In a rapidly changing world, rules can quickly become outdated or lead to unintended consequences and unnecessary costs. Regular evaluation and review are therefore essential to ascertain whether rules continue to meet their objectives in practice and inform ongoing improvement. This chapter investigates EU Member States’ approaches to ex post evaluation, including requirements and methodologies. It also assesses how reviews are used to reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens. Finally, the chapter examines how governments involve citizens and stakeholders in reviews and ensure transparency and accountability.
Better Regulation Practices across the European Union 2025
Abstract
Evaluating and reviewing rules after they are implemented is vital to keep them fit-for-purpose and to feed a virtuous feedback loop. In a rapidly changing world, with profound societal and economic transformations driven by the green and digital transitions, laws and regulations can quickly become outdated or lead to unintended consequences that undermine policy objectives. In addition, an ever-growing statute book risks imposing unnecessary burdens on citizens and businesses, threatening European competitiveness. Analysing relevant evidence and listening to stakeholders enables policymakers to check if rules stand the test of time and improve them and adapt to changing circumstances. It also offers governments an opportunity to query whether the goals initially identified as part of the agenda setting remain valid.
Policymakers across EU Member States (EUMS) are still at risk of “regulate and forget” as the use of evidence to evaluate rules ex post remains underdeveloped compared to ex ante assessment. Although almost all EUMS have recently undertaken some policy reviews, whether of particular rules or across themes, efforts remain largely ad hoc. Only one quarter of EUMS require periodic evaluation of existing rules, and a minority use threshold tests to objectively trigger them. The lack of a systematic approach suggests that reviews are often politically driven or in response to the immediate issue of the day, possibly after regulatory failures. To avoid conducting them once it’s too late, a methodical approach is needed to objectively prioritise and target reviews on those rules and policy issues with the highest impact.
Despite measured improvements over time, more holistic and consistent methodologies are needed to focus evaluations on policy outcomes that tangibly improve people’s lives and prosperity. There is clear indication that EUMS are investing in the development of methodologies, reflected in the increased adoption of written guidance for evaluations (up from 11 in 2017 to 18 in 2023). However, methodological gaps remain that hamper the potential impact of evaluations. Few EUMS systematically assess whether the policy goals have been achieved or look at unintended consequences. In addition, evaluations often do not systematically assess costs and benefits to determine the net impacts of rules. Improving the methodology – and ultimately the quality – of evaluations make them more likely to generate useful evidence to improve the regulatory stock, which only 9 EUMS report occurring within the last 5 years.
Reviews of existing rules can be used more strategically to advance policy goals – including burden reduction and driving growth. Reviewing the stock of regulation through the lens of a specific objective has high potential to inform structural reforms. However, a declining number of EUMS report such broad-based reviews with a focus on simplification, competition, or compliance costs. Similarly, deep-dives looking at the total effects of different laws and regulations in a particular sector or industry carry significant potential to inform structural reforms that can unleash growth but are rarely used by governments. Stock-flow linkage rules that condition the introduction of new rules or costs upon the removal of existing ones like “one-in, one-out” are only used by 8 EUMS – to varying degrees of success. EUMS can look to feedback-driven simplification programmes as models for identifying and resolving irritants and reducing burden.
Governments can better involve the people directly impacted by rules in the evaluations they carry out, both in informing findings and in reporting back. Compared to the design stage, stakeholder engagement in the evaluation of rules remains lacking, despite the necessary foundations already being in place: most EUMS have ongoing mechanisms for feedback on existing rules and use interactive websites for consultation at earlier stages of the policy cycle. Whilst most EUMS publish the findings of evaluations, few of them systematically consult with stakeholders to shape them in the first place. Transparency and accountability are essential to maintaining credibility and trust. Accordingly, governments must communicate better how they intend to take evaluation results forward to demonstrate responsiveness – for instance by issuing a public response, which currently only few of them do.
With an ever-growing stock of domestic laws and regulations and EU acquis, systematic evaluation and review are critical to ensuring that rules keep delivering against their stated objectives of bolstering safety, health, economic stability, and environmental sustainability. In a context of rapid technological change, evolving social and economic landscapes, and pressing crises like climate change, policymakers must resist the temptation to “regulate and forget”. To this end, the OECD Recommendation on Regulatory Policy and Governance calls on governments to “[c]onduct systematic programme reviews of the stock of significant regulation against clearly defined policy goals, including consideration of costs and benefits, to ensure that regulations remain up to date, cost justified, cost effective and consistent, and deliver the intended policy objectives” (OECD, 2012[1]).
Even with diligent design and rigorous analysis, whether a rule works as intended – or leads to unintended consequences – can only be known after it has come into force. In Spain, solar subsidies introduced in 2007 to promote renewable energy led to rapid growth in sales but significant financial liabilities for the government, with the subsidy scheme being revised based on post-implementation data to create a more sustainable framework (del Río and Mir-Artigues, 2014[2]). The European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy initially led to waste and disproportionate benefits for large agricultural business, unintended impacts that multiple subsequent reforms have since sought to address (European Parliament, 2023[3]).
Through learning and iteration, reviews can help the regulatory environment evolve and respond in lockstep with societal progress, technological advancements, and global developments. For example, existing building codes may require the use of materials that undermine modern environmental goals. Outdated transportation regulations may prevent the use of modern automated vehicles. Insights from reviews can, in turn, provide valuable data to help improve existing rules and improve the evidence base for future decisions to keep pace with evolving societal needs and economic realities (OECD, 2020[4]).
As the body of regulation expands over time, it becomes increasingly important to systematically review existing rules to prevent redundancies, inconsistencies, costs, and unnecessary burdens from accumulating (OECD, 2020[4]). As noted in the Letta report, excessive regulatory burden and bureaucratic red tape pose a risk to the efficiency of the Single Market (Letta, 2024[5]). Similarly, the Draghi (2024[6]) report points out that the growing regulatory burden on businesses acts as a drag on European competitiveness, with 61% of EU companies citing it as an obstacle to investment. Regular review can help inform changes to legislation that minimise unnecessary costs for businesses. The European Commission, for instance, through regular review, identified and subsequently proposed several changes to legislation protecting the exclusive use of novel and unique designs to make the framework – originally set out in 2002 – fit-for-purpose in the digital age and more efficient. These changes include allowing for protection of new digital design types, like 3D printing, as well as making application processes cheaper and faster for designers (European Parliament, 2024[7]). As part of its wider strategic agenda to boost competitiveness, the Commission is also putting forward a series of “omnibus” packages to simplify EU law across different areas and reduce burdens (European Commission, 2025[8]).
Evidence-driven and transparent review of rules can also strengthen accountability of decision makers, highlighting successes and shortcomings in their choices, and help build trust in government. Using sound evidence, including from on-the-ground implementation, to evaluate the impact of policies and improve them can help address concerns shared by the 59% of respondents from the 2024 OECD Trust Survey who do not believe their government uses the best available evidence in decision making. Similarly, putting stakeholder engagement and feedback at the core of reviewing rules can show responsiveness to the less than 40% of respondents that believe their government would improve a poorly performing service, implement an innovative idea to improve a public service, or change a national policy in response to popular demands (OECD, 2024[9]).
This chapter sets out requirements and practices for how EU Member States (EUMS) and the European Commission are keeping rules and processes fit-for-purpose over time, through evaluation and review. The first section explores methodologies and characteristics of reviews that, help to foster effective and efficient rules. The final section discusses the central role of stakeholders, as the people directly impacted by rules, in providing more complete information about how they are working in practice.
Observing how a rule works in the real world post-implementation can yield the most accurate and reliable evidence on its efficiency and effectiveness. By examining actual outcomes and progress towards initial policy goals, reviews help refine and optimise regulatory stock and implementation, making it more responsive to changing social, economic, and environmental realities.
Planning for evaluation
To ensure rules remain fit-for-purpose over time and deliver desired outcomes, their evaluation needs to be embedded into the rule-making process. The European Commission, for instance, is implementing a process to continuously stress-test their regulatory stock, with evaluations of individual laws or policy areas leading to concrete simplification measures in the Commission’s work programme each year; the ultimate aim of this process is to review the full EU acquis (European Commission, 2025[8]). Despite being a valuable tool for the regulatory cycle, ex post evaluations are systematically required for all or major regulations by only approximately one-quarter of EUMS (Figure 5.1). However, almost all EUMS report having undertaken evaluations within the last five years, suggesting that rules to be evaluated may not have been selected based on the scale of their impacts but at the discretion of political decision makers, in specific policy areas or in response to external events. Ad hoc political decisions, for instance, are the most commonly reported triggers for ex post evaluations undertaken between 2021 and 2024, alongside government or party programmes.
To ensure consistency and impact of evaluations, one of the first questions to address is which rules and when to review. This is especially important in the context of limited public sector resources to conduct extensive policy evaluation on top of day-to-day business. If rules have potentially significant social or economic impacts, if there is uncertainty as to whether a rule will be effective, or if a rule has a novel aspect, review requirements should be embedded directly into the corresponding legislative framework (OECD, 2020[4]).
Whilst EU Member States (EUMS) use a variety of mechanisms to initiate evaluation of rules (Figure 5.1), they could use these “triggers” more systematically to focus efforts on those rules with the highest impact. In approximately half of them, reviews are embedded directly in the law through automatic evaluation requirements or sunsetting clauses (though it is important to note that this is mostly the case for only some primary laws and subordinate regulations). This is also the case for the European Commission where, under their “evaluate first” principle, evaluation clauses are incorporated into major acts. Notably, sunsetting and legal review provisions are relatively common in rules created in an emergency context; Denmark, for example, used sunsetting clauses commonly for rules created as part of the response to Covid pandemic. Despite only Austria and Germany reporting threshold tests actually triggering a review, eight EUMS use threshold tests to decide whether a review is required.
Note: Data based on the 27 Member States of the European Union.
Source: OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) 2024.
Threshold tests remain underutilised as a tool to focus review efforts on those rules with the highest impact on people and businesses. Only a minority of EUMS use threshold tests to require or trigger a review (Figure 5.1), with very limited change since 2017. Where threshold tests are used, projected impact/cost remains the most common threshold type. Since 2020, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic have newly adopted threshold tests to trigger evaluations of regulation. New legislation in Lithuania requires evaluation when a regulation has significant impact, or, more broadly, if a regulation is fundamentally changed or newly regulates a previously unregulated area. The Slovak Republic uses cost-based thresholds, requiring reviews if regulations introduced by parliament creates total expected costs of more than EUR 10 000 for businesses; the country also allows for reviews to be triggered if there is reason to believe that costs or benefits estimated ex ante were, respectively, underestimated or overestimated. In Austria, any regulatory proposal that warrants a full impact assessment also requires an ex post evaluation. Germany requires evaluation if proposals create over EUR 1 000 000 in annual compliance costs nationally for citizens, businesses or the administration. In Estonia, the trigger is a combination of impact and urgency: when a regulatory proposal with significant projected impact is exempted from ex ante analysis requirements due to urgent need, the proposal must include a requirement for ex post evaluation; this is similar to Slovenia, where any rules adopted under emergency procedures must be reviewed after 2 years.
In addition to helping determine what and when to review, qualitative and quantitative thresholds can also help governments to get right how they review and ensure the exercise remains proportionate. The coverage and duration of consultations, for example, should be proportionate to the significance of the rule and its impacts. The governance and resourcing of reviews also need to be proportionate to the nature and significance of the regulations concerned to ensure credible findings – that is, rules that are particularly sensitive or impactful are more likely to benefit from an arm’s-length or independent review process. Review of regulations and in areas that carry major impact need to be resourced sufficiently to conduct more rigorous, in-depth analysis (OECD, 2020[4]).
Complementing the role of governments and holding them accountable, parliaments have an important role to play in the evaluation of existing rules. Under the Principles of Public Administration, aimed at EU enlargement countries, parliaments should regularly review implementation of major laws and policies to assess their effectiveness and hold governments accountable (OECD, 2023[10]). All EUMS parliaments play some role in post-legislative scrutiny – from triggering to conducting evaluations. Requests from parliament are also among the more common triggers, with 13 EUMS reporting such requests initiating an evaluation of existing primary laws or subordinate regulations between 2021 and 2024. However, the European Parliamentary Research Service (2020[11]) notes that, broadly, their involvement remains limited. A 2024 OECD report highlighted different approaches, such as Belgium creating a dedicated parliamentary committee for ex post evaluation, or Germany’s Federal Parliament (Bundestag) primarily relying on the government to conduct evaluations despite having different bodies that can be mobilised to conduct post-legislative scrutiny upon request by Members of Parliament (Tunyan and Goetz, 2024[12]).
Outcome-focused methodology
To effectively close the policy cycle and generate evidence to inform the improvement of existing rules, the design of evaluations should focus on accurately identifying and demonstrating their outcomes. Grounding evaluations in robust methodologies enables policymakers to appreciate how effective and efficient a rule works in practice. Overall, the adoption of various requirements and practices that foster outcome-focused evaluations has steadily grown among EUMS since 2017 (see the composite indicator on ex post evaluation, discussed in Chapter 1). The provision of written guidance on evaluations, for instance, is one specific practice that has seen consistent growth over this time (Figure 5.2) – a potential reflection of growing commitment from governments and competency among officials carrying out evaluations. The European Commission’s comprehensive guidance for carrying out an evaluation of EU law can serve as a model, guiding policymakers through identifying when an evaluation is required, applying common criteria and principles in the conduct of evaluations, and setting out a common format for conveying findings from the evaluation (European Commission, 2021[13]).
Note: Data based on the 27 Member States of the European Union.
Source: OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) 2024.
Assessing the effectiveness of a rule in practice involves determining whether it achieves the objectives for which the rule was introduced. Most EUMS still do not systematically assess, by default, whether underlying policy goals have been achieved, though this practice has become more common in the evaluation of primary laws: 17 EUMS in 2024 contain this assessment by default at all – 7 of which do so systematically – up from 11 in 2017, when 4 EUMS did so systematically. It is also important to note that this practice is still seen in evaluations where there was no explicit requirement to do so. In Estonia, ex post evaluation found that 2016 reforms to support and incentivise people with reduced work ability to return to the labour market exceeded the set indicator of 50% of working age people with partial work ability being employed by 2021 (Estonian Applied Research Center, 2022[14])As noted in Chapter 4, setting up for an assessment of effectiveness begins early in the policy cycle by identifying clear processes for assessing progress in achieving the desired short-term and long-term goals, including which data and other evidence may be needed and how it should be gathered.
Ensuring continued effectiveness also means that policymakers must be mindful of the assumptions made at the design stage and observe if they prove to be accurate in practice. Even when the initial ex ante analysis is robust, various factors can lead to divergence between the predicted and actual impacts of rules over time. Compliance with a rule, for example, can increase or decrease based on evolving societal attitudes (Lind and Arndt, 2016[15]). Since 2017, comparison of actual and predicted impacts has steadily grown among EU Member States (Figure 5.3). Identifying and then understanding why divergence exists can inform important policy changes.
Note: Data based on the 27 Member States of the European Union.
Source: OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) 2024.
A rule’s effectiveness can also be undermined by unintended consequences. These can undermine the achievement of the rule’s own objective and/or adversely affect the achievement of other public policy objectives, putting policy cohesion at risk. Rent control policies, for example, may be implemented with the intent of providing affordable housing options in a particular area; however, if the policies lead to unintended reductions in housing supply, deterioration in housing quality, or exacerbations of housing equality, policymakers may need to reconsider the rationale and design for the original policy. However, unintended consequences are not systematically looked into as part of EPEs, with only 6 EUMS doing so in EPEs for all EPEs or for those on major regulations.
Assessing whether a rule is efficient in practice involves determining whether it gives rise to unnecessary costs (OECD, 2020[4]). Overall, EUMS are less likely to assess costs and benefits when evaluating rules than when designing rules – despite evaluation offering the opportunity to check assumptions underlying ex ante projections (see Figure 5.4). Comprehensive consideration of both costs and benefits is necessary for policymakers to determine the net impact of a rule (OECD, 2020[4]). Most EUMS require assessment of costs for at least some reviews, with Austria, Germany, Slovak Republic, and Sweden requiring the assessment for all reviews. Specifically, assessments are most likely to cover compliance costs and administrative burdens – though this practice is not as common as with ex ante analysis. Meanwhile, reviews are less likely to quantify benefits than costs. Some countries, like Germany, also assess different social impacts (e.g. impacts on gender) as part of their ex post evaluations. Quantification should be attempted whenever feasible to inform necessary political judgements of whether rules are “worth it”, even when subjective elements – like benefits associated with less tangible social values – are present (OECD, 2020[4]). To help address this gap, countries may look to models for ex ante analysis, where the quantification of both costs and benefits is more prevalent (discussed in Chapter 3).
Note: Data based on the 27 Member States of the European Union.
Source: OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) 2024.
Evaluations should also consider whether alternative approaches may have performed better (OECD, 2020[4]). Advances in technologies can present alternative solutions at the time of evaluation that were not available when the rules were originally drafted; as one example, data analytics can enable real-time compliance monitoring and provide an alternative to static, periodic reporting requirements (see Chapter 4 for discussion on data‑driven approaches). There is significant unexploited opportunity for EUMS to use evaluation as an opportunity to revisit whether other options might be more efficient (at lower cost) and/or more effective (achieving greater impact) in achieving regulatory goals: less than one-quarter of EUMS compare the impact of a rule to alternative options, and only the Slovak Republic reports doing so for all laws and regulations.
For evaluations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of regulations, they need to inform changes to existing rules, as appropriate. Despite the vast majority of EUMS having undertaken evaluations of some rules within the last five years, only nine of them report evidence of an evaluation’s recommendations leading to a tangible improvement, suggesting a breach in the feedback loop. This crucial part of translating evidence into impact remains a gap among both EU and OECD members alike, though key examples set out in Box 5.1 highlight the potential and impact of reviews.
In Denmark, the Danish Business Regulation Forum recommended removing a requirement for shops to accept cash payments, if the shop primarily catered to the professional market (B2B trade). Companies had highlighted that the capability to accept cash was burdensome and costly to maintain, as well as troublesome for employees. In July 2022, this requirement was removed for stores where more than 75% of the store's revenue comes from sales between companies and the primary marketing is aimed at traders.
In Finland, an evaluation report highlighted the cumulative impacts of amendments to the Finnish immigration code’s provisions on the rights of asylum-seekers, made from 2015 to 2019. The report identified that a focus on making the asylum process more efficient had compromised human rights protections and increased the need for appeals and re-applications. As a result, key changes pursued to the Aliens Act included the reintroduction of legal aid at the start of the asylum-seeking process, placing greater focus on the vulnerability of applicants (including children), and addressing gaps in cases where people do not receive a residence permit but cannot be removed from the country.
In Latvia, following a fire hazard in a Riga hostel that resulted in the deaths of eight people in 2021, it was revealed that the property owner had failed to provide necessary information about fire safety compliance and had denied fire inspectors access to the building, highlighting the limited authority of the State Fire and Rescue Service when property owners refuse regular inspections. Consequently, in March 2023, Latvia adopted amendments to the Fire Safety and Fire-fighting Law. These amendments expand the rights of the State Fire and Rescue Service, allowing them to suspend the use of structures and facilities if the owner refuses or avoids inspection three times.
Source: OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) Survey 2024; Pirjatanniemi et al (2021[16]), Ulkomaalaislain ja sen soveltamiskäytännön muutosten yhteisvaikutukset kansainvälistä suojelua hakeneiden ja saaneiden asemaan.
Broader reviews to advance policy goals
Broader reviews of the stock of regulation as a whole can complement evaluations of individual (or packages of) regulations to help advance specific policy objectives or the efficacy of rules in specific sectors. They can assess the cumulative impact and interactions between multiple regulations and/or provide a deep dive into a particular policy area or sector of the economy.
EUMS have an opportunity make more strategic use of reviews that look at the regulatory stock to boost economic growth and competitiveness. Over the last five years, 17 EUMS have undertaken so-called “principle-based reviews” of rules, which focus on a specific type of impact or policy objective ranging from compliance costs to environmental sustainability. Over the last decade, such reviews have mostly focused on identifying administrative burdens to determine which regulations in specific sectors, policy areas or the economy as a whole warrant review or potential reform (see below). However, reviews are much less used to look at existing rules with a focus on other drivers or drags on the economy. Since 2017, the number of EUMS that report undertaking broader reviews to identify impediments to competition have dropped by half. Similarly, reviews based on compliance costs remain conducted by only a handful of EUMS (Figure 5.5) – though they could play an important role in alleviating the regulatory burden on businesses in the EU, which are considered high compared to other economies (Draghi, 2024[6]).
Note: Data based on the 27 Member States of the European Union.
Source: OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG).
EUMS also have opportunity to leverage other types of impactful reviews. Broader reviews can also take a deep dive into a particular policy area or sector of the economy. These more resource-intensive, in-depth reviews focussing on a larger set of impacts and their interactions in a specific policy area are growing but still less commonly reported (9 EUMS), despite carrying high potential benefits in identifying deeper challenges and opportunities, and informing structural reform (OECD, 2019[17]). The least common reviews are cross-jurisdictional comparisons (6 EUMS), despite these comparisons providing a rare “counterfactual” – how things would have turned out under a different regime – and potentially identifying important improvements based on comparisons with jurisdictions having similar objectives (OECD, 2020[4]). Across the EU, reviews based on comparisons with other Member States might be particularly instructive and offer opportunities to benefit from shared experience and strengthen the cohesion of the Single Market.
Excessive regulatory and administrative burden1 can pose a serious risk to economic growth and competitiveness. For instance, 61% of businesses participating in the 2023 European Investment Bank (EIB) Investment Survey identified regulatory frameworks as barriers to long-term investment in the EU, while 83% of firms surveyed by Business Europe across 21 Member States reported that the complexity and extended duration of permitting procedures posed significant obstacles to investment within Europe (EIB, 2023[18]). As observed in the Letta (2024[5]) report, “the dynamism and efficiency of the Single Market are currently being significantly impeded by a complex web of challenges, primarily due to the excessive regulatory burden and bureaucratic red tape.” Suggesting that the scale of the challenge is growing, stakeholders surveyed in 2022 also reported an increases perception of regulatory burden in the EU compared to 2021 (European Commission, 2023[19]). The Draghi (2024[6]) report flags that this is in particular a challenge for SMEs and innovative scale-ups that are essential to European competitiveness.
The European Commission itself recognises this challenge, expanding the scope of its target of reducing reporting burdens by at least 25% to all administrative burdens and to 35% for SMEs (European Commission, 2025[8]). In addition, the Commission is putting forward a series of legislative omnibus packages to simplify EU rules across a range of different areas such as sustainability, investment or data protection and cybersecurity (European Commission, 2025[20]). To create impact and spur growth across Europe, these efforts need to be flanked and supported by actions at the national level. EUMS can rely on a range of approaches including stock-flow linkage rules, stakeholder engagement, and more novel methods such as “sludge audits” based on behavioural science to lift regulatory burdens.
Regulatory burdens from people’s interactions with government requirements can also tangibly impact their quality of life more directly. Unnecessarily complex administrative rules and processes – known as “sludge” – force people to invest significant time and energy in searching for information, evaluating options, deciphering complex information. The more burdensome a process is, the more emotional and psychological costs it entails, including stress, frustration, and helplessness. Furthermore, sludge can exacerbate inequity in government service delivery, disproportionately affecting those who rely on government services the most (OECD, 2024[21]). These psychological costs can lead to feelings of helplessness and a loss of autonomy, reducing overall trust in government institutions (Moynihan, D. P., Herd, P., & Harvey, H, 2015[22]).
Linking the flow of new rules to reviewing the stock
As governments faced rapidly growing regulatory stock and regulated entities (whether businesses or people) faced increasing burden, some OECD countries introduced regimes that conditions the introduction of new rules or costs upon the removal of existing rules or costs. Often referred to as 'one in, one out' (OIOO) rules, these mechanisms are designed to limit the overall regulatory burden by requiring that the introduction of new rules or costs be offset by the equivalent reduction of existing ones (Trnka and Thuerer, 2019[23]).
While these mechanisms can set incentives to review rules and procedures and consider alternatives to regulation, their implementation and methodological choices also present risks. If focused on the number of regulations, OIOO can lead ministries to repeal obsolete but innocuous ones (so-called “easy outs”) to make space for more complex and burdensome rules. Whilst this is not the case when OIOO instead focuses on offsetting estimated regulatory burden (cost-offsetting) rather than the number of regulations/acts, the same stakeholders negatively impacted by the burden of a new rule may not benefit from the removal of another, which may affect a different industry/sector. This challenge can either be helped or exacerbated through processes like “trading”, where ministries introducing rules offset that introduction with reduction in another sector or another portfolio – for instance, one portfolio has more regulations or has regulations that are considered easier to abolish (Trnka and Thuerer, 2019[23]). Finally, the removal of rules may themselves entail some burden, as businesses and people may have to invest resources in learning and adjusting to a new regulatory environment. This suggests that stakeholder input to identify issues that may arise in implementation is critical for effectively realising OIOO targets.
Metrics that only contemplate burdens, instead of net costs and benefits, may lead to policymakers taking too narrow a focus that ignores broader policy objectives. This narrow offsetting can have the unintended effect of discouraging the introduction of rules that impose some direct cost but have a larger – potentially longer-term – net benefit for the economy and society more broadly. Narrow metrics can also overlook burdens that have hidden or more subjective human impacts, which is discussed further later in this section. In jurisdictions that have already undergone significant regulatory streamlining, OIOO can reach a point of diminishing returns, as governments find it increasingly difficult to identify unnecessary regulations to repeal in exchange for new, essential rules aimed at pressing public policy needs (OECD, 2017[24]).
In 2022, the European Commission started to systematically implement a “one-in, one-out” approach that involved offsetting new administrative burdens resulting from the Commission’s proposals by equivalently reducing existing burdens in the same policy area. This means that adjustment costs are compensated to the greatest extent while administrative costs are offset in the same policy area. However, since the mechanism is based on the costs of the Commission’s legislative proposals, it does not account for any additional costs that may stem from subsequent amendments made by the co-legislators. This might potentially limit the effectiveness and impact the regime might have in curbing burdens. Some commentators have also suggested that the, in its current form, the Commissions “one-in, one-out” mechanism “cannot serve as a tool for better regulation” as it is too narrowly focused on the costs of regulation and not taking into account regulatory objectives (Xanthaki, 2023[25]).
Currently, the adoption of such rules remains limited across the EU, with only eight Member States reporting the use of stock-flow linkage rules (Figure 5.6). Since 2021, the Slovak Republic has been the only country to adopt the practice. Compared to the one-third of OECD members that use such rules, adoption among EU states is proportionally slightly less common.
Note: Data based on the 27 Member States of the European Union.
Source: OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) 2024.
Four EUMS have undertaken independent evaluations of their OIXO programmes. Finland’s 2019 review, which led to the continued scaling up of their pilot programme, identified challenges such as the availability of data on costs for certain rules, the need for extensive guidance and the need for specialised expertise; Finland has also quantified impacts associated with their application of the rule, with the total annual regulatory burden falling by EUR 490 000 prior to significant increases in 2021 and 2022 likely linked to the government response to the Covid-19 pandemic.
Generally, perceptions on the effectiveness of OXIO rules have been mixed. The United Kingdom, for instance, increased offsetting requirements over time to a one-in, three-out target but ultimately decided to repeal the rule altogether. Canada published an evaluation in 2022 noting broad compliance over seven years and an overall removal of 185 regulations equivalent to over CAD 480 million in accumulated administrative burden on business. However, the evaluation also emphasised that repealing rules should not be automatically equated with a reduction in burden, noting that 87% of rules repealed had no impact on the administrative burden on businesses (Government of Canada, 2022[26]). In implementing such rules, the metric of ins and outs needs to be thought through carefully.
Targeted simplification programmes
People will always experience some level of burden in navigating administrative procedures. Governments’ role is to identify when burdens are unavoidable and when they are unnecessary, and remove the latter. Stakeholder feedback can be very valuable in helping governments to do this, as people and businesses are often best positioned to identify especially irritating or burdensome rules and processes. The European Commission, for instance, has an online portal – Have your say: Simplify! – where people can submit suggestions to simplify existing rules and to reduce regulatory burdens; the Commission also launched a call for evidence gathering feedback on burdensome reporting requirements, in support of achieving the Commission’s burden reduction targets (European Commission, 2023[27]). The Commission’s new implementation dialogues and reality checks, discussed in Chapter 4, further ensure that the practical experiences of stakeholders shape the identification and design of simplification measures (European Commission, 2025[8]). Meanwhile, the new Swedish Simplification Council, an independent decision-making body placed at the Agency for Economic and Regional Growth, is tasked with collecting and analysing proposals for simplification from stakeholders, using them as a basis for recommendations to the government. Box 5.2 highlights how Spain uses targeted collaboration with non-government partners to identify and address simplification opportunities.
Spain’s Central Administration seeks to tackle unnecessary administrative burdens through collaborative agreements with key stakeholder organisations. Based on these agreements, stakeholder organisations bring together members and government representatives through workshops and discussion fora to identify burdens and propose specific opportunities for simplification. Currently, the administration has seven agreements with a variety of organisations representing business interests, from the Spanish Chamber of Commerce and Confederation of Business Organizations (CEOE‑CEPYME), to social interests, like persons with disabilities (CERMI) and the elderly/pensioners (PMP). Self-employed people are also represented through ATA and UPTA associations, and so is the Social Economy, by the Spanish Business Confederation (CEPES).
Since 2008, Spain’s Central Administration has received over 2,100 burden reduction proposals through these agreements, submitted through a structured template outlining the issue, responsible entity, relevant regulations, potential solutions, and estimated benefits. Competent ministries review these annually and must respond, indicating whether proposals are accepted, implemented, under review, or rejected, along with justifications. If proposals also impact regional administrations, they are forwarded by the Central Administration to the autonomous communities for review.
Simplification proposals point to some horizontal enablers, as most of them involve:
Enhancing interoperability and co-ordination across government levels
Eliminating redundant requests for information already held by the administration
Digitalising administrative processes
Standardising procedures across Autonomous Communities
Ensuring timely responses from the administration
Improving direct communication with public bodies
As an example of this collaboration in practice, the Spanish Chamber of Commerce alone has signed 14 collaboration agreements over the years, covering horizontal topics such as SMEs and electronic administration, and on specific sectors, such as tourism and agri-food. These agreements have led to over 900 proposals for simplification, around 23% of which were implemented within two years. The agreement on improving administrative processing in the tourism sector, for example, led to 53 proposals that the Chamber estimates would carry 433 million euros total in savings if implemented.
Source: Ministerio para la Transformación Digital y de la Función Pública (2023[28]), “Administrative Simplification in Spain: A Map”; Ministerio para la Transformación Digital y de la Función Pública (2014[29]), Manual de Simplificación Administrativa y Reducción de Cargas para la Administración General Del Estado
Across EUMS, stakeholders generally want more digital and fewer duplicative touchpoints with government – as broad simplification programmes carried out by France and Italy have highlighted (Box 5.3).
In France, a 2023 national consultation on simplification to make life easier for businesses solicited input through an online platform and in-person meetings with business leaders. In total, 29 000 participants submitted and voted on over 5 000 proposals to express their priorities. The most popular proposals were based on simplifying the administrative processes that businesses have to navigate when, for example, getting involved in public procurement processes, applying for aid, changing company information, transferring a business, or ceasing an activity. More userfriendly administration was also a top priority, with proposals on centralising the various government websites and portals that businesses must navigate, enabling access to dedicated advisors over telephone and virtual meetings, continuing to establish one-stop shops, and establishing a “tell us once” framework to avoid businesses needing to constantly re-submit the same information. The findings from the consultation are intended to inform the drafting of legislation to simplify existing rules and procedures.
Italy’s feedback-driven programme follows a target to simplify 600 procedures by 2026 as part of their National Recovery and Resilience Plan emerging from the Covid-19 pandemic. Through a 2022 public consultation, the government received 955 submissions from businesses, public employees, citizens, and public administrations. People contributed to the list of procedures to simplify, with many respondents highlighting unnecessary paper-based processes as a key burden. People also identified fragmented or duplicative information and reporting requirements. These burdens are particularly stressful for processes related to disability and healthcare (such as applications for aid) where the need to navigate through multiple offices and application systems compounds existing life stressors.
Source: Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances (2024[30]), 23 idées plébiscitées pour simplifier la vie des chefs d’entreprise.
Administrative burden can also be a psychological human experience, imposing unnecessary complexity, confusion and stress that makes it difficult for people to go about their lives. Recognising this, “sludge audits” have emerged as a tool to extend traditional administrative burden assessment approaches to account for the psychological experience of dealing with burdens. Sludge audits of a service or process seek to identify the micro-level and hidden behaviours required to complete a process (e.g. waiting time) and analyse psychological experience and costs that include, but go beyond, time and money to encompass more qualitative experiences (e.g. stigma, uncertainty, confusion, lack of respect) (OECD, 2024[21]). In a regulatory context, including a human-centred lens to consider the full citizen experience when identifying regulatory complexities – in addition to standard objective quantification methods (such as the Standard Cost Model) – can help to ensure that simplification efforts bring tangible benefits to the people who have to navigate the rules (Box 5.4).
The Franco-German Barometer on Administrative Complexity is a tool to identify the most complex and irritating administrative procedures encountered by citizens in the French and German border regions. Funded by the European Union, it aims at fostering freedom of movement between France and Germany.
Focusing on the perspective of citizens, the barometer is developed to measure administrative complexity through the perspective of cross-border citizens to identify, evaluate, and simplify the most problematic administrative procedures in the Franco-German area. The barometer is an essential part of the process towards developing simplification solutions. The objective of the tool is to help prioritise between a certain number of pre-identified procedures for follow-up simplification work. This prioritisation exercise is thus determined by the citizens themselves, allowing for a proper human-centric approach.
The general concept of the barometer allows for the perspective of citizens to be captured through life events, ensuring questions are formulated in a way that is meaningful and relatable for citizens. The instrument’s design required an understanding of complexity as seen and experienced by citizens through different quantitative and qualitative elements to consider, ranging from administrative burdens and missed opportunities to frustration, dissatisfaction, and irritants. These elements are parts of what citizens may perceive as complex. Therefore, a key element of the approach developed within this barometer concerns the need for proper balance between quantitative and qualitative sources of information. The barometer survey questionnaire sees both objective and subjective questions, allowing for quantitative information on time and costs as well as perceived complexity. Subjective questions also come with possible bias, further arguing for the need for a hybrid approach combining objective and subjective questions.
Source: OECD work in France and Germany.
Citizens and other stakeholders “experience” rules, including any disparities between policy intent and real‑world impact and implementation issues. Listening to stakeholders’ views is therefore an essential source of insight for governments to improve existing rules. In addition, incorporating feedback from the people who have to comply with the rules can also drive public trust and increase buy-in for resulting policies. For instance, only one‑third of people surveyed by the OECD reported believing their government would adopt opinions expressed in a public consultation. Around 40% said that their government would improve a poorly performing service, implement an innovative idea, or change a national policy in response to public demands (OECD, 2022[31]).
Making reviews open to stakeholders
Availability of information is a critical foundation for the public to be able to engage on how rules are impacting their lives. They need to first know the rules that are in place. It falls upon governments to effectively communicate the existence and content of all rules to the public, ensuring that the public enjoys unimpeded access to regulation. In all EUMS, this is done through a complete and up-to-date legislative and regulatory database, available to the public free of charge in a searchable format over the internet. Most EUMS also publish online a list of laws to be modified, reformed, or repealed in the near-term which allows for the public to remain informed as rules evolve – though less than half of them do so for subordinate regulations. Beyond creating a foundation for public engagement on existing rules, this practice entails broader benefits in increasing transparency while reducing possibilities for abusing discretion and for corrupt behaviour from public officials (OECD, 2022[32]).
While most EUMS engage stakeholders in at least some reviews, improving key practices would bolster the scale and quality of feedback and engagement. Most EUMS have ongoing mechanisms in place for the public to provide feedback on existing rules and actively engage stakeholders in their review (though, on the latter point, only a minority of states do so systematically). Other good practices like providing advance notice to the public when reviews are planned to take place and providing public responses to reviews are notably less common (Figure 5.7), despite being important to establishing productive engagement. Providing advance notice to stakeholders, for example, enables data gathering on actual impacts and experiences that can be brought to bear during reviews. Similarly, referencing the initial impact assessment as part of reviews can prompt people to consider whether the evidence and assumptions used ex ante remain valid. Despite this, only 3 EUMS do so systematically. Ultimately, ensuring people are provided with the access and information needed to meaningfully engage is in the interest of policymakers – who, in turn, can then be better positioned to receive meaningful input that actually helps to determine whether rules are working as intended.
Note: Data based on the 27 Member States of the European Union.
Source: OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) 2024.
Particularly for more significant reviews, transparency is essential to maintaining credibility and buy-in. Reviews and findings should be made public, and reasons provided where feedback is not taken on board. Lack of responsiveness and lack of information about outcomes can reduce the future willingness of stakeholders to participate in review processes, negatively impacting the quality of future reviews, and may erode public trust in government’s regulatory efforts generally (OECD, 2020[4]).
Actively engaging stakeholders in reviews
Policymakers have an increasingly diverse set of tools and approaches at their disposal to gather feedback on existing rules, whether on an ongoing basis or as part of specific reviews. The European Commission’s Have Your Say portal,2 for instance, allows stakeholders to participate in calls for evidence to share direct feedback on how rules are working.
Among the 20 EUMS that report having ongoing mechanisms in place for public, the most common mechanisms are electronic mailbox and websites – both relatively generic initiatives that still provide a way for the public to directly relay comments and concerns on a range of regulatory issues to the government at any point.
More involved and targeted mechanisms range from regular call-outs for comments to standing bodies that assemble specific stakeholder groups to deliberate on regulatory issues. The Danish Business Regulation Forum, for instance, organises regular meetings where representatives from industry associations and businesses come together to discuss regulatory challenges, such as compliance burdens, administrative complexities, or barriers to innovation. The Forum then provides specific policy recommendations to government officials to inform changes for a more business-friendly regulatory environment. As technology continues to advance, digital tools make it increasingly accessible for policymakers to connect directly with stakeholders on the real-world implications of rules. Interactive platforms can be developed to support dialogue and collaboration beyond the independent submission of a comment. These tools not only make it easier for the public to participate, but also provide an avenue for more in-depth, substantive engagement.
Among EUMS, different types of interactive websites have become increasingly adopted since the first survey in 2014, with functionalities tailored to different parts of the policy cycle. Estonia’s eelnoud.valitsus.ee allows members of the public to review and comment directly on draft legislative and regulatory documents. France’s vie-publique.fr, among its missions, allows people to engage on specific rules, as well as more generally on plans and broader initiatives. Finland’s otakantaa.fi offers various interactive features such as surveys, forums for discussions with other users and government representatives, and the ability to submit feedback and proposals on policy issues.
Despite the general growth in adoption, there remains a consistent gap since 2017 in when interactive websites are used. Compared to draft regulations (discussed in Chapter 3), Member States are less likely to use interactive websites for engagement on plans to make regulations, plans to change regulations, or on finalised regulations or on plans change regulations. Chapters 2 and 3 includes further discussion of stakeholder engagement mechanisms and practices in the design and development of regulations.
In addition to involving stakeholders in ongoing evaluations, e.g. to test assumptions and possible recommendations, governments can also place them at the centre of reviews. Through so-called “public stocktakes”, governments invite businesses and citizens to provide information on the effectiveness, efficiency and burdens imposed by any legislation/regulation, either economy-wide or in a specific sector or policy area. 12 EUMS and the EU have undertaken such public stocktakes, spanning sectors and policy areas and driving tangible improvements to the regulatory system:
In Estonia, for example, feedback from underage offenders, their family members, and law enforcement professionals informed changes to address challenges and inefficacies with the “juvenile committee system”, a system intended as an alternative to help keep young people away from detention and the criminal justice system; this review ultimately led to the “juvenile committee system” being abolished.
Finland’s reform of the Food Act combined online and in-person consultations with the public, regulated businesses, and regulatory officials. Feedback collected helped changes to reduce compliance burden, including transition to a risk-based enforcement model, focusing enforcement on high-risk areas and on activities instead of physical locations.
In Slovenia, the government surveyed construction stakeholders, including engineering and architecture groups, municipalities, building inspectors, real estate investors, developers, and realtors. Investors, for instance, identified challenges with a lack of legal certainty in cases where a purchased building is later found to be in non-compliance due to an issue that existed pre-purchase. As a result, reforms included a new option to seek “predecisions” from compliance authorities.
The feedback gathered through evaluation processes carries benefits throughout the policy cycle. Lessons learned from implementation help policymakers adjust laws and regulations – whether designing new or refining existing ones – to enhance outcomes and reduce unnecessary burdens, while also showing people that their insights are being fully integrated, fostering trust. This continuous feedback loop ensures that regulation remains adaptive, relevant, and responsive to societal and economic needs, effectively linking the end of one policy cycle to the beginning of the next.
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← 1. Administrative burdens encompass the costs incurred by individuals and businesses when interacting with government bodies or institutions.