OECD Digital Connectivity Review of Colombia

1. Overview: Main findings and policy guidance to strengthen digital connectivity in Colombia

Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of how market evolution and the regulatory changes are reshaping Colombia’s digital connectivity landscape within the context of challenges stemming from digital transformation. It summarises the main conclusions from the report’s results found in the three main subsequent analytical chapters. The chapter highlights key policy and regulatory orientations aimed at improving broadband connectivity, such as strengthening competition, promoting investment and ensuring regulatory agility in the communication sector, so it can adapt to a rapidly changing digital environment.

1.1. Overview

Realising the potential of digital transformation and addressing its associated challenges is a shared objective across OECD Member countries. Digitalisation has become a powerful engine of economic growth and sustainable development, generating positive spillovers across the wider economy and reshaping the way people, firms and governments interact.

Connectivity is the backbone of digital transformation, enabling the use and adoption of transformative digital technologies. A broader set of complementary policies are critical for shaping this evolution and allowing for digital opportunities to be translated into concrete economic and social benefits. Effective digital policies call for coherent, whole‑of‑government action across multiple domains ranging from secure and widespread access to communication infrastructures and data, to the effective use of digital technologies, support for innovation, strong labour-market performance, prosperity, trust and security online, and an open and competitive environment for digital business. The OECD Going Digital Integrated Policy Framework, supports countries in developing comprehensive and aligned strategies for digital transformation (OECD, 2026[1]).1

Within this broader context, the communication sector is key to Colombia’s economic growth and development, with positive externalities for the entire economy. The government’s Digital Transformation Strategy recognises its importance by positioning connectivity as a catalyst for regional convergence and competitiveness in its broader productivity and inclusion agenda (Government of Colombia, 2023[2]).

In 2014, the OECD reviewed Colombia’s communication policy and regulatory frameworks (OECD, 2014[3]) at the request of the Colombian government. Under the auspices of the Digital Policy Committee and the Working Party on Connectivity Services and Infrastructures (WPCSI), the study examined the communication sector, along with its institutional and regulatory framework. It offered tailored recommendations to the Colombian authorities to advance regulatory reform, foster market competition and investment, and improve access to affordable and high-quality connectivity.

Since then, Colombia has made progress in developing its digital policies and modernising the sector, notably through regulatory reform in 2019. A key milestone was Law 1978 of 2019 (the ICT Modernisation Law), which amended Law 1341 of 2009 (the previous ICT Law). The ICT Modernisation Law introduced important provisions to facilitate investment, particularly through encouragement of private sector participation. The law strengthened legal certainty; simplified deployment of costly infrastructure; and made the sectoral regulator, the Communications Regulation Commission (Comisión de Regulación de Comunicaciones, or CRC), an independent entity. It also expanded the CRC’s mandate to include technical and commercial regulation of the audiovisual sector. Moreover, Law 2108 of 2021, which also amended Law 1341, classified Internet access as an essential public service. This introduced the principle of universality as a guiding mandate for ICT policy to progressively expand Internet coverage, particularly in rural and vulnerable areas.

With respect to broader digital policies, the National Development Plan 2018‑2022 (“Pact for Colombia, Pact for Equity”, Law 1955 of 2019), placed digital connectivity as a key driver for economic development and social inclusion. The National Development Plan 2022‑2026 (“Colombia, World Power of Life”) sets specific objectives for digital inclusion and connectivity. For example, it incentivises communication network rollout by allowing operators to offset spectrum fees through investment commitments.

Despite real advances in reducing digital divides2 and improving connectivity in the decade since the first digital connectivity review in 2014, Colombia still faces major challenges. Broadband infrastructure deployment and adoption continue to lag behind regional and international benchmarks. In parallel, the connectivity landscape has evolved rapidly, with online platforms becoming increasingly relevant as service and content providers. Other key actors in connectivity and related infrastructure such as content delivery networks (CDNs) have also gained prominence. These developments underscore the need to update market assessments and reconsider the adequacy of the regulatory framework.

Against this background, this report analyses the evolution of communication markets in Colombia. It pays special attention to the changing connectivity environment and the role of emerging players such as over-the-top (OTT) players. The study seeks to inform future policies to strengthen Colombia’s institutional and regulatory framework.

1.2. Key findings of connectivity in an evolving digital environment in Colombia

Over the past decade, Colombia’s communication market has experienced significant change, driven by rapid technological progress, evolving consumption habits and ongoing structural challenges. The sector has made notable advances in expanding broadband infrastructure and diversifying services, but its growth remains uneven across regions. The combined impact of technological shifts, competitive disparities and changing market conditions has created a more advanced and dynamic communications ecosystem than existed a decade ago. Yet the market still faces issues such as affordability, market concentration risks and unequal access to high-quality connectivity.

Broadband networks have developed significantly, with Colombia successfully shifting from legacy networks to modern, high-capacity infrastructure. Fibre deployment has rapidly expanded and accounts for a growing share of fixed broadband access, signalling a clear move towards next-generation networks. This has enhanced overall performance, enabling operators to provide faster and more reliable services.

Mobile broadband has also become the primary driver of connectivity growth, with the deployment of 4G and, more recently, the introduction of 5G networks. However, the latter started later than in peer countries, and adoption remains limited.

Although broadband infrastructure has grown substantially, user adoption has not kept up. Many households remain unconnected or rely on lower-quality services. This is especially the case in rural and remote areas where investment incentives are weaker, and service provision is often commercially unattractive.

The quality of broadband services in Colombia has improved significantly in the past decade, especially in fixed networks, where Colombia’s average speeds compare favourably within the region. Mobile performance, however, continues to lag with respect to international benchmarks. This disparity reflects both the delayed transition to 5G and ongoing coverage gaps in rural and semi-urban areas. Improvements have been made nationwide; however, the digital divide between metropolitan and remote regions has widened in relative terms. The challenge is therefore not only about access to basic connectivity but rather about providing equitable access to high quality, resilient broadband networks that can support digital services and innovation across the entire territory.

While broadband services are becoming more affordable, they are still out of reach for many low-income and rural communities. Affordability has significantly improved, driven by competitive pressures and technological advancements. Broadband services, both fixed and mobile, are now more affordable for households and businesses. However, despite this headway, income inequality and regional differences still restrict broadband adoption among low-income populations and in rural communities. This may limit the social and economic benefits of network investments.

The Colombian broadband market has undergone significant structural changes since the OECD Review of Telecommunication Policy and Regulation in Colombia (OECD, 2014[3]). The growing demand for high-speed connectivity, alongside increased convergence, with the prevalence of OTT services, has transformed both the fixed and mobile broadband segments. Communication operators have responded by diversifying commercial offers and reducing prices. Meanwhile, new entrants and business models have reshaped the competitive landscape, particularly in the mobile segment.

The nature of competition in Colombia’s communication markets is changing. At the time of writing, some operators faced financial restructuring and two communication operators were merging (Tigo and Movistar). The merger proceeding studied the effects on competition in 19 relevant markets; it was approved with remedies on 13 November 2025 by Colombia’s competition authority, the Superintendence of Industry and Commerce (Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio, or SIC).

The overall broadband market structure remains highly concentrated, which limits competition and consumer choice. The mobile side has a small number of vertically integrated operators and one dominant player. Meanwhile, a fragmented fixed broadband market has many local players and three major players operating nationwide. At a local level, despite the apparent larger number of players, markets are highly concentrated. They are often characterised by monopolistic or duopolistic conditions, a feature maintained in the past decade and already identified in the OECD’s previous Review (OECD, 2014[3]). Such concentration limits consumer choice and prevents smaller competitors from scaling.

The emergence of open-access wholesale fibre networks, such as On Net Fibra Colombia, plays a vital role in enabling retail-based competition in communication markets. By lowering entry barriers and providing wholesale access in non-discriminatory basis, open-access networks help alleviate last-mile bottlenecks.

The benefits of open-access wholesale fibre networks are still uneven across regions. Additional investments in transport and backhaul infrastructure are needed to expand competitive opportunities beyond major cities. Supporting measures to enhance transport and backhaul infrastructure are essential to expand competitive supply in less populated areas.

The mobile segment is characterised by different players with varying influence. One dominant player has had a relatively stable market share in the past decade (Claro). Two mid-size mobile network operators (Tigo and Movistar), whose merger has been authorised and is now in the process of being implemented. Finally, one small operator (WOM) acting as “fringe competition” that entered the market in 2020 is currently undergoing financial restructuring.

While competition has grown, one major mobile network operator (MNO) continues to dominate the market. Competitive dynamics have grown more intense in recent years, especially after the arrival of WOM disrupted established pricing models. Still, the market remains concentrated, with one operator holding a dominant position. Mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) have not achieved sustainable scale due to limited wholesale access and minimal differentiation. The merger of two MNOs places the Colombian communication markets in a pivotal stage. Ongoing regulatory oversight will be essential to protect market conditions.

From a financial perspective, overall revenues in the communication sector have declined, investment has been cyclical, and profit margins has been generally stable for most operators. Between 2015‑2023, overall revenues in real terms (adjusted for inflation) contracted by 16.5%, representing a -2.2% annual decrease (compound annual growth rate, or CAGR). Investment levels, which have a cyclical nature, were more variable. After reaching an annual low in 2017, investment entered a period of strong growth through to 2020, before shifting to a downward trend. Profit margins for the overall sector, or operational performance measured by the share of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA) over revenues, have been relatively stable. However, overall profits have decreased for some operators.

In the mobile market, Colombian players have used economies of scale and network effects to maintain EBITA margins and investment levels. Average revenue per user (ARPU) in the mobile segment fell steadily between 2014 and 2024. Indeed, Colombia’s ARPU is lower than other OECD Member countries in Latin America. While Colombia displays relatively low ARPUs, other indicators (e.g. EBITDA margins and capital expenditure intensity) tend to reflect that Colombia’s mobile communication market players have captured efficiencies derived from economies of scale and network effects. In this way, they have maintained healthy margins and consistent investment levels.

Although the sector continues to attract investments, especially from the largest operators, these investments are becoming more concentrated among a few players. The investment gap between the dominant player and smaller operators causes concerns about long-term competitive dynamics. The combination of low revenues and high capital expenditures hampers the ability of players with smaller market shares to upgrade or expand networks, potentially deepening the spatial connectivity divide.

A key factor in this changing connectivity landscape is the increasing influence of OTT digital services, which have significantly transformed consumption habits and market dynamics. The widespread use of streaming, messaging and social media platforms has boosted demand for high-speed broadband and spurred infrastructure investments, especially in CDNs and international connectivity, such as submarine cables. In response, stakeholders, in particular content and application providers, have expanded CDN capacity and local caching — a technique that speeds up network access to data files by caching data on clients instead of on servers. In so doing, they have reduced reliance on international traffic routes and enhanced service quality for users.

This change in the connectivity ecosystem also creates structural dependencies. A small number of global OTT providers now handle most traffic and infrastructure needs, consolidating bargaining power and creating deeper technical interdependencies. Stakeholders have raised concerns about the ability of national operators to negotiate on equal footing. The regulatory framework in Colombia, as in many OECD Member countries, has yet to adapt fully to this platform-driven market.

In sum, Colombia’s communication sector stands at a crucial turning point. It has made substantial progress in connectivity infrastructure expansion and upgrades, service quality and affordability. Still, ongoing spatial connectivity divides in the urban-rural continuum remain a key challenge. The overall connectivity ecosystem is becoming more sophisticated. However, in a sector crucial both for Colombia’s economic growth and development, as well as its social cohesion, market structures in the sector remain concentrated and in flux due to structural changes.

The sector’s future strength will depend on policies that promote inclusive investment, maintain competition and ensure the benefits of digitalisation reach all regions and social groups. Tackling these challenges requires co-ordinated efforts to strengthen wholesale access policies, encourage infrastructure sharing, make services more affordable for vulnerable users, and adjust regulatory tools to account for the increasing influence of OTT digital services.

Box ‎1.1 summarises the key messages related to the progress and challenges in the Colombian digital connectivity ecosystem.

Box ‎1.1. Colombia’s communication sector at a turning point

The following points highlight the progress achieved to date and the key challenges facing Colombia’s digital connectivity ecosystem:

• Colombia’s communication sector has advanced significantly since the previous OECD Review of Telecommunication Policy and Regulation in Colombia (2014), with the expansion of broadband infrastructure, particularly fibre, and the widespread deployment of mobile broadband driven by 4G, while 5G deployment has begun but at a slower pace compared with peer countries.

• Connectivity improvements remain uneven, with persistent connectivity divides with many households that remain unconnected or rely on lower-quality services, especially in rural and remote areas where investment incentives are weaker.

• Broadband affordability has improved, but remains a barrier for adoption by some groups, particularly low-income households and rural communities, limiting the full socio-economic benefits of connectivity.

• Market structures remain concentrated and are currently evolving, with one dominant mobile operator, financial restructuring of some players, and the merger of the second and third largest mobile network operators (Tigo and Movistar), creating a pivotal moment for competition and regulatory oversight. Fixed broadband markets appear more fragmented, but are highly concentrated at the local level, often operating under monopolistic or duopolistic conditions.

• Open-access wholesale networks are emerging as an important mechanism to promote competition, but their benefits remain uneven due to insufficient backhaul and transport infrastructure in less populated regions.

• Financial trends show declining sector revenues in real terms, cyclical investment, and stable overall profit margins, but investment has been concentrated in larger players, with smaller operators facing increasing difficulty to finance network expansion and upgrades.

• Colombia’s connectivity ecosystem is becoming more complex, shaped by increasing demand for high-quality infrastructure and the rise of over-the-top (OTT) services that have driven greater service convergence. Operators have diversified commercial offers, reduced prices and adjusted business models, especially in mobile markets where new entrants have intensified competition.

• Colombia’s communication sector stands at a turning point, requiring policies that promote inclusive investment, strengthen competition, expand wholesale access, and adapt regulation to new digital market dynamics.

1.3. Regulatory developments and institutional evolution in Colombia’s communication sector

Colombia’s regulatory framework has undergone a far-reaching transformation. Adoption of Law 1978 of 2019, also known as the ICT Modernisation Law (henceforth, “the 2019 reform”), redefined the institutional and regulatory landscape for communication and broadcasting markets. The 2019 reform responded to growing convergence between technologies and services, modernising oversight, strengthening regulatory capacity and supporting digital inclusion.

While the new framework has been transformative, challenges remain to ensure greater expansion and adoption of digital connectivity. It consolidated authority across institutions, created a single converged communication regulator, and aligned Colombia’s governance structures more closely with OECD standards by promoting independence of the regulator, evidence-based regulation and long-term investment incentives. Nevertheless, further institutional improvements are required to fully unleash the potential of connectivity for all.

1.3.1. Key developments

Institutional reform and convergence

Institutional reform has radically altered the regulation landscape in the Colombian communication sector. The 2019 reform dissolved the National Television Authority (ANTV), transferring its functions to the Communications Regulation Commission (Comisión de Regulación de Comunicaciones, CRC). The CRC is now the unified regulator for communications, broadcasting, postal services and audiovisual content. The Ministry of Information and Communications Technologies (Ministerio de Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones, MinTIC, hereafter “the ministry”) retained digital policy leadership, oversees spectrum assignment and manages the Unified ICT Fund (Fondo Único de Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones, or FUTIC). Meanwhile, the National Spectrum Agency (Agencia Nacional de Espectro, ANE) continues to be a technical body attached to the MinTIC. It advises the ministry on spectrum management, including policy design and planning, as well as allocation and assignment.

The independence of a sector regulator, both from those it regulates and from the government, is essential to establish confidence in the integrity of decisions (OECD, 2014[4]). Regulators need strong safeguards to protect their decisions from undue influence and preserve public trust. An independent and well-qualified board of commissioners supports objective, impartial and consistent regulation, reducing the risk of conflicts of interest or bias. A transparent and robust process for selecting and appointing commissioners is therefore essential. In addition, budgetary independence and commensurate powers are critical to ensure the regulator can carry out and enforce its mandate effectively.

While Colombia has taken steps to modernise ICT legislation, the communication regulator is not yet entirely independent. With the ICT Modernisation Law, Colombia made important strides to follow a key recommendation in the 2014 OECD Review (OECD, 2014[3]): to establish a strong independent and convergent communication regulator. The independence of communication regulators is also in line with the OECD’s 2021 Council Recommendation on Broadband Connectivity (OECD, 2021[5]). The CRC’s dual-session governance model established in this law enhanced its independence and expertise, but it is not completely insulated from political influence.

Colombia can take further steps to strengthen the regulator, including removing representation from the executive branch on CRC’s board. The 2019 reform established an unusual governance structure for the converged regulator by creating two parallel boards within the CRC, one for audiovisual content and the other for communications. Under the reform, the executive branch appoints two of five board commissioners of the Communications Session (CS): one by the Minister of ICTs and one by the President. Moreover, regional public TV operators appoint one of the three board commissioners of the Audiovisual Content Session (ACS). As highlighted in prior reviews and assessments, OECD best practices recommend against such institutional arrangements. As such, the government should not have a seat on the CRC’s CS Board as this will undermine its independence (OECD, 2014[3]; OECD, 2019[6]). The OECD Best Practice Principles for the Governance of Regulators emphasise that a single, independent regulator should oversee the sector and have commensurate powers to carry out its role and operational distance from government (OECD, 2014[4]). Moreover, the appointment of a board commissioner of the ACS by some of the regulated entities raises potential conflicts of interest (OECD, 2019[6]).

The appointment of all CRC commissioners should be independent, transparent and based on merit. Co‑ordination between policy formulation and sectoral regulation is needed to bridge connectivity divides, and foster competition and investment in the sector. However, the resulting governance structure may undermine the CRC’s independence. Moreover, two parallel boards within a regulator has no precedent in OECD Member countries. It may lead to conflicts of remit, particularly in relation to regulating the audiovisual content market.

Ex ante pro-competitive regulation

The CRC has refined market definitions and strengthened ex ante tools with the aim of addressing structural market concentration, especially in mobile services where Claro remains dominant. The regulator opened an investigation in 2018 on two issues. First, it sought to determine whether Claro had a dominant position in the “mobile services” market. Second, it looked at whether competition problems transitioned from the “mobile voice” market to the “mobile services” market, which was halted during the process of the ICT Modernisation Law (OECD, 2019[6]). While the CRC declared the dominance of Claro in the national market for mobile communication services in 2021 (CRC, 2021[7]), this decision to date has largely been without ex ante regulatory measures applicable to the operator with significant market power (SMP) to decrease market concentration.

In one area of progress, regulation moved to symmetric ex ante measures (i.e. applying to all operators in the market), such as the “sender-keeps-all” mobile termination regime in 2025 and the national automatic roaming (NAR) framework. The NAR measures have encouraged service-based competition and expanded coverage. However, national roaming tariffs per megabyte sometimes still exceed operator revenues, highlighting the weak bargaining position of smaller MNOs. WOM benefitted from lower newcomer roaming tariffs 5-year sunset clause after obtaining International Mobile Telecommunications (IMT) spectrum in December 2019, formalised in H1 2020 (MinTIC Resolution 3078 of 2019). This advantage should have expired in May 2025, after which it will need to operate under standard wholesale terms.

Spectrum management

Colombia should build on initial reforms to spectrum management, reducing costs and increasing transparency. Reforms extended spectrum licence duration to 20 years, following a recommendation by the OECD in 2014 (OECD, 2014[3]). This applies only to new spectrum licences and not renewals of licences granted prior to the 2019 reform, whereby licensees decide extension periods for renewal. The reform also introduced incentives to expand network coverage, allowing network build-out commitments to meet up to 90% of fees. Spectrum auctions have successfully combined financial and coverage obligations. However, high fees and complex assignment procedures persist. Enhanced co‑ordination between the MinTIC, the ANE and the CRC should strengthen transparency in spectrum licensing and reduce spectrum costs.

Universal service funding

The merging of FonTIC and FonTV into the Unified ICT Fund (FUTIC) created a single financial instrument for universal access, inclusion and public-interest content. FUTIC has become the central financial instrument for implementing digital and audiovisual public policy, and supporting major programmes to expand connectivity. Managed by the MinTIC, FUTIC pools vast resources from sectoral contributions to finance universal service goals, among other broader digital policy aims.

Several structural issues require adjustments in the management and operation of FUTIC to avoid distortions in the sector and to achieve policy objectives such as bridging digital divides. Policy efforts have rightly shifted from voice to broadband access and digital adoption (OECD, 2014[3]). However, the merger of the two previous funds has created challenges in ensuring that resources are directed effectively towards expanding high-quality connectivity rather than dispersed across diverse objectives. These challenges relate to long-term financial sustainability, execution performance and the broadened mandate.

Long-term financial sustainability

FUTIC depends increasingly on spectrum assignment and licence renewal revenues, which now constitute the largest share of sectoral contributions. However, as spectrum assignment remains within the remit of the ministry, spectrum fees fluctuate with the timing of auctions and policy choices linked to the political cycle.

The 2019 ICT Modernisation Law calls for spectrum management in Colombia to follow welfare considerations instead of fiscal maximisation principles – a welcome development to promote broadband deployment. In practice, the dependence of FUTIC on spectrum revenues may provide other incentives when making important spectrum assignment decisions. Meanwhile, the share of operators’ gross revenues continues to decline, reflecting the contraction of the sector’s income.

The combination of dependence on spectrum revenues and lower gross revenues of operators exposes the Fund to volatility and limits its ability to plan long-term investments. Efforts to transform FUTIC into a second-tier financing entity (i.e. a lender providing financing to other intermediaries) and where it diversifies its financing sources through international co‑operation (MinTIC, 2024[8]), could improve flexibility. However, proper safeguards should guarantee transparency and accountability.

Execution performance

FUTIC’s execution performance (i.e. the alignment or gap between how resources are planned and what is delivered or spent) also requires strengthening. The investment component, which includes digital infrastructure deployment projects, has shown persistent underperformance. In 2024, execution rates declined to approximately 60% compared with around 90% execution rate for current transfers (i.e. transfers from the FUTIC to the National Treasury, MinTIC, ANE, SIC, CRC, Colombian National Radio and Television, and Computers for Education Association) (MinTIC, 2025[9]). This shortfall may delay implementation of priority projects, particularly in underserved and rural areas. These challenges are compounded by weaknesses in monitoring and evaluation frameworks: the absence of systematic ex ante and ex post assessments limits the ability to ensure that resources are targeted effectively, used efficiently and conducive to long-term project sustainability and impact.

Broadening mandate

The broadening of FUTIC’s mandate since 2019 to support digital government, audiovisual content or online safety risks, among other uses, may divert resources away from the core objective of expanding high-quality connectivity. The distribution of current transfers illustrates this misalignment: a large share is channelled to the National Treasury, while the sectoral regulator (CRC) receives less than 1% of FUTIC’s budget.

To minimise this risk of misallocating resources and maximise the impact of programmes, as highlighted in prior OECD reviews, Colombia should strengthen FUTIC’s oversight. To that end, spending decisions should be based on systematic cost-benefit analyses. FUTIC’s resources must be transparently monitored, independently evaluated and used to complement, not crowd out, private investment (OECD, 2014[3]; OECD, 2022[10]).

Industry contributions should be kept to the minimum required to achieve public policy objectives, as they can act as a sectoral levy (see below). The 2020 reduction of operator contributions from 2.2% to 1.9% was a positive step towards a more sustainable and transparent funding framework (MinTIC Resolution No. 0903 of 2020). Moreover, revenues from spectrum auctions should be channelled into the general budget to enhance efficiency and avoid distortions of the Fund (OECD, 2014[3]). This also helps avoid important trade-offs in policy objectives (i.e. funding the needs of the ministry versus following social welfare aims in spectrum management that call for lower spectrum costs).

Taxes affecting the communication sector

Communication companies in Colombia face a multitude of fees and taxes, which should be reduced to lift the heavy burden on industry. Some taxes apply to all sectors, while others are specific to the communication sector. The largest block of sector-specific fees is the contributions to the FUTIC. While the contribution was reduced from 2.2% (in the past for the FonTIC) to 1.9% of operators' gross revenues in 2020 (MinTIC Resolution 0903), this levy is sector specific. If the funds are not redirected to the expansion of connectivity, they place an additional burden in a sector that produces positive spillovers to the Colombian economy. General taxes, both on national and municipal levels, add to the sector-specific fees. Overall, the tax burden on the communication industry can be considered as very high. It is recommended to find ways to reduce the overall fees and taxes on the sector.

Moreover, as recommended in OECD (2014[3]) and OECD (2019[6]), Colombia should eliminate the additional 4% value-added tax (VAT) on mobile communication services. The VAT unjustifiably penalises a sector that generates significant positive externalities for the economy and society. Higher taxes on communication services discourage demand, distort the market, and hinder productivity and social development. Consumers also face relatively high costs for terminal devices. The Colombian government’s exemption of entry-level mobile handsets from VAT was a laudable initiative to make devices more affordable, promote digital inclusion and encourage adoption of ICT services (OECD, 2022[10]).

Regulatory quality and predictability

The CRC has established a comprehensive policy to improve regulatory quality. This policy incorporates regulatory impact assessments (RIAs), public consultations, ex post evaluations and regulatory sandboxes within a structured policy cycle. These mechanisms improve stability, foresight and stakeholder engagement. To further leverage the impact of the CRC’s commendable efforts to improve regulatory quality, continuous capacity building should support consistent implementation.

1.3.2. Key challenges

Despite notable progress since the 2019 reform, Colombia’s regulatory framework still faces challenges that affect its consistency, agility and long-term effectiveness. In short, Colombia’s next phase of regulatory evolution must focus on consolidating independence, deepening institutional co‑ordination and building the capacity to govern a rapidly changing digital ecosystem.

While the independence of the communication regulator has improved significantly, it still needs further strengthening. Moreover, to improve regulatory co‑operation among the entities involved in the sector, the CRC, the SIC and the ANE should enhance co‑ordination mechanisms. This should pair the CRC’s increased autonomy with broader policy coherence and operational complementarity, preventing both regulatory overlaps and gaps.

Competition remains a persistent issue in Colombia’s communication markets, with high mobile market concentration at a national level and fixed market concentration at a local level. Any further consolidation of converged operators requires timely, balanced regulatory actions. The challenge is to keep incentives for investment and innovation while preventing structural imbalances that could entrench dominance and harm consumer welfare.

FUTIC’s heavy dependence on spectrum-based revenues, along with slow disbursement cycles, weakens the predictability and efficiency of universal service funding. Diversifying revenue streams and enhancing budget implementation are vital to ensuring the continuity and effectiveness of inclusion policies.

Spectrum management also faces challenges to balance concerns related to affordability, efficiency and administrative flexibility. High spectrum costs and complicated assignment procedures threaten to slow the deployment of next-generation networks, especially 5G. Implementing more transparent valuation methods and flexible assignment models, along with enabling secondary trading, could help ensure that spectrum is used efficiently and supports broader connectivity goals.

The rapid convergence of technologies and the growth of OTT and data-driven services demand a more flexible regulatory response. The CRC’s tools for better regulation, such as impact assessments, ex post evaluations and regulatory sandboxes, offer a solid foundation. However, they must be supported by increased foresight and cross-sector co‑ordination to keep up with changing market dynamics.

Finally, institutional capacity and coherence remain central to the system’s overall effectiveness. Although convergence has reduced fragmentation, overlapping mandates and uneven resource allocation persist. Strengthening the technical, analytical and enforcement capabilities of both the CRC and the MinTIC is vital to ensure that well-designed rules are implemented efficiently and enforced consistently.

Box ‎1.2 summarises the main institutional and regulatory developments brought about with the 2019 reform and the remaining regulatory challenges in Colombia’s connectivity ecosystem.

Box ‎1.2. Institutional evolution in Colombia’s connectivity ecosystem since 2019 and key regulatory challenges

The following points highlight the main institutional and regulatory developments in Colombia’s connectivity ecosystem since 2019 and the key regulatory challenges that remain:

• The 2019 ICT Modernisation Law reshaped Colombia’s communication regulatory framework. The reform created a converged regulator and aligned governance more closely with OECD principles of independent, evidence-based regulation and long-term investment incentives. However, further reforms are needed to ensure stronger institutional arrangements and predictable, investment-friendly regulation that supports Colombia’s digital transformation.

• Institutional reform created a converged regulator, but regulatory independence could be strengthened. The 2019 reform dissolved the National Television Authority (ANTV) and transferred its functions to the Communications Regulation Commission (CRC), making it the unified regulator for communications, broadcasting, postal services and audiovisual content. However, ministerial representation on the CRC’s Communications Session Board and the appointment of a commissioner to the Audiovisual Content Session by broadcasters may weaken its independence.

• Stronger institutional co-ordination is needed across the sector’s governance framework. The MinTIC retains digital policy leadership, including connectivity policy, spectrum management, and oversees the Unified ICT Fund (FUTIC), while the National Spectrum Agency (ANE), a body within the ministry, provides technical expertise on spectrum management. Improved co-ordination between MinTIC, CRC, ANE and the competition authority (SIC) is needed to ensure coherent policies and effective oversight.

• Competition challenges persist despite improvements in regulatory tools. The CRC has refined market definitions and strengthened its ex ante toolkit to address market concentration, particularly in mobile markets, although the 2021 declaration of dominance has not yet resulted in major corrective measures. Symmetric measures such as the “sender-keeps-all” mobile termination regime (2025) and national roaming have supported service-based competition, but high concentration and wholesale conditions still disadvantage smaller operators.

• Spectrum management reforms have improved the investment framework but challenges remain. The 2019 reform extended the duration of new spectrum licences to 20 years and introduced coverage obligations to support network expansion. However, high spectrum costs, complex assignment procedures, limited transparency in licence renewals may hinder efficient spectrum assignment and slow next-generation network deployment.

• The Unified ICT Fund (FUTIC) is the main instrument for universal service; however, structural challenges affect its effectiveness. Created through the merger of FonTIC and FonTV, FUTIC supports connectivity expansion and digital adoption. However, reliance on operators’ contributions and spectrum revenues exposes the Fund to volatility, while execution rates of around 60% delay infrastructure projects. The expansion of its mandate beyond connectivity risks diverting resources from its core objective.

• High sector-specific taxes and levies may constrain investment and adoption of digital connectivity. Communication operators face a heavy fiscal burden, including the 1.9% contribution to FUTIC and an additional 4% VAT on mobile services. Reducing these levies could strengthen incentives for network investment and support wider broadband adoption.

• Strengthening regulatory quality and institutional capacity will be key for the next phase of reform. The CRC has introduced tools to improve regulatory quality, including regulatory impact assessments, public consultations, ex post evaluations and regulatory sandboxes. Continued investment in technical capacity and stronger institutional co-ordination will be necessary to address evolving market dynamics and technological convergence.

1.4. Policy and regulatory orientations

1.4.1. Broad policy orientations to promote affordable and high-quality connectivity for all

Colombia’s communication sector continues to face persistent challenges in its digital transition including the need to improve the quality and reliability of digital connectivity. The challenge is no longer only to expand access to connectivity but also to achieve high-quality and reliable connectivity for all while managing the risks associated with increasing market concentration. The policy and regulatory directions outlined here aim to consolidate recent progress, correct persistent imbalances and strengthen the institutional framework that supports digital transformation. These policy orientations are not intended to be prescriptive measures, but rather strategic orientations to guide co‑ordinated policy action across government, regulators and industry.

Promoting investment and ensuring effective competition is essential. The high degree of market concentration, in both fixed and mobile markets, calls for continuous oversight and proactive regulatory intervention. Strengthening wholesale access frameworks for fibre and mobile networks, monitoring potential mergers and revitalising the MVNO ecosystem will help preserve consumer choice. Competition must also extend beyond the retail layer to include transport and backhaul infrastructure, where bottlenecks still restrict entry in less populated areas.

Sound regulatory and institutional frameworks will provide incentives to invest in network expansion and upgrades (OECD, 2025[11]). Despite progress in broadband deployment, significant disparities remain between urban and rural areas. Further efforts are needed to bridge spatial connectivity divides. Public policy should align investment incentives with universal service goals by promoting infrastructure sharing, open-access models and targeted funding for high-capacity networks in underserved regions. A stable, technology-neutral regulatory environment will be key to sustaining investor confidence and accelerating deployment.

On the demand side, while prices have fallen substantially, adoption remains uneven, particularly among low-income households. Policy initiatives should combine targeted affordability arrangements with digital and media literacy programmes and the promotion of locally relevant content. Addressing non-price barriers is essential to ensure that all citizens can fully benefit from connectivity.

To expand high-quality digital connectivity, regulatory frameworks should foster an enabling environment that promotes investment and improves communication market conditions. Encouraging cost-sharing arrangements, energy-efficient infrastructure and convergence of network functions can enhance efficiency and free resources for reinvestment. At the same time, smaller and regional operators require access to financing mechanisms to participate meaningfully in next-generation network deployment.

Given the persistence of administrative barriers to network deployment, including in the most highly populated cities such as Bogotá, greater emphasis is needed on the effective implementation, monitoring and enforcement of legal and regulatory measures, particularly at the local level. This may include introducing more binding mechanisms to address persistent obstacles that continue to hinder network deployment (e.g. slow and complex procedures, lack of co‑ordination between administrations). In parallel, reforms in the design of local taxes should be considered, particularly public lighting fees. These should ensure that municipal fiscal instruments do not unintentionally discourage network investment or undermine key public policy objectives, such as expanding high-quality connectivity at affordable prices to bridge digital divides.

Effective and adaptive regulatory decision making requires high standards of regulatory quality. The OECD Recommendation on Regulatory Policy and Governance (OECD, 2012[12]) calls for a continuous, evidence-based policy cycle from design to evaluation. Colombia has made laudable steps to improve regulatory quality. It could further strengthen data-driven regulation through granular, privacy-preserving connectivity indicators and regulatory sandboxes, using ex post evaluation to scale measures where benefits are clear.

The growing influence of OTT online platforms calls for a modernised, convergent approach to regulation. Enhanced co‑operation and data exchange between regulators and major OTT providers can improve transparency in traffic management and content delivery. Promoting interoperability and open standards will also help safeguard user choice and prevent excessive dependency on a few global actors.

Finally, Colombia could further strengthen institutional capacity and regulatory coherence. The 2019 reform was a significant step forward, but further refinement is needed to strengthen co‑ordination, analytical capabilities and policy execution. Consolidating regulatory responsibilities, enhancing technical expertise and promoting inter-institutional collaboration, both nationally and regionally, will improve regulatory agility and coherence. Transparent, participatory processes will also bolster public trust in regulatory outcomes.

1.4.2. Policy considerations on how to adapt Colombia’s institutional framework to over-the-top services

Several elements of the connectivity landscape are changing, in terms of players, business models, services and technologies. The emergence of OTT services is a relevant part of this transformation. These services, such as video streaming, messaging apps and VoIP, are accelerating the convergence between traditional communications markets and the broader digital ecosystem, making it increasingly difficult to distinguish between the two.

The OTT landscape is dynamic and rapidly evolving, prompting ongoing regulatory debates both within the OECD and globally (OECD, 2022[13]). As an initial consequence, convergence has blurred traditional boundaries between the communications and broadcasting sectors. Market players now compete through bundled offerings that combine voice, video and data services (OECD, 2021[14]). Moreover, OECD Member countries have developed a range of responses to address the challenges arising from convergence. Many have taken steps to broaden the scope of their legal and regulatory frameworks (OECD, 2022[13]). Overall, 69.8% of regulators in the communication sector across the OECD and select partner economies in the accession process to the OECD3 have extended their mandate to include OTT, according to responses to the OECD 2025 CSI Communication Regulatory Questionnaire.4

Building on country practices across the OECD, some regulatory areas have been identified in Colombia that could be updated to accommodate emergence of the new OTT communication service model. Different approaches tend to converge around six domains: i) service provision (authorisation, transparency, quality of service, security); ii) competition policy (market definition; significant market power, or SMP, assessment; remedies); iii) network use (interconnection, CDN placement); iv) open Internet rules enforcement; v) universal service financing; and vi) dispute resolution.

Against this backdrop, the following policies outline a set of options for Colombia. They are policy considerations and approaches drawing from international experience. These diverse approaches can be potentially phased, tested and assessed using the country’s existing regulatory tools.

Clarifying the scope and adopting proportional obligations for OTT service provision

Service provision regulation covers whether and how OTT providers must be authorised or registered; what transparency and end-user rights they must uphold; the quality of service and security standards they must meet; and any conditions attached to pricing and emergency access.

Across the OECD, the most developed approach in relation to the definition of OTT services within the regulatory framework is arguably the European Union (EU), which applies to 22 of the OECD’s 38 Member countries (OECD-EU Member countries). The European Electronic Communications Code (EECC) defines services functionally. It brings many OTTs into scope as “interpersonal communications services”, distinguishing between number-based and number-independent services, applying core duties to both and enhanced duties to services that engage in the numbering ecosystem. The EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) complements the EECC with obligations on designated “gatekeepers” offering core platform services, such as online social networking or video sharing. These cover data use, anti-bundling, transparency and interoperability.

OTT services have been largely unregulated across OECD Member countries. Nevertheless, some countries (e.g. Canada, the United Kingdom and Switzerland) have moved to classify certain OTTs into communication regulatory regimes. This has been done largely around categories related to transparency and user protection. Korea’s 2020 reforms require OTT providers (Internet-based communication platforms) to register as value-added communication businesses and impose user-response obligations on large OTTs. By contrast, the United States treats OTTs as “information services” or “value-added services” that remain outside communication regulation.

Colombia could begin by providing guidance, mapping which OTT functionalities fall within the “communication services” scope (e.g. number-based VoIP and OTT services that complete calls on public numbers). This could be paired with proportional obligations, like transparency, security incident notifications and basic quality of service reporting, that increase with user base and functional risk. A light-touch notification system for large OTT interpersonal communications, with clear exemptions for small innovators, would maintain entry barriers while enhancing oversight.

Updating competition policy tools to reflect OTT substitution where relevant

Competition policy analysis concerns market definition in communication markets, the assessment of significant market power and the design of remedies to keep markets working effectively as OTTs and on-net services converge.

Relevant examples of competition policy applied to OTTs include Colombia itself. Colombia already includes OTTs in at least one market definition: the retail market for outgoing international long-distance voice, which explicitly covers “OTT platforms to make calls”. For its part, Brazil has updated its competition framework to reflect convergent dynamics, signalling that OTTs can be substitutes or competitors where functionalities overlap and adjusting asymmetric remedies accordingly.

In OECD-EU Members, OTT interpersonal communication services are treated within the common regulatory framework. This framework is harmonised in EU Member States through periodic recommendations of the European Commission on the definition of relevant markets and significant market power analysis. In the latest Recommendation (2020), the European Commission does not consider the service of unmanaged voice as an OTT service within the same market as traditional voice calls (fixed or mobile). This is because simultaneous login and device constraints limit substitutability (European Commission, 2020[15]). The Recommendation recognises paid OTT termination to public numbers as an indirect constraint in forward-looking SMP assessments.

Building on this, Colombia could regularly screen for OTT substitution in future market reviews. When OTT trends shift the bottlenecks (such as interconnection to numbers, access to numbering-related features), the CRC could consider targeted wholesale remedies while ensuring strict proportionality. Limited, confidential data collection from large OTTs (usage and interconnection metrics) would enhance evidence-based SMP assessments.

Monitoring shared network use with openness and transparency

Countries follow different regulatory approaches to ensure access to network resources while promoting quality and sustained investment in broadband infrastructure. OTT and network-integrated service providers operate within the same market and depend on the same underlying infrastructure: IP-based communication networks. This shared reliance on IP network infrastructure, or network use, refers to modalities to reach end users (user side), as well as the way to interconnect platforms and CDNs (wholesale or platform side).

On the user side, debates around network use focus on whether the high Internet Protocol (IP) traffic generated by OTT services should justify a contribution from large technology firms to access network deployment costs via direct payments or bundled commercial arrangements. Proponents cite proportional cost-sharing, while critics argue OTT-driven demand already underpins operator revenues and upgrades.

OECD Member countries have recognised the importance of preserving network neutrality principles as highlighted in the OECD Council Recommendation on Principles for Internet Policy Making (OECD, 2011[16]) and the Declaration on a Trusted, Sustainable and Inclusive Digital Future signed by the Digital Economy Ministers in 2022 (OECD, 2022[17]). Nevertheless, if market failures arise, for example, monopoly over IP traffic termination or asymmetric bargaining positions that could exclude smaller players, regulators are assessing options. In one scenario, an OTT provider may not be able to offer services to end users over a particular network due to traffic blocking. Alternatively, it could only offer these services with reduced quality because it cannot install a content delivery network (CDN) node at the access node of an ISP. Given these possibilities, regulators may consider transparency measures and performance monitoring.

Beyond monitoring and transparency, countries may consider ex ante access remedies as a last resort, drawing on analogies such as MVNO access. However, regulators need to be mindful of the possible risks this may entail: changing the nature of IP traffic interconnection may lead to distortions. Moreover, any consideration of a cost recovery arrangement should start with identifying a specific market failure that would justify ex ante regulatory intervention, with a RIA to evaluate the effects of introducing a regulatory measure on investment, competition and alignment with Open Internet principles.

On the wholesale or platform side, targeted inventions may be needed to avoid bottlenecks and distortions. Interconnection and CDN placement are usually negotiated bilaterally between private parties; however, intervention might be warranted where bottlenecks or concentrated bargaining power distort outcomes.

Two national examples illustrate different approaches. In Italy, the communication regulator (AGCOM) required DAZN, an OTT digital sports streaming service based in the United Kingdom, to deploy caches (DAZN Edge) inside major Internet service providers (ISPs). AGCOM has established minimum service standards for events of significant public interest. Korea requires large OTT providers to ensure service stability and responsiveness once traffic or user thresholds are met.

When considering regulatory measures related to shared network use and interconnection, policymakers should ensure that they do not distort the functioning of IP interconnection, which is essential to maintaining a global and interoperable Internet. At the same time, the interdependence between OTT providers and communication network and service providers should be taken into account, as well as the broader market dynamics of the digital connectivity ecosystem in which all actors play key roles across the value chain.

As an initial approach, Colombia could consider the following staggered steps. First, establish transparency and operational co-ordination requirements for very-high-traffic OTT players (such as incident post-mortem reports and capacity-planning practices). Second, consider implementing a technology-neutral CDN placement framework that is voluntary by default under fair, non-discriminatory hosting conditions.

Safeguarding Open Internet principles and strengthening practical enforcement

Network neutrality is a core principle of Internet governance stating that all data traffic be treated equally, without discrimination based on content, application, source or destination. Its regulatory foundations stem from the need to preserve the open, non-discriminatory and interoperable nature of the Internet, also known as Open Internet principles. These principles were reinforced in the OECD Council Recommendation on Principles for Internet Policy Making (OECD, 2011[16]) and reaffirmed in the Declaration on a Trusted, Sustainable and Inclusive Digital Future signed by Digital Economy Ministers in 2022, where governments committed to work together “to promote a safe, secure, inclusive and sustainable digital environment, underpinned by an open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, accessible, affordable, secure and resilient Internet […]” (OECD, 2022[17]).

Therefore, network neutrality relates to the non-discriminatory treatment of Internet Protocol (IP) traffic and the ability of Internet users to access content and applications of their choice. The debate around network neutrality centres on two aspects. The first relates to users’ access to content and applications, covering issues like quality, blocking or differential pricing between users and ISPs. The second concerns commercial arrangements between network operators and content providers (OECD, 2015[18]). In the context of OTT services, net neutrality guarantees a level playing field. On the one hand, it prevents ISPs from throttling, prioritising or blocking OTT traffic, even when it competes with their own services. On the other, it limits their ability to manage or monetise network traffic commercially.

Within the broader network neutrality debate, different traffic management practices by operators, pricing models such as ‘zero rating’, and the use of ad blocking have focused the interest and actions of policy makers and regulators in the past years. The discussion of zero rating applied to certain OTT services is part of this broader policy debate, and the practice relates to excluding certain types of traffic from users’ data allowances. Some perspectives highlight economic efficiency and welfare maximisation, while others focus on the wider political, social and pluralistic impacts of information flows (OECD, 2019[19]).

Across the OECD, most Member countries have implemented legal or regulatory measures to protect an Open Internet, commonly known as network neutrality rules. These frameworks generally require ISPs to handle data traffic fairly and to avoid prioritising, throttling or blocking content for commercial gain. Concerning “zero rating” (i.e. when specific Internet traffic is unmetered compared to other metered traffic), authorities usually evaluate such offers on a case-by-case basis to see if they distort competition or harm consumer welfare.

Colombia could consider both policy positions. To that end, it could reaffirm Open Internet safeguards and strengthen practical enforcement, while ensuring its regulatory framework properly reflects the changing dynamics of the digital ecosystem. This is especially critical as data volumes grow and OTT platforms become increasingly central to Internet usage.

Regulation in Colombia allows Internet access providers to make offers tailored to the needs of market segments or their users (Article 56 of Law 1450 of 2011) (Congreso de Colombia, 2011[20]). However, the Constitutional Court is studying whether this regulation violates the principles of freedom of expression, informational pluralism and network neutrality (Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 2025[21]).

Colombia can strengthen the implementation of its own network neutrality rules. First, by clarifying how zero rating is treated to prevent discriminatory data offers that favour certain OTTs. Second, it could publish measurement methods to detect traffic differentiation along with clear disclosures of traffic-management policies by operators.

Aligning universal service objectives without discouraging innovation

Some countries are debating whether large platforms should support connectivity goals and help fund universal service objectives, which have traditionally been funded by communication operators. To align universal service obligations without discouraging innovation, Colombia could take a pragmatic approach that prioritises in-kind and co-investment contributions before imposing levies. In such an approach, Colombia could prioritise in-kind or co-investment contributions that support FUTIC priorities. These priorities could include rural CDN nodes, shared backhaul to schools or health posts, and community network support.

Any expansion of the contribution base of financial contributions to FUTIC requires a comprehensive impact analysis. As a first step, the effectiveness of universal service funds should be assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether expanding the contribution base would translate into greater investment in digital connectivity. For example, Colombia’s FUTIC has shown low execution rates. Alternatively, reducing contributions from traditional operators could help encourage investment and address asymmetries among market players.

Dispute resolution mechanisms

As the relationships between OTT providers and network operators become more interdependent, regulatory frameworks may consider incorporating formal mechanisms for dispute resolution, particularly regarding access conditions, interconnection, CDN placement or traffic-management practices. Colombia could expand the CRC’s tools by introducing a fast-track process for dispute resolution between OTTs and connectivity providers. This process would cover interconnection quality, CDN hosting terms and access to numbering/emergency services, while adhering to strict timelines and providing mediation tools.

1.4.3. Digital connectivity: An opportunity to harness Colombia’s economic and social development

Colombia has significantly modernised the communication sector since 2014, supported by a robust regulatory framework and rising digital connectivity. The 2019 reform marked a turning point for the communication sector. By establishing a converged regulatory and policy framework, the reform created a single communication regulator to improve efficiency and transparency. It also consolidated universal service initiatives under a unified fund and made some improvements in spectrum management (e.g. increasing the length of spectrum licences).

While the reform has strengthened regulations, challenges remain. Colombia needs to ensure effective co‑ordination among authorities with responsibilities in the communication sector. Priorities include strengthening the independence of the regulator, fostering investment in next-generation networks, and maintaining predictable and evidence-based policymaking.

Box ‎1.3 summarises the main policy orientations to expand affordable and high-quality connectivity and to adapt the regulatory framework to an evolving digital connectivity landscape.

Box ‎1.3. Policy guidance to strengthen digital connectivity in Colombia

Broad policy orientations to promote affordable and high-quality connectivity for all

Colombia’s digital transformation demands renewed policy focus to ensure connectivity that is not only widespread but also reliable, high-quality and affordable. Persistent structural challenges, including market concentration and pronounced urban–rural spatial connectivity divides, call for co-ordinated action across government, regulators and industry. Priority orientations include:

• Strengthen institutional capacity, independence and policy coherence. The 2019 reform created a converged regulatory framework, but further steps could reinforce the independence of the sector regulator (the CRC), strengthen analytical capabilities and improve co-ordination among institutions with a mandate in the sector. Transparent and participatory regulatory processes can enhance policy predictability and investor confidence.

• Promote investment while safeguarding competition. High concentration in fixed and mobile markets calls for sustained regulatory oversight. Strengthening wholesale access to fibre, monitoring consolidation and ensuring implementation of merger remedies, and revitalising the MVNO ecosystem can help preserve consumer choice. Competitive pressure should also extend to transport and backhaul infrastructure, where bottlenecks still constrain entry in less populated areas.

• Align investment incentives with universal service goals. Despite progress in broadband deployment, territorial disparities persist. Public policy should promote infrastructure sharing, open-access models, and targeted financing for high-capacity networks in underserved regions. A predictable, technology-neutral regulatory environment is essential to sustain private investment.

• Remove local administrative and fiscal barriers to network rollout. Deployment is hindered by complex and slow administrative procedures, weak inter-administrative co-ordination, and uneven local implementation across municipalities. Strengthening monitoring and enforcement and reviewing municipal fiscal instruments can help ensure local rules and fees do not discourage network investment.

• Reduce excessive sector-specific taxes and levies at the national level. Communication operators face a relatively heavy fiscal burden, including sector-specific contributions and additional VAT on mobile services. Streamlining these levies could support network investment and help expand affordable connectivity.

• Address demand-side barriers to connectivity adoption. Although broadband prices have declined, adoption remains uneven, particularly among low-income households and rural communities. Targeted affordability measures, combined with digital and media literacy initiatives and support for locally relevant content, can help address non-price barriers.

Policy considerations to adapt the institutional framework to OTT services

The rapid growth of OTT communication and content services is reshaping connectivity markets and blurring the boundaries between traditional communication services and the broader digital ecosystem. Drawing on evolving practices across OECD Member countries, Colombia could consider the following approaches:

• Clarify the regulatory scope. Identifying which OTT functionalities fall within the communication framework (e.g. interpersonal communications or number-based services) could help define the regulatory perimeter. Basic and proportionate obligations, such transparency and security incident reporting, could be scaled with the user base and risk, which can aid in the oversight, while preserving a light-touch regulatory approach conducive to innovation.

• Update competition policy tools to reflect convergence. Regular screening for OTT substitution in market reviews could help refine significant market power (SMP) assessments and ensure remedies remain proportionate and forward-looking. Limited and targeted data collection from large online platforms could strengthen the evidence base for competition analysis.

• Increase transparency in shared network use. Enhanced transparency and operational co-ordination for high-traffic OTT services could improve network planning and traffic management. In case of potential congestion during public interest events or states of emergency, targeted and technology-neutral measures, such as voluntary CDN-hosting frameworks under non-discriminatory conditions, may help maintain service quality.

• Safeguard Open Internet principles while safeguarding enforcement. Clarifying the treatment of zero-rating practices, improving the disclosure of traffic-management policies, and publishing transparent measurement methodologies could reinforce compliance with network neutrality principles, while accommodating evolving traffic patterns.

References

[20] Congreso de Colombia (2011), Ley 1450 de 2011 “Por la cual se expide el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, 2010-2014.”, https://www.funcionpublica.gov.co/eva/gestornormativo/norma.php?i=43101 (accessed on 20 January 2026).

[21] Corte Constitucional de Colombia (2025), Sentencia C-206/25, https://www.suin-juriscol.gov.co/viewDocument.asp?id=30055042 (accessed on 20 January 2026).

[7] CRC (2021), Resolución 6380 Por la cual se resuelve el recurso de reposición interpuesto por COMUNICACIÓN CELULAR S.A. COMCEL S.A. en contra de la Resolución CRC 6146 de 2021, [Whereby the appeal for reconsideration filed by COMUNICACIÓN CELULAR S.A. COMCEL S.A. against Resolution CRC 6146 of 2021 is resolved], https://crcom.gov.co/es/normatividad/resolucion-6380.

[15] European Commission (2020), Commission Recommendation of 18.12.2020 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-updated-recommendation-relevant-markets (accessed on 23 January 2026).

[2] Government of Colombia (2023), Estrategia Nacional Digital 2023-2026, https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Desarrollo%20Digital/EVENTOS/END_Colombia_2023_2026.pdf.

[9] MinTIC (2025), Información Presupuestal: Ingresos y Gastos del FUTIC, https://www.mintic.gov.co/portal/inicio/Presupuesto/Informacion-Presupuestal (accessed on 22 December 2025).

[8] MinTIC (2024), Plan integral de expansión de conectividad digital. Con conectividad, cambiamos vidas, https://mintic.gov.co/micrositios/PlanConectividadDigital/870/articles-399394_documento.pdf (accessed on 19 September 2025).

[22] OECD (2026), National Digital Strategy Comprehensiveness Index, https://goingdigital.oecd.org/datakitchen/#/explorer/1/toolkit/indicator/explore/en?mainCubeId=OECD.STI.DEP%2FDSD_TOOLKIT_DK%40DF_NDSC&pairCubeId=&sizeCubeId=&mainIndId=NDSC&pairIndId=&sizeIndId=&mainBreakdowns=DIMENSION%3AACC&pairBreakdowns=&sizeBreakdow (accessed on 12 February 2026).

[1] OECD (2026), “The OECD Going Digital Integrated Policy Framework 2026”, OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 381, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0254ae07-en.

[11] OECD (2025), Closing Broadband Connectivity Divides for All: From Evidence to Practice, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/d5ea99b2-en.

[13] OECD (2022), “Communication regulators of the future”, OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 333, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f02209e6-en.

[17] OECD (2022), Declaration on a Trusted, Sustainable and Inclusive Digital Future, OECD/LEGAL/0488, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0488 (accessed on 22 October 2025).

[10] OECD (2022), Rural Policy Review of Colombia 2022, OECD Rural Studies, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c26abeb4-en.

[23] OECD (2021), “Bridging connectivity divides”, OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 315, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e38f5db7-en.

[14] OECD (2021), “Emerging trends in communication market competition”, OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 316, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/4ad9d924-en.

[5] OECD (2021), Recommendation of the Council on Broadband Connectivity, OECD/LEGAL/0322, Adopted in 2004, revised in 2021, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0322.

[6] OECD (2019), OECD Reviews of Digital Transformation: Going Digital in Colombia, OECD Reviews of Digital Transformation, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/781185b1-en.

[19] OECD (2019), “The effects of zero rating”, OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 285, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/6eefc666-en.

[18] OECD (2015), OECD Digital Economy Outlook 2015, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264232440-en.

[3] OECD (2014), OECD Review of Telecommunication Policy and Regulation in Colombia, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264208131-en.

[4] OECD (2014), The Governance of Regulators, OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264209015-en.

[12] OECD (2012), Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264209022-en.

[16] OECD (2011), Recommendation of the Council on Principles for Internet Policy Making, OECD/LEGAL/0387, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0387 (accessed on 22 October 2025).

Notes

← 1.  Colombia has made notable progress in advancing such an integrated approach. Its National Digital Strategy Comprehensiveness (NDSC) score reached 71 in 2023, surpassing the OECD average of 67 (OECD, 2026[22]). This progress highlights the extent to which communication policy forms part of a wider digital policy landscape. The methodology for this indicator can be found in OECD Digital Economy Policy Paper No 324, Assessing national digital strategies and their governance. The underlying policy information used to construct this score is available upon request by contacting [e-mail].

← 2.  The term “digital divide” commonly refers to different levels of access and use of digital technologies. The levels of access and use can vary in terms of geography or between men and women, or by age, skill level, income, firm size and, in general, by different vulnerable groups in society. Some aspects of digital divides are common to most geographical areas, such as income disparities or lack of skills. Other aspects are accentuated by differences in geography. Connectivity divides are one important aspect of digital divides. They refer to gaps in access and uptake of high-quality broadband services at affordable prices in areas with low population densities and for disadvantaged groups compared to the population as a whole. This report focuses on connectivity divides of a geographical nature” (OECD, 2021[23]).

← 3.  Of the eight accession countries to the OECD (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Indonesia, Peru, Romania, Thailand), five were sent the OECD 2025 CSI Communication Regulatory Questionnaire, to which all responded (Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Peru and Romania). Argentina, Indonesia and Thailand were not sent the questionnaire, due to their advancement in the accession roadmap and in an effort to avoid additional burden on national administrations.

← 4.  The report draws on responses provided by the Colombian authorities to the OECD 2025 CSI Communication Regulatory Questionnaire, which contains self‑reported information on communication policies and regulatory practices. However, data from policy questionnaires often present certain biases. They tend to capture the existence of policy initiatives (quantity) rather than their effectiveness (quality), and they rely on input from policymakers who may hold differing views on what constitutes an appropriate policy mix. To help mitigate these potential sources of bias, the report also incorporates insights gathered through an extensive series of on‑site interviews with major communications stakeholders in Colombia.