



ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS REPUBLIC OF EVALUATION OF UNDP CONTRIBUTION **TAJKISTAN**



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EVALUATION OF UNDP CONTRIBUTION **TAJKISTAN**

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ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS: REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN

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FOREWORD

The Evaluation Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducts independent evaluations of UNDP contributions to development results through its country programmes. These evaluations are titled Assessments of Development Results (ADRs). An ADR evaluates the relevance and strategic positioning of UNDP support and contributions to the country's development over a period of time. The purpose of the ADR is to generate lessons for future country-level programming and to contribute to the effectiveness and substantive accountability of UNDP. This report presents the findings and recommendations of an ADR that was conducted in Tajikistan with a scope covering the period of two country cooperation frameworks (2001 to 2008). More specifically, the ADR provides forward-looking recommendations to assist the UNDP country office and its partners in formulating an action plan for the next programming cycle (2010-2014).

The report examines the context in which UNDP operates in Tajikistan, mainly with regard to economic and human development. Following the national independence and civil war, Tajikistan faced formidable challenges in political restructuring, reorganizing the economy, and responding to the socio-economic needs of the people. The government has been pursuing institutional reforms for the past decade, and there have been measures towards macro-economic stabilization, restructuring financial systems, privatization and controlling inflation. Tajikistan is one of the first pilot countries of the Millennium Project and became a signatory to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000.

The international community, including United Nations organizations active in Tajikistan, played an important role in reconstruction and transition to development. The development strategy pursued by the government is aimed to lower the poverty and extreme poverty rates, create employment, increase school enrolment levels, reduce

maternal and child mortality and the number of infectious diseases, and enhance social and gender equality. While there has been an overall decline in poverty level, the percentage of the population living below the poverty line remains high. The civil war contributed to the deterioration of the physical infrastructure and an already weak institutional capacity. A landlocked country, Tajikistan also remains highly dependent on its rich natural resources. Recurrent humanitarian crises have slowed down development and diverted the focus from long-term development issues.

The evaluation looked at the range of support provided by UNDP to Tajikistan in the areas of poverty reduction, democratic governance, reducing vulnerability to infectious diseases, and disaster management. The evaluation found that, in the context of transition, UNDP quickly established itself as a capable and reliable implementing agency of the government and donors. The government considers UNDP as a trusted partner. The evaluation found that UNDP has contributed to policy development and dialogue, and played a key role in incorporating the MDGs and pro-poor concerns into national development planning. UNDP support to infrastructure development has been important in addressing social service needs in rural areas.

Through support to data systems, strategic research on key issues and other initiatives, UNDP has contributed to capacity development in the government to carry out high-level policy. The contribution of UNDP in developing disaster management policy was found to be noteworthy. However, there are still areas where UNDP can assist the government, such as in the field of governance—strengthening coordination mechanisms in social service sectors, particularly the health sector and disaster management. In the areas of environment and sustainable development, more could be done to incorporate related issues into policy dialogue in order to optimize the sustainable use of natural resources for the benefit of the country.

One of the key roles UNDP has played in Tajikistan is supporting the government in managing the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. This has contributed to reducing the incidence of malaria and there are important ongoing efforts to minimize the incidence of tuberculosis and risk of HIV/AIDS. However, the evaluation found that UNDP can play a more proactive role in enhancing government capacities in the health sector and in coordinating donor contributions. As governance reforms and efficient management of environment and energy will continue to be an essential precondition for sustainable development, the evaluation recognizes the importance of the continued engagement of UNDP in priority areas where enhanced national capacity and ownership of development processes can lead to significant results.

To maximize results in areas central to the UNDP mandate and build on its comparative advantages, the evaluation recommends that UNDP emphasize policy support and strengthening government systems. UNDP should be more responsive to governance needs in the country and coordinate with other agencies working in the area. It is also recommended that UNDP make an assessment of the role it can play in energy, environment and climate change concerns in Tajikistan. Sufficient measures need to be taken to integrate environment and climate change issues in the poverty and disaster management interventions.


A number of people contributed to the evaluation, particularly the evaluation team composed of Leif Manger, Team Leader; Olga Lukashenko International Evaluator; Rahamat Khakulov Usufovich, National Consultant; and Evaluation Office Task Manager and Team Member Vijayalakshmi Vadivelu. I would also like to extend my appreciation to Johannes Linn and Yasemin Aysan, the external reviewers of the ADR report. I wish to thank Nidhi Sharma for her background research and Kutisha Ebron, Thuy Hang To and Anish Pradhan for their administrative support. I wish to thank Margo Alderton for the copy-editing.

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I hope that the findings and recommendations of this report will assist UNDP in responding to the country's challenges and provide broader lessons that may be of relevance to UNDP and its partners internationally.



Saraswathi Menon
Director, Evaluation Office

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADR	Assessment of Development Results
CCF	Country Cooperation Framework
CCM	Country coordination mechanism
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CoES	Committee of Emergency Situations
CP	Community Programme
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DCC	Donor Coordination Council
DDC	District Development Committee
DOTS	Directly Observed Treatment, Short-course
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GFATM	Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
IMAC	Information Management and Analytical Centre
JCSS	Joint Country Support Strategy
JDC	<i>Jamoat</i> Development Centre
JRC	<i>Jamoat</i> Resource Centre
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
NDS	National Development Strategy
NHDR	National Human Development Report
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
RC	Resident Coordinator
REACT	Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Team
RRDP	Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Development Programme
SRC	Strategic Resource Centre
SWAp	Sector-wide Approach
TB	Tuberculosis
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
USD	United States Dollar
WHO	World Health Organization

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

Since its national independence in 1991 and subsequent civil war until 1997, Tajikistan has faced formidable challenges in political restructuring, reorganizing the economy and responding to the socio-economic needs of the people. There was a steep economic decline with disruption of trade with countries in Central Asia, withdrawal of subsidies from Moscow, and decline in both industrial and agriculture production. The civil war contributed to the deterioration of the physical infrastructure and an already weak institutional capacity. After a decade of political unrest and social and economic instability, institutional reforms have been underway since 1997. The government has been pursuing measures towards macro-economic stabilization, restructuring financial systems, privatization and controlling inflation. While there has been an overall decline in the poverty level, 64 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. Recurrent humanitarian crises have slowed down development and diverted the focus from long-term development issues.

In response to post-war reconstruction and development needs, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has supported the United Nations (UN) in establishing peace and security in the region and has implemented programmes in Tajikistan since 1993. Since the signing of the Peace Agreement in 1997, UNDP efforts have been more focused on reconstruction and development. The aim of UNDP assistance in Tajikistan is to provide quality policy and programme support in alleviating poverty, share best practices and enhance government capacities to address development challenges. The Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) I and II, and National Development Strategy (NDS) provided a framework for UNDP to design development support for the Government of Tajikistan. Two

country programmes have been completed in Tajikistan and the ongoing country programme will conclude in 2009.

PURPOSE OF THE ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS (ADR)

An ADR is an independent country-level evaluation carried out by the UNDP Evaluation Office to evaluate and validate the contribution of UNDP interventions to national development results. This ADR assesses UNDP contributions in Tajikistan between 2001 and 2008. The findings and recommendations of the ADR are intended to inform the preparation of the next country programme. The purpose of the ADR is to assist UNDP in continuing to build on its strengths and enhance its contribution to national development results.

The objectives of the ADR in Tajikistan include:

- Provide an independent assessment of the progress, or lack thereof, towards the expected outcomes envisaged in the UNDP programming documents. Where appropriate, the ADR will also highlight unexpected outcomes (positive or negative) and missed opportunities.
- Provide an analysis of how UNDP has positioned itself to add value in response to national needs and changes in the national development context.
- Present key findings, draw key lessons, and provide a set of clear and forward-looking options for management to make adjustments in the current strategy and next country programme.

UNDP SUPPORT

The ADR evaluated the second and third country programmes during 2001 to 2008.

The programme emphasis during 2001 to 2004 (the second country programme) was on governance and capacity building, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and environment protection and sustainable natural resource management. UNDP has been the principal recipient of the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM). Programme and policy support was provided for reducing vulnerabilities in the area of disaster management and mine action. The programme delivery for the second country programme period was USD 18 million.

The third country programme (2005 to 2009) aligned with the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for the same period. The programme areas include: poverty alleviation (through microfinance, business support services and development of public infrastructure); strengthening institutions of local and central government; enhancing the capacities of health institutions to minimize the risk of HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis (TB); furthering mine action and reducing vulnerability to natural disasters; and promotion of sustainable energy and the environment. The programme delivery for the period 2005 to 2008 has been USD 93.6 million.

DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

UNDP annual operations have been approximately 6 percent of the total Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Tajikistan. The government was the principal partner of UNDP. There were also partnerships and close engagement with civil society organizations and multilateral and bilateral agencies. Many donor agencies channeled their funds through UNDP due to its well established local presence and its role as a UN organization in the post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction.

RELEVANCE AND RESPONSIVENESS

UNDP contribution has been significant in the post-war reconstruction and transition. The programme emphasis corresponds to the

development needs perceived by the government and civil society. Because destruction and the impact of civil war were severe in rural areas, UNDP made a considered decision to work at the district and sub-district level. The microfinance initiatives of UNDP provided credit for livelihood and enterprise development at the community and household level.

Support was provided to reconstruct local public infrastructure that was destroyed or damaged during the war or neglected since Soviet days. UNDP is one of the main actors in the rehabilitation of the water infrastructure and supported drinking water and irrigation infrastructure. This has been highly relevant considering low public spending for infrastructure development in rural areas.

The participatory approach introduced by UNDP brought elements of responsiveness to local needs and community responsibility to contribute to service delivery at the sub-district. This was a change from earlier thinking that the state is responsible for providing services free of cost. UNDP supported formation of *Jamoat* Resource Centres (JRCs) at the sub-district level, which were registered as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and served as a community-level forum for the local government and NGOs. The JRCs functioned as intermediary organizations with operational links with the sub-district government and furthered community participation in infrastructure projects. The execution of most of the projects implemented by UNDP at the local level was supported by JRCs. The JRCs also provided a similar function for other development agencies implementing programmes in rural Tajikistan.

UNDP was successful in bringing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) into the national development agenda. The government was forthcoming in owning the process and ensured that it was reflected in all the national strategies and action plans. UNDP has been proactive in furthering MDGs in Tajikistan and played a key role in ensuring that MDGs are

incorporated in NDS and informing pro-poor policies. Along with other international agencies, UNDP supported the government in designing the PRS-I, PRS-II and NDS.

UNDP played an important role in supporting the government in the areas of controlling infectious disease and disaster management. UNDP has been significant in enabling government access to GFATM, which comprises 25 percent of the ODA in the health sector. GFATM has been crucial for controlling malaria and TB in Tajikistan. The interventions in disaster management demonstrated the potential for strengthening institutional systems and policies. The government indicated it is keen to develop disaster management systems and responses.

There were areas where UNDP has been less responsive. Governance issues, both at the national and local level, did not receive the attention they required. A strategic approach was not followed to strengthen institutions of local government. Opportunities to strengthen government institutions and capacities—particularly in the health sector—and enhance transparency and accountability mechanisms were not optimized. Addressing gender-related concerns did not receive the emphasis it deserved. While efforts were occasionally made to address women's issues, a gender equality dimension was not integrated into the programme process.

UNDP developed a governance strategy in 2005. The strategy is in alignment with the national approach to local governance, and there is emphasis on capacity building and introducing new practices in social-sector service delivery. A Gender Equality Strategy 2008-2011 for the Communities Programme (CP) was implemented in 2008. It is too early to observe the results of these initiatives.

EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY

UNDP Tajikistan has been effective in mobilizing funds and expanding the scope of programme interventions. The local presence of UNDP through its area offices is exceptional in the context

of international donor response in Tajikistan. Many donors channeled their funds through UNDP due to its well established local presence and important role as a UN organization in the post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction process. However, the dependence on external funds considerably influenced the prioritization of activities and continuance of UNDP interventions to enhance local capacities. The leverage UNDP has among the international agencies has been challenged, as most interventions are joint programmes.

Results were manifested in public infrastructure support. There was also the potential to achieve results in minimizing the incidence of malaria and TB. UNDP support in developing a socio-economic profile at the district level and monitoring the MDGs has been effective, although sustainability of these activities beyond the programme period is a concern. While it is too early to say whether the desired outcomes have been achieved in disaster management policy and strategy, efforts are needed to adequately link disaster management and development. Emergencies such as winter crisis, food crisis, energy management and small scale floods are all development issues. A long-term strategy is important to avoid repeated flash appeals and temporary solutions.

Contributions to results were less evident in the areas of poverty alleviation, local governance, and policy support. While UNDP established effective cooperation with the national level state institutions such as the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, State Statistics Committee, Strategic Research Centre under the Office of the President, and Institute for Civil Servant Training, further efforts are required to enhance linkages between local programmes and macro processes. Until recently, there were limited efforts to demonstrate new products as part of the microfinance project and inform national policy on microfinance. The ADR did not have sufficient evidence to demonstrate the contribution of microfinance interventions in alleviating poverty at the household level and enhancing gender equality at the household and community level.

With some exceptions, the UNDP programme did not adequately address policy and governance issues, and there was a lack of strategic approach to enhancing government capacities. Reforms in the area of health are critical in Tajikistan. The GFATM provided means and opportunity for UNDP to enhance sector-wide approaches (SWAp) and donor coordination in the health sector, but it did not take advantage of these. UNDP was also less proactive in the area of reforms and donor coordination.

SUSTAINABILITY

Sustainability of project outcomes has been a concern in the interventions of UNDP. While the sustainability of microfinance institutions is largely determined by the evolving microfinance sector in Tajikistan, the microfinance activities are stable with a high percentage of repayments. In the programme design, infrastructure development was seen more as a humanitarian response and institutional sustainability was not adequately emphasized. Lack of a clear legal framework and financial and human resources at the district level for maintaining infrastructure has contributed to poor maintenance. The Water User Associations formed by UNDP have ensured sustainability in a few areas. While the Water User Associations helped increase communities' understanding of how to use water resources efficiently, the role of the Associations needs to be strengthened within the legal framework of the local government. The participatory processes that were piloted by UNDP were not institutionalized, and it was not evident that they would be sustainable after the project period.

It is too early to determine sustainability of interventions under GFATM. However, adequate efforts are required to enhance the government ownership of the assets created. UNDP could have been more proactive in furthering donor coordination in the health sector. One of the issues in sustaining interventions is the lack of capacities of government agencies to continue with the preventive practices beyond the project period. While there was a small component for training government staff

and implementing agencies, efforts were not adequate to facilitate strengthening of the health agencies in a more holistic way.

One of the recurrent issues has been the programme implementation modality followed by UNDP. UNDP interventions in Tajikistan are entirely implemented by the country office with different levels of involvement of government counterparts. The nature of the programme (for example, in microfinance initiatives at the household level) and the donor specifications (for example, in GFATM) limited the possibility of implementation through government agencies. Lack of government capacity to implement development projects and procedural delays constrained following a national implementation approach. While the country office intends to shift to a national implementation modality, there was no indication of efforts to enable such a process. Capacity development is an important component of UNDP support, and direct execution curtailed opportunities to strengthen government systems.

SOCIAL EQUALITY

Addressing issues of livelihood, rural development, and the MDGs has been core to UNDP interventions in Tajikistan. UNDP has implemented programmes in the less developed regions of Tajikistan and made efforts to reach the economically disadvantaged sections of the rural population. The microfinance activities were aimed to provide micro-credit to poor households without traditional collateral. UNDP made a valuable contribution to the promotion of Resolution 111, which allowed farmers to plant crops other than cotton. A large local presence provided UNDP with the opportunity to further practices that enable social equality.

There was considerable opportunity for UNDP to address issues related to gender, migration and cotton farming and link them to development and policy discussions. However, it was not evident that UNDP addressed these issues in its programmes. Cotton farming is a politically sensitive issue in Tajikistan, and UNDP made

a considered decision not to have interventions related to concerns in the sector. The opportunity to enhance gender equality in programme interventions and in influencing policy was lost. The microfinance programme was not used to reach the most economically disadvantaged sections of the population and cotton farmers.

The poverty and MDG initiatives could have been better used to address the issues of migration of a large working population to countries such as Russia. While there are joint initiatives with the International Organization for Migration to channel remittances into development, further efforts are needed to address social and economic dimensions of large-scale migration.

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

NATIONAL HUMAN RESOURCES AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

Weak government capacity is one of the key issues in Tajikistan that constrained development and reform processes. The civil service lacks skilled human capital and appropriate reporting systems. The administrative systems are undermined by lack of transparency and accountability. UNDP capacity development initiatives were largely in the form of training, introducing new practices and, to a lesser extent, policy support. While there were initiatives for strengthening institutional systems and practices, they lacked strategic emphasis in the programme framework.

UNDP supported the government in the areas of aid coordination, monitoring MDGs and PRS, anti-corruption, mine action environment protection and disaster management. In the past six years, there were initiatives to improve the statistics capacity of the government and financial support was provided to the Strategic Resource Centre (SRC) and State Committee on Statistics. However, there are limitations in the periodic collection and analysis of data on social sectors and poverty. The reliability of state statistics and data collection systems for social sectors needs to be further strengthened.

Disaster management is an area where there is potential for contributing to results. UNDP is supporting the Information Management and Analytical Centre (IMAC) in developing an information system and updating data on disasters regularly. It also supports the Rapid Emergency Assessment and Coordination Team (REACT) in coordinating international humanitarian assistance. Both the government and IMAC strongly support improving disaster information systems. More effort is required on the part of UNDP to ensure the government actively engages in this process. UNDP supported the government in preparing action plans in the areas of environment and climate change and revising legislation on Protected Areas and Forestry Code, which is important in the context of Tajikistan.

Managing the GFATM provided UNDP with the opportunity to enhance the capacities of the health sector. However, little effort was made to systematically engage in strengthening the capacities of the Ministry of Health. The health sector reforms and SWAp process has been slow in Tajikistan. UNDP, in coordination with other UN organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), had the potential to support the government in improving aid coordination in the health sector and defining its strategy. This was not optimized during the programme period. Transparency and accountability mechanisms and government procurement procedures are weak. These mechanisms are important to acquiring a health infrastructure. More efforts are required to strengthen health administration and procurement procedures.

Across the programme, results in capacity development were undermined by the programme implementation modality followed by UNDP. Approximately 98 percent of the programme was implemented directly by UNDP. The limited capacity of the government agencies to plan and implement projects and the donor requirements for implementation of programmes such as GFATM contributed to this direct

implementation approach. An assessment by GFATM found that government capacities were not adequate to manage the funds, and UNDP was assigned as the role of Principal Recipient of GFATM. Despite such limitations, project interventions should be used to strengthen government implementation systems by working through them, including negotiating with GFATM for a modality where part of the programme is implemented by the government. During the planning of the next programme, sufficient measures need to be taken to adopt a national implementation modality. Enabling a national implementation modality requires prior discussions and agreement with the government, and UNDP should start planning for this.

MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGS)

At the macro level, UNDP support to bringing the MDGs into the development agenda has been important. Tajikistan became one of the first pilot countries in the Millennium Project in 2000, with the government signing the UN Millennium Declaration to achieve the MDGs. UNDP, along with the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, supported the government in designing PRS-I, PRS-II and the NDS. NDS is a long-term strategy to achieve development results by 2015 and furthers the priorities identified in the PRS-II. UNDP supported the government in carrying out the needs assessment for achieving the MDGs, which informed the NDS. The MDGs are incorporated in the NDS and were endorsed by the international donor community. Difficulties in achieving the MDGs are perceived in the areas of education and health. For better aid effectiveness and furthering the NDS, the Donor Coordination Council (DCC) was preparing a Joint Country Support Strategy (JCSS) at the time of the ADR. UNDP, as member of the DCC, has participated in the preparation of the JCSS.

One of the issues that was not sufficiently addressed in the MDG debate following the needs assessment was the accountability of the government to enhance fiscal discipline and carry out reforms for better management of public

funds. UNDP stopped short of providing the leadership required for ensuring that policy and a reform agenda is linked to the process of achieving the MDGs. While UNDP prepared sector papers for the NDS to improve understanding of MDG issues, more consensus and a sustained approach is required for moving the MDG agenda forward. While the international financial institutions agree on the importance of achieving the MDGs, there is lack of sufficient coordination in furthering government efforts. The JCSS process provided an opportunity for UNDP to build consensus on some of these issues and influence the priority to be accorded to achieving the MDGs. UNDP engagement in the JCSS could have been more active.

GENDER EQUALITY

Addressing gender related concerns was the weakest area of the UNDP programme. There were indications that women were not adequately reached by UNDP development initiatives. In all the regions where UNDP is working, gender inequality is a challenge—constraining women’s access to development benefits and social services. Although the Constitution provides for gender equality, in practice, women do not enjoy the same rights as men. It is too early to make observations about the outcome of the development strategies outlined by the government to further gender equality.

While rigid gender structures in rural Tajikistan is a constraining factor in achieving results in enhancing gender equality and empowering women, sufficient efforts were not made by UNDP to link lessons from micro interventions to further the MDG commitment to promoting gender equality. Women were included as beneficiaries in micro-finance programme and GFATM programme as a vulnerable group. There were however missed opportunities in the CP in analysing and addressing gender inequality at the household and community level. UNDP did not use the extensive programme at the local level to address gender issues in a structured way. Opportunity was lost to make linkages between poverty and gender inequality, implications of

male migration, and in informing measures to reduce greater incidence of poverty amongst women and female children.

UNDP recently developed a Gender Mainstreaming Strategy for 2008-2011 for the CP. It is too early to observe its implementation. It is imperative for UNDP to pay specific attention to the gender dimension in poverty and development in the next programme, both in programme planning and implementation.

STRATEGIC POSITIONING

The programme decisions UNDP made were largely guided by the post-war transition and development needs in Tajikistan. UNDP has been implementing programmes in Tajikistan since the civil war, which started in 1993. UNDP has significantly contributed to bringing the MDGs into the development agenda to further human development and human security. The government has taken full ownership of the MDG agenda, although further efforts are required to translate government commitment into action. Responding to the critical infrastructure needs in rural areas, in the ongoing and previous country programmes, UNDP decided to emphasize local infrastructure development. In terms of programme presence, the scale of operations has been extensive at the sub-district level and UNDP addressed approximately 30 percent of the infrastructure needs at the local level. Local development activities have given UNDP a niche at the district and sub-district level. UNDP was responsive to the needs of the Tajikistan water sector and concerted efforts were made to strengthen water infrastructure.

Disaster management is an important dimension of development in Tajikistan, which is highly prone to natural disasters. UNDP is well positioned in the area of early recovery and has been supporting the strengthening of disaster management institutions and policy. UNDP is supporting the preparation of the National Disaster Management Strategy and National Disaster Management Action Plan. While

UNDP is one of the main organizations working on disaster management, more sustained efforts are required to ensure adoption and implementation of disaster management policy.

Despite being well positioned to play a major role in health sector reform, UNDP confined its activities to the GFATM programme agenda and did not actively engage in ongoing deliberations in SWAp, donor coordination in the health sector, or effective joint work with UN organizations.

Support to reforms in the area of governance did not receive adequate attention in the country programmes. Transparency and accountability in public expenditure, institutionalizing procurement procedures and reforms, implementation of the amended Civil Service Law, reforms that would further merit-based civil service and wage classification, measures to minimize corruption, and implementation of local government law are some of the governance issues where UNDP contributions could have been a valuable addition. UNDP has not been consistent in supporting anti-corruption efforts in the country. There were limitations in carrying out activities that have policy relevance, even in areas such as local governance where UNDP is well positioned. It is crucial that UNDP be more responsive to furthering institutional and governance reforms at the national level.

RECOMMENDATIONS

UNDP has a significant role in informing development policy, reforms and strengthening institutions in Tajikistan. The lessons for the country office mainly pertain to the nature of interventions (micro versus policy interventions and institution building), strategic approach to programme emphasis, and developing national human resources and capacity.

PROGRAMME STRATEGY AND APPROACH

- 1. UNDP should emphasize policy support and strengthening government systems. Interventions in the area of governance**

should be further strengthened. UNDP should be more responsive to governance needs in the country and coordinate with other agencies working in the area.

Weak administrative and public finance management systems undermine development in Tajikistan. UNDP interventions need to focus on policy enhancement and governance issues. UNDP should prepare a strategy for interventions in the area of governance with an adequate time-frame (a minimum of five years). Some of the governance issues where UNDP can add value include implementation of civil service reforms, mechanisms to strengthen the capacity of government staff, strengthening budget systems, and local governance reforms.

UNDP should broaden its earlier work in the area of anti-corruption, and should have specific interventions to enhance transparency and accountability in government administrative and financial management. UNDP has already outlined local governance as one of its priority activities. The time-frame of such efforts should be realistic to contribute to strengthening institutions and informing local government reforms.

UNDP is well positioned to further government capacities in disaster management. Adequate measures should be taken by UNDP to strengthen the role of the Committee of Emergency Situations (CoES) within the disaster management structures in Tajikistan. There are weak linkages between disaster management and development efforts in Tajikistan. UNDP interventions should be aimed at strengthening the capacity of CoES to coordinate mitigation, preparedness and response needs; and integrating disaster management in national development strategy.

- 2. There should be more substantial support to the government in the area of MDGs. UNDP should strengthen its role in advocating for implementation of pro-poor policies and strategies.**

UNDP is recognized in Tajikistan as the lead agency in mainstreaming the MDGs in the national development strategy. There has also been success in government ownership to achieve the MDGs. While UNDP should continue its support to monitoring the MDGs, further efforts should be taken to ensure there is donor facilitation in the area of MDGs, particularly in the health sector, where achieving the MDGs by 2015 is challenging. There is need for sustained efforts to ensure adequate attention is paid by the government to achieving the MDGs among diverse development priorities.

Human development is the guiding principle of UNDP interventions. UNDP should further strengthen its role in advocating for poverty reduction and human development. There should be continuous support to the National Human Development Report (NHDR) which is a useful tool for advocating pro-poor strategies.

- 3. Use programme partnerships to strengthen donor coordination for achieving development results. Strengthen UNDP positioning in donor coordination.**

Donor coordination in several areas of development in Tajikistan can be further enhanced, and UNDP is well positioned to play this role. In the GFATM HIV/AIDS Project, UNDP should take sufficient measures to strengthen the country coordination mechanism (CCM). UNDP should further coordination in the health sector and actively engage in the SWAp process. While the role of UNDP in the functioning of REACT is critical, UNDP should work out ways to shift the REACT Secretariat to CoES and strengthen the CoES capacity to lead coordination. Functioning of REACT needs to be gradually handed over to the CoES.

UNDP should be more active in coordination forums such as DCC and JCSS. At the time of the ADR, the DCC was scheduled to function until September

2008. It was not clear if it will be extended beyond that period. UNDP should be proactive in ensuring the continuation of forums such as DCC and should adequately engage other UN organizations in the process. The programme partnerships should be furthered for more effective coordination in different sectors.

4. Implement programmes through government agencies to improve national ownership and enhance local capacities.

UNDP should, in a phased manner, move from direct implementation of the programme to national execution modality. Executing through government agencies enhances national ownership and is an opportunity to strengthen government administrative systems and capacities. Considering that financial and administrative systems in Tajikistan are weak, UNDP should work with the government to discuss and plan measures to be taken to implement programmes by the government.

All projects and programmes should be defined by what they contribute to enhancing national human resources, development policy and government institutions. In designing the projects, sufficient measures should be taken to follow the approach that will further national capacities. The large project staff of UNDP currently substitutes for government capacities. Alternate approaches, such as seconding staff to the government departments, should be followed.

Developing capacities of civil society organizations (CSOs) should be a complementary process to enhance the performance of institutions of local government. The JRCs had a specific purpose to mobilize participation of communities and facilitate project implementation in the transition from humanitarian activities to development. However, this short-term solution did not sufficiently address strengthening the capacities of the *Jamoat* administration. As a long-term measure of strengthening

government institutions, UNDP should work through the existing government systems in the next country programme and avoid creating parallel structures such as JRCs.

5. Develop a programme strategy for consistency in interventions and for raising funds.

It is important that UNDP develops a programme strategy to raise funds. UNDP should shift from the present approach of responding to project priorities of donor agencies to a more coherent approach of long-term and sustained interventions. The strong presence of UNDP at the local level should be used as an advantage to mobilize funds to achieve results in the Country Programme Action Plan.

UNDP should take adequate efforts to strengthen micro-macro linkages. With exceptions such as district development plans, several projects were essentially pilots that were localized and were neither scaled up nor informed government planning and practices.. UNDP should be selective in piloting new practices and ensure such pilots are linked to policies and strengthening government capacities.

6. UNDP should make an assessment of the role it can play in energy, environment and climate change concerns in Tajikistan. Integrate environment and climate change issues into poverty and disaster management interventions.

UNDP supported the government in preparing several action plans—such as the 2007 National Environmental Action Plan, National Action Plan on Conservation of Biodiversity, National Action Plan on Mitigation of Climate Change, and revising the legislation on Protected Areas and Forestry Code. Environment and climate change is an area where UNDP can define a structured response to further national policies and plans. There are other international agencies in Tajikistan working in

the area of energy and environment. UNDP should carry out an assessment of the national needs, gaps in support to the government, and the role UNDP can play in supporting the government, in the areas of environment and climate change and efficient energy and water management.

The forthcoming programme should take adequate measures to integrate environment and climate change issues into poverty alleviation and disaster management interventions. At the macro level, the World Bank is a major player in providing support in the area of energy. UNDP should initiate interventions to further practices and policy in cost-effective energy efficiency and facilitate government support to energy efficiency investments. UNDP should have an advocacy strategy for furthering government efforts to adopt and implement cost-effective energy efficiency as a high priority resource. Lessons should be learnt from the ongoing programme to ensure that micro-interventions in this area are not fragmented and compartmentalized. Efforts should be made to ensure that interventions such as demonstration of energy efficiency technology have sufficient linkages with the government programme to enable scaling up.

7. Strengthen gender mainstreaming in programme interventions.

UNDP should pay immediate attention to mainstreaming gender in its programme interventions. UNDP should diversify its activities to include interventions that are critical for gender equality and women's rights, such as support to capacity building for women to participate in development, measures for confidence building and legal services. UNDP should facilitate the government in monitoring the implementation

of the PRS, NDS and JCSS in relation to their impact on gender equality and women's rights. UNDP should work with other UN organizations (such as UNIFEM and UNICEF) to further government commitment to international agreements on women's rights and development, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, MDGs, and the Beijing Platform for Action.

PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

8. Strengthen monitoring systems.

The monitoring and evaluation systems should be strengthened for the entire programme. Except for the GFATM programme, baseline information was not available for other projects. Baseline data was also lacking for outcomes outlined in the country programme. Baseline information data should be prepared for all outputs and outcomes. Gender analysis and gender disaggregate data should be made available for all interventions. There should be adequate human resources allocated for monitoring and evaluation of the programme.

Results-based management also needs to be further strengthened both in the national and area offices. In the present monitoring system, programme performance is largely tied to activities and outputs and performance indicators related to results are not properly defined or monitored. It is important to develop outcome monitoring systems to establish linkages between programme outcomes and UNDP contributions to national development results. UNDP should also carry out periodic analysis of contributions to results for more efficient programme management.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Tajikistan is the poorest among the countries of the former Republics of the Soviet Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). A large section of the population in Tajikistan was directly affected by the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent civil war. While the country returned to peace and political stabilization in the late 1990s, the transition to development poses several challenges. Development challenges include: post-war reconstruction, targeted assistance to the poor and reducing poverty, generating employment, and strengthening public institutions and governance.

1.1. RATIONALE FOR THE EVALUATION

In response to post-war reconstruction and development needs, UNDP has implemented programmes in Tajikistan since 1993, working with the United Nations to establish peace and security during the years following the war. Since the signing of the Peace Agreement in 1997, UNDP efforts focused on reconstruction and development. Two country programmes have been completed in Tajikistan and the ongoing one will be concluding in 2009. The completion of 2005-2009 UNDAF and the country programme for the same period present an opportunity to evaluate the contribution of UNDP to development results and the strategic positioning of UNDP during the ongoing and previous programme cycles. UNDP is in the process of designing its new country programme for 2010-2015, within the context of UNDAF. The ADR will inform this process—honing the priorities of UNDP to align with the NDS and JCSS.

The geo-strategic and political context in Tajikistan, as well as the socio-economic challenges the country is currently facing, have

implications for UNDP operations and strategic positioning. Since the end of the civil war, the situation in the country is one of ‘cautious reform’. The process of linking economic and political reform and recognizing the importance of this linkage for human development has been long drawn. Further, the development process in Tajikistan is closely linked to the political dynamics in Central Asia. The current transition phase in Tajikistan brings with it many challenges and opportunities for UNDP to contribute to the national reform process and human development.

1.2 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The UNDP programme in the Republic of Tajikistan was selected for an ADR in 2008 through an agreement between UNDP senior management, the Government of Tajikistan and the UNDP Evaluation Office. The ADR is an independent evaluation that aims to analyse how and to what extent UNDP has addressed available opportunities and related challenges, and how this is reflected in UNDP strategic positioning and contributions to overall development results in the country. Tajikistan is in the process of transition from a post war situation. It is unclear how the process to achieve development goals and priorities will play out strategically and politically. The evaluation also takes this issue into account.

The ADR seeks to ensure UNDP substantive accountability as an organization and provides evidence on key issues of support to programming at the country office level. The overall goals of an ADR are to:

- Provide substantive support to the Administrator’s accountability function in reporting to the Executive Board

- Support greater UNDP accountability to national stakeholders and partners in the programme country
- Serve as a means of quality assurance for UNDP interventions at the country level
- Contribute to learning at corporate, regional and country levels

The ADR reviewed the UNDP programme in Tajikistan and its contribution to the solution of social, economic and political challenges. The evaluation covered the current and previous country programmes (2005-2009 and 2001-2004). Although more emphasis was placed on interventions of the ongoing country programme due to more availability of data, efforts were made to examine the development and implementation of UNDP projects during the previous country programme. The ADR included all the thematic areas of UNDP contribution to development results, although not all projects were included for evaluation. The projects on mine action, border security management and environment were not included for evaluation. The findings of the ADR and the lessons are intended to inform the preparation of the next UNDP country programme.¹

The evaluation had two main components: the analysis of UNDP contribution to development results and the strategic positioning of UNDP. The ADR entails a comprehensive review of the UNDP programme portfolio of the previous and ongoing programme cycles. This included an evaluation of development results achieved and the contribution of UNDP in terms of key interventions; progress in achieving outcomes for the ongoing country programme; factors influencing results (UNDP positioning and capacities, partnerships, policy support); achievements, progress and contribution of UNDP in results areas (both in policy and advocacy); and

analysing the cross-cutting linkages and their relationship to the MDGs and UNDAF. The ADR is also intended to identify challenges and strategies for future interventions.

The evaluation of UNDP strategic positioning was carried out from the perspective of the development priorities in the country and the organisation. It entailed an analysis of: the UNDP niche within the development and policy space in Tajikistan; strategies used by UNDP Tajikistan to strengthen its position in the development space and create a position for the organization in the core practice areas; and policy support and advocacy initiatives of the UNDP programme *vis-à-vis* other development stakeholders.

1.3 METHOD

An independent team of consultants was constituted by the UNDP Evaluation Office to carry out the ADR. The ADR team comprised four members: two international consultants, one national consultant and Evaluation Office task manager and team member. The evaluation exercise was supported by the UNDP Evaluation Office and the country office in Tajikistan.

Drawing from the ADR guidelines² and the broader UNDP evaluation policy³ the ADR method is based on the objectives and scope identified during the preliminary consultations in the scoping mission and a subsequent review of programme evaluability. The evaluability review included an appraisal of the programme objectives and strategies, monitoring and evaluation systems, monitoring data available, evaluation reports and external studies. The evaluation questions were defined through extensive stakeholder consultations carried out during the preliminary phase of the evaluation. These inputs were framed under the overall

¹ In the thematic area on reversing decline, the assessment did not include the projects related to mine action and border security.

² UNDP, 'Assessment of Development Results: Key Elements of Methodology', Evaluation Office, UNDP, New York, NY, 2002.

³ UNDP Evaluation Policy.

objectives of evaluating strategic positioning and contribution to development results. A set of standard UNDP evaluation criteria was used to assess development results. This includes effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, relevance, responsiveness and social equality. The Terms of Reference is in Annex 1.

The findings and conclusions of the ADR are based on the perception of the key stakeholders of the programme and those working on development issues in Tajikistan. The findings were substantiated with programme data wherever available and the programme and project evaluations.

The evaluation used both qualitative and quantitative data. Qualitative data was collected by the team from primary sources during the mission and documentary review of secondary sources. This was combined with quantitative synthesis and analysis of relevant secondary data. Data collection methods included:

- Review of documents
- Semi-structured interviews (with selected stakeholders such as government officials, donor organizations, private sector representatives)
- Selected site visits (at regional and local level activities to assess issues at implementation levels)

1.3.1 REVIEW OF DOCUMENTS

A repository of documents related to the evaluation was prepared by the UNDP Evaluation Office. A wide range of documents from this repository were consulted by the evaluation team prior to and during the course of the evaluation. The documents reviewed include:

- UNDP corporate documents (Strategic Plan, Multi-Year Funding Framework, policy papers)
- Country programming documents (Common Country Assessment, UNDAF, Country Programme Action Plan)

- UNDP corporate results-based management reporting documents (Results Oriented Annual Report)
- UNDP project documents and evaluation reports
- Internal UNDP documents (audit reports, surveys)
- Government programmes and reports (PRS-I and PRS-II, NDS, JCSS background papers, MDG needs assessment and progress reports, data collected by the Strategic Research Centre and Economic Department, Tajikistan Living Standards Survey)
- Country assistance strategies and policy papers of donor agencies and international financial institutions
- Scientific papers by national and international research institutions and universities
- Regional analytical papers

1.3.2 SEMI-STRUCTURED STAKEHOLDER INTERVIEWS

Semi-structured interviews were used to collect primary data from individual respondents. The focus of the interviews was on: programme performance (for those who were directly involved with the UNDP programme or were aware of the programme); perception of UNDP programme; policy issues; and response of development agencies. A standardized check list (see Box 1) was used to guide interviews with informants, and summary sheets were used to collate interview information to enable systematic analysis of information. Interviewees were determined following a stakeholder analysis during the scoping mission and were extended to include new leads as they emerged. More than 110 individuals were interviewed during the ADR. The evaluation team also interviewed UNDP management and programme team members.

The evaluation team organized data collection processes collectively as well as in separate teams. Because the evaluation covered all

Box 1. Checklist of questions

Stakeholders	Main evaluation questions
Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Did UNDP programmes reflect national priorities? • How responsive was UNDP to the changing priorities and needs of Tajikistan? • How do you see the role of UNDP as a contributor to national development? • How do you see the role of UNDP in policy support? • What were the most significant and successful UNDP interventions and why? • Are there areas where UNDP should intervene further or improve its performance? • How do you see the approach followed by UNDP in implementing programmes in Tajikistan? • What arrangements have been made to ensure the sustainability of results achieved with UNDP support? • What are the existing coordination mechanisms? • How effective has UNDP been in coordinating with others?
NGOs and representatives of civil society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are your views on development needs in Tajikistan and progress towards development? • Has UNDP effectively contributed to improving the situation in Tajikistan? • What was the most significant contribution of UNDP? • Do you participate in projects/consultations supported by UNDP? • How effective were such projects/consultations? • What could have been done better or differently to improve effectiveness and better respond to needs more adequately? • Have you benefited from UNDP-supported training or capacity building?
Multilateral and bilateral development partners, including UN organizations and international financial institutions, programme beneficiaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are your views on progress towards human development in Tajikistan? • What are your views of the UNDP role and performance, including effectiveness, efficiency, relevance and strategic role? • What are the major comparative advantages of UNDP in this country? • What has been the major value addition of UNDP? • How could UNDP have been more effective? • What coordination mechanisms are in place, and what role does UNDP play in coordination? • Has your situation improved because of the development projects (those implemented/supported by UNDP)? • Did interventions correspond to your needs? • Was the support timely and well targeted? • What did UNDP do well? • Which are the interventions that did not work well? • What could have been done better? • How do you see the future? • Will you be able to continue your activities once direct support of UNDP ceases?

the regions in Tajikistan where the UNDP programme was implemented, the team split up on several occasions to carry out stakeholder interviews simultaneously.

1.3.3 SITE VISITS

The ADR team visited all the area offices of UNDP—including field visits to Kulyab, Gharm, Ayni, Shartuz and Kushand—providing a geographical representation of different regions in Tajikistan. The field visits provided the opportunity to get the perceptions of the beneficiaries of various programmes and their views on development needs at the local level.

1.3.4 EVALUATION CRITERIA

Standard ADR criteria were used to evaluate UNDP contributions to results. These criteria include the following:

- **Effectiveness** is assessed by an appreciation of the extent to which specific objectives were achieved or were expected to be achieved, taking into account the external factors that could have affected implementation.
- **Efficiency** is used to examine outputs—qualitative and quantitative—achieved as a result of inputs. The ADR was not entirely successful in assessing efficiency in terms of alternative approaches to achieving an output.
- **Sustainability** is based on a considered assessment of whether UNDP has been able to develop permanent structures, procedures and professional capacity that would continue to perform the expected services within national institutions.
- **Relevance** is based on an assessment of whether the types of interventions selected by UNDP fit the priorities of the country, and whether UNDP used partnerships with donors, other UN organizations, NGOs and the private sector effectively in addressing MDGs and enhancing its programme outcomes.

- **Responsiveness** was used to evaluate the extent the UNDP programme responded to the development needs in Tajikistan and the timeliness. That is, how has UNDP anticipated and responded to significant changes in the national development context?
- **Social equality** was used to evaluate if programme activities led to reduced vulnerabilities in the country. That is, did the UNDP programme in any way influence the existing inequalities in the society? Was the selection of geographical areas of intervention guided by need?

Partnership, coordination and national ownership were evaluated as part of each of the above criteria.

The ADR was a transparent, participatory process and took adequate measures to include all the development stakeholders in Tajikistan. The ADR process promoted participation of stakeholders and beneficiaries, particularly the government counterparts of UNDP and civil society representatives. A wide range of development stakeholders were contacted, including government officials, international agencies, donors to the UNDP programme, international and national NGOs, and public recipients or beneficiaries of the programme. The assessment also included the perceptions of key informants not directly involved with UNDP programmes.

1.3.5 PHASES OF THE ADR PROCESS

The **preparatory phase** involved an intensive initial review of documentation, as well as consultations with the UNDP Evaluation Office, Regional Bureau of Europe and the CIS, and key UNDP agencies. In New York, the two international consultants met with representatives of UNDP bodies. The preparatory phase included a one-week scoping mission to Dushanbe (30 June to 7 July 2008), undertaken by the team leader and Evaluation Office task manager. The mission was used to define the scope of the evaluation, discuss the structure and rationale of the country programme with the UNDP country office, carry

out stakeholder mapping, and identify additional documentation to guide the team. A workshop was held with the development stakeholders in Dushanbe to get their perception on development needs in Tajikistan and how those needs are being addressed. The workshop was also used to share with the development community the purpose and process of the ADR. The criteria used for selecting the projects included thematic focus, size, duration, geographical coverage and nature of partnership. An inception report was prepared to enable the team to follow the evaluation design.

The **main ADR** mission involved three weeks from 4 August 2008 to 22 August 2008. The ADR team had extensive discussions with the country office management, programme units and project staff in Dushanbe and area offices. The team also met key government counterparts at the state, *Oblast* (region or sub-national), *Ryon* (district) and *Jamoat* (village) levels; representatives of UN organizations, bilateral and multilateral organizations; UNDP donors, international and national NGOs, members of civil society; and beneficiaries of the UNDP programme. The international organizations and NGOs the team met included those that were not directly involved with UNDP programming.

The initial observations and findings were presented to the UNDP country office staff and key government counterparts in Dushanbe in two separate workshops. The comments and reflection during the workshops was taken into consideration while preparing the report. Before finalizing, the evaluation findings were shared for discussion with wider development stakeholders in a workshop in Dushanbe in April 09.

1.4 LIMITATIONS

One of the main limitations of the ADR was the lack of proper monitoring information on the intended outcomes and results. The baseline information crucial for evaluation of results was lacking for most programmes. The monitoring systems for the programme areas were weak, although there was sufficient information on the individual project activities and outputs. Although the linkages of results in the Country Programme Document and Country Programme Action Plan were appropriate, the outcomes were too broad and ambitiously stated. Also, the outcomes did not adequately reflect the entire range of results and the projects that were carried out. There was less clarity in the project objectives and indicators and their overall contribution to goals. Similar lack of clarity was evident in the project outputs and outcome indicators.

There were also limitations in the collection of monitoring information at the outcome level. The evaluation largely relied on the interviews and midterm and outcome evaluations. The country office carried out external evaluation of projects and outcomes of all major areas of the programme, except disaster risk management programme. Considering that the focus of evaluations and approach varied, it was not always possible to assess results based on these evaluations. The quality of the evaluations was largely good and formed a basis for the ADR.

Since the ADR does not include a comprehensive primary survey of the effect of all interventions or examine a sufficient period to determine such change, clear linkages of UNDP contributions to development results pose limitations. Data was available on broad trends in the areas of evaluation, which was supplemented by perceptions of stakeholders and observations during the field visits.

Chapter 2

NATIONAL CONTEXT

Since its national independence in 1991 and the subsequent civil war until 1997, Tajikistan has faced formidable challenges in political restructuring, reorganizing the economy and responding to the socio-economic needs of the people. There was a steep economic decline with disruption of trade with countries in Central Asia, withdrawal of subsidies from Moscow, and a drop in both industrial and agricultural production. The civil war contributed to the deterioration of the physical infrastructure and an already weak institutional capacity. Tajikistan

also has a complex geography—it is landlocked, resource poor, mountainous and faces an unfavorable geo-political backdrop bordered by Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. Recurrent humanitarian situations have slowed down development and diverted the focus from long-term development issues. After a decade of political unrest and social and economic instability, political and economic reforms have been underway since 1997. For social and economic indicators and geographical profile of Tajikistan, see Box 2 and Box 3.

Box 2. Selected indicators for Tajikistan

Size	143,100 sq km
Arable land (1998)	6.52%
Population (2007)	7.13 million
Population less than 14 years of age	34.6%
Annual population growth rate (2003)	2.1%
Total fertility rate, births per woman (2000-2005)	3.04
GDI rank, out of 177 countries (2004)	88
Life expectancy at birth (2005)	66.3 years
Male	62 years
Female	68 years
Adult literacy rate, age 15 and above (1995-2005)	99.5%
Male	99.7%
Female	99.2%
Population living on less than \$1 a day (2003)	2.5%
Population living below the national poverty line (2003)	44.4%
Under 5 mortality rate per 1,000 live births (2006)	68
Population using an improved drinking water source (2004)	59%

Source, Human Development Report, 2007/2008; Asian Development Bank. 2007. *Key Indicators 2007*. Manila; Asian Development Bank. 2008. *Basic Statistics 2008*. Manila. Note: GDI indicates Gender-Related Development Index.

Box 3. Geographic and social profile

- Tajikistan is landlocked by Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and China.
- The country is predominantly mountainous and approximately 50 percent of the country's surface is elevated 3,000 meters above sea level or higher.
- Arable land and land under permanent crops make up 7.5 percent of the total surface.
- Tajikistan has a population of approximately 7.3 million, which consists of 2 million of urban and 5.3 million of rural inhabitants.
- The country's ethnic structure comprises 65 percent Tajiks, 25 percent Uzbeks, 3 percent Russian and 7 percent of others (such as Tatars, Kyrgyz and Koreans).
- The official language is Tajik, a Persian-based language.

Source: *The Cotton sector of Tajikistan, New opportunities for the International Cotton Trade*, presented by the Government of Tajikistan, April 2007.

2.1 ECONOMIC CONTEXT

The transformation in Tajikistan during the past decade has been twofold: transformation from a civil war situation to a stable political situation, and from a Soviet economic model to a more liberal economy. Tajikistan's economy followed a similar path to that of other CIS countries following the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991, notably a steep decline in output followed by a recovery beginning in the second half of the 1990s.⁴

Since 1997, the Government of Tajikistan has initiated several measures towards economic

restructuring including tax reforms, banking sector restructuring, and legal and regulatory development of markets. The country achieved full currency convertibility in 2000, followed by price liberalization and small-scale privatization. Agriculture is the second largest sector of the economy, after services. In 2004, agriculture accounted for 24 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 66 percent of employment, 26 percent of exports and 39 percent of tax revenue. Cotton is the main agricultural export crop, constituting 90 percent of agricultural exports.⁵

The sustained economic recovery since 1998 is mainly attributed to continued political stability, an improving macro economic environment, and substantial support from donors and international financial institutions.⁶ Real GDP growth, which had begun to recover in 1997, accelerated in the 2000s, averaging 9 percent per annum during 2000 to 2005⁷ and 8.5 percent during 2003-2005. The real GDP was 7.8 percent in 2007 and 5 percent in the first half of 2008, with a projection of 7 percent for the year.⁸ GDP growth slowed in 2008 due to reduction in outputs and exports because of a winter crisis, locust infestation, and shortages of energy for pump irrigation. Strong growth, better tax administration and a change in the method for determining value added tax boosted domestic revenues, which rose by more than 6 percent of GDP from 1999 to 2006.⁹

The capital investment rate remained low, although there has been substantial improvement in economic performance. Inflation accelerated in the past two years, at 19.5 percent in 2007 and

⁴ Brownbridge M and S Canagarajah, 'Fiscal Policy for Growth and Development in Tajikistan', Policy Research Working Paper 4532, The World Bank, 2008.

⁵ Government of Tajikistan, 'The Cotton Sector of Tajikistan: New Opportunities for the International Cotton Trade', Presentation by the Government of Tajikistan, April 2007.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Real GDP growth, which had begun to recover in 1997, accelerated in the 2000s, averaging 9 percent per annum during 2000-2005.

⁸ IMF, 'Republic of Tajikistan: First Assessment Under the 2008 Staff-Monitored Programme', IMF Country Report No. 08/382, December 2008.

⁹ Brownbridge M and S Canagarajah, *ibid.*

a projected 18.5 percent in 2008.¹⁰ While this has been attributed to the surge in international wheat prices and energy, it also reflects rapid monetary expansion from quasi-fiscal operations by the central bank associated with cotton sector financing.¹¹ There has been a sharp increase in price of imported food commodities contributing to significant food price inflation. Overall, consumer price inflation reached 25 percent in mid 2008.¹²

Remittances have risen rapidly, supporting domestic demand. Total remittances in Tajikistan were estimated at approximately USD 550 million (26 percent of GDP) in 2004, USD 735 million (31 percent of GDP) in 2005,¹³ and 38 percent of GDP in 2007.¹⁴ The current account deficit averaged approximately 3 percent of GDP during 2002-2006 and tripled in 2007.¹⁵ Remittances have been an important source of foreign exchange, surpassing the receipts from aluminum and cotton exports. Considering that most remittances originate from Russia, the financial crisis and imbalances in the Russian economy, particularly the construction sector where migrants from Tajikistan are employed, can significantly affect the remittances inflow. The increase in remittances has not led to growth in domestic savings or investment rates. Private investment is chronically low at 5.4 percent of GDP. Public capital investment (mainly infrastructure projects) also remains low.¹⁶

Incentives to channel remittances toward private investment are needed to stimulate broader-based growth.¹⁷ Medium- to long-term growth hinges on implementing structural reforms and accelerating agricultural and infrastructure reforms.

There have been setbacks to economic growth in the past two years. Domestic and external balances are projected to deteriorate due to slow growth and emerging crises. External debt is rising as the debt to GDP ratio was 50 percent in 2008.¹⁸ Tajikistan remains vulnerable to a sudden increased demand for foreign currency caused by macroeconomic shocks. Cotton and aluminum, traditional sectors of the Tajikistan economy, provided approximately 9 percent of GDP in 2007 and their contribution to the total economy has been declining steadily.¹⁹ Cotton production, though still a significant part of the agricultural sector and representing approximately 10 percent of exports, is facing decline, despite a positive global price tendency. This is due to losing efficiency gains in the sector as well as diversification of the economy, that is, the increase of non-cotton agriculture, textiles and services. Tajikistan has so far been able to counterbalance the large trade deficit with surging remittance inflows.²⁰

The main long-term challenges for development policy in Tajikistan are to sustain rapid economic growth and to ensure that the benefits of this

¹⁰ IMF Country Report No. 08/382, December 2008.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, available online at <http://www.ebrd.com/country/country/taji/econo.htm>.

¹³ Abdul-Ghaffar Mughal, 'Migration, Remittances, and Living Standards in Tajikistan, A Report Based on Khatlon Remittances and Living Standards Measurement Survey (KLSS 2005)', International Organization for Migration, Tajikistan, 2007.

¹⁴ IMF, 'Republic of Tajikistan: First Assessment Under the 2008 Staff-Monitored Program', IMF Country Report No. 08/382.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Asian Development Bank, available online at <http://www.adb.org/documents/books/ADO/2007/TAJ.asp>.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ The World Bank, Country Brief 2008, available online at <http://web.worldbank.org/wbsite/external/countries/ecaext/tajikistanextn/0,,contentMDK:20630697~menuPK:287255~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:258744,00.html>.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, available online at <http://www.ebrd.com/country/country/taji/econo.htm>.

growth are equitably distributed. This necessitates a growth in labor-intensive production to create more employment and to reverse the deterioration in social indicators—notably educational attainment and health status—that has taken place since the country became independent. The business climate still lags behind those of other transition countries. The private sector is approximately 50 percent of the GDP, and foreign direct investment is low. Tajikistan has the lowest labor productivity among CIS countries, although this may reflect other factors besides the quality of the workforce, such as the high cost of doing business in the country.²¹ Improving labor productivity is necessary to sustain long-term growth. While the macroeconomic environment for private investment has improved markedly, some of the institutional features of the investment environment are a major constraint to private investment, as shown by business surveys such as the 2005 Business Environment and Enterprise Survey. Small and medium-sized businesses continue to suffer from excessive administrative barriers. Excessive interference of the government in financial management and corruption has limited private investment in Tajikistan. While the public infrastructure assets are considered as over-dimensioned for the size of the economy,²² what is needed is an infrastructure conducive to private investment. The country's legal and regulatory institutions and public sector administration need to be improved in order to provide an environment truly conducive to domestic and foreign private investment and efficient public service delivery.

2.2 POVERTY REDUCTION AND MDG

There have been several initiatives by the government of Tajikistan in the past eight years to address poverty and human development needs. Tajikistan is one of the first pilot countries of the Millennium Project and became a signatory

to the MDGs in 2000. The PRS-I in 2003 and PRS-II and NDS in 2007 are the medium and long-term strategies designed by the government to address development priorities. The PRS and NDS are aimed to lower the poverty and extreme poverty rates, create employment, increase school enrolment levels, reduce maternal and child mortality and the number of infectious diseases, and enhance social and gender equality.

Despite the efforts by the government and the international community, poverty is one of the critical development challenges, and Tajikistan continues to be dependent on international aid. Poverty in Tajikistan (including extreme poverty) continues to be widespread, although the poverty rate has declined since 2003. According to the 2007 Tajikistan Living Standards Survey, 53.1 percent of the population is poor and 17.4 percent is extremely poor. The absolute and extreme poverty lines are estimated at USD 39 and USD 25 per month respectively. Income-based inequality is higher than consumption-based inequality. There is significant regional variation in the rates of poverty and Sughd and Khatlon together represent 71 percent of the poor people in the country. Poverty is most severe in the remote mountainous areas, where the population is increasingly composed of very young and elderly. The Living Standards Survey notes that rural areas account for 71.4 percent of the national poverty and 75.6 percent of extreme poverty. Female headed and large households were found to be more vulnerable to poverty.

Investment in the cotton industry did not contribute towards any major results in poverty reduction. However, remittances from other countries have reduced the incidence of total and extreme poverty, and the poverty gap, by 5 percent.²³ Employment trends are less reliable as not all unemployed are registered. Trends however indicate that there are high levels of informal employment. There

²¹ World Bank, 'Tajikistan: Trade Diagnostic Study', Report No 32603, 2005.

²² World Bank, 'Europe and Central Asia Infrastructure Study', 2006.

²³ Tajikistan Living Standards Survey, 2007.

are indications of significant increase in the labour force by 40 percent, which has implications for the labour market and public services. Meeting the income poverty reduction target seemed less likely with a large percentage of unemployed. Public employment fell and private-sector employment, particularly in agriculture, grew in 2004.

2.3 SOCIAL SECTOR²⁴

One of the concerns in Tajikistan, despite economic growth, is that government spending for the social-service sector is low. Public expenditure for the social sector is approximately 8 percent, and spending for health is less than 1.5 percent of the GDP. A large share of the budget is spent on salaries and there is little left for improving public services. The quality of the labour force has been a concern in Tajikistan. Poor salaries for government staff and the migration of qualified labour have undermined the quality of human resources in government agencies.

Although social indicators have stabilized since the end of the civil war, there are clear indications that achievements of the MDGs in health and education remain ambitious. While the government is committed to achieving the MDGs, difficulties are foreseen in achieving the MDGs in reducing child and maternal mortality, gender equality, school enrolment, and access to improved water sources. There has been a decline in educational attainment, with falling school completion rates and deterioration in the quality of school education. The school enrolment rate among girls has dropped considerably, as has their upper secondary school attendance. The low level of public investment and spending on education translates into poor physical conditions of schools and underpaid teachers. Chronic as well as acute malnutrition

was prevalent in many parts of the country, particularly among young children.

Tajikistan is close to achieving the MDG target of 76 percent of the population having access to safe drinking water. While the average percentage of the population having access to improved drinking water in 2006 was 67 percent, the proportion of rural populations having access to an improved drinking water source was much lower compared to urban areas (58 percent compared to 93 percent).²⁵ Physical infrastructure deteriorated during the transition from the Soviet Union and long civil war, and due to many frequent natural disasters. In the past years, the level of budgetary allocation in the health sector has been 1.2 percent of GDP. Lack of access to essential health care services has contributed to an increase of infectious diseases including malaria, TB and HIV/AIDS. Cross-border drug trafficking and drug use by injection has increased the spread of HIV/AIDS.

2.4 AGRICULTURE SECTOR

Agriculture in Tajikistan is dominated by the cotton farming, which absorbs vast amounts of agricultural inputs but produces only 14 percent of agricultural output. It suffers from substantial domestic inefficiencies and inequalities and faces significant challenges. The large debt of the cotton sector (estimated at approximately USD 450 million), the absence of competition in input and output marketing, and slow land reforms have led to a decline in the sector and left cotton farming unviable for many farmers.

Reforms in the agriculture sector have been slow. While the monopoly of the state in cotton ended in 1998 with the disbanding of Glavkhlopkoprom—the government agency for purchasing and exporting cotton—other state

²⁴ 'The State of Children and Women in Tajikistan: A Comparative Analysis of MICS 2000 and MICS 2005 Results', Central Asia HDR, Tajikistan Living Standards Survey 2007.

²⁵ UN Population Division, 'World Population Prospects the 2006 Revision', WHO/UNICEF JMP, 2008.

structures have emerged in its place.²⁶ Local officials continue to use their authority to enforce *de facto* production quotas and artificially low prices by withholding inputs from farmers who refuse to grow cotton, blocking farmers' access to external markets, and allocating the best land to cotton farming while leaving the worst land for food production. This has implications for farmers in the Khatlon and Sughd regions where poverty rates are high.

Market oriented agriculture is mainly constrained by lack of land rights and the state withholding inputs from farmers who refuse to grow cotton. While the Presidential Decree 111 provides some flexibility in land use, lack of incentives for growing other crops limits development in the agriculture sector. Land use has become inefficient and unsustainable as farmers lack incentives to invest and adopt practices consistent with long-term agriculture development. Poorly functioning markets also constrained the development of agriculture.²⁷ The trade mechanisms are largely controlled by local monopolies, undervaluing cotton produced by the farmers, and overcharging inputs and credits. Margins are less viable for farmers to profit in the cotton sector, leading to increased debt among cotton farmers. Further reforms and efforts are required in the agriculture sector to ensure land and user rights and create a free trade environment.

2.5 ENERGY AND WATER— CENTRAL ASIA DYNAMICS

As in other Central Asian countries, water and energy management is a crucial factor for development in Tajikistan. The disintegration of the Soviet Union had significant implications for the water and energy sharing arrangements among the Soviet republics of Central Asia.

Most of the water for the region originated from Kirgizstan and Tajikistan. There have been issues about water sharing with countries such as Uzbekistan. While the Central Asian Republics of the Former Soviet Union have avoided open conflict and military hostilities over scarce water resources, their relations have been strained, especially between Tajikistan and Kirgizstan on the one side and Uzbekistan on the other.²⁸

The winter crisis in Tajikistan in 2007-2008 brought to the forefront the need for more cooperation among the countries in the regions in sharing water and energy. The severe winter led to a shortage of electricity that brought normal life in Tajikistan to a standstill. Tajikistan's situation was aggravated by the fact that Uzbekistan, due to its own winter energy shortages, suspended gas exports and limited transfer of electricity through its territory. The lack of water in summer and lack of electricity in the winter created humanitarian crisis and significant economic losses in Tajikistan. Besides the potential for the water and energy situation to deteriorate into a political crisis in the region is highly probable unless there are diplomatic efforts to resolve these issues.²⁹

2.6 GOVERNANCE REFORMS

There have been considerable efforts on the part of the government to initiate macro-economic reforms. However, governance reforms in the social sector and in enhancing democratic governance have been slow. Among the challenges outlined in the NDS, ineffective public administration and inadequate implementation of local governance reforms are seen as adversely affecting sustainable and long-term economic growth and poverty reduction.³⁰

²⁶ World Bank, 'Republic of Tajikistan: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Second Progress Report', 2006.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Linn JF, 'The Impending Water Crisis in Central Asia: An Immediate Threat', The Brookings Institution, 2008.

²⁹ Linn JF, 'Tajikistan: Progress and Problems at the Heart of Central Asia', The Brookings Institution, 2008.

³⁰ NDS, 2007.

Government institutions at the national and sub-national level and judicial and law enforcement systems lack adequate capacities. Excessive interference by government authorities at all levels, including in law enforcement agencies, in the operations of economic entities have undermined governance. The decision-making mechanism is not transparent and has been less conducive to encourage private investment. Lack of transparency and accountability mechanisms have contributed to high levels of corruption in the use of public funds. Mechanisms for public expenditure planning, budget preparation and execution, internal controls, and audit are weak. Public procurement and enforcement of the procurement law continues to be an issue. A public financial management reform process is underway, but it is too early to assess the outcome of this.

Development of local government and an administrative-territorial division based on decentralization in Tajikistan started in the early 1990s. Local government institutions derive their legal basis from the Constitution, the Law on Local Public Administration, and the Law on Local Self-Governance in Towns and Villages. There are some constraints in autonomous functioning of local governments. Centralization of government revenues and lack of clarity with regard to the rights, powers and accountability of local government constrain the effective functioning of local government. Local governments are not actively involved in the development process as incentives for revenue rising and regional development are low. Recent amendments to local government legislation are intended to address some of these issues.

As mentioned, the quality of human resources is of major concern in government services. Low salaries in government jobs do not attract people to join government service. As many organizations have closed their specialized personnel departments, the decree on performance

appraisal is not being implemented.³¹ There have been efforts to strengthen civil service and legislation has been adopted, such as the 2007 Civil Service Law, which is expected to enforce competitive recruitment.

2.7 CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS

The concept of civil society organisations and NGOs are relatively new in Tajikistan. The adoption of the new Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan in 1994 recognized civil society and brought certain legal guarantees for its development. These guarantees were primarily related to human rights and the general freedom of citizens. Further development of these basic principles is nevertheless subject to the willingness of the state to minimize control over communities and accept the formation of NGOs.

The Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on Public Associations, legislated in 2008, recognizes public associations as voluntary, self-managed and non-commercial formations. There are a number of NGOs registered in the country by the Ministry of Justice. During a process of re-registration of NGOs in 2007, the number of organizations was reduced from 3,500 to 1,043. The re-registration process was seen to restrict the space of CSOs and the process was perceived to be less transparent.

2.8 GENDER AND ACCESS TO DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES

The Constitution of Tajikistan provides for gender equality, and there is legislation to further ensure women enjoy the same rights as men. Despite such legislation, there are significant variations in the participation of men and women in economic and political activities and in access to social services. Women are disproportionately poor—often left caring for households as men leave villages to find work or widowed during the war. During the past decade, several

³¹ PRS Monitoring Report, 2007

laws were passed to further gender parity in accessing development resources and to enhance equal participation of men and women in the economic, social and political sphere.³² However, limitations in the implementation of gender policies continue to exist and women are in many ways are disadvantaged.

In the Soviet system, quotas existed for participation of women, although men held most key positions. The political participation of women decreased considerably in post Soviet Tajikistan. In recent Parliamentary elections, 5 of the 181 deputies were women. The percentage of women in politics at the *Oblast* level is 4 percent, 7 percent at the district level, and 11 percent at the municipal level.³³

There are gender differences in participation of men and women in different occupations. Only 25 percent of business managers are women, while almost 50 percent of all workers are women. Approximately 70 percent of the workforce in agriculture is made up of women, which includes 85 percent to 90 percent of the labourers in cotton growing areas. Women also receive fewer wages compared to men. While the Soviet Union subsidized childcare facilities, most facilities have since closed. Male migration to Russia has increased the number of women taking up agriculture labour and the number of female-headed households. Of the small percentage of privatized land, women officially administer only 1 percent, and the female-headed households are thus among the poorest households in rural Tajikistan.

2.9 DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Donor participation has been high in Tajikistan since the civil war, and several international development agencies have been implementing programmes. Development assistance for

post-war reconstruction and development in Tajikistan is an important component of development spending. In the past three years, there have been new dimensions to development aid in Tajikistan. The country has been attracting development aid because of its strategic location in the U.S. war against terror. During the past five years, loans from Russia, China and Iran for infrastructure development have increased, with limited stipulations for public fund management. The economic impact of these projects is still uncertain.

Overseas aid is the main source of funding for humanitarian and development activities in Tajikistan. Between 1991 and 2006, Tajikistan received approximately USD 1.98 billion dollars in ODA. Approximately 80 international aid organizations (bilateral and multilateral donors and NGOs) have been supporting development activities. There has been a considerable increase in development aid in the past decade, and ODA increased from USD 16 million in 1992 to USD 300 million in 2006. On average, official ODA during the past six years was USD 225 million a year. Approximately two thirds of the ODA was in grant form and one third was a loan.

The State Committee of Investment and State Property Management of the Republic of Tajikistan recently published the Foreign Aid Report 2007. The report shows that, in 2007, 448 development projects were implemented and 665 agreements were reached with the government. Of those, 481 agreements were completed in 2007 and 273 agreements are still continuing. Bilateral organizations contributed approximately 57.3 percent of the total funds received, while 40.2 percent was contributed by multilateral organizations and 2.5 percent by NGOs and other organizations.

³² For example, National Action Plan on Increasing the Female Status and Role for 1998-2005; Law On Reproductive Health and Reproductive Rights (December 2002); Main Directions of the State Policy for Ensuring Equal Rights and Opportunities of Men and Women in the Republic of Tajikistan for 2001-2010.

³³ Stucker D, 'Linking Natural Capital, Rural Livelihoods, and Conflict: Towards Governance for Environmental Security and Peace in Tajikistan', Costa Rica, 2006.

The disbursement of funds during the past five years indicates that priority was given to economic development in Tajikistan. With the exception of the 2002-2003 period, expenditure on development related interventions exceeded humanitarian and technical support. Among the non-programme aid, technical assistance comprised one third of the assistance followed by food and humanitarian aid.

Consecutive natural disasters in Tajikistan increased aid for humanitarian and food assistance, and until 2002, comprised about 50 percent of the total aid. The nature of aid for humanitarian assistance has changed and donors respond to flash appeal by the government. During the past five years, there were flash appeals by the government for disaster response and mitigation. The contribution of international agencies to the flash

appeal during the 2007-2008 winter crisis was approximately USD 25 million.

Despite intense donor presence in Tajikistan, coordination of external aid across sectors has been weak. There have been excessive investments in some sectors and fragmentation within sectors undermining the effective use of aid. The Government Aid Coordination Unit lacks adequate capacity to manage and disseminate aid information in a timely manner. While the government has adopted the PRS and NDS in the past five years, development assistance continues to be donor driven, with considerable discrepancies between government priorities and donor priorities. While there have been efforts by the government to develop a legal framework for foreign assistance, there has been limited progress in this area, leading to lack of transparency in development assistance.

Chapter 3

UNDP IN TAJIKISTAN

UNDP began its programme in Tajikistan in 1993 and supported the relief and stabilization efforts of the international community and the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office. Until 1997, UNDP activities were defined by the political and social instability in the country and the programme was largely confined to humanitarian assistance at the sub-district. Since the signing of the Peace Agreement in 1997, UNDP has expanded its programme scope to reconstruction, transition and development. A strategic framework for UNDP assistance was formulated for the period 1997 to 1998 to link humanitarian and longer-term development assistance. This later evolved into the first country programme for the period 1999 to 2000, subsequently followed by the second (2001 to 2004) and third country programmes (2005 to 2009). The ADR carried out an evaluation of the third country programme and part of the interventions of the second country programme. The programme response of UNDP is described in the following sections.

3.1 FIRST COUNTRY PROGRAMME (1999-2000)

The first country programme comprised three broad areas of intervention focusing on: governance; rehabilitation, reconstruction and development; and the sustainable management of natural resources. During the programme period, UNDP along with the World Bank participated in carrying out a Living Standards Survey, which established for the first time a national poverty profile for Tajikistan and served as the basis for a poverty assessment and the subsequent formulation of the PRS. UNDP started the NHDR series on political, social and economic dimensions of sustainable human development. Support was provided to the newly elected Parliament of

Tajikistan to develop rules of procedure for both houses; strengthen national capacity in the area of external resource management and aid coordination; strengthen the management capacities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Commission for National Reconciliation; and establish a database.

The Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Development Programme (RRDP) was initiated during the first country programme to enhance social and economic recovery and consolidate peace. There were more than 690 projects in the area of health, education, infrastructure, agriculture, water management and promotion of gender equality. These have had thousands of beneficiaries. The projects were implemented by sub-contracting to public and private firms. The reintegration programme is reported to have helped 1,200 ex-combatants find short-term employment and 485 ex-combatants find permanent employment.³⁴ UNDP also introduced interventions that involved self-financing and contributions from the local government to sustain the operations of rehabilitated schools, health centres, hospitals, and water and irrigation systems. District Development Advisory Committees and tender committees were formed for programme implementation and ensuring transparency in recovery and rehabilitation activities.

Total resources for the period 1995 to 2000 (which includes the first country programme period) was approximately USD 23 million, of which core funds were approximately 10 million. Approximately 80 percent of the core funds (USD 8.3 million) were spent on reconstruction, rehabilitation and RRDP in the Shaartuz, Kulyab and Gharm regions, which were most affected during the civil war.

³⁴ UNDP Country Programme for Tajikistan, 2001-2003.

3.2 SECOND COUNTRY PROGRAMME (2001-2004)³⁵

The reconstruction and development assistance in the second country programme³⁶ was implemented within the broad framework of poverty reduction. The humanitarian and peacebuilding projects during the first country programme provided the ground work for long-term development interventions during the second country programme. The focus of the programme was on governance and capacity building, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development, and environmental protection and sustainable natural resources management. The total programme delivery for the period 2001 to 2004 was USD 38 million, which included USD 22 million in non-project assistance from Japan.

UNDP supported the government in adopting and mainstreaming the MDGs into its development strategy. During the programme period, UNDP supported the government in establishing a Legal Education Centre to enhance rule of law and an independent judiciary. Further support was provided to the Presidential Working Group for drafting new legislation for local self-government institutions in Tajikistan. UNDP initiated the Working Group on Anti-Corruption to promote discussion among donors, information sharing, coordination and identification of entry points. Through RRDP, the activities of the earlier programme were carried forward, and UNDP supported post-conflict humanitarian and development needs. According to the programme document more than 4,000 ex-combatants were reintegrated into their home communities, more than one million inhabitants were provided with access to safe drinking water, and job opportunities were created for more than 40,000 people.³⁷

UNDP was the principal recipient of Tajikistan's first grant from the GFATM. UNDP initiated disaster management activities during the second country programme, which identified key

areas for capacity building and coordination to strengthen disaster prevention and mitigation. UNDP supported the government in establishing the Tajikistan Mine Action Cell in mid 2003 and provided guidance to meet government obligations under the Ottawa Convention. As part of the five-year mine action plan, the Tajikistan Mine Action Cell has set up a central mines database, developed standards, established priorities for minefield survey and clearance, provided mine risk education and victim assistance, and commenced clearing mines in mid 2004. UNDP supported government preparation of environmental reports.

3.3 UNDAF (2005-2009)

Based on the Common Country Assessment carried out in 2004, the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for 2005 to 2009 identified four priority areas: reversing declines, overcoming mountains, transforming livelihoods, and redistributing responsibilities. Eight outcomes were identified in these broad programme areas. The thematic area of 'reversing declines' was aimed at addressing issues related to the complex transition in the social sector and social protection. In the area of 'overcoming mountains', the UN programme focused on reducing vulnerability of the population to natural disasters. The activities in 'transforming livelihoods' focused on livelihoods creation and employment generation in rural areas. The thematic area of 'redistributing responsibilities' focused on governance issues.

3.4 THIRD COUNTRY PROGRAMME (2005-2009)

The third and ongoing country programme for the period 2005 to 2009 is in alignment with the UNDAF for the same period. The programme priorities are broadly classified under the same four thematic areas defined in the UNDAF. The programmes and projects under these thematic

³⁵ The country programme was for 2001-2003 and extended to 2004.

³⁶ UNDP Country Programme for Tajikistan, 2001-2004.

³⁷ UNDP Country Programme for Tajikistan, 2005-2009.

areas are aimed at: supporting the MDGs, poverty alleviation, and governance initiatives (national and local governance, support to PRS, strengthening statistics, and mine action); strengthening health systems; and reducing vulnerability to natural disasters.

Transforming livelihoods focuses on increasing agricultural productivity, food security and economic opportunities, especially for women and vulnerable groups. The emphasis is on poverty alleviation, and the outcomes focus on better access to rural microfinance, livelihood opportunities (through enhanced capacities for local entrepreneurship), and infrastructure (through community-based revolving funds). The projects and practices are intended to inform national policy-making and strengthen local government.

The third country programme emphasizes improving water infrastructure in rural areas and includes projects on safe drinking water, irrigation and sanitation facilities. UNDP plans to support the government in developing a comprehensive water management policy and promoting better understanding of cross-boundary water management in Central Asia.

Redistributing responsibilities is aimed at increasing responsiveness and accountability of decision-making structures, including the justice system. The focus has been on local governance, aimed at improving links between local government, civil society and the private sector. Under this thematic area, UNDP intends to assist in building the capacity of local government for eventual decentralized budget management. It is also proposed that the capacities of the *Jamoat* level government will be built with UNDP assistance, within the scope of the new law on local governments that provides for the election of local officials.

UNDP plans to introduce the practice of 'Community Linked Development' in infrastructure and local development. This practice intends to further local government capacity by forming Resource and Advocacy Centres that network civil society at the sub-district and foster the emergence of the local private sector. UNDP plans to network with other development agencies in

promoting the Community Linked Development approach to scale it up across different regions. While the UNDP goal is to cover at least half of the country's *Jamoats* with this approach, the joint goal with other partners will be to cover all 404 *Jamoats* in Tajikistan by 2009.

Other interventions under this thematic area include support to anti-corruption efforts and to develop a national anti-corruption strategy, and enhancing government capacity for coordination of development activities. Initiatives for intensified advocacy and campaigning for the MDGs, greater understanding and ownership of the MDGs, and enhanced government capacities for MDG monitoring are also planned.

Reversing decline seeks to strengthen national capacity to prevent and reduce infectious diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB; provide assistance for mine action; and reduce vulnerability to mine-related hazards. UNDP is the principal recipient of GFATM, which includes interventions in the area of HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB, aimed at strengthening government capacities for better public health systems to combat infectious diseases. The HIV/AIDS activities under the GFATM are intended to be a collaborative effort with the Joint UN Programme on AIDS (UNAIDS) and members of the UN Thematic Group on HIV/AIDS. In the area of malaria and TB, joint activities with WHO are envisaged. Joint UN activities are planned in the area of advocacy and national campaigns; civil society mobilization; and a UN inter-agency unit to support national coordination capacity (comprising UNICEF, United Nations Population Fund, UNAIDS, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, International Organization for Migration, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Food Programme and WHO). Support to mine action is to be continued to further national capacity to plan, coordinate and implement a comprehensive mine-action programme by the Tajikistan Mine Action Cell.

Overcoming mountains focuses on sustainability and management of natural resources and efforts to decrease vulnerability to natural disasters. The projects under this thematic area are aimed

at improving national capacities for disaster preparedness and mitigation and to efficiently manage environment, energy and hydrological resources. UNDP, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction intend to support national efforts in disaster mitigation. Support will also be provided to environment and climate change policy development and furthering practices in the area of renewable energy.

3.5 THIRD COUNTRY PROGRAMME OUTCOMES

The third country programme comprises seven outcomes:

- **Outcome 1:** Rural communities, including the most marginalized, have greater access to rural finance, infrastructure and employment
- **Outcome 2:** Rural communities, including the most marginalized, have greater governance
- **Outcome 3:** Public sector transparency, accountability, conduct and participation at local and national levels strengthened
- **Outcome 4:** The government successfully adopts more pro-poor policies, laws and expenditures and receives greater support for this from the international community
- **Outcome 5:** Increased public understanding of HIV/AIDS issues
- **Outcome 6:** Create a sustainable national institution to plan, coordinate and implement comprehensive mine action
- **Outcome 7:** Natural resources sustainability managed and fewer persons killed, injured made homeless, or affected by disasters

3.6 SOURCE AND APPLICATION OF FUNDS

There has been considerable increase in the mobilization of non-core funds since 2005 and the country programme budget has tripled in four years (see Figure 1). Core funds (Figure 2) are allocated on the basis of gross national income per capita and the size of the population. They have been approximately USD 3 million to USD 5 million during the years 2004 to 2008. Core funds were used to strengthen national capacities to enhance the MDGs and support human development policy and plans.

Figure 1. Core and non-core funds (USD thousands)





Figure 2. TRAC funds (USD thousands)




UNDP has funding partnerships with several international agencies. Since 2005, the country office has mobilized more than USD 70 million from 26 sources including Tajikistan private-sector organizations (see Annex 3). GFATM, the European Union and the Government of the United Kingdom-Department for International Development were the main sources of finances for projects implemented by UNDP. Together, they accounted for approximately 80 percent of total cost-shared resources mobilized during the period 2005 to 2008. The funds have been used to support projects on community development and prevention of infectious diseases, particularly TB, malaria and HIV/AIDS.

A total of USD 27 million was raised during 2007, which is a 21 percent increase in annual resource mobilization compared to 2006, and a 43 percent increase compared to 2005 (see Figure 1). The increased fund-raising and delivery allowed UNDP to increase the extra budget reserve to USD 1,623,000 by the end of 2007 and create a strong base for programming. With many donors closing their programmes in Tajikistan, there has been a decline in external funding in 2008 compared to previous years. The country office estimates a USD 1.9 million extra budget

balance in 2009, which is expected to strengthen financial sustainability for programme activities.

The distribution of funds across programme areas indicates that, poverty alleviation and infrastructure development was spread across two thematic areas of the Country Cooperation Framework (CCF)—transferring livelihoods and redistributing responsibilities—receiving a large component of the programme funding (see Figure 3). This was followed by the GFATM grants for strengthening health institutions to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB, and allocations for mine action under the thematic area of reversing decline. Disaster management and sustainable environment under the thematic area of overcoming mountains comprised a small component of the total funds.

The level of administrative expenditure in the country office (as a ratio of total expenditure) decreased significantly during the period of 2004 to 2007 from 14.3 percent to 6 percent. This is significantly lower than the intended target of 10 percent.³⁸ The online client survey indicates an average of 66.5 percent satisfaction with services provided by the country office.



³⁸ Tajikistan 2007 Balanced Scorecard Report, Atlas.

3.7 PROGRAMME DELIVERY MODALITIES

More than 95 percent of UNDP projects are executed directly by UNDP staff. A few projects, namely, MDG, Aid Coordination, Human Rights, Second National Communication, Tajikistan Mine Action Cell, Gissar Biodiversity Project, Agro Biodiversity, NHDR, Microfinance Capacity Building involving small grants

were transferred to national implementation modality in 2007. Subject to the positive assessment of the capacities of the national counterpart, the country office is planning to transfer the Disaster Risk Management Project to national implementation modality in 2009. Considering the low administrative and financial capacities of the government, the national implementation modality is still considered as a mid-term strategy to be implemented in three to four years.

Chapter 4

CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

The aim of UNDP assistance in Tajikistan has been to provide quality policy and programme support in alleviating poverty, share best practices and enhance government capacities to address development challenges. The PRS-I, PRS-II and NDS provide a strong framework for UNDP to design development support for the Government of Tajikistan. During the period 2001 to 2008, UNDP implemented two country programmes that comprised four broad areas: poverty alleviation (through microfinance, business support services, and development of public infrastructure), support to MDGs and strengthening of local government; strengthening national governance; enhancing the capacities of health institutions to minimize the risk of HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB; and reducing vulnerability to natural disasters. The analysis of contribution to national development results is structured along these broad programme areas within the context of national priorities and strategies.

4.1 OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF COUNTRY PROGRAMME

UNDP interventions during the assessment period were found to be in alignment with the priorities identified in the PRS-I, PRS-II and NDS. The second CCF had a large component aimed at recovery and stabilizing livelihood at the household and community level. The third CCF shifted the focus to development issues, taking forward the momentum generated at the local level through community-based interventions.

The government was the principal partner of UNDP, although there were also partnerships and close engagement with civil society and multilateral and bilateral organizations. Building

on the UNDP programme in Tajikistan since 1996, the two country programmes worked towards: strengthening the capacity of the government; providing support to institutionalizing the MDGs; reducing vulnerability to natural disasters and mines; and enhancing the performance of government institutions. Specific projects were piloted in the area of poverty alleviation and local governance.

The programme emphasis corresponds to the development needs perceived by civil society and national and international development agencies. The poverty alleviation and infrastructure projects were relevant from the point of local needs, and UNDP contribution to local infrastructure development was widely acknowledged by development stakeholders. The government was generally appreciative of UNDP poverty alleviation and local infrastructure projects, and efforts to support the government in disaster management initiatives, statistics management and preparing the NHDR. UNDP is considered a trusted and valued partner for its neutral position and flexibility in support of the government. While not attributing any particular area of expertise to UNDP, the government considered UNDP good at organizing technical expertise.

UNDP support to strengthening the capacities of the government institutions in the area of mine action and disaster risk reduction has been significant. In the health sector, the government was a more reluctant partner as there was considerable resentment that UNDP had full control over GFATM. Policy support has been more dispersed, exceptions being in the area of MDGs, local government legislation and disaster management.

A widely shared view, particularly among the international agencies, was that UNDP could play a more proactive role in enhancing policy and reforms. The programme method of UNDP was seen as less conducive for furthering national capacities.

4.2 ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES

Corruption has been a major development challenge in Tajikistan. Lack of administrative reforms and poor transparency in public finance management has severely constrained development and an enabling environment for business. Tajikistan has an Anti-corruption Law and Regulation on Audit. Through a Presidential Decree in 2004, an Anti-Corruption Department was set up in the Prosecutor General's Office. In 2007 the Agency for State Financial Control and Combating Corruption was established in Tajikistan. The Agency is responsible for detecting, investigating and prosecuting (supporting public prosecution in court) corruption offences. UNDP support to government anti-corruption efforts has been significant, as it is one of the few agencies supporting anti-corruption efforts. UNDP supported the government working group in developing the National Anti-Corruption Strategy and the Prosecutor General's Office in conducting seminars on corruption for judges, prosecutors, police, and tax and customs officers. Training programmes were organized by UNDP on rights of the citizens, mechanisms to prevent corruption and journalistic investigations of corruption offences.

UNDP financed a study on incidence and dimensions of government corruption and interventions required to further anti-corruption reforms.³⁹ The study carried out a nationwide survey on perception of corruption in public office and looked at the financial accountability of the Parliament. The findings were significant in drawing attention to areas of governance where

corruption was high. However, the anti-corruption initiatives were discontinued in 2006. The momentum created by the study was not used to prepare an action plan for greater transparency in government institutions and specific measures to combat large scale corruption.

UNDP interventions in the area of anti-corruption were not sufficiently long enough to have any discernable results. According to Transparency International's perception on corruption for 2008, Tajikistan ranks 151 out of 180 countries. Considering the complexity of the corruption issue, sustained interventions are needed to enhance transparency and accountability in public institutions. Efforts to enhance transparency in public functioning did not receive adequate attention in the ongoing programme. Lack of funding was one of the reasons for UNDP not continuing support to anti-corruption interventions. Future UNDP anti-corruption initiatives should include support to transparency and accountability mechanisms. Lessons from the previous programme will be useful in providing strategic direction to UNDP interventions in this area. To overcome funding constraints core funds should be allocated for anti-corruption activities.

4.3 POVERTY ALLEVIATION AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

UNDP Tajikistan used a multi-sector approach to address poverty and rural development. Interventions in the area of poverty alleviation, local infrastructure development and strengthening local governance were implemented as Communities Programme (CP) during the ongoing country programme and as RRDP in the previous country programme.⁴⁰ Microfinance and rehabilitation and construction of the local infrastructure were main components of the UNDP programme during 2001 to 2008. It encompassed two programme areas outlined in the UNDAF and ongoing country programme:

³⁹ The study was carried out by the Centre for Strategic Research, located in the Office of the President.

⁴⁰ The RRDP was implemented in Kulyab, Shartuz, Gharm and Ainy. The CP was implemented in five regions, with Area Offices in Kulyab, Shartuz, Gharm, Ainy and Khujand.

transforming livelihoods and redistributing responsibilities. The CP covers three UNDP service lines: decentralization, local governance, and urban rural development; local poverty initiatives; and effective water governance. The projects under CP were implemented at the district and sub-district. There were regional variations in investing funds in infrastructure and microfinance activities.⁴¹ Considering the weak water infrastructure in the rural areas, emphasis was given to building drinking water and irrigation infrastructure. More recent initiatives in CP included addressing governance issues at the district and sub-district level.

The financial contribution of UNDP was high during the RRDP period and in the early phase of CP. In the past four years, the share of donor funding increased from approximately 40 percent to almost 78 percent. Local area offices of UNDP have been a source of strength in terms of local presence and most donors found it useful to implement programmes through UNDP.

The various components of the RRDP and CP were relevant in the rural areas of Tajikistan, particularly in the context of a post civil war humanitarian situation. Considering the need for microfinance at the household level, poor capacities at the community level and lack of funding for rehabilitation of public infrastructure, UNDP initiatives were largely perceived as significant. However, interventions under RRDP and CP were extremely project oriented with limited synergy among programme components. One exception was the more holistic approach followed in Zerafshan, where a programme was developed with various dimensions of local development, poverty alleviation and local governance.

4.3.1 COMMUNITY LINKED DEVELOPMENT AND JRCS

UNDP supported formation of *Jamoat* Resource Centres (JRCs) at the sub-district (*Jamoat*) level. The JRCs are based on the earlier programme

where *Jamoat* Development Centres (JDCs) and District Development Centres (DDCs) were formed to advise on rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes. Registered as NGOs, the JRCs were formed in 110 *Jamoats* and comprised representatives of local government at the sub-district level, community and CSOs. The JRCs functioned as intermediary organizations having operational links with the sub-district, and managed the microfinance revolving fund until 2007. The JRCs played a key role in the implementation of local infrastructure projects of UNDP. Among other tasks, the JRCs mobilized the community to participate in identifying and prioritizing infrastructure needs, organizing tenders, and monitoring implementation of the infrastructure projects. The JRCs attracted funds for infrastructure development and several agencies channeled funds through JRCs. A few JRCs organized the community to maintain infrastructure projects. While some JRCs provided business advisory services, agricultural extension, and health advocacy, these activities were in the preliminary stage.

UNDP made a considerable investment in developing JRCs—providing funds for basic office equipment, and training members to improve their skills in project management and community mobilization. The functioning of JRCs was not uniform across regions, although they fulfilled the essential function of mobilizing the community for participation in development projects and supporting their implementation. Considering the range of activities UNDP implemented at the sub-district level, the JRCs were an important platform to mobilize different rural stakeholders and initiate participatory local planning. This is significant in the context of Tajikistan where participatory governance was something that local governments and people were not accustomed to. The JRCs were also accepted by different levels of local government and among the CSOs and the community. In the past year, with the transfer of microfinance

⁴¹ The area offices of Kulyab and Shartuz in the south and Khujand in the north focused on cotton farmers.

functions to regional microfinance institutions, the role of JRCs is confined to supporting project implementation.

There are issues that need to be resolved about the role of JRCs *vis-à-vis* the local government at the district and sub-district level and their sustainability as community organizations. The sub-district and district governments are weak in Tajikistan, and in many ways, the JRCs filled the capacity gaps of the local government. The public infrastructure funds that would normally be channeled through government institutions were channeled through JRCs. It was evident that JRCs became centres of public investment, with local authorities abdicating their responsibility in the implementation of infrastructure projects. The district administration and institutions responsible for water infrastructure in the places the evaluation team visited did not appear to demonstrate ownership of the infrastructure. The functional relationship of JRCs and the sub-district government was not clear, although the assumption was that the local government members were represented in the JRCs. Considering that JRCs do not have a legal space in the local government structure, handling of infrastructure funds by JRCs makes accountability uncertain. The JRCs are encouraged to access private funding for infrastructure activities and accountability of these processes are not fully established.

Support to JRCs was relevant in a humanitarian context where there was a need for speedy implementation of local development projects and to enable participation of the community in reconstruction process. However, the JRC process was limited by being 'delivery oriented'⁴² rather than adopting a long-term perspective to strengthen institutions of local government. It is debatable whether creation of JRCs was self serving for the UNDP programme implementation. While the JRCs had an important role in ensuring responsiveness to local needs and

participation of the civil society, their role and functions somewhat undermined the responsibility of the sub-district government. Earlier evaluations also pointed out that JRCs have in many ways become parallel institutions.⁴³ An opportunity was lost to use JRCs to facilitate the functioning of district and *Jamoat* administration, instead of using JRCs to carry out the responsibility of *Jamoats*. The active involvement of JRCs in the public infrastructure activities has contributed to abdicating of responsibility by the sub-district and district governments. While lack of funds is one of the reasons for this, it was not evident if JRCs could sufficiently engage district government in active ownership of the infrastructure created.

Over the period, there has been an expansion of activities and functions of JRCs. With UNDP starting interventions in the area of local government, JRCs are expected to provide training and information services. However, it is not evident if JRCs are in a position to be effective in strengthening local government at the *Jamoat* level. There are changes being made to local government legislation giving powers to the *Jamoats* to access private investment for local development activities. Changes were also made for a democratic election of the *Jamoat* head. In the *Jamoats* visited during the ADR, it was not evident that UNDP efforts have enhanced the capacities of the sub-district government. The DDCs did not receive much attention during the programme period. Although the district government is an important level of government, having the responsibility of service delivery, there were limited efforts to strengthen DDCs, which are envisaged as advisory bodies. The local governance projects started more recently do envisage working with the district and sub-district governments directly. While JRCs becoming micro fund organizations is imminent, UNDP may have to start the process all over to strengthen local governments. The participatory process piloted through JRCs remains to be institutionalized.

⁴² The evaluation of CP in 2007.

⁴³ SIDA, 'Evaluation of SIDA Support to Local Governance in Tajikistan', 2006.

It is time UNDP defines its civil society strategy and broadens support beyond the JRCs in strengthening the larger civil society process in Tajikistan. Not all NGOs and CSOs participated in the activities of JRCs. There were perceptions of preferential inclusion of some NGOs and CSOs and there was limited rotation of JRC leadership. UNDP has to structure its support to create an enabling environment for CSOs and NGOs. There is scope for UNDP to provide intellectual direction to the legislation on CSOs, which restricts the functioning of CSOs and NGOs. The law also has implications for the JRCs created by UNDP. While JRCs need to revisit their legal framework, choices are already made by most JRCs about future activities. Approximately 90 JRCs promoted micro fund organizations with specific interests in microfinance. It was not evident whether JRCs will continue to play the advocacy and community mobilization role envisaged at the time of their formation.

4.3.2 MICROFINANCE⁴⁴

Approximately 10 percent of the programme portfolio during 2001 to 2008—was committed to microfinance initiatives in five regions of Tajikistan: Kulyab, Shartuz, Gharm, Ainy and Khujand. The intended result was to enhance livelihoods opportunities at the household level and reduce poverty at the community level. The microfinance services were offered to individuals with low income, who could not access bank loans due to high transaction costs and lack of traditional collaterals. The JDCs and later JRCs, were formed to manage microfinance projects. During the assessment period, 110 JRCs managed microfinance revolving funds and microfinance services until 2007.

The UNDP microfinance portfolio was large in terms of size and geographical coverage. The UNDP programme has a loan portfolio of

USD 3.5 million which comprised 25 percent of the microfinance operations in Tajikistan. The programme has provided micro loans to approximately 100,000 persons (1 percent of the population) since the beginning of the programme in 1996. The number of active clients in 2008 was 16,135. While there were regional variations in the participation of women accessing microfinance, an average of 31 percent of the beneficiaries were women. This is significant in the context of Tajikistan where women have been passive in participation in public space. Agriculture and livestock received most loans, followed by small and medium enterprises and services. The average loan size ranged from USD 155 to USD 442. The recovery rates were high, further increasing the microfinance reach.

The microfinance initiatives are important in terms of the critical need for micro-credit in rural households, particularly in the post-conflict and transition phase. At the project implementation level, there was not sufficient evidence to establish whether microfinance provided by UNDP produced expected results. It was not evident whether the UNDP microfinance projects contributed to enhancing livelihoods at the household level or in improving access of rural poor to credit. The micro loans were largely at subsistence level.⁴⁵ Because households accessed multiple credit services, sufficient data was not available to link UNDP poverty alleviation outcomes. The reporting systems of the microfinance programme were not strong enough to establish the linkages between accessing micro loans and livelihood condition and economic opportunities of the beneficiaries. While monitoring systems track the loan portfolio and repayment schedules, they do not provide information on who was being served, how the loans were used, and how they improved the economic situation of the household or livelihood opportunities. The data

⁴⁴ The ADR could not assess microfinance activities during the second country programme mainly due to the lack data and field presence.

⁴⁵ Individual loans from 500 to 1,500 Somoni.

collected at the district level shows a decrease in the poverty levels, but this was mainly attributed to increases in remittances.

The country office carried out three evaluations and the findings substantiate the observations of the ADR. While the relevance of microfinance interventions during conflict and immediately after cannot be denied, there have been questions whether microfinance projects are relevant during the development phase when UNDP goals are aimed at providing support to strategic national development planning and policy.⁴⁶

At the national level, the government has acknowledged the importance of microfinance in poverty reduction. Subsequent to the Law on Microfinance Institutions, there were changes in the institutional system of delivering microfinance. The 2004 Law on Microfinance Institutions, which was operationalised in 2007, specifies institutional systems required for microfinance transactions and provides legal status to microfinance institutions. The law had significant implications for UNDP micro credit activities. The requirement that microfinance institutions obtain a license from the National Bank of Tajikistan necessitated changes in programme structure and operations. In compliance with the requirement that microfinance institutions be registered, six regional microfinance institutions were formed by UNDP to manage microfinance loans.⁴⁷ Efforts were made to strengthen the administrative and management capacity of the regional microfinance institutions. However, while the regional microfinance institutions are operationally sustainable, financial sustainability remains an issue. More funding is required for regionalization and sustaining operations.

While the Law on Microfinance Institutions is not yet fully operational, it empowers

microfinance institutions to access deposits for microfinance lending. The scale of operations of microfinance institutions created by UNDP is not yet adequate to access loan funds from commercial banks. With increasing competition in the area of microfinance, the outcome of UNDP measures to sustain regional institutions remains uncertain, although UNDP provided additional funding to extend the credit portfolio of the microfinance institutions.

The JRCs joined together to form the Micro Loan Fund Institutions.⁴⁸ Approximately 105 JRCs formed 6 micro loan institutions to continue to manage the microfinance revolving fund. It is not evident that the JRCs have adequate skills and management capacities to provide services to Micro Loan Fund Institutions. At the time of the ADR, UNDP was providing training to enhance management and administration capacities. However, the financial sustainability of Micro Loan Fund Institutions remains uncertain.

There were lost opportunities in furthering microfinance approach, practices and policy. With an extensive programme on microfinance, UNDP had the opportunity to establish vertical linkages and to initiate debate on microfinance issues that constrain rural finance. Opportunity was lost in assisting the government in furthering microfinance law and providing directions for a progressive microfinance policy that allows different institutional structures. While the support of UNDP to the Association of Microfinance Organizations is significant, UNDP did not use its microfinance programme to strengthen the capacity of the government to regulate microfinance institutions. Considering credit needs in agriculture and in the cotton sector specifically, a more focused lending strategy would have produced better results. This also would have given

⁴⁶ De Martino L and M Makhkamova, 2007.

⁴⁷ The regional microfinance institutions were established in Soughd, Zeravshan, Kurgan-Tube, Kulyab and two in Rasht Valley.

⁴⁸ The Micro Loan Fund Institutions were formed in Sughd, Kurgan-Tube, Kujhand, Rasht and Kulab.

UNDP an opportunity to engage in issues pertaining to operationalization of land reforms and regulations on cotton farming.

Having confined itself to traditional micro-credit, UNDP did not design and test different microfinance products such as financial products, saving services and those that reduce livelihood risk at the household level.⁴⁹ UNDP has recently started projects aimed at attracting and transferring remittances into community development activities. The UNDP strategy in furthering these activities is not clear and it is too early for discernable results from the remittances project. Taking into consideration the scaling down of microfinance projects, UNDP may not be able to adopt new activities in an effective way to ensure sustainable results.

Addressing gender related concerns was one of the weak areas of the UNDP programme. While efforts were occasionally made to address women's issues and gender inequality during the programme period, these were approached more as 'add on' activities rather than integrated into the programme process. The microfinance and micro-enterprise initiatives were more oriented toward credit profile and risk involved rather than reaching out to vulnerable groups. Across the regions, 30 percent of the recipients of the microfinance programme were women. This however is skewed in a context where women comprise a substantial proportion of the economically active population in rural areas. The microfinance programmes did not have products that addressed gender related issues pertaining to education, employment opportunities, political participation, violence against women, and empowerment of women, which is important in the context of Tajikistan. UNDP did not use microfinance to create a space for articulating concerns specific to women and unequal gender relations. Although UNDP

promoted one third representation of women, there was no adequate representation of women on the JRC Board.

4.3.3 PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE IN RURAL AREAS

UNDP sees local development initiatives as a means to enhance economic and human development. During the two programme periods, a major component of the UNDP rural development initiatives (approximately 140 projects) supported reconstruction and rehabilitation of public infrastructure destroyed or damaged during conflict. While this was critical to bring normalcy in the post-conflict period, the implementation of various infrastructure projects also provided short-term employment. The third country programme, while carrying forward infrastructure development activities, further emphasized support to water infrastructure. Several initiatives were supported by UNDP to improve access to clean drinking water, irrigation, and promote participatory water management practices. There have been more than 80 water infrastructure projects during the programme period.

The ADR did not have information on the number of persons who were involved in short-term employment through infrastructure projects during the two programme periods. Based on earlier evaluations, indications are that projects were beneficial in providing short-term employment.⁵⁰

The infrastructure projects were managed by JDCs and later JRCs, and the implementation of the projects were outsourced to private companies through a transparent tender process. The community was involved in identifying and prioritizing infrastructure projects. The process for tendering and bidding for the infrastructure projects introduced practices of transparency and accountability into local administrations. The infrastructure grants were on a matching funds

⁴⁹ This is also pointed out in the 2007 evaluation of CP.

⁵⁰ Brooks, 2006.

basis, where on average, the community had to mobilize 15 percent of the cost. The project documents, however, indicate that community contribution has not always been at the desired levels. Results were evident in drinking water interventions. An earlier evaluation notes that the State Epidemiological Station, which collects data on waterborne diseases, indicated a decrease in the number of waterborne diseases in areas where drinking water points were provided.⁵¹

Water infrastructure is a major problem in rural Tajikistan. Approximately 90 percent of the irrigation infrastructure was built during the Soviet period and was destroyed or damaged during the war. More than 60 percent of the rural population does not have access to safe drinking water. Lack of finances for rural infrastructure development and maintenance further contributed to the poor condition of water infrastructure. UNDP is one of the key players in reconstructing and building rural water systems⁵² and its contribution has been significant. UNDP has helped enable a change in the Soviet-era mindset among the rural community that the state provides free public service by introducing practices where the community paid for the water services. The accountability of maintaining water services assumes importance with collective farms disintegrating into individual farms. The Water User Associations formed with the support of UNDP brought focus to the issues of accountability and maintaining the water infrastructure.

Sustainability of irrigation infrastructures created through various projects was better compared to drinking water infrastructure. Lack of a clear legal framework and minimal resources at the *Jamoat* and district level have contributed to poor infrastructure maintenance and reliance on community contribution. The Water User Associations have ensured

sustainability of irrigation systems in most areas and increased community understanding about using water resources efficiently. The Law on Water User Associations endorses the role of the irrigation Water User Associations. While there is a greater understanding of the responsibility of local authority, water users, and those who manage water points, the accountability of local government and resources required is yet to be defined. The sustainability of drinking water infrastructure was more challenging as there was less active involvement of Water User Associations. It was also evident that a one-time contribution by the community may not always guarantee regular maintenance. More efforts are required to ensure sustainability of the public infrastructure.

Interviews indicated that it was easier to implement and maintain smaller infrastructure projects. Larger projects had difficulties raising resources and defining ownership of government institutions. In the case of medium and large irrigation projects, different government agencies had jurisdictional responsibility, making it difficult to carry out these projects and ensure asset ownership. The accountability of the assets continues to be an issue. While the implementation of the projects may be at the *Jamoat*, the responsibility of assets often rests with different line ministries at the district. Sufficient linkages were not made with the district administration for maintaining the infrastructure. UNDP piloted projects to draw investment from remittances for local development. While these initiatives have the potential to attract investment, as was seen in southern Tajikistan, it is too early to say that remittances can be mobilized on the scale that is required for local public infrastructure.

⁵¹ De Martino L and M Makhkamova, 'Assessing UNDP Communities Programme', External Outcome Evaluation Report for UNDP Tajikistan, 2007.

⁵² 2005 Country Programme Action Plan. The latter mentions that "the overall objectives of water access measures are to improve the living conditions of rural populations by supplying clean water and safe sanitation practices, thereby decreasing the occurrence of waterborne diseases, with a high emphasis on sustainability mechanisms."

4.3.4 STRENGTHENING LOCAL GOVERNANCE

The district level government in Tajikistan has the responsibility to provide services such as water, power, waste management, land management and security. The district governments are an interface between the national and local governments and are crucial for furthering MDG efforts. Recognizing the limitations of focusing only at the sub-district level, in the past two years UNDP has initiated projects to strengthen local government at the district level. According to project documents, the rationale for the shift from sub-district to district level local government has been to enhance the capacity of the district in service delivery.

UNDP interventions were primarily in three areas: first, projects to strengthen district level information on development trends and citizens' needs, intended to improve planning and the effective use of resources; second, develop partnership with CSOs to strengthen local government, which has been a consistent approach followed by UNDP in the second and third country programme; and third, efforts to promote private investment in local development, since one of the main concerns in local development is the constraint of funds.

UNDP supported the Strategic Resource Centre (SRC) in developing an updated database on district level information and periodically analysing the trends. SRC carried out a baseline survey on poverty at the household level at the sub-district level and for periodic collection and analysis of district-level information. District officials and NGOs were involved in collecting information. Support to SRC has been important in many ways. SRC analyses development trends at the national and district level and informs policy decisions of President's Office and has an important role in informing policy by analysing development trends at the national and district level. SRC is professionally managed and is an important source of information for Statistics and Economic Planning Departments. The poverty data collection, if continued at

the district level, can be a valuable source for monitoring PRS and MDG progress. More recent efforts in developing statistics include a partnership with the State Statistics Committee to develop poverty indicators and a database.

UNDP efforts to strengthen local governments both at the district and sub-district levels have not been optimal. During the second and third country programme, emphasis was on JRCs, which shifted in the past two years to DDCs. DDCs are not fully functional and do not have the resources necessary to play a role similar to JRCs. The same can be said about the district development plans, which are in early stages of conceptualization. More efforts are required for their operationalization. In these initiatives, UNDP has taken a civil society approach rather than a local government centred approach.

UNDP developed a local government strategy for the period 2006 to 2007 that specifies outcomes for strengthening local governments. Considering the extent of institutional strengthening required at the district level, a two-year period was too short to produce realistic results. The various initiatives under the local governance portfolio, such as developing a district-level database, enhancing citizens' voices, district development planning and attracting private funds had varied levels of importance in contributing to development results. It was not evident how these activities related to each other in strengthening institutions at the district level. For sustainable results, piloted practices should be institutionalized and linked to macro-processes and reforms.

Despite the UNDP presence at the local level and work with the local government on interventions in health, poverty reduction, local infrastructure development and disaster management, change in the functioning of the local government was not evident. Efforts to strengthen administrative capacities of the local government were not simultaneously followed by activities to initiate changes in the institutional framework giving more financial and administrative powers to carryout development work. The excessive

control of the local government by the central government does not encourage responsive local governance. There is need for changes in the legal framework for effective service delivery. UNDP did not adequately initiate and facilitate amendments to the local government legislation.

Under the present law, local governments are responsible for delivering public services and revenue collection. However revenue raising power, such as levying taxes, rests with the national government. Local governments continue to be executive structures of national administration and are only allowed to levy a narrow range of charges on their own account. The democratic decision-making systems are weak and the local government representatives are nominated to the positions. There are no transparency and accountability systems to report public expenditure. There is minimal information available for effective planning. The budgeting is on an annual basis, restricting long-term development planning. UNDP, with its strong local and national presence, is well positioned to further local governance reforms and practices. It was not evident that UNDP made adequate efforts towards this.

4.4 REDUCING VULNERABILITY TO INFECTIOUS DISEASES

UNDP has been active in helping the government strengthen health systems in combating infectious diseases. Since 2003, UNDP has been the Principal Recipient of four GFATM grants for HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis (TB) applied by the Government of Tajikistan. UNDP Tajikistan leads the UN Joint Advocacy Programme that aims to encourage acknowledgement of HIV/AIDS, mobilize civil society to address the HIV/AIDS problem, and increase public awareness and understanding of the risks associated with HIV/AIDS. In addition, UNDP

supported a joint regional project on Long Term Joint Capacity Building for AIDS Control in Central Asia. These activities are in line with priorities identified in UNDP strategic documents such as the 2005-2009 UNDAF⁵³ and 2005-2009 Country Programme Action Plan.⁵⁴ The outcomes envisaged include support to strengthen national capacity to prevent and reduce infectious diseases, particularly HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB.

GFATM comprises approximately 25 percent of the ODA in the health sector. GFATM assistance has been used for rehabilitating and building health infrastructure, implementing prevention measures, and increasing public awareness on HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB. To carry out its functions as Principal Recipient, UNDP set up a Programme Implementation Unit. During the first grant period in 2003, funding was provided to support HIV/AIDS prevention. Since 2005, HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria, are being supported by the GFATM programmes. While results were evident in preventing malaria, it is too early to assess contribution to results in the areas of HIV/AIDS and TB.

4.4.1 HIV/AIDS

HIV/AIDS is a relatively minor problem in Tajikistan, although the potential for increase is high because of the rising number of drug users and narcotic trafficking. The government formulated the First National Programme on HIV/AIDS in 1997 and established the National Coordination Committee for HIV/AIDS Prevention. There have been serious constraints in financing health programmes and projects pertaining to HIV/AIDS from the government budget. The GFATM provided a boost to addressing HIV/AIDS prevention and cure.

UNDP coordinated and managed three GFATM grants related to HIV/AIDS while national health

⁵³ 'Moving Mountains, A United Nations Assessment of Development Challenges in Tajikistan', UNDAF, Tajikistan, 2005-2009.

⁵⁴ This document is a joint strategy of the Government of Tajikistan and UNDP.

agencies and UN organizations implemented the programmes.⁵⁵ The first grant was aimed at injecting drug users, commercial sex workers and young persons (age group 11 to 25 years). The second grant addressed the issues of people living with HIV/AIDS, supporting: HIV/AIDS counseling; testing services for migrants, prisoners and street children; antiretroviral therapy; treatment for opportunistic infections; improved HIV diagnostics and monitoring; and national capacity for treatment, care and support for people living with HIV/AIDS. The third grant aimed at increasing the access of vulnerable groups, such as injection drug users, sex workers, men who have sex with men, young people and uniformed staff,⁵⁶ to HIV prevention and care services. It also included measures to ensure effectiveness of the national blood safety system and to strengthen the areas of the health system that address HIV, sexually transmitted infections and TB.

UNDP leads the joint advocacy effort of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) on HIV policies and programmes in Tajikistan. The advocacy efforts are aimed at increasing public awareness and understanding of risks related to HIV/AIDS, mobilizing civil society, and introducing prevention and mitigation policies in government strategic documents.⁵⁷ The new National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan (and associated Action Plan) has been prepared and focuses on multi-sector collaboration in HIV prevention and care. National legislation related to HIV/AIDS has been amended to increase alignment with international standards. A National AIDS

Treatment Protocol was approved by the Ministry of Health and antiretroviral drugs have been included in the essential drug list of the country. The UN HIV/AIDS team developed partnerships with both the government and the private sector.

Service points were supported during the project period that provide counseling on HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infections to high risk groups and antiretroviral therapy for people living with HIV/AIDS. However, use of the facilities has been low.⁵⁸ Factors contributing to low coverage by antiretroviral therapy include the understaffed health services and lack of expertise on HIV/AIDS therapy. Poor road conditions, lack of adequate transportation, social stigma, and the attitude of health professionals in assisting individuals with HIV/AIDS-related health problems posed constraints in using service points. While some of these issues were addressed by the UNDP Programme Implementation Unit, more efforts are required to strengthen the service points and involve health authorities in this process. In addition, Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) equipment and reagents used for analysis and monitoring of antiretroviral therapy, which were supplied two years ago, are still not operational. Additional funding has been provided by UNDP for professional training on using PCR equipment for national specialists, for repairs of premises where PCR is located, and for procuring new reagents. The equipment was not operational in the places the ADR team visited.

⁵⁵ Activities under Round 4 programme are implemented by International Organization for Migration, UNICEF, the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, Department of Penitentiary Affairs of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Health and the Republican Centre on AIDS Prevention and Control. Activities under Round 6 grant project are implemented by the Central Military Hospital of the Ministry of Defense, the Republican Centre on AIDS Prevention and Control of the Ministry of Health, Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan, the State Youth Committee, NGO 'RAN', NGO 'Mehrboni', NGO 'Youth Legal Support Centre', UNFPA and WHO. Local NGOs were involved in the implementation of grant activities.

⁵⁶ Uniformed staff is a term intended to collectively describe the military, border control, local militias, police, etc.

⁵⁷ Technical working group created under the programme. The Joint UN HIV/AIDS team provides recommendations to the HIV/AIDS Theme Group.

⁵⁸ The record of the National Venereal Diseases Centre⁵⁸, review of records of centres visited during field trips in Gharm and Zhartuz, and interviews conducted with relevant health authorities all evidence a low visiting rate.

Several GFATM interventions were carried out in partnership with WHO and UNICEF. In collaboration with WHO, training was provided to health professionals. HIV/AIDS education is one of the components of the HIV/AIDS programme. UNICEF supported the preparation of a manual on Information, Education, Communication materials for schoolchildren and a series of training sessions has been prepared for the school teachers.

There have been interventions to increase the access of vulnerable groups (such as injection drug users, sex workers, men who have sex with men, young people and uniformed staff) to HIV prevention and care services, expand and strengthen voluntary counseling and testing, and to provide post-test care and support. This includes measures to ensure effectiveness of the national blood safety system and to strengthen a health system that supports HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted infections, TB and blood safety interventions. The overall number of people screened for HIV has increased, while the number of injection drug users has decreased from 3 percent in 2005 to 1.1 percent in 2007.⁵⁹ The increase in screening was mainly due to enforcement of legal requirements related to HIV testing for certain categories of the population.⁶⁰ Research conducted among sex workers reveals that, for the last three years, the percentage of women who adopt behaviors that reduce the risk of HIV transmission is at the same level—approximately 70 percent.⁶¹ While there is increased awareness about HIV/AIDS among targeted groups and the general population, there is a large gap in knowledge related to prevention of infection, particularly among the rural population.⁶²

The activities and coverage of the population has been extensive, although the effectiveness of these activities has been uneven. The contribution of the various interventions to results stated in the country programme is yet to be fully realized.⁶³ While it is too early to assess results for most of the interventions, one of the issues is how the GFATM grant was used to address issues related to health governance in Tajikistan. While the grant efforts were largely aimed at achieving outputs, larger issues that are crucial to sustaining outcomes—such as strengthening qualified staff, ensuring that there are adequate numbers of health professionals, and effective health administration—are not given adequate attention.

4.4.2 MALARIA

Programme implementation of the GFATM grant on malaria began in 2006 and is aimed at preventing malaria outbreaks and related mortality. The project is implemented in line with the national strategy “to fight tropical diseases (malaria) in the Republic of Tajikistan for 2006-2010,” and aims to strengthen ongoing activities and the health care system to control malaria. Project interventions include efforts to enhance access to early and reliable diagnosis, ensuring adequate anti-malaria treatment in malaria-affected areas, establishing a rapid response capability to cope with emergencies, and vector control. Research and training was included as part of the grant interventions.

The main activities under the Malaria Grant are implemented by the Republican Centre to Fight Tropical Diseases, Agency for Cooperation and Technical Development, and WHO. In

⁵⁹ Presentation by Mr. Mulloabdol, Director of Khorol AIDS Centre, May 2008, Dushanbe.

⁶⁰ Law on Countering HIV/AIDS, 28 December 2005, stipulated that HIV screening is “a volunteer procedure; however, foreigners who work or study in the country, as well as clinical patients planning to undergo surgery and pregnant women are required to pass the test.” These requirements are articulated through secondary legislation (official directives and letters) and are mainly driven by stigmas.

⁶¹ Presentation by Mr. Tumanov, Director of Kulyab AIDS Centre, May 2008, Dushanbe.

⁶² UNDP-UNAIDS, ‘Behavioral Survey on Knowledge, Attitude and Practice Towards HIV/AIDS Among Population Aged 15-49 in the Republic of Tajikistan’.

⁶³ Outcome 5, Country Programme Action Plan for 2005-2009.

collaboration with WHO, technical expertise was provided to strengthen the Republican Centre to Fight Tropical Diseases institutional capacity and improve disease management, epidemiological control and vector control. Support was provided to improve laboratory services and research programmes related to malaria. Joint activities with the Ministry of Defense, Committee for State Border Protection and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are carried out as members of these agencies work in areas where the risk of malaria transmission exists. UNDP enhanced cooperation among implementing partners of the Malaria Grant. Government experts from the Ministry of Health and the Centre for Healthy Life Style Promotion facilitated the preparation of health education materials. One of the issues in the implementation of the programme has been procurement delays. Both UNDP and the government reported delays in procurement and failures of suppliers to meet contractual obligations of timely delivery of goods and services.⁶⁴

UNDP has played a catalytic role in establishing cooperation in the area of malaria prevention with the bordering countries of Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. An agreement has been reached with the Government of Kyrgyzstan on joint activities and the provision of health treatment in border territories.

For a decade, malaria was one of the major development challenges in Tajikistan. The GFATM grant initiatives significantly decreased the incidence of malaria and Tajikistan is in a position to achieve its MDG commitment in this area. During the grant implementation period, malaria incidence has decreased significantly, from 2,309 cases in 2005 to 636 cases in 2007. As a result of progress in reducing morbidity and mortality due to malaria (especially *P.falciparum* cases⁶⁵), the second phase of the grant has been

reduced from three years to two (April 2008 to April 2010.)⁶⁶ However, the difficult epidemiological situation in neighboring countries and the limited government budget for malaria control activities in Tajikistan could affect sustainability of the outcomes. The UNDP Programme Implementation Unit has taken the initiative to develop the project proposal for Round 8 (2009 to 2015) to ensure sustainability of the results achieved to date as well as measures to eliminate *P.vivax* malaria in Tajikistan by 2015.

4.4.3 TUBERCULOSIS

The international community has played a leading role in addressing problems related to TB in Tajikistan. In budgetary terms, 88 percent of the total spending for prevention of TB was provided by international organizations, mainly the GFATM, and funds from the government comprised the remaining 12 percent. The implementation of the GFATM Tuberculosis Grant commenced in August 2007 and aims to support government strategies stated in the National Tuberculosis Control Programme of Tajikistan for 2003-2010.

The implementing partners of UNDP include the National Tuberculosis Control Centre of the Ministry of Health, World Food Programme, WHO and CARITAS Luxemburg. The programme included efforts to scale up and sustain universal coverage of Directly Observed Treatment, Short-course (DOTS) interventions within the framework of the Stop TB Strategy and the Global Plan to Stop TB 2006-2015. Primary beneficiaries of the grant are TB patients and their family members, labour migrants, prisoners and HIV/TB co-infected patients. The goals of the Tuberculosis Grant are to sustain universal coverage of DOTS therapy and to improve the quality of DOTS interventions.

⁶⁴ For example, due to delay in signing the agreement between UNDP and Agency for Cooperation and Technical Development (which required Regional Advisory Committee on Procurement approval), 3,553 insecticide-treated bed nets were not distributed.

⁶⁵ 81 *P.falciparum* malaria cases were reported in 2005.

⁶⁶ Decision made by CCM and approved by GFATM.

There is evidence of sustained universal coverage of DOTS therapy.⁶⁷ However, it is too early to assess results of the interventions. Strengthening TB control in the penitentiary system is still in its early stages. UNDP supported the government in establishing appropriate links between the prison and the civil health sectors and including prison health facilities in external quality assessment⁶⁸ and monitoring activities.

UNDP has played a leading role in advocating a new approach for national TB control. Accordingly, DOTS is one of the initiatives that has been implemented gradually throughout Tajikistan. Bacteriological confirmation of TB is accepted among national doctors and there is less opposition to this method of diagnosis than in the past. Support was provided to the National Management Team of the TB Programme in building capacities and for disease monitoring. However, the involvement of the National Management Team is limited in policy formulation and implementation of interventions.⁶⁹ International standards of TB care are still not included in the National TB Policy.

There have been delays in the implementation of the programme, which are attributed to procurement delays and slow down of activities in the country due to the winter crisis in 2007-2008. Poor coordination of activities of international agencies has been an issue in the implementation of the TB programme and there has been duplication of activities. UNDP had to change its earlier planned interventions because other agencies were carrying out similar activities.⁷⁰ The funds anticipated for the multi-drug resistant TB related activities were reallocated to other areas.⁷¹ Changes

in the programme were also made because of lack commitment on the part of the government. Efforts are underway to build on the momentum created by the GFATM and the government is developing a project proposal for Round 8 grants (2009-2015).

4.4.4 PERFORMANCE OF GFATM GRANT

The health sector budget allocation in Tajikistan is 1.2 percent of GDP, which covers 16 percent of health sector expenditure. The remaining 84 percent has been covered by private payments (70 percent) and donor assistance (14 percent).⁷² As mentioned, the GFATM is approximately 25 percent of the ODA in the health sector and is critical in strengthening the health infrastructure. In addition, GFATM has contributed to knowledge transfer to health professionals to enable treatment of infectious diseases in a more safe and efficient manner.

Except in malaria control, it is too early to assess results for many of the interventions. In the area of HIV/AIDS and TB, performance of the programme has been largely effective from the point of the outputs achieved, with a few exceptions where there were delays in supplying equipment and medicines. The collaboration with the government has been mainly at the national level. UNDP was successful in advocating for mainstreaming HIV/AIDS into the PRS and developed partnerships with international agencies and NGOs. Support has been provided to government efforts to strengthen health services, counseling and care. There has been progress in improving the infrastructure for dealing with TB, HIV/AIDS and malaria, and technical capacities of health authorities through formal and on-the-job

⁶⁷ TB Grant Performance Report, GFATM, August 2008.

⁶⁸ External Quality Assessment, usually undertaken for sputum microscopy.

⁶⁹ Report of the Consultant of the WHO Regional Office for Europe by Dr. Stefan Talevski.

⁷⁰ For example, construction of multi-drug resistant projects.

⁷¹ Procurement of equipment for a multi-drug resistant department, renovation of a Children's TB Hospital, two vehicles, and financial support of the national programme staff.

⁷² World Bank, 'Republic of Tajikistan Health Sector Note', 2005.

training. Efforts were made to build capacities at the community level to address the challenges of these infectious diseases. It is too early to evaluate the outcome of these interventions.

The National Committee on HIV/AIDS formed in 1997 was restructured to bring issues related to TB and malaria within its purview. Sub-committees and commissions at the local government were established in the *Oblasts*, regions and cities. Technical working groups were formed comprising sector specialists and experts. International organizations and local NGOs were invited to participate in the National Committee, which serves as the CCM. A CCM Secretariat was established in 2006 as a permanent body, although more efforts are needed to make it functional.⁷³ While these are first steps, more efforts are needed to operationalize the committees.

The management of GFATM provided an opportunity for UNDP to engage in health sector reforms and enhance government coordination of aid. Although the grant interventions were aligned with national priorities, UNDP did not adequately use the opportunity to proactively participate in reform processes and SWAp efforts. According to the country office, lack of additional funds for health interventions was one of the reasons for not actively engaging in SWAp. With exceptions, UNDP confined itself to achieving GFATM programme outputs. While support was provided to national coordination and participation of different government bodies in the activities under GFATM grants, there were limited efforts to strengthen overall government capacities for coordination and health governance. The coordination of aid in the health sector is weak. A large number of donors implement programmes independently, reducing the effectiveness of interventions. With exceptions such as malaria

interventions, lack of joint activities narrowed the scope of health interventions and there was duplication of activities.

Although the capacity of the government health agencies has improved, it is not adequate to address the challenges due to infectious diseases such as malaria, TB and HIV/AIDS. Existing budget limitations and dependence on donor funds in the areas of malaria, TB and HIV/AIDS affect the timelines and perception of roles among project implementers and the sustainability of activities. Participation of the government in preventing these infectious diseases is more in formulating legislations and creating institutions. While there are indications of some sustainable activities (for example, TB control/monitoring and anti-malarial activities), continuing, the ongoing initiatives require an increase in government budgetary spending. It was not evident that UNDP initiated measures to enhance health policies in Tajikistan, including increased budget allocations.

The total control UNDP had in managing the grant has been a contentious issue with the government. Because the government systems lacked the capacity to manage the GFATM grant, UNDP became the Principal Recipient. The government's responsibility is yet to be fully established in the grant implementation, thus the onus of sustainability of the programme often falls on UNDP. Government officials are also unclear about the grant implementation decision-making process. There is a need for effective communication with the government and a meaningful consensus regarding the functioning and sustainability of the interventions. UNDP has made efforts to strengthen finance and management systems of national HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria agencies. However, some government officials think UNDP could do more to prepare the government to become

⁷³ Main tasks of this Secretariat are: draft amendments to relevant legislation; coordinate the implementation of activities on prevention of infectious diseases in Tajikistan; develop and monitor the implementation of these activities; and assist in the organization of prevention, diagnostics and treatment of these infectious diseases within Tajikistan, including the allocation of financial resources.

the Principal Recipient. The grant period in the past years was not adequately used to strengthen government procurement procedures. The GFATM requested UNDP to be the Principal Recipient of the next grant as the capacities of the government are not adequate to manage the grant funds and operations. While the operational issues are yet to be worked out there were indications that government is keen to be the recipient of the grants.

Several respondents the evaluation team met pointed to issues in procurement under the grant. There were perceptions about mismanagement of procurement. Concerns were also expressed about delays in procurement of goods and services required to support the goal and objectives of the grants. At the time of the evaluation, the financial delivery was behind schedule for ongoing HIV/AIDS grants. Delays in programme implementation were attributed to the low response of suppliers for procurement, unavailability of many health products in the local market, difficulties in transportation to remote areas, and the harsh winter of 2007-2008. The operational procedures of UNDP caused further delays, which led to considerable pressure from the government for delivering outputs. UNDP attributes the delays to procedural requirements in setting up the Regional Advisory Committee on Procurement, as well as the sheer scale of operations. UNDP Tajikistan is the first UNDP office in the Regional Bureau for Europe and CIS region to become involved in implementing the GFATM programme on such a large scale. UNDP has to get approvals from the regional office for large-scale procurements. Measures should be taken to expedite procurement procedures.

4.5 REDUCING VULNERABILITY TO DISASTERS

The impact of disasters on human and economic development in Tajikistan is largely the cumulative effect of small to medium range disasters throughout the year. In the past decade, there were more than 2,800 disasters.⁷⁴ The years 2000 and 2001 were exceptions in the history of Tajikistan, when the country was hit by consecutive droughts affecting a large section of the population. The number of disasters reported has decreased considerably in the past two years,⁷⁵ and with exceptions of the winter crisis (which caused a humanitarian situation), have been small-scale disasters. Since 2003, economic damage has averaged 9 percent of the total budget. Issues that required humanitarian intervention often have been development issues, related to management of energy, water, land regulation and public infrastructure.

The country is not in a position to recover from the economic loss caused by disasters. However, government expenditure on disaster management has been minimal as development priorities took precedence. Although 8 percent of the budget is allocated for emergency response, expenditure is through various ministries, which often delays disbursement of funds. There is a perpetual humanitarian situation in Tajikistan with efforts of several donor agencies focused on emergency response and recovery. Katlon is the most disaster prone region, followed by Regions of Republican Subordination and Sugdh. For most households in these regions, disasters are one of many risks they face and often there is limited preparedness at the household level.

⁷⁴ IMAC database.

⁷⁵ The total number of disasters was 111 in 2006 and 134 in 2007. The disasters were small scale and caused by wind, mudslides, rain and hail storms. However, the economic loss due to disaster was high in 2006 (104,624,600 Somanis) compared to 2007, which was 70,431,800 Somanis. Source: IMAC, Dushanbe.

Disaster management legislation in Tajikistan covers important elements of risk, mitigation and response.⁷⁶ The CoES, which was the Ministry of Emergency Situation prior to 2005, is the focal agency for disaster management. The CoES functions under the purview of the State Commission for Emergency Situation⁷⁷ and has administrative mechanisms for disaster management at the regional and district levels. There are inconsistencies in the way institutions for disaster management are organized and roles and responsibilities. Coordination between different disaster management agencies and other ministries is evolving.⁷⁸ Tajikistan is located in a high-risk seismic zone, including the entire city of Dushanbe. The disaster preparedness measures, mechanisms for planning and implementation at different levels of the government, are not adequate in the case of a large-scale emergency response. REACT was established at the national and regional level within CoES to coordinate international donor support and for sharing of information. Regularly updated risk assessment and data related to disasters continues to be a concern for contingency planning and mitigation efforts, and IMAC in CoES is intended to bridge this gap.

4.5.1 ENHANCING DISASTER MANAGEMENT

UNDP has been engaged in humanitarian coordination and support in Tajikistan since 2003, first as part of the UN team and later as

a lead agency for early recovery. The disaster risk management programme was initially implemented by UNDP as a joint UN programme under the Resident Coordinator (RC). Since 2007, it is implemented as a UNDP programme. The programme outcome in the disaster risk management programme is to reduce the impact of natural disasters on vulnerable communities by strengthening national capacity to prevent, coordinate and respond to natural disasters. It is in accordance with strategic priorities set in the NDS of Tajikistan, 2005-2009 UNDAF,⁷⁹ and 2005-2009 UNDP Country Programme Action Plan.⁸⁰ The programme is implemented entirely by UNDP. By 2009, the government is expected to have the capacity to implement the disaster risk management programme on its own.

The programme has four main components: early recovery and reconstruction; donor coordination and contingency planning (REACT at the national and regional level); community-based activities; and support to developing institutions and policy for disaster management (support to CoES, IMAC, Civil Defence Training Centre, and preparation of a national strategy and action plan). Approximately 32 projects with different timelines were implemented between 2001 and 2007. A large number of them were activities related to demonstrating early warning systems, improved land and water management, renewable energy practices, community awareness, regional

⁷⁶ The legislation covering disaster management include funds for mitigation of emergency situations (1993) and civil defense (1995, revised in 2004); Emergency Rescue Services and the Status of Rescuers (2004); Protection of Population and Territories Against Natural and Man-made Disasters (2004); Republic of Tajikistan Decree 400; and Establishment of the Committee for Emergency Situations and Civil Defense (1994).

⁷⁷ The State Commission of Emergency Situation is chaired by the Head of State, Republic of Tajikistan. The Prime Minister is the Deputy Chairperson.

⁷⁸ During emergency situation 15 state services are expected to be mobilized to provide services to the affected areas. This includes medical, sanitation, public nutrition, animal and plant protection, fuel supply, fire fighting, civil protection, logistical assets, road and transportation, repairing services, utility services, energy, engineering, warning and communication, and flood and riverbank protection.

⁷⁹ Outcome 4 in the UNDAF outlines states, "Natural resources sustainably managed, and fewer persons killed or affected by disasters."

⁸⁰ Outcome 4 of the Country Programme Action Plan states "Natural resources sustainably managed and fewer persons killed, injured, made homeless, or affected by disasters; Country Programme Action Plan Output 12: Improved Disaster Response and Risk Management." In the ongoing Country Programme Action Plan, the disaster risk management programme has been implemented in two phases. The first phase of the programme was for the period of three years during 2004-2006. The ongoing second phase has commenced in the year 2007 and is for a period of three years.

projects and disaster response to earthquake, floods and winter crises. Other activities included donor coordination, strengthening institutions (adviser and technical assistance) and policy support. The portfolio has been significantly increasing in the past three years with increase in donor funding for disaster management activities. UNDP works in coordination with OCHA during emergency response and with the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction in Dushanbe on issues related to disaster management. UNICEF, the Food and Agriculture Organization, WHO, and the World Food Programme work in coordination with UNDP on issues related to recovery and contingency planning.

The partnership and implementation of the programme is at all levels of government. At the national level, UNDP work closely with CoES. At the regional (*Oblast*), district (*Ryon*) and sub-district (*Jamoat*) level, it works with the respective government levels, the CoES at the district, and the city administration of Dushanbe. UNDP has also partnered with international donors, international NGOs and NGOs working on disaster management.

UNDP has demonstrated a concerted approach to the management of natural disasters in the areas of donor coordination, strengthening public institutions and initiating policy mechanisms. The donor coordination mechanism REACT is an important forum for coordinating emergency activities and for mitigation efforts. UNDP has initiated different projects to strengthen the data base on disasters, through support to IMAC. While there are issues of sustainability and government ownership if UNDP withdraws financial support, UNDP has the potential to contribute to results in the area of disaster management.

During the assessment period, a regional UNDP disaster management programme was implemented in the border districts of Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. Although the ADR did not evaluate the projects under the regional programme, the evaluation could get

the perception of the government and NGOs on the projects contributions to greater collaboration among countries in the region to enhance environment security and disaster mitigation was collected. The discussions with the national government and the local government in Khujand do not provide sufficient indication that there is increase in collaboration with Kazakhstan on disaster management and environmental issues. While there have been community and infrastructure projects as part of the regional programme, they have been UNDP driven and have not been integrated into local and national development planning. The short-term recovery interventions were not in close engagement with the government. Most of these programmes were implemented by UNDP and local partners and did not adequately contribute to enhancing the capacity of the government at different levels. There was very little evidence to suggest the projects had any continuity at the district or sub-district level or were scaled up by the government.

The disaster risk management programme has been less successful in mainstreaming disaster risk mitigation into other UNDP programmes, thereby missing the opportunity to reduce vulnerability of the population affected by disasters. The disaster mitigation features were lacking in activities such as housing, construction, and rehabilitation of public infrastructure, both in UNDP implemented programmes as well as those by other agencies. There was very little linkage between the disaster risk management, CP or HIV/AIDS interventions. Some of the disaster risk management programme interventions would have been more sustainable if they were part of the CP in Garm, Aini and Kulyab. The CP provided an excellent opportunity to try out community-based disaster mitigation practices. In several *Jamoats*, houses continue to be built in high disaster risk areas. A case in point are the houses built by UNDP for the earthquake victims in Garm, which lacked disaster resistant features. The disaster risk mitigation activities did not use the existing community capacity in disaster recovery.

4.5.2 EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND DISASTER MITIGATION

The national REACT was set up in 2000 by OCHA to facilitate effective use of donor resources in emergency recovery. When OCHA withdrew its operations in Tajikistan, responsibility for supporting CoES in donor coordination was handed over to the United Nations and later to UNDP. The UN/UNDP is the Secretariat for REACT. There are 245 registered members of national REACT, comprising government ministries, international agencies (including bilateral agencies and UN organizations), and international NGOs. Cluster groups⁸¹ were established at the national and regional REACT to facilitate contingency planning. There are five cluster groups, each led by an UN organization, to facilitate contingency planning.⁸² The cluster groups had a similar thematic focus as that of the sector groups, operational until 2006.⁸³

UNDP initiatives in the area of donor coordination through REACT have been useful in ensuring coordination of emergency response and working on contingency planning. Government officials and international donor agencies considered REACT to be effective in coordinating donor activities and sharing information. It is also seen as an important link with the national administration. REACT has been considered a best practice in the Central Asia region and has been replicated in a few countries.

However, there are several areas that need to be strengthened in the donor coordination mechanism in Tajikistan. REACT needs further government ownership. While the CoES representative chairs REACT meetings, the representation of the line ministries has

been weak. The role of REACT remains confined to coordinating donor activities and has limited linkages to contingency activities of the government. More efforts are needed to ensure REACT functions as a decision-making body. For REACT activities to be more effective, it should be part of government contingency planning.

Not all cluster groups are effectively functioning and participation of agencies has been low. The clusters are yet to be functionally integrated within the government approach to early response. The shift from sector groups to the cluster approach has created confusion among non-UN and government members of REACT. The significance of the cluster approach is yet to be demonstrated to all members. Non-UN organizations feel they lack representation in cluster groups, as they are all headed by UN organizations. The inter-agency arrangements need to be sufficiently discussed among the REACT members. Since the cluster approach as an Inter-agency Standing Committee practice is of a recent origin, and there are global efforts to strengthen the process at the implementation level, UNDP can be proactive in making clusters more collaborative, particularly in involving non-UN stakeholders in humanitarian action.

The active membership of REACT has been decreasing. Discussions with some REACT members indicated that about 12 organisations were active participants. The participation in the coordination forum was more effective during humanitarian appeals. It is noteworthy that the World Bank and Asian Development Bank are not active members of REACT. The World Bank has interventions in the energy sector and the Asian Development Bank in public infrastructure. The World Bank has

⁸¹ The cluster approach was endorsed by the Inter Agency Standing Committee in 2005. The approach is designed around the concept of partnerships between UN organizations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, international organizations and NGOs. The approach aims to ensure sufficient global capacity, predictable leadership, strengthened accountability and improved strategic field-level coordination and prioritization.

⁸² The cluster groups include food items, non-food items, wash, health and housing.

⁸³ Prior to 2007, REACT had five sector groups: food security, non-food items including shelter, health, water and sanitation and education.

been supporting the Committee for Energy Situation, which has the mandate to reduce crises due to energy shortages. Absence of major donors reduces the effectiveness of influencing policy processes and institutional structures for disaster management.

More efforts are required to ensure there is participation of local and government agencies. REACT is seen as a donor 'English speaking forum' by local observers and participants. There is lack of sufficient understanding in terms of language, rhetoric and responsibilities. While having consultants has strengthened the REACT process, REACT meetings should not be led by consultants.

The regional REACTs have a long way to go in efficiently coordinating emergency recovery and contingency planning. There has been a variation in the functioning of the regional REACTs and uniformly demonstrated weak linkages with the national REACT. Despite the rhetoric, the national REACT does not believe the regional REACTs have the potential to be involved in contingency planning.⁸⁴ There are instances where some agencies in the regional REACTs participate individually by providing information to the national REACT. The top down approach undermines the possibility of strengthening REACT at the regional level. Considering the importance of district and sub-district level coordination in contingency planning, emergency response and mitigation, the regional REACTs have an important role in disaster management. The ongoing efforts of UNDP do not sufficiently emphasize strengthening regional REACTs.⁸⁵

UNDP played an important role in coordinating flash and consolidated appeals. Early recovery appeals are made every year and have been reactive and deliberate. While a formidable humanitarian situation was often the argument in favor of repeated humanitarian appeals, a more strategic and proactive approach aimed at long-term mitigation was consistently lacking. The issues addressed through flash and consolidated appeals are often development issues, and considering them as humanitarian issues does not address the basic problem. The cumulative effect is a series of small-scale disasters aggravated because of failure in development interventions and public services. While international agencies are conscious of this, efforts for a more long-term and sustained approach have been slow. Results of UNDP interventions in the area of reducing disaster risk or poverty resulting from disasters were not fully manifest.

4.5.3 STRENGTHENING DISASTER MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS

The establishment of IMAC in the CoES is a significant step in enhancing information management capacity in disaster preparedness and response. The IMAC is a scientific-technical unit of the CoES established with UNDP support in 2005. Its aim is to strengthen the CoES information management capacity. Situated within the CoES office in Dushanbe, IMAC has five regional Informational Management and Analytical Departments and carries out collection, analysis and dissemination of disaster related information. Working closely with relevant government agencies, such as Glavgeology, the Institute of Seismic Resistant Constructions and Seismology, Hydrometeorology and others,

⁸⁴ When the evaluation team was in Dushanbe, preparations were underway for the contingency planning and it was evident that regional REACTs were not sufficiently involved in the process. While a few members of the national REACT were of the view that the discussions reflected the inputs of their field offices, the opportunity to develop the capacities of the regional REACTs in occasions such as the ongoing contingency planning was lost. Contingency planning at the regional level should have preceded the national level contingency planning.

⁸⁵ The ADR team visited areas where three regional REACTs were operational: Kulyab, Garm and Aini. The REACT in each of these places was led by different organizations. While they demonstrated local level coordination, often under difficult circumstances, efforts were limited to strengthen their potential. Aini REACT was not fully functional at the time of the visit.

enables IMAC to compile and share data on the priority areas for disaster preparedness. This has been significant in providing communities, government and donors information on disaster risks areas. IMAC has a strong leadership and has demonstrated potential for effective management of disaster information system.

IMAC has the potential to collect data related to disaster management and inform planning and decision making at the national and regional level. One of the issues in the effective functioning of IMAC is the weak staff support and the capacity of CoES to take it further. IMAC is not sustainable in terms of financial resources as well as establishing information systems at the regional and sub-regional levels.

4.5.4 SUPPORT TO INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY

In the past three years, UNDP has initiated projects to strengthen government institutions and legislation for enhancing disaster management. Advisory and technical support has been provided to CoES and IMAC. The preparation of the National Disaster Management Strategy and Action Plan has been initiated during the ongoing country programme. UNDP supported preparation of modules on disaster management for the national civil defense training course. According to the Civil Defense Training Centre in Dushanbe, the civil defence training manual has approximately 70 percent of orientation course on disaster management and the training material developed in coordination with UNDP has been extremely useful. Considering that it is mandatory for employees of state institutions to undergo civil defense training, it is an efficient way of orienting government staff to disaster management issues. However, UNDP has not assessed the usefulness of these modules and of any additional training needs.

There has been a formal engagement with the government and buy-in on many activities initiated by UNDP. However, UNDP could have tried other approaches to implementing disaster risk management, such as seconding

staff members to work in CoES, rather than implementing projects directly. The donor agencies and a majority of the REACT participants were appreciative of UNDP support to REACT. However, it is not evident whether these partnerships are used for furthering disaster risk mitigation activities at the regional level.

There have been certain limitations in policy engagement. For example, adequate efforts have not been made to link disaster management and development. Emergencies such as winter crisis, food crisis, energy management, and small-scale floods are development issues. A long-term strategy is essential to avoid repeated flash appeals and temporary solutions. In addition, adequate emphasis was not given to disaster management in the ongoing preparations for the JCSS. The PRS and NDS pass over disaster management. UNDP was not effective in supporting the shift from 'periodic humanitarian response' to addressing disaster management from a development perspective.

UNDP initiated the preparation of a National Strategic Plan for Disaster Management and Action Plan, which is a step in the right direction. However, it appears to be a consultant-led process, with the draft to be presented to the government for comments. Government officials could not comment on the content of the strategy and action plan as they had not yet seen it. A more consultative and joint preparation would have improved national ownership. UNDP should ensure that the preparation of policy documents is led by the government and that consultants work with the government.

UNDP interventions were not optimal in facilitating greater interaction between different government agencies working in the area of disaster management. Under the present structure, CoES is under the State Commission for Emergency Situation. Within the State Commission, CoES is one of the agencies responsible for disaster management, but not the agency responsible for coordinating various ministries, although it has a similar function. The

Chairperson of the CoES is not one of the deputy chairs of the State Commission. This presents a skewed power structure in the implementation of disaster management activities. There is also a Committee for Energy Situation, which deals with energy-related mitigation and response activities, which has a limited working relation with CoES. The National Disaster Management Strategy should emphasize the need for restructuring institutional systems, streamline various

agencies dealing with disaster management, and provide a clear mandate for a single agency. While the restructuring of power and functions of CoES is important for enhancing national disaster management strategy, UNDP should engage with other government agencies whose work influences disaster management. It is important to have timelines with the government while working on these issues.

Chapter 5

CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

The previous chapter on development results discussed UNDP's support to capacity development in relation to specific initiatives. It is further discussed here in the context of the entire programme. The support to data systems are discussed as part of the section on capacity development.

5.1 NATIONAL HUMAN RESOURCES AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

One of the key issues in Tajikistan that has constrained development and reforms is the weak government capacity. Civil service lacks skilled human capital and appropriate reporting systems. Administrative systems are undermined by lack of transparency and accountability. Under such circumstances, it is important that donor agencies not only support development initiatives but also strengthen government capacities to plan, implement and manage programmes. The capacity development initiatives of UNDP were in the form of training, introducing new practices and policy support. While there were initiatives for strengthening institutional systems and practices, they lacked strategic emphasis in the programme framework.

UNDP supported the government in the areas of aid coordination, monitoring MDGs and the PRS, anti-corruption and disaster management. In the past six years, there were initiatives to improve the statistics capacity of the government and financial support was provided to the SRC and State Committee on Statistics. During the previous programme period, UNDP and other UN organizations supported the State Statistics Committee in carrying out a Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey and PRS monitoring. In the past two years, UNDP has been supporting SRC to carry out socio-economic surveys at the district

and sub-district level. There has been positive improvement in the linkages between various agencies collecting statistics, such as SRC, the Committee on Statistics and the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Support to SRC is significant because it is located within the Office of the President and facilitates statistical information required for decision making. However, there are limitations in the periodic collection and analysis of data on social sectors and poverty. Donor agencies indicated that state statistics and data collection systems for the social sectors need further strengthening. UNDP support can be more consistent and substantive in the area of strengthening the statistics capacities of the government.

In the previous and ongoing programme, assistance was provided to the Aid Coordination Unit. The Unit does not coordinate external aid, rather it provides a platform for accessing information on donor agencies (including UN organizations) working in Tajikistan and their programmes. There was recently a publication by the Aid Coordination Unit on external aid to development in Tajikistan. While the Aid Coordination Unit is intended to inform donor coordination it was not evident if this was achieved. The Unit has been shifted from the Office of President, where it was earlier located, to the State Committee for Investment Coordination and State Property. It was not evident that UNDP has provided strategic support to define and strengthen the capacity of the Aid Coordination Unit to coordinate external aid.

One of the areas where there has been the potential for contributing to results was in disaster management activities. UNDP has been supporting IMAC in developing an

information system and regular updating of data on disasters. The government and IMAC leadership have strongly supported improving disaster information systems. While the Government of Tajikistan is keen to strengthen disaster management systems, more ownership to further information systems on disasters, particularly at the sub-national level, is crucial. UNDP needs to do more to ensure the government actively engages in this process. While there has been support for preparation of an action plan and legislation for disaster management and mitigation of consequences of climate change, more sustained efforts are required for their operationalization.

The managing of GFATM provided UNDP the opportunity to enhance capacities in the health sector. However, there was little effort on the part of UNDP to systematically strengthen the capacities of the Ministry of Health and enhance donor coordination in the health sector. UNDP has been extending support to strengthening government coordination in early recovery and contingency planning. While UNDP has demonstrated persistence in supporting REACT, national capacities need to be furthered to independently carry out coordination. The process followed by UNDP in such initiatives is important in enhancing government capacities. UNDP should follow an approach that would facilitate government capacities and not substitute them.

Across the programme, the results in capacity development were undermined by the programme implementation modality followed by UNDP. Approximately 98 percent of the programme was implemented directly by UNDP. The lack of administrative and financial management capacities of the government was used as justification for direct implementation of the programme. Instead of strengthening government implementation systems by working through them, UNDP adopted the easier approach of direct implementation. During the planning of the next programme, measures need to be taken to adopt national programme execution. Enabling national

implementation modality may require prior discussions and agreement with the government, and UNDP should start planning towards this.

5.2 MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Supporting the achievement of the MDGs is an important part of the UN system and is used both for UNDAF and UNDP frameworks. UNDP implemented development projects to reduce poverty at the household and community level, and supported policy and capacity development of government agencies. UNDP could have been more optimal in its efforts to link project-based lessons to inform social sector policy and further MDGs.

At the macro level, the contribution of UNDP to bring MDGs into the development agenda has been important. Tajikistan became one of the first pilot countries in the Millennium Project in 2000, with the government signing the UN Millennium Declaration to achieve the MDGs. UNDP along with other international agencies (World Bank and Asian Development Bank) supported the government in its design of PRS-I, PRS-II and NDS. NDS is a long-term strategy to achieve development results by 2015 and expands upon the priorities identified in the PRS-II. The NDS places emphasis on agriculture, energy and aluminum production as drivers of development. Social sector, sector diversification, and small and medium enterprise development are seen as key areas of development. Public fund management, democratic principles of governance, strong leadership and national ownership of development processes form the basis of NDS. The MDGs are incorporated into the NDS and have the endorsement of the international donor community. For better aid effectiveness and furthering NDS, DCC has been engaged in the preparation of the JCSS. UNDP, as a member of DCC, participated in the preparation of the JCSS.

The MDG agenda and the process followed have been seen as contentious by the donor agencies. Achieving the MDGs and the resources this

requires is seen as ambitious by most international agencies working in Tajikistan. The financial requirements based on the budgetary allocations and ODA projected by the study for achieving MDGs was short by USD 13 billion. The MDG needs assessment was intended to bridge the shortfall of approximately 60 percent. Donor agencies considered this overambitious and creating unrealistic expectation on the part of the government. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund were concerned that an increase in assistance to fulfill the MDGs will skew the public debt to GDP ratio. ODA comprises a major proportion of development funds in Tajikistan. This means that the extra funds required for achieving the MDGs has to come from international agencies. The needs assessment was not considered necessary by the multi-lateral agencies, when issues related to MDGs were being addressed on a prioritized basis by the development agencies working in Tajikistan. The MDG agenda and the NDS have a longer time-frame and are seen as undermining the PRS agreed by donor agencies. The international financial institutions wanted to emphasize energy, infrastructure and economic reforms, which are critical to sustained development. While this does not contradict the emphasis on achieving MDGs, it was hard to achieve consensus among the major international aid agencies.

The government was forthcoming in owning the MDG agenda and ensured that it was reflected in all the national strategies and action plans. The government also established working groups on MDG areas involving major donors and is optimistic that it will achieve most of the goals by 2015. Difficulties in achieving MDGs are perceived in the area of education and health. While there has been progress, external assistance remains crucial for Tajikistan to achieve the MDGs by 2015. An analysis of the institutional systems and governance processes is important for strategic support to achieving the MDGs. This was found to be lacking.

One of the issues that was not sufficiently addressed in the MDG debate following the needs assessment study was government accountability to enhance fiscal discipline and carry out reforms for better management of public funds. UNDP stopped short of providing the leadership required for ensuring that policy and reform agenda are linked to the process of achieving the MDGs. While UNDP prepared sector papers for NDS for a better understanding on MDG issues, more consensus and a sustained approach is required for taking forward the MDG agenda. While the international financial institutions agree on the importance of achieving MDGs, there is lack of coordination in furthering government efforts to achieve the MDGs. The JCSS process provided an opportunity for UNDP to build consensus on some of these issues and influence the priority to be accorded to achieving MDGs. Discussions indicate that UNDP did not adequately use this opportunity.

UNDP supported monitoring and reporting of the MDGs, and as part of the UN team supported the government in preparing a joint report on progress towards MDGs. UNDP supported the government in preparing two NHDRs, while a third one is under preparation. The first NHDR was prepared in 2000 and discussed issues related to the consolidation of the Peace Agreement and National Reconciliation, and sustainable economic and social development. The report highlighted the key development challenges and priority areas for sustainable development. The second NHDR released in 2003 dealt with water resource management. The report discussed the important linkages in water management and poverty in Tajikistan. At the time of the evaluation, an agreement with the government was reached for carrying out the next NHDR. UNDP should focus on MDGs in the forthcoming NHDR.

5.3 GENDER EQUALITY

The UNDP strategy and programme documents refer to the need for a gender perspective in development interventions. The 2003 Common

Country Assessment highlights issues related to gender equality and women's rights and the importance of having a gender sensitive approach to development planning. The second country programme mentions gender in development as cross-cutting themes and the 2005-2009 results matrix refers to the MDG goal on gender equality. However, the implementation process did not pay sufficient attention to gender equality in programme interventions. There were serious limitations in the analysis of gender differences to inform programme planning and monitoring.

Women were not adequately reached by UNDP development initiatives. Gender inequality is a challenge in all the regions where UNDP is working—constraining women's access to development benefits and social services. Although the Constitution provides for gender equality, in practice, women do not enjoy the same rights as men. It is too early to assess the outcome of the development strategies outlined by the government to further gender equality.

While rigid gender systems constrained participation of women in public space, UNDP did not make sufficient efforts to link lessons from micro interventions to furthering the MDG commitment to “promoting gender equality and empowering women.” The CP aimed to include women as beneficiaries of the programme, as a vulnerable group for specific attention. This was not informed by an analysis of different roles and position of women in rural society and the changing dynamics with large male migration to Russia. Most of the women beneficiaries had limited involvement in the livelihood activities supported by UNDP. The interventions did not adequately take into consideration the different roles women play and specific support required for entrepreneurship development among women. Considering that the

microfinance approach was a client-oriented rather than a group-oriented approach, opportunity was lost to use microfinance as a tool for gender advocacy at the local level.

UNDP made little efforts to use the extensive programme interventions at the local level to address gender issues in a structured way. Although evaluations of RRDP and CP pointed to the lack of gender analysis in planning and implementation, there was little effort to integrate gender in the programme process.⁸⁶ Opportunities were lost to make linkages between gender and poverty interventions, implications of male migration and in informing policy. It is imperative for UNDP to pay specific attention to gender dimensions in the next programme.

The problems in addressing gender issues in the CP reflect the gap between commitment and practice. The CP lacked sex disaggregated data and analysis of outcomes of interventions for men and women. There was very little monitoring of the performance on gender equality. While certain inferences were made on the outcome for women in the water infrastructure, these were not based on any systematic data. The NHDRs looked at certain dimensions of gender, particularly the one on water management. However, the analysis did not inform programme design or strategy. There was lack of proper understanding among the staff on application of gender to programme interventions.⁸⁷ It is important that all future UNDP programmes develop baseline gender data, analysis of gender dimensions, gender disaggregated data and periodic monitoring of project performance.

The role of CSOs in furthering the gender agenda varied. The CSOs and NGOs supported by UNDP provided support to women subjected to domestic violence and created awareness of women's legal rights. These are largely micro

⁸⁶ De Martino L and M Makhkamova, 'Assessing UNDP Communities Programme', External Outcome Evaluation Report for UNDP Tajikistan, 2007; 'Evaluation Micro Credit Programmes', UNDP Tajikistan, 2005; and 'Poverty Alleviation in the Rasht Valley Mid-Term Evaluation', 2006.

⁸⁷ Except for a short duration, there was no support to monitor gender mainstreaming.

interventions as the CSOs in Tajikistan are not sufficiently strong to lobby for women's rights and gender equality in policy. The JRCs were not sufficiently used as an instrument to increase awareness about gender specific needs at the *Jamoat* level. The JRCs provided a perfect opportunity to mobilize women to participate in the development process, which was not optimized by UNDP. There were limitations in ensuring women were adequately represented in the JRCs. In the earlier part of the second CCF, UNDP supported the NGO GAD in facilitating government interventions on gender mainstreaming. This was discontinued and there has been a lack of consistency in supporting the government in this area. Coordination with other UN organizations, such as UNIFEM, was not optimal for achieving results in the area of gender equality.

The surveys supported by UNDP at the district and sub-district level collected gender disaggregated data on the socio-economic situation at the household level. The MDG monitoring report analysed progress using gender disaggregated data. However, more efforts are required to

facilitate gender analysis from different sources to inform policy. Discussions with agencies working on gender issues revealed that sustained efforts are needed to implement existing legislations to enhance gender equality in public and private spheres. The JCSS and other ongoing processes, such as SWAp in the health sector, provide the opportunity for specific attention to gender equality in the social sector and allocations for women-specific needs, such as reproductive health. Some of the background papers prepared for JCSS discussions did point to gender differences in health and education. Among various development priorities, gender concerns were often undermined and the policy commitment has been weak. UN organizations revealed that there is a need for a more coordinated approach to further gender dimensions in development. UNDP can play an important role in coordinating efforts in this area, particularly among UN organizations. UNDP was less forthcoming in working with other UN organizations on these issues and involving smaller agencies, such as UNIFEM, for support in mainstreaming gender.

Chapter 6

STRATEGIC POSITIONING OF UNDP

UNDP programme decisions were largely guided by the post-war transition and development needs in Tajikistan. UNDP has been implementing programmes in Tajikistan since the civil war. Initial UNDP work was post conflict rehabilitation and support to the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office. UNDP followed a phased approach in its programme intervention: beginning with reconstruction and stabilization activities that were followed by transition and development interventions. The second and ongoing country programmes focused on improving economic opportunities in rural areas, support to public services, and strengthening institutional capacities. These are the priority issues in Tajikistan.

Although UNDP is a small player in Tajikistan in terms of its own financial resources, it successfully mobilized a large portfolio. The scale of operations of UNDP annually is approximately 6 percent of the total ODA in Tajikistan. UNDP has the advantage of acceptability and a good working relation with the government. The diplomatic role UNDP can play in alleviating water and energy issues in the region has generated a lot of expectations on the part of the government. Local presence and ability to work with the government gives UNDP a unique opportunity to influence development strategies.

Many donors channeled their funds through UNDP because of its well established local presence and role as a UN organization in the post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction process. The dependence on external funds, however, considerably influenced the prioritization of activities and its interventions to enhance local capacities. The leverage UNDP has among the international agencies has been challenged, as most interventions are joint programmes.

The long civil war severely damaged public infrastructure and economic systems leading to a decline in industrial and agriculture production. Poverty was further exacerbated due to lack of employment. In the ongoing and previous country programmes, UNDP made a considered decision to emphasize poverty alleviation and local infrastructure development. UNDP has contributed significantly to bringing MDGs into the development agenda. The government has taken full ownership of the MDG agenda and is confident it will achieve the goals in many areas by 2015. While UNDP has consistently supported the government in integrating MDGs into the development strategies and monitoring MDGs, there is further need for coordination of donor efforts in this area. UNDP has the challenging task of keeping the MDG agenda rooted within the competing development priorities in Tajikistan, while at the same time not alienating other international agencies from participating in furthering MDGs.

During the assessment period, the country office demonstrated significant mobilization of funds. In the past four years, the contribution of external funds to the implementation of the CP increased by 78 percent, and UNDP is one of the major players in developing rural water infrastructure. The funds enabled UNDP to sustain a wide range of local development initiatives and have a large field presence. The strong local presence, however, did not give UNDP adequate leverage at the national level. The UNDP role in informing public service delivery and strengthening local governance has been limited. UNDP projects were generally fragmented, with activities structured to suit the donor programme needs rather than following an integrated approach to local development. Linkages between micro interventions and

capacity development at the local level and macro reform processes at the national level have been weak. The new programme provides an opportunity to design interventions that have policy implications and strengthen the capacity of the national institutions.

Considering that UNDP has invested a considerable proportion of its funds for activities at the *Jamoat* in poverty alleviation, infrastructure development and local governance, the question was whether it was optimal for UNDP to limit its scope of activities at the *Jamoat* without adequately involving the district and national government in the process. There were limitations in developing a strategy for local development and mobilizing funds to carry out sustained interventions to strengthen local government at the district and sub-district level. While intensive involvement at the local level should give UNDP the leverage to engage in local governance reforms and measures to enhance public service delivery, the role of UNDP in these areas has been less discernable. Strategic thrust in its activities could have enhanced the UNDP position as a key player in policy and advocacy at the national and sub-national level.

Disaster management is an important dimension of development in Tajikistan. UNDP is well positioned in the area of early recovery and has been supporting disaster management by strengthening institutions and policy. Further efforts are needed by UNDP to ensure there is national ownership of disaster management and that disaster risk reduction is integrated in the development process. UNDP support to the Ministry of Economics and Statistics, Strategic Resource Centre, and State Committee on Statistics is noteworthy. However, there are significant gaps in data on poverty and more interventions are required in this area.

Support to reforms in the area of governance did not receive adequate attention in the two programmes. There were limitations in carrying out activities that have policy relevance, even in areas such as local governance reforms where

UNDP is well positioned. Despite being well positioned in the health sector, UNDP contribution has been less than optimal. Transparency and accountability in public expenditure, institutionalizing procurement procedures and reforms, implementation of the amended Civil Service Law, reforms that would further merit-based civil service and wage classification, measures to minimize corruption, and implementation of local government law are some of the governance issues where UNDP contributions could have been valuable. More sustained support to anti-corruption efforts is another area of governance where UNDP has a niche. While lack of donor support for anti-corruption efforts is one of the reasons UNDP is not continuing interventions in this area, measures need to be taken to allocate resources from the core funds for initiatives such as this.

It is crucial that UNDP is more responsive to furthering institutional and governance reforms at the national level. UNDP can do well by focusing on long-term measures to reduce corruption. This includes measures to enhance transparency and accountability in public fund management. The new programme gives UNDP an opportunity to hone its priorities in the governance area and participate in the ongoing reform efforts in the health sector. UNDP should prepare a strategy for addressing governance issues and the areas it wants support during the next five years.

Many donors in Tajikistan are scaling down their programmes. This means that there will be a decrease in the external funds for UNDP. While this has implications for the CP, it necessitates a more strategic approach in programme interventions. Instead of spreading itself thinly, UNDP should outline priority areas for long-term policy interventions.

6.1 DONOR COORDINATION

Considering the intense donor presence in Tajikistan in humanitarian and development

activities, it is an imperative to coordinate international assistance to ensure funds are effectively used and that there are no gaps in reaching different sections of the population. During the previous country programme, UNDP facilitated coordination of technical and implementation processes in various programme areas. UNDP has been one of the few agencies to facilitate the formation of thematic groups and donor coordination meetings and discussions since 2000. The RC's office was proactive in organizing meetings for donor representatives and ambassadors on various development issues, such as transboundary river issues, border management and anti-corruption efforts.

In the past three years, there have been concerted efforts among donors to prioritize development needs outlined in the NDS and to improve aid effectiveness in achieving development results. The DCC was started in 2006 and provides a space for coordination on development issues. Important DCC activities include organizing high-level donor consultation and preparation of the JCSS for better aid coordination in furthering NDS. UNDP participation in the DCC and JCSS has been seen by international agencies as passive.

UNDP played a significant role in donor coordination of early recovery initiatives, although further efforts are required to enhance government ownership. As a principal recipient of GFATM, UNDP supported the government in the formation of the CCM. The CCM is a coordination mechanism at the national level involving agencies working on HIV/AIDS and provides inputs for furthering HIV/AIDS strategy. The functioning of the CCM has been less effective in terms of ownership by the government, and it was not evident if adequate efforts were made by UNDP to strengthen the coordination mechanisms. Both donor agencies and the government believe that better coordination in the health sector is needed to enhance health reforms, national ownership, long-term donor commitment and prioritization of health needs. UNDP has a stake in the ongoing issues

in the health sector as the manager of the GFATM. UNDP participation in coordination mechanisms in the health sector and in efforts towards SWAp was not at the expected level. While other UN organizations such as WHO may be involved in such efforts, UNDP coordination with UN organizations on these issues was less clear.

Despite large ODA, government interest in coordinating aid has been weak. The State Committee on Investments and State Property Management does not have adequate capacities and power to play an effective role in coordinating external aid. There have been other ongoing efforts, such as the creation of a National Development Council, but it is too early to say how effective these will be. In this context, aid coordination is one area where the contribution of UNDP can be important and the next country programme needs to include interventions in this area.

More recently, there have been coordination efforts at the regional level to discuss issues pertaining to water and energy. Tajikistan had a severe winter last year that triggered humanitarian problems because of lack of power. The regional efforts to address this crisis were coordinated by UNDP Bratislava, and UNDP Tajikistan participated in these efforts to enhance cooperation on energy and water issues in the region. It is too early to observe the outcomes of such efforts.

6.2 DEVELOPMENT PARTNERSHIPS

UNDP has a good working partnership with the Government of Tajikistan. The national government considers UNDP a trusted and neutral partner. The neutral position of UNDP has given the organization an edge over many international agencies working in Tajikistan. The government values UNDP work in the area of rural infrastructure development, particularly the UNDP interventions in developing a water infrastructure. The UNDP role in initiating the MDG process in Tajikistan was also acknowledged by the government. While there are

issues to be resolved in arriving at a manageable time-frame and targets, the JCSS provided the way forward to address some of these issues.

One of the areas of partnership that had limitations was engagement with the government in programme implementation. With minor exceptions, UNDP interventions in Tajikistan were entirely implemented by the country office with different levels of involvement of government counterparts. While the nature of the programmes—for example, the country programme and the GFATM mandatory requirement for direct implementation—necessitated direct implementation, there were no indications that the country office was planning to shift to a national implementation modality. While government representatives were brought on board when required, UNDP managed or implemented the programme. There were three patterns of direct execution of the programme: first, where UNDP implements programmes and government agencies and officials participate without having decision-making power; second, where government officials participate and can influence the way a project is managed; and third, little government involvement. In all these patterns, UNDP manages the funds.

Despite direct implementation modality, the participation of the government counterparts—such as IMAC, the Strategic Resource Centre and the Ministry of Economic Affairs—in some areas was promising. However, direct implementation of programmes by UNDP constrained capacity development, ownership by the government and the possibility of expanding and sustaining interventions. This was more evident in the local development initiatives where parallel systems were formed to implement projects. Similar effort invested in institutions of local government would have strengthened the capacities of the district and sub-district government and could have informed local governance reforms. The weak administrative and financial systems were used as justification for direct implementation of projects. However, the capacities of the government will not be strengthened if

international agencies such as UNDP substitute government capacity. The planning for the next programme offers an opportunity to initiate measures to implement programmes through the government.

The partnership with the international community was evident in early recovery activities where UNDP provided support to the government in coordinating donor activities. Partnerships were less optimal in the health sector. In local development, most donor agencies considered UNDP's local presence a valuable resource to implement their programmes. UNDP also manages European Community funded BOMCA-CADAP, an intervention aimed to train and equip border forces in countries around the Ferghana Valley. The relevance of managing European Community funds to broader development goals was limited. There were also accusations that UNDP was less forthcoming in sharing credit and recognizing donor-funded projects. UNDP needs to think through its role in interventions where it plays a managerial role.

The funding partnerships were more project oriented, and efforts to further synergies were not evident. The donor agencies who funded the programme considered UNDP to be one of the many implementing partners and wider collaboration was found to be lacking. There was also a perception that UNDP was increasingly becoming a local player like most other NGOs. The large size of UNDP operations and direct implementation of the projects was also a subject of criticism. UNDP has to follow a more strategic approach in planning and accessing funds for development interventions. UNDP should move from a pilot- and project-based approach that caters to the needs of the donors to long-term policy and national capacity development activities.

The partnership with the major donor agencies in Tajikistan such as World Bank and Asian Development Bank was less evident in the area of health and disaster management. While UNDP is seen as a UN organization to reckon with, tensions were obvious on issues such as

prioritization in the PRS and NDS and the needs assessment for the MDGs. While most of these issues have been resolved and there is a consensus on the MDGs, a more proactive engagement with the World Bank and Asian Development Bank will enhance development results in the area of health, disaster management and governance.

Partnerships were developed with CSOs and NGOs in the implementation of development programmes. NGOs were part of the regional and national REACT in the disaster risk management programme, and participated in the community awareness programme of the GFATM. A more structured approach was followed in RRDP and CP, where JDCs and JRCs were formed to implement local development projects. While it is debatable whether UNDP created parallel structures to local government institutions in its support to JRCs, JRCs were successful in making local development inclusive and participatory. It is too early to say if the JRCs will be sustainable and will continue with their earlier mandate. The CSOs in Tajikistan are in the process of evolving and are actively engaged in development activities. The legislation for registering of the NGOs has been more restrictive in the past year and there were concerns about the participation of NGOs and CSOs in the development process. There are expectations among the NGOs that organizations such as UNDP will address issues for ensuring a more liberal space for NGOs. While this can be tricky for UNDP relations with the government, advocacy for a free civil society is important for strengthening democratic space in Tajikistan.

6.3 UN COORDINATION

UNDP, in its role as the Resident Coordinator (RC) of the UN team, plays a diplomatic role and a neutral role in development support. The UNCT had several joint activities responding to development issues in Tajikistan. Members of UNCT are represented in the DCC and other technical groups formed to support the NDS, MDGs and JCSS. The UNDAF is the primary inter-agency joint activity. UN organizations

considered it a positive engagement and well coordinated by the RC. While joint effort as a UN team was evident in the support to PRS, disaster management, and GFATM programme, the potential is yet to be fully realized.

In the past years, the RC's office initiated several donor coordination activities and represented the United Nations in coordination forums. The RC participated in the Principals Group, a political forum mainly comprising ambassadors, which periodically discussed development concerns and ways to address them. The RC also represented UN organizations in the JCSS although other UN organizations such as UNICEF and WHO also participated in the JCSS.

There are areas where UNDP as part of UNCT demonstrated effective joint work. Disaster management was initially implemented as a joint UN programme by UNCT, within the scope of the RC's office. Although recently this has been shifted to UNDP, the joint work among UN organizations continues to be well coordinated. Effective UN joint work is also exemplified in early recovery activities. Considering that natural disasters are a recurrent feature in Tajikistan, early recovery and contingency planning are areas where there is consistent joint work among UN organizations. The RC is the Co-Chair of the government-led donor coordination forum REACT.

Despite effective engagement in areas such as disaster management, the PRS and MDGs, synergy among the UN organizations has not been fully realized in other areas. The UN organizations were not convinced that their agencies were adequately represented in joint initiatives of UNCT. There was also lack of adequate communication on complementary activities, such as surveys and the NHDR. Joint work and synergies were not optimal in the management and implementation of GFATM. UN organizations perceived a need for greater alignment of UN activities in responding to development needs. Individual UN organizations

were representing themselves in donor forums and in working with the government in areas where joint work could have been more optimal.

The RC of the UN is also the Resident Representative of UNDP. This has created considerable ambiguity about the role of the RC. There were perceptions that representation of the RC in donor and government forums is often interpreted as representing UNDP. The new UN leadership provides an opportunity to clarify the dual roles of the RC and Resident Representative. The country office is also in the process of recruiting a country director for UNDP, which will also assuage the confusion about role of the RC and further a neutral leadership.

The country office was preparing the second UNDAF and the UN organizations were appreciative of the well coordinated role of the RC. With the new leadership, there is opportunity to take the UNDAF process beyond the joint programme framework. More efforts are required to optimize the resources of UN organizations in achieving development results. To enhance synergy and identify complementary areas where more joint work would be productive, UNCT should carry out an evaluation of UNDAF outcomes and processes. Except the

self-assessment of UNDAF carried out by the UNCT in 2004, there has been no evaluation of the UNDAF outcomes.

6.4 RESPONDING TO FUTURE NEEDS

The development needs discussed in Chapter 2 indicate that Tajikistan has a long way to go in carrying out reforms and strengthening institutions. UNDP has made important contributions in supporting government efforts in different areas of development. The UNDP role will be critical in informing government policies and practices in the area of governance, disaster management and health. There is a need for UNDP to be more strategic in its interventions and responsive in the use of resources. UNDP should focus more on supporting reform processes and developing institutional capacities. Local development and local governance work should be linked to macro processes and should involve government at its respective levels. To further develop government finance and administrative systems and national ownership, UNDP should move towards national programme implementation modality. The new programme and leadership could provide an opportunity to make changes in this direction.

Chapter 7

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter summarizes the main conclusions from the evaluation and certain recurring issues, largely interconnected, that have implications for the future programming. These are followed by specific recommendations for consideration by UNDP.

7.1 MAIN CONCLUSIONS

The UNDP contribution has been significant in the post-war reconstruction and transition. The programme emphasis corresponds to the development needs perceived by the government and civil society.

The UNDP programme in Tajikistan has been implemented in an environment of challenging post-civil war reconstruction and transition, weak government systems and evolving political economy. The programme aimed to provide policy and programme support, share best practices and support government efforts to build capacity to address development challenges. The size of the programme in the past four years has been approximately 6 percent of the annual ODA of Tajikistan, although most UNDP assistance comprised joint projects with other donors. While the small size of core funds has been a factor in leveraging its position among international agencies, UNDP was successful in establishing a good working relation with the government. The neutral position of UNDP is valued by the government.

Considering that the impact of the civil war was severe in rural areas, UNDP made a considered decision to work at the district and sub-district level. Local infrastructure development and poverty alleviation at the household and

community level have been key areas of UNDP interventions. A determined effort was made to develop the water infrastructure and it has been highly relevant considering low public spending for infrastructure development in rural areas. UNDP is one of the main actors in the rehabilitation of the water infrastructure, supporting drinking water and irrigation infrastructure.

UNDP has played an important role in furthering pro-poor policies in development planning and in supporting the government to reduce vulnerability to natural disasters and infectious diseases. Sustained efforts are required to strengthen government systems and capacities to ensure national ownership and enable development results in these areas.

UNDP, along with other international agencies, supported the government in designing PRS-I and II and the NDS. At the macro level, UNDP was successful in bringing MDGs into national development strategies. While the government was forthcoming in owning the process and ensured that it was reflected in national strategies and action plans, more efforts are required to ensure that commitment is translated to action.

UNDP played an important role in supporting the government in controlling infectious disease and in furthering efforts towards disaster management. UNDP has been significant in enabling the government to access the GFATM to strengthen the health infrastructure and minimize the risk of HIV/AIDS, Malaria and TB. GFATM forms a substantial proportion of the ODA and is crucial for controlling the incidence of Malaria and TB in Tajikistan. Further efforts are needed to strengthen health administration

and service delivery to sustain the results of these interventions.

The UNDP programme in the past five years had specific interventions on issues related to disaster management. The programme, implemented in partnership with government agencies and other national and international stakeholders, demonstrated the potential for strengthening institutional systems and policies for efficient disaster management in Tajikistan. The government appears keen to develop a disaster management system and response. While it is too early to say whether the desired results has been achieved in enabling effective disaster management policy and strategy, efforts are essential to link disaster management with development.

The local presence of UNDP through its area offices is exceptional in the context of international donor response in Tajikistan. While several useful outputs in poverty reduction were achieved, contribution to long-term results has been less effective. UNDP responsiveness to the governance needs in Tajikistan has been modest.

The effectiveness of UNDP contributions to results varied across programme intervention and in relation to achieving outputs and outcomes. From the point of the individual projects, the programme has been effective in achieving most of the stated outputs. UNDP Tajikistan has been successful in mobilizing funds and expanding the scope of interventions. Most donor agencies found it resourceful to implement local development projects through UNDP. While UNDP has appropriately identified the priority areas of support, the programme lacked a long-term strategy in implementation. With exceptions such as results in the area of water infrastructure support, there were limitations in the effectiveness of the programme when assessed from the perspective of contribution to programme goals and development results.

The interventions in many areas have been in a humanitarian mode and, with a few

exceptions, the UNDP programme response did not adequately address policy and governance issues. UNDP was less responsive to strengthening government institutions and capacities, particularly in the health sector, enhancing transparency and accountability mechanisms and local governance. There was a lack of strategic approach to enhancing government capacities.

One issue to consider when evaluating effectiveness of outcomes is how realistic UNDP has been in defining its strategies and programme results. The programme approach of UNDP makes it difficult to establish the contributions to development results. While the country programme is a joint programme and the government is a signatory to the realization of the outcomes, accountability is skewed, as the programme is implemented entirely by UNDP.

UNDP has a comparative advantage in addressing social development issues in Tajikistan. However linkages were not systematically established between micro interventions of UNDP and government planning and policy.

The projects and programmes that were assessed had varied time-frames, and several projects were implemented under each programme area. For many interventions in the area of poverty alleviation, governance and disaster management sustainability was not evident. The UNDP approach often has been *ad hoc* and project oriented, not giving adequate attention to sustainability of interventions or informing government practices and policies. There were also limitations in government ownership, and the timeframe was not realistic for achieving outcomes. Considering limitations in resources UNDP should confine its work to areas where it can contribute to policy, reforms and institutional development. At the district and sub-district, level local governance is one area where UNDP support will have added value.

Reforms in the area of health are critical in Tajikistan and the GFATM provided means

and opportunity for UNDP to enhance SWAp and donor coordination in the health sector. While it is too early to determine sustainability of interventions under GFATM, the engagement of the government agencies in the ownership of the assets created is not optimal. One of the issues in sustaining interventions is the lack of adequate government capacity to continue with the preventive practices beyond the project period. While there was a small component for training government staff and implementing agencies, there was no strategy to facilitate strengthening of the health agencies in a more holistic way. Strengthening the capacities of the health personnel is a critical factor in health interventions in Tajikistan, and sustainability of the interventions and the infrastructure created was not followed by adequate human resource development. A better coordination of donor interventions in the health sector is important for a more strategic approach in the implementation of the GFATM programme. Similarly, a more consultative approach and joint preparation of disaster management strategy and action plans will have better national ownership.

UNDP through its various interventions at the national and local level has addressed issues related to poverty and sustainable livelihood. However, the synergy between poverty alleviation interventions and other areas of the programme (such as disaster management and environment) was not adequately established. The programme was less systematic in addressing gender related concerns and issues pertaining to large scale migration of working population to other countries.

Addressing issues of livelihood, rural development, and the MDGs has been core to UNDP interventions in Tajikistan. Concerted effort was made to reduce poverty through community level interventions. UNDP has implemented programmes in the back regions of Tajikistan in Garm and Shartuz and made efforts to reach the economically disadvantaged sections of the rural population. The UNDP contribution is significant in promoting Resolution 111,

which permits farmers to opt for the crop of their choice. Considering that a large component of the UNDP interventions involved working directly with the community, there was considerable opportunity for UNDP to address issues of gender, migration and cotton farming and link them to policy discussions. Clearly, opportunity was lost in enhancing gender equality in programme interventions as well as in influencing policy. The microfinance programme was not adequately used to reach the most economically disadvantaged sections of the population. A safer approach to microfinance lending meant that UNDP reached those who had a more sustainable income. UNDP introduced participatory processes in the implementation of the projects. The sustainability of these processes appeared weak as limited efforts were made to institutionalize these processes.

The poverty and MDG initiatives did not sufficiently address the dimension of migration of a large working population to countries such as Russia. Remittances are an important factor in the reduction of poverty levels in rural Tajikistan. UNDP project interventions do not provide insights into the implication of large-scale migration for the local economy and for inequality (regional, intra and inter household) and how the UNDP interventions addressed these issues. The new programme provides an opportunity to examine how issues such as land, labour and capital markets are crucial for the allocation of resources and development.

There were dispersed interventions in the areas of environment and climate change. Besides providing support to the National Action Plan for Mitigation of Climate Change, UNDP piloted projects on renewable energy. Although the evaluation did not include environment and climate change interventions, there was no evidence of scaling up renewable energy interventions. The analysis of poverty and natural disasters indicated that linkages to environment and climate change were not made. Considering that a large section of the population in Tajikistan lives below the poverty line, the impact of climate

change can have adverse impact on the food security, livelihood and assets of the rural population. The programme areas on poverty alleviation and disaster risk mitigation had the potential to address some of these dimensions.

Use of direct implementation modality for programmes is an issue of concern in Tajikistan, where a large proportion of programmes are implemented by UNDP. This has implications for the sustainability of development results and strengthening the capacities of the national institutions.

One of the recurrent issues during the evaluation was the programme implementation modality followed by UNDP. With exceptions, UNDP interventions in Tajikistan were entirely implemented by the country office with different levels of involvement of government counterparts. There was concern about the government capacity to implement development projects and procedural delays. The efficiency of government financial systems and the corruption levels were some of the reasons for following direct implementation of projects. There were no indications that the country office was planning to shift to national implementation modality. While government representatives were brought on board as required, UNDP managed or implemented the programme. Concerns about national administration systems and finance systems and ways to address them were not adequately incorporated in the design and action plans of the projects. UNDP should plan ahead to develop appropriate national execution mechanisms. Capacity development is an important component of UNDP support and direct execution curtails opportunities to strengthen weak government systems.

7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

UNDP has a significant role in informing development policy, reforms and strengthening institutions in Tajikistan. The lessons for the country office mainly pertain to the nature of interventions (micro versus policy interventions

and institution strengthening), strategic approach to programme emphasis, and developing national human resources and capacity.

7.2.1 PROGRAMME STRATEGY AND APPROACH

- 1. UNDP should emphasize policy support and strengthening government systems. Interventions in the area of governance should be further strengthened. UNDP should be more responsive to governance needs in the country and coordinate with other agencies working in the area.**

Weak administrative and public finance management systems undermine development in Tajikistan. UNDP interventions need to focus on policy enhancement and governance issues. UNDP should prepare a strategy for interventions in the area of governance with an adequate time-frame (a minimum of five years). Some of the governance issues where UNDP can add value include implementation of civil service reforms, mechanisms to strengthen the capacity of government staff, strengthening budget systems, and local governance reforms.

UNDP should broaden its earlier work in the area of anti-corruption, and should have specific interventions to enhance transparency and accountability in government administrative and financial management. UNDP has already outlined local governance as one of its priority activities. The time-frame of such efforts should be realistic to contribute to strengthening institutions and informing local government reforms.

UNDP is well positioned to further government capacities in disaster management. Adequate measures should be taken by UNDP to strengthen the role of the CoES within the disaster management structures in Tajikistan. There are weak linkages between disaster management and development efforts in Tajikistan. UNDP interventions should be aimed at strengthening the capacity of CoES to coordinate mitigation,

preparedness and response needs and integrating disaster management in national development strategy.

2. There should be more substantial support to the government in the area of MDGs. UNDP should strengthen its role in advocating for implementation of pro-poor policies and strategies.

UNDP is recognized in Tajikistan as the lead agency in mainstreaming the MDGs in the national development strategy. There has also been success in government ownership to achieve the MDGs. While UNDP should continue its support to monitoring the MDGs, further efforts should be taken to ensure there is donor facilitation in the area of MDGs, particularly in the health sector, where achieving the MDGs by 2015 is challenging. There is need for sustained efforts to ensure adequate attention is paid by the government to achieving the MDGs among diverse development priorities.

Human development is the guiding principle of UNDP interventions. UNDP should further strengthen its role in advocating for poverty reduction and human development. There should be continuous support to the NHDR which is a useful tool for advocating pro-poor strategies.

3. Use programme partnerships to strengthen donor coordination for achieving development results. Strengthen UNDP positioning in donor coordination.

Donor coordination in several areas of development in Tajikistan can be further enhanced, and UNDP is well positioned to play this role. In the GFATM HIV/AIDS Project, UNDP should take sufficient measures to strengthen the CCM. UNDP should further coordination in the health sector and actively engage in the SWAp process. While the role of UNDP in the functioning of REACT is critical, UNDP should work out ways to shift the REACT Secretariat to CoES and strengthen the CoES

capacity to lead coordination. Functioning of REACT needs to be gradually handed over to the CoES.

UNDP should be more active in coordination forums such as DCC and JCSS. At the time of the ADR, the DCC was scheduled to function until September 2008. It was not clear if it will be extended beyond that period. UNDP should be proactive in ensuring the continuation of forums such as DCC and should adequately engage other UN organizations in the process. The programme partnerships should be furthered for more effective coordination in different sectors.

4. Implement programmes through government agencies to improve national ownership and enhance local capacities.

UNDP should, in a phased manner, move from direct implementation of the programme to national execution modality. Executing through government agencies enhances national ownership and is an opportunity to strengthen government administrative systems and capacities. Considering that financial and administrative systems in government are weak, UNDP should work with the government to discuss and plan measures to be taken to implement programmes by the government.

All projects and programmes should be defined by what they contribute to enhancing national human resources, development policy and government institutions. In designing the projects, sufficient measures should be taken to follow the approach that will further national capacities. The large project staff of UNDP currently substitutes for government capacities. Alternate approaches, such as seconding staff to the government departments, should be followed.

Developing capacities of CSOs should be a complementary process to enhance the performance of institutions of local government. The JRCs had a specific purpose to mobilize

participation of communities and facilitate project implementation in the transition from humanitarian activities to development. However, this short-term solution did not sufficiently address strengthening the capacities of the *Jamoat* administration. As a long-term measure of strengthening government institutions, UNDP should work through the existing government systems in the next country programme and avoid creating parallel structures such as JRCs.

5. Develop a programme strategy for consistency in interventions and for raising funds.

It is important that UNDP develops a programme strategy to raise funds. UNDP should shift from the present approach of responding to project priorities of donor agencies to a more coherent approach of long-term and sustained interventions. The strong presence of UNDP at the local level should be used as an advantage to mobilize funds to achieve results in the Country Programme Action Plan.

UNDP should take adequate efforts to strengthen micro-macro linkages. With exceptions such as district development plans, several projects were essentially pilots that were localized and were neither scaled up nor informed government planning and practices. UNDP should be selective in piloting new practices and ensure such pilots are linked to policies and strengthening government capacities.

6. UNDP should make an assessment of the role it can play in energy, environment and climate change concerns in Tajikistan. Integrate environment and climate change issues into poverty and disaster management interventions.

UNDP supported the government in preparing several action plans—such as the 2007 National Environmental Action Plan, National Action Plan on Conservation of Biodiversity, National Action Plan on Mitigation of Climate Change, and revising

legislation on Protected Areas and Forestry Code. Environment and climate change is an area where UNDP can define a structured response to further national policies and plans. There are other international agencies in Tajikistan working in the area of energy and environment. UNDP should carry out an assessment of the national needs, gaps in support to the government and the role UNDP can play in supporting the government in the areas of environment and climate change and efficient energy and water management.

The forthcoming programme should take adequate measures to integrate environment and climate change issues into poverty alleviation and disaster management interventions. At the macro level, the World Bank is a major player in providing support in the area of energy. UNDP should initiate interventions to further practices and policy in cost-effective energy efficiency and facilitate government support to energy efficiency investments. UNDP should support advocacy for furthering government efforts to adopt and implement cost-effective energy efficiency as a high priority resource. Lessons should be learnt from the ongoing programme to ensure that micro-interventions in this area are not fragmented and compartmentalized. Efforts should be made to ensure that interventions such as demonstration of energy efficiency technology have sufficient linkages with the government programme to enable scaling up.

7. Strengthen gender mainstreaming in programme interventions.

UNDP should pay immediate attention to mainstreaming gender in its programme interventions. UNDP should diversify its activities to include interventions that are critical for gender equality and women's rights, such as support to capacity building for women to participate in development, measures for confidence building and legal services. UNDP should facilitate the government in monitoring the

implementation of the PRS, NDS and JCSS in relation to their impact on gender equality and women's rights. UNDP should work with other UN organizations (such as UNIFEM and UNICEF) to further government commitment to international agreements on women's rights and development, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, MDGs and the Beijing Platform for Action.

7.2.2 PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

8. Strengthen monitoring systems.

The monitoring and evaluation systems should be strengthened for the entire programme. Except for the GFATM programme, baseline information was not available for other projects. Baseline data was also lacking for outcomes outlined

in the country programme. Baseline information should be prepared for all outputs and outcomes. Gender analysis and gender disaggregate data should be made available for all interventions. There should be adequate human resources allocated for monitoring and evaluation of the programme.

Results-based management also needs to be further strengthened both in the national and area offices. In the present monitoring system, programme performance is largely tied to activities and outputs and performance indicators related to results are not properly defined or monitored. It is important to develop outcomes monitoring systems to establish linkages between programme outcomes and UNDP contributions to national development results. UNDP should also carry out periodic analysis of contributions to results for more efficient programme management.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENT RESULTS IN TAJIKISTAN

1. INTRODUCTION

The Evaluation Office (EO) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) conducts country evaluations called Assessments of Development Results (ADRs) to capture and demonstrate evaluative evidence of UNDP contributions to development results at the country level. ADRs are carried out within the overall provisions contained in the UNDP Evaluation Policy.⁸⁸ The overall goals of an ADR are to:

- Provide substantive support to the Administrator's accountability function in reporting to the Executive Board
- Support greater UNDP accountability to national stakeholders and partners in the programme country
- Serve as a means of quality assurance for UNDP interventions at the country level
- Contribute to learning at corporate, regional and country levels

The EO plans to conduct an ADR in Tajikistan beginning in May 2008. The ADR will focus on the results achieved during the ongoing Country Cooperation Framework (CCF) (2005-2009), while the previous CCF (2001-2004) will be assessed as a background. The ADR will contribute to the new UNDAF and the ongoing and next country programmes.

2. BACKGROUND

Tajikistan is the poorest country in the former Republics of Soviet Union and CIS. A large section of the population in Tajikistan was directly affected by the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the civil war in 1992-1993. While the country returned to peace and political stabilization towards the end of the 1990s, the transition to development poses several challenges. The challenges include reducing poverty and targeted assistance to poor; generating employment; strengthening institutions and governance; and post-conflict reconstruction.

UNDP initiated its programmes in Tajikistan during the reconstruction phase in 1994. The goal of its programmes is to continue to provide quality policy and programme support, share best practices and support government efforts to build capacity to address development challenges. The practice areas of the Tajikistan UNDP programme include poverty reduction, democratic governance, crisis prevention, energy and environment, and HIV/AIDS.

The completion of the 2005-2009 United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and the 2005-2009 CCF in Tajikistan presents an opportunity to evaluate the UNDP contributions and shortcomings during the ongoing programme cycle and before. The findings will be used as inputs to the 2010-2012 Country Programme Document and for the next UNDAF.

⁸⁸ Available online at <http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/Evaluation-Policy.pdf>.

3. OBJECTIVES, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The objectives of the ADR in Tajikistan include:

- Provide an independent assessment of the progress, or lack of, towards the expected outcomes envisaged in the UNDP programming documents. Where appropriate, the ADR will also highlight unexpected outcomes (positive or negative) and missed opportunities.
- Provide an analysis of how UNDP has positioned itself to add value in response to national needs and changes in the national development context.
- Present key findings, draw key lessons, and provide a set of clear and forward-looking options for the management to make adjustments in the current strategy and next country programme.

The ADR will review the UNDP experience in Tajikistan and its contribution to the solution of social, economic and political challenges. The evaluation will cover the ongoing and previous country programmes (2005-2009 and 2000-2004). Although it is likely that greater emphasis will be placed on more recent interventions (due to better availability of data) efforts will be made to examine the development and implementation of UNDP programmes during the last CCF. The identification of existing evaluative evidence and potential constraints (lack of records, institutional memory, etc.) will occur during the initial Scoping Mission (see Section 4 for more details on the process).

The overall methodology will be consistent with the ADR Guidelines prepared by the EO (dated January 2007). The evaluation will undertake a comprehensive review of the UNDP programme portfolio and activities during the period under review, specifically examining UNDP contribution to national development results. It will assess key results, specifically outcomes—anticipated and unanticipated, positive and

negative, intentional and unintentional—and will cover UNDP assistance funded from both core and non-core resources.

The evaluation has two main components: the analysis of development outcomes and the strategic positioning of UNDP.

DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

The assessment of the development outcomes will entail a comprehensive review of the UNDP programme portfolio of the previous and ongoing programme cycles. This includes an assessment of development results achieved and the contribution of UNDP in terms of key interventions; progress in achieving outcomes for the ongoing CCF; factors influencing results (UNDP positioning and capacities, partnerships, policy support); achievements, progress and contribution of UNDP in practice areas (both in policy and advocacy); and analysing the cross-cutting linkages and their relationship to Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and UNDAF. The analysis of development results will identify challenges and strategies for future interventions.

Besides using the available information, the evaluation will document and analyse achievements against intended outcomes and linkages between activities, outputs and outcomes. The evaluation will qualify UNDP contribution to outcomes with a reasonable degree of plausibility using a core set of criteria related to the design, management and implementation of its interventions in the country:

- **Effectiveness:** Did the UNDP programme accomplish its intended objectives and planned results? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the programme? What are the unexpected results it yielded? Should it continue in the same direction or should its main tenets be reviewed for the new cycle?
- **Efficiency:** How well did UNDP use its resources (human and financial) in

achieving its contribution? What could be done to ensure a more efficient use of resources in the specific country/sub-regional context?

- **Sustainability:** Is UNDP contribution sustainable? Are the development results achieved through UNDP contribution sustainable? Are the benefits of UNDP interventions sustained and owned by national stakeholders after the intervention is completed?

Special efforts will be made to examine UNDP contribution to capacity development, knowledge management and gender equality.

STRATEGIC POSITIONING

The evaluation will assess the strategic positioning of UNDP both from the perspective of the organization and the development priorities in the country. This entails: a systematic analysis of the UNDP niche within the development and policy space in Tajikistan; the strategies used by UNDP Tajikistan to strengthen the position of UNDP in the development space and create a position for the organization in the core practice areas; and from the perspective of the development results for the country, the assessment will evaluate the policy support and advocacy initiatives of UNDP programme *vis-à-vis* other stakeholders. In addition, the evaluation will analyse a core set of criteria related to the strategic positioning of UNDP:

- **Relevance of UNDP programmes:** How relevant are UNDP programmes to the priority needs of the country? Did UNDP apply the right strategy within the specific political, economic and social context of the region? To what extent are long-term development needs likely to be met across the practice areas? What were critical gaps in UNDP programming?

- **Responsiveness:** How did UNDP anticipate and respond to significant changes in the national development context? How did UNDP respond to national long-term development needs? What were the missed opportunities in UNDP programming?
- **Equality:** Did the programmes and interventions of UNDP lead to reduce vulnerabilities in the country? Did UNDP intervention in any way influence the existing inequities (exclusion/inclusion) in the society? Was the selection of geographical areas of intervention guided by need?
- **Partnerships:** How has UNDP leveraged partnerships within the UN system as well as with national civil society and private sector?

The evaluation will also consider the influence of administrative constraints affecting the programme and, specifically, UNDP contribution (including issues related to the relevance and effectiveness of the monitoring and evaluation system). If during initial analysis these are considered important, they will be included in the scope of the evaluation. Within the context of partnerships with the UN system and overall UN coordination, the specific issue of the development of joint programmes will be highlighted.

4. EVALUATION METHODS AND APPROACHES

DATA COLLECTION

The evaluation will use a multiple method approach for data collection that includes desk reviews, workshops, group and individual interviews (at both Headquarters and the country office), project/field visits and surveys. The appropriate set of methods will vary depending on country context and the precise nature would be determined during the Scoping Mission and detailed in an Inception Report.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ The Scoping Mission and Inception Report are described in Section 5 on the evaluation process.

VALIDATION

Data analysis will follow objective, verifiable methods. All information will be triangulated and validated to the greatest possible extent.

STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION

A strong participatory approach, involving concerned stakeholders is envisaged. The identification of the stakeholders, including government representatives of ministries/agencies, civil society organizations, private sector representatives, UN organizations, multilateral organizations, bilateral donors, and beneficiaries will be carried out. To facilitate this approach, the ADR will include a process of stakeholder mapping that would include both UNDP direct partners as well as stakeholders who do not work directly with UNDP.

5. EVALUATION PROCESS

The ADR process will follow the ADR Guidelines, according to which the process can be divided in three phases, each including several steps.

PHASE 1: PREPARATION

- **Desk review:** Initially carried out by the EO (identification, collection and mapping of relevant documentation and other data) and continued by the evaluation team. This will include general development of related documentation to the specific country as well as a comprehensive overview of UNDP programme over the period being examined.
- **Stakeholder mapping:** A basic mapping of stakeholders relevant to the evaluation in the country will be carried out. These will include state and civil society stakeholders and go beyond UNDP partners. The mapping exercise will also indicate the relationships between different sets of stakeholders.

- **Inception meetings:** Interviews and discussions in UNDP Headquarters with the EO (process and methodology), the Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS (context and county programme), as well as with other relevant bureaus (including Bureau for Development Policy and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery).
- **Scoping mission:** A mission to Tajikistan in order to:
 - Identify and collect further documentation
 - Validate the mapping of the country programmes
 - Get key stakeholder perspectives on key issues that should be examined
 - Address logistical issues related to the main mission including timing
 - Identify the appropriate set of data collection and analysis methods
 - Address management issues related to the rest of the evaluation process including division of labour among the team members
 - Ensure the country office and key stakeholders understand the ADR objectives, methodology and process

The Task Manager will accompany the Team Leader on the mission.

- **Inception report:** An inception report will be prepared by the evaluation team leader. This will include the evaluation design and plan—background to the evaluation, key evaluation questions, detailed method, information sources and instruments and tools for data collection and analysis, and the format for reporting.

PHASE 2: CONDUCTING ADR AND DRAFTING EVALUATION REPORT

- **Main ADR mission:** The mission involves a three-week country visit by the independent Evaluation Team and will focus on data collection and validation. An important part of this process will be an Entry Workshop (possibly more than one) where the ADR objectives, methods and process will be explained to stakeholders. During the Scoping Mission the number of projects and programmes to be visited will be identified. The team will visit significant project/field sites as identified in the scoping mission.
- **Analysis and reporting:** The information collected will be analysed in the draft ADR report by the Evaluation Team within three weeks after the departure of the team from the country.
- **Review:** The draft will be subject to: factual corrections and views on interpretation by key clients (including the UNDP country office, Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS, and government); a technical review by the EO; and a review by external experts. The EO will prepare an audit trail to show how these comments were taken into account. The Team Leader, in close cooperation with the EO Task Manager, shall finalize the ADR report based on these final reviews.
- **Stakeholder meeting:** A meeting with the key national stakeholders will be organized to present the results of the evaluation and examine ways forward in Tajikistan. The main purpose of the meeting is to facilitate greater buy-in by national stakeholders in taking the lessons and recommendations from the report forward and to strengthen the national ownership of development processes and the necessary accountability of UNDP interventions at the country

level. It may be necessary to incorporate some significant comments into the final evaluation report (by the Evaluation Team Leader.)

PHASE 3: FOLLOW-UP

- **Management response:** The UNDP Associate Administrator will request relevant units (in the case of ADR, usually the relevant country office and Regional Bureau) to jointly prepare a management response to the ADR. As a unit exercising oversight, the Regional Bureau will be responsible for monitoring and overseeing the implementation of follow-up actions in the Evaluation Resource Centre.
- **Communication:** The ADR report and brief will be widely distributed in both hard and electronic versions. The evaluation report will be made available to the UNDP Executive Board by the time of approving a new Country Programme Document. It will be widely distributed in Tajikistan and at UNDP Headquarters, and copies will be sent to evaluation outfits of other international organizations as well as to evaluation societies and research institutions in the region. Furthermore, the evaluation report and the management response will be published on the UNDP website.⁹⁰

⁹⁰ Available online at www.undp.org/eo

The time-frame and responsibilities for the evaluation process are tentatively as follows:

Activity	Estimated date
Collection and mapping of documentation by the Research Assistant	May
Desk review by the Evaluation Team	June
Scoping mission to [Dushanbe]	June-July
Inception report and full ADR Terms of Reference	July
The following are tentative and will be firmed during the scoping mission in consultation with the country office and the government:	
Main ADR mission to [Tajikistan]	August
Submission of First Draft Report	September
Comments from EO and Advisory Panel	September
Submission of Second Draft Report	September
Factual corrections from country office, Regional Bureau, Government	October
Issuance of Final Report	October
Stakeholder workshop	November

6. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

UNDP

The UNDP EO Task Manager will manage the evaluation and ensure coordination and liaison with the Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS, other concerned units at Headquarters level, and at the Tajikistan country office. The EO will also contract a Research Assistant to facilitate the initial desk review and a Programme Assistant to support logistical and administrative matters. The EO will meet all costs directly related to the conduct of the ADR. These will include costs related to participation of the Team Leader, international and national consultants, as well as the preliminary research and the issuance of the final ADR report. EO will also cover costs of any stakeholder workshops as part of the evaluation.

THE EVALUATION TEAM

The team will be constituted of three members:

- Consultant Team Leader, with overall responsibility for providing guidance and leadership, and in coordinating the draft and final report

- Consultant Team Specialist, who will provide the expertise in the core subject areas of the evaluation, and be responsible for drafting key parts of the report
- National Consultant, who will undertake data collection and analyses at the country level, as well as support the work of the missions
- Other members as appropriate

The Team Leader must have a demonstrated capacity in strategic thinking and policy advice and in the evaluation of complex programmes in the field. All team members should have in-depth knowledge of development issues in Tajikistan and the region.

The evaluation team will be supported by a Research Assistant based in the Evaluation Office in New York. The Task Manager of the Evaluation Office will support the team in designing the evaluation, will participate in the scoping mission and provide ongoing feedback for quality assurance during the preparation of the inception report and the final report. Depending on the needs, the EO Task Manager might participate in the main mission too.

The evaluation team will orient its work by United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) norms and standards for evaluation and will adhere to the ethical Code of Conduct.⁹¹

TAJIKISTAN COUNTRY OFFICE

The Tajikistan country office will take a lead role in organizing dialogue and stakeholder meetings on the findings and recommendations, support the evaluation team in liaison with the key partners, and make available to the team all necessary information regarding UNDP activities in the country. The office will also be requested to provide additional logistical support to the evaluation team as required. The country office will contribute support in kind (for example office space for the Evaluation Team) but the EO will cover local transportation costs.

7. EXPECTED OUTPUTS

The expected outputs from the Evaluation Team are:

- An inception report (maximum 20 pages)
- A comprehensive final report on the Tajikistan ADR (maximum 50 pages plus annexes)
- A two-page evaluation brief
- A presentation for the Stakeholder Workshop

The final report of the ADR to be produced by the Evaluation Team will follow the following format:

Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 2: Country Context

Chapter 3: The UN and UNDP in the Country

Chapter 4: UNDP Contribution to National Development Results

Chapter 5: Strategic Positioning of the UNDP Country Programme

Chapter 6: Conclusions, Lessons and Recommendations

Detailed outlines for the Inception Report, main ADR report and evaluation brief will be provided to the evaluation team by the Task Manager.

The drafts and final version of the ADR report will be provided in English. The drafts and final version of the ADR report will be provided in the official language of Tajikistan.

⁹¹ UNEG, 'The UN Evaluation Group Guidelines: Norms for Evaluation in the UN System and Standards for Evaluation in the UN System', April 2005.

Annex 2

LIST OF PERSONS CONSULTED

UNDP IN NEW YORK

Douglas Gardner, Deputy Assistant Administrator and Deputy Director, Bureau of Development Policy, UNDP

Oliver Adam, BDP, UNDP New York

Lubna Baqi, Associate Director, UN Development Operations Coordination Office

Seder Bayriyev, Programme Specialist, Europe and CIS Programme and Operation Support Cluster, Bureau of crisis Prevention and Recovery

Oliver Adam, BDP, UNDP New York

Blerta Cela, BDP, Gender

Lori Lee, Senior Programme Adviser, HIV/AIDS Group, BDP

Lenni Montiel, BDP, Governance

Christine Roth, Director for Central Asia in UNDP RBEC

Liliana Ramirez-Benischek, Policy Specialist, UN Development Operations Coordination Office

Bharati Silawal, BDP, Gender

Sanjar Tursaliev, Programme Specialist, Central Asia, RBEC.

Jennifer Colville, Capacity Diagnostics Coordinator, Capacity Development Group, BDP.

UNDP IN TAJIKISTAN

Michael P. Jones, UN Resident Coordinator

Farid Garakhanov, Deputy Resident Representative

Sukhrob Khojimatov, Assistant Resident Representative, Operations

Sukhrob Khoshmukhamedov, Assistant Resident Representative, Programme Coordinator

Nazira Boronshoeva, Deputy Country Manager, BOMCA Programme

Diana Ismailova, Gender Specialist, Community Programme

William Lawrence, Project Manager, BOMBAF.

Tahmina Anvarova, Programme Finance Analyst

Sukhrob Kaharov, Country Manager, BOMCA/CADAP.

Mubin Rustamov, Senior Economic Adviser, UNDP Tajikistan

Khusrav Sharifov, Project Manager, Disaster Risk Management Programme

Brian Donaldson, Early Recovery Advisor.

Nargis Shomahmadova, Programme Associate, UNDP Tajikistan

Siltaly Alidodkhonov, Malaria Grant Manager

Ulugbek Aminov, Prevention and Scale-up Programme Officer (HIV/AIDS)

Zumrad Maksumova, Tuberculosis Grant Manager

Sayora Grezova, Training Coordinator, Disaster Risk Management Programme

Muzafar Muzafarov, Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator

Tanzila Ergasheva, Specialist, Monitoring and Evaluation

Vali Musaev. TA Project Coordinator.

Saleban Omar, GIU Manager on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria

Gafur Kasynov, Water Engineer

Firuz Khamidov, OIC/Economic Adviser

Olim Kurbonov, Civil Engineer

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Annex 3

RESOURCE MOBILISATION 2005-2008 (USD)

Donor	2005	2006	2007	2008
DFID	207,780	6,256,156	-	2,983,730
ADB	-	-	-	200,000
EU	2 212 000	4 615 640	9 853 794	4,198,256
GFATM	5,383, 510	8,100,000	11,416,808	2,653,361
CIDA	-	250,000	1,000,000	267,951
CERF	-	-	-	2,171,600
Centre for Development and Environment				31,993
Government of Canada	-	250,000	-	
SIDA	1 191,546	883,388		
BCPR	-	550,471	812,257	
Government of Finland	-	71,250	-	
OCHA	42,000	-	-	
GEF	1,485,000	55,000	975,000	621,200
SDC	3,000	-	75,400	746,087
International Trust Fund				6,000
World Bank	1,595,350	-		
Private Sector				50,000
Democratic Governance Trust Fund	200,000	200,000	130,000	150,000
USAID	-	-	192,857	
Government of Germany	50,000	-	39,447	70,000
Government of Belgium				23,316
Irish Government				74,000
OHCHR	-	-	78,794	
ILO	-	-	370,000	
UNEP/NATO	137, 000	-	-	
OSI			125,000	
Swedish Rescue and Research Agency	-	-	-	624,167
Government of UK	2,639,500	-	1,494,876	
Total	15,146,686	21,231,905	26,564,234	9,672,977*

* Data is as of August 2008, total amount fundraised in 2008 is 14,992,806.

Notes: ADB indicates Asian Development Bank; BCPR, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery; CERF, Central Emergency Response Fund; CIDA, Canadian International Development Agency; DFID, Department for International Development; EU, European Union; GEF, Global Environment Facility; GFATM, Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; ILO, International Labour Organization; OCHA, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; OHCHR, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; OSI, ; SDC, ; SIDA, Swedish International Development Agency; UNEP, United Nations Environment Programme.



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