that the spectrum is not indirectly concentrated through related parties.
Spectrum availability
As of 2024, Colombia had assigned approximately 740 MHz of spectrum for IMT services, with an additional 190 MHz still available in previously auctioned bands. According to ANE estimates, current assignments cover short-term demand. However, by 2028, it estimates an additional 270 MHz will be required to meet traffic needs. This may necessitate a review of spectrum caps (ANE, 2024[45]).
Further ahead, the ANE projects a future availability of 122 MHz in low bands, 710 MHz in mid-bands and 16.25 GHz in high bands (ANE, 2024[45]). Moreover, the estimated demand by 2030 could exceed 1 075 MHz, implying the need for band reallocation, spectrum sharing or development of secondary markets. The agency has also started technical assessments of satellite-based mobile services (direct-to-device) and their coexistence with terrestrial networks.
Challenges for the spectrum management institutional and regulatory framework
Despite significant progress in aligning spectrum management with international practices, several challenges remain.
First, the availability of spectrum is becoming a structural constraint: although current assignments are sufficient, medium-term projections point to a gap of at least 270 MHz within three years (ANE, 2024[45]). This underscores the need to accelerate planning, open new IMT bands and consider spectrum-sharing mechanisms to avoid shortages. Nevertheless, spectrum management must consider market dynamics to achieve key policy objectives, such as fostering investment and innovation while ensuring effective competition.
In markets characterised by low revenues per user, such as Colombia, measures may be needed to stimulate participation in spectrum assignment processes, including auctions. For example, reserve prices should be set at levels that allow market players to express their genuine valuations of the spectrum. Additionally, bidding credits can be used to increase participation in auctions. Eligible entities would benefit from credits that reduce the total amount payable for a winning bid, thereby lowering entry barriers and promoting broader market involvement (OECD, 2022[31]).
Second, spectrum costs remain a contentious issue in Colombia. GSMA Intelligence has repeatedly warned that high spectrum prices in Latin America, including Colombia, could undermine investment and slow 5G deployment (GSMA, 2025[46]). Over the past few years, Colombia has faced a difficult environment due to the overlap between the 2023 spectrum auction and multiple licence renewals scheduled between 2023 and 2025. During this period, several operators came under financial pressure, including WOM, which entered a restructuring process, and Tigo, which faced liquidity constraints. This situation underscored the importance of operators’ financial capacity, access to funding and broader macroeconomic conditions in ensuring that spectrum assignments are viable over time.
In response to high spectrum costs, the government announced the creation of a Spectrum Valuation Observatory to benchmark international prices and guide tariff reforms. Costs of spectrum are not only determined by assignment procedures, but also depend on licence renewal fees determined by the ministry.
Colombia should provide timely, transparent process and clear rules for spectrum licence renewals. Given the importance of connectivity for the country and the positive spillover effects to all sectors of the economy, Colombia should ensure that licence fees are not set at overly excessive prices. In other words, licence fees should not aim to maximise fiscal revenues but rather to increase overall welfare in the country (OECD, 2022[20]; OECD, 2022[31]).
Third, spectrum management is one of the most important tools for regulating competition in mobile markets. To realise the benefits of the digital transformation, spectrum is an essential input for communication-based services. These services include mobile broadband connectivity, backbone or backhaul connectivity in some scenarios (e.g. microwave links), and access to rural or less populated areas. For this reason, policymakers must manage spectrum in the most efficient and cost-effective manner possible to maximise benefits for society as a whole.
Fourth, in a rapidly evolving technological landscape, spectrum management can involve choosing between competing priorities. When essential, but often scarce, spectrum is not used as efficiently as possible, spectrum management decisions are particularly high, as they involve potential opportunity costs. These challenges are intensifying as emerging technologies rapidly transform entire economic sectors and link previously separate markets. Effective spectrum management entails a vast array of tasks. These tasks must rely on a set of overarching principles, which include observing technological and service neutrality to the extent possible; ensuring the highest degree of legal certainty (predictability) for market players and other stakeholders; and providing transparent and clear conditions for spectrum use and making decisions based on evidence (such as cost-benefit analyses). In addition, spectrum managers need to be both proactive to anticipate changes in the market, but also reactive to circumstances that may arise (OECD, 2022[31]). in addition, spectrum managers need to be both proactive to anticipate changes in the market, but also reactive to circumstances that may arise (OECD, 2022[31]).
Given the breadth of responsibilities for effective spectrum management, the CRC should play a more active role. The management of spectrum requires knowledge of highly technical engineering functions and a detailed understanding of market structure and sectoral evolution. Consequently, effective spectrum management requires an institutional framework with a clear mandate and sufficient technical, analytical and regulatory capacities. In most OECD Member countries, these functions are entrusted to the communication regulator. This reflects the close link between spectrum decisions and broader regulatory objectives related to competition, investment, innovation and consumer welfare.
As previously recommended by the OECD, the Colombian regulator should manage spectrum decisions. This role is crucial for communication services, but also in light of an increasingly converged sector (OECD, 2014[3]; OECD, 2019[16]). However, if the organisational structure of spectrum management remains unchanged, co‑ordination between the ANE, the MinTIC and the CRC remains essential. The ANE provides technical planning and oversight, while the MinTIC is responsible for allocation and licensing. Any gaps in co‑ordination could cause delays or disrupt market incentives. At the same time, spectrum management is one of the most important tools for regulating competition. For this reason, the CRC should play a much more active role in spectrum management, and its opinions should be binding.
Finally, there is a broader policy challenge: balancing revenue from spectrum fees with the need to expand coverage and boost digital inclusion. High costs, rigid payment arrangements or strict caps could hinder investment, while inadequate oversight risks concentration or underuse of valuable bands. In this context, reopening the debate on secondary markets and more flexible spectrum use seems necessary to keep spectrum management a driver of connectivity and innovation (OECD, 2022[31]).
3.2.4. Regulation aimed at facilitating infrastructure deployment
The deployment of communications infrastructure in Colombia remains constrained by regulatory and administrative barriers. Operators highlight, in particular, the heterogeneity of authorisation procedures applied by territorial and municipal authorities and community bodies; limited co‑ordination among competent institutions; and extended permit approval timelines. Beyond administrative constraints, operators have consistently identified high local tax burdens as a significant obstacle to infrastructure deployment in several municipalities. In particular, they emphasise the adverse impact of certain local taxes on the economic viability of telecommunications networks. In particular, public lighting charges can negatively affect investment incentives and network expansion.
These constraints are reinforced by multiple authorities with overlapping competences. for communication infrastructure. Such bodies include national entities such as ICT authorities; ministries responsible for culture, environment, mining and energy; territorial authorities, including mayors’ offices and municipal councils; and community-level actors (juntas de acción local, comunal). The Political Constitution of Colombia recognises the autonomy of territorial entities, including in relation to local regulation and the setting of local taxes. However, such autonomy must be exercised within the limits of the national legal framework.
In recent years, Colombia has introduced legal reforms to strengthen regulatory coherence across levels of government (CRC, 2025[47]). In particular, territorial authorities must identify and remove barriers to communication infrastructure deployment. This has the dual objective of ensuring the effective and continuous provision of public communication services; and clarifying institutional competences and responsibilities (Article 193 of Law 1753 of 2015, as amended by Article 309 of Law 1955 of 2019 and Article 147 of Law 2294 of 2023).
On this basis, Colombia has developed a targeted regulatory framework to reduce administrative and regulatory barriers to infrastructure deployment. As a central component of this framework, a single national procedure for telecommunications infrastructure deployment establishes uniform requirements, identifies the competent authorities and sets binding response timelines (MinTIC Decree 1031 of 2024) (MinTIC, 2024[48]). This procedure is mandatory for territorial entities, public and private bodies that issue permits, and service providers. It aims to standardise local processes, increase predictability and prevent the imposition of requirements lacking technical justification. The framework provides for ten days for the formal review of applications; one month to issue authorisation once all requirements have been met; and the application of positive administrative silence (Article 193 of Law 1753 of 2015).
In parallel, communication services have been formally designated as public utilities. In addition to reinforcing their strategic importance, this designation requires national and territorial authorities to facilitate access to public assets and buildings for network deployment (Law 2416 of 2024). Complementary measures further streamline deployment, including exemption from land-use licences for low-impact transmission and reception elements that do not require civil works, such as low-power antennas installed on poles, building façades or urban furniture. Where infrastructure has a distinct structure (compared to conventional buildings), an urban planning licensing regime applies (Ministry of Ministry of Housing and Territory Decree 1077 of 2015) (Ministro de Vivienda, Ciudad y Territorio, 2015[49]).
The regulatory framework also incorporates an infrastructure-sharing regime. This enables communication service providers to access supporting elements belonging to eligible infrastructure in other sectors, including electricity networks, mass transport systems and urban furniture. The applicable conditions and obligations are defined in sector-specific regulation issued by the CRC (i.e. Chapter 10 of Title IV of CRC Compilatory Resolution 5050 of 2016, as amended by CRC Resolution 7120 of 2023).
In addition to binding regulation, Colombia has introduced complementary soft-law mechanisms to promote regulatory convergence at the territorial level. In particular, a code of good practice (CRC, 2025[47]) and an accreditation system for territorial entities, administered by the CRC, provides a structured framework for identifying and addressing local regulatory barriers (Article 193 of Law 1753 of 2015, as amended by Law 1955 of 2019 and Law 2294 of 2023; CRC Guideline 126 of 2019).
Municipalities may voluntarily request accreditation. for these soft-law mechanisms. Where no restrictive provisions are identified, accreditation is granted. Where barriers persist, the CRC issues formal opinions setting out recommendations for corrective action. Examples of barriers include requirements beyond those set by national regulations; prohibitions on installing infrastructure due to land-use restrictions; and height limitations. As of October 2025, approximately 78% of municipalities hold valid accreditation, while more than 18% have initiated the process.
In a complementary measure, the CRC has developed an Infrastructure Deployment Favourability Index to enhance transparency and support benchmarking across capital cities (CRC, 2025[50]). The index disseminates the regulator’s diagnostic assessment and recognises local administrations that have introduced regulatory adjustments conducive to infrastructure deployment. It evaluates six dimensions: deployment barriers, accreditation status, the regulatory framework, authorisation response times, integration into municipal development plans and the municipal tax burden. A score of 100 reflects fully favourable deployment conditions.
Beyond administrative barriers, operators have consistently identified high local tax burdens as a significant constraint on infrastructure deployment in several municipalities. The Colombian Constitution grants territorial entities administrative autonomy in the definition of local taxes. However, such powers must be exercised within the limits established by national legislation. In this context, operators have highlighted the adverse impact of specific local taxes on the economic viability of communication networks, particularly public lighting charges. Under Law 1819 of 2016, municipal and district councils may levy the public lighting tax through a surcharge on property tax applied to communications installations. This, in turn, may affect investment incentives and slow the expansion of network infrastructure.
3.2.5. Universal service funding: The Unified ICT Fund (FUTIC)
Colombia has a long tradition of earmarking financial resources to promote access to communications and ICT services. Since the creation of the Communications Fund in 1976, significant resources have been channelled into universal service initiatives. Over the years, its objectives were gradually redefined, shifting from supporting ministerial operations to a more traditional universal service mandate focussed on funding projects that expand access and bridge the digital divide.
The ICT Law of 2009 strengthened this approach, creating FonTIC to finance projects to expand connectivity, support online government, promote digital literacy and provide access to disadvantaged groups, including people with disabilities. The universal service fund was sourced from a levy on gross operator revenues (excluding handsets), spectrum fees (excluding broadcasting), fines, domain revenues and allocations from the national budget. Similarly, in 2012, FonTV was created to support public broadcasters and fund the production of culturally and socially valuable audiovisual content. Its income mainly came from fees and tariffs paid by private broadcasters for concessions and spectrum usage.
The 2019 reform consolidated FonTIC and FonTV into a single financial instrument: FUTIC. This unification aimed to reduce fragmentation, simplify management and address technological convergence between telecommunications and audiovisual services (Law 1341, Arts. 34-37). FUTIC is managed as a Special Administrative Unit under the MinTIC.
FUTIC’s mandate is broader than its predecessors. It serves as the central public funding mechanism to implement ICT and audiovisual policies in Colombia. Law 1341 sets a wide range of eligible uses, including reducing digital divides, strengthening digital skills and inclusion, and supporting public-interest audiovisual content and public television. Over time, additional uses have been incorporated, such as implementing digital government initiatives, the National Telecommunications Emergency System, and measures to prevent online risks for children and adolescents (Art. 35, Law 1341).
FUTIC also supports the institutional framework governing Colombia’s ICT sector. Specifically, FUTIC finances the activities of the MinTIC (Art. 35.8, Law 1341), the CRC (Art. 24 Law 1341 of 2009), the ANE (Art. 31, Law 1341 of 2009) and the SIC related to consumer protection in communications services (Art. 21 of Law 1369 of 2009), and the Computers for Education Association (Computadores para Educar, or CPE), Art. 39 of Law 1341 of 2009). FUTIC must allocate to the Colombian National Radio and Television (Radio Televisión Nacional de Colombia, or RTVC), although there is no mechanism to monitor the resources provided to the national public operator.
FUTIC’s resources are drawn primarily from sectoral contributions, which represented 87.5% of total revenues in 2024 (MinTIC, 2025[51]). These contributions originate from several sources: payments related to spectrum assignment and renewal; levies based on gross revenues from communication services (1.9%); levies on gross revenues from television services; and income generated from the ccTLD.CO domain (Articles 36 and 37, Law 1341 of 2009). In addition, FUTIC receives revenues from fines and other financial penalties imposed by regulatory authorities, the sale of goods and services, current transfers and capital resources such as financial gains.
Sectoral contributions to FUTIC fluctuated moderately between 2021 and 2023 before rising sharply in 2024. Between 2019‑2024, FUTIC experienced a net increase in contributions – from COP 1 481 billion (USD 451 million) to COP 2 128 billion (USD 522 million) (Figure 3.4). Within sectoral contributions, spectrum assignment and renewal payments have become increasingly dominant in recent years (MinTIC, 2025[51]). After emerging as a significant source from 2021 onward, the two reached COP 1 334 billion (USD 327 million) in 2024, representing 63% of sectoral contributions that year. This reflects relevant spectrum assignment and renewal processes during the period (Table 3.6), which have significantly increased the weight of spectrum policy in FUTIC funding (Figure 3.4). Within sectoral contributions, spectrum assignment and renewal payments have become increasingly dominant in recent years.
By contrast, contributions based on gross revenues from communication services show a clear downward trend. Their share within sectoral contributions fell from around 51% in 2021 to 26% in 2024, when they totalled COP 545 billion (USD 134 million) (Figure 3.4). This decline in relative and absolute terms mirrors the evolution of operational revenues in the communication sector in real terms (adjusted for inflation). Between 2019 and 2023, operative revenues decreased from COP 8.6 billion (USD 2.6 million) to COP 7.8 billion (USD 1.8 million), representing a cumulative contraction of around 17% (Figure 2.19 in Chapter 2). As the levy is calculated as a percentage of gross revenues, the weakening revenue base of communication services translated directly into lower inflows to FUTIC under this heading.
Contributions linked to television services have remained comparatively small throughout the period and have gradually lost weight, representing between 9% and 5% of sectoral contributions over 2019-2024. Revenues from the ccTLD.CO, while negligible until 2021, became more relevant thereafter. They reached COP 150 billion (USD 37 million) in 2024, equivalent to 7% of sectoral contributions (6% of total revenues) (Figure 3.4).
Other operating revenue items play a limited role in overall funding. Fines and other financial penalties consistently represented less than 3% of total FUTIC income. Sales of goods and services and current transfers were negligible in quantitative terms. Finally, financial gains (capital resources) were volatile. They ranged from a share of total FUTIC income that peaked at over 35% in 2021 and fell to around 11% in 2024 (MinTIC, 2025[51]).
Sectoral contributions to FUTIC, 2019-2024
Note: FUTIC revenues represented in figure include “sectoral contributions” understood as payments related to spectrum assignment and renewal; levies based on gross revenues from communication services (1.9%); levies based on gross revenues from television services; and revenues derived from the ccTLD .CO (Art. 36, 37, Law 1341). Additional FUTIC revenues include fines and other financial penalties imposed by regulatory authorities, sales of goods and services, transfers and capital resources (financial gains). Figures have been deflated per year, using the OECD annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) (2025[24]) (based on 2024) and then converted to USD using current exchange rates.
Source: Based on OECD analysis of MinTIC (2026[52]), Información Presupuestal -FUTIC, https://www.mintic.gov.co/portal/inicio/Presupuesto/Informacion-Presupuestal.
After remaining at around COP 1 000 billion (around USD 288 million) in 2019 and 2020, FUTIC expenditure rose sharply in 2021, more than doubling to COP 2 141 billion (USD 572 million). From that point, annual spending stayed at elevated levels. It reached COP 1 890 billion (USD 444 million) in 2022, COP 2 001 billion (USD 462 million) in 2023 and peaked at COP 2 266 billion (USD 556 million) in 2024 (Figure 3.5).
FUTIC expenditure is concentrated in two main categories: investment (e.g. facilitating access to and use of ICTs across the national territory, promoting the development of applications) and current transfers (National Treasury, Colombian National Radio and Television, Computers for Education Association, the MinTIC, the ANE, the CRC). Investment spending dominates throughout 2019‑2024, reflecting the Fund’s core role in financing programmes and projects. Investment spending accounted for approximately 60% of total expenditure in 2019 and during 2021‑2023; it surged to just over 90% in 2020 and reached 75% of total spending in 2024. Current transfers show greater volatility, peaking in 2023 at slightly above 42% of total expenditure before dropping to about 24% in 2024 (Figure 3.5).
FUTIC expenditures, 2019-2024
Note: Figures have been deflated per year, using the OECD annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) (2025[24]) (based on 2024) and then converted to USD using current exchange rates.
Source: Based on OECD analysis of MinTIC (2026[52]), Información Presupuestal-FUTIC, https://www.mintic.gov.co/portal/inicio/Presupuesto/Informacion-Presupuestal.
In 2024, the Fund disbursed COP 1 707 billion (USD 419 million) in investment initiatives: 166 different projects were funded around three main areas. The largest share, 69% of total investments, was directed towards facilitating access to and use of ICTs across the national territory. A further 25% was allocated to promoting development of applications, software and digital content to encourage adoption of these technologies. Finally, 7% of resources were dedicated to strengthening and supporting institutional management within the ICT sector (MinTIC, 2025[51]).
Findings of a recent study suggest FUTIC investments could be allocated more effectively. According to a study by the National University of Colombia (2024[53]), 42.2% of the Fund focussed on reducing digital divides in 2022, such as through social programmes and strengthening the ICT sector. Most of the Fund was used for transfers (39.1%) and other expenses (18.7%). Moreover, investment in programmes to bridge digital divides decreased to 26.6% in 2023 and to 16.2% in Q1 2024. These figures suggest there may be room for improvement on how the funds are used and that more stringent rules might be required.
With regard to current transfers, the largest component by far is the transfer of financial surpluses to the national budget (Figure 3.6). These accounted for roughly three-quarters of all current transfers in 2019 and remained the primary destination between 2021 and 2023, representing about half of the total each year. Among institutional recipients, the Colombian National Radio and Television stands out in years when it receives funding. It accounted for approximately 24% of current transfers in 2021 and for around 18% in 2023, reflecting occasional allocations linked to public broadcasting requirements.
The MinTIC has been a consistently significant beneficiary of FUTIC since 2021, with its share increasing from about 12% in 2021 to roughly 14% in both 2022 and 2023. The Computers for Education Association enters later in the period but expands rapidly once included. In 2024, the Association became the largest institutional recipient with around 34% of current transfers, surpassing the MinTIC at approximately 21%. The ANE maintains a smaller yet stable share, typically between 5‑9% in years with substantial transfer volumes, while the SIC remains marginal at about 1% in most years. The CRC is consistently the smallest recipient of transfers from the Fund, generally below 1% (Figure 3.6).
FUTIC expenditures, transfers, 2019-2024
Note: CRC = Communications Regulation Commission; ANE = National Spectrum Agency; SIC = Superintendence of Industry and Commerce; MinTIC = Ministry of Information and Communications Technologies; National budget = transfers of financial surpluses to the national budget. Figures have been deflated per year, using the OECD annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) (2025[24]) (based on 2024) and then converted to USD using current exchange rates.
Source: Based on OECD analysis of MinTIC’s (2026[52]), Información Presupuestal-FUTIC, https://www.mintic.gov.co/portal/inicio/Presupuesto/Informacion-Presupuestal.
An important aspect to consider is the extent to which FUTIC implements its planned activities and disburses its allocated resources within a given period, which is referred to as “execution performance”. The execution of investment spending lags behind that of current transfers. FUTIC’s expenditures related to investment represent the highest share of the Fund, including programmes to bridge digital divides. However, they have consistently shown low execution rates with respect to the maximum spending authorised per fiscal year (i.e. budget appropriations, or apropiación presupuestal under Colombia’s public expenditure regulations). While spending of current transfers has consistently achieved an execution rate of around 90%, the performance of investment spending has lagged behind. Execution of investment spending reached approximately 70% in 2021 and 2022, improved to around 80% in 2023, but declined again to roughly 60% in 2024 (MinTIC, 2025[51]). Execution performance of the Fund is important given that after 31 December each year, spending authorisations lapse and therefore cannot be committed, increased, transferred or offset.8
Challenges of FUTIC
FUTIC has played a central role in advancing Colombia’s digital policies, ensuring continuity in flagship programmes and supporting large-scale initiatives aimed at bridging the digital divide. Despite its importance, several challenges persist.
Financial sustainability
The Fund remains structurally fragile due to its reliance on spectrum fees that fluctuate depending on the timing and frequency of auctions. The growing preference for build-out obligations over cash payments further threatens its financial stability. On the other hand, the second source of funding – the levy on operators’ revenues – is likely to stagnate, mirroring the anticipated trend in this market indicator (MinTIC, 2024[54]; Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2024[53]).
Execution efficiency
Although FUTIC manages substantial resources, disbursements often fall short. Many projects underspend their allocated budgets. This delays the delivery of critical infrastructure and services, particularly in rural and underserved areas.
Monitoring and evaluation
While the Fund supports numerous initiatives, systematic ex ante and ex post impact assessments are lacking. This makes it challenging to ensure that investments are prioritised correctly; are economically and socially effective; and yield long-term benefits. Incorporating incentives to make projects self-sustainable brings significant benefits. This is especially the case for greenfield network deployments in underserved areas, where ongoing operating costs are critical. Such an approach ensures resilience and continuity even if external funding ceases, fostering long-term impact and efficiency. FUTIC would need to implement appropriate governance tools to address these issues. OECD (2014[3]) had already highlighted some of these issues for stronger accountability and performance measurement in Colombia’s universal service policies.
Universal service obligations
With FUTIC, the MinTIC can draw from a vast pool of resources obtained from the operators’ contribution to universal service objectives. In the past decade, the MinTIC has appropriately shifted its policy focus towards extending broadband access (instead of telephony) (OECD, 2014[3]), as well as increasing demand-side programmes to foster adoption. However, the merging of the two previous funds (FonTIC and FonTV) has created new challenges. FUTIC supports a diversity of potential uses. Furthermore, it has a mandate to address network deployment and management skill gaps in remote and rural areas; these are essential for funded initiatives to be viable in the long term. However, it is unclear if universal service funding is directed towards expanding high-quality connectivity in practice. The allocation of funds gains heightened relevance amid ongoing discussions of potentially increasing the type of contributors to the Fund (e.g. OTT players).
Transfers to the national budget
The expenditure category corresponding to transfers to other entities, which represents a significant share of FUTIC spending, may also warrant reconsideration. Although FUTIC is intended to support the ICT sector and the national radio and television system, it makes disproportionate contributions to the national budget. The CRC receives the smallest share of FUTIC resources, typically less than 1% of total transfers. This is, far below, for instance, transfers to the ANE, whose remit is limited exclusively to spectrum management, and the Computers for Education Association (in the years in which the Association received funds).
Institutional capacity and governance
FUTIC is directly managed by the MinTIC, raising concerns about political interference and limited operational independence. In response, the ongoing FUTIC modernisation project, part of the Digital Connectivity Expansion Plan (MinTIC, 2024[55]), aims to diversify its financing sources through international co‑operation, donations and partnerships with other public entities. It is also considering transforming FUTIC into a second-tier bank. The success of this initiative will depend on striking the right balance between flexibility and accountability; ensuring transparency in resource allocation, improving co‑ordination with other sectoral agencies; and creating incentives for long-lasting impact that does not permanently rely on the Fund.
Management of country code domains
With the 2019 reform, management of the country code top-level domain (cctld) “.co” for Colombia, was reassigned to the MinTIC (article 14 of the ICT Modernisation Law). The funds derived from .co are part of FUTIC; they accounted for 6% of the Fund’s total revenues in 2024 [OECD calculations based on MinTIC (2025[51])]. Experiences in other countries suggest that a multistakeholder approach of governance of country code domains may lead to better results (OECD, 2019[16]). For instance, in Brazil, the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (Comitê Gestor da Internet no Brasil, CGI.br), an independent body, oversees Internet initiatives nationwide. It reinvests the revenue from .br domain registrations to strengthen the country’s Internet infrastructure and traffic exchange ecosystem (OECD, 2019[16]; OECD, 2020[56]).
Oversight of FUTIC
As previously recommended by the OECD (OECD, 2014[3]; OECD, 2022[20]), Colombia needs to ensure use of FUTIC resources are monitored. It must also ensure that projects are evaluated and set up to maximise welfare and extend high-quality connectivity in sustainable ways. FUTIC requires stronger oversight, particularly in years when revenues increase due to spectrum auctions. To date, Colombia lacks systematic cost-benefit analyses of public ICT investments, raising the risk of inefficient or misdirected spending. The Ministry, together with the DNP, should implement rigorous monitoring and evaluation of universal service and access programmes to ensure that public investment complements rather than crowds out private initiatives; complies with cost-benefit criteria; and applies targeted measures only where necessary to expand coverage in remote areas.
Finance of FUTIC through general government resources
Industry contributions to FUTIC should be limited to the minimum needed to achieve public policy objectives, as they can act as a sectoral levy (see below). Moreover, revenues from spectrum auctions should not be earmarked for FUTIC. Instead, they should be integrated into general government revenue to allow greater budget flexibility and efficiency. This also helps avoid important trade-offs in policy objectives (i.e. funding ministry needs vs. following social welfare aims in spectrum management). Colombia could consider moving towards financing through general government resources instead of depending on a sectoral fund that can act as a sectoral levy.
Sectoral taxation
At present, Colombia’s communication sector is subject to multiple taxes and levies on both service providers and consumers (Table 3.7). Taxes and sectoral charges can discourage the uptake of communication services given their potential impact on prices. As connectivity creates many positive spillover effects throughout the economy, taxes and sectoral levies should be reduced to incentivise uptake of communication services.
Communication service providers must pay a periodic contribution to FUTIC, which is managed by the MinTIC to finance projects that expand broadband connectivity. Contributions to FUTIC were reduced from 2.2% of operators’ gross income to 1.9% through MinTIC Resolution No. 0903 of 2020. While this is a positive step, the contributions remain substantial.
Colombia should make further efforts to ensure that contributions do not exceed the MinTIC’s actual funding needs. Moreover, the use of these funds should be allocated efficiently to maximise social benefits and reinvested in the sector. Although public policy initiatives connecting centres in rural areas are welcome developments, they are not a substitute for individuals having access to reliable, high-quality Internet connections in their own homes (OECD, 2022[20]).
In addition to sector-specific fees, the communication industry faces a heavy general tax burden at both national and local levels. Nationally, the effective average tax rate on corporate income stands at 32% – the highest among OECD Member countries (OECD, 2024[57]). Furthermore, every financial transaction is subject to a 0.004% tax.
Local taxes and charges increase the cost of communication services and reduce available funds for investment. At the municipal level, the industry and commerce tax ranges from 0.2% to 0.7% for industrial activities and from 0.2% to 1% for commercial and service activities. Additional local taxes include property or municipality-specific levies (e.g. taxes for “public lighting”). These combined taxes and charges raise the cost of communication services and reduce the funds available for investment in the sector. In so doing, they limit the accessibility of these services, especially for low-income users, and hinder infrastructure development.
Source: OECD (2019[16]), OECD Reviews of Digital Transformation: Going Digital in Colombia, https://doi.org/10.1787/781185b1-en.
As noted by GSMA Intelligence (2025[58]), Colombia is among the Latin American countries with the highest overall tax burden on the mobile sector. Higher taxes on communications discourage demand, distort the market, and hinder productivity and social development. Colombia still places an additional 4% VAT on mobile communication services (Colombia, 2025[59]). Total taxes and fees represent an estimated 39.8% of sector revenue – one of the highest levels in the region, exceeded only by Argentina (51.4%), the Dominican Republic (42.9%) and Brazil (41.5%). Of this amount, sector-specific taxes account for around 8% of revenue. Colombia is also one of only seven countries in the region that apply consumer-facing, sector-specific taxes on mobile services. These represent approximately 3.3% of the price of 1 GB of mobile (GSMA Intelligence, 2025[58]).
Altogether, fiscal obligations raise the cost of communication services and reduce the funds available for reinvestment. In so doing, they potentially limit service adoption, especially among low-income users, and constrain innovation and investment in the sector. This is particularly concerning given the communications industry’s strong positive spillover effects across the broader economy.
Consumers also face relatively high costs for terminal devices. In a laudable initiative, the Colombian government encourages broader adoption of ICT services through a VAT exemption for entry-level mobile handsets. This aims to make devices more affordable and promote digital inclusion (OECD, 2022[20]).
3.2.6. Measures for a stable and predictable regulatory framework
The CRC has gradually developed a comprehensive set of mechanisms to ensure that regulation in the communication, postal and broadcasting sectors remains stable, predictable, evidence-based and adaptable. Since 2018, these mechanisms have been formalised through the institutionalisation of a “Better Regulation Policy” framework (CRC, 2023[60]), long-term strategic planning, regulatory agendas, public and exploratory consultations, adoption of regulatory impact assessments, development of ex post evaluations and the introduction of regulatory sandboxes.
Better Regulation Policy framework is the foundation of the tools and mechanisms to ensure stable and predictable regulations (CRC, 2023[60]). Launched in 2022, the framework is aligned with OECD best practices (OECD, 2021[61]), although the CRC had been designing strategic plans long before. The framework establishes principles such as transparency, proportionality, accountability and adaptability. Its main goal is to enhance regulatory quality. To that end, it aims to ensure rules serve the public interest, are based on evidence, reduce unnecessary burdens on citizens and businesses, and can be updated when circumstances change. The framework also includes a regulatory cycle that combines ex ante and ex post tools, public participation and ongoing institutional learning.
Within this framework, the CRC develops strategic plans that span at least five years, outlining the Commission’s mission, vision, higher purpose and strategic objectives. The preparation of these plans involves internal participatory workshops; foresight exercises such as “strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats” assessments; “political, economic, social, technological, environmental, and legal” analyses; “correct, adapt, maintain, exploit” evaluations; and a review of the results from the previous plan. Although the plans are not subject to public consultation, they are published on the CRC’s transparency portal and provide the guiding framework for the regulatory agenda. The most recent plan, covering 2025‑2029, reflects a more mature institutional identity than its predecessor. It places greater emphasis on digital transformation, foresight and international co‑operation (Box 3.2).
The 2021‑2025 Strategic Plan
The 2021‑2025 Strategic Plan was the first to be designed following the institutional transformation introduced by Law 1978 of 2019, which established the CRC as the convergent regulator of communication, postal services and broadcasting services. This foundational plan consolidated the CRC’s new mandate, updated regulations and created a unified identity across converging sectors. It was structured around five pillars and comprised 12 objectives (CRC, 2021[62]).
The first pillar, User and Audience Welfare and Rights, focussed on protecting user rights, guaranteeing service quality, promoting pluralism in audiovisual content, and empowering users with tools to make informed choices and participate in regulation.
The second and third pillars, Stakeholder Management, and Markets and Competition, sought to consolidate the CRC’s role as the convergent regulator, encourage stakeholder participation, promote infrastructure sharing, foster competition and investment, and improve dispute resolution.
The fourth and fifth pillars, Innovation and Regulatory Improvement, and Institutional Strengthening, focussed on creating a flexible and transparent regulatory cycle. They promoted evidence-based decision making and improved data governance. They also strengthened the CRC’s institutional values, social responsibility and digital transformation.
The 2025‑2029 Strategic Plan
The 2025‑2029 Strategic Plan, adopted in March 2025, builds on the outcomes of its predecessor but reflects a more mature and outward-looking institution. It is structured around four pillars, with a stronger emphasis on foresight and digital transformation (CRC, 2025[63]).
The first pillar, User and Audience Rights, seeks to enhance regulatory protections, develop innovative tools that empower audiences and promote media literacy. It reflects a shift towards a more preventive approach to overseeing audiovisual content, moving away from reactive measures.
The second pillar, Sectoral Foresight, centres on the systematic identification and analysis of developments within the digital ecosystem, including emerging technologies and evolving business models. It underscores the importance of strategic studies and participatory foresight in shaping the regulatory agenda.
The third pillar, Markets and Competition, is dedicated to broadening access to services, encouraging investment and competition, and improving interactions across the sector, particularly in areas where infrastructure bottlenecks continue to pose challenges.
The fourth pillar, Institutional Strengthening, focuses on reinforcing the CRC’s organisational culture, refining management tools, accelerating its digital transformation, enhancing access to sectoral data, and expanding its international engagement through collaboration with global regulatory networks.
Sources: CRC (2021[62]), Plan estratégico institucional 2021-2025, https://crcom.gov.co/sites/default/files/Transparencia/planes_institucionales/PLAN_ESTRAT%C3%89GICO_CRC_2022.pdf; CRC (2025[63]), Plan Estratégico Institucional 2025-2029, https://crcom.gov.co/sites/default/files/Transparencia/planes_institucionales/Plan-Estrategico-Institucional-2025-2029-VF.pdf.
The annual regulatory agenda, mandated by Presidential Decrees 2696 of 2004 and 1078 of 2015, implements this long-term vision. Each year, the CRC must release a draft agenda by 30 October, open it for public consultation and publish the final version by the end of the year. This provides stakeholders with predictability about upcoming initiatives and offers a formal opportunity for them to influence the regulatory pipeline. The agenda has become a crucial tool for stability and transparency, ensuring that new projects are developed according to a coherent plan rather than in an ad hoc manner.
The 2025‑2026 CRC Regulatory Agenda (CRC, 2024[64]) comprises 33 topics, structured across five key categories:
User and Audience Welfare and Rights encompasses nine initiatives focussed on parental mediation, pluralism and misinformation, quality of service indicators, digital literacy and audience empowerment.
Markets and Competition comprises 11 topics such as competition analysis in bundled television services, the definition of relevant markets in radio broadcasting, and reviews of fixed voice and mobile services. It also features measures to stimulate backbone infrastructure deployment. The CRC is examining competition concerns in 170 municipalities identified as having limited backbone provision, in collaboration with the MinTIC and InterNexa.
Innovation and Regulatory Improvement also comprises 11 topics, including the ongoing publication of sector statistics; the development of investment observatories; ex post evaluations; and studies on the integration of emerging technologies to enhance the CRC’s operational capabilities.
Stakeholder Management focuses on expanding participatory mechanisms and strengthening strategic communication.
Institutional Strengthening is dedicated to improving the CRC’s organisational performance and accelerating its digital transformation.
Of the 33 topics of the 2025-2026 CRC regulatory agenda, 17 are ongoing studies that reflect the multi-year nature of regulatory work; 10 are permanent activities such as statistical reporting, citizen engagement tools and industry monitoring; and 6 represent new initiatives. Among the most innovative is the development of a regulatory framework for Community Fixed ISPs. These are non-profit organisations established and operated by local communities that manage their own networks and deliver connectivity directly to their members (MinTIC, 2024[65]).
The CRC also conducts public consultations for every general rulemaking process. Draft resolutions must be published at least 30 days in advance and made available for comments from users, service providers, oversight agencies and other stakeholders. Exceptions to this requirement must be explicitly justified. Following the consultation, a committee of experts prepares a final report that documents the rationale for accepting or rejecting proposals. When a resolution is issued, the explanatory memorandum must reference this report and explain it considered stakeholder input. This process enhances transparency and accountability and is widely recognised as best practice (OECD, 2025[66]).
Complementing these formal consultations, the CRC has increasingly resorted to non-rulemaking consultations and sectoral diagnostics. These exploratory exercises, authorised by Article 22 of the ICT Law, enable the Commission to analyse markets, emerging technologies and user needs without immediately engaging in rulemaking. For example, the CRC has conducted consultations on digital OTT services to deepen its understanding of their role in the ecosystem and the implications for traditional communication services (CRC, MinTIC, 2024[67]).
The introduction of regulatory impact assessment (RIA) is one of the most important reforms. Since 2018, all general regulatory projects must include an RIA, which evaluates the need, proportionality and expected effects of regulatory actions. The method uses cost-benefit and multi-criteria analyses, considering economic, social and environmental factors.
In addition to employing ex ante regulatory instruments, the CRC has also committed to conducting ex post evaluations. These assessments help measure the actual impact of regulations once they are in force, enabling the Commission to compare real-world outcomes with initial projections. A notable example is the CRC’s evaluation of Resolution 5929 of 2020, which led to the removal of automatic compensation for dropped calls and shortened the time required to switch mobile operators. These changes contributed positively to number portability and reduced market concentration. For its rigorous approach to this evaluation, the CRC received an award from the DNP (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2024[68]). This marks a significant step towards closing the regulatory feedback loop. However, international observers such as the OECD have noted that implementation remains uneven, and several obligatory ex post evaluations have yet to be published (OECD, 2025[66]).
Finally, the CRC has added regulatory sandboxes to its toolkit. These controlled environments provide temporary exemptions from regulatory requirements, enabling companies to trial new services, technologies or business models under the Commission’s supervision. The first sandbox framework was established in 2020, and the first call for projects was issued in 2021. Two pilots were conducted: Movistar’s Service Operation Centre Tool project used big data analytics to evaluate user experience on 3G networks; and TIGO-UNE’s Convergent Contract project simplified service contracting by combining fixed and mobile contracts. While neither pilot resulted in immediate regulatory changes, both offered valuable insights. The lessons learnt were integrated into the second call, launched in April 2025, which expanded the scope to include audiovisual projects (CRC, 2025[69]).
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Source: OECD elaboration based on CRC’s Resolutions mentioned in the table.
Note: Values for 2023‑2025 are expressed in constant January 2022 Colombian pesos (COP) and are updated to current COP as of 1 January 2023, in accordance with the adjustment index set out in Annex 4.2 of Resolution CRC 5050 of 2016. Values for 2017‑2022 are expressed in constant COP January 2017 pesos and are updated to current pesos as of 1 January 2018, in accordance with the adjustment index set out in Annex 4.2 of Resolution CRC 5050 of 2016. Values for 2013‑2015 are updated to current pesos as of 1 January 2014, in line with the tariff adjustment index established under CRC Resolution 4112 of 2013. Empty cells indicate that no glide path has been defined beyond the annual updates to current COP, as per the adjustment index.
Source: OECD elaboration based on CRC Resolution 5050 of 2016 (consolidated version), Articles 4.7.4.1 (voice), 4.7.4.1.2 (SMS) and 4.7.4.2.1‑4.7.4.2.2 (data services). NAR wholesale tariff cap values for 2013‑2015 are drawn from Resolution 4112 of 2013; values for 2017‑2022 from Resolution 5107 of 2017; and values for 2023‑2025 from Resolution 7007 of 2022. The tariff caps applicable to operators holding a dominant position in the “mobile services” market are taken from Resolution 7285 of 2024.
← 1. The CRC has limited sanctioning powers related to information requirements for communication services and sanctions related to media pluralism.
← 2. A market is considered for ex ante intervention if there are persistent barriers to entry, if the market structure does not tend towards effective competition and if competition law alone is deemed insufficient to address failures.
← 3. In the Colombian regulatory context, the acronym RAN stands for Roaming Automático Nacional (National Automatic Roaming). It should not be confused with the English acronym Radio Access Network (RAN), which refers to the network components that connect users’ devices to the core. The Colombian RAN mechanism aligns with what is internationally known as a Multi-Operator Radio Access Network (MORAN) or Radio Access Network as a Service (RANaaS).
← 4. The national automatic roaming (NAR) regulation was first introduced in 2013 (CRC Resolution No. 4 112 of 2013) and subsequently consolidated in Chapter 7 of Title IV of CRC Resolution No. 5 050 of 2016. Although national roaming was already included in general regulations (i.e. Resolution No. 087 of 1997), Resolution No. 4 112 of 2013 first defined specific considerations for NAR.
← 5. 2G meaning GSM EDGE Radio Access Network (GERAN).
← 6. 3G meaning Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (UTRAN).
← 7. “To-do obligations” are understood as an alternative form of payment for the use of the spectrum consisting of the development of connectivity projects in rural, remote and vulnerable areas of the country through the deployment of communication infrastructure (MinTIC, 2021[37]).
← 8. The percentage of execution of a given heading is calculated as the ratio of payments to the budget appropriation for that item (final minus blocked appropriation). Budget appropriations (apropiación presupuestal) in the regulation of public expenditure in Colombia are the maximum spending authorisations approved by the Congress of the Republic to be committed during the respective fiscal year. After 31 December of each year, these authorisations expire and, as a result, cannot be committed, added to, transferred or offset (Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público, 2024[70]).