Substantial analytical capacity on productivity exists within government, with expert units across ministries producing rich and diverse analytical insights on productivity barriers and drivers. A Productivity Council, established in 2018, whose mandate ended in 2021, represented an initial step towards a more coordinated approach to productivity analysis and policy advice. However, a comprehensive and durable framework to integrate productivity evidence into policymaking has yet to be established, leaving gaps in the evidence and policies aimed at strengthening productivity. Against this background, this chapter assesses the current institutional set‑up for pro‑productivity policies and analysis in Portugal. It first reviews international experience with pro‑productivity institutions and examines Portugal’s early experience with its Productivity Council. It then analyses the role of ministerial expert units in producing productivity‑related analysis, with a view to identifying opportunities for strengthening the institutional set-up for productivity‑enhancing policymaking.
Strengthening Pro‑Productivity Institutions and Policymaking in Portugal
Abstract
Productivity outcomes are shaped by a wide range of interconnected policy areas, including education and skills, competition, innovation, regulation, finance, labour markets and regional development as shown in Chapter 2. Moreover, productivity growth increasingly depends on the interaction between traditional drivers and emerging factors. While capital accumulation and skills remain fundamental transmission mechanisms, productivity performance is increasingly shaped by the capacity of firms and workers to adapt, learn and absorb new technologies (Box 3.1).
Productivity is an increasingly multi‑dimensional and complex phenomenon. The drivers and implications of productivity growth are changing rapidly, impacted by major structural transformations, while long standing constraints continue to weigh on productivity performance across OECD countries. Recent OECD work underscores that long‑standing productivity drivers remain highly relevant, despite rapid technological change.
Weak business investment reflects a combination of cyclical and structural factors, including heightened uncertainty, weaker demand expectations, financing constraints, and rising adjustment costs, with adverse implications for capital deepening, technology adoption and diffusion (Dlugosch et al., 2025[1]). At the same time, slower growth in human capital accumulation, driven by skills mismatches, unequal access to training, demographic ageing and insufficient lifelong learning, has weighed on productivity growth and constrained firms’ ability to adapt to technological change (Andrews, Égert and de la Maisonneuve, 2025[2]). Ageing further exacerbates these trends by reducing labour supply and altering workforce composition. Ageing affects productivity through multiple channels, including shifts in sectoral demands towards services, many of which exhibit relatively low productivity growth, altered investment incentives as firms adjust to slower labour force growth, and weaker business dynamism as firm entry and reallocation decline with age‑biased demand and labour supply constraints (André, Gal and Schief, 2024[3]).
Alongside these long-standing factors, new structural forces are affecting productivity dynamics. A growing share of productivity‑enhancing activity is linked to intangible assets (such as software, data, organisational capital and skills) which are harder to measure and may be imperfectly captured in conventional statistics. As a result, meaningful productivity analysis increasingly requires granular, micro‑based approaches to improve the measurement of inputs, including intangible capital, and understand how value is created, distributed and diffused across the economy (Cavassini et al., 2022[4]). Work from the Global Forum on Productivity shows that these transformations amplify productivity dispersion across firms and places, making diffusion mechanisms, skills systems and place‑based policies increasingly central to future productivity outcomes (OECD, 2025[5]).
As a result, productivity‑enhancing reforms increasingly depend on coherent policy packages, credible prioritisation and sustained implementation over time. Ensuring that productivity considerations are systematically integrated into policy decisions has therefore become both more complex and more important. To facilitate the development of policy-oriented productivity analysis that enables synergies and complementarities across policy areas, governments have invested in analytical capacity and advisory bodies to better understand productivity dynamics and inform reform agendas. In OECD analysis, pro‑productivity institutions are dedicated public or publicly mandated bodies whose core mission is to strengthen productivity performance through evidence‑based analysis, policy advice, and institutional learning. They are not implementing agencies, nor line ministries, but analytical and advisory institutions designed to improve the design, coherence and political traction of productivity‑enhancing reforms. These are dedicated pro-productivity institutions, often referred to as national productivity councils, commissions, bodies or similar entities that operate through analysis, advice and coordination, supporting governments in addressing complex and long‑term productivity challenges. Their comparative advantage lies in their ability to combine analytical independence with proximity to policymaking, allowing them to act as trusted intermediaries between data, policy options and public debate (Cavassini et al., 2022[4]).
These institutions have emerged in response to structural productivity slowdowns, increasing policy complexity, and the recognition that productivity growth depends not only on individual policies but also on policy coherence, sequencing and institutional credibility. OECD evidence shows that productivity‑enhancing reforms often suffer from fragmentation across ministries and policy domains. Pro‑productivity institutions contribute by adopting a whole‑of‑economy perspective, helping governments assess whether existing policy frameworks are aligned with long‑term productivity objectives (Cavassini et al., 2022[4]).
While institutional forms vary across countries, international experience shows that effective pro‑productivity institutions tend to fulfil a set of core functions, operate through well‑defined modes of analysis, and rely on structured co‑operation mechanisms with government and stakeholders. The mere existence of a productivity council or board is not, in itself, sufficient to generate policy impact. In many OECD and partner countries, some early experiences with pro-productivity institutions struggled to shape policy outcomes, not because of weak analytical ambition, but due to institutional design limitations. Common challenges included unclear or overly narrow mandates, limited analytical independence, insufficient access to granular data, weak integration into core policy processes and limited visibility or political traction. Where these constraints were binding, productivity institutions often remained peripheral to policymaking, with their analysis insufficiently connected to reform prioritisation and implementation (Cavassini et al., 2022[4]).
These early experiences underline that institutional design and positioning matter as much as analytical capacity. Evidence accumulated across OECD countries over the past decade through peer reviews, applied policy support and exchanges among productivity institutions points to a set of recurring features that distinguish impactful pro‑productivity institutions from those with limited influence. The OECD framework for pro-productivity institutions divides its features into three broad dimensions: institutional set‑up, core functions and responsibilities, and mechanisms for engagement with policymakers and stakeholders (Figure 3.1). The remaining part of this section provides an overview of the framework, enriched with evidence on pro‑productivity institutions’ practices collected through recent country policy support work (OECD, 2025[6]). The framework and practices are used in the following section to assess Portugal’s early experience with its pro-productivity institution.
Source: Cavassini et al. (2022[4]).
Key design features of pro-productivity institutions
Institutional set‑up
The institutional set‑up of a pro‑productivity institution plays a central role in shaping its credibility, analytical capacity and ability to influence policymaking. Institutional design determines not only how analysis is produced, but also whether it is trusted, visible and ultimately used in policy decisions. While international experience does not point to a single dominant institutional model, comparative evidence across OECD and partner countries highlights several design dimensions that are consistently decisive for impact.
First, mandate clarity and scope are fundamental. Institutions with clearly defined responsibilities, covering monitoring of productivity trends, policy analysis and, in many cases, advisory functions, are better positioned to prioritise work, allocate resources effectively and communicate their role to policymakers and stakeholders. A well‑articulated mandate also helps insulate institutions from ad‑hoc task expansion or shifting political expectations, while providing a stable framework for long‑term analysis. Across OECD countries, pro‑productivity institutions share broadly aligned mandates centred on monitoring productivity and competitiveness trends, assessing policy impacts and encouraging improvements through evidence‑based advice. A defining feature is their medium‑ to long‑term orientation, which allows them to focus on structural challenges that may receive less attention in day‑to‑day policymaking.
This long‑term mandate can enhance policy ownership and reform continuity. In practice, mandates have remained relatively stable since 2022, with most institutions retaining a focus on economy‑wide productivity, while increasingly incorporating digitalisation, skills and sustainability considerations. Ireland’s National Competitiveness and Productivity Council (NCPC), for example, explicitly links productivity to broader competitiveness and resilience objectives, while Austria’s Productivity Council frames productivity within a multi‑pillar competitiveness framework.
Second, the degree of analytical independence, combined with proximity to policymaking, shapes both credibility and relevance. Analytical independence is essential to ensure objective, evidence‑based assessments, particularly where productivity‑enhancing reforms involve politically sensitive trade‑offs. At the same time, excessive distance from policy processes can limit uptake of recommendations. Experience suggests that it is not independence per se that drives impact, but rather the presence of safeguards that protect technical autonomy while maintaining structured channels of interaction with decision‑makers.
Third, legal status and organisational anchoring affect authority, visibility and continuity. Government advisory councils, standing inquiry bodies and institutions hosted within existing expert organisations each entail different trade‑offs between independence, access to policy processes and resource requirements. Regardless of form, institutional stability over time and clarity on reporting lines are critical to building reputation and cumulative influence.
Experience also illustrates that institutional sustainability matters. The discontinuation of New Zealand’s Productivity Commission following broader public‑sector reforms demonstrates that external political and fiscal conditions, alongside institutional design, influence durability and long‑term relevance.
Fourth, composition and leadership matter for both analytical quality and policy traction. Boards combining recognised academic expertise, policy experience and, in some cases, stakeholder perspectives can broaden analytical depth and legitimacy. Strong and credible leadership, typically provided by respected economists or senior experts, helps articulate clear messages, manage internal diversity of views and engage effectively with policymakers and the public. Broad, multi‑stakeholder boards bring diverse perspectives and enhance legitimacy but require strong leadership to converge on actionable advice. In addition, boards combining government experts and academics tend to facilitate analytical coherence and feasibility, though policy traction depends on effective integration into policy processes. Predominantly academic boards strengthen analytical rigour and credibility, but may face challenges in aligning advice with operational constraints.
Recent experience also highlights the value of advisory councils or similar structures. Ireland provides a notable example, with government departments attending council meetings in an advisory capacity, allowing for systematic knowledge exchange while preserving independence. Regarding the chairpersons, in OECD countries there are typically experienced economists or senior experts, reinforcing credibility (e.g. France, Germany, Ireland). While more political chairing arrangements exist, they require robust safeguards.
Finally, the role of the secretariat and resources is decisive. The secretariat provides the continuous analytical backbone of the institution, ensuring methodological consistency, data access and timely outputs. Secretariat location, whether within a ministry, an independent expert body or a stand‑alone organisation, also influences both analytical capacity and alignment with policymaking. Models include secretariats within ministries with shared staffing, which ensure closeness to policy but risk capacity constraints (e.g. Belgium); secretariats hosted by expert bodies (e.g. Central Bank in Austria, Federal Statistical Office in Germany, High Commission for Strategy and Planning in France), facilitating expertise and data access; and, stand‑alone secretariats (e.g. Australia, Chile), enabling extensive analysis but requiring greater resources. More recently, Italy established a National Productivity Board in 2024 within the National Council for Economics and Labour (CNEL), drawing on the operational and research support of the host institution, alongside expertise from the Bank of Italy and the National Institute of Statistics.
Adequate and stable funding, including skilled staff with policy‑relevant expertise, is necessary for sustained performance. Funding is consistently associated with stronger analytical outputs and sustained engagement across the policy cycle.
Core functions and responsibilities
Beyond institutional form, the impact of pro‑productivity institutions depends critically on what they do in practice and how their functions are organised over the policy cycle. International experience shows that effective pro‑productivity institutions combine a limited number of clearly defined core functions, supported by analytical frameworks and operating routines that link diagnosis to policy relevance. Institutions that lack clarity on functions, or that perform them in isolation, tend to struggle to move from analysis to sustained policy impact.
A core function of most pro‑productivity institutions is to serve as national reference points for productivity, monitoring productivity developments and diagnosing problems. This typically involves consolidating indicators, benchmarking performance against peers, and identifying emerging challenges affecting productivity growth. Increasingly, institutions rely on structured analytical frameworks to guide this work, helping prioritise issues and connect diagnostic findings to policy questions. Such frameworks reduce the risk of descriptive reporting and support a more selective, policy‑oriented approach to analysis.
International practice indicates the value of this approach. Ireland’s National Competitiveness and Productivity Council uses a structured framework to assess performance across a set of competitiveness pillars, while Austria’s Productivity Council monitors productivity drivers through an integrated framework covering economic, social and environmental dimensions. These approaches enhance analytical clarity, improve comparability over time, and strengthen the link between monitoring and policy discussion.
A growing body of experience shows that pro‑productivity institutions can support the policymaking cycle at multiple stages, provided their role is clearly defined and embedded in institutional processes. At the upstream stage, institutions can support scoping and prioritisation by identifying high‑impact reform areas and signalling emerging risks. Through ex‑ante advice, they can inform policy design, highlight trade‑offs, and clarify responsibilities across institutions. At a more strategic level, some institutions contribute to national productivity or competitiveness strategies, helping align short‑term measures with medium‑ to long‑term objectives. In addition, pro‑productivity institutions can contribute to ex‑post follow‑up and evaluation, assessing implementation progress and identifying gaps that require adjustment. Experience across OECD countries suggests that such roles tend to emerge gradually as institutions mature, build analytical capacity and become embedded in policymaking processes. The Irish and Australian productivity commissions provide prominent examples of institutions that have developed these functions over time, allowing productivity analysis to inform decision‑making in a timely and targeted manner rather than as a one‑off exercise.
Effective pro‑productivity institutions typically operate with differentiated work cycles, balancing responsiveness with strategic depth:
Short‑term cycles often produce concise bulletins, notes or updates on emerging issues, helping maintain visibility and relevance in ongoing policy debates.
Longer‑term cycles deliver in‑depth annual reports, inquiries or thematic studies that provide comprehensive diagnostics and develop integrated policy recommendations.
This differentiation allows institutions to remain agile while retaining a focus on structural challenges. The Australian Productivity Commission exemplifies the use of inquiry‑based work for in‑depth analysis, while Ireland combines regular competitiveness bulletins with annual flagship reports. Such differentiation helps manage analytical resources efficiently and enhances the likelihood that outputs are used at different stages of the policy process.
Engaging policymakers and stakeholders
The ability of pro‑productivity institutions to influence policy outcomes depends not only on analytical quality, but also on how they engage with policymakers and stakeholders. International experience highlights several mechanisms that help translate analysis into action. These include formulating actionable recommendations, often with clear assignment of responsibilities; establishing government response procedures, whereby authorities formally react to recommendations; and maintaining regular follow‑up, tracking progress over time.
Some institutions also contribute directly to government strategies, such as advising on national productivity or competitiveness action plans. Ireland and Australia illustrate how such mechanisms strengthen accountability and increase the likelihood that recommendations inform policy decisions. Beyond government, pro‑productivity institutions frequently act as platforms for dialogue with social partners, businesses and academia. Structured consultation processes improve diagnostic quality, enhance legitimacy and help build support for reform. Chile’s extensive consultation practices and Australia’s inquiry‑based model are often cited as good practice in this regard.
Communication, visibility and knowledge brokering
Finally, many pro‑productivity institutions play an important knowledge‑brokering role, enhancing the visibility of productivity analysis produced within and outside government. By synthesising work across institutions, disseminating findings in accessible formats and engaging with media and public debate, these institutions help convey consistent messages to policymakers and society. Visibility and communication are not ancillary functions: they are central to building credibility, sustaining attention to productivity challenges, and anchoring productivity as a long‑term policy priority.
International experience underscores that the effectiveness of pro‑productivity institutions ultimately hinges less on their formal establishment than on how they are designed, positioned and embedded within the policy system. It also points to a clear distinction between the initial generation of productivity councils and more recent efforts to strengthen their analytical independence, relevance and policy traction. This distinction is particularly relevant in the Portuguese context. Portugal, like several other OECD countries, has previously sought to institutionalise productivity analysis through the creation of a National Productivity Council. While this initiative reflected a strong recognition of the importance of productivity for long‑term growth, its experience highlights the practical challenges of translating analytical ambition into sustained policy impact. This experience provides a valuable entry point for identifying the institutional features that are most critical for a renewed and effective pro‑productivity institution.
Set-up, mandate and intended role
Portugal established its first Productivity Council (Conselho para a Produtividade, CPP) in March 2018, following growing recognition of the role of productivity in supporting long‑term growth, competitiveness and convergence. The Council was created through a joint order of the Ministers of Finance and of Economy, reflecting the government’s intention to place productivity analysis at the intersection of macroeconomic policy, structural reform and competitiveness. The initiative aligned Portugal with a broader international trend, particularly within the European Union, to strengthen institutional capacity for productivity analysis.
The Council became operational in 2018 and was foreseen as a temporary arrangement, with an initial two‑year mandate. An in‑depth review of its functioning was planned at the end of this period, with the objective of assessing its role and informing decisions on its continuation or adaptation. The assessment was postponed due to the COVID‑19 pandemic and never conducted. Discussions in 2021 explored options for reviving or reconfiguring the Council’s activities, including possible involvement of PLANAPP, which had been created the same year as an expert unit with the Ministry of the Presidency to strengthen strategic and impact‑oriented policy design and analysis across government. However, the Council’s mandate has never been renewed, nor has a new mandate been developed.
The institutional design of the Portuguese Productivity Council reflected an effort to ensure proximity to policymaking. It was established as a joint structure between the Office of Strategy and Studies (GEE, now the Directorate‑General for the Economy, DGE) in the Ministry of Economy and the Office for Economic Policy and International Affairs (GPEARI) in the Ministry of Finance. Senior officials from the two institutions jointly headed the Council, with the chair role rotating between them. Technical, administrative and logistical support was provided by staff from the two services, alongside their existing responsibilities, and without additional dedicated resources (Cabinets of the Ministers of Finance and Economy, 2018[7]).
The Council’s mandate was twofold. On the one hand, it was expected to monitor and assess public policies affecting productivity, including through ex ante and ex post analysis. In this regard, the mandate specified that its work should help to improve existing policy measures and inform the development of new policies in relevant areas including innovation, investment attraction, the adequacy of human capital, or the capacity to compete in international markets. On the other hand, the Council was expected to promote public discussion and awareness on productivity by engaging with relevant stakeholders, including through collaboration with the academic and partnerships with international organisations. This function was operationally pursued with the establishment of an Advisory Council composed of national and international researchers and productivity experts.
This mandate reflected a clear governmental intention to strengthen the analytical foundations of productivity policy and to foster dialogue between experts and policymakers. In that respect, Portugal’s approach was broadly comparable to early institutional designs adopted in other OECD countries.
Outputs and analytical contributions
During its period of formal operation, the Productivity Council produced several outputs that represented an important step forward in consolidating productivity‑related knowledge in Portugal. Most notably, it published the first annual Productivity Report in 2019 (Box 3.2). The report provided a comprehensive assessment of productivity and competitiveness developments, including an analysis of productivity trends and sources, an international benchmarking exercise, and a discussion of how public policies influence key productivity drivers. While the report stopped short of issuing explicit policy recommendations, it constituted the first integrated and systematic overview of productivity dynamics in Portugal.
In parallel, the Council developed a productivity monitoring dashboard, intended as a central repository of productivity indicators drawing on international and national data sources. The dashboard covered a wide range of metrics, including labour and total factor productivity, competitiveness indicators and factor inputs, and aimed to facilitate continuous monitoring over time (Box 3.2). The Council also consolidated and expanded existing analytical work carried out within GEE and GPEARI, notably through the publication of 17 working papers by internal and external researchers under a dedicated Productivity Council Series.
These analytical efforts were complemented by outreach activities, including a first annual conference bringing together national and international experts, as well as a series of webinars during the Council’s second year of operation. Taken together, these outputs helped raise awareness of productivity issues and improved the visibility of productivity analysis within the policy and expert community.
First annual Productivity Report 2019
The 2019 Productivity Report provided a comprehensive assessment of productivity and competitiveness developments in Portugal and was structured around three substantive chapters. The first chapter analysed productivity developments over time, including a decomposition of the sources of productivity growth, and examined the relationship between productivity and competitiveness. The second chapter presented an international benchmarking exercise, including a discussion of potential determinants of productivity performance based on relevant indicators across policy areas. The third chapter explored how public policies affect key productivity determinants and identified areas for further evaluation and analytical work, without providing policy recommendations (CPP, 2019[8]).
Productivity monitoring dashboard
A detailed productivity monitoring tool, referred to as the National Productivity Board Database, served as a central repository of indicators related to productivity performance and its structural drivers. The dashboard tracked several groups of indicators on an annual basis, covering export market shares, price and non‑price competitiveness, and productivity developments. The latter included a range of productivity measures, such as total factor productivity (TFP), labour and capital productivity, contributions to GDP growth, and related indicators of factor inputs, including unit labour costs, gross fixed capital formation, and factor substitution.
Data were compiled from multiple sources, including Eurostat, AMECO, the OECD, and the Conference Board. However, the dashboard was not updated on a regular basis, and the most recent data available refer to 2018 (CPP, 2018[9]).
Emerging limitations
Experience with the first Productivity Council highlights a number of institutional and functional constraints that limited its ability to translate analytical work into sustained policy impact, when compared with practices observed in other OECD countries. These constraints provide useful lessons for the design of future arrangements.
While the location of the Council within line ministries responsible for key economic policies ensured proximity to government, it did not sufficiently strengthen linkages between expert analysis and policy decision‑making. Unlike in countries such as Australia and Ireland, where productivity councils benefit from structured involvement of multiple government departments, established feedback mechanisms, or clearly defined channels for follow‑up, the Portuguese Council lacked systematic processes to connect its outputs to reform prioritisation, follow‑up or implementation.
A further limiting factor was the absence of dedicated financial and human resources. The Council was not supported by an autonomous budget nor by a permanent secretariat, and relied largely on the existing staff, analytical tools, and work programmes of GEE (now DGE) and GPEARI to carry out its activities. While this arrangement helped contain administrative costs and ensured technical quality, it constrained analytical continuity, limited the Council’s capacity to set an independent work programme, and reduced flexibility to respond to emerging policy needs.
The Advisory Council provided valuable academic input, but its role remained largely consultative and was not directly embedded in policymaking processes. Moreover, while analytical outputs were disseminated to policymakers and discussed at senior levels, no formal consultation or follow-up mechanisms were established to ensure that findings informed concrete policy actions.
From an analytical perspective, the Council’s work focused primarily on diagnosis and benchmarking. This represented an important first step, but international experience suggests that policy impact tends to be stronger when diagnosis is complemented by clearly articulated policy implications, ex‑ante assessments or targeted policy briefs tailored to decision‑makers. Similarly, the productivity dashboard was not systematically integrated with analytical reporting and lacked interpretative notes that could facilitate its effective use by policymakers.
Drawing lessons for the future
Overall, Portugal’s first Productivity Council can be seen as a foundational institutional experiment, demonstrating the government’s intent to address productivity challenges through better evidence, monitoring and dialogue. Its establishment marked an important step towards recognising productivity as a cross‑cutting policy concern requiring dedicated analytical capacity and institutional attention. In this respect, Portugal’s experience mirrors that of several OECD countries that initially adopted lighter‑touch, temporary, or pilot arrangements before moving towards more robust and permanent productivity institutions.
The experience of the Council therefore does not point to a lack of relevance of productivity institutions but rather highlights the importance of institutional design choices for ensuring sustained policy impact. It underscores how mandate clarity, analytical autonomy and independence, adequate and stable resourcing, and structured integration into the policy cycle shape the ability of pro‑productivity institutions to move beyond diagnosis and contribute effectively to reform prioritisation, implementation, and follow‑up. International experience suggests that productivity institutions tend to be most influential when they are equipped not only to analyse trends and challenges, but also to translate evidence into timely, policy‑relevant insights that respond to decision‑makers’ needs.
The experience of the Council also illustrates that strong analytical capacity within government, while essential, is not sufficient on its own. Without clearly defined channels linking analysis to decision‑making, formal feedback mechanisms, and institutionalised expectations regarding the use of evidence, even high‑quality outputs risk remaining under‑utilised. At the same time, the Council’s analytical outputs, stakeholder engagement efforts, and collaboration with academic experts provide a valuable foundation on which future arrangements can build.
Overall, these lessons point to the importance of viewing the renewal of a national productivity institution not as a stand‑alone organisational exercise, but as part of a broader effort to strengthen evidence‑based policymaking and policy coherence. A renewed Productivity Council has the potential to capitalise on existing analytical strengths, benefit from accumulated experience, and address previously identified gaps, provided that its mandate, composition, resources, and links to the policy process are carefully designed from the outset.
Portugal has multiple expert units across central and line ministries producing analysis on productivity, including numerous research papers, a few policy-oriented ad hoc reports, and diverse monitoring outputs. This work – sometimes produced jointly between expert units and with external experts – offers rich insights into productivity dynamics, key drivers, and the role of public policies, complementing research produced by the Bank of Portugal and academia. However, in the absence of a strong coordination framework for productivity-related analysis, outputs are spread across expert units, the visibility and use of this work remain limited across government, and cooperation tends to be linked to specific outputs. Analysis rarely translates into actionable policy recommendations.
The section is structured as follows. It first provides an overview of the relevant expert units regarding their location, mandates and productivity-related functions. It then describes the existing cooperation practices between the units and with external stakeholders. It further presents the different productivity-related outputs discussing their relevance and limitations for policymaking.
Responsibility for productivity-related analysis is distributed across expert units
Different ministries have dedicated expert units working to some extent on productivity (see Figure 3.2 below). The primary function of these expert units is to inform the decision-making process of their respective ministries, notably by supplying research and responding to requests of ministerial cabinets supporting and advising Ministers and State Secretaries. No expert unit has a specific mandate to monitor productivity trends or lead analysis on productivity policies:
The Directorate General for the Economy (DGE) (formerly the Office of Strategy and Studies (GEE) until 2025) in the Ministry of Economy and Territorial Cohesion has a mandate that is the most specific regarding productivity drivers and relevant policy areas. Its analytical work, which includes support for the design, implementation, dissemination, and evaluation of public policies, is intended to promote business competitiveness and innovation, with a focus on policy areas relevant to productivity and sectoral policies. It is also tasked with providing technical support for strategic and operational planning (Decree-Law No. 52/2025).
The Office for Economic Policy and International Affairs (GPEARI) in the Ministry of Finance has a broader mandate, defining analytical responsibilities such as conducting economic and financial studies to inform policymaking, evaluating the macroeconomic impacts of structural reforms (Regulatory Decree No. 7/2018).
The Directorate-General for Coordination and Planning (DGCP) (formerly Strategy and Planning Office (GEP) until 2025) in the Ministry of Labour, Solidarity and Social Security has a similar broad mandate, specifying its responsibility for data analysis to support public policies and contribute to medium- to long-term strategic planning instruments (Regulatory Decree No. 1/2026).
The Centre for Planning and Evaluation of Public Policies under the Ministry of the Presidency (PLANAPP), differs from other ministerial expert units as its intended role is to strengthen coordination and analytical foundations of planning, monitoring, and evaluation in order to improve public policies across all areas of government. In its planning role, PLANAPP oversees the drafting of the Major Options Law – Portugal’s constitutionally-mandated multi-year strategic planning instrument – in coordination with the Ministry of Finance and sector ministries. (as defined in Decree-Law No. 67/2024). In its analytical capacity, PLANAPP supports policymaking through monitoring, evaluation and ad hoc analyses including on productivity.
The Directorate-General for Research, Planning and Evaluation (DGEPA) in the Ministry of Education, Science and Innovation was established in 2025 to strengthen analytical capacity for research in the areas of responsibility of the Ministry. DGEPA is still in the process of being established, including the development of a work programme.
In practice, the analytical work of expert units on productivity and competitiveness focuses on three areas:
conducting productivity-related research in working paper format
occasionally producing ad hoc reports that focus on specific dimensions or drivers of productivity
monitoring through the creation and tracking of productivity-related indicators and regular drafting of analysis notes and thematic bulletins
Productivity-related expertise and research also exist at the Bank of Portugal and in academia, with which ministerial expert units engage on an ad hoc basis and in relation to specific outputs (see further below). Productivity research often draws on administrative and statistical microdata provided by the National Institute of Statistics (INE), which is made available to public agencies and academia for research purposes.
Source: OECD elaborations.
Collaboration on productivity analysis takes place occasionally
Collaboration on productivity-related analytical work among ministerial expert units, and with other public institutions and academia, occurs at the initiative of individual expert units for specific outputs and mostly for research papers. This in turn limits the capacity to link different policy areas, identify complementarities and trade-offs and produce analysis that is policy relevant and has visibility across government.
In the domain of research in working paper format – a key source of productivity-related outputs in Portugal, as elaborated below – DGE and GPEARI staff occasionally co-author working papers. However, since the work programme of GPEARI has reportedly focused on other priorities in recent years, joint releases have become less common in practice. Academic contributions to productivity research published in institutional working-paper series are often initiated through thematic calls for papers, the temporary integration of PhD students into staff, and the supervision of master’s theses based on arrangements with universities.
Only on a few occasions in recent years have expert units collaborated on policy-oriented reports that provide recommendations directly to policymakers. PLANAPP, DGE, GPEARI, and DGCP were part of the Working Group on Productivity and the Quality of Employment, which provided support for the preparation of an initiative opinion by the Economic and Social Council (CES) on productivity and the quality of employment in 2023 (CES, 2023[10]). In 2025, PLANAPP collaborated with researchers from the University of Minho to produce an expert report, published as a PLANAPP Study, on the role of international openness in the performance of Portuguese firms, including firm-level productivity analysis (PLANAPP, 2025[11]).
In the area of monitoring, DGE and GPEARI jointly produce the Quarterly Economic Bulletin, which tracks macroeconomic developments, including aggregate labour productivity and several productivity drivers, and occasionally includes policy-oriented analysis relevant to productivity in dedicated background boxes. Staff from expert institutions, including DGE, GPEARI, and the Bank of Portugal, also worked together in the Working Team for Indicators of Productivity and Competitiveness of the Portuguese Economy, under the Portuguese Superior Council for Statistics to develop macro- and micro-level composite indicators tracking the competitiveness of the Portuguese economy in international comparison. Methodology and results were presented in joint Bank of Portugal publications (Amador, Fernandes and Nogueira, 2022[12]; Lourenço et al., 2022[13]).
In 2022, the government established an inter-ministerial network, known as REPLAN, composed of ministerial expert units to foster cooperation and harmonisation of planning, monitoring, and evaluation across expert units (see Figure 3.2 above). PLANAPP coordinates REPLAN. While the creation of REPLAN as an inter-ministerial network of expert units has contributed to institutionalising and strengthening overall cooperation and exchange among government expert units, the network is not designed for joint work on productivity and does not have a direct connection to the policymaking cycle. In the area of productivity, REPLAN has at most indirectly improved the accessibility of productivity-related analytical work within the administration through initiatives to systematically gather public policy evaluation and monitoring outputs from across government.
Productivity analysis is spread across multiple outputs but some attempts to consolidate evidence and identify priorities are emerging
Key insights on productivity in Portugal are mostly created through working papers written by staff from ministerial expert units, the Bank of Portugal and academia. Between 2017 and 2025, almost 100 relevant studies were released in institutional working paper series, including the GEE Papers, GPEARI Articles and the Bank of Portugal Working Papers. Many studies have been published in peer-reviewed academic journals at later stages, highlighting their relevance and analytical quality. Moreover, the knowledge acquired by staff while working on key datasets has also been useful to support complementary research by international researchers. The research has created strong foundations to understand the drivers and structural barriers to productivity growth in Portugal, providing indications of areas in which policy action may be required to boost productivity (Box 3.3). However, the reliance on contributions by external researchers from academia as part of the institutional working paper series also implies that the availability of productivity evidence varies with the thematic priorities of academic research.
Different studies by expert units have also provided ex ante and ex post assessments of the impact of public policies and reforms on productivity (see stocktaking in Chapter 2 above). Evidence exists for measures taken across various policy areas, including product and labour market reforms, wage-setting institutions, corporate taxation, tax incentives and business support instruments, European structural funds, public infrastructure investment, education policy, and emergency support in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and disaster relief.
Institutional working papers published by ministerial expert units and the Bank of Portugal provide comprehensive insights into the drivers of productivity in Portugal.
Competitive pressures and business innovation activity, such as R&D spending and technology adoption, are found to significantly shape productivity in Portugal (Amador and Silva, 2025[14]; Barbosa and Faria, 2022[15]; Carvalho, 2018[16]; Santos et al., 2018[17]; Félix and Maggi, 2021[18]; Candeias, Boavida and Brandão Moniz, 2022[19]). However, productivity gains from increasing competition are found to be heterogeneous across firms depending on their sectors, position in the value chain, and their initial productivity levels (Monteiro, Fontoura Gouveia and Santos, 2017[20]), adding important considerations for policymakers regarding policy complementarities between pro-competition reforms and the facilitation of resource reallocation.
Likewise, the accessibility and quality of labour and capital inputs drive productivity growth but can also create barriers (Rocha et al., 2025[21]; Portugal et al., 2022[22]; Caliendo et al., 2020[23]). Notably, skills gaps and workforce composition partly explain within-industry productivity dispersion, while variation in business investment in different intangible assets also explains firm productivity differences (Cincera et al., 2020[24]). Some evidence from specific manufacturing industries points to the relevance of potential productivity gains from investment in emerging technologies including automation and artificial intelligence (Candeias, Boavida and Brandão Moniz, 2022[19]), while other work has highlighted the complementarity of digital skills to harness broad-based gains from transformative technologies (Osório de Barros and Asensio Menchero, 2024[25]).
Productivity diffusion is further determined by exposure to potential knowledge transfer and the absorptive capacity of firms. Exposure to foreign trade and investment can drive productivity growth, while uneven exposure across firms within industries also explains productivity dispersion (PLANAPP, 2025[11]). Furthermore, firms’ internal organisation shapes the absorptive capacity to realise productivity improvements, pointing to the relevance of managerial practices and skills (Caliendo et al., 2020[23]).
Further evidence highlights different drivers of business dynamism and resource allocation in Portugal, which influence productivity through firm selection and economic composition effects. SMEs operating in international markets and young firms with a highly skilled workforce are better positioned to scale up (Oliveira and Fonte-Santa, 2023[26]). By contrast, inefficient credit allocation and weak exit dynamics of firms with poor financial performance and low productivity, often referred to as zombie firms, were found to slow the reallocation of resources towards more productive firms (Fontoura Gouveia and Osterhold, 2018[27]; Carreira, Teixeira and Nieto-Carrillo, 2023[28]; Azevedo, Mateus and Pina, 2021[29]).
Some expert units produce more recurring analysis on productivity trends within their respective ministerial responsibilities, and assess related policy developments considering potential competitiveness implications – most notably the GPEARI-DGE Quarterly Economic Bulletins and DGE Competitiveness Sheets. PLANAPP – in line with its mandate to strengthen public policies across government – publishes more ad hoc analysis notes with a potentially broader policy focus (Box 3.4).
GPEARI and DGE Quarterly Bulletins and DGE Competitiveness Sheets
Bulletins and analytical notes produced by ministerial expert units provide regular insights into developments in productivity drivers and policy areas within the scope of ministerial responsibilities and are published on the expert units’ websites. The Quarterly Economic Bulletins produced by DGE and GPEARI provide a broader overview of economic indicators and feature thematic sections and background boxes related to specific productivity dimensions and drivers on an ad hoc basis. Some issues, for instance, have addressed determinants of firm growth, the minimum wage, and industrial policy (GPEARI and DGE, 2025[30]; GPEARI and DGE, 2024[31]). DGE also monitors policy developments and benchmarks performance – including in an international perspective – within the remit of the Ministry of Economy and Territorial Cohesion through its publication series Competitiveness Sheets and Economic Themes (DGE, 2026[32]; DGE, 2026[33]).
PLANAPP analysis notes and studies
PLANAPP releases analysis notes and studies that are less frequent. These notes have flexible formats, ranging from the compilation and interpretation of indicators to the econometric analysis of microdata, literature reviews, methodological overviews, and discussions of research findings. Productivity and closely related themes have been the focus of several notes. Two notes addressed productivity directly by reviewing evidence on firm-level productivity and its main determinants in Portugal, and examining long-term labour productivity developments, applying a shift-share decomposition to distinguish between productivity gains within sectors and changes in sectoral composition (PLANAPP, 2023[34]; PLANAPP, 2025[35]). Further notes focused on analysis of wage dynamics, qualification-related wage premia, and educational mismatch (PLANAPP, 2023[36]; PLANAPP, 2024[37]; PLANAPP, 2026[38]).
There have been also some attempts to develop indicators to monitor productivity trends. The Productivity Dashboard maintained while the Productivity Council was active was a step towards identifying a set of indicators monitoring productivity drivers, but it was not accompanied by systematic interpretation of trends. Joint work by expert institutions to develop macro- and micro-level composite indicators of Portugal’s competitiveness in international comparison, released in 2022, provided further useful insights (Amador, Fernandes and Nogueira, 2022[12]; Lourenço et al., 2022[13]). The indicators have been updated and occasionally featured in the Bank of Portugal’s Economics in a picture series (Bank of Portugal, 2022[39]; Bank of Portugal, 2023[40]; Bank of Portugal, 2026[41]), but are not regularly interpreted in a policy-oriented manner. PLANAPP and REPLAN’s Multisectoral Monitoring Team (MMT) have developed high-level monitoring dashboards in response to the finding that monitoring is fragmented across institutions and often linked to specific planning instruments, with inconsistent metrics and timeframes. The new dashboards track annual aggregate labour productivity alongside dozens of other indicators, including metrics of productivity drivers such as innovation and skills.
A crucial gap in the current analytical set-up for productivity-related analysis is a lack of a systematic stocktaking of the existing evidence across working papers, studies, bulletins and indicators. Without this systematic stocktaking, productivity barriers risk being analysed in silos, missing complementarities and making it difficult to identify priority actions that could inform policymaking.
A notable attempt of consolidating evidence has been conducted, offering useful lessons on which to build to strengthen the institutional framework for pro-productivity policy. The 2019 report of the Productivity Council reviewed the Portuguese productivity literature and identified areas in which further analytical evidence could be generated. An annual Productivity Report would have provided a suitable format to draw lessons on a recurring basis. However, this report remained a one-time exercise due to the non-renewal of the Council’s mandate. Moreover, the report did not lead to the identification of policy actions or priorities.
Two further attempts to take stock of evidence on productivity barriers, drivers, and economic implications took place in 2023. The initiative opinion on productivity and the quality of employment by the Economic and Social Council (further discussed in the sub-section below) gathered evidence and included further analysis on the relationship between productivity and labour market outcomes (CES, 2023[10]), while a PLANAPP literature review of productivity determinants (PLANAPP, 2023[34]) distinguished between context factors and intrinsic determinants of firm-level productivity. The PLANAPP review led to the development of a framework aimed at informing the future development and prioritisation of pro-productivity policies in Portugal (Box 3.5).
Building on the framework developed in the literature review, PLANAPP is coordinating a prioritisation through the development of a set of cross-cutting and concrete public policy measures with the potential to significantly boost Portugal’s aggregate productivity performance. The measures are intended to be selected from a broad range of options across all policy areas and government responsibilities, and prioritised according to their potential impact, taking complementarities into account (PLANAPP, 2025[42]). This is a promising step into the direction of identifying priorities by consolidating the extensive evidence produced by expert units. The challenge will be to ensure that this exercise is institutionalised. The prioritisation exercise is highlighting the need for an institutional framework to support the implementation and monitoring of the priority measures (Box 3.5), a role that a Productivity Council could take up.
The 2023 literature review conducted by PLANAPP distinguished determinants into context factors and endogenous firm-level determinants of productivity, detailed in (PLANAPP, 2025[42]) as follows:
Context factors: financing, context costs (business environment), competition, infrastructure, workforce age
Endogenous firm-level drivers: production processes, human capital, management quality, R&D and innovation, international trade, and indebtedness
To address these determinants, nine policy dimensions for potential priority interventions are identified:
1. Institutional framework: Set up integrated systems for monitoring and managing productivity and pro-productivity policy measures.
2. Growth and internationalisation: Support firm scale, consolidation, and expansion.
3. People: Improve skills and align competencies of workers and managers.
4. Competition: Reduce regulatory barriers and improve market dynamics.
5. State reform and institutional quality: Enhance efficiency of public administration and justice.
6. Financing: Improve access to finance for firm creation and growth, innovation, and internationalisation.
7. Labour market: Improve job quality, wages, and labour dynamics.
8. R&D and innovation: Enhance technological development and adoption, and the market value of innovation.
9. Recognition of productivity: Promote and reward productivity gains.
Source: PLANAPP (2023[34]) and PLANAPP (2025[42]).
Productivity analysis is rarely accompanied by policy recommendations and only occasionally integrated into the policymaking process
Only a few expert reports with a dedicated focus on specific dimensions of productivity included explicit policy recommendations or guidelines:
A 2025 study coordinated by PLANAPP analysed the relationship between firms’ participation in international markets and their productivity performance between 2010 and 2021 (PLANAPP, 2025[11]).
Two reports published in 2021 and 2023 involved contributions by ministerial expert units and responded to political demand to inform the debate and policymaking in the area of wages, employment and productivity (GEP, 2021[43]; CES, 2023[10]).
PLANAPP study on international openness and productivity
The study was initiated and coordinated by PLANAPP and prepared by researchers from the University of Minho. It examines how Portuguese firms’ participation in international markets is associated with productivity performance. It provides an overview of firms’ international activities and their productivity characteristics and presents econometric evidence on the relationship between productivity and different forms of global engagement, including exporting, importing, foreign ownership, sourcing practices and participation in global value chains. The analysis is based on linked firm-level datasets from the National Institute of Statistics, including the Integrated Business Accounts System and external trade data. It estimates productivity differentials associated with different forms of international engagement, including sectoral breakdowns. Based on these findings, the report formulates two dozen policy recommendations focusing on different policy areas addressing various productivity drivers (PLANAPP, 2025[11]).
Studies on productivity in relation to employment and wages
In 2023, the Economic and Social Council (CES) issued an opinion on productivity and the quality of employment in Portugal on its own initiative. The report was prepared by the Vice-President of the CES as rapporteur, with thematic inputs and coordination support from a dedicated Working Group comprising PLANAPP, GEE (now DGE), GPEARI, and GEP (now DGCP), as well as social partners. It also reflects consultations with additional experts, including members of the advisory council of the Productivity Council. The report synthesises evidence on the evolution of productivity and employment quality in Portugal and identifies structural challenges affecting productivity growth and living standards. The report emphasises the interdependence between productivity and job quality, stressing the importance of productivity gains for sustainable wage growth as well as the role of employment conditions for firms’ capacity to attract and retain skilled workers. Based on the diagnostic, the initiative opinion sets out various recommendations (CES, 2023[10]).
In 2021, the Ministry of Labour, Solidarity and Social Security released a Green Paper on the Future of Work, coordinated by the Cabinet of the Secretary of State for Labour and Vocational Training with substantive contributions by GEP. The report focused on structural labour-market transformations and changes accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic. It sets out a framework identifying the main forces shaping the future of work and defines challenges and policy guidelines across twelve dimensions, with labour productivity treated as a cross-cutting theme. The analysis concludes with comprehensive guidelines for reflection on public policies (GEP, 2021[43]).
In the current institutional set-up, in which relevant analytical work is spread across ministerial expert units, productivity-related policy recommendations face different policy-integration challenges. Formulating advice to inform productivity-enhancing measures is generally challenging due to the multifaceted nature of productivity, which necessitates action across a variety of policy areas that usually cut across the responsibilities of individual ministries.
The 2025 PLANAPP study included actionable recommendations on specific measures and instruments and suggested responsibilities for implementation. The output was reportedly not systematically discussed with policymakers, and no response or follow-up actions were defined. Its impact on policymaking appears limited. For instance, several dimensions of the recommendations to foster the integration of domestic firms in international markets are not systematically reflected in high-level strategic planning, despite the report’s timely publication during the preparation phase of the Major Options Law for 2025-2029, the constitutionally-mandated law that translates the government programme into concrete measures (see the dedicated section further below).
Recommendations provided in the initiative opinion by the Economic and Social Council on productivity and the quality of employment in 2023, to which different ministerial expert units contributed, were subject to extensive consultations with stakeholders, including social partners. The consultations led to high-level and less specific recommendations, which reportedly facilitated agreement and adoption in the CES plenary.
A notable exception are the guidelines defined in the 2021 Green Paper on the Future of Work, prepared by different entities within the Ministry of Labour, Solidarity and Social Security (GEP, 2021[43]), that shaped measures in the 2023 labour reform under the umbrella of the Decent Work Agenda. However, guidelines related to cross-cutting policy areas going beyond the responsibility of the Ministry of Labour, Solidarity and Social Security, such as measures to address the labour market implications of climate change and energy transition, lacked a basis for systematic consideration across government.
The analysis shows that substantial analytical capacity on productivity exists within government. Expert units across central and line ministries produce a wide range of outputs – including research papers, ad hoc reports and a range of monitoring outputs – that provide rich and diverse analytical insights on productivity. In addition, PLANAPP’s mandate to support cross‑cutting public policies has strengthened analytical capacity at the centre of government, while the establishment of the REPLAN network has helped institutionalise collaboration on planning, evaluation and monitoring methodologies.
At the same time, responsibility for productivity-related work remains dispersed across institutions, and collaboration largely takes place at the level of individual units. As a result, few outputs draw systematic connections between analytical insights on different productivity drivers and policy areas, and the visibility and use of productivity analysis is generally limited across government and sometimes even within ministerial boundaries, as reported by different ministerial cabinets.
Key strengths and gaps are highlighted below and summarised in Table 3.1:
Strong analytical evidence base, but limited synthesis. A high number of institutional working papers produced over the last decade provides a rich evidence base on productivity determinants and the role of policies, complementing the research conducted by academia and the Bank of Portugal. However, this body of work is not systematically consolidated or linked across institutions, with the exception of three ad hoc exercises: the 2019 Productivity Council report, the 2023 PLANAPP review of productivity determinants, and the 2023 CES initiative opinion on productivity and the quality of employment. The main challenge going forward is to institutionalise this type of stocktaking and conduct it on a more regular basis. Beyond consolidating existing work, a systematic regular stocktaking should also generate novel insights by highlighting complementarities, bottlenecks and needs for greater coordination across policy areas, so that reform priorities can more easily be identified.
Limited translation of analysis into actionable policy advice. A very small number of ad hoc reports over the last decade have translated productivity analysis into policy recommendations. Where recommendations were formulated, their uptake has been apparently limited. This reflects, in part, the multifaceted nature of productivity, which requires action across policy areas that cut across individual ministerial responsibilities. Other recommendations that emerged from institutional collaboration and extensive consultation with stakeholders remained high-level, which limited their practical relevance. Recommendations should be provided more regularly and be as specific and relevant as possible, supported by an institutional set-up that ensures systematic follow-up and uptake across government.
Fragmented monitoring, with limited integration across policy areas. A range of productivity-related monitoring tools and outputs co-exist across institutions, comprising indicator dashboards, regular economic bulletins, and ad-hoc analysis notes. However, the existing dashboards mostly track a single aggregate labour productivity indicator alongside other economic variables, while analysis notes and bulletins either provide thematic ad hoc analysis of productivity or focus on specific drivers and policies without drawing systematic connections. A dedicated productivity monitoring could complement existing research outputs which, by their nature, tend to be deeper, narrower and less timely (e.g. due to the delay of microdata releases). Such an approach could be valuable for policymakers to consider broad-based productivity insights in a timely manner and help them to distinguish structural trends from cyclical dynamics and support more informed decision-making.
Taken together, these observations point to the importance of an institutional mechanism capable of synthesising evidence across policy areas to prioritise cross-cutting reform efforts, formulate more effective policy advice, and monitor progress over time – a role that a renewed Productivity Council could effectively fulfil.
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