Once a rule has entered into force, governments need to take steps to foster compliance and observe outcomes. The implementation of laws and regulations through various mechanisms fundamentally shapes their real-life impact and perception by citizens and stakeholders. This chapter assesses to what extent governments across the EU plan early how they will implement and monitor rules. It also looks into the use of “smart” risk-based and data-driven approaches in their implementation that maximise efficacy and limit burdens. In addition, the chapter examines how Member States use better regulation tools and co-ordinate throughout the implementation of EU law, in particular when transposing directives into domestic law.
Better Regulation Practices across the European Union 2025
Abstract
The implementation and delivery of laws and regulations is critical to securing impact and achieving government objectives – whether that is keeping people safe, protecting the natural environment or ensuring the proper functioning of markets. Once in force, the real-life impact of laws and regulations depends on whether they are implemented “on the ground”, and how – government action to drive up compliance determines how effective a rule will be in driving behavioural change and meeting policy goals, no matter how well it is designed. Implementation also fundamentally shapes how people and businesses perceive and experience rules, be that as fair and proportionate, or on the contrary, as a source of unnecessary burdens and obstacles. For example, overly complex reporting requirements can weigh heavily on businesses, especially smaller ones, putting competitiveness at risk.
Governments across the EU need to invest more into planning how rules will work out in practice. Once a law or regulation enters into force, public authorities need to enforce it and encourage compliance. This can be achieved through a variety of delivery mechanisms ranging from awareness-raising campaigns, issuing licenses and permits, formal inspection and enforcement regimes and, as a last resort, sanctions for non-compliance. Planning early for these mechanisms, often carried out by decentralised agencies and/or at lower levels of government, can act as a “reality check” and pave the way for smooth implementation. Only a minority of EU Member States (EUMS) require policymakers to identify enforcement mechanisms and assess levels of compliance, suggesting that, too often, implementation comes as an afterthought. This creates a risk that rules might work well in theory but not in practice.
EUMS can improve the effectiveness and efficiency of how rules are enforced on the ground. To make the best use of taxpayers’ money and avoid undue burdens on businesses, governments need to be “smart” in how they deliver and enforce rules. This starts with focussing on those areas where non-compliance would have the most severe consequences. Using risk analysis to guide inspection and enforcement activities – e.g. basing their frequency on the level of risk posed by a certain business (activity) – helps maximise the use of government resources without compromising outcomes. It also ensures proportionality, limiting regulatory burdens, and fosters a more conducive business environment. The use of data analytics and machine learning can help better understand, predict and identify risks associated with specific (economic) activities. At present, only a minority of governments in the EU actively encourages inspection and enforcement authorities to base activities on risk and to use data-driven approaches.
Governments across the EU need to step up efforts to track how rules perform in practice to prevent them going “out of sight, out of mind”. Monitoring the implementation of rules and their real-life outcomes based on clear measurable targets helps policymakers understand if rules are achieving their objectives. This evidence, in turn, is valuable for informing future review and improvements. Sharing monitoring data publicly also supports transparency and can demonstrate government effectiveness. To set up systematic monitoring, policymakers need to determine early on what kind of data or other evidence is needed and how to collect it. Despite some progress over recent years, only a few EUMS require a methodology and/or clear indicators to assess progress towards policy goals when rules are prepared – potentially leaving decision makers as well as the public in the dark as to the effectiveness of rules.
EUMS have scope to improve the domestic implementation of EU law to ensure the smooth functioning of the Single Market and minimise burdens. The implementation of EU law is largely within the purview of the 27 Member States and, in the case of EU directives, starts with their transposition into domestic law. Whilst this process is generally supported by an impact assessment, the risk of “gold-plating” – the addition of requirements that go beyond those of the directive – often remain unchecked. In addition, consultation procedures tend to be less open than for rules originating domestically, foregoing the views from wider stakeholders and citizens. As a result, transposed EU directives can be difficult to comply with and create unnecessary and/or unjustified regulatory costs, leading to a fragmentation of the Single Market.
There remain opportunities for closer collaboration and to pool evidence to improve the implementation of EU law. Sharing information among EUMS and the European Commission throughout the development and implementation of EU law is vital to ensure a level playing field across the Single Market and keep rules practical. It also empowers Member States to learn from each other and foster synergies. In the absence of specific evidence sharing mechanisms for transposition, this potential remains untapped as only a handful of Member States actively use each other’s or the Commission’s impact assessments to inform the transposition of EU directives. Similarly, the feedback loop to inform the review and potential update of EU laws remains incomplete, as only a small minority feed results from their ex post evaluations back to the European Commission.
A rule will only ever be as effective in achieving impact as its implementation on the ground, no matter how well designed it is. Once in force, the effectiveness of a law or regulation depends on the ability of governments to foster compliance and drive behavioural change. For instance, food safety regulation aims at ensuring that the food people eat is safe; however, if regulators are overstretched or otherwise unable to verify that rules are followed in practice, people are exposed to potential harm. For example, a newly established “dark kitchen” operator may inadvertently not be following required hygienic practices – if regulators are unable to detect such cases of non-compliance and intervene to rectify, food quality might be compromised putting people’s health at risk. As such, implementation is critical to securing the desired impact of rules in mitigating risks, ensuring health and safety or protecting the environment.
Implementation also fundamentally shapes how people and businesses perceive and experience rules. For instance, they may find it easier to understand and comply with inherently complex reporting requirements, provided that they are communicated plainly and delivered through efficient digital filing systems. Rules that are enforced consistently and proportionately may be seen as fairer and more legitimate. On the other hand, inefficient implementation can have tangible consequences, like unnecessary burden, confusion, compromised trust in government, or an uneven playing field for businesses (OECD, 2014[1]).
In the EU context, where consistency and a level playing field are critical to the functioning of the Single Market and the free flow of goods, services, people, and capital, the impact of inefficient implementation comes at a high cost. As highlighted in the Letta (2024[2]) report, refining the application of existing regulations on goods and services can potentially unlock efficiency gains amounting to EUR 700 billion by 2030. The European Commission has recognised implementation as a critical priority and, through its Communication on implementation and simplification “A simpler and faster Europe” (2025[3]), strengthened its commitment to reducing administrative burdens for businesses by at least 25%, and by at least 35% for SMEs. It also announced plans to “stress test” the EU acquis and to organise regular implementation dialogues with stakeholders.
As rules are transformed from theory to practice, ongoing monitoring1 of real-world impacts and outcomes helps create an evidence base for ongoing improvement and accountability. When governments actively track the enforcement and impact of rules, for instance through compliance rates or other KPIs and measurable targets for the policy objective, they can quickly identify gaps, unintended consequences, or areas where compliance is lagging (OECD, 2018[4]). Using this data allows for timely adjustments or support, helping businesses and individuals better understand their obligations. It also allows for proactively targeting high-risk areas, streamlining processes in low-risk areas, and closing loopholes that undermine the rule’s functioning (OECD, 2014[1]). All the while, the data gathered through monitoring – especially if based on measurable targets and KPIs – also contributes to an objective evidence base to inform future review and renewal of the political agenda (discussed in Chapter 5). Making relevant data and KPIs available to the public also empowers citizens to hold decision makers accountable and can facilitate effective parliamentary scrutiny.
This chapter scrutinises how governments across the EU can secure lasting impact through evidence-driven and consistent implementation of their laws and regulations, avoiding unnecessary barriers for citizens and businesses. It first considers how policymakers can ensure their rules are reflective of realities on the ground by embedding compliance and enforcement considerations into the early stages of rulemaking. The following sections of the chapter look into efforts across EUMS to harness the potential of risk-based approaches, as well as data-driven and joined-up approaches to maximise the efficacy and proportionality of rules.
This chapter also includes a focus on the use of better regulation tools in relation to the implementation of EU law, which is largely a responsibility of the Member States. After the adoption at EU level, Member States need to take the necessary measures to ensure directives are transposed and regulations are implemented correctly and in time. Incorrect or delayed transposition and implementation measures can pose a risk to the effective implementation of EU law across the Union. The addition of national provisions in transposition measures that go beyond the requirements of the directive – known as “gold-plating” – can further undermine the cohesion of the Single Market. With their pivotal role in mind, this Chapter concludes by looking specifically at how Member States approach the transposition and implementation of EU laws.
Planning for effective monitoring and enforcement needs to be embedded early in the policy-making process. Using relevant evidence is critical in demonstrating the effectiveness of government interventions and to strengthen accountability. New or changed rules should be monitored by policymakers by drawing on reliable data and other information to gauge real-life impacts (OECD, 2012[5]). Similarly, considering how a rule should be implemented through different enforcement mechanisms helps to ensure it is practical.
Monitoring progress
Observing and publishing performance against measurable targets – be it to protect people from food poisoning when they eat out or keeping rivers and wetlands safe from wastewater – enables officials to understand what works and what does not and allows people to scrutinise government action. To ensure that can occur, policymakers need to set the foundation for future monitoring when the rules are being designed. This includes, for instance, establishing the processes for gathering, analysing and reviewing data and other evidence. As they draft rules, policymakers should therefore simultaneously consider how it will later be determined whether requirements are working as intended, both in terms of effectiveness (“does it achieve its objective?”) and efficiency (“does it use more resources than is necessary?”) (OECD, 2020[6]).
Overall, governments across the EU have scope for improvement when it comes to monitoring the implementation and impact of their rules. Despite some slight improvements over the years, the number of EUMS requiring to set out a process for assessing progress in achieving the goals for at least for major new rules is only at about half (14 in 2024 up from 8 in 2017 for primary laws and 10 up from 6 for subordinate regulations). In addition, not all of them underpin this with a clear methodology and indicators that measure progress (Table 4.1). Even fewer require indicators that measure the contribution towards a country’s more strategic long-term goals, which could help ensure policy coherence. The lack of clear methodologies and indicators compromises governments’ capability to monitor rules post‑implementation, leaving ineffective or obsolete rules that undermine social, economic, or environmental goals unnoticed. As an example of positive adoption, the Romanian Government Decree No. 443 from 2022 provides that each normative act should 1) specify whether there is already a monitoring system regarding aspects within scope of the act; 2) a description of the way in which the impact of the act will be monitored; and 3) the indicators that will be monitored for the purpose of evaluating the results of the normative act will be listed.
Note: Data for the European Union reflects requirements and practices of the European Commission.
Source: OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) 2024.
Despite the general lack of indicators and methodologies to measure progress against the objectives of rules, there are notable practice examples of EUMS gathering, analysing and making relevant data publicly available. In France, a circulaire from 2019 requires each legislative proposal to be supported by five impact indicators to enable policymakers to effectively measure the achievement of policy objectives. These indicators must be presented when the draft law is tabled in cabinet and included in the impact assessment. At a broader level, France has established in 2021 and revised in 2023 the Baromètre des résultats de l'action publique,2 which provides the public with a real-time overview of the progress made against 60 key policies, grouped under four priority areas. Each policy objective is underpinned by one or more progress indicators and additional information provides context on impacts at a regional or local level.
Planning for enforcement and inspections
Governments in EUMS still have some way to go to create effective linkages between upstream (design) and downstream (delivery) considerations of regulation that can boost the impact rules might have in practice. Regulatory enforcement, i.e. the activities conducted by or on behalf of public authorities aimed at promoting compliance and reaching regulations’ outcomes can take a variety of forms, including: issuing information and guidance, data collection and analysis, or inspections (OECD, 2014[1]). To make sure rules are grounded in reality, policymakers must plan ahead to select the most effective (mix of) enforcement tools and anticipate expected compliance levels. However, most EUMS still do not systematically hardwire early consideration of regulatory delivery into the development of rules, suggesting that implementation remains somewhat of an afterthought (Figure 4.1). Only around one-third of EUMS identify and assess potential enforcement mechanisms for all or major rules when designing them, with very limited movement since 2017; still fewer assess expected levels of compliance.
Note: Data based on the 27 Member States of the European Union.
Source: OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) 2024.
Gaps in planning for implementation can impede the effectiveness of rules once adopted. For instance, policymakers might realise too late that they have not required reporting of necessary information or if there are insufficient public resources to carry out the necessary inspection schedule. To prevent this, the Netherlands, developed an implementation test to identify early any adjustments necessary to facilitate implementation while they are still feasible (Box 4.1). The implementation test was used, for instance, to verify the feasibility of proposed entry into force timeline for corporate tax relief rules (Knowledge Centre for Policy and Regulations, 2023[7]).
In 2023, the Dutch government developed an implementation test (Invoeringstoets) to better understand how regulations work out in practice and what can be improved. Its objective is to provide an early feedback loop to identify necessary adjustments while they are still feasible.
The implementation test is designed to be conducted at the earliest possible moment when meaningful observations from implementation can be made. As such, it is an “ex durante” test that provides early insights into perceived bottlenecks for the regulation’s target group and the implementing organisation. It thereby seeks to potentially reveal early signs of failure and to enable course corrections rather than to definitively confirm the effectiveness of the regulation. A series of core questions guide the test:
1. How does the scheme work out for the people, organisations or companies for whom it is intended?
A. How is the scheme experienced by the target group and other stakeholders?
B. Are there any bottlenecks or unintended effects in practice? (for example, ICT problems or discriminatory aspects)
C. To what extent does practice correspond with the assumptions from the preparatory phase of the scheme?
2. How does the scheme work out for implementation?
A. How is the implementation of the scheme experienced by the implementing organisations?
B. Are there any bottlenecks or unintended effects in the implementation practice?
C. To what extent does practice correspond with the assumptions from the implementation test?
The implementation test offers several benefits. Firstly, it enables quicker and more effective responses to feedback received (from citizens, implementing organisations, and businesses) about how new regulations are working in practice, allowing adjustments or its early termination. Furthermore, it aids implementing organisations by allowing them to report practical obstacles back to policymakers. Lastly, the implementation test can help the House of Representatives enhance its legislative, supervisory, and representative roles. Experience from initial trials of the innovation tests have been shared across the administration through a dedicated network and have fed into a guideline published in October 2024.
Source: Government of the Netherlands, Knowledge Centre for Policy and Regulations (KCBR), https://www.kcbr.nl/themas/themas-z/invoeringstoets.
Governments need to be “smart” and methodical in how they implement rules in order to maximise their effectiveness and efficiency in keeping people safe, while also limiting burdens on businesses. Testing and inspecting every individual product and business on an ongoing basis is neither achievable (limited resources) nor desirable (unnecessary burdens). Smart implementation of rules involves focussing compliance and enforcement activities on the level of risk they seek to mitigate and targeting interventions and actions, such as inspections, accordingly (OECD, 2021[8]).
In this landscape, regulators’ approaches should generally aim to focus on the positive promotion of compliance, with punishment as a last resort. To do so, inspectors should rely on a wide range of tools towards regulated entities that allow both i) providing guidance to those who are not yet fully aware of complex requirements or do not understand them, and ii) only adopting appropriate punitive measures against businesses for the most severe cases of infringement, where they actively and knowingly create significant risks or engage in criminal activities (Ayres and Braithwaite, 2016[9]). Helping businesses comply and rewarding those who do so voluntarily and spontaneously can help nurture a common interest towards the protection of public goods (e.g. health, safety, environment) and, thereby, help strengthen trust between the public and private sectors.
Risk-based enforcement and inspections
All enforcement activities, including inspections, should be informed by an analysis of risks, understood as a combination of the likelihood of an adverse event and the potential resulting magnitude of harm (OECD, 2021[8]). Public authorities can use risk assessment to target the most pressing challenges. More targeted enforcement can help focus on those areas where rule breaches are the most likely and/or have the gravest consequences. Doing so not only helps to upkeep vital protections for citizens and the environment, but also minimises burdens on businesses and saves public resources. For instance, data analysis, mathematical models and information systems can be used to predict where non-compliance is most likely to occur. This enables regulators to tailor their inspection regime to target those businesses that are most likely to be non-compliant (see Box 4.2).
Using food inspection results in Lombardy and Campania regions, a compliance analysis was conducted to mitigate risks. Each inspection entails checks on various procedures (e.g. surface cleanliness, animal welfare). Assuming that a company in non-compliance of any of these points is probably also in breach of others, statistical correlations can predict compliance issues.
Companies that were in breach in the past were also more likely to be in breach in subsequent inspections. These observations allow authorities to focus resources on companies most at risk and help them achieve compliance. For instance, the analysis of the historical inspections in food safety revealed correlations between the outcomes of different inspection procedures of the same company. This paves the way for the possibility of inferring compliance variations for aspects not yet inspected. Therefore, the tool could be used both as a self-assessment system for the company and as a “probability” component for a complete risk-assessment system.
Source: OECD work in Italy.
Enforcement and inspection activities are typically delegated to arms’-length bodies but central governments in EU countries can play an important role in setting expectations and enabling them to adopt risk-based approaches. However, evidence suggests that governments of EUMS can better encourage the adoption of risk-based approaches to inspections and enforcement, as only around half of EUMS actively require their inspection and enforcement authorities to base their activities on risk criteria (Figure 4.2). Around one-quarter allow such approaches but do not actively require them, whilst the remaining EUMS do not allow such approaches at all. This puts a question mark behind how risk-based approaches are currently being used to boost effectiveness and efficiency of rules. Similarly, only 9 EUMS report having a regulation and/or policy document that explicitly allows for differentiated responsive enforcement (i.e. depending on the profile, compliance history and behaviour of specific businesses).
Note: Data based on the 27 Member States of the European Union.
Source: OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) 2024.
Allowing, and even mandating, the use of risk-based approaches is insufficient if there is no proper understanding of what they actually mean, and how to implement them. Authorities need to translate findings from gathering data and risk analysis to proactively target their inspections (OECD, 2018[4]). In the Autonomous Province of Trento in Italy, the Agricultural Payments Agency (APPAG) distributes payments to farmers based on land management practices, such as manual mowing or limited pesticide use, with contributions proportional to land size. Given the limited regional resources for inspection, APPAG seeks to prioritise inspections based on the level of risk. To do so and to improve precision, the agency applied machine learning techniques to validate and refine its risk criteria, making it easier to identify high-risk cases and improve non-compliance detection. Proportionality and risk-responsiveness mean that, even if a violation is found in a business that is usually compliant (or is a new business), but this violation is particularly egregious and poses very serious threats to life, health or other essential public goods or rights, the enforcement response should be stronger and more coercive than in cases where violations are relatively less egregious and do not create an imminent hazard (OECD, 2014[1]).
Risk-based licensing and permitting
Consideration of risk should also guide authorities’ approach to licensing and permitting. Whilst licensing and permitting are an important part of the regulator’s toolkit for ensuring compliance with rules and enabling responsible economic development, they should only be used when necessary to safeguard against risks to people and the environment. In cases where hazards are limited and/or the probability and intensity of harm is low, considering a more proportionate regulatory tool that imposes less burden on regulators and businesses alike, such as notifications, may be appropriate (Figure 4.3) (OECD, forthcoming[10]). If and where licensing and permitting is needed, aligning processes and requirements with the level of risk avoids bureaucratic hurdles for businesses that hinder the commercialisation of innovation and take up excessive government resources to administer. If an activity is considered low risk, for instance, less information may be asked for in the licence application or lighter reporting may be required to maintain a license (OECD, forthcoming[10]). In Portugal, under the Responsible Industry System, thresholds based on the level of environmental and food safety risks are being used to determine both, whether licensing should apply and, if so, the level of information and reporting obligations imposed on a business.
Source: OECD (forthcoming[10]), Best Practice Principles for Licensing and Permitting: Mitigating Risks and Incentivising Growth.
Risk-based licensing and permitting has played an important role in fostering the safe development of renewable energy technologies, which is critical in achieving the EU’s objectives under the European Green Deal. In the case of environmental protection and in order to speed up the green transition, substantial efforts are needed to: 1) minimise the use of permitting, e.g. for the use of hydrogen applications, (and related information obligations and requirements) to what is strictly necessary, while 2) ensuring risk proportionality throughout the permitting process and 3) ensuring risks are assessed in a comprehensive context that accounts for various trade-offs (OECD, 2023[11]) (OECD, 2014[1]) (OECD, forthcoming[10]). The flexibility to enable a proportionate approach to licensing needs to be built in upstream, including by specifying scenarios in legislation can enable regulators to enhance or relax requirements according to the level of risk. For instance, low-risk and generally small-scale renewable energy installations, like small-scale solar installations, can have simplified processes as the safety issues (both to environment and the public) are not severe. This is already taken into account in European countries where an environmental impact assessment is not required for small-scale projects (OECD, 2024[12]).
Regulators have found it challenging to balance safety risks associated with the deployment of renewable energy technologies with the slow permitting processes resulting from technological uncertainty. If a risk is known to exist but its probability and magnitude of harm are uncertain or unknown, the precautionary principle (PP) can inform the approach of risk assessments (OECD, 2023[11]). However, as the PP often works with worst-case scenarios, which can lead to the “exaggeration of real risk” (OECD, 2023[13]), an over-application can undermine the pace of green innovation. To ensure balanced delivery of regulation, the government must regularly consider whether increasing or decreasing the stringency of regulatory frameworks as scientific insights on risk evolve (European Commission, 2023[14]). Here, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) can provide a clear picture of the risks, advantages and disadvantages of a range of options to guide regulatory delivery.
The OECD recommends looking at risks or public concerns together and how they interact with climate risks, rather than considering them in isolation (OECD, 2023[13]). In licensing and permitting of low emissions infrastructure, risks need to be assessed in a wider systemic and cumulative context that accounts for trade-offs (e.g. the trade-offs between the harms of climate change and the safety risks from producing, transporting, storing and using low carbon energy). Co-ordination between different authorities can help build a complete understanding to inform risk assessment. The need for co-ordination and holistic risk assessments also form part of the six lessons learned from hydrogen deployment in the Netherlands, which were identified by the OECD (see Box 4.3).
Policymakers and regulators tend to take a more cautious approach towards permitting new technologies because of an unclear understanding of the way safety works. Regulators struggled to balance safety risks from the deployment of hydrogen technologies with slow permitting due to technological uncertainty. Six lessons were identified to support the transition toward widespread use of low-emission hydrogen in the Netherlands:
1. Advances in knowledge and technologies allow for better management of hydrogen risks.
2. Holistic risk assessments can ensure regulation effectively balances the multiple risks at stake.
3. Additional caution should be applied where necessary and when risks are still largely unknown.
4. Focusing on outcomes rather than prescribing detailed procedures can support efficient licensing, inspection, and enforcement practices.
5. Effective communication and guidance can support public trust and an enabling investment climate.
6. Role clarity, effective co-ordination and sufficient resources can empower public institutions to keep pace with changes.
Advances in technology and a more interconnected society create new challenges as well as opportunities for governments to rethink how rules are delivered. The ability to gather and process large amounts of data in real time and using algorithms for risk analysis and prediction, enables regulatory enforcement agencies to monitor how rules are working in practice and identify non-compliance at pace. At the same time, risks have become more globalised and increasingly transcend national borders, making information exchange and concerted action critical to keeping people safe and protecting the environment. This is particularly the case in the highly integrated EU Single Market. However, most EUMS are yet to unleash the full potential of data and co-operation to improve how rules are monitored and enforced on the ground.
Data-driven approaches to monitoring and enforcement
Approximately three-quarters of EUMS are not applying data-driven approaches (Figure 4.4). Such approaches rely on the collection, utilisation and publication of (big) data to expand regulatory capacity and to improve the design, delivery, and review of laws and regulations. They can be supported by big data analytics, Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of Things, cloud computing, augmented reality, unmanned aerial vehicles, blockchain and open APIs. Data-driven approaches enable regulators to more effectively and efficiently monitor how rules are working in practice and/or to inform enforcement strategies. They can also provide a continuous, real time feedback loop of evidence into the policy-making process, making regulation more adaptive to changing circumstances. A similar low proportion – one-quarter – of EUMS do apply data-driven methods to monitor the impacts of laws and regulations. Where undertaken, most EUMS report applying data-driven methods relatively recently.
Note: Data based on the 27 Member States of the European Union.
Source: OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) 2024.
Data that was previously unavailable, inaccessible or only usable at significant administrative cost can be harnessed through technology to enable more effective monitoring and targeted enforcement of rules (OECD, 2020[15]). Tools like web scrapers are becoming increasingly common for compliance functions, making it possible to navigate the wealth of data available online and generate relevant insights. In Italy, for example, a regional environmental protection agency uses an automated web scraper to identify businesses that have not applied for required licences allowing the agency to monitor pollution activities. The programme uses public search engines like Google and Bing to identify businesses webpages (e.g. searching “car repair Trentino”), and then compares business identification numbers from webpages with the list of licenced operators. Examples from various countries showcase how data analytics can be employed to inform how monitoring and enforcement resources are targeted (see Box 4.4).
Estonia’s statistical office, in collaboration with mobile network operators, utilised mobile phone positioning data to analyse the impact of COVID-19 restrictions on mobility. This project demonstrated that mobile phone data can precisely and swiftly measure human mobility, providing valuable insights into population movement patterns at both national and local levels. Additionally, Estonia is using data analytics to evaluate the effects of the country’s 2014 e-residency regulation, which grants holders a transnational digital identity. The country is also employing data-driven methods to enhance traffic safety, including adaptive traffic lights, dynamic speed limits, real-time public transportation data, demand-based public transport, and AI-powered cameras in transit buses to detect parking violations in bus lanes and at stops.
In 2021, Latvia's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) adopted goAML, a tool originally developed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. This application streamlines the analysis and digital submission of suspicious transaction reports and threshold declarations from entities subject to the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation Law. It also enhances information exchange with competent law enforcement, supervisory and control authorities in the field of financial intelligence. In 2023, a new version of goAML was introduced, tailored to global trends in financial intelligence, to improve FIU’s operations and ensure the collection of higher quality data for investigating money laundering cases and collaborating with relevant institutions.
Portugal’s e-communications regulator, ANACOM, is starting to use AI in handling complaints by developing the Artificial Intelligence Platform for the Analysis and Management of Consumer Experience. ANACOM’s goal is to achieve a comprehensive and complete view of market behaviour, enabling it to act more effectively in defending consumer interests. The platform, which is expected to be launched around the third trimester of 2024, will serve as the application support for processing complaints and information requests, while also enabling the identification of consumer dissatisfaction patterns and other behavioural trends of analytical interest, particularly on social networks. One of its main advantages is the automated classification of complaints by reason, which will make it easier for the regulatory body to measure consumer dissatisfaction levels.
Source: Statistics Estonia, Mobility analysis; Transport Administration of Estonia (2021[16]), Road Transport ITS Development Plan 2021-2025; Latvian Ministry of Economy (2017[17]), Guidelines on the application of the “consult first” principle in the work of public institutions; Forthcoming OECD paper on AI in Regulatory Delivery.
Importantly, digital tools can empower members of the public to promote compliance and buy-in. In Lithuania, as part of a plan to tackle rising waste production and littering in the countryside in 2023, the environmental protection regulator launched a web and mobile application called “I manage Lithuania” (Tvarkau Lietuva) that enables citizens to report illegal waste (Ministry of Environment, 2024[18]). The regulator can then follow up to communicate when the report is received, addressed, and provide feedback on the actions taken. This application was inspired by systems used in many cities to let people notify the municipal authorities of damaged public goods or areas in need of cleaning. The system offers several advantages: it is very simple to use and entirely transparent as every message is public, showcasing the reaction of the authority.
To proactively prevent non-compliance, other countries have developed web services to give users a better understanding of their obligations. As part of its food safety strategy, the Campania region of Italy has launched a self-assessment tool to reinforce business compliance, called GISA Autovalutazione (self-assessment) (Region of Campania, n.d.[19])). The web-based application allows companies to access and fill out the official and relevant inspection checklist autonomously. This enables them to identify the strengths and weaknesses of their facilities from the health authorities’ perspective. The tool is also available to “guest users”, enabling individuals to learn more about food and veterinary requirements before setting up a business, depending on its future characteristics. The result of the self-simulated inspection is expressed as a risk level. The purpose of GISA Autovalutazione is to educate, and it is therefore not a mandatory self-monitoring or self-reporting tool. Advances in the use of predictive techniques may in the future allow the tool to also indicate the occurrence of potential risks to profiled companies by enhancing their historical data.
Maximising effectiveness and efficiency through joined-up action
The risks and challenges that rules are seeking to tackle do not stop at borders – be they between different countries, regions or municipalities or between industries and sectors of the economy. However, the practical implementation of rules on the ground can often reveal gaps, duplication and inconsistencies in regulatory requirements, making them hard to understand and comply with. For instance, businesses that operate across jurisdictional boundaries may find it difficult to comply with varying interpretations of the same rule. In addition, businesses that are subject to various regulatory frameworks might be asked to provide the same information to different enforcement bodies, exacerbating administrative burdens. To maximise the effectiveness and efficiency of rules, policymakers and those responsible for implementation must collaborate within and across borders to expand their evidence base, share best practice, and to ensure coherent and consistent implementation of rules.
Within borders
Governments across the EU can foster more effective and data-driven enforcement by promoting and supporting information sharing between relevant authorities. The data held by one regulatory authority can afford useful insights for another. For example, a business that is in breach of food standard regulations may also be more likely be non-compliant in other areas. Sharing information about businesses, their compliance history and other characteristics can help regulators create synergies and maximise efficiency in how they enforce rules. By pooling data and expertise together, agencies can have a global picture of potential risks and vulnerabilities in regulated industries and activities. Sharing information in real-time also allows for quicker identification of non-compliance and emerging risks, enabling authorities to take quick action if needed. In the Netherlands, Inspection View is an integrated used by over 500 national, regional, and local inspectors to consult and exchange data on inspections and enforcement of businesses, including data and results from previous inspection visits. Inspectors can then use this data to target actions in areas of higher risk and prevent duplication (OECD, 2021[8]).
Governments can positively influence and set expectations of arms-length bodies to collaborate and share data. For example, adopting strategic policies or binding requirements on regulators can set important signals to compel regulators to share data – especially in an environment where data protection concerns can act as a disincentive. However, evidence suggests that countries are not fully exploiting the potential of sharing information systematically, as approximately one-third of EUMS do not allow for information-sharing by enforcement authorities with their counterparts in other bodies (Figure 4.5); another third does allow information sharing but does not actively require it. Authorities that operate in siloes risk creating gaps in their understanding of the market and emerging issues.
Central government and ministries also have a crucial role to play in facilitating seamless join-up and knowledge exchange between enforcement authorities, making life easier for the people complying with rules. Government bodies co-ordinating and sharing relevant information behind-the-scenes, e.g. through common IT systems and platforms, can limit the burden of navigating duplicative processes from falling on people and businesses. Portugal, for instance, developed the interoperability platform iAP that aims to connect public entities and digital platforms that accumulate public information and allows public services to share data in real time, thereby facilitating the “only-once principle”, whereby citizens do not have to repeatedly provide information that is already in a public administration database. Chapter 5 further discusses efforts to reduce administrative burden by reviewing existing rules and processes.
Note: Data based on the 27 Member States of the European Union.
Source: OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) 2024.
The prominent role of sub-national levels of government in implementing and enforcing laws and regulations in many EUMS creates a need for co-ordination and join-up, both horizontally and vertically. In several Member States, regional and/or local governments (or affiliated agencies) are charged with the implementation of regulations issued by national governments – or even those emanating from EU law. They do so through licensing, permitting and inspections and enforcement. Furthermore, subnational governments also often have the responsibility to regulate specific areas, such as sanitation, health services, waste management, and in some cases, energy generation and distribution. This system of shared responsibility for rulemaking and implementation means government bodies on different levels need to co-ordinate to avoid horizontal and vertical gaps, overlaps and contradictions in how rules are applied.
Evidence shows that mechanisms to promote regulatory coherence across levels of government are not consistently used across all EUMS yet. The number of EUMS with a co-ordination mechanism across national and subnational governments or municipalities to promote coherence in regulatory approaches and avoid duplication or conflict has increased from 17 in 2020 to 19 in 2024. The most common mechanism is a standing co-ordination mechanism, such as standing bodies, councils, or regular formalised meetings, as opposed to ad hoc commissions, laws, or administrative arrangements. These mechanisms can be cross-cutting or focus on specific policy issues or areas. Box 4.5 showcases an example from the Netherlands on providing advice on the correct application of EU law.
Europa Decentraal is an initiative founded in 2002 by the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the Association of Dutch Municipalities, the Interprovincial Consultation and the Union of Water Boards to assist decentralised authorities and national governments with questions about European Union law and policy. By informing and advising central and decentralised governments in the Netherlands about European law and policy, Europa Decentraal helps them with questions about the correct application of regulations coming from the European Union. According to the 2023 report by Decentraal, during that year it handled around 500 requests for help and advice with European Union law and policy, where 68% came from local or provincial government, 9% from central government, and the rest from other government bodies.
Source: OECD work in Italy; https://europadecentraal.nl/, accessed 20 April 2024.
Across borders
Just as challenges cross borders, so must the response to tackle them. To implement rules consistently and avoid loopholes, governments and enforcement agencies also need to collaborate with their counterparts in other countries – particularly in a context as interconnected as the EU, with goods, services, capital, and people flowing freely across borders where concerted action is necessary to avoid loopholes and inconsistencies. In addition to making rules more effective, collaborating across borders can also help governments avoid unnecessary divergence of rules and create synergies and save taxpayer and business resources, as well as citizen headaches (OECD, 2021[20]). For example, the OECD’s Environment, Health and Safety (EHS) Programme, through its Mutual Acceptance of Data system, helps avoid repeat testing for industrial chemicals, pesticides and biocides and reduces testing through the use of computational approaches for prediction of properties of chemicals. The annual net benefits of the programme were estimated at over EUR 309 million. In addition, over 32 000 fewer animals were needed annually for testing new industrial chemicals (APEC-OECD, n.d.[21]). Furthermore, The OECD’s work in promoting administrative simplification and regulatory efficiency is strengthening this approach by supporting human-centric policies and enhancing cross-border co-operation within the EU, fostering greater freedom of movement between Member States.
Collaboration and join-up between enforcement bodies in different countries is especially critical to keep consumers safe across the EU’s integrated Single Market. Each Member State is responsible for the effective surveillance of their markets to protect consumers, workers, and businesses against unsafe products and unfair competition. To do so, they must monitor whether products on the market are safe and compliant and, as necessary, take actions like product recalls or sanctions to take products off the market or bring them into compliance (European Commission, 2023[22]). Within the Single Market where products can circulate freely, effective market surveillance requires authorities in different jurisdictions to co-ordinate and share information. Tools like the OECD’s Global Recalls portal,3 as well as the Commission’s Information and Communication System for Market Surveillance (ICSMS)4 and Safety Gate5 help to facilitate sharing and co-ordination. Safety Gate, for instance, acts as a rapid alert system for dangerous non-food products across the EU. There is further potential to use other data sources, such as firefighting and healthcare institutions, which could signal to the market surveillance authority that a fire or an injury was linked to a specific dangerous product. The OECD has assisted Member States to review data sharing approaches within their market surveillance frameworks (Box 4.6).
Greece: Leveraging international platforms
To better predict the emergence of dangerous products on the market, the Greek government is looking to leverage expert heuristics, data sharing with other members of the EU Single Market and improved collection of user outputs. The approach will be based on a series of risk factors associated with class of products a software will guide inspectors to focus on the riskier produces first. The system will also be connected to the European ICSMS platform that allows market surveillance authorities to share information on their ongoing investigations. It will also receive data from Safety Gate, the European rapid alert system for dangerous products. Finally, as investigations often result from customer warnings, the paper forms previously used by the authorities will be replaced with an online system where anyone can send an alert to market surveillance inspectors.
Latvia: The impacts of fragmentation
Latvia's market surveillance actions are co-ordinated and implemented by the Ministry of Economics, who acts as market surveillance co-ordinating body. However, with market surveillance responsibilities fragmented (e.g. the Consumer Rights Protection Centre supervises most non-food products, but at least six authorities are responsible for surveillance of chemicals), effective communication between authorities is essential. Different authorities use different data platforms at various levels of modernisation to manage their surveillance – however, the absence of a centralised, integrated data-sharing platform limits the exchange of critical information among authorities and impedes the effective co-ordination of surveillance efforts. The OECD is supporting Latvia with recommendations on how to address this challenge and encourages the country to enhance data exchange mechanisms that allow for regular data-sharing between different authorities. Achieving full interoperability and making records of other authorities easily available would be important, especially if several inspection structures are active in the same regulatory field.
Source: OECD work in Greece and Latvia.
Member States play a pivotal role in the implementation of EU laws. According to the Treaties, they are responsible for the effective application of EU laws, including potential enforcement mechanisms. In the case of directives, Member States are also responsible for the timely and accurate incorporation into their domestic legal frameworks. By a set date, EUMS must send the Commission the text of the national measures that incorporate the directive into their national legislation. The Commission is responsible for making sure that all Member States follow through on their implementation obligations and may take remedial actions in cases of non-compliance.
The divergent implementation of EU law by Member States can lead to a fragmentation of the Single Market and undermine its efficiency. Although all EUMS are equally bound by the objectives set out in the EU directive, their unique political, legislative, institutional, and capacity contexts means that national transposition and implementation measures can give rise to divergence of EU law and their real-life impacts on people and businesses. Between Finland and Sweden, for instance, factors like diverse RIA methodologies, varying levels of government centralisation, and different political mandates all contributed to divergence in how national provisions were formulated and how policies were implemented (Nerhagen and Jussila Hammes, 2024[23]). In particular, the tendency of EUMS to add national provisions that go beyond the actual requirements set-out in the directive – also known as “gold-plating” – further exacerbates the risk of divergence and creates additional costs for businesses as pointed out in Draghi (2024[24]) report.
Consistent implementation is further challenged by cases of incorrect, incomplete, or non-transposition. Actions taken by the Commission in 2022 included launching pre-infringement processes with 16 Member States due to incorrect transposition of agricultural policy rules, referring 10 Member States to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for failing to fully transpose the European Electronic Communications Code into national law, and requesting the ECJ to impose financial sanctions on five Member States that still had not notified of transposition measures for the Code (European Commission, 2023[25]). By using the better regulation tools described below and ensuring strong communication between parties, Member States can implement EU law in a manner that aligns with domestic interests without propagating unnecessary inconsistencies and regulatory barriers across the EU.
Use of better regulation tools in the transposition of EU directives
The transposition process allows national governments to determine the best form and method to domestically enact EU law. Even as more Member States opt for copying out directives as much as possible for simplicity and consistency, elaboration is still favoured on occasion to ensure policies fit the domestic context (Voermans, 2018[26]). The use of better regulation practices at the transposition stage is relatively well developed – especially compared to the negotiation stage. A possible reason for this is that a large majority of EUMS indicate that, whether in carrying out regulatory impact assessment (RIA) and/or consultation, they follow the same procedures for transposition as for their own domestic rules. However, as discussed below, there remain concerns for EUMS to address: further attention needs to be paid to risks of “gold-plating” EU directives and evidence sharing in relation to transposition of directives and implementation of EU law.
Regulatory impact assessment
Government across EUMS have a crucial role to play in making sure that transposition of EU directives is based on the best possible evidence. The original impact assessment carried out by the European Commission does not necessarily include an assessment of impacts on individual Member States, given the need for specific national data. By definition, it also pre-dates any potential amendments by the Council and Parliament. Systematically assessing the impacts of transposing measures on the domestic economy, society and legal framework can help bridge the gap to identify the most appropriate option, catering to both EU requirements and national circumstances. Approximately three-quarters of EUMS systematically require RIA to inform the design of domestic regulations that transpose EU directives into national law (Figure 4.6).
Note: Data based on the 27 Member States of the European Union.
Source: OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) 2024.
Despite the prevalence of RIA requirements at the transposition stage, there remain opportunities to improve, expand and pool the evidence base at this stage. Only around half of EUMS use the Commission’s Impact Assessment – and most of them only do so “sometimes” – and less than a quarter of EUMS use those conducted by other Member States to inform their transposition (Figure 4.7). There is also limited evidence of any specific mechanism to share information on anticipated impacts of EU law with other Member States and the Commission. Only four EUMS indicate having such a mechanism and, in most cases, refer to Council working parties and/or Commission working groups. The absence of a bespoke mechanism to share and pool evidence leaves Member States vulnerable to duplicating analytical efforts, overlooking relevant evidence gathered by other jurisdictions, and creating inconsistencies across the Single Market.
Note: Data based on the 27 Member States of the European Union.
Source: OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) 2024.
In most Member States, the procedures to assess impacts of transposition measures are the same as those for domestic rules. Only a small minority (4) of them indicate that procedures for transposition differ: in Estonia, the process is similar but provides an exemption from the development of a legislative intent document if the EU directive leaves no room for discretion; in Cyprus the RIA questionnaire is slightly different for transposition measures and in Czechia, the transposing measure is checked by the Department of Compatibility with EU Law within the Office of the Government. In Romania, legislation that transposes EU law is exempted from RIA requirements altogether. However, slightly more EUMS – less than one-third – have specific guidance for officials on how the RIA should be carried out on transposition measures. In Finland, for instance, the new 2022 RIA guidelines include a dedicated section addressing on the implementation of EU law (examples of specific unique guidance are discussed below and in (Box 4.7).
The risk of additional national requirements that go beyond the actual requirements set-out in the directive – a practice known as “gold-plating” continues to go largely unchecked. Unchanged from 2021, few EUMS systematically assess the additional impacts that gold-plating imposes on domestic citizens and businesses (Figure 4.8), creating a risk of unnecessary and/or not properly justified burdens. EUMS are required to inform the Commission of gold-plating, but this does not prevent inconsistencies that can fragment the Single Market, creating uneven playing fields (Letta, 2024[2]).
Note: Data based on the 27 Member States of the European Union.
Source: OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) 2024.
However, recently, some countries have taken steps to guard against the risk of gold-plating. Both Finland and Slovakia have taken measures to prevent the unnecessary expansion of national legislation beyond the minimum requirements of EU directives by issuing relevant guidance and – in the case of Slovakia – institutionalising advice mechanisms (Box 4.7).
In Slovakia, the Slovak Ministry of Economy introduced in 2021 the reformed “Measures to reduce regulatory burden on business”. The reform was developed to mitigate the administrative and regulatory burdens caused by the transposition or implementation of European legislation into Slovak law, that may create a barrier to competitiveness for entrepreneurs operating in Slovakia compared to entities from other EU countries where the increased burden does not exist. As part of the amendment, the Institute of Protection against Unfounded Gold Plating was introduced, as well as the ex post evaluation of regulations impacting the business environment. The law proposers are responsible for identifying in the compliance table whether gold plating is applied during the transposition of a directive, including specifying its category, the areas affected, and the type of impact. The proposer must also provide a justification for the gold plating in the compliance table and include any additional required details about its characteristics. If the draft law introduces gold plating during the implementation of a European Union regulation or decision, the extent of this implementation will be separately assessed in the general section of the explanatory report.
Finland’s new RIA guidelines of 2022 specifies that RIAs should carefully assess impacts and options for any kind of national tailoring in the transposition of EU law. RIAs should distinguish impacts arising from standard EU provisions and impacts arising from any provisions proposed solely for national reasons. This applies especially to situations where the EU legal act comprises minimum regulation and national measures propose gold plating; in these cases, the impacts of using or not using any potential room for manoeuvre should be assessed comprehensively and justified accordingly.
Source: Slovak Ministry of Economy (2025[27]), Protection against unjustified gold plating; Finnish Government (2023[28]), Guidelines for Impact Assessment in Law Drafting; OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) 2024.
Stakeholder engagement
Policymakers in Member States routinely seek stakeholders’ views to inform the transposition of EU directives but processes are less open than for domestic rulemaking. By seeking stakeholders’ input during transposition, national governments can ensure that resulting measures remain aligned with local realities that may not have been considered in the formulation of the Commission’s proposal. Contrasting the relative rarity of consultation requirements during the negotiation stage (see Chapter 3), approximately two-thirds of EUMS systematically require engagement with stakeholders to inform the transposition of EU directives. In keeping with previous results and analogous to RIA, stakeholder engagement requirements for transposing EU directives largely mirror domestic rulemaking procedures: the proportion of EUMS with such requirements is similar to the proportion that report having stakeholder engagement requirements for domestic laws and regulations, meaning there is no bespoke mechanism to consult on transposition measures. However, engagement on transposing measures appear to be less open than for domestic rules with less use of public consultations: only about one-quarter of EUMS systematically require this for the transposition of all or major EU directives (Figure 4.9) – opposed to three-quarters doing so for domestic primary laws (and over half of EUMS for domestic subordinate regulations).
Note: Data based on the 27 Member States of the European Union.
Source: OECD Indicators of Regulatory Policy and Governance (iREG) 2024.
There are only a few exceptions – 3 out of 27 Member States – where consultation procedures on transposition measures differ from those for legislation of domestic origin. In Ireland, the government is obliged to bring the issue before the EU Affairs Committee of the Oireachtas (parliament) and may regularly carry out public consultations in practice, even in the absence of a specific requirement (for either domestic or EU-derived rules); in Malta, engagement on transposition measures is focused on targeted stakeholders and facilitated by the Malta-EU Steering and Action Committee (MEUSAC) in collaboration with the ministry responsible; finally, in the Slovak Republic the accompanying dossier must include a correlation table of legal provisions with EU law.
Some countries have also taken steps to institutionalise engagement on the adoption of EU law. Complementing direct consultation with stakeholders, governments in some EUMS have also established more institutionalised and business-focused engagement mechanisms. For instance, Denmark and Sweden established advisory bodies to help directly convey recommendations from external stakeholders to inform domestic adoption of EU law (Box 4.8).
Denmark’s Business Regulation Forum
The Danish Business Regulation Forum advises the government on how the implementation of new EU regulation can be carried out in a manner that minimises costs to businesses. Through the Forum, representatives from Danish business organisations, the trade union movement, and experts identify potential challenges that rules may create for businesses, such as involving significant time, driving expenditure, or restricting production. The Forum also prepares specific and actionable recommendations to reduce the costs of those rules in implementation.
Sweden’s Implementation Council
In May 2024, Sweden established a new advisory body for the implementation of EU law, the Swedish Implementation Council (Implementeringsrådet) with the objective to strengthen Swedish competitiveness. The Council focuses on avoiding implementation above a minimum level, counteracting unjustified regulatory burdens and reducing administrative costs and other compliance costs when implementing EU regulations in Swedish law. Its makes recommendations to the Government supporting the implementation of new or amended EU law that the Council considers to be of particular interest for businesses in Sweden and to draw the Government's attention to upcoming EU law of particular interest for businesses in Sweden. As such, the council can contribute both early in the EU's legislative process and when an EU legal act is to be implemented in Sweden. For instance, the Council’s analysis can, among other things, form an important part of the Government's overall assessment of upcoming EU negotiations and contribute important knowledge before and during such negotiations.
Complementing efforts within EUMS, the European Commission announced new initiatives in 2025 to help better align implementation of EU law with the practical experiences of stakeholders. In keeping with the Commission’s strategic objectives, implementation dialogues and reality checks aim to inform simplification proposals and, thereby, lighten regulatory burdens (Box 4.9).
Implementation dialogues
Each Commissioner will hold at least two implementation dialogues annually with stakeholders to gather feedback on implementation challenges and identify improvements needed for EU policies to deliver results. These dialogues will target a balanced representation of the main groups affected by EU policies such as industry, SMEs, social partners, regional and local authorities and civil society. Outcomes will be documented in annual enforcement and implementation reports, highlighting poor implementation, gold-plating, over-compliance, and simplification opportunities.
Reality checks
The Commission will engage with business practitioners, especially SMEs and small mid-caps, to understand their on-the-ground experiences with EU law implementation and how EU law has impacted their activities. These technical exchanges will help identify practical challenges related to authorisations, permitting, controls, and compliance. Reality checks will evaluate whether EU legislation is meeting its intended goals and whether planned simplification measures are appropriate, effective, and likely to generate cost savings. Outcomes from reality checks would feed into the stress-testing of existing legislation (including evaluations and fitness checks, discussed in Chapter 5) and the design of future simplification proposals.
Although consultation practices during transposition are somewhat more developed than RIA, similar gaps exist. For instance, only 8 EUMS have specific guidance for officials on the conduct of consultation to inform transposition, like Estonia’s Good Practices for Engagement. Whilst the final directive following potential amendments might differ substantially from the initial Commission proposal, the insights from the consultation process can still yield relevant evidence for the transposition, complementing domestic engagement procedures. For instance, if they point to implementation challenges, these can be factored into the design of transposing measures from the outset. However, most EUMS forego this readily available evidence with only 7 EUMS using the findings of the Commission’s consultation processes to inform their transposition “always” or “frequently”, with 9 of them using them “sometimes”.
Monitoring and implementation of EU law
Continuous monitoring and smooth implementation of EU law hinges on effective communication and collaboration across Member States and with the Commission. With implementation of EU law being firmly withing the purview of the Member States and the Commission’s line-of-sight often limited to the information that Member States feed back, this stage of the policy cycle can be particularly prone to divergent practices and information gaps. Barriers resulting from inconsistent implementation by various national authorities can hinder the EU’s efforts to ensure a single internal market with the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people. In addition to undermining efficiency and European competitiveness, uneven implementation of EU law can also have serious negative impacts on individuals when their rights as EU citizens are affected.
Sharing evidence and insights early in the development of EU law can help pave the way for smooth implementation. Just like for domestic laws and regulations, considerations of their practical implementation should be hardwired into the development of EU law, starting with the European Commission when it starts working on a proposal. However, Member States are best placed to assess specific domestic impacts, including on the existing national legal and constitutional framework and to anticipate potential transposition and implementation challenges, such as administrative capacity. Anecdotal evidence suggests that at least some Member States already assess such impacts. Sharing these insights throughout the development and negotiation is critical to ensure that the final act is grounded in reality and implementable. It would also enable the Commission to tailor its implementation support for Member States according to their needs, making them more effective and undermining implementation problems later on.
The EU’s Better Regulation Guidelines and Toolbox (European Commission, 2023[29]) emphasise the importance of effective monitoring and implementation to ensure that EU laws achieve their intended goals in practice. This includes embedding monitoring and evaluation clauses into significant proposals, defining when and how the effects of the legislation will be evaluated. They also encourage Commission services to consider the development of implementation strategies, though they are not compulsory. It suggests such strategies should cover, inter alia, the different types of implementation support the Commission will provide as well as arrangements for monitoring. This may include the establishment of networks, expert groups, committees and workshops, “compliance dialogues” between the Commission and Member States, the development of scoreboards and barometers and Commission controls. The Better Regulation Toolbox also recommends that early consideration is given to monitoring – including relevant data and sources – and relevant legal provisions be included in the Commission proposal. This may include indicators and/or regulatory reporting requirements.6 The practical uptake of these measures and their effectiveness are beyond the scope of this report and warrant further investigation.
To further support the consistent implementation of EU law horizontally, the Commission has established multiple mechanisms to help ensure consistency in the application of rules. The Single Market Enforcement Taskforce (SMET), for instance was established in 2020 with the original intent of averting protectionist measures resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. Since then, the SMET has evolved into an important mechanism for enhancing the implementation and enforcement of Single Market rules. Through the SMET, Commission and Member State representatives collaborate on diverse projects to reduce unnecessary market barriers and support economic competitiveness, digitalisation, and the green transition. Overall, feedback on SMET's activities has generally been positive, though there have been calls from European Parliament Members and business stakeholders for increased transparency. The Commission has also established an online service known as SOLVIT to help identify and address other inconsistencies (Box 4.10).
SOLVIT is an online free service created by the European Commission in 2002, provided by national administrations in each EU country, as well as in Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway. The service assists individuals in various matters such as professional qualifications recognition, visa and residence rights, pension rights, unemployment, health insurance, and access to education, when their EU rights as citizens or businesses are breached by public authorities in another EU country, and legal action has not been taken yet.
National SOLVIT centres receive complaints from citizens and businesses via the online complaint form. A citizen or business is represented by a “home centre”, typically the SOLVIT centre of their country of nationality or residence, or where the business is established. This centre assesses whether the problem stems from an incorrect application of EU law. If so, it forwards the complaint through the SOLVIT system to the SOLVIT centre of the country responsible for the potential misapplication of EU law. This centre then engages with the relevant national authority to address the issue and ensure correct application of EU single market rules.
After 20 years of existence, 85% of 28 600 cases for EU citizens and businesses have been successfully resolved. At the same time, operational limitations hinder SOLVIT's performance, evident in unresolved cases, delayed handling, and inconsistencies in EU law application, due to insufficient staffing, lack of oversight, and varying procedural standards. To tackle these issues, the Letta report suggests that states establish a legal framework for SOLVIT and contemplate consolidating enforcement instruments within a “Single Market National Office” per Member State and an “EU Single Market Office” at the EU level.
Source: (European Commission, 2023[30]), Single Market Enforcement Task Force – Report 2022-2023; (European Commission, 2025[31]), SOLVIT – EU rights problem solving when working, living or doing business in another EU country; (Letta, 2024[2]), Much more than a market – Speed, Security, Solidarity.
Member States are best positioned to oversee how rules are working nationally – and their feedback is critical to inform the Commission’s understanding of how effective existing laws are in achieving their objectives (Börzel, 2004[32]). To be effective, monitoring arrangements should be based on consistent and meaningful data. Discussed further in Chapter 5, Member States use various tools to monitor evaluate existing rules, including feedback mechanisms and in-depth reviews. However, the feedback loop between the Commission and Member States remains a pronounced gap, potentially complicated by political dynamics and asymmetries in the EU (Voermans, 2018[26]). While the Commission conducts its own evaluations, only four EUMS (Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Italy) share the results of their domestic evaluations of EU laws with the Commission – a number that has seen no change since the previous report (OECD, 2022[33]). Italy invites its ministries to contribute to the Commission's evaluation process by providing relevant information and data on the on-the-ground impacts of the specific directive or regulation under review. This gap is reflective of the broader lack of focus on ex post evaluation compared to ex ante practices – in most countries where this feedback does not occur, the reason may be a lack of a regular domestic process for conducting such evaluations or the absence of a mechanism for evaluating EU directives and regulations specifically (European Commission, 2022[34]).
Whether for EU or domestic legislation, the transposition, monitoring, and implementation stage of the policy cycle is not only a crucial reality check for laws and regulations but can also aid their continuous improvement. The way in which public authorities ensure compliance with rules is critical to their success – and to keeping them proportionate and practical in light of realities on the ground. Rather than the end point of a linear process, evidence gathered from implementation should set the scene for the ongoing improvement of regulations through evaluation and review (discussed in Chapter 5).
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[26] Voermans, W. (2018), Transposition of EU legislation into domestic law: challenges faced by national parliaments, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/226406/IPOL_Briefing_Transposition_of_EU_legislation_into_domestic_law.pdf.
← 1. Monitoring here refers to the systematic gathering of data and other evidence to observe the implementation of a rule and its impacts.
← 3. The Global Recalls portal includes information on mandatory and voluntary consumer product recalls from around the world that were issued by, or notified to, a government authority and made publicly available, see https://globalrecalls.oecd.org/.
← 4. ICSMS (Information and Communication System for Market Surveillance) is the comprehensive communication platform for market surveillance of non-food products and for mutual recognition of goods facilitating the exchange of information among market surveillance authorities, see https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/icsms/.
← 5. Safety Gate (former Rapex) is the EU rapid alert system for unsafe consumer products and consumer protection. It allows a quick exchange of information on measures such as repatriation or product recalls, whether carried out by national authorities or by voluntary action of manufacturers and distributors, see https://ec.europa.eu/safety-gate/#/screen/home.