The Climate Action Monitor 2026

1. How far are countries from achieving national and global mitigation objectives?

Translating climate commitments into sustained emissions reductions while raising ambition to match the scale of the global climate change is a challenge. Since the Paris Agreement in 2015, projected end-of-century warming has fallen from around 4°C to a 66% chance of 2.8°C (Olhoff, 2026[1]), but current commitments still fall short of global temperature goals and implementation remains uneven across countries. As 2030 approaches and net-zero targets draw closer, the key question is increasingly whether current efforts are on track to deliver.

The latest Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) cycle offers a timely opportunity to evaluate whether implementation efforts are keeping pace with growing levels of ambition. Greenhouse gas (GHG) emission trends show whether countries are advancing at the pace consistent with their declared targets. At the global level, GHG emissions have yet to peak, underscoring the gap between climate commitments and real-world emissions outcomes. Meanwhile, new national 2035 targets also provide an indicator on whether near- and medium-term ambition is becoming better aligned with longer-term objectives, including net-zero targets. Substantial gaps persist on both fronts: many countries remain off track to achieve their 2030 targets, while the latest 2035 commitments have not closed the gap with long-term climate objectives. Despite more ambitious 2035 targets in several countries, collective ambition remains insufficient to align near-term action with long-term climate goals.

At the same time, important signs of progress are emerging. Global emissions growth has slowed; emissions have declined in a growing number of countries; renewable energy deployment continues to expand and economies are becoming less emissions-intensive, although trends differ markedly across countries and sectors (OECD, 2026 forthcoming, “Emissions Unpacked”). Accelerating these developments will be essential as the impacts of climate change intensify (Chapter 2) and stronger climate policy action becomes increasingly important for closing the gap between commitments and outcomes (Chapter 3). This chapter examines these trends and their drivers, highlighting both the progress achieved and the scale of the challenges that remain.

1.1. Global greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise despite declining emissions intensity

Global GHG emissions continued to rise in 2024, reaching a peak of around 51 Gt CO2e, (55 Gt CO2e when considering LULUCF global estimates) despite declining emissions intensity (Box 1.1). This represents a 1% increase from 2023 and a 7% increase since 2015, when the Paris Agreement was adopted. (Figure 1.1, Annex A for more details).

These global emissions trends mask substantial differences within countries and across country groups. The contribution in mitigation efforts from individual countries also needs to be considered in light of national circumstances, capacities and responsibilities, consistent with the Paris Agreement's principle of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (UNFCCC, 2025[2]).

In OECD member countries, GHG emissions including national LULUCF (from official inventory sources) collectively peaked in 2007 and have declined since, despite a temporary rebound following the COVID-19 pandemic (Figure 1.1). Meanwhile, emissions in OECD partner countries1, have continued to increase over the past three decades, driven largely by rapidly growing major emerging economies, particularly the People's Republic of China (hereafter "China") and India. As a result, aggregate G20 emissions have continued to rise, despite declining emissions in many G20 members. Member countries of the European Union recorded collectively some of the largest reductions, with emissions falling by 19% since 2015. The G7 countries, comprising Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, followed a similar downward trajectory. These diverging trends reflect a combination of factors, including differences in economic structure, stages of development, energy systems and the extent to which emissions have been relatively decoupled from economic and population growth.

OECD countries, which account for nearly one third of global GHG emissions (excluding international bunkers), remain central to global mitigation efforts. Their emissions fell by 0.6% between 2023 and 2024 and by 11% since 2015, reaching approximately 12.9 Gt CO₂e in 2024. Emissions in OECD partner countries reached 23.1 Gt CO₂e in 2024, increasing by 2% since 2023 and 12% since 2015. Rising energy demand associated with economic growth, industrialisation and improving living standards continues to put upward pressure on emissions in many rapidly growing emerging economies. For a detailed discussion on the structural changes in GHG emissions trends, see Box 1.1.

Box 1.1. Complementary evidence on the drivers of emissions trends since the Paris Agreement

A complementary OECD study (OECD, 2026[4])​ examines how GHG emissions trajectories and their underlying drivers have changed since the adoption of the Paris Agreement. While the Climate Action Monitor primarily tracks emissions using official national inventories, the study draws on the EDGAR emissions dataset ​(Crippa et al., 2025[2])​ to provide a consistent global time series and analyse the structural drivers of changes in emissions trends.

Covering 170 countries and 10 regions, the study identifies changes in emissions trajectories before and after 2015 and decomposes these shifts into their underlying drivers. This makes it possible to distinguish changes associated with structural decarbonisation, including changes in the energy mix and the emissions intensity of energy use, from those primarily reflecting changes in economic growth.

Despite differences in data sources and methodological approaches, the study points to trends broadly consistent with those observed in inventory-based emissions data. It finds that global GHG emissions growth slowed from an estimated 1.8% per year before 2015 to 0.7% per year after 2015 (Figure 1.2). Nevertheless, global emissions continued to rise and remained far from the reductions rates required under Paris-aligned pathways, which would require that global emissions need to peak and subsequently decline by 3.8% to 8.1% yearly by 2030 (Pouille, 2023[5]; Byers, 2022[6]).

Part of the slowdown in global emissions growth can be attributed to improvements in the energy mix. After 2015, the expansion of low-carbon energy sources and a shift towards less emission-intensive use of fossil fuels began to hold down emission growth, which had not occurred over a sustained period before. Slower global economic growth accounted for the remainder of the slowdown.

These global trends mask important differences between OECD and non-OECD countries. After 2015, OECD emissions reductions accelerated from 0.6% per year to 1.2% per year, mainly thanks to accelerated improvements in energy-related emission drivers, while economies continued to grow. OECD countries hence accelerated decoupling of emissions from economic growth: emissions per unit of GDP declined from 2.2% to 3.0% per year after 2015. In non-OECD countries, emissions kept growing after 2015, albeit more slowly, with annual growth falling from 3.3% to 1.5%. That slowdown was driven mostly by slower GDP growth rates, rather than faster decarbonisation.

 

Note: The Figure shows the estimated average annual rate of change in GHG emissions (excl. LULUCF) in the last observed trend segment before 2015 and the post-2015 period. Grey rectangles show the ranges in global emission growth rates in the period 2019-2030 estimated to keep global temperature increase well-below 2 C and to align emissions with the Paris Agreement, as defined by ​ (Pouille, 2023[5])​ based on IPCC AR6 global scenarios ​ (Byers, 2022[6]) ​. See ​ (OECD, Forthcoming[3])​.

Source: (OECD, 2026[4]); (OECD, Forthcoming[7])​, based on the EDGAR database ​ (Crippa, 2025[8]).

1.2. Faster emissions reductions are necessary to deliver 2030 Nationally Determined Contributions

As the 2030 NDC milestone approaches, several countries remain off track to deliver their mitigation commitments under the Paris Agreement. Recent emissions trends provide an indication of progress by showing whether emissions are evolving at a pace consistent with national targets. To assess progress, this chapter uses the NDC Delivery Gap, an indicator that measures the difference between observed emissions in 2024 and a linear pathway from emissions in the 2019 reference year (to a country's 2030 NDC target (Figure 1.3, Annex A). A positive gap indicates that emissions are above the level implied by this pathway: the larger the gap, the further a country is from the trajectory consistent with achieving its target (OECD, Forthcoming[7]).2

The results indicate that, collectively, both OECD members and partner countries remain off track to meet their aggregate 2030 climate commitments, although the scale of the delivery gap differs considerably. Keeping emissions on trajectories consistent with these commitments will be important not only for achieving national targets but also for contributing to the temperature goals of the Paris Agreement.

OECD countries have collectively put emissions on a downward trajectory, but progress remains insufficient to meet their aggregate 2030 GHG emission reduction commitment. In 2024, aggregate emissions were 0.5 Gt CO2e (around 4%) above the level implied by a linear pathway towards the aggregate 2030 target (Figure 1.3). The delivery challenge is substantially larger among OECD partner countries reflecting their rapid economic growth and rising energy demand. Their aggregate emissions in 2024 were 2 Gt CO2e (around 10%) above the level consistent with a linear trajectory towards their collective 2030 target (Figure 1.3).

Moreover, being on track to meet a country's NDC does not necessarily mean that global temperature goals will be achieved, as this depends critically on the ambition of the target itself. Meeting the objectives of the Paris Agreement requires global emissions to peak and decline across a much broader range of economies and at a pace consistent with limiting warming to well below 2°C and pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. As a result, many countries will need not only to deliver on existing commitments, but also to strengthen their mitigation efforts and increase the ambition of future climate targets.

While it is too early to assess implementation progress towards the 2035 NDCs on the same basis as the 2030 targets, a preliminary assessment – since not all countries have presented 2035 targets – suggest that the challenge of aligning near- and medium-term emissions trajectories with longer-term climate objectives persists. As the window for course-correction continues to narrow, closing the NDC Delivery Gap will be essential not only for achieving 2030 commitments, but also for maintaining credible pathways towards longer-term climate commitments.

 

Note: NDC: Nationally Determined Contribution. OECD partner countries include Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, People's Republic of China, India, Indonesia, Malta, Peru, Romania, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Thailand. To calculate aggregate targets, individual countries’ targets were harmonised across sectors and gases (Annex A). Saudi Arabia is not included since its NDCs cannot be quantified. For Argentina and Israel, 2035 targets estimates are derived by linearly extending the trajectory from current emissions levels to 2030 targets through to 2035, as 2035 NDCs had not been submitted as of October 2026. For the United States, estimates and projections are based on a combination of previously communicated targets and recent emissions trends in NDCs for 2030 and 2035 prior to withdrawal from the Paris Agreement.

Source: OECD calculations based on Common Reporting Tables (CRT) submitted by countries to UNFCCC (OECD, Forthcoming[3]). Targets are OECD estimates which convert NDC submissions to the UNFCCC to common units (Pizarro et al., 2024[9]).

OECD analysis suggests that countries with stronger climate policy frameworks are generally closer to meeting their NDC targets (Chapter 3). Figure 1.4 compares OECD and partner countries' current level of climate action, measured using the OECD Climate Actions and Policies Measurement Framework (CAPMF), with their NDC Delivery Gap. Higher climate action scores indicate broader and more stringent policy frameworks, while larger NDC Delivery Gaps indicate greater implementation challenges. Bubble size represents countries' emissions.

Figure 1.4 shows an association between stronger climate action and smaller NDC delivery gaps. Countries with more comprehensive and stringent climate policy frameworks tend to be closer to the emissions pathways implied by their NDCs, as illustrated by the downward-sloping trend line. Several countries combine relatively high levels of climate action with small delivery gaps (upper-left quadrant), whereas countries with weaker policy frameworks often face larger implementation gaps (lower-right quadrant).

Climate policy stringency is, however, only one factor shaping NDC delivery. Countries are distributed across all four quadrants of Figure 1.4, reflecting differences in economic conditions, emissions trajectories and importantly the ambition of NDC targets themselves. Less ambitious targets may be generally easier to achieve. To improve comparability, countries whose NDCs allow emissions to increase relative to the reference year are therefore excluded from this analysis.

 

Notes: NDC: Nationally Determined Contribution; Climate action is displayed on the vertical axis, with higher scores indicating a broader and more stringent climate policy mix, while the NDC Delivery Gap is displayed on the horizontal axis; bubble size reflects emissions. Countries further to the right of the figure face larger implementation challenges reflected in their larger NDC Delivery Gaps (Annex A) – labelled “higher challenges” – while those on the left have emissions closer to the pathways implied by their NDC targets and are therefore on track to achieve their NDC targets.

Source: Based on data from OECD, IEA, ITF, World Bank and others using the methodology of (Nachtigall, D. et al., 2022[10]).

1.3. Targets of 2035 Nationally Determined Contributions are not aligned with long-term climate objectives

Beyond NDC implementation, a critical question is whether countries’ near- and medium-term commitments are aligned with their long-term climate objectives. The submission of 2035 NDCs provided an opportunity to bring medium-term targets into closer alignment with net-zero and other long-term goals. Yet, in the aggregate, the gap between NDC targets and the emissions trajectories implied by countries long-term commitments is larger in 2035 than in 2030. This suggests that many countries did not strengthen their medium-term commitments sufficiently to place emissions on a pathway aligned with their long-term net-zero objectives. While differences in national circumstances and transition pathways must be considered, this misalignment increases the scale of emissions reductions that would be required after 2035 to achieve long-term climate goals.

This misalignment is captured by the 2050 Targets Alignment Gap3, which measures the difference between emissions implied by countries’ NDC targets and the emissions levels consistent with a linear trajectory towards their long-term commitments (Figure 1.5). A larger gap indicates greater misalignment between medium-term targets and the pathways implied by long-term objectives. Across OECD members and partners, the aggregate gap is estimated at 5.2 Gt CO₂e in 2030, equivalent to emissions around 21% above the level implied by the aligned trajectory. By 2035, the gap widens to 5.7 Gt CO₂e, 28% above the corresponding linear trajectory (Figure 1.5). While around half of OECD members and partners submitted 2035 NDCs aligned with their long-term pathways, several major emitters remain off track and account for a substantial share of the collective gap. Closing this gap would require stronger medium-term ambition and/or more rapid emissions reductions after 2035.

 

Note: NDC: Nationally Determined Contribution. To calculate aggregate targets, individual countries’ targets were harmonised across sectors and gases. Further details are provided in the Annex A. Saudi Arabia is not included since its NDC cannot be quantified. For Argentina and Israel, 2035 targets estimates are derived by linearly extending the trajectory from current emissions levels to 2030 targets through to 2035, as 2035 NDCs had been submitted as of October 2026.

Source: OECD calculations based on Common Reporting Tables (CRT) submitted by countries to UNFCCC (OECD, Forthcoming[3]). Targets are OECD estimates which convert NDC submissions to the UNFCCC to common units (Pizarro et al., 2024[9]).

1.4. Many net-zero targets extend beyond 2050 and remain non-binding

Net-zero targets now cover a large share of global emissions, but their timing and legal status vary considerably. As of October 2026, 122 countries and the European Union – together accounting for around 80% of territorial emissions – have adopted net-zero targets. This represents substantial progress in the coverage of long-term climate commitments. However, over 20% of national GHG emissions (including LULUCF) remain outside any net-zero commitment and a significant share of existing targets extend beyond 2050 (Figure 1.6).

Although most net-zero targets are set for 2050, several major emitters have adopted later deadlines, including 2060, 2065 and 2070. Only 34% of country production-based GHG emissions (including LULUCF) emissions are covered by net-zero targets for 2050 or earlier, while a further 43% are covered by targets for later years (Figure 1.6). China's 2060 target and India's 2070 target account for a substantial share of emissions covered by post-2050 commitments. Consequently, the aggregate long-term targets of OECD members and partner countries do not imply net-zero emissions by 2050, emissions would still amount to around 7.1 Gt CO₂e in that year as illustrated in Figure 1.5.

Differences in target years should be interpreted in light of countries’ national circumstances and development pathways. Nevertheless, net-zero targets adopted after 2050 affect the pace and timing of the global transition and imply that substantial emissions reductions would continue to be required after 2050. At the same time, some countries, including Finland, Germany, Slovenia and Sweden, have set net zero targets before 2050 with some also aiming to achieve net-negative emissions thereafter. Together, however, these countries represent only around 5% of global GHG emissions (including LULUCF and excluding emissions from international bunkers).

Net-zero targets also differ substantially in their legal status (Figure 1.7). Most are set out in policy documents, such as Long-Term Low Emissions Development Strategies (LT-LEDS), NDCs or other non-binding declarations. Since the last review, Belize, Bolivia, Lebanon, Togo and Uzbekistan have introduced net-zero targets through such policy frameworks. Only 36 countries and the European Union, representing around 17% of emissions, have enshrined their net-zero targets in law. In 2025, Bulgaria, Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates provided legal backing to their respective targets. Embedding net-zero targets in law can strengthen accountability by anchoring them within domestic governance frameworks, increasing policy certainty and helping sustain climate action across political cycles. The relatively small share of emissions covered by legally binding targets highlights significant scope to strengthen existing commitments through legislation (Figure 1.8). Twelve countries, including Madagascar and Panama, have declared that they have already achieved net-zero emissions by virtue of being net carbon sinks.

The widespread adoption of net-zero targets therefore provides only a partial picture of long-term climate ambition. Their contribution to emissions reductions will depend not only on the target year and legal status, but also on whether they are supported by credible intermediate targets and sufficiently strong policies. The alignment gaps identified above suggest that for many countries, to align short-, medium-, and long-term emissions increased emission reductions are necessary if these gaps are to be closed.

1.5. Current commitments remain insufficient to achieve the Paris Agreement temperature goals

Current climate commitments remain insufficient on two fronts. First, many countries remain off track to deliver their existing NDCs, as reflected in the NDC Delivery Gap. Second, even where NDC targets are set to be achieved, many are not aligned with countries' long-term net-zero commitments, as captured by the 2050 Targets Alignment Gap. These findings suggest that both the implementation and ambition of current commitments remain insufficient to place the world on a pathway consistent with long-term climate goals.

At the global level, Figure 1.8 illustrates that emissions trajectories are not consistent with the reductions needed to achieve the Paris Agreement temperature goals. Global emissions have not yet peaked and remain above pathways consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C or even 2°C. Indeed, current assessments suggest that limiting warming to 1.5°C is no longer possible (UNEP, 2026[11]). Therefore, achieving temperature targets will require both stronger near-term implementation and greater ambition in future climate commitments.

 

Note: CO₂e: carbon dioxide equivalent; Gt: giga tonnes; NDC: Nationally Determined Contribution; the LULUCF adjustment considers differences between the bookkeeping method as in (Olhoff, 2026[1]) and national inventories (Annex A). GHG emissions for 2050 targets are estimated considering that some countries have net-zero target years beyond 2050.

Source: Country production-based GHG emissions (including LULUCF) are based on OECD calculations using countries’ UNFCCC Common Reporting Tables (OECD, Forthcoming[3]), while international aviation and shipping emissions are derived from EDGAR. The LULUCF adjustment follows the methodology of (Friedlingstein et al., 2025[12]) and (Olhoff, 2026[1]). The 2050 targets estimate is based on OECD calculations (Annex A), while emissions under current NDCs and temperature pathways are based on (Olhoff, 2026[1]).

1.6. Sectoral emissions trends

GHG emissions originate from a range of economic sectors, each characterised by distinct sources, trends and mitigation opportunities. Understanding sectoral emissions helps identify priority areas for action and inform the design of effective climate policies. The following sections therefore review recent sectoral trends and the structural factors shaping emissions pathways across OECD members and partners.

Electricity and heat generation remained the largest source of emissions for both OECD members and partner countries in 2024, accounting for 30% and 37% of total emissions including LULUCF, respectively (Figure 1.9). As a sector where low-emission technologies are already available and increasingly cost-competitive, it offers significant opportunities for accelerating emissions reductions and has a key role to play to decarbonise other sectors through electrification.

Sectoral trends, however, diverge significantly between and within country groups (Figure 1.9) reflecting varying levels of development, economic and energy system characteristics and historical emissions trajectories. In OECD countries, emissions from electricity and heat generation declined from around 5 Gt CO₂e in 2015 to less than 4 Gt CO₂e in 2024. In OECD partner countries, emissions from electricity and heat generation increased by 37% from around 6.3 Gt CO₂e (31% of total emissions) in 2015 to approximately 8.5 Gt CO₂e in 2024.

Transport remains the second-largest emitting sector in OECD countries, accounting for around 27% of total emissions (Figure 1.8). Emissions remained relatively stable between 2015 and 2024, apart from a pronounced decline in 2020 and subsequent rebound following the COVID-19 pandemic. As emissions from electricity and heat generation continue to decline, transport is likely to account for an increasing share of total emissions. Emissions from agriculture, industrial processes and waste remained broadly stable, while emissions from buildings declined, reflecting improvements in energy efficiency and building renovations (OECD, 2026[13]).

In OECD partner countries, a larger share of emissions is concentrated in manufacturing and construction (12%), reflecting the prominent role of some partner countries in global manufacturing. Industrial process emissions are also relatively significant. Transport and building emissions account for relatively smaller shares of total emissions (9% and 4%, respectively). Agricultural emissions increased gradually over the period, whereas emissions from waste remained broadly unchanged.

These aggregate trends mask substantial differences in sectoral emissions profiles, economic structures and mitigation challenges across countries. For example, transport accounts for an exceptionally large share of emissions in Luxembourg, while agriculture represents a much larger share of emissions in New Zealand, Denmark or Ireland due to the importance of livestock production. Similarly, the relative importance of electricity generation, industry, buildings and land use vary considerably across countries depending on resource endowments, development pathways and economic specialisation. Country-level analyses is therefore essential for identifying national mitigation priorities. The OECD Climate Action Dashboard provides detailed country-level information on emissions trends and sectoral emissions profiles, allowing users to examine how mitigation challenges and opportunities differ across countries.

It is equally important to recognise that mitigation efforts must be understood within the context of an interconnected global economy. Assessing national mitigation priorities and progress also requires consideration of emissions embodied in international trade, as production-based emissions which refer to the emissions in a specific territory, do not fully capture the emissions associated with domestic consumption or countries' positions within global value chains. Declining national emissions in developed economies may overstate progress if emissions-intensive production is relocated to emerging economies rather than reduced globally (OECD, 2025[14]).

 

Note: OECD partner countries include Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, People's Republic of China, India, Indonesia, Malta, Peru, Romania, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Thailand; Sectoral breakdown follows IPCC categories. The buildings category includes residential and commercial fuel use, classified under energy. Some residual emissions in other energy subcategories and LULUCF are not shown. CO2e: carbon dioxide equivalent; Gt: giga tonnes.

Source: OECD calculations based on Common Reporting Tables (CRT) submitted by countries to UNFCCC (OECD, Forthcoming[3]).

1.6.1. Power sector decarbonisation is progressing

Renewable electricity generation has expanded, driven by solar and wind

The share of renewables in electricity and heat generation has increased substantially across G20 economies, rising from around 18% in 1990 to more than 32% in 2024, driven largely by rapid growth in solar and wind power (Figure 1.10). While hydropower remained the largest renewable source for much of the period, accounting for between 13% and 16% of total generation, the contribution of solar, wind and other renewables expanded rapidly. This expansion of renewable electricity generation was driven by declining costs, technological progress, economies of scale and targeted policy support (Chapter 3). Solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind overtook hydropower as the largest renewable component from 2023 onwards, and global solar PV capacity is projected to more than double by 2030, accounting for nearly 80% of worldwide renewable electricity capacity expansion (IEA, 2026[15]). Biofuels and geothermal energy play a comparatively smaller role, reflecting resource, geographical and scalability constraints. Nevertheless, both increased gradually over time.

The expansion of renewable electricity generation has occurred across a diverse range of economies. While OECD countries, particularly in Europe, have continued to increase the share of renewables in electricity generation, major emerging economies such as China and India, have accounted for a large share of recent renewable capacity additions. However, rapid renewable energy deployment in these countries has occurred alongside continued growth in electricity demand and, in some cases, continued investment in fossil fuel-based generation. Consequently, growth in renewables has not always translated into lower emissions, particularly where electricity demand has grown faster than renewable generation or where reliance on fossil fuel-based generation has not declined sufficiently.

Despite the rapid expansion of renewables in many countries, global renewable energy deployment remains below the level consistent with the international goal to triple global renewable energy capacity by 2030, endorsed by nearly 200 countries at COP28. Under current trajectories, global renewable capacity is projected to reach around 2.6 times its 2022 level by 2030, falling short of the tripling target. Closing this gap will require stronger policy implementation, faster permitting, expanded and modernised grid infrastructure and improved access to finance (IEA, 2026[15]).

1.6.2. Coal remains a major energy source in some OECD members and partner countries

Despite a substantial decline in coal use in many countries since 2015, coal remains an important component of total energy supply in several OECD members and partner countries (Figure 1.11). This continued reliance on coal helps explain why the rapid expansion of renewable energy has not always translated into corresponding reductions in emissions in some countries. Given coal's high carbon intensity, reducing unabated coal use remains central to lowering energy related emissions. Yet, countries that are among the largest global coal producers and consumers have not announced plans to fully phase out unabated coal-fired power generation (Chapter 3, Figure 3.17).

1.6.3. Reducing transport emissions

As emissions from electricity generation decline in many countries, transport is becoming a relatively more important source of emissions. Despite progress in vehicle electrification and energy efficiency improvements, reducing transport emissions remains challenging worldwide, as growth in passenger and freight demand continues to offset part of these gains.

Car ownership remains high across much of the OECD and is increasing rapidly in several partner economies (Figure 1.12). These trends are particularly relevant for transport emissions, as rising vehicle ownership can increase transport demand and offset gains from vehicle efficiency improvements and electrification. At the same time, the transition towards electric mobility is progressing. Global electric vehicle (EV) sales increased by 20% between 2024 and 2025. However, EVs still accounted for only around one-quarter of new passenger car sales (IEA, 2026[16]). Beyond further vehicle electrification, expanding and improving public transport services, alongside measures affecting modal choice and sustainable urban planning, are essential to reduce transport emissions.

 

Source: ITF, "Transport performance indicators", ITF Transport Statistics (database).

1.6.4. Carbon sinks remain significant, but uncertainties persist

The Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector, plays an important role in climate mitigation by removing CO₂ from the atmosphere. In 2024, the LULUCF sector offset around 10% of emissions in OECD countries. These removals are a central component of national mitigation pathways, particularly where they are expected to offset residual emissions from hard-to-abate sectors.

However, the strength of the LULUCF sink varies considerably over time. Net removals in OECD countries ranged from 1.3 to 1.6 Gt CO₂e over the past three decades, with pronounced year-to-year fluctuations (Figure 1.13). After strengthening through much of the 1990s and early 2000s, the net sink has generally decreased since the mid-2000s and has become more volatile in recent years. This variability reflects the influence of a wide range of factors such as land-use change, natural disturbances and harvesting practices, including deforestation, as well as increasingly severe climate-related impacts such as droughts and wildfires. This raises questions about the extent to which countries can rely on LULUCF removals to offset residual emissions over the medium and long term.

Monitoring LULUCF emissions and removals remains complex because estimates are based largely on changes in carbon stocks rather than direct measurement of emissions and removals. National inventories generally report LULUCF as a net carbon sink, while global assessments can estimate the land sector as a net source of emissions (IPCC, 2023[17]). The resulting discrepancy is substantial, at approximately 7 Gt CO₂e per year, equivalent to nearly one sixth of global annual emissions (see ‘LULUCF adjustment’ in Figure 1.8). This divergence reflects differences in system boundaries, definitions and estimation methodologies. Improving the accuracy, consistency and transparency of LULUCF monitoring is therefore important for interpreting emissions pathways and assessing progress towards climate targets. Advances in Earth observation technologies offer opportunities to complement national inventories and improve understanding of LULUCF dynamics (Box 1.2).

Box 1.2. Measuring carbon stock trends using Earth observation data

Tracking changes in terrestrial carbon stocks is important for understanding emissions and removals from the LULUCF sector. Figure 1.14 shows changes in terrestrial woody carbon stocks, an important component of land-based carbon sinks. Advances in satellite missions, Earth observation data and biomass measurement techniques have expanded the availability of globally harmonised and spatially explicit information on these changes.

These datasets can be a useful additional reference point alongside national inventories and model-based estimates. However, differences in methodologies, definitions, spatial resolution and underlying assumptions can result in discrepancies between Earth observation datasets and national inventory estimates. Consequently, Earth observation data should be considered complementary to, rather than a substitute for national reporting.

Figure 1.14. Several terrestrial carbon stocks are in decline

Source: (OECD, Forthcoming[18]).

1.7. Per capita emissions vary widely even at similar income levels

There is a weak association between income and per capita emissions, however, income alone cannot explain the differences across countries (Figure 1.15). Countries with similar levels of GDP per capita can exhibit different emissions profiles, reflecting differences in energy systems, economic structure, energy efficiency and other national circumstances. Moreover, production-based emissions measures do not capture emissions embodied in international trade, meaning that relatively low domestic per capita emissions may partly reflect the relocation of carbon-intensive production (OECD, 2025[14]).

 

Note: Iceland is excluded as an outlier.

Source: OECD calculations based on Common Reporting Tables (CRT) submitted by countries to UNFCCC (OECD, Forthcoming[3]); OECD National Accounts; UN World Population Prospects.

1.8. Economic activity has become less emissions-intensive but aggregate emissions have continued to increase

Emissions intensity complements per capita emissions by relating GHG emissions to output. It provides an indication of how efficiently economies generate income relative to their emissions and serves as an important indicator of progress in distinguishing absolute or relative decoupling economic growth from environmental pressures.

These different patterns are evident across OECD members and partner countries (Figure 1.16). In OECD countries, GDP has continued to increase while emissions have declined, indicating absolute decoupling of economic growth from emissions. In partner countries, emissions continued to rise, but at a slower pace than GDP, indicating relative decoupling.

This represents important progress, but declining emissions intensity alone is not sufficient to reduce emissions in absolute terms. For countries where emissions have yet to peak, moving from relative to absolute decoupling will be important for bringing emissions onto trajectories consistent with medium-term mitigation targets and longer-term net-zero objectives. Further progress will depend on further improvements in energy efficiency, structural economic transformation and the deployment of low-carbon technologies, supported by well-designed policy packages (Chapter 3).

 

Note: OECD partner countries include Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, People's Republic of China, India, Indonesia, Malta, Peru, Romania, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Thailand. GDP: gross domestic product.

Source: OECD calculations based on Common Reporting Tables (CRT) submitted by countries to UNFCCC (OECD, Forthcoming[3]); OECD National Accounts.

References

[6] Byers, E. (2022), AR6 Scenarios Database, https://zenodo.org/records/7197970.

[8] Crippa, M. (2025), GHG emissions of all world countries – 2025, Publications Office of the European Union, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/9816914.

[12] Friedlingstein, P. et al. (2025), “Global Carbon Budget 2024”, Earth System Science Data, Vol. 17/3, pp. 965-1039, https://doi.org/10.5194/essd-17-965-2025.

[16] IEA (2026), Global EV Outlook 2026, https://www.iea.org/reports/global-ev-outlook-2026 (accessed on 18 August 2026).

[15] IEA (2026), “Renewable Energy Progress Tracker”, International Energy Agency, https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/renewable-energy-progress-tracker (accessed on 19 August 2026).

[17] IPCC (2023), “Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Uses (AFOLU)”, in Climate Change 2022 - Mitigation of Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009157926.009.

[10] Nachtigall, D. et al. (2022), The climate actions and policies measurement framework: A structured and harmonised climate policy database to monitor countries’ mitigation action, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/2caa60ce-en.

[4] OECD (2026), Emissions unpacked: Trends and drivers before and after 2015, OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/099cc74a-e.

[13] OECD (2026), OECD Economic Surveys: Croatia 2026, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b52e3ac0-en.

[14] OECD (2025), The Climate Action Monitor 2025, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/1819c631-en.

[7] OECD (Forthcoming), An update of the Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trends and Target (GETT) Indicators.

[18] OECD (Forthcoming), Measuring carbon stock trends using Earth observation data, OECD Publishing.

[1] Olhoff, A. (ed.) (2026), Emissions Gap Report 2026: The point of return – Urgent emissions cuts needed to come back from overshoot of 1.5°C., United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, https://doi.org/10.59117/20.500.11822/48854.

[3] Paris (ed.) (Forthcoming), Methodology to estimate gaps in National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, OECD Publishing.

[9] Pizarro, R. et al. (2024), “GHG Emission Trends and Targets (GETT): Harmonised quantification methodology and indicators”, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 230, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/decef216-en.

[5] Pouille, C. (2023), Paris-consistent climate change mitigation scenarios: A framework for emissions pathway classification in line with global mitigation objectives, OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/0de87ef8-en.

[11] UNEP (2026), Limiting Overshoot: Navigating exceedance of 1.5 C and pathways towards return., United Nations Environment Programme.

[2] UNFCCC (2025), Paris Agreement, https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/paris_agreement_english_.pdf.

Notes

← 1.  OECD partner countries include Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, People's Republic of China, India, Indonesia, Malta, Peru, Romania, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Thailand.

← 2.  The NDC Delivery Gap is a harmonised analytical metric based on a linear emissions reduction pathway and is intended to provide high-level guidance for assessing progress towards NDC targets. As such, it does not necessarily reflect the official implementation pathways of individual countries, which may follow non-linear emissions trajectories and different timing patterns in achieving their NDC commitments.

← 3.  This indicator was referred to as the “2050 Targets Consistency Gap” in the 2025 Climate Action Monitor.