Budgeting in Egypt

1. Budget planning

1.1. Budget context

Since 2020, Egypt’s economy has faced multiple external shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine and geopolitical tensions in the region. Despite this, real growth remained resilient; it exceeded 4.4% in FY2024/2025 and is forecast to reach 5.0% and 5.3% in FY2025/2026 and FY2026/2027 respectively (OECD, 2024[1]).

Fiscal policy is currently being implemented under challenging external and monetary conditions. Inflation reached 38% in September 2023 before moderating in early 2024 and recording 13.9% in July 2025, due to tighter monetary policy and easing supply disruptions (Central Bank of Egypt, 2025[2]). Despite this, Egypt has made notable progress in fiscal consolidation since 2020. While the central government budget deficit has widened from 6.8% of GDP in FY 2020/21 to 7.2% in FY 2024/25, the primary surplus has strengthened, rising from 1.3 of GDP in FY 2020/21 to 3.5% by end of FY 2024/25, a historic high and exceeding the target. Following a period of elevated debt ratios due to the challenging macroeconomic environment, the government set a nominal general government debt ceiling of around 96.4% of GDP for FY 2024/25; it also set a target of reducing the central government debt to below 80% by FY 2026/2027 and below 72% over the medium term. This ceiling marks a step toward institutionalising fiscal discipline, as it requires parliamentary approval for any breach. In FY 2024/25, this ceiling was respected.

Egypt’s central government debt portfolio is predominantly composed of domestic debt, but the share of external debt has risen steadily from 19% of GDP in FY 2019/20 to 22.9% in June 2024/25 Ministry of Finance of Egypt. The burden of debt repayments, both external and domestic, continues to pose a major fiscal challenge, due to high interest rates and currency devaluation. On the domestic side, interest rates have risen sharply to contain inflation (although the CBE was able to lower rates by over 7% in 2025) and on the external side, successive currency devaluations have led to a noticeable rise in external interest and principal payments when expressed in local currency.

Over the past five years, Egypt’s public revenues as a percentage of GDP have fluctuated, reflecting both structural reforms and the impact of challenging economic conditions. However, stronger tax administration, improved compliance through digitalisation, and enhanced enforcement efforts that expanded the effective tax base led to a notable 35.2% year-on-year increase during FY 2024/25. A package of Value Added Tax policy reforms approved by Parliament in June 2025 will increase revenue further and reduce fragmentation in the tax system.

Expenditure trends have been shaped by competing pressures to consolidate the fiscal position, maintain essential public investment, and protect the most vulnerable citizens. Expenditure control is, however, undermined by a rising interest burden, which now accounts for nearly half of total expenditure and more than two thirds of total revenues (Figure 1), as well as expanding social protection commitments. Capital spending has been restrained to align with the government’s primary surplus targets. Sustaining quality public services while containing recurrent expenditures will remain a central challenge.

Figure 1. Central government debt service as a share of total revenues

Source: Ministry of Finance

The Fiscal Strategy is anchored in four interlinked pillars:

• revamping the tax system and building trust with the business community to support private sector and export-led growth

• restoring macroeconomic stability and enhancing fiscal discipline

• implementing an integrated strategy to place public debt on a more sustainable path

• generating fiscal space for priority social spending, especially health, education, and targeted social protection programmes.

Sustaining the reform agenda will be critical to safeguarding macro-fiscal stability and translating growth into tangible improvements in living standards. Towards this end, Egypt’s PFM system is at the centre of a broader reform agenda aimed at strengthening budget credibility, reducing arrears, and aligning spending with reform priorities. A legal framework provides for modern budgetary governance practices, most notably, medium-term and top-down budgeting, programme and performance budgeting, enhanced fiscal oversight and stronger transparency and accountability mechanisms.

1.2. Institutional and legislative framework

Egypt’s budgetary system is underpinned by an institutional and legal foundation that sets clear mandates for fiscal governance and budget oversight. The PFM Law (No. 6/2022) marks a turning point in the modernisation of the PFM system. The Law consolidates previously fragmented budgetary regulations and introduces a comprehensive framework for fiscal discipline, transparency, and accountability. These reforms facilitate the alignment with international standards and OECD good practices and provide the legal backbone for a more strategic and performance-driven approach to public spending. In parallel, the General State Planning Law (No. 18/2022) provides the strategic counterpart to the PFM Law by mandating the preparation of a rolling Medium-Term Economic and Social Development Plan, updated annually by MOPEDIC. Together, the two laws establish an integrated system for fiscal and development planning.

To support the implementation of these laws, the MoF undertook an ambitious organisational restructuring that lays the foundation for top-down budgeting, sectoral expenditure ceilings, and programme and performance budgeting. It provides efficient and modern budget management functions, such as macro-fiscal policy, fiscal risk management, monitoring and evaluation, and debt policy. This reorganisation is supported by the rollout of digital tools such as the GFMIS, alongside targeted capacity-building.

While ministries base their budget submissions on the Budget Circular, proposals traditionally exceed available ceilings, prompting bilateral negotiations with MoF. Where consensus cannot be reached, issues may be escalated to the Economic Ministerial Group (EMG) for resolution. The EMG, which is chaired by the Prime Minister and brings together ministers with economic portfolios, including the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Planning, Economic Development and International Cooperation, provides a structured channel for reconciling sectoral ambitions with macro-fiscal realities, while preserving flexibility to address strategic policy trade-offs and emerging needs.

1.3. Macroeconomic and fiscal forecasting

Egypt’s MoF has strengthened its credentials in macro-fiscal forecasting. The Macro Fiscal Policy Unit (MFPU) has its own macro-fiscal excel model, with inputs from the MOPEDIC and the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE). Internal assumptions on (i) growth are agreed with the MOPEDIC, (ii) interest and exchange rates are agreed with the CBE. The MoF is upgrading this model because it is concerned that it lacks sufficiently updated sectoral linkages, thus limiting its usefulness for scenario analysis and long-term planning.

A technical-level Coordination Committee comprising representatives from the MoF, the MOPEDIC, the Ministry of Investment and Foreign Trade and the CBE facilitates, was formally established through a Cabinet decree in October 2025. It consolidates macroeconomic assumptions and indicators and submits a unified framework to the ministerial Coordination Council for Monetary and Fiscal Policies process for endorsement. The technical Committee meets regularly and on an ad hoc basis during the year for specific assignments. This technical Committee and the ministerial Coordination Council complement the inter-ministerial EMG, which meets weekly to set the overarching economic and fiscal policy direction, ensure alignment across government, review quarterly economic indicators, and engage with international financial institutions.

Egypt’s fiscal framework does not have a comprehensive system of fiscal rules and corrective mechanisms to anchor medium-term discipline and is largely non-binding. There is no Independent Fiscal Institution that could provide external validation of the framework, which is a standard practice in many OECD countries (OECD, 2014[3]). However, Cabinet-level endorsement of medium-term fiscal objectives institutionalises the framework at the highest level of Government. Furthermore, the credibility of Egypt’s Medium-Term fiscal Framework (MTFF) is validated externally through the negotiation and monitoring processes associated with successive IMF programmes since 2017.

At the headline level, persistent inflationary and exchange rate pressures have affected forecasting accuracy for revenues and expenditures. While taxes and grant inflows have consistently exceeded budget targets, other revenue forecasts have been volatile, owing to exchange rate volatility. Although budget deficits for the period FY 2022/23 to FY 2024/25 were closely aligned with the budget targets (Figure 2), expenditure forecasts have seen sectoral deviations, particularly on interest payments and subsidies. This highlights the need to incorporate more robust scenario analysis during the budget planning stage. While the forecasting challenges presented by geopolitical pressures will remain, the authorities are aware of the need for prudence and the impact that over optimistic forecasts can have on planned expenditures. The MoF has already taken action to mitigate this by incorporating fiscal risk assessments and conducting sensitivity analyses on key variables. Further strengthening scenario-based planning within the MTFF would help ensure greater robustness in the face of persistent macroeconomic volatility and geopolitical uncertainty.

Figure 2. Deviation on budget deficit compared to actual, 2022-2025

Note: FY 2023/24 excludes one-off receipts of USD 12 billion deriving from an investment agreement between Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. Including these receipts, the budget deficit would be 4% of GDP.

Source: Ministry of Finance

1.4. Medium-term budget framework

An MTBF first was prepared in FY 2024/25 for the period FY 2025/26 to FY 2027/28. The initial implementation was transitional, marked by a “learning-by-doing” approach typical of inaugural reform measures. A summary assessment of initial strengths and areas for improvement ahead of the next budget cycle is presented below (Table 1).

The MTBF is informed by the Medium-Term Debt Strategy (MTDS) and the Medium-Term Revenue Strategy (MTRS), both developed by the MoF. It follows international good practice in adopting a rolling budget framework that covers one budget year and three forward years. In line with practice in many OECD countries, the ceilings for the outer years are indicative rather than binding and may be increased in response to unforeseen developments. (Moretti, Keller and Majercak, 2023[4]) The Planning Law reinforces the strategic orientation of the MTBF and aligns it with Egypt’s development agenda. Budget formulation is further guided by a set of national frameworks, including Egypt Vision 2030, which serve as strategic anchors for medium-term fiscal planning.

The law provides for a Fiscal Strategy that guides fiscal policy by demonstrating how debt sustainability, revenue mobilisation, expenditure projections, and fiscal risk assessments are reconciled within a unified framework. The FSP was first published in December 2025. The Budget Statement contained little information on medium-term targets although the presentation by the Minister of Finance to the Parliament included references to medium-term macro assumptions and key fiscal targets. The FSP should be presented formally to Parliament, as is the case in most OECD countries. Also, the fiscal risk management framework should be extended to cover the duration of the MTBF. This would help frame the annual budget within a transparent multi-year fiscal trajectory and enhance policy credibility. It also would enhance coherence across MoF’s medium-term frameworks and improve the alignment between planning and budgeting processes.

While legislation provides that the MTBF should be aligned with the Medium-Term Strategy for Economic and Social Development (MTSESD) prepared by MOPEDIC, this plan was not published in FY2025/26. To strengthen transparency and predictability, MoF and MOPEDIC plan to institutionalise the publication of the FSP and the MTSESD as a core element of the annual budget documentation. The recent formalisation of the technical Coordination Committee on macroeconomic framework alignment should further strengthen coherence and consistency across the planning and budgeting processes.

Legislation provides that a High-Level Committee on MTBF, chaired by the Minister of Finance, agrees on medium-term fiscal targets, endorses strategic priorities, oversees implementation, and monitors compliance with expenditure ceilings. To date, the committee has not convened, and its functions have been carried out in a more ad hoc and fragmented manner. Operationalising this committee is essential for cross-departmental collaboration and aligning the budget process with the government’s medium-term fiscal objectives.

The effectiveness of the MTBF is limited by weaknesses in the application of expenditure ceilings. Although the law mandates ceilings by economic classification, these are not linked to strategic decision-making. The MoF therefore intends to circulate ceilings, through bilateral ministerial letters, by functional classification during the budget cycle for FY2026/27. Furthermore, the early communication of multi-year indicative ceilings would mark a significant step toward improving the credibility and effectiveness of the framework.

Expenditure baselines that demonstrate the medium-term costs of existing policies on a no-policy change basis are not currently applied. Line ministries estimate expenditure baselines internally to support expenditure requests but these are not formally passed to the MoF. In OECD countries, the preparation of no-policy-change baselines is a standard step in the medium-term budget process, serving as a reference point for identifying fiscal space and assessing the affordability of new spending proposals. The absence of this practice in Egypt limits the ability to evaluate trade-offs and allocate resources strategically over the medium-term. Given that line ministries are making such estimates internally, this should be applied on a formal basis.

An important feature of Egypt’s MTBF is the inclusion of contingency reserves of up to 5% of the appropriations for each economic chapter in each of the four fiscal years to provide for unforeseen spending without undermining overall fiscal discipline. This approach mitigates against ad hoc in-year budget revisions and ensures the credibility of the framework. In line with OECD good practice, the Cabinet approves annually the criteria for the allocation of the general contingency reserve, reinforcing an element of executive control over unforeseen spending. These criteria are published at the beginning of the fiscal year, alongside the Annual Budget Law.

Table 1. Summary Assessment of Implementation of MTBF in FY 2025/2026

Elements	Status	Recommendation for FY2026/27
Legal foundation	Yes
Political Commitment	Yes
Publication of General Guidelines to explain reform	Yes
Strategic Guidance for medium-term budget planning	Partial: Vision 2030, NSRP, Investment Plan	Timely preparation and publication of Medium-term Strategy for Economic and Social Development by MOPEDIC
Preparation and publication of FSP that formally aligns MTDS, MTRS, Fiscal risk management framework	Partial: published	Ensure FSP is published and updated annually at the beginning of the budget cycle. Extend fiscal risk reporting to medium-term.
Formal alignment between MTBF and Planning Strategy	Yes
Application of top-down, multi-year ceilings by functional classification	Partial: no early ceilings in FY25; result of bottom- up negotiations	Issue top-down indicative ceilings early in the budget process
Preparation of bottom-up baseline projections by line ministries	Partial	Clarify the distinction between “no-policy change” scenarios and programme scenario projections through two stage negotiations (at a later stage). Consolidate budget submissions by dealing directly with line ministries and independent entities, rather than with all 670 individual budget units, to improve coherence and manageability of baseline projections.
Capacity for medium-term forecasting and costing	Partial: Uneven across ministries	Invest in capacity-building for costing and medium-term projections
Parliamentary Discussion of the MTBF	No	Present key MTBF targets and highlights as an annex or sub-chapter to the annual Budget Statement submitted to Parliament
Operationalisation of the High-Level MTBF Committee	Not yet convened; functions carried out informally	Activation of the High-Level Committee on MTBF during FY26/27 budget cycle, ensuring institutional leadership and co-ordination.

Source: OECD.

1.5. Fiscal risk management

In OECD countries, sound fiscal risk management has been key to the credibility of macroeconomic and fiscal forecasts. In the same context, it will be a key component of the ambitious PFM multi-annual agenda in Egypt.

Egypt has made significant progress in developing a fiscal risks management framework, most notably through the Ministerial Decree, issued in December 2025, which establishes a dedicated Fiscal Risks Management Unit (FRU) with a clear mandate to manage fiscal risks, the regular publication of a Fiscal Risks Statement (FRS), the inclusion of all 59 Economic Authorities within the scope of General Government and the extension of the Treasury Single Accounts (TSA) to include these entities. The authorities have committed to an annual nominal ceiling on sovereign guarantees. New procedures have been introduced to close or absorb redundant extra-budgetary funds (special accounts), aiming to reduce fiscal fragmentation and improve oversight. These efforts, which reflect a growing recognition that unexpected fiscal deviations undermine expenditure planning and reduce resilience to shocks, will foster a fiscal responsibility mindset across the broader public sector.

Egypt nevertheless has been publishing its FRS since FY 2017/18 and the FRS for FY2025/26 represents an improvement in the scope of fiscal risk reporting. For the first time, the FRS provides (i) a quantification of the stock of contingent liabilities as a share of GDP by borrowing entity, (ii) sensitivity analysis of key macroeconomic risks for the annual budget year, and (iii) initial visualisations using two scenario-based charts. The FRS provides a qualitative overview of risks related to public-private partnerships (PPPs), state-owned enterprises (SOEs), litigation, and climate-related exposures, alongside a discussion of prevention and mitigation strategies. However, in Egypt these risks are not quantified.

The Ministerial Decree provides a comprehensive definition of fiscal risks and their sources, with analysis and reporting anchored in both the annual budget and the medium-term fiscal framework. The implementation of these steps will provide a critical foundation for more structured risk assessment, measurement, management and disclosure. Future reports could gradually strengthen the quantification of risks by covering additional (independent and/or dependent) variables for the sensitivity analysis, track changes in the risk profile over time, extend the timeframe of the scenario-based charts in line with MTBF implementation, and incorporate more visual tools to make data more accessible and comprehensible.

The MoF has committed, starting with the 2026/27 Budget, to publishing in the FRS a quantitative analysis of long-term climate-related fiscal risks and climate-sensitive contingent liabilities, as well as describing how the government will manage these risks. This risk-based approach allows the MoF to establish robust, practical frameworks that will address the challenges posed by climate change.

By collecting and consolidating information on fiscal risks across government, the FRD has improved co-ordination and laid the groundwork for a more structured approach. However, a formal fiscal risks register is yet to be prepared, and information gathering remains ad hoc and dependent on informal co-operation, limiting the comprehensiveness and consistency of risk coverage. To establish systematic fiscal risk management, the FRU is mandated to manage fiscal risk by maintaining a unified register based on a standardised template and clear data-sharing protocols. To operationalise this mandate and strengthen the quality of its information base, the FRU should conduct a “data gaps assessment” and co-ordinate with line entities and with other MoF units to improve the scope and reliability of fiscal risk data.

Off-budget spending stemming from the drawdown on sovereign guarantees (SGs) constitute one of the most significant sources of fiscal risk in Egypt, prompting the MoF to launch a series of reforms that aim to embed stronger ex-ante controls. The expansion of the general government perimeter will strengthen ex-ante oversight over Economic Authorities, the key beneficiaries of SGs. Despite these additional controls, the regulatory framework for SGs is fragmented and unclear. Key elements of the framework have been introduced by ad hoc official decisions, and are yet to be consolidated in a single policy document. The regulatory framework for SGs, therefore, should be consolidated.

Finally, the fiscal risk management framework needs to capture all quasi-fiscal activities (QFA), which are services where the government directs that the price charged is less than the market rate. QFAs can distort the financial performance of SOEs and Economic Authorities (executive bodies charged with implementing government policies), leading to higher reliance on guarantees or budgetary support. Currently, they are not transparently costed or reported. Egypt should identify and cost these QFAs and adopt a plan to reduce reliance on opaque or off-budget support mechanisms.

1.6. Interactions with local government

Egypt has five sub-national tiers of government: governorates, regions, markaz (rural districts) or urban districts, cities, and villages. Local governments are funded mainly by the central government. A smaller proportion of revenue comes from fees generated by certain services provided at local level. Local-government accounts are consolidated within general government accounts alongside central government and the Economic Authorities.

Local budgeting is governed by PFM Law 6/2022 and its regulations. Each governorate’s budget appears as a separate chapter and line-item schedule in the national budget. The legislation creates a formal MTBF for every entity and make its ceilings binding once approved by Cabinet. The annual MoF Budget Circular instructs governorates to distribute funds to districts and cities within these ceilings.

The Governorates are responsible for drafting the budgets of the lower levels within their scope. Each district develops its draft budget and submits it to the Governorate for inclusion within the Governorate budget request four months before the new fiscal year. In accordance with the hierarchical structure, any spending request identified at the lowest level must be passed from the village to the district to the Governorate level, before it can be included in a budget request prepared at the Governorate level. The Governorate submits its draft budget to the Ministry of Local Government (MoLD), which is the lead ministry responsible for co-ordination of the ministries and institutions involved in local government matters, for agreement. It is then submitted to the MoF (for current expenditures) and the MOPEDIC (for capital expenditures).

While appropriations are ostensibly linked to meeting targets, the focus is on meeting previous spending commitments. Performance targets are not yet used at local level. The move from an annual line-item basis to the multi-annual programme and performance-based approach will apply to local government. Given the proportion of public spending attributed to local government, capacity building will be important. The MoF already is working to develop capacity at the local government level.

The Budget Circular stipulates that there be co-ordination between the MoLD, the governorates and relevant ministries in the fields of education, health, agriculture, housing and utilities, social affairs and transport, to determine the strategy of governorates and provide the funding necessary to fulfil assigned objectives. Despite this, public bodies prepare their budget proposals separately, with little co-ordination. This means line ministries have little involvement in the formulation of the Governorates’ budgets. For example, there is little co-ordination regarding budget allocations between the Ministry of Education, the 27 Governorate educational directorates and the public service authorities that are affiliated to the sector. The allocations are negotiated separately with the MoF (current expenditure) and/or the MOPEDIC (capital expenditure). This limits the role of the Ministry of Education in negotiating the various budgets and impedes its ability to improve the sector’s overall performance. The implementation of the MTBF provides an opportunity to enhance the co-ordination between the various budget entities during the preparation phase to avoid duplicative requests for resources, and activities being developed and implemented in silos.

Local government bodies are not allowed to borrow, run deficits, incur commitments beyond their voted appropriations or carry forward unspent funds. The Governor has financial and administrative authority for the various entities within their jurisdiction, yet they may not alter expenditure or revenue limits set by central line ministries and they require prior MoF sign-off on any contract that would exceed the approved budget. Any payment order that would breach the approved ceiling is automatically blocked in GFMIS until the adjustment is authorised. All local units must transfer any operating surplus (at a monthly rate of one twelfth of the estimated annual surplus) to the General Treasury. Legislation provides that the MoF may directly recover unpaid surpluses from sub-national bank accounts, increasing oversight.

The Governorates submit quarterly financial reports to the MoF and monthly financial reports to the MoLD. Both reports are submitted through the GFMIS. The monthly report is used to justify requests for additional funding as cost overruns emerge. Where overruns occur, the MoF must first approve additional funding through a virement or budget reinforcement. Such approval is not automatic and has been refused in the past. However, since FY 2022/2023, inflation and foreign exchange rate pressures have led to additional funding being provided.

1.7. Annual budget calendar

The annual budget calendar is gradually incorporating the MTBF. The fiscal year runs from July to June, and the formulation of the Budget is divided into two parts: the formulation of the MTBF in the months up to March is followed by the annual budget process in the three following months. The PFM Law and its Executive regulations establish the key stages for the budget process, which are outlined in Table 2.

Table 2. Calendar of the Fiscal Cycle

	Deadline	Activity
Setting the Medium-term Budgetary Framework	End August	MOPEDIC’s MTSESD approved by the Cabinet
	End September	MoF’s FSP endorsed by Cabinet.
	Late October/ November	The MoF issues the Budget Circular to line ministries and independent agencies, with top-down expenditure ceilings for each budget entity.
	End December	Line ministries and budget entities submit their medium-term staffing needs in coordination with the Central Agency for Organization and Administration (CAOA) to MOPEDIC and MoF
	5 January	Line ministries and budget entities upload their MTBF proposals to the MoF using the GFMIS
	Late January/ Early February	MTBF negotiations/ bilateral technical discussions held between MoF and each budget entity and final agreement is reflected on the GFMIS.
	31 March	Cabinet endorses the Executive Budget Proposal for the MTBF and submits it to Parliament.
	31 March	MoF publishes the Pre-budget Statement
Developing and approving the Annual Budget Law	April- May	Planning and Budget Committee reviews and discusses the draft annual State Budget Law
	30 June	The Parliament adopts the Annual State Budget Law MoF uploads the budget law for budget entities to the GFMIS and TSA
	31 October	Government submits the Final Budget Account to the Accountability State Authority (ASA).
	31 December	The ASA submits the audited report on the Final Budget Account to the Parliament.

Sources: PFM Law 6/2022 and its Executive Regulations, Budget Circular for FY 2024/2025 and OECD

The process begins in late August, when the Cabinet approves the MTSESD prepared by MOPEDIC, followed by the MoF’s FSP by the end of September. These strategic documents set the fiscal parameters and strategic priorities for the budget year and beyond. Based on these, the MoF issues the Budget Circular and top-down expenditure ceilings to line ministries and public entities. While the law prescribes that this be done by 31 October, in practice, this can be delayed until December. These ceilings and guidelines serve as the foundation for preparing multi-year budget submissions by budget entities. The Budget Circular does not include all macroeconomic assumptions, which are communicated verbally to spending agencies.

Line ministries and independent entities submit their staffing needs for the medium-term by late December, in co-ordination with the Central Agency for Organization and Administration (CAOA). By 5 January, entities must submit their medium-term budget proposals to the MoF using the Government Financial Management Information System (GFMIS). The GFMIS enables structured submission of both financial and non-financial data (not yet active) and supports real-time visibility for MoF officials. This functionality improves the timeliness and transparency of budget preparation and also includes modules for programme allocations (not yet active).

Following the submission, bilateral negotiations between the MoF and spending entities take place in late January through early February, allowing for technical discussions and policy alignment. The initial submissions normally exceed the aggregate ceiling although the authorities hope that the circulation of the FSP and sectoral ceilings, planned to start in FY 2026/2027, will lead to line ministries’ baseline spending plans being more in line with the fiscal constraints and national priorities. Agreements reached during these consultations are reflected in the GFMIS. By 31 March, the Cabinet approves the Executive Budget Proposal, which includes both the medium-term and annual budget frameworks, and submits it to the House of Representatives. A Pre-Budget Statement is published annually. Between April and May, the Parliament’s Planning and Budget Committee (PBC) reviews the draft budget and its annexes, providing feedback before it proceeds to final approval of the House.

The Annual Budget Law must be signed by the President by June 30 to ensure its entry into force by the start of the fiscal year on July 1. The MoF then uploads the final budget to the GFMIS and activates budget controls through the TSA. At the end of the fiscal year, the government submits the Final Budget Account to the Accountability State Authority (ASA) by 31 December, with the ASA typically submitting its audited report to Parliament during the second quarter of the subsequent year. Although the timeline is broadly respected, in practice, certain steps are still evolving toward greater consistency and credibility.