This chapter presents how infrastructure contributes to productive transformation in Southern Africa (Angola, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe). First, it highlights the infrastructure investment need and current financing in the region and individual countries. Second, it outlines the degree to which regional and national infrastructure plans contribute to productive transformation. Third, it shows how development corridors can accelerate productive transformation and enhance countries’ integration into regional and global markets.
Africa's Development Dynamics 2025
Infrastructure, Growth and Transformation
Abstract
Large-scale infrastructure investment is a key driver of productive transformation in Southern Africa. The region’s infrastructure investment need is estimated at USD 40 billion per year by 2040, equivalent to 6.1% of its gross domestic product (GDP). An annual investment of this amount would increase the region’s annual GDP growth by 4.2 percentage points on average.
Southern Africa is on the right track, but there remains significant room to scale up infrastructure spending to unlock the region’s full transformation potential. In 2024, Southern Africa was the African region with the highest government spending on infrastructure, at 2.4% of GDP. Between 2013 and 2023, the region received the highest share of Africa’s private investment projects in infrastructure: 31%.
Sustaining the necessary investment levels will require aligning financial and institutional capacities with productive transformation objectives at the national and regional levels. To do so, skills development is essential, as it can help overcome implementation barriers and improve the operational sustainability of infrastructure projects.
At the regional level, the Southern African Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan (RIDMP) can support productive transformation, but its implementation is held back by limited financing and skills capacity. In 2019, 70% of RIDMP projects lacked funding, and only 12% were supported through national budgets.
National infrastructure development plans can more directly target productive transformation. For example, Namibia and South Africa have included green hydrogen infrastructure in their national plans to strengthen energy security and promote economic diversification.
Southern African development corridors can accelerate productive transformation and enhance trade efficiency between landlocked and coastal countries if aligned with local needs. For example, the Lobito Corridor promises to boost regional trade by reducing shipping time from 45 days to 48 hours. However, better impact assessment tools and multistakeholder co-ordination mechanisms are needed to realise the region’s full potential for productive transformation.
Note: Infrastructure investment needs refer to modelled estimates of the total expenditures required to build new infrastructure to match the infrastructure levels of peer countries that perform well in productive transformation while also maintaining existing infrastructure. See Annex 1.A for details.
Source: Data sources for the investment needs estimations are listed in Annex 1.A.
Note: Transport = kilometres (km) of paved roads and railways per 100 km2 of non-desert land area. Digital = per cent of the population aged 15+ with Internet access. Energy = installed energy capacity as watt per capita. Water = per cent of the population with access to drinking water. For transport and energy stocks, the averages for Southern Africa and Africa are population-weighted. For transport and energy stocks, the values for Southern Africa and Africa reflect aggregated totals relative to population or area, depending on the indicator. For digital and water access, the values for Southern Africa and Africa represent unweighted averages of country values.
Source: Transport and energy indicators’ sources are reported in Annex 1.A. Water: Drinking water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) estimates, from UNICEF (2024[1]), Drinking water, sanitation and hygiene in households by country, 2000-2022 (database), https://data.unicef.org/topic/water-and-sanitation/drinking-water/; Digital: from Gallup (2020[2]), Gallup World Poll 2020 (database), https://www.gallup.com/analytics/213617/gallup-analytics.aspx.
Some South African countries already have good infrastructure networks, but the region could still invest more to boost productive transformation. While there are differences across the region, Southern African countries have, on average, better access to and higher physical stocks of infrastructure than the African average (Figure 3.2). For example, Botswana’s levels of digital, water and energy infrastructure are similar to those of developing Asia, and South Africa has higher levels (Chapter 1). However, Angola and Mozambique tend to be below the continent’s average. To close the gap with peer countries in other world regions that have high levels of productive transformation (Annex 1.A), Southern Africa will need to invest around USD 40 billion per year by 2040, equivalent to 6.1% of the region’s GDP in 2024 (Figure 3.1). This is higher than the value for all of Africa (5.6%). The higher investment need reflects the fact that the largest Southern African economies are upper middle-income countries (Botswana, Namibia and South Africa), leading their peers to also fall within that income-level, while most other African countries have lower- or lower-middle-income countries as peers. Investing USD 40 billion per year by 2040 is estimated to increase the region’s annual GDP growth by 4.2 percentage points on average.
Southern African countries have a lower debt service-to-infrastructure spending ratio than the African average, with large differences across countries. Southern Africa is the continent’s region with the highest rate of government spending on infrastructure, at 2.4% of GDP. This is more than twice as much as Central Africa (1.1%). Excluding Mozambique, in 2019-23, Southern Africa spent 2.7 times more on debt servicing than on infrastructure, the lowest average among all African regions (Figure 3.3). However, Mozambique stands out also as it spent over USD 4 billion – or 84 times more – on its sovereign debt than on infrastructure, the highest debt service-to-infrastructure spending ratio of all African countries. In contrast, Botswana had the third lowest ratio of debt service to infrastructure spending on the continent (0.35).
Note: GDP = gross domestic product. The indicator in Panel B is calculated based on an average of available data over the past five years for public infrastructure spending (2019-20) and debt servicing (2019-23). Median values are displayed for Africa and Southern Africa in Panel B to account for extreme cases. The selected countries are presented based on data availability.
Source: Authors’ calculation based on ICA (2022[3]), Infrastructure Financing Trends in Africa 2019-2020, and World Bank (2024[4]), International Debt Statistics (database), https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/debt-statistics/ids.
Southern Africa has the highest private participation in infrastructure (PPI) projects on the continent. Between 2013 and 2023, Southern Africa attracted 115 PPI projects – representing 31% of all such projects in Africa during this period, above all other African regions – with a total investment of USD 6.6 billion. Ninety-nine (86%) of these projects were in energy (Figure 3.4). South Africa records the highest number of projects and ranks first in terms of total PPI investment received, accounting for 80% of the total PPI investment value in the region and 75 projects out the 115.
Note: RHS = right-hand side.
Source: World Bank (2024[5]), Private Participation in Infrastructure (database), https://ppi.worldbank.org/en/ppi.
Despite differences across countries, Southern Africa has the lowest inflow of official development finance (ODF) for infrastructure relative to GDP of all African regions. ODF averaged USD 1.6 billion per year between 2019 and 2023, equivalent to 0.3% of the region’s annual GDP. This was the lowest share among all African regions, compared to a continental average of 0.8% of GDP. Only Malawi and Mozambique had average shares of ODF allocated to infrastructure over 1% of GDP in the period. ODF to the region was mainly allocated to energy, transport and storage (70% of total ODF) (Figure 3.5). With an average of USD 509.8 million per year, Mozambique accounted for 30% of the total ODF of the region. It also stands out for receiving ODF equivalent to 3% of its GDP, which is 10 times more than its public infrastructure spending.
Between 2020 and 2023, 25% of official development assistance (ODA) for infrastructure provided by OECD DAC members included gender equality objectives. This is the third highest share, after Central Africa (35%) and East Africa (33%). Nonetheless, gender considerations in infrastructure projects greatly differ across countries. In South Africa, only 10% of the total ODA supported infrastructure projects that included gender mainstreaming, against 97% in Lesotho.1
Note: RHS = right-hand scale. Official development finance disbursements include official development assistance (ODA) and other official financial flows that do not meet the conditions for eligibility as ODA (either because they are not primarily aimed at development, or because they have a grant element of less than 25%).
Source: OECD (2025[6]), Creditor Reporting System (database), https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/development-finance-statistics-data-on-flows-to-developing-countries.html.
Aligning Southern Africa’s infrastructure plans with productive transformation and effective skills development can boost trade, productivity and energy diversification
Fully implementing Southern Africa’s infrastructure plans can foster regional integration and countries’ development. A harmonised regional plan for infrastructure development is key to trade facilitation and regional integration. At the national level, infrastructure plans can align their infrastructure priorities with national development goals. Yet, implementation challenges such as lack of political incentives and lack of skills hinder the full delivery of infrastructure benefits for productive transformation in Southern Africa (Table 3.1).
Note: SADC, the Southern African Development Community, is made up of 16 countries: Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on SADC Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan (2019[7]); SADC Secretariat (2012[8]), Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan ICT Sector Plan; SADC Secretariat (2016[9]), Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Strategy & Action Plan (2016-2030); GIS Reports website (2021[10]), “Political roadblocks to Southern Africa’s digital revolution”; NEPAD Business Foundation (2022[11]), SADC ICT Infrastructure Strategy; Government of South Africa (2022[12]), National Infrastructure Plan 2050 (NIP 2050) Phase 1; Government of Namibia (2021[13]), Harambee Prosperity Plan II (2021-2025); Government of Botswana (2023[14]), Second Transitional National Development Plan (2023-2025); ECDPM website (2018[15]), “SADC industrialisation: Where regional agendas meet domestic interests”; Government of Malawi (2020[16]), National Transport Master Plan (2017-2037).
The Southern African Regional Infrastructure Development Master Plan (RIDMP) can support productive transformation, but its implementation is held back by limited financing and capacity. Adopted in 2012 by SADC member states, RIDMP is the continent’s earliest comprehensive infrastructure framework, covering six priority sectors – energy, water, transport, meteorology, tourism, and information and communications technology, each having a dedicated plan with specific targets for 2027. These plans aim to address key competitiveness challenges by lowering business costs, improving regional integration and easing funding constraints. However, in 2019, only 5% of RIDMP projects had been completed, with the majority still at the pre-feasibility or feasibility stage. A major barrier was financing: 70% of projects lacked funding, and only 12% were supported through national budgets, highlighting a mismatch between national priorities and available resources. Additionally, capacity and skill shortages continue to impede progress across the RIDMP and its sectoral components (SADC, 2019[7]). Establishing dedicated focal points at the country level (e.g. implementation units) could strengthen national ownership, secure initial funding and speed up regional project implementation (Chapter 2).
At the national level, infrastructure development plans can align their infrastructure priorities with national development goals to leverage their country-specific priorities. These plans clearly define implementation agencies and monitoring bodies, like inter-ministerial bodies, and all include institutional reforms. SADC countries aim to align their infrastructure priorities with national development goals, as part of national infrastructure plans (as is the case in South Africa and Zimbabwe), within broader national development plans (as in Botswana, Namibia and Zambia) or sector-specific plans, mostly in energy and transport (as in Malawi). Despite this structured framework, most countries face financial and human resource constraints. To address these limitations, some national plans underscore the importance of international development partnerships and private sector participation or of better planning and greater expenditure in crucial project phases such as maintenance (e.g. Botswana, Malawi and South Africa).
Botswana’s Second Transitional National Development Plan (2023-2025) promotes infrastructure development to reinforce industrialisation, boost a diversified, export-led private sector and strengthen regional trade, notably through projects like the Trans-Kalahari Railway linking Southern Africa to Namibian ports and the Mosetse-Kazungula-Livingstone Railway connecting Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia (Government of Botswana, 2023[14]).
The National Transport Master Plan (2017-2037) of Malawi has the objective of improving transport systems in support of growth sectors by reducing costs through a shift from roads to rail and inland waterways, boosting rural economic participation, and strengthening regional integration and trade (Government of Malawi, 2020[16]).
South Africa’s National Infrastructure Plan 2050 aims to provide energy, water, freight and digital infrastructure to support global and regional value chains, promote industrial diversification, and strengthen regional integration in line with the goals of SADC and the African Continental Free Trade Area (Government of South Africa, 2022[12]). As of 2023, 88 Strategic Infrastructure Projects had been implemented or launched (South African Government, 2023[17]).
Technical and green skills development can help overcome barriers created by skill shortages in Southern Africa. Skill shortages are found to affect decision-making and the approval of infrastructure projects in the region, inducing lengthy negotiations, inappropriate decisions, and inadequacies in contract and performance management (SADC, 2019[7]). To overcome these shortages, some Southern African countries have implemented skill-building initiatives and facilities, particularly those that promote technical and green skills for infrastructure (Table 3.2).
Note: COMESA = Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa; IDA = International Development Association; TVET = technical and vocational education and training. MDB = multilateral development bank; GIZ = German Corporation for International Cooperation.
Source: COMESA website (2025[18]), “The Regional Infrastructure Finance Facility (RIFF) Project”; ADB (2024[19]), Build4Skills: Integrating Traineeships into ADB-Supported Infrastructure Projects – A Handbook for Project Processing Teams and Project Implementation Units; Africa Rise (2023[20]), Study on Job Opportunities for Women in the Transformation towards a Green Economy (Final Report); SOLTRAIN website (2025[21]), (Home page).
Southern African corridors can accelerate productive transformation and enhance countries’ integration into regional and global markets
Southern Africa’s corridors focusing on critical raw materials and green economy can boost productive transformation if they are aligned with local needs (Table 3.3). Connecting different Southern African countries along diverse segments of regional and global value chains improves the trade efficiency of the region. Strong regional collaboration through SADC and support by international partners are common features of Southern African corridors. While exports of critical raw materials dominate in corridors like Lobito (Box 3.1), others, like Maputo, focus on integrating agrifood value chains. Differences emerge in local impacts: for example, the Maputo Corridor faces challenges in job creation due to the local labour force lacking specific skills, and the Nacala Corridor has been underutilised, despite heavy investments. Notable positive impacts include reduced transport costs and improved border efficiency, with the Maputo Corridor achieving clearances in under 30 minutes. Practical experience from these corridors reveals the importance of effective co-ordination mechanisms, impact assessment tools and capacity-building, and investments that align with regional and national development strategies and translate into broad-based local benefits.
Source: OECD (2025[22]), “The Lobito Corridor (draft)”; APRI website (2024[23]), “Lobito Corridor - A Reality Check”; European Commission website (2023[24]), “Connecting the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia, and Angola to Global Markets through the Lobito Corridor”; WBCG (2019[25]), A Guide to the Walvis Bay Corridors: Facilitating Free Flow of Trade to and from the SADC Region; Dzumbira, Geyer, Jr., and Geyer (2017[26]), “Measuring the spatial economic impact of the Maputo Development Corridor”; UN (2024[27]), “Potential Impact of the Lobito Corridor and Support to the Regional Transformation Agenda”; Thorn et al. (2022[28]), “The African Development Corridors Database: A new tool to assess the impacts of infrastructure investments”; Söderbaum and Taylor (2008[29]), African Development Corridors Database (database), http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A280482&dswid=1017; JICA (2022[30]), Data Collection Survey on Corridor Development in Africa: Final Report; AfDB (2023[31]), Cross-border Road Corridors: Expanding Market Access in Africa and Nurturing Continental Integration; UNCTAD/ISDB (2022[32]), The Trans-Saharan Road Corridor Towards an Economic Corridor: Commercializing and Managing the Trans-Saharan Road.
The Lobito Corridor is a 1 300 kilometre (km) strategic railway line connecting the port of Lobito on Angola’s Atlantic coast with the mining regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo) and the North-Western Province of Zambia. The corridor was once a key export route for minerals, linking landlocked countries in Central and Southern Africa to the Atlantic and to Western markets. Decades of civil conflict in Angola caused severe damage to the railway, reducing operations to just 34 km and shifting Zambia’s copper exports to the Beira and Dar es Salaam Corridors (OECD, 2025[22]).
Interest in the Lobito Corridor has increased, as major international and regional organisations are committing political and financial support. In late 2023, the governments of Angola, DR Congo and Zambia signed a memorandum of understanding with the United States, the European Commission, the African Development Bank and the African Finance Corporation to support the development of the Lobito Corridor, including through a new greenfield railway project connecting Zambia with the Lobito rail line in Angola (Lobito Corridor Investment Promotion Authority, 2023[33]). Since then, the initiative has become a major flagship project of both the European Union’s Global Gateway and the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. As of today, international partners have committed nearly USD 6 billion (Wala Chabala and Hofmeyr, 2025[34]). The project promises to be an opportunity to strengthen critical minerals supply chains and regional economic integration while offering an alternative to the People’s Republic of China (hereafter “China”)’s trade infrastructure investments in the region (Rogers, 2025[35]; Way, 2024[36]).
The Lobito Corridor has the potential to become a trade route that can support both productive transformation in Southern Africa and the region’s integration into global markets. Ensuring synergies between the Lobito Corridor and relevant initiatives on local value addition will be key for productive transformation. In the face of the global critical mineral crisis, building local refining capacity could support industrialisation and job creation in the region while reducing both production and environmental costs.1 The DR Congo holds approximately 80% of the world’s cobalt but only 3% of the battery and electric vehicle value chain. Also, Zambia is Africa’s second-largest producer of copper, which accounted for 72% of the country’s total exports in 2022 (King, 2024[37]; EITI, 2023[38]). Since 2021, the DR Congo and Zambia have taken concrete steps to establish a cross-border battery and electric vehicle Special Economic Zone, an initiative that could strongly benefit from new trading opportunities along the Lobito Corridor (UNECA, 2024[39]; AUC/OECD, 2024[40]). The Angolan government will develop a master plan to make the corridor a strategic platform to enable private sector investment across multiple industries, including agriculture, manufacturing, tourism and technology (Bekele, 2024[41]).
Better co-ordination and a clear and coherent action plan could address limited data availability and fragmented governance. According to estimates, the full realisation of the corridor project will reduce transit time from 45 days to 48 hours. However, project governance, prioritisation and duplication present challenges: at least 14 agreements and memorandums of agreement related to the Lobito Corridor were signed among multiple public and private actors between 2022 and 2024 (Karkare and Byiers, 2025[42]; Wala Chabala and Hofmeyr, 2025[34]). Furthermore, little information is publicly available about the broader development impact of the announced investments (US Department of State, 2024[43]). Regional bodies, such as SADC which helped establish the Lobito Corridor Transit Transport Facilitation Agency in January 2023, are well-positioned to provide a multi-stakeholder co‑ordination platform to facilitate data and information sharing and set up a common action plan that is integrated into national and regional development strategies.
1. For example, building a battery precursor facility in the DR Congo costs a third of an equivalent installation in China or the United States; moreover, a local plant using hydroelectric power would reduce emissions by 30% compared to present processing (BloombergNEF, 2021[44]). Resource-rich neighbouring countries, such as Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, could provide other key raw materials (e.g. copper, manganese and nickel) that account for significant expenses in refining, with clear benefits for regional integration (King, 2024[37]).
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[5] World Bank (2024), Private Participation in Infrastructure (database), https://ppi.worldbank.org/en/ppi.
← 1. Authors’ calculation based on OECD (2025[45]).