Towards an integrated rural fire management framework in Portugal

2. Toward a stronger institutional framework

Before 2017, the Plan for Forest Fire Defence 2006-2018 guided Portugal’s wildfire management. Developed in response to the severe fires of 2003 and 2005, it aimed to improve wildfire prevention and protection structures. It emphasised active forest management and the reduction of wildfire risk through three priority areas: structural prevention, surveillance, and firefighting, each under the responsibility of different national entities (Ministry of Agriculture, 2006[12]). Until 2012, the Plan sought to reduce burned area and the number of wildfires. From 2012 to 2018, the focus shifted to limiting the occurrence of prolonged active fires (Independent Technical Observatory, 2019[13]).

Following the 2017 fires, several evaluations revealed major gaps in Portugal’s wildfire management system. An independent technical commission found that the three-pillar system, with separate agencies responsible for prevention, surveillance and firefighting, fostered a siloed approach that lacked a joint operational command, shared objectives and coordinated strategies. In this context, prevention was undervalued and funding and resources primarily concentrated on emergency response and firefighting. This imbalance between prevention and response created a fire paradox: short-term reductions in burned area through suppression allowed fuel to accumulate, increasing the severity of future fires (Independent Technical Commission, 2018[7]). The system also lacked a specialised coordinating body with clear authority and responsibility to align actors across local, regional, and national levels, define a common strategy, monitor progress, and ensure accountability (Independent Technical Commission, 2018[8]) (Independent Technical Observatory, 2019[13]). As a result, no single actor assumed responsibility for managing risk before fires occur. Finally, while fire response teams operated under a three-tier command structure (national, district, and municipal), this hierarchy was insufficiently reflected in planning and prevention efforts, weakening cross-level coordination and preparedness.

2.1. Portugal has addressed some coordination gaps identified after 2017

The Integrated Rural Fire Management System (IRFMS) established in 2018 proposes a new fire management model. The IRFMS revolves around two axes: (i) managing rural fires and defending forest areas and (ii) protecting communities and assets. In addition, the IRFMS introduces a new process of six stages – planning, preparation, prevention, pre-suppression, suppression, relief, and post-fire – clarifying the responsibilities of each stakeholder in each stage. Incidentally, the Agency for Integrated Rural Fire Management (AGIF) was established to coordinate public authorities involved in the Integrated Rural Fire Management System (IRFMS) and steer fire management planning. AGIF has led the development of the National Plan for Integrated Rural Fire Management (AGIF, 2020[1]). Finally, the IRFMS confers greater roles and responsibilities to subnational governments, including stakeholders such as the Regional Development and Coordination Committees (CCDRs), who were not involved in fire management before and are now coordinating the Regional Commissions of the IRFMS.

The IRFMS promotes an integrated, whole-of-government approach to wildfire management. With its new process chain, the IRFMS addresses the entire wildfire risk management cycle and defines clear roles and shared responsibilities across all relevant agencies, rather than assigning exclusive roles and tasks to specific agencies. Its system-wide coordination seeks to ensure that all actors, from civil protection to those responsible for forest policies and management, operate under a coherent strategy that aligns efforts at every stage of fire risk management. In addition, the IRFMS embeds fire management in broader rural and territorial development policies, to respond to the long-term demographic and economic transformations that have reshaped Portugal’s rural territories and The IRFMS aims at contributing to addressing land abandonment of agricultural and forest lands, with the objective of limiting fuel accumulation and altered landscapes and hence mitigating fire risks (AGIF, 2020[1]).

The establishment of AGIF addresses the need for a dedicated body to coordinate and steer the reform process. As an autonomous, cross-sectoral agency initially overseen by the Prime Minister’s Office, AGIF has played a central role in the development of a shared wildfire management strategy (Independent Technical Observatory, 2021[14]) (Box 1). It has fostered coordination among public authorities by enhancing vertical and horizontal coordination, notably through the creation of national and subnational bodies that plan and guide the implementation of the National Action Programme (NAP). AGIF also monitors the implementation of the NAP, compiling insights from entities into annual consolidated reports. Finally, it leads a lessons-learned system, i.e. a collaborative exercise that analyses selected wildfire management actions to identify opportunities for improvement and best practices worth replicating. These lessons learned analyses are made public and the identified corrective actions are monitored.

The IRFMS also provides a reference for wildfire management beyond Portugal. In many countries, responsibilities are fragmented across agencies and coordination gaps are becoming increasingly evident. In Spain, a national evaluation following the 2022 fires highlighted how weak interregional coordination exacerbated fire impacts and called for national guidelines to harmonise wildfire policies (Spanish Ministry of Ecological Transition, 2022[15]). In France, recent evaluations pointed to insufficient implementation of wildfire management plans (French Senate, 2022[16]), prompting calls for a national coordination body to steer policy implementation, monitor progress, and strengthen accountability in fire management. Similarly, Australia’s 2019–2020 bushfires exposed shortcomings in leadership, integrated planning and unified communication despite strong operational capacity, resulting in delays, inefficiencies, and greater impacts (Australia Royal Commission, 2020[17]). The IRFMS governance model offers a relevant example for addressing the issues identified in these national assessments.

Under the IRFMS, subnational authorities have gained a stronger role in prevention planning and implementation. The five CCDR are tasked with transposing the NAP to the regional scale, including guidelines for subregional and municipal actions. They also coordinate and chair regional committees that bring together all relevant IRFMS stakeholders represented at this administrative scale, as well as identify funding opportunities for the implementation of the NAP (Box 1) at subnational level. Intermunicipal communities, that previously had no role in fire management, are now tasked with planning sub-regional action programmes, in alignment with the regional action programmes to which they contributed. They also have specific responsibilities such as adapting the secondary fuel break network to their territory. Finally, municipalities have taken on broader responsibilities in fuel management, land-use planning, public awareness-raising, and post-fire recovery. They contribute to sub-regional committees to inform the elaboration of the subregional action programmes that are then translated into municipal execution programmes, replacing former municipal forest fire defence plans.

The transition from a three to a four-tier governance system aligns with the need to increase territorial coherence. While the previous three-tier framework (national, district, municipal) was lacking an agile operational structure with clear command hierarchy and defined territorial boundaries (Independent Technical Observatory, 2019[13]), the establishment of regional, sub-regional, and municipal committees with robust, two-way communication channels has enhanced both alignment with strategic objectives and coordination across all levels. The addition of a regional and sub-regional level of fire management planning is also consistent with the roles and institutional arrangements of the CCDRs and CIMs. Traditionally, CCDRs are responsible for implementing spatial planning and regional development policies at the regional level, bridging the gap between national priorities and local execution. CCDRs are instrumental in promoting regional development, including managing national and European structural and investment funds (OECD, 2020[18]). They facilitate projects that enhance economic, social, and environmental conditions within their jurisdictions, i.e. including rural development or agriculture programmes that are central to the IRFMS. In addition, the appointment of regional coordinators (i.e. representatives of AGIF at regional level) facilitates dialogue and contributes to overcome resistance to change, encouraging greater collaboration among stakeholders (AGIF, 2020[1]). It is to be noted, however, that the creation of new planning and coordination structures has increased procedural demands on existing technical staff and is perceived by some agencies as of limited operational value – especially if roles and outputs across levels are not more clearly differentiated.

Box 1. The National Action Programme for wildfire management

The NAP is designed to meet three main targets: (i) civilian casualties are rare; (ii) fires spanning over 500 hectares account for less than 0.3% of total fires (iii) cumulative burned area by 2030 does not exceed 660 000 ha. To achieve these targets, the NAP is built around four strategic orientations:

• Valuing rural areas refers to the implementation of rural economic development, rural land management programmes, and certified forest management.

• Active management of rural areas entails projects that contribute to maintain 1.2 million hectares of land through vegetation clearing, pastoralism, controlled fires, or species management. This pillar also aims at reinforcing emergency and recovery planning.

• Changing behaviours relies on promoting awareness of wildfire risk, including through educational practices, and establishing regulations to reduce human-induced fire ignitions.

• Efficient risk management seeks to strengthen the qualifications and competencies of the stakeholders involved in fire management. It also aims at fostering risk-informed governance practices in wildfire management.

2.2. Recent institutional shifts may reduce effectiveness of the 2017 reforms

Recent shifts in institutional responsibilities have resulted in overlapping strategies for fire management. After the election of a new government in 2024, forest management responsibilities were transferred exclusively to the Ministry of Agriculture, which since then has overseen AGIF. In 2025, the ministry released the Forest Intervention Plan to 2050, which promotes a sustainable and resilient forest, less vulnerable to climate risks, along the enhancement of the production of goods and services (Ministry of Agriculture, 2025[19]). While the plan places greater emphasis on the economic value of forests and on strengthening local capacity for fuel management through new or complementary actions, it often overlaps with the NAP. For instance, the NAP already seeks to address land abandonment by promoting rural economic value through agroforestry, sustainable forest management, biomass-based energy financing models, and improved valuation and remuneration for ecosystem services provided by landowners.

These overlaps can create confusion among stakeholders and potentially reduce the effective implementation of the NAP. The Forest Intervention Plan includes an estimated budget for each objective for the period 2025–2050, drawing on the same funding sources earmarked for NAP implementation during 2020-2030. While visibility on potential funding beyond the current period is a positive development, it remains unclear whether projects under the two programmes will compete for the same resources. Furthermore, several actions under the Forest Intervention Plan mirror NAP projects with only minor adjustments, making prioritisation difficult for entities. Additionally, the proposal to develop an additional monitoring and evaluation platform – parallel to AGIF’s system operating since 2021– further adds to this ambiguity. Instead, overlapping actions could be monitored in an integrated way through AGIF’s existing platform, which is already downscaled to territorial levels and can support both the NAP and the Forest Intervention Plan simultaneously.

More generally, the Forest Intervention Plan raises concerns about the continuity of a coordinated approach to integrated fire management. While it aims to strengthen forest resilience to fire, it excludes most aspects related to preparedness and suppression, risking to re-fragment responsibilities among civil protection, forest management, and broader fire prevention. Moreover, the Plan proposes revisiting the number of entities and governance layers involved in the IRFMS, arguing that complexity has hindered implementation (Ministry of Agriculture, 2025[19]). As new national fire management plans have been introduced after each major wildfire (2006, 2018, and 2024), stakeholders have grown accustomed to post-crisis shifts in strategic direction. Yet the IRFMS represents a paradigm shift toward integrated and coordinated fire risk management that requires sustained commitment to gain traction. The proposed changes risk slowing down ongoing reforms and reinforcing the status quo – especially at the local level, where municipal execution plans and subregional action programmes under the IRFMS have yet to be adopted.

2.3. The IRFMS has improved clarity of roles, less so accountability

The IRFMS has improved clarity of roles. The detailed process chain introduced by the IRFMS clearly defines the roles and responsibilities of each agency across all stages of the wildfire management cycle. Each action is assigned to specific entities – whether for implementation, approval, coordination, or oversight (Independent Technical Observatory, 2021[14]). This structured approach also provides a good entry point for enhancing accountability through identifying stakeholders responsible for defined actions.

Significant progress has been made as well in strengthening the structure and coherence of suppression efforts. Before the IRFMS, the national civil protection agency (ANEPC) held primary responsibility for fire suppression, while ICNF focused on forest management and prevention. The reform introduced a new Forest Fighter Force (Força de Sapadores Bombeiros Florestais, FSBF) operating under ICNF, whose mission focuses on extended attack and mop-up operations in forest areas where terrain and fire behaviour require more specialised ecological and technical knowledge (Independent Technical Commission, 2018[8]). The FSBF operates under the guidance and command of ANEPC and its interventions complement the work of traditional firefighters, who are more focused on protecting communities and built assets. In addition, operational procedures for suppression activities have been refined. The Integrated System of Protection and Relief Operations established by Decree-Law No. 90-A/2022 ensures that all protection and relief operations follow the principle of unity of command, providing clear direction and coordination among entities. Coordination is further strengthened annually through the national operational directive (Dispositivo Especial de Combate a Incêndios Rurais, DECIR) and the national plan for wildfire suppression in mainland Portugal, which defines the structure, mobilisation, and operational response for all wildfire-related emergencies. By incorporating lessons learned from all participating entities, the directive promotes continuous improvement and more efficient resource deployment.

As a result, suppression capacity has improved since the onset of IRFMS reforms. With accelerated resource dispatch and strengthened suppression capacity 92% of fires were extinguished within 90 minutes in 2024 compared with 79% in 2017 and the 2007–2017 average of 69% (AGIF, 2021[20]). This has helped limit fire spread and escalation in recent years.

However, the most complex fires pose continued coordination challenges on the ground. During the 2022 season, misinterpretations of operational directives and limited knowledge of terrain occasionally delayed or compromised suppression effectiveness (Expert Group on Rural Fires, 2023[21]). In 2024, weaknesses in coordination during initial attack and pre-suppression phases may have undermined response efforts (AGIF, 2025[10]). The Caranguejeira fires in the Center region in 2025 also highlighted communication issues between different firefighting forces (Expert Group on Rural Fires, 2023[21]). As a result, while most fires are controlled in their early stages, a small proportion continue to escape initial attack and end up accounting for most of the burned area. While increasing firefighting capacity upstream of urban areas was pointed out as necessary (Independent Technical Commission, 2018[8]), this additional capacity was underutilised during recent incidents, such as the Serra da Estrela fires in 2022 (National Commission for Integrated Rural Fire Management, 2023[22]). Finally, the organisation of the civil protection system retained a different territorial model, with district commissions that do not correspond to the areas of sub-regions. This can pose coordination challenges during complex fires.

Coordination and operational decision-making are further hampered by the lack of uniform qualifications. Although a national qualification plan has been in preparation since 2021, its full implementation is still pending, meaning that not all fire operators have the same level of training. In addition, high turnover and unavailability of volunteers have limited the effectiveness of available training. Consequently, hierarchy may be prioritised over expertise, ultimately reducing operational effectiveness (Independent Technical Observatory, 2021[14]).

More generally, accountability remains limited by the absence of enforcement mechanisms, insufficient consequences for underperformance, institutional capacity constraints and lack of transparency. There are currently no effective mechanisms to hold institutions accountable when they fail to meet NAP objectives, comply with Decree-Law 82/2021 obligations, or implement corrective actions from lessons-learned exercises intended to strengthen fire prevention or suppression. For example, although lessons learned from the 2023 fires were identified, by the September 2024 fires only half of the corrective measures were implemented, despite their potential to significantly improve response capacity (AGIF, 2025[10]). No sanctions or consequences exist for such delays, partly because agencies are facing financial and human resource constraints that hinder implementation. In addition, some entities do not submit progress reports on specific projects under the NAP, even when such reporting is mandatory as part of annual monitoring. There is no clear objective or criteria for municipalities to allocate funding to key stakeholders, such as volunteer firefighters. The lack of clear rules has resulted in inconsistent financing, where operational effectiveness depends more on local resources and leadership than on national standards. It also limits accountability of municipal stakeholders as no evaluation of these funds’ effectiveness is performed (Court of Account, 2022[23]). In California (United States), the Wildfire and Forest Resilience Taskforce (California Wildfire and Forest Resilience, 2025[24]) holds quarterly public meetings to review fire management programmes, funding and partnerships. Meeting minutes are published online, enhancing institutional follow-through and accountability.

2.4. Looking ahead: maintain an integrated approach to wildfire management

To strengthen its institutional framework for wildfire management, further clarifying roles and responsibilities, as well as reaffirming support for a whole-of-government approach is needed. This means, clearly articulating how the IRFMS and the Forest Intervention Plan complement each other and strengthen the coordination between prevention and suppression. It also requires clarifying mandates and coordination roles for fire management to preserve the integrated approach promoted by the IRFMS. Finally, it is also important to reinforce coordination on the ground, to address remaining weaknesses during suppression activities. To support these efforts, it is essential to reinforce the capacity and qualifications of the agencies’ resources. Finally, fostering a strong evaluation culture and increasing transparency of decision-making processes (including spending) can further improve accountability and operational efficiency.