This chapter outlines a roadmap for establishing a renewed Productivity Council in Portugal. Drawing on international experience and good practices from pro-productivity institutions in OECD countries, it identifies key design features and implementation steps to strengthen the role of productivity analysis in policymaking. It builds on the strengths identified in Chapter 3, while addressing gaps that have limited the translation of evidence into policy action. The proposed roadmap shows how a renewed Council could support policymaking by integrating and interpreting productivity analysis in a forward-looking manner, linking productivity evidence to decisions, and delivering a small set of timely, actionable policy messages, supported by an appropriate institutional set-up and linkages to expertise and decision-makers to maintain a sustained focus on productivity over time.
Strengthening Pro‑Productivity Institutions and Policymaking in Portugal
4. Roadmap for establishing a renewed Productivity Council
Copy link to 4. Roadmap for establishing a renewed Productivity CouncilAbstract
Portugal could strengthen the linkages between productivity-related expert work and different stages of policymaking. The country has taken action in many areas relevant for productivity over the last decade, including numerous measures to improve the business environment, increase fiscal support for innovation and diffusion, and strengthen firm capitalisation and access to finance. It is currently developing a set of priority public policy measures to boost productivity that are expected to cut across different productivity drivers, policy areas and ministerial responsibilities (PLANAPP, 2025[1]). Multiple expert units across central and line ministries produce analysis on productivity, which offers rich insights into productivity dynamics, key drivers, and the role of public policies, complementing research produced by the Bank of Portugal and academia.
However, as the analysis in Chapter 3 has shown, in the absence of a strong coordination framework for productivity-related work, the visibility and use of the work of individual expert units remain limited across government. In addition, a systematic overview of pro-productivity policies is limited by incomplete assessments of policy implementation and a lack of evidence on the productivity impact of many measures. Currently, no institution in Portugal systematically translates findings on the role of public policies for productivity into practical guidance for establishing or improving pro-productivity policies in the future. This implies missing important complementarities and synergies across policy areas as highlighted in Chapter 2.
To address these challenges, a renewed Productivity Council could effectively translate existing productivity evidence into actionable policy recommendations. The approach to the establishment of the institution should be pragmatic, starting with the recognition that extensive work has been conducted to diagnose productivity bottlenecks in different policy areas but there is a need to provide an overarching institutional framework that connects these sectoral diagnostics and identifies practical implications for policymakers. As such, the institution would be small and draw on existing evidence and analysis but address the current shortcoming by:
Operating as a stand-alone and independent body from central and line ministries to be able to connect different policy areas and provide an objective, long-term view on strengthening productivity. This approach would also allow addressing institutional and capacity constraints currently faced by expert units.
Focusing its work programme on policy impacts by building on existing evidence and translating this evidence into actionable recommendations as a start. The work programme could be focused on a few priority issues per year, with the objective of providing clear and actionable policy recommendations.
Establishing a formal collaboration mechanism with ministries’ expert units to leverage existing analytical capacity while avoiding duplication of existing work.
Ensuring strong leadership, visibility and policy engagement, in order to enhance the uptake of recommendations and strengthen the role of productivity as a cross‑government policy priority.
The primary objective of a renewed Productivity Council should be to strengthen the policy relevance and impact of productivity analysis in Portugal. This requires a clear and focused mandate that positions the Council as a strategic analytical and advisory body, with a distinct role in supporting policymaking rather than duplicating existing analytical work.
To translate the analytical findings of this report into a practical and sequenced reform agenda, the roadmap is organised around five complementary pillars that together aim to strengthen the role of productivity analysis in policymaking:
1. The first pillar focuses on the institutional foundations of the Council, notably the need for analytical independence, continuity, and a solid legal basis.
2. The second pillar defines the purpose and mandate of a renewed Productivity Council, ensuring a strong emphasis on policy relevance and impact.
3. The third pillar sets out the institutional set-up, capabilities and coordination, defining the operational arrangements, capacity for analysing productivity developments and related policies and linkages to relevant expertise required for the Council to function effectively and achieve high visibility across government.
4. The fourth pillar concentrates on embedding the Council’s outputs in the policy cycle, strengthening stakeholder engagement, and ensuring continuous learning and improvement over time.
5. The fifth pillar addresses the need to ensure institutional learning and continuous improvement by periodically evaluating the impact of the Productivity Council.
Taken together, these pillars provide a coherent framework for establishing a renewed Productivity Council that builds on existing strengths while addressing the institutional gaps identified in the report.
Pillar 1. Establish the Productivity Council and anchor its analytical independence and continuity through a strong legal framework
Copy link to Pillar 1. Establish the Productivity Council and anchor its analytical independence and continuity through a strong legal frameworkThe first pillar is the foundation of the roadmap, establishing the credibility, continuity, and autonomy of the Productivity Council across political cycles. A strong and clearly defined legal framework is essential to ensure that the Council can operate as an independent and trusted source of productivity analysis and policy advice, free from short‑term political considerations and institutional fragmentation.
International experience shows that productivity institutions are most effective when they are established as stand‑alone bodies with a clear legal identity. In the Portuguese context, this would represent a departure from the arrangements underpinning the Productivity Council created in 2018, which was established through a joint ministerial decision and lacked legal personality, budgetary autonomy, and statutory guarantees of independence. Establishing the renewed Productivity Council through a dedicated law (Lei), rather than an administrative or ministerial act, would provide stronger institutional foundations and reflect the body’s strategic and cross‑cutting role in economic policymaking.
Under the Portuguese constitutional framework, a Lei is required when the creation of a body has strong political or institutional relevance, notably for new categories of public entities, bodies affecting major public policies, or independent authorities not covered by an existing framework law. The constitutional basis for this requirement is Article 161(c) of the Portuguese Constitution, which reserves to Parliament the creation of public legal regimes.
A law establishing the Productivity Council should clearly define the guarantees of analytical independence. These include autonomy over the Council’s analytical conclusions, full control over its work programme, and the freedom to publish reports and recommendations without prior approval from political authorities. Such safeguards are critical to ensure the credibility of the Council’s analysis and to foster trust among policymakers, stakeholders, and the wider public (Box 4.1). The legal framework should also specify the Council’s purpose, scope, and operating principles. This includes clearly delineating its advisory role, defining the limits of its activities to avoid duplication with existing analytical bodies, and setting out core principles such as transparency, policy relevance, and coordination with other institutions. In addition, the law should clarify the Council’s relationship with Parliament and the government, including reporting obligations and channels for communication, while preserving its functional autonomy. Together, these elements would help ensure analytical continuity, protect institutional independence, and provide a stable basis for the Council’s contribution to productivity‑enhancing reforms over time. Australia and Belgium provide useful examples in this respect (Box 4.1).
Box 4.1. Legislation establishing the pro-productivity institutions in Australia and Belgium
Copy link to Box 4.1. Legislation establishing the pro-productivity institutions in Australia and BelgiumAustralia’s Productivity Commission Act
The establishment of the Australian Productivity Commission (APC) in 1998 was driven by the need for a stronger focus on productivity in national policymaking, amid declining productivity growth as well as debates on which policy reforms could better strengthen competition. The APC replaced the Industry Commission, Bureau of Industry Economics and Economic Planning Advisory Commission.
The Productivity Commission Act 1998 – last amended in 2024 – establishes the Productivity Commission as an independent statutory body, setting out its institutional structure, governance, and core functions, and defining its role as a central provider of policy advice, research, and public inquiry processes on matters affecting industry, productivity, and economic performance. It outlines how the Commission operates – through conducting inquiries referred by the Minister, producing reports and recommendations, delivering research and advisory services, and supporting evidence‑based policymaking – while also specifying procedural rules, reporting obligations, and mechanisms such as competitive neutrality complaints (Parliament of Australia, 1998[2]).
Belgium’s law establishing the National Productivity Council
The Belgian law establishing the National Productivity Council sets out its creation, composition, organisation, and functions as advisory body, defining it primarily as an independent expert council tasked with analysing productivity and competitiveness developments in Belgium. It specifies the Board’s role in producing analysis and publications. The law also establishes the rules on governance and operation including the appointment of members. Amendments – most recently introduced in 2024 – have refined aspects of the Board’s composition and independence, including nomination procedures, incompatibility rules, the representation of the regional level, and its secretariat (House of Representatives of Belgium, 2018[3]).
At the same time, the legal framework should clarify that independence does not preclude relevance: the Council may consider topics suggested by government, while retaining full discretion over prioritisation, methods, findings, and publication, as it is the case in Ireland (Box 4.2).
Box 4.2. Consideration of government-proposed areas of work by the Irish NCPC
Copy link to Box 4.2. Consideration of government-proposed areas of work by the Irish NCPCThe mandate of the Irish NCPC defines that it has functional autonomy towards any public authority in charge of policymaking in areas relevant to productivity and competitiveness. Moreover, it is responsible for the management and direction of its own work programme but may occasionally respond to requests by the Minister to focus on certain productivity and competitiveness-related issues (NCPC, 2020[4]).
In practice, this arrangement establishes a two‑way but non‑hierarchical relationship between the NCPC and government. Ministerial requests serve as signals of emerging policy concerns or areas of political relevance, rather than as binding instructions. The Council remains fully responsible for setting its work programme, defining analytical approaches, drawing conclusions and publishing outputs. This ensures that engagement with government priorities strengthens policy relevance without compromising analytical independence.
Recommendations
Recommendation 1.1. Establish the Productivity Council through a dedicated law (Lei)
Establish the Productivity Council as a stand-alone body created through primary legislation to provide legal personality, analytical independence, and continuity across political cycles, in line with Article 161(c) of the Portuguese Constitution.
Recommendation 1.2. Guarantee autonomy over analysis, work programme and publication
Ensure that the law explicitly safeguards the Council’s independence over analytical conclusions, work programme prioritisation, and publication of outputs, while allowing government to suggest topics without influencing outcomes.
Pillar 2. Define the purpose and mandate of the Productivity Council
Copy link to Pillar 2. Define the purpose and mandate of the Productivity CouncilA key design choice concerns the scope of the mandate. International experience suggests that productivity institutions are most effective when their mandate is narrow and policy‑oriented (Cavassini et al., 2022[5]). In the Portuguese context, this would imply focusing less on broad diagnostic analysis – where substantial work already exists across government, the central bank, academia and international organisations – and more on monitoring productivity trends, identifying key structural barriers, and translating evidence into actionable policy guidance. The emphasis should be on synthesising, complementing and extending existing analysis, including through forward‑looking assessments, with the explicit objective of informing policy priorities.
To support impact, the Council’s work programme should be deliberately selective. Limiting the annual work programme to a small number of priority issues (typically two to three per year) would help ensure analytical depth, clarity of messages, and relevance for decision‑makers. A strong focus on policy recommendations – rather than descriptive reporting – would further distinguish the Council’s role and strengthen its contribution to reform prioritisation and follow‑up (Box 4.3).
These design choices should be reflected explicitly in the Council’s legal basis. The mandate and core outputs of the Productivity Council should be clearly defined in law, providing a stable framework for its activities and safeguarding continuity over time. In particular, the law should specify the Council’s main deliverables, notably the preparation of a regular (typically annual) Productivity Report centred on a limited number of priority challenges and accompanied by clear, prioritised and actionable policy recommendations. Such clarity would help anchor expectations regarding the Council’s role, reinforce its credibility, and facilitate its integration into the policymaking process across policy cycles.
Box 4.3. Definition of strategic intent, responsibilities and outputs for the Belgian and Irish pro-productivity institutions
Copy link to Box 4.3. Definition of strategic intent, responsibilities and outputs for the Belgian and Irish pro-productivity institutionsThe Belgian NPB has a clearly-defined limited number of key responsibilities
The mission of the Belgian National Productivity Board (NPB) is to study the evolution of productivity and competitiveness in Belgium, as well as the impact and implementation of the recommendations of the European institutions in this regard. For this, the NPB’s activities are supposed to focus on three areas of analysis:
conducting assessments and analyses of the evolution of productivity and competitiveness in Belgium
conducting analyses of the political issues in the field of productivity and competitiveness
evaluating the consequences of policy options in the aforementioned areas
The mandate further specifies that the analyses will be made publicly available, notably by publishing an annual report reflecting the NPB’s activities (House of Representatives of Belgium, 2018[3]).
The mandate of the Irish NCPC combines productivity and competitiveness analysis with policy advice
The mission of the Irish National Competitiveness and Productivity Council (NCPC) is to promote sustainable economic growth and quality employment so that living standards and quality of life improve for all of society. To achieve this, the NCPC combines analytical and advisory functions to:
diagnose and analyse productivity and competitiveness issues facing the Irish economy
analyse policies in the field of productivity and competitiveness in Ireland;
provide advice to the government on key competitiveness issues facing the Irish economy and offer recommendations on the policy actions required to enhance Ireland’s competitive position
The mandate further specifies outputs that the NCPC should produce including the dimensions they should address. Notably the annual report should benchmark the competitiveness of Ireland’s business sector against international peer countries and outline the main competitiveness challenges facing the business sector in Ireland over the medium term, and the policy responses required to meet them. Beyond the required annual outputs, the mandate also provides scope to prepare and publish other reports on competitiveness and productivity issues as the Council considers appropriate, with recommendations on measures required to improve competitiveness and productivity, and – on an occasional basis – to follow government directives for other competitiveness and productivity related functions (NCPC, 2020[4]).
Recommendations
Recommendation 2.1. Define a focused, policy‑oriented mandate
Establish the Productivity Council as a strategic analytical and advisory body with a clear focus on monitoring productivity trends, identifying structural barriers, and translating evidence into actionable policy recommendations, rather than duplicating existing diagnostic work.
Recommendation 2.2. Prioritise impact through a selective work programme
Limit the Council’s annual work programme to a small number of priority issues (typically two to three per year), with a strong emphasis on policy relevance, prioritisation, and follow‑up.
Pillar 3. Building the Council’s operational capacity, high-level visibility and linkages to existing expertise
Copy link to Pillar 3. Building the Council’s operational capacity, high-level visibility and linkages to existing expertiseThe third pillar of the roadmap focuses on ensuring that the Productivity Council can operate effectively in practice and achieve sufficient visibility within the policymaking process. While Portugal benefits from substantial analytical capacity across government, much of this work remains fragmented, is often disseminated through technical working papers, or circulates primarily within institutional silos. As a result, productivity‑related analysis is not always visible, synthesised, or translated into policy‑relevant messages to inform public policies across sectors and ministerial responsibilities. Establishing a strong institutional set-up, capacity for analysing productivity trends, barriers and policies, as well as institutional linkages is therefore essential for the Council to fulfil its bridging role between evidence and decision‑making.
Structure the Council around a chair and board members with clear expertise in productivity analysis and policymaking
Strong governance and leadership arrangements are critical to the credibility, authority and policy relevance of the Productivity Council. International experience suggests that Councils are most effective when they are structured around a clearly identified chair and a board composed of members appointed on the basis of individual expertise and recognised competence. In the Portuguese context, this would help ensure that the Council provides independent, cross‑cutting perspectives on productivity challenges, rather than primarily reflecting sectoral or ministerial positions.
Members of the Council, including the chair, should be appointed for fixed and staggered terms, ideally extending beyond the electoral cycle, to reinforce continuity and protect the Council’s independence over time. Appointments should be based on demonstrated expertise in areas relevant to productivity analysis and policymaking – such as economics, business dynamics, labour markets, innovation, or public policy – rather than purely on representational criteria. Consideration could also be given to including international experts among the members of the board, as in the case of the Irish NCPC. Drawing on external expertise can provide comparative perspectives, strengthen analytical independence, and facilitate the integration of international best practices into the Council’s work. Clear incompatibility rules should be established to prevent conflicts of interest, for example by excluding individuals holding ministerial or senior political positions, or roles that could compromise analytical independence.
The mandate should also clarify the respective roles of the chair and the board. The chair would provide strategic direction, represent the Council externally, and ensure the quality and coherence of its outputs, while the board would collectively guide the work programme, validate analytical priorities, and contribute expertise to the Council’s deliberations. International examples illustrate approaches that emphasize a diverse mix of expert profiles offering useful reference points for design choices in Portugal (Box 4.4).
Box 4.4. Composition of the boards of the Australian, Chilean, and Irish pro-productivity institutions
Copy link to Box 4.4. Composition of the boards of the Australian, Chilean, and Irish pro-productivity institutionsAustralian Productivity Commission’s diverse range of expertise
The Australian Productivity Commission (APC) consists of a chair plus a variable number (4–12) of Commissioners, appointed for up to five‑year terms, potentially supplemented by associate commissioners for specific inquiries and reports. Commissioners must have a strong expertise in areas such as economics and public policy. While the Act establishing the APC does not impose criteria on each commissioners’ specific expertise, it requires that the Commission as a whole includes specific types of expertise to ensure a balanced and multidisciplinary composition. Specifically, there should be at least one commissioner which has one of the following areas of expertise: social impact of economic adjustment, industry, environment, first nations communities (APC, 2026[6]).
Chile’s National Evaluation and Productivity Commission (CNEP)’s small diverse board
The Council of Chile's CNEP is composed of five members, including the president, appointed by the President of the Republic for a term of up to five years, with staggered renewal or reappointment of one member per year. The members are distinguished academics and professionals with relevant experience, who serve on the Council on a part-time basis. The profiles of current members combine academic expertise, experience from work in international organisations and research centres, as well as private-sector representation (CNEP, 2026[7]).
The Irish NCPC’s inclusion of national and international stakeholders and experts from diverse backgrounds
The mandate of the Irish NCPC allows for a variable number and a relatively flexible composition of members, to be appointed by the Minister who holds responsibility for business and enterprise. It specifies that members may be people with relevant expertise in competitiveness and productivity such as economists, or individuals who have direct experience of competitiveness and productivity issues from a business perspective or in academia. The appointment of members and the chairperson shall benefit the diversity on the Council, including with regards to gender and the representation of views of different stakeholder groups (NCPC, 2020[4]). While not a State Board, the Code of Practice for the Governance of State Bodies serves as a good practice for members (NCPC, 2025[8]).
Currently, the Council has seventeen members including the chair (NCPC, 2026[9]):
While not explicitly defined in the mandate, the chair typically is a renowned academic with in-depth knowledge of the Irish economy and research expertise on productivity and competitiveness.
The Irish employer and employee associations (IDA Ireland and Enterprise Ireland), the Chairperson of the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission, and the Department holding responsibility for business and enterprise are represented by one member respectively ex officio.
The remaining members have diverse profiles and areas of expertise and can be broadly grouped into independent sectoral experts (e.g. on the semiconductor industry), executives of International Organisations (e.g. OECD and World Bank), executives of private business operating in key sectors in the Irish economy (e.g. technology, finance, and SMEs), representatives of public and non-profit agencies in thematically relevant areas (e.g. Industry Research and Development Group, and Financial Services and Pensions Ombudsman), and further representatives of business associations and trade unions.
Members of the Council are appointed for a three-year term, which may be extended for one further three-year term. Member shall serve on the Council for no longer than six years in total, except for ex officio members, who may serve for the duration of their term of office (NCPC, 2020[4]). In 2025, the Council used a call for expressions of interest to attract new candidates for membership and support the Minister’s selection (NCPC, 2025[8]).
Establish a small technical secretariat to support the work of the Board
To support the work of the chair and board, the Productivity Council should be backed by a small, dedicated technical secretariat. A lean structure – typically comprising three to five staff – can be sufficient to ensure analytical continuity, coordinate inputs, prepare drafts, and manage stakeholder engagement, while keeping administrative costs contained. Staff should work primarily for the Council and be able to operate with a high degree of analytical autonomy.
International practice offers flexibility regarding hosting arrangements. Secretariats can be an integral part of the pro-productivity institution or may be hosted by a government department, provided that appropriate safeguards are in place to protect the Council’s independence and control over its work programme. What matters most is not the formal hosting arrangement, but the ability of the secretariat to support the Council’s analytical agenda, ensure timely delivery of outputs, and facilitate coordination with other institutions. Examples from Ireland and Germany illustrate different models for organising secretariat support, each adapted to national institutional contexts (Box 4.5).
Box 4.5. The set-up of the secretariat of the Irish and German pro-productivity institutions
Copy link to Box 4.5. The set-up of the secretariat of the Irish and German pro-productivity institutionsSecretariat support for the Irish NCPC is provided by the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment
The Enterprise Strategy, Competitiveness and Evaluation Division of the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment provides research, analysis, and administrative support to the NCPC. In its role as the secretariat, the Division provides seven staff members on a part-time basis, including a principal officer, three assistant principal officers, and three staff for administrative and secretariat support (NCPC, 2026[10]).
The German Council of Economic Experts has a scientific staff hosted by the Federal Statistical Office
The German Council of Economic Experts is supported by a secretariat with dedicated scientific staff that is attached to the Federal Statistical Office. The scientific staff supporting the Council is chaired by a secretary general and comprises sixteen people, including senior economists, economists and administrative support functions (CEE, 2026[11]).
Structured engagement with relevant expert units to serve in an advisory role
Finally, effective linkages to existing expertise require structured and transparent engagement with expert units across government. Rather than duplicating analytical work, the Productivity Council should draw on the extensive evidence produced by ministries’ expert units, the Bank of Portugal, and other public bodies. Establishing an advisory network – potentially building on a subset of existing coordination structures such as REPLAN – could facilitate participation of ministries in the work of the Council and Board’s discussions, regular information exchange and mutual awareness of ongoing and planned work.
Representatives of ministries and agencies could participate in Council meetings to share insights, flag emerging policy issues, provide feedback, and help ensure the policy relevance of the Council’s analytical conclusions or recommendations. This two‑way information flow would help ensure that the Council’s work is informed by policy realities, while also enhancing the visibility and uptake of its outputs across government. The Irish and Chilean experiences, where departmental/ministerial representatives participate in an advisory capacity, illustrate how such arrangements can strengthen policy relevance without compromising analytical independence (Box 4.6).
Box 4.6. Advisory roles of government departments in the Irish and Chilean pro-productivity institutions
Copy link to Box 4.6. Advisory roles of government departments in the Irish and Chilean pro-productivity institutionsIreland’s National Competitiveness and Productivity Council
The mandate of the Irish NCPC provides that twelve different Government Departments – including central and line ministries – make available representatives to attend the Council meetings in an advisory capacity. It further specifies that the Council may invite additional representatives of Government Departments and Agencies to attend Council meetings in an advisory capacity where appropriate (NCPC, 2026[12]; NCPC, 2020[4]).
The participation of departmental representatives in an advisory role is intended to strengthen the policy relevance of discussions at Council level, while safeguarding the Council’s analytical independence. In practice, this participation during these meetings – taking place usually three to four times per year – helps ensure two-way visibility of ongoing and planned work between the NCPC and government. The presence of Department representatives reportedly also supports the development of actionable policy recommendations, which, in the case of the NCPC, often define concrete measures for implementation and assign responsibility to institutions.
Chile’s National Evaluation and Productivity Commission
In Chile, three representatives from the Undersecretariats of Social Evaluation of the Ministry of Social Development and Family, Economy and Small Businesses of the Ministry of Economy, Development and Tourism, and the Budget Directorate of the Ministry of Finance participate in the Council’s discussions (CNEP, 2026[7]).
Recommendations
Recommendation 3.1. Appoint an expert‑based chair and board with strong expertise in productivity-related policies and appropriate safeguards
Structure the Council around a chair and a board appointed on the basis of relevant and diverse expertise, including national and international experts, and representatives of business and trade unions. Members should be appointed for fixed staggered terms and be subject to clear incompatibility rules to protect independence.
Recommendation 3.2. Establish a small, dedicated technical secretariat
Provide the Council with a lean secretariat (around 3–5 staff) working primarily for the Council, with hosting arrangements that preserve analytical autonomy and operational continuity.
Recommendation 3.3. Formalise advisory engagement with expert units
Create a structured advisory network of ministries and expert bodies (e.g. building on REPLAN) to support information exchange and policy relevance, while preserving the Council’s independence over conclusions and recommendations.
Pillar 4. Produce policy-relevant outputs and support their dissemination and take-up
Copy link to Pillar 4. Produce policy-relevant outputs and support their dissemination and take-upThe fourth pillar of the roadmap focuses on ensuring that the outputs of the Productivity Council are closely aligned with policymaking needs, visible across government, and conducive to follow‑up and learning over time. While Portugal produces a substantial volume of high‑quality productivity‑related analysis, much of this work is disseminated through technical reports or working papers and is not systematically translated into actionable policy guidance. Moreover, existing recommendations are often developed in isolation, without sufficient consideration of complementarities and trade‑offs across policy areas. Strengthening the design, dissemination, and follow‑up of the Council’s outputs is therefore critical to maximise policy impact.
Produce a focused annual Productivity Report with actionable recommendations
A central element of this pillar should be the production of a focused annual Productivity Report centred on a limited number of priority challenges. Rather than providing a comprehensive diagnostic overview, the report should prioritise the formulation of clear, well‑targeted and actionable policy recommendations, grounded in evidence and explicitly linked to the identified productivity barriers. Where relevant, recommendations should be presented as coherent packages that take account of interactions across policy domains – such as skills, competition, innovation, regulation and public administration – to support integrated reform efforts. Concentrating on a small number of priorities would help sharpen policy messages, enhance visibility, and facilitate meaningful discussion at senior political and administrative levels. International practice highlights structured approaches to formulating policy recommendations, with Ireland emphasising clear objectives, concrete measures and assigned responsibilities within a prioritised framework, Germany linking recommendations to identified challenges, defined goals and corresponding policy actions, and Chile specifying the time horizon for action and suggested legislative revisions (Box 4.7).
Box 4.7. Approaches to develop specific and tailored policy recommendations by the Irish, German, and Chilean pro-productivity institutions
Copy link to Box 4.7. Approaches to develop specific and tailored policy recommendations by the Irish, German, and Chilean pro-productivity institutionsIreland’s National Competitiveness and Productivity Council: structuring recommendations around objectives, measures and responsibility
The NCPC provides policy recommendations to the Irish government annually following a structured process. Each year, Ireland’s Competitiveness Challenge report presents twenty recommendations, necessitating strict prioritisation by the council and its secretariat. These recommendations are elaborated in collaboration with relevant government stakeholders, ensuring their relevance and feasibility from the outset.
The recommendations are organised around six core areas of an analytical framework developed by the NCPC to facilitate prioritisation, while covering the key productivity drivers. Typically, three to four recommendations are developed per policy area. The typical structure of NCPC recommendations consists of three parts: 1) a call to action accompanied by a stated objective; 2) details on concrete policy measures or instruments to be implemented; 3) identification of responsible ministries (NCPC, 2025[13]).
Germany’s Council of Economic Experts: structuring recommendations around challenges, goals and policy measures
The German Council of Economic Experts (CEE) publishes an annual report that takes stock of and interprets Germany’s economic development. The report always includes a chapter on national productivity trends and also provides recommendations to policymakers that are organised along identified key challenges.
The CEE presents a concise overview of its recommendations. Each challenge is mapped to goals that should be targeted. To pursue these goals, several policy actions are formulated. Recommendations reference items in the national report that explain how such measures could be designed and implemented (CEE, 2025[14]).
Chile’s National Evaluation and Productivity Commission: structuring recommendations around time horizon, legislative changes, and responsibility for action
The National Evaluation and Productivity Commission (CNEP) produces in‑depth sectoral evaluation studies, such as recent work on hospital procurement and inventory management and on productivity in the telecommunications sector. These evaluations generate detailed and operational policy recommendations organised across several thematic dimensions, typically structured with a headline recommendation followed by more granular and actionable supporting elements.
CNEP recommendations are explicitly designed for implementation: they usually define a clear time horizon (for example, short- versus medium-term actions), often identify the specific legal or regulatory changes required (including which laws or decrees should be amended and how), and systematically assign responsibility for implementation to particular public institutions or stakeholders (CNEP, 2026[15]).
To reinforce accountability and learning, there should be formal mechanisms for government follow‑up to the Council’s recommendations. International practice illustrates different approaches. In Ireland, the government issues a structured, though non‑mandatory, response to the recommendations of the National Competitiveness and Productivity Council, outlining actions taken or planned (Box 4.8). Establishing expectations around government responses could strengthen the policy traction of the Council’s advice and improve transparency regarding the use of evidence in decision‑making. Follow‑up on recommendations could be integrated into subsequent annual reports allowing the Council to track progress and refine its advice over time.
Box 4.8. Government’s response to the recommendations of the Irish NCPC
Copy link to Box 4.8. Government’s response to the recommendations of the Irish NCPCIreland has a formalised, though non-mandatory, practice of issuing a government response to the NCPC’s recommendations set out in the annual Competitiveness Challenge Report. In its published response, the government addresses each recommendation, outlining actions taken or planned, or explaining why no action is envisaged (Government of Ireland, 2024[16]).
Since 2024, Ireland has also held a Competitiveness Summit, bringing together the government and the NCPC alongside national and international experts. The Summit complements the written follow-up process on NCPC recommendations and helps inform government action, as illustrated by the development of priority actions in an Action Plan on Competitiveness and Productivity under the government programme (Government of Ireland, 2025[17]).
To further strengthen the effectiveness of the Portuguese Productivity Council, stronger procedural links to the policymaking cycle could be envisaged. In particular, requiring the government to respond in writing to the recommendations set out in the annual report within a defined timeframe would create clearer accountability and ensure that recommendations are actively considered. In addition, aligning the publication of the annual report with the budget cycle – such as by releasing it by mid‑year – would increase the likelihood that recommendations inform budget preparation and broader policy decisions.
Engage with stakeholders in the preparation of the annual Productivity Report
Systematic stakeholder engagement should form an integral part of the preparation of the annual Productivity Report to ensure relevance and impact. Consulting a broad range of stakeholders – including social partners, representatives of civil society, the Bank of Portugal, the National Statistical Office, and the Economic and Social Council – can help enrich the analytical base, test the feasibility of policy recommendations, and improve the legitimacy and visibility of the Council’s work. Such engagement can also provide valuable insights into implementation challenges and distributional considerations that may not be fully captured in quantitative analysis alone.
At the same time, consultation processes should be clearly structured to safeguard the Council’s analytical independence. Stakeholder input should inform the analysis, but not determine the Council’s conclusions or recommendations. The experience of the French National Productivity Council provides a useful reference: social partners and other stakeholders are consulted on draft reports, and their views may be annexed to the final publication, while the Council retains full responsibility for the content and final judgments (Box 4.9). Adopting a similarly transparent and structured approach in Portugal could strengthen inclusiveness and policy relevance, while preserving the independence and credibility of the Council’s advice.
Box 4.9. Stakeholder engagement for the preparation of the annual Productivity Report in France
Copy link to Box 4.9. Stakeholder engagement for the preparation of the annual Productivity Report in FranceThe French National Productivity Council (CNP) prepares an annual Productivity Report and consults with trade unions and employers' organisations on a draft before its final adoption. If these organisations issue an opinion on the report, it is appended to it. The annual Productivity Report is also subject to a public and civil society consultation phase. In line with the analytical independence anchored in the CNP’s mandate, the Council is solely responsible for how it incorporates the comments received during this consultation process into the final version of its report (Prime Minister of France, 2018[18]).
Recommendations
Recommendation 4.1. Produce a focused annual Productivity Report with actionable recommendations
Task the Council with producing an annual report centred on a limited number of priority challenges and clearly articulated, prioritised and actionable policy recommendations.
The report should be published at a strategic point in the policy cycle, notably by mid‑year, to maximise its relevance for budget preparation and policy planning.
Recommendation 4.2. Establish expectations for government follow‑up
Introduce a formal mechanism for government responses to the Council’s recommendations, and integrate follow‑up into subsequent reports.
This could include requiring a written government response within a defined timeframe after publication of the report, thereby strengthening accountability and increasing the likelihood that recommendations translate into policy action.
Recommendation 4.3. Systematically engage stakeholders while preserving independence
Consult social partners, civil society, the Bank of Portugal, the National Statistical Office, and the Economic and Social Council during report preparation, using transparent procedures that inform analysis without constraining conclusions.
Pillar 5. Ensure institutional learning and adaptation over time
Copy link to Pillar 5. Ensure institutional learning and adaptation over timeThe fifth pillar of the roadmap focuses on ensuring that the Productivity Council remains effective, relevant, and responsive over time by embedding mechanisms for assessing the Council’s work and learning. Given the evolving nature of productivity challenges and policymaking priorities, continuous improvement is essential to sustain the Council’s policy impact and credibility. Periodic reviews of the Council’s analytical approaches, prioritisation choices, and the uptake of its recommendations can help ensure that its work remains relevant as economic conditions and policy challenges evolve.
International experience suggests that productivity institutions benefit from regular assessments of their mandate, analytical approaches, and outputs. Such evaluations help ensure that the institution adapts to changing economic conditions, emerging policy needs, and lessons from its own experience, while reinforcing a culture of accountability and learning.
As a first step, the roadmap could envisage an assessment of the Productivity Council after an initial period of operation, for example after three years. This assessment could consider whether the Council’s mandate, institutional set-up, analytical focus, and outputs remain fit for purpose, and whether its recommendations are sufficiently relevant, timely, and influential in the policy process. The assessment could also review the adequacy of resources, the effectiveness of coordination with other institutions, and the visibility and uptake of the Council’s work across government.
Experience from other OECD countries offers useful reference points. In Ireland, the National Competitiveness and Productivity Council has periodically reassessed its own analytical approaches and prioritisation choices, adjusting its framework to strengthen focus, improve coverage of emerging issues, and sharpen policy recommendations. This self‑assessment process has been documented and used to inform subsequent work programmes, contributing to greater clarity and policy relevance over time. In Australia, the mandate of the Australian Productivity Commission has been periodically reviewed and updated through recurring reviews to refine its mandate and strengthen its emphasis on evolving policy challenges (Box 4.10).
In Portugal, such assessment could take different forms, ranging from an internal self‑assessment by the Council to an external review commissioned by government or Parliament, potentially with international peer involvement. Regardless of the modality, findings should be made public and used explicitly to inform adjustments to the Council’s mandate, work programme, and operating practices. Embedding such feedback loops would help ensure that the Productivity Council remains a learning institution, capable of evolving alongside Portugal’s productivity challenges and sustaining its contribution to evidence‑based policymaking over the longer term.
Box 4.10. Reviews and learning in pro-productivity institutions in Australia and Ireland
Copy link to Box 4.10. Reviews and learning in pro-productivity institutions in Australia and IrelandRegular assessment of methods and recommendations by Ireland’s National Competitiveness and Productivity Council
The NCPC has reviewed its analytical approaches and policy recommendations at its own initiative. In this context, it has updated its analytical framework in line with changed structural economic conditions and external factors based on a systematic review, and documented the considerations and changes in a special bulletin published on its website (NCPC, 2024[19]).
Moreover, the NCPC has conducted a multi-annual stocktaking of its own policy recommendations in the annual Competitiveness Challenges report. The stocktaking reviewed the implementation progress by government of the 79 recommendations it has made over the period from 2020-2023. The review concluded that meaningful progress had been made, with the Government fully delivering on 45 recommendations. The NCPC used the review to draw lessons for the prioritisation and potential operational improvements of its own future advice (NCPC, 2026[20]).
Review of the mandate and work of the Australian Productivity Commission
The Australian Productivity Commission (APC) has been re-examining the scope and priorities of its work through five-year productivity reviews that assess Australia’s productivity performance and policy framework and allow the APC to refresh and update analytical methods and areas of focus.
In 2023, for the first time, the government also issued a Statement of Expectations outlining expectations for the work of the APC. The Statement of Expectation does not formally change the mandate and independence of the APC but sets directions to which the APC formally responds through a Statement of Intent (APC, 2026[6]).
Recommendations
Recommendation 5.1. Assess the work of the Productivity Council after the first years of operation
Undertake an assessment of the Productivity Council after an initial three‑year period, reviewing mandate relevance, analytical focus, governance, resourcing, and policy impact.
Recommendation 5.2. Use findings to adjust mandate and practices
Ensure that results are made public and explicitly used to refine the Council’s mandate, work programme, analytical approaches and operating practices, drawing on international experience (e.g. Ireland, Australia).
References
[6] APC (2026), How we operate, https://www.pc.gov.au/about/operate/.
[5] Cavassini, F. et al. (2022), “Pro-Productivity institutions at work: Country practices and new insights on their set-up and functioning”, OECD Productivity Working Papers, No. 32, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f5a3a2df-en.
[11] CEE (2026), Scientific Staff, https://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/en/about-us/scientific-staff.html.
[14] CEE (2025), Annual Report 2025/26, https://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/en/annualreport-2025.html.
[15] CNEP (2026), Findings and Recommendations, https://cnep.cl/hallazgos-y-recomendaciones/.
[7] CNEP (2026), Members, https://cnep.cl/consejo/.
[17] Government of Ireland (2025), Action Plan on Competitiveness and Productivity, https://enterprise.gov.ie/en/publications/action-plan-on-competitiveness-and-productivity.html.
[16] Government of Ireland (2024), The Government Response to Ireland’s Competitiveness Challenge 2024, https://www.competitiveness.ie/media/tvwlufc1/the-government-response-to-ireland-s-competitiveness-challenge-2024.pdf.
[3] House of Representatives of Belgium (2018), 25 NOVEMBRE 2018. - Loi portant création du Conseil National de la Productivité [Law of 25 November 2018 establishing the National Productivity Council], Belgian Official Gazette, https://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&cn=2018112501&table_name=loi.
[12] NCPC (2026), Council Advisors, https://www.competitiveness.ie/about-us/council-advisors/.
[9] NCPC (2026), Council Members, https://www.competitiveness.ie/about-us/council-members/.
[20] NCPC (2026), Retrospective Review, 2020-2023, https://www.competitiveness.ie/latest-news/retrospective-review-2020-2023/.
[10] NCPC (2026), Secretariat, https://www.competitiveness.ie/about-us/secretariat/.
[8] NCPC (2025), Call for Expressions of Interest: Member of the National Competitiveness and Productivity Council, https://www.competitiveness.ie/media/dfhhillz/information-booklet-call-for-expressions-of-interest.pdf.
[13] NCPC (2025), Ireland’s Competitiveness Challenge 2025, https://www.competitiveness.ie/media/3y4kcpus/irelands-competitiveness-challenge-2025.pdf.
[19] NCPC (2024), Bulletin 24-2 Ireland’s Competitiveness and Productivity Framework, https://www.competitiveness.ie/latest-news/bulletin-24-2-ireland-s-competitiveness-and-productivity-framework/.
[4] NCPC (2020), Terms of Reference – National Competitiveness and Productivity Council, https://www.competitiveness.ie/media/2viaohem/ncpc-terms-of-reference-november-2020.pdf.
[2] Parliament of Australia (1998), Productivity Commission Act 1998, Federal Register of Legislation, https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2004A05326/latest/text.
[1] PLANAPP (2025), “Analisar e Melhorar a Produtividade em Portugal: um Plano Holístico de Intervenção [Analysing and Improving Productivity in Portugal: A Holistic Action Plan]”.
[18] Prime Minister of France (2018), Order of 21 June 2018 relating to the National Productivity Council, Journal officiel de la République française, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000037095532.