Questions over the competitive effects of the acquisition of start-ups or ‘nascent’ firms, by dominant incumbents have become a key part of the debate on how effective merger control regimes have been in protecting competition during a period of increasing profits.
One of the most discussed theories of harm in such mergers has been the risk of ‘Killer Acquisitions’ in which firms acquire nascent competitors only to discontinue the target’s innovation projects, thereby pre-empting the emergence of future competition.
In June 2020, the OECD explored questions such as:
- How to ensure these mergers can be investigated?
- How agencies can identify the relevant counterfactual in such cases?
- What tools can be used to assess competitive effects?
- Which types of efficiency might result from these acquisitions?
- What, if any, broader policy reforms might be required to help improve decision-making in these cases?
The key findings of the discusion can be accessed here, a detailed summary here and below, all session information and materials including contributions from participating delegations and speakers.
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In February 2021, killer acquisitions was also addressed at the third edition of the OECD Competition Open Day (Watch the session on replay l Watch the full event's playlist).
