This chapter analyses how the rise of over-the-top communication services is transforming connectivity ecosystem globally, raising challenges for regulators and policymakers, including in Colombia. Using international experiences from OECD Member countries and partner economies, it identifies emerging policy strategies in areas like service provision, competition, network neutrality, universal service and dispute resolution. The chapter also showcases different approaches taken in countries that promote innovation, openness and user protection, giving guidance for Colombia’s future regulatory development. Pursuing a fair, transparent and inclusive digital ecosystem will require co‑ordinated, data-driven and forward-looking policy.
OECD Digital Connectivity Review of Colombia
Abstract
Technological convergence has enabled the delivery of multiple services over a single Internet Protocol (IP)-based communication network, fundamentally transforming the competitive landscape. As an initial consequence, convergence has blurred the traditional boundaries between the communications and broadcasting sectors. Market players now compete through bundled offerings that combine voice, video and data services (OECD, 2021[1]).
The over-the-top (OTT) landscape is dynamic and rapidly evolving, prompting ongoing regulatory debates both within the OECD and globally. On the one hand, OTT services offer innovative solutions and greater choice for consumers. This, in turn, can drive demand for broadband services and exert growing competitive pressure on traditional providers, pushing them to innovate and expand their offerings. On the other hand, it is increasingly challenging to distinguish communication operators based on the platforms on which they deliver services. Communication regulators face the challenge of fostering innovation while simultaneously safeguarding key regulatory objectives. This includes promoting fair and effective competition, establishing a balanced and coherent regulatory framework, and encouraging investment (OECD, 2022[2]).
OECD Member countries have developed a range of responses to address the challenges arising from convergence and an evolving digital ecosystem.
First, the digital transformation is posing new challenges to the current roles and mandates of communication regulators. Consequently, countries need to guarantee that communication regulators have the appropriate mandate, functions and powers to ensure they can deliver on policy objectives. The key question for OECD policymakers is no longer whether regulatory structures need to change, but rather how (OECD, 2022[2]).
Second, communication regulation will need to be reshaped. The boundaries between traditional communication markets and broader digital markets and players are blurring. Consequently, new issues are arising in areas such as competition, content and consumer protection.
Third, regulators need the capacity and legal clarity for regulatory co-operation, both at domestic and international levels. In practice, communication regulators across OECD Member countries rely on both informal and formal co-operation mechanisms to support the achievement of objectives. These will become increasingly important in light of the blurring of traditional market boundaries (OECD, 2022[2]).
This chapter draws on international experiences, particularly those of OECD Members, to explore examples of convergent regulatory approaches that respond effectively to the entry of online platforms into the connectivity space. To this end, the chapter first clarifies terminology of the models for service provision of communication services (i.e. network-integrated service provision model and the OTT model relying on a third-party access to users via Internet-based applications). It then explores regulatory domains that might need to adapt to accommodate the prevalence of the OTT service provision model (e.g. authorisation requirements, quality standards, user rights, open access, network neutrality, universal service obligations and competition policy). Finally, the chapter examines the regulatory landscape across OECD Member countries, using the previously identified domains as a reference. It explores the various approaches regulators are taking to OTT services.
4.2.1. Conceptualising communication services and their modes of provision
To assess the impact of OTT services on the connectivity ecosystem and the implications for regulation, models of connectivity service provision must first be defined and compared.1 This analysis provides an understanding of the underlying network infrastructure and the roles that operators and Internet service providers (ISPs) play within the broader digital ecosystem. There are two main approaches or models of connectivity service provision that can be distinguished: the network-integrated service provision and the OTT service provision (Figure 4.1).
Notes: ISP = Internet service provider. Service providers = content and application providers or ISPs that run applications “over the top” of existing connectivity infrastructure. VoIP = Voice over IP. Colour legend: Green refers to communication services; dark blue refers to part of the connectivity value chain (infrastructure) owned and managed by the operator; and light blue refers to parts of the value chain operated and managed by separate entities (which could be content and application providers and/or ISPs). The models are presented here for illustrative purposes, noting that vertically integrated communication operators also offer their own OTT services.
Source: OECD.
Connectivity services comprise personal communication services and audiovisual content delivery services.
Personal communication services enable direct, interpersonal and interactive exchanges between a limited number of individuals. In these services, the sender and recipient are explicitly identified by the users. This category includes voice services (fixed and mobile voice telephony), video communication (such as videoconferencing) and messaging applications.
Audiovisual content delivery services refer to the transmission of audiovisual signals in both traditional broadcasting and Video on Demand (VoD) formats. Users can access audiovisual content in different ways: linear and non-linear broadcasting. Linear broadcasting allows for viewing according to a set programme or schedule and may be viewed by multiple users simultaneously. Linear broadcasting is most often thought of in “traditional” television, but increasingly broadcasters are offering the ability for users to watch linear TV programmes via web streaming.
Non-linear broadcasting, also called “on demand”, allows users to choose from a library of options provided by a media service provider, to view when and where they would like. These include VoD offers, which may be based on subscriptions or transactions. Subscription-based offers, such as Netflix, are known as Subscription Video on Demand (SVoD). Transaction-based offers involve, for example, a one-time, on-demand purchase, known as Transactional Video on Demand (TVoD).
Suppliers may offer different types of services. For example, Amazon Prime combines SVoD and TVoD, allowing users to view on-demand content from a library of series and films, as well as buy newly released films on a one-time basis (for a limited period). In certain countries, the content of national broadcasters may also be made available on demand online (e.g. New Zealand’s TVNZ, the United Kingdom’s BBC). Some operators have developed their own video streaming and VoD services to compete with OTT non-linear broadcasting services. Some examples include América Móvil (ClaroVideo), NTT DoCoMo (dTV) and SFR (France, SFR Play) (OECD, 2019[3]). Finally, video-sharing platforms allow users to upload and share audiovisual content (e.g. YouTube).
OECD Member countries have taken various approaches to audiovisual content delivery services of OTT players, and some are still refining their regulations. Regulatory frameworks and mandates may differ for transmission and content. This means that one agency and legal framework may be responsible for audiovisual content, and another may govern transmission of audiovisual content (i.e. content delivery).
Transmission refers to the distribution of the broadcasting programme, which could be over IP networks, while content itself relates to the production, programming and packaging of the audiovisual content. OTT providers, for example, are not only involved in transmission, but also in content production, programming and packaging (OECD, 2020[4]). Within the scope of the report, the analysis of video content delivery services focuses solely on content distribution, such as the delivery of television signals. It does not extend to content production, packaging and programming. Where a provider is involved in both the transmission and aggregation of content, only the transmission component is considered in this context.
The first service provision model, i.e. network-integrated connectivity services, represents the “traditional approach” whereby a vertically integrated network provider and service provider (an operator) provide connectivity services. The transmission of personal communications is implemented through network elements such as voice switches and SMS servers. For audiovisual services, transmission involves elements such as central control points (i.e. headend) for linear TV (broadcasting) and non-linear TV, including VoD that feeds video into broadband networks (Figure 4.1).
The second model is the provision of OTT connectivity services, which is characterised by the logical separation of services from the underlying connectivity infrastructure. In this model, content and application providers or ISPs deliver connectivity services through software platforms hosted on general-purpose servers, which may be located anywhere on the Internet. Users access these services through terminal devices, such as smartphones or smart TVs, via dedicated client applications. Examples of OTT platforms include messaging and social media services (e.g. WhatsApp, Instagram, Facebook), video-sharing platforms (e.g. YouTube, TikTok), VoD platforms (e.g. Netflix, Disney+) and audio-on-demand services (e.g. Spotify).
The OTT service delivery model often depends on more than just centralised servers. Providers usually use intermediate infrastructure to enhance performance, scalability and geographic coverage. Content delivery networks (CDNs) are especially important because they store content closer to users, reducing latency. CDNs are often placed inside the networks of local ISPs, called “on-net” CDNs, or at Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) and data centres, referred to as “off-net” CDNs. In the case of “on-net” CDNs, content and application providers can either partner with the local ISP to place their caches on-net (e.g. Netflix’s Open Connect) or use the operator’s own CDN service (e.g. Orange CDN). Well-known examples of off-net CDNs include Akamai and Cloudflare.
IP connectivity infrastructure across various technologies (fixed and mobile broadband) constitutes the core infrastructure for both service provision models: network-integrated and OTT. However, the players involved in providing communication services to end users differ between the two models.
In the network-integrated model (Figure 4.1), a vertically integrated service and network provider deliver end-user services. The same operator that manages the IP network connects the network elements transmitting the services (e.g. voice switches, SMS servers to users). In contrast, under the OTT model, the service provider operates the OTT platform, while intermediate service providers manage the nodes of CDNs. In some cases, the same entity. may perform both roles. These providers still depend on third-party network operators to supply the IP connectivity that links platforms and distribution nodes. However, increasingly, many large content and application providers are investing in their own backbone network connectivity, such as submarine cables, and in their own data centres.
4.2.2. Regulatory domains relevant to OTT services
The emergence of new digital service models and associated market players has created significant challenges for regulatory frameworks. In a broad sense, the mere applicability of regulation to OTT service providers and intermediaries can be challenging.
Many of these entities, OTTs, and content and application providers, operate without a physical presence or legal registration in the jurisdictions where they offer services, which complicates enforcement and oversight. This issue extends beyond communication regulation to encompass general regulations applicable to all economic sectors, including commercial registration, consumer protection and taxation. This difficulty has been circumvented in some OECD Members, specifically in EU Member States. In these cases, the legislation applicable to online platforms, specifically the Digital Markets Act (European Union, 2022[5]) and the Digital Services Act (European Union, 2022[6]) (see below for more details), applies if users are in the EU, irrespective of the place of establishment or residence of the service providers.
The issue of physical presence or registration extends beyond communication regulation to encompass general regulations applicable to all economic sectors, including commercial registration, consumer protection and taxation. As a result, policymakers may need to review regulatory frameworks to ensure these actors meet obligations comparable to those of competitors with a physical presence in the country, all in line with Open Internet principles. Some OECD Members, specifically in EU Member States, have partially addressed the question of physical presence for online platforms.
More specifically, the sectoral regulation of the communication market may need adjustment. Initially, sectoral regulation was designed for network-integrated connectivity services in many OECD Member countries. However, it may need adjustments to reflect the operation and market effects of emerging service models, such as OTT services. Given these questions, regulators are observing market developments to understand the competitive dynamics of the digital economy and its impact on the communication sector.
Questions have been raised regarding the CRC’s mandate (or lack thereof) over the provision of OTT services. The CRC’s remit is defined by reference as oversight over the provision of “telecommunications networks and services”, including all forms of television and sound broadcasting services (Article 22 of Law 1341 of 2009). Under the glossary of definitions applicable to the interpretation of sectoral regulation, communication services are limited to “the sending, transmission and reception of signs, signals, written texts, images, sounds, data or information of any nature by wire, radiofrequency, optical means, or any other electromagnetic systems” (MinTIC Resolution 2022 of 2010) (MinTIC, 2010[7]). The Colombian communication regulator’s remit over communication services therefore seems to be narrower than in some OECD Member countries (especially those that are also EU Members), where regulation extends beyond the mere transmission layer.
In this context, and to gain insights into the role of OTT communication services in Colombia, the CRC requests information on IP traffic from communication networks and service providers under its authority. This information is complemented by a survey of end users to identify the proportion of traffic dedicated to accessing OTT services (CRC, 2024[8]).
Since 2018, the CRC has carried out several studies to evaluate the impact of OTT services. The latest report, the Study on the role of Over-the-Top (OTT) services in Colombia – 2024 (CRC, 2025[9]), concluded that OTT digital service platforms, communication operators and users share a mutually beneficial relationship. It noted that the platforms drive demand for data; operators provide essential connectivity to users; and users gain access to a broader variety of services and content. The CRC also announced four lines of action to reduce information asymmetries between OTT providers and operators, promoting better data exchange and co‑ordination in traffic management.
This report identifies different potential regulatory areas or domains that countries are currently considering to accommodate the prevalence of OTT services in communication markets. The following regulatory domains highlight the relevant areas of this evolving landscape in light of the rise of OTT services:
service provision
competition policy
IP interconnection and shared network use
network neutrality (Open Internet Rules)
universal service funding
dispute resolution mechanisms.
OECD Member countries have been taking steps to adapt their regulations to OTT services. In response to shifts stemming from digital transformation, regulatory frameworks across many countries have begun to adapt. Many OECD Members have begun to broaden the scope of their legal and regulatory frameworks (OECD, 2022[2]).
Communication regulators around the OECD and select partner economies in the accession process to the OECD2 increasingly have at least partial responsibilities that extend to broader digital issues. This has come either through their own mandates, regulatory co‑operation or as part of a whole-of-government approach. The most common mandate reported in 2024 was on end-user devices (74.4%), followed closely by over-the-top (OTT) services (69.8%), Internet of Things (IoT) and artificial intelligence (AI) (67.4%) and digital security (62.8%) (OECD, forthcoming[10]).
Compared to 2021 (OECD, 2022[2]), partial or full responsibilities of communication regulators in 2024 notably increased in the OTT domain, as well as in other digital policy areas (e.g.AI, IoT, and cloud computing). In 2021, 60% of communication regulators reported full or partial responsibilities regarding OTTs; this figure increased to 69.8% in 2024 (OECD, forthcoming[10]). In 2024, 20 OECD Members and partner economies declared they had regulations applicable to OTT services.3
The following section summarises how different countries have approached regulation related to OTTs in each of the domains identified: service provision, competition policy, IP interconnection, network neutrality, universal service and dispute resolution mechanisms.
4.3.1. Service provision
The service provision regulatory domain encompasses licensing or registration requirements, service quality standards, pricing conditions and other operational obligations applicable to OTT services. Content-related regulations on OTT audiovisual services, including requirements for local content production and cultural promotion, are outside the scope of this analysis.
The regulation of OTT service provision across OECD Member countries has developed unevenly. The most comprehensive and widely adopted framework is found within the EU, which provides a harmonised regulatory environment for its Member States. In particular, the regulation of OTT services is articulated through two key instruments: the European Electronic Communications Code (EECC), established under Directive (EU) 2018/1972 (European Union, 2018[11]), and the Digital Markets Act (DMA), enacted under Regulation (EU)2022/1925 (European Union, 2022[5]).
The EECC adopts a functional rather than technological, definition of “electronic communications services, including interpersonal and interactive exchanges of information (interpersonal communications services), as well as Internet access [Art. 2 (4) European Electronic Communications Code (European Union, 2018[11])]. In this context, OTT personal communication services are included in the subcategory of “interpersonal communication services”. However, the regulatory treatment of such services is not uniform across all types. The EECC distinguishes between interpersonal and independent number-based services. Number-based interpersonal communication services (NB-ICS) rely on publicly assigned numbering resources. Number-independent interpersonal communication services (NI-ICS) do not use public numbering.
In the European framework governing electronic communications, although all interpersonal communication services are subject to basic regulatory requirements, number-based services have additional obligations. The EECC justifies this distinction based on the idea that number-based services “participate in, and hence also benefit from, a publicly assured interoperable ecosystem” (Recital 18, EECC). This distinction leads to differentiated regulatory treatment of OTT services depending on their functionalities. For example, services such as SkypeOut (now discontinued), Viber Out or Google Voice, which can place calls to telephone numbers, may fall under the scope of number-based interpersonal communication services. In contrast, services such as WhatsApp, which do not use telephone numbers to connect with public networks, would typically be classified as number independent.4
The transmission or distribution of the broadcasting programmes, which could be transmitted over IP networks (recital 310 of the EECC), would also fall within the scope of the European framework for communication services (Recital 310 of the EECC). However, the EECC explicitly excludes services that exercise editorial control over transmitted content from its scope (Article 2[4] EECC). The content provided by audiovisual OTT services falls under Directive 2010/13/EU, known as the Audiovisual Media Services Directive, as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/1808. This amendment also introduced rules for “video-sharing platform services” that are intended to make programmes, user-generated videos or both, available to the general public without the platform provider assuming editorial responsibility.
In addition to the Electronic Communications Code, the EU has introduced further regulation relevant to OTT services through the DMA, and the Digital Services Act (DSA), enacted by Regulation (EU) 2022/2065.5
The DMA targets so-called gatekeepers – core online platform services that wield significant market power. Several of these “core platform services” fall within the category of OTT communication services, including, namely, “online social networking services” and “video-sharing platform services” (Article 2 [2]). The DMA introduces a range of obligations for designated gatekeepers. These include restrictions on the use of user data for cross-platform purposes, prohibitions on bundling services that limit user choice, and transparency requirements for commercial terms and conditions. Additionally, gatekeepers must ensure interoperability with third-party services.
The DSA establishes EU-harmonised rules for provision of intermediary services, including transmission of information (“mere conduit”), caching and hosting services. It sets obligations for service providers regarding action against illegal content, transparency reporting, complaint-handling systems, online advertising, online protection of minors and trader traceability, among others. The regulation also includes specific obligations for “very large online platforms” and “very large online search engines”.
Outside the EU, several OECD Member countries have adopted national frameworks that reflect similar principles. For example, Canada, the United Kingdom and Switzerland have introduced measures to enhance transparency, protect users and bring certain OTT services under their communication regulatory regimes. These initiatives, while not as harmonised as those in the EU, are aligned with the broader trend of incorporating OTT services into sector-specific oversight.
In contrast, other OECD Member countries, most notably the United States, do not apply sector-specific regulations to OTT services. In the United States, OTTs are classified as information services under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which exempts them from obligations imposed on traditional telecommunication carriers. As a result, OTT services in the United States operate outside the communication regulatory framework, with minimal direct federal-level oversight. Colombia would also fall into this group, given that no sectoral regulations are applicable to OTT services.
An analysis of regulatory approaches to OTT services across OECD Members reveals that many jurisdictions have implemented specific rules covering key areas. These include authorisation and licensing, interoperability and number portability, access to emergency services, end-user rights and transparency, quality of service and security obligations. The following sections offer an overview of how different OECD Members have addressed each of these regulatory domains related to OTT services.
Authorisation and licensing
According to the harmonised EU legislation, OECD-EU Member States may subject the provision of electronic communications networks or services, excluding NI-ICS, to a general authorisation regime. For example, numeral 6 of Austria’s Telecommunications Act 2021 (Austria, 2021[12]) requires providers intending to offer public communications networks or services to notify the regulatory authority before commencing, modifying or ceasing operations. Türkiye has amended its Electronic Communications Law No. 5809 to authorise “OTT-1 type providers” and is defining the criteria of which providers would fall into the category.
In Korea, the regulatory framework for Value-Added Telecommunications Businesses (VATTs) illustrates how traditional communications regulation can evolve to encompass OTT services. Under the Telecommunications Business Act, amended in 2020, all providers offering electronic communications services over the Internet, including messaging, video streaming, cloud communication and other OTT platforms, are required to register as VATT operators with the Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT) (Korea, 2023[13]).
Interoperability and number portability
The 22 of 38 OECD Members that are also EU Members may encourage the use of the standards or specifications for the provision of services, technical interfaces or network functions, to the extent strictly necessary to ensure interoperability of services, end-to-end connectivity, facilitation of provider switching and portability of numbers and identifiers, and to improve freedom of choice for users [Art.39[2] European Electronic Communications Code (European Union, 2018[11])]. For instance, Romania’s communication regulator, ANCOM, can impose interoperability requirements, including those related to emergency call handling. In Hungary, emergency call capabilities are required for these types of services, although this is acknowledged to be limited due to the nomadic nature of use. In Spain and Germany, services using public numbering resources must support emergency calls in line with traditional telecommunication obligations.
Access to emergency services
In the EU, Article 109 of the EECC requires that all end users of publicly available number-based communication services (NB-ICS) must be able to access emergency services at no charge. This applies to OTT services such as Skype, Viber or Google Voice, which allow calls to public numbers.
Several non-EU jurisdictions have also introduced regulatory measures to address the challenges posed by the shift from traditional telephony to IP-based voice services, particularly in accessing emergency services. In the United Kingdom, Ofcom has implemented specific requirements to safeguard access to emergency services during the transition from the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) to Voice over IP (VoIP). These include obligations for providers to offer battery backup solutions and to supply clear guidance to consumers regarding emergency call access during power outages.
In Canada, VoIP providers must support either basic or enhanced 911 emergency services. They must inform users of any limitations associated with their service, particularly those arising from the user’s location or the use of non-traditional access methods. In Switzerland, emergency call routing is restricted to the address registered by the subscriber. Providers must clearly inform users of this limitation to avoid confusion in the event of an emergency.
End-user protection and transparency
A harmonised framework for end-user protection across the EU includes OTT services under the scope of the EECC (Articles 102 to 115 of the EECC). This framework encompasses key areas, including contract information, transparency requirements and the availability of comparison tools. Specific national developments include Austria, where the transposition of the EECC into national law through the Telecommunications Act 2021 introduces specific obligations for larger providers. Operators with more than 350 000 users must notify the national regulatory authority of their general terms and conditions, as well as pricing information, before launching new services.
Quality of service
In Korea, the revised Telecommunications Business Act, Article 22-7 (Korea, 2023[13]), requires OTT providers categorised as "value-added telecommunications business operators", to take specific measures to ensure service quality. Those meeting certain thresholds (e.g. traffic volume or user base, as defined by presidential decree) must guarantee service stability and implement mechanisms for responding to user requests, to deliver reliable and user-friendly communication services.
In Italy, Decision 74/24/CONS by the Italian communication regulator, AGCOM, issued in 2024 (AGCOM, 2024[14]), established service quality and reliability standards for streaming events considered to be of significant social or public interest, as defined by the Ministry of Enterprises and Made in Italy. Under this framework, audiovisual media service providers are required to maintain adequate image quality during such broadcasts and to offer effective and timely technical support, including procedures for handling user complaints. Together, these decisions oblige OTT providers to integrate CDN infrastructure within ISP networks and to meet minimum service performance standards, particularly during periods of high demand.
In OECD Member countries that are also part of the EU, regulatory authorities may require providers of publicly available interpersonal communication services, including OTT providers, to publish clear, comparable and up-to-date information on the quality of their services (Article 104 of the EECC). To support this, the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) has issued guidelines that specify relevant quality-of-service parameters, outline appropriate measurement methodologies and recommend publication formats. In addition, Article 108 of the EECC obliges Member States to ensure the continued availability of voice communication services and access to emergency services in the event of major network disruptions or force majeure situations.
Security obligations
In the EU, harmonised regulation (Articles 40 to 42 of the EECC) establishes security obligations for providers of publicly available electronic communications services, including OTT services under the scope of the EECC. National regulatory and supervisory authorities are granted powers to request security-related documentation, carry out audits and investigate cases of suspected non-compliance. These obligations require providers to adopt a proactive and proportionate approach to managing security risks. They must implement robust technical and organisational measures to prevent and mitigate potential threats, ensuring that service integrity and continuity are maintained. In the event of a security incident with a significant impact on service provision, providers must notify the competent national authorities without undue delay, enabling rapid response and co‑ordination. Where relevant, they must also inform end users of specific security risks and the protective measures available to them, promoting transparency and strengthening users’ capacity to safeguard their own digital environments.
4.3.2. Competition policy
Competition policy aims to ensure well-functioning markets and address market failures. In this context, the growing role of OTT services is particularly relevant. On the one hand, several OTT services may increasingly be seen as substitutes of traditional communication services. in terms of functionality. As such, relevant market definitions may need to be revised to include both network-integrated and OTT services. On the other hand, as convergence progresses, operators increasingly compete through bundles that now include OTT packages. This leads to new partnerships between OTT players and operators, suggesting these services may be complements. Given these dynamics, regulators across the OECD are monitoring market evolutions. Some are considering the substitutability of traditional offers by OTT services when analysing relevant communication markets. From this point, the competent body for ex ante regulation may conduct a competition analysis and impose the regulatory measures it deems necessary to remedy identified competition problems.
For OECD Member countries part of the EU, the EECC considers OTTs as communication services; therefore, the regulatory measures applicable to relevant markets are uniform. Both the products and services included in markets subject to ex ante regulation and the guidelines for market analysis and the assessment of significant market power (SMP) are harmonised across all OECD Member countries that are part of the EU. This occurs through the European Commission’s Recommendation on Relevant Product and Service Markets and guidelines for market analysis and the evaluation of SMP. National regulatory authorities (NRAs) shall take the utmost account of their respective national markets. However, NRAs can regulate markets not listed in the Recommendation based on national circumstances.
In the last revision of the Recommendation about the relevant product and service markets definition in the EU (European Commission, 2020[15]), the European Commission does not consider unmanaged VoIP provided as an OTT service as part of the same market as traditional voice calls (fixed or mobile). An OTT service is not considered a full substitute because both users need to be logged into the specific service and have their device (such as a smartphone, tablet or laptop/PC) turned on to use the service. However, the termination of voice calls originating from some OTTs (e.g. Skype, Viber or Google Voice) to numbers in the numbering plan as a paid service should be considered when assessing SMP from a forward-looking perspective, as an indirect competitive constraint (European Commission, 2020[16]). In Italy, in line with this Recommendation, an ongoing market analysis of ex ante regulation on mobile termination services is likely to conclude that VoIP services are significantly increasing, and exerting increasing competitive pressure, on traditional voice calls (without declaring full substitutability).
Brazil’s regulator Anatel has been revising the General Competition Goals Plan (Plano Geral de Metas de Competição, or PGMC) to reflect convergent competition dynamics. This explicitly signals that OTT platforms should be assessed as competitors or potential substitutes to traditional communication services where functionalities overlap. This direction was formalised through Public Consultation No. 64/2023, which circulated a draft new PGMC. It invited comments on updated relevant markets, criteria for SMP assessments, and the interface between telecom offerings and application-layer services (OTTs). The consultation sits within Anatel’s Regulatory Agenda 2023‑2024, which expressly flagged the need to evaluate OTT participation in competitive dynamics; depending on the outcome, the agency foresaw adjusting asymmetries to reflect actual market power and reduce unnecessary burdens on traditional operators (Anatel, 2023[17]). Following consultation (2023‑2024), Anatel finalised the instrument. In August 2025, the agency announced approval of a new PGMC, updating asymmetrical remedies to strengthen competition and incentivise investment. The approved text is reflected in Resolution No. 783/2025 insert (Anatel, 2025[18]), which consolidates the revision cycle initiated with CP 64/2023. The resolution and its annexes contain operational details. However, Anatel’s public notes and monitoring reports (Superintendência de Competição, 2025[19]) indicate that the revised PGMC embeds convergent market analysis and expands the wholesale toolkit. This is consistent with recognising competitive pressures that include OTT-driven substitution.
Other jurisdictions are also addressing competition regulation by considering OTT services. Colombia already incorporates certain OTT services within its list of relevant communications markets. Specifically, the CRC’s Resolution 7156 of 2023 updated Annex 3.1 of Resolution 5050 (2016) and, in the national retail market for “outgoing international long-distance voice” (market 2.2), explicitly includes “fixed voice, mobile services and OTT platforms to make calls” (plataformas OTT para realizar llamadas). In other words, OTT voice offerings that terminate on numbers in the national numbering plan are treated as part of this retail voice market for market definition and any ex ante analysis. However, this does not mean that the regulatory body has jurisdiction over OTT services themselves, as discussed above.
4.3.3. IP interconnection and shared network use
OTT and network-integrated service providers operate within the same market and depend on the same underlying infrastructure: IP-based communication networks. These networks are typically managed by one of the competing parties, which may raise concerns about potential market failures (e.g. monopoly on IP traffic termination, or asymmetric bargaining power among players). This shared reliance on IP network infrastructure occurs in two main contexts. First, it relates to delivery of services to end users who need to connect to the Internet to access both OTT and network-integrated services. Second, in providing services themselves, OTT players also have to connect their platforms and CDNs to the Internet, often through backbone networks or international transit links. Each of these areas presents specific challenges that might require customised policy solutions.
In the first context, i.e. using networks to deliver services to end users, tensions have arisen between OTT providers and network operators that maintain and upgrade the physical infrastructure about whether regulations should be changed to ensure a “fair” distribution of costs to upgrade and finance digital infrastructure. On the one hand, some proponents of the “fair contribution” debate call for regulatory intervention that would impose direct compensation mechanisms by content providers to ISPs, altering how IP interconnection works today (Box 4.1). On the other hand, content providers are a major driver of broadband demand, helping generate additional revenues for network providers. These revenues are often reinvested in infrastructure upgrades. Moreover, content providers are also heavily involved in digital connectivity investments, such as data centres, fibre backbone, and submarine cables.
These complex interactions point to the need for a regulatory framework that ensures a level playing taking into account the interdependence between traditional internet service providers (communication operators) and technology firms providing OTT services. Any consideration of a cost-recovery arrangement in IP interconnection mediated by regulation should begin with the identification of a specific market failure that would justify an ex ante regulatory intervention, as well as a regulatory impact assessment (RIA) to evaluate the effects of such a measure on investment, competition, and its alignment with Open Internet principles.
The second context of shared reliance on network infrastructure – the use of networks to support service provision – involves OTT providers acting as corporate clients of connectivity services. In this role, they connect their platforms and CDNs to the Internet, often through backbone networks or international transit links. In recent years, tech companies, including OTT providers, have increased their investment in fibre backbone and access networks, as well as submarine cables (OECD, 2024[20]). These arrangements on international transit links outside the public Internet are typically governed by commercial contracts, which fall outside direct regulatory oversight. Key terms, including pricing, service levels and interconnection conditions, are negotiated privately and are generally kept confidential.
The Internet is the global network of networks. IP interconnection agreements among Internet Service Providers (ISPs) or carriers hold these networks together.
How does IP interconnection work? IP interconnection agreements take two forms: transit and peering. Transit is a bilateral agreement where one network pays another network for upstream and downstream access to the Internet. They are often based on a typical customer-supplier commercial contract. Peering is an agreement between one or more carrier networks to exchange IP traffic amongst themselves. This allows access to the “peer’s” customers, and they are most common in the core of the Internet. For the most part, 99% of peering agreements are settlement free, informal “handshake” agreements (Weller and Woodcock, 2013[21]).
IP interconnection and network performance. Several elements contribute to making IP traffic routing more direct, and thus, reduce latency and overall quality of the Internet. For example, these elements include a reduced reliance on transit, local availability of Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), direct delivery of traffic by content delivery networks (CDNs), and caching of content closer to the user (OECD, 2022[22]).
The role of Content Delivery Networks. A CDN is a geographically distributed group of servers that work together to minimise delays in loading webpage content by reducing the physical distance between the server and the user. When placed closer to end-users they help improve network performance (throughput, latency and availability of traffic) and also reduce the costs of ISPs.
Content providers in many countries use local caches to reduce latency and/or peer with communication operators. For caching, a CDN improves the user’s experience by delivering a local copy of the requested content from a nearby cache edge or Point of Presence (POP) where CDNs can peer directly with ISPs. That is, CDN caching eliminates the need for a request to travel to the origin (OECD, 2022[22]).
The deployment of CDNs involves installing caches near users and building subsea cables to increase network performance. For example, in the past years, content providers have heavily invested in submarine cables globally. According to TeleGeography, investment in these cables has been driven largely by a few large international tech companies (e.g. cloud and content providers) (OECD, forthcoming[10]). Content providers either solely own, or are part of a consortium that operates, over 60% of global cable km of cables that entered or are expected to enter into service from 2024-2027, up from 8% global cable km in 2010-2015 (TeleGeography and Infra-Analytics, 2025[23]). These large technology firms are also investing in fibre backbone infrastructure connecting their data centres (OECD, 2024[20]).
In the Colombian context, the CRC report published in September 2025, The Role of OTT Services in Colombia, found no evidence that communication providers did not foresee the IP traffic generated by OTTs when dimensioning the capacity of their networks. Moreover, the report analysed, among other issues, the IP interconnection relationships in the digital ecosystem. In its preliminary conclusion, the report found that, under Colombian regulation, an interconnection relationship involves the wholesale use of a provider’s network elements and infrastructure by another provider. Conversely, in the case of digital service platforms, Autonomous Systems (AS) and the ISPs that provide services to end users have no direct relationship.
Given the interplay among content providers and communication service providers, countries are assessing whether regulatory tools are necessary to ensure non-discriminatory access to shared network resources and sustainable investment in IP infrastructure, both to reach end users and to interconnect platforms and CDNs. Few OECD Member countries have implemented initiatives on both sides of the network used for OTT services.
On the platform side, interconnection and CDN placement are usually negotiated bilaterally between private parties in most OECD Member countries; however, two countries, such as Korea and Italy, have introduced targeted interventions. In Korea, a regulation issued in 2016 required ISPs to charge for the traffic they receive from each other, commonly referred to as the “Sending Party Network Pays” (SPNP) model (revised “Interconnection Standards for Telecommunication Facilities”). From 2018-2019, the interpretation of the “Facebook v Korea Communication Commission” (KCC) case was that SPNP guidelines also applied to content providers, not only ISPs. Korea’s interconnection regulation implies that if international content providers want to get IP traffic to Korea, they have two options: i) deliver content directly with each Korean ISP in the country through local Points of Presence to avoid sender-pays charges among ISPs; or ii) decide to make the content available outside the country, where Korean ISPs would have to fetch it. However, a move to impose high interconnection fees for Internet traffic charged by local ISPs may result in content providers removing local caches, which could be reflected in higher latency results for end users (OECD, 2022[22]).
In Italy, the communications regulator, AGCOM, introduced targeted infrastructure obligations for audiovisual streaming services to address the technical challenges associated with live-streaming and high-traffic content delivery. In 2021, AGCOM issued Decision 206/21/CONS, requiring DAZN to deploy caches from its proprietary CDN (DAZN Edge) within the networks of major Other Authorised Operators. This measure aimed to reduce network congestion, enhance quality of service, and support the technical and economic sustainability of growing live-streaming traffic. The decision also mandated that the number of CDN caches be proportionate to each operator’s market share.
When considering regulatory measures related to shared network use and interconnection, policymakers should ensure that such measures do not distort the functioning of IP interconnection, which is essential to maintaining a global and interoperable Internet. At the same time, they should take into account the interdependence between OTT providers and communication network and service providers, as well as the broader market dynamics of the digital connectivity ecosystem in which all actors play key roles across the value chain.
4.3.4. Network neutrality (Open Internet principles)
Network neutrality is a fundamental principle of Internet governance that requires all data traffic on the Internet to be treated equally, without discrimination based on content, application, source or destination. The origin of network neutrality regulation lies in the need to preserve the open and non-discriminatory nature of the Internet, also known as Open Internet principles. These principles were set in the OECD Council Recommendation on Principles for Internet Policy Making (OECD, 2011[24]) and the Declaration on a Trusted, Sustainable and Inclusive Digital Future signed by the Digital Economy ministers in 2022, where governments committed to work together “to promote a safe, secure, inclusive and sustainable digital environment, underpinned by an open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, accessible, affordable, secure and resilient Internet […]” (OECD, 2022[25]).
Network neutrality can be divided into two broader areas. One deals with factors that affect users' ability to access content and applications, such as varying levels of quality, degradation or blocking of access, or differential pricing. It focuses on the link between the user and the ISP. The second area relates to commercial arrangements between network operators and content providers (OECD, 2015[26]).
In the context of OTT services, network neutrality is closely linked to maintaining a level playing field with end-user service providers and infrastructure operators (in the case of network-integrated services, these two are vertically integrated). In practice, network neutrality rules mean that communication operators are prohibited from throttling, prioritising or blocking OTT traffic, even when it competes directly with their own services. However, network neutrality also limits the ability of network operators to manage traffic based on commercial considerations or to monetise network usage differently. This has led to ongoing debates about whether the regulatory framework adequately reflects the evolving dynamics of the digital ecosystem, especially as data volumes surge and OTT platforms become increasingly central to Internet usage.
Within the broader network neutrality debate, different traffic management practices by operators, pricing models such as ‘zero rating’, and the use of ad blocking have focused the interest and actions of policy makers and regulators in the past years. Therefore, the discussion of zero rating highlights the arrangements between OTTs and operators in their service offerings and is embedded in the broader net neutrality debate. Zero rating occurs when a predetermined type of traffic received by consumers is not counted against the data allowance of the Internet access service. Policy approaches to zero rating are often characterised by disagreements over the policy’s goals. Some take a primarily economic approach, focusing on economic efficiency and welfare maximisation. Others are more concerned, or additionally concerned, with the broader political, social or pluralistic issues that arise in connection with the flow of information (OECD, 2019[27]).
Many OECD Member countries have introduced network neutrality rules that require ISPs to treat data carried over the Internet equally, without prioritising content, throttling services or blocking content in a way that favours some providers over others. In Colombia, for example, regulations establish respect for the principle of net neutrality (Article 56 of Law 1450 of 2011 “Issuing the National Development Plan, 2010‑2014”). This regulation prohibits ISPs from arbitrarily distinguishing between content, applications or services based on their source or ownership. However, it allows Internet access providers to make offers tailored to the needs of market segments or their users, in accordance with their usage and consumption profiles, which shall not be understood as discrimination (paragraph 1) (Congreso de Colombia, 2011[28]). This latter aspect, however, was declared unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court found the provision violates freedom of expression, informational pluralism and the principle of net neutrality (Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 2025[29]), although this provision remains in force until the sentence is final.
For OECD Member countries part of the European Union, Regulation (EU) 2015/2120, commonly known as the Open Internet Regulation, establishes the principle of net neutrality within the EU. It requires that all Internet traffic be treated equally, without discrimination, restriction or interference, irrespective of the content, application or service involved. This rule applies across the entire value chain of Internet access, thereby directly shaping the regulatory environment for OTT services. Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 prevents ISPs from blocking, slowing down or prioritising data traffic linked to specific OTT platforms, such as VoD, messaging or cloud-based communication services. It therefore guarantees that OTT providers can reach end users under the same technical and commercial conditions as traditional network integrated services, preserving an open and competitive digital ecosystem. Limited exceptions are permitted only for reasonable traffic management (e.g. network integrity, security or compliance with court orders), which must remain transparent, proportionate and not based on commercial motives.
In terms of “zero rating” regulation, OECD Members are taking several different approaches. While some countries lack specific zero-rating policies and regulations, others have established network neutrality laws that cover zero rating. Of the countries with some form of network neutrality regulation, many take a case-by-case approach in assessing the different offers available in the national market (OECD, 2019[27]). The United Kingdom, for example, permits most zero-rating offers. The regulator clarifies that these offers will generally be allowed, while outlining the limited circumstances where concerns might arise (Ofcom, 2022[30]). In EU countries, regulation prohibits zero-rating practices in which certain OTT services are exempted from data caps or charged preferentially, as these can distort competition and restrict consumer choice. Enforcement and supervision fall under the NRAs of each EU Member State, co‑ordinated by BEREC, which issues implementation guidelines to ensure consistency (BEREC, 2022[31]).
4.3.5. Universal service funds
Traditional communication operators (i.e. network integrated service providers) are generally subject to regulatory obligations that require them to support the expansion of network infrastructure, particularly in underserved or rural areas, for example in the form of contributions to the universal service fund. In contrast, OTT service providers, are not bound by comparable responsibilities. This disparity has prompted some policymakers to explore whether OTT platforms should assume a more active role in advancing broader connectivity objectives, such as digital inclusion. One proposal that was under consideration one OECD Member country in previous years was whether to require OTT providers to contribute to universal service funds or to participate in infrastructure development arrangements. Nevertheless, as a first step, the overall effectiveness of universal service funds would need to be assessed in a case-to-case basis to consider whether expanding the contribution base would effectively translate into investments in digital connectivity projects. For example, in Colombia the FUTIC has had a low execution rate. Alternatively, lowering contributions from traditional operators to such funds may be a way to encourage investment and reduce asymmetries.
4.3.6. Dispute resolution mechanisms
As the relationships between OTT providers and network operators become more interdependent, regulatory frameworks may consider incorporating formal mechanisms for dispute resolution, particularly regarding access conditions or traffic-management policies. The implementation of these regulatory responses may require institutional adaptation, including updated mandates for NRAs to oversee new services and market players.
For OECD Member countries part of the EU, the EECC regulates dispute resolution between providers of all types of communication services, whether the dispute arises within a single Member State or involves cross-border issues. Articles 26 and 27 of the EECC set out the applicable procedures. In cases of domestic disputes, the relevant national regulatory authority must, upon request by either party, issue a binding decision to resolve the matter as quickly as possible. This must be done through transparent and efficient procedures, and in any event within four months, except in duly justified exceptions. In cross-border disputes, the competent NRA or NRAs must notify BEREC to ensure a consistent and co‑ordinated resolution across jurisdictions.
The proposed Digital Networks Act (DNA) (European Commission, 2026[32]), intended to replace the EECC, complements existing dispute‑resolution mechanisms at both national and cross-border levels. It does so by introducing guidance and a voluntary conciliation procedure for disputes between providers of electronic communication networks and other undertakings active in the electronic communication sector or closely related sectors.
In particular, these mechanisms in the EU would apply in situations where non‑public electronic communication network providers hand over traffic to public network providers6 through peering or transit arrangements as part of end‑to‑end traffic delivery. The aim is to address cases where such traffic handover may impose “disproportionate or unsustainable investment needs” for the receiving public network providers (Recital 164 DNA). The proposed voluntary conciliation procedure will be supported by national regulatory authorities in co-operation with BEREC, to encourage amicable solutions, reduce the likelihood of lengthy disputes, and improve regulatory consistency (Recital 405 DNA).
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← 1. The concept of “over-the-top (OTT)” is defined in Recommendation ITU-T D.262 (2019), as “an application accessed and delivered over the public Internet that may be a direct technical/functional substitute for traditional international telecommunication services”.
← 2. Of the eight accession countries to the OECD (Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Indonesia, Peru, Romania, Thailand), five were sent the CSI 2025 regulatory questionnaire, to which all responded (Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Peru and Romania). Argentina, Indonesia and Thailand were not sent the questionnaire, due to their advancement in the accession roadmap and in an effort to avoid additional burden on national administrations.
← 3. Based on the OECD 2025 CSI Communication Regulatory Questionnaire.
← 4. In a landmark case, the European Court of Justice ruled that the SkypeOut service qualified as an electronic communication service and thus fell within the scope of the Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework Directive). The ruling confirmed that services enabling users to call public telephone numbers, even when delivered via the Internet, could be classified as regulated telecommunications services under EU law (Ref. Case C-142/18 – Skype Communications).
← 5. Directive 2010/13/EU on audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive), amended by the Directive (EU) 2018/1808 (European Union, 2010[33]), governs EU-wide co‑ordination of national legislation on all audiovisual media, both traditional TV broadcasts, on-demand audiovisual media services, and video-sharing platform service.
← 6. According to Article 2[11] of the DNA ‘public electronic communications network’ means an electronic communications network used wholly or mainly for the provision of publicly available electronic communications services which support the transfer of information between network termination points.