Setting clear fiscal objectives is core to achieving fiscal goals. Fiscal objectives can be established through political decisions or legislated as a fiscal rule. They set limits for fiscal aggregates, such as total revenue, expenditure, government debt, or the budget deficit. These limits encourage prudent fiscal management by informing budget policy and acting as a benchmark to hold government accountable. Clear fiscal objectives should support long-term fiscal sustainability, and strike a balance between flexibility, simplicity and accountability.
Quality Budget Institutions
Developments in OECD Countries
Abstract
Increased levels of government debt has heightened the importance of sound and sustainable fiscal policy. Compared to the early 2000s, nearly all OECD countries have seen public debt rise as a share of GDP. Successive shocks have required governments to borrow to support the economy. Rising interest rates and long-term pressures such as ageing populations have highlighted renewed concerns over the cost of public debt and the long-term sustainability of public finances. Without changes to policy, future debt burdens are likely to rise significantly. Stronger efforts are necessary to contain spending growth and establish credible medium-term budgets (OECD, 2024[1]).
Setting clear fiscal objectives and legislating fiscal rules can help governments meet fiscal goals. Well-designed fiscal objectives and fiscal rules enhance the credibility of fiscal strategies and provide a basis for budget planning and control. A critical challenge is to ensure that fiscal objectives remain credible in the face of changing priorities and looming spending pressures. For this, fiscal objectives and fiscal rules must promote a sustainable fiscal policy position and should balance three basic principles: flexibility, simplicity and accountability.
General government gross debt as a percentage of GDP (2007 to 2024)
Note: The System of National Accounts (SNA) debt definition used here differs from the definition applied under the Maastricht Treaty, which is used to assess EU fiscal positions. Data for Colombia and Costa Rica are not available. Data for Türkiye are not available for 2007. For Iceland, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand and Türkiye, 2023 data are shown as 2024 data are not yet available. Data for Korea for 2007 are based on OECD estimates.
Sources: OECD National Accounts Statistics (database); Eurostat Government finance statistics (database). Data on public finance and economics were extracted on 08 May 2025.
The politics of budgeting in most democratic countries creates a deficit bias (Schick, 2003[2]). Without explicit limits on taxation, spending, or borrowing, budget negotiations can become an open-ended process in which governments accommodate a growing number of additional demands for lower taxes or more spending, leading to higher borrowing.
To guard against this bias, many OECD countries have strengthened the institutions for top-down budgeting. Finance ministries have been given a stronger mandate to put forward ceilings on total expenditure and the budgets of public entities. These ceilings are guided by fiscal rules or fiscal objectives:
“Fiscal rules” are numerical parameters set by the government to permanently constrain budgetary aggregates, usually based in legislation. This is distinct from a “fiscal objective”, which is a target that is not legally binding but mandated through political decision or established custom and practice. (Moretti, Keller and Chevauchez, 2019[3])
Fiscal objectives can take the form of a government statement to parliament or be contained in coalition or other political agreements. Fiscal rules may be set through the constitution, primary legislation or other laws. This chapter discusses national fiscal rules, but in some countries, these are aligned with the requirements of European Union and euro area membership.
Governments set fiscal objectives and rules to constrain budget aggregates, such as public debt or the deficit (Box 1.1). High-level fiscal objectives or rules anchor fiscal policy – all fiscal policy decisions need to be consistent with those objectives. These may then be operationalised by using more specific objectives or rules that guide budget decisions. A fiscal rule limiting public debt might, for example, be complemented by a fiscal objective to restrict the growth rate for public expenditure. This provides the basis for setting expenditure ceilings for budget formulation and for negotiating detailed budget estimates.
Revenue objectives and rules set upper limits on the tax-to-GDP ratio and place constraints on the way governments can use revenues raised in excess of projected amounts.
Expenditure objectives and rules limit the amount of government spending, or the rate of growth in government spending, and can be expressed in nominal or real terms or as a percentage of GDP.
Budget balance objectives and rules may set requirements to attain a defined surplus at minimum; to run a balanced budget; or not to exceed a defined deficit limit. Such rules can be expressed in nominal or cyclically adjusted terms, usually by reference to a percentage of GDP.
Debt objectives and rules limit the amount of government debt that can be accumulated and can be expressed in nominal terms, as a debt-to-GDP ratio, or as a target reduction of the debt-to-ratio.
1.2.1. Fiscal objectives and rules and budget aggregates
Historically, most countries set fiscal rules to limit the budget balance (e.g. Germany and the Netherlands) or public borrowing (e.g. the United States). However, most OECD countries now commit to a range of fiscal objectives and rules to limit different budget aggregates (Table 1.1).
Note: Data for Lithuania and Mexico are not available. The table shows only the fiscal rule or objective with the highest legal or policy status for each budget aggregate. More detail is shown in Annex A, including where countries have multiple rules or objectives linked to each budget aggregate. Other fiscal objectives include Norway’s limit on withdrawals from the Government Pension Fund.
Source: OECD (2023), OECD Senior Budget Officials Survey on Budget Frameworks, Question 3.
Limits on the budget balance or public debt remain the most common focus for national fiscal objectives and fiscal rules among OECD countries. These are also the rules most likely to be established in the constitution:
Limits on the budget balance: 34 OECD countries have a fiscal objective or fiscal rule that limits the budget balance. Twenty-five of these countries set limits on the overall budget balance. Nine countries set limits for the primary budget balance, which excludes debt interest payments. Only two countries use a golden rule, which balances the current budget to allow governments to borrow for capital investment.
Limits on public debt: 30 OECD countries report using fiscal objectives or fiscal rules limiting public debt. Within this group, 18 countries have fiscal objectives or fiscal rules that set a ceiling on public debt, in financial terms or as a share of GDP. Debt targets are set in 25 countries either to require the government to reduce public debt following a specific path or towards a target. While debt ceilings are more commonly set as a legislated fiscal rule, debt targets are more evenly split between fiscal objectives and fiscal rules.
However, governments are increasingly combining constraints on the budget balance and public debt, along with limits for expenditure and revenue:
Limits on public expenditure: 30 OECD countries reported using fiscal objectives or rules that constrain public spending. Expenditure limits were more common (23 countries) and were more likely to be legislated (16 countries) than constraints on the growth of expenditure (15 countries).
Restrictions on taxation and other revenue: Fewer OECD countries have rules or fiscal objectives that restrict revenue raising. Only three countries set upper limits for revenue, but 11 countries set constraints on the allocation of higher-than-expected revenues, usually through primary legislation.
This means that most OECD countries set national fiscal objectives or have national fiscal rules that cover three or four of the main fiscal aggregates. In many cases, countries employ more than one fiscal rule or objective for each budget aggregate, for example by setting limits on the nominal and structural budget deficit (the detail is annexed in Table A A.1).
1.2.2. The benefits of setting clear fiscal objectives and rules
The main motivation for adopting fiscal objectives and fiscal rules is to promote fiscal sustainability. Setting clear fiscal objectives and fiscal rules encourages prudent fiscal management by reinforcing the position of the finance minister, anchoring budget planning and providing a benchmark to hold government accountable.
Without fiscal constraints, governments can prioritise policies that yield shorter-term benefits at the expense of long-term fiscal health. By limiting the scope for such policies, fiscal objectives encourage a more strategic approach to fiscal policy, one that balances current needs with future obligations. Analysis of 30 OECD countries, for example, concludes that fiscal rules support better fiscal outcomes, including higher primary budget balance and lower public expenditure (Fall et al., 2015[4]).
Fiscal objectives and fiscal rules provide the basis for planning and negotiating tax and spending policy through the budget process. Clear fiscal objectives, such as a limit on the overall budget deficit or a ceiling on public debt, will still need to be operationalised through the government’s medium-term budget framework (MTBF) and the final budget appropriations. However, firmer limits help the CBA set more credible top-down ceilings for aggregate spending. This forces greater scrutiny and prioritisation of the bottom-up proposals that build on existing expenditure baselines. Stable fiscal objectives also reinforce the medium-term outlook of the budget strategy forecasts and estimates.
Fiscal objectives and fiscal rules strengthen budget oversight and accountability by establishing a clear benchmark for assessing government performance. They serve as a commitment device, signalling to both the public and financial markets that the government seeks to maintain fiscal discipline. When governments deviate from their fiscal targets, they must justify their actions to the public and stakeholders, which can lead to greater scrutiny and pressure to return to the agreed-upon fiscal path.
1.2.3. Features of clear, well-designed fiscal objectives and rules
The benefits of clear fiscal objectives or rules depend on these being well-designed and part of a coherent fiscal framework with sound budgeting practices. There is rarely one way to achieve this, but key elements relate to credibility and balanced design.
Fiscal objectives and fiscal rules must be credible within the government, with the markets and with the general public. Credibility means that stakeholders accept fiscal objectives and rules as legitimate goals for the government. It also means that stakeholders believe there is a strong likelihood that they will be followed – not just by the letter of the law, but in the spirit of it.
Central to this credibility is the ambitions of the government’s fiscal policy goals themselves:
Fiscal objectives should produce sustainable outcomes: This is particularly important for maintaining credibility with financial markets that allow the government to access credit at reasonable costs. It is also why governments need to design fiscal rules that limit the risk of unintended consequences, such as undesirable reductions in investment spending.
Fiscal objectives must be politically feasible to implement: Similarly, it is important that fiscal objectives and fiscal rules can be translated into budget plans that are politically feasible. For example, where countries are using fiscal objectives to support fiscal consolidation, the path for fiscal consolidation must be realistic.
Operationalising fiscal rules through a MTBF offers a more concrete projection of the government’s fiscal plans. Disclosing these plans can show, for example, the magnitude of tax and spending changes that are needed to eliminate a budget deficit under a balanced budget rule. This helps the government to explain how the policies in the budget will contribute to meeting its fiscal objectives.
Fiscal rules also need to be carefully designed. Three principles are widely considered to help design better fiscal objectives and rules: flexibility, simplicity and accountability (or enforcement). These apply not just to fiscal rules but also to fiscal objectives and are relevant to the overall fiscal framework as well.
Flexibility: Fiscal rules must allow fiscal policy to respond to unforeseen events and changes in the business cycle.
Simplicity: Fiscal rules need to be easy to understand, implement and monitor in order to support a culture of compliance.
Accountability: Fiscal rules need to set binding constraints that can be monitored and enforced by the legislature with the support of IFIs and other external actors.
The three principles can be mutually reinforcing. Simpler rules are easier to understand which supports accountability. Flexibility is necessary to ensure that fiscal rules are not so rigid that they become politically unenforceable. However, the three principles can also work against each other. Simple, firm rules usually have less flexibility. Flexible rules with firm limits can be complex to understand and implement. Simple, flexible rules offer weaker constraints on fiscal policy. Ultimately, each country needs to find its own way to navigate the trade-offs inherent in the design of good fiscal objectives and rules.
Flexibility is usually justified to allow governments to react to changes in the business cycle or to significant fiscal risks, such as a macroeconomic shock. The uncertainty underlying economic forecasts and fiscal plans makes this principle increasingly important for good objectives and fiscal rules.
Governments have found different ways to create flexibility to respond to uncertainty:
Allow flexibility to revise fiscal objectives.
Design fiscal objectives that can respond to changes in the economy.
Set principles to suspend or miss fiscal objectives, typically called “escape clauses”.
1.3.1. Flexibility to revise objectives
One way to make fiscal policy more flexible is to allow governments more discretion to change fiscal objectives and fiscal rules. Fiscal objectives that are set through political agreements typically offer considerable scope for the government to change the fiscal objectives as needs arise. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Norway are among the countries that have higher degrees of flexibility within their respective institutional frameworks to set and vary fiscal objectives. In contrast fiscal rules that are legislated can be more difficult to amend. Germany and Switzerland have fiscal rules in constitutional law. Such legislation requires broad cross-party agreement to make amendments.
Periodic evaluations of fiscal objectives and rules can help to maintain a stable fiscal policy framework while recognising that changes will be needed if there are major shifts in the political or economic context. The Netherlands and Sweden offer examples of countries with a clear process for revising fiscal objectives and rules linked to changes in government. In the Netherlands, fiscal objectives are set through the government’s coalition agreement (Box 1.2). In Sweden, the government is required to propose a target for net lending for general government which is reviewed every eight years at the end of every other electoral period. That allows any revisions to the fiscal rule to be applied within the year following the ordinary elections.
In the Netherlands, the budget policy framework is grounded in the principles of “trend-based fiscal policy” which allows revenues to fluctuate with the economic cycle while maintaining predictable medium-term spending plans. The government’s fiscal objectives are established in the coalition agreement and are operationalised through revenue framework and expenditure ceilings that will be maintained for the four-year parliamentary term. The coalition agreement also agrees the budgetary rules for making changes to expenditure ceilings for the next four annual budgetary cycles.
The discussion of new fiscal objectives and budgetary rules typically starts one year before the general elections. The Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (Centraal Planbureau, CPB) publishes an independent macroeconomic projection and budget baselines, covering the next four to five years, based on the assumption of unchanged policy. The projections inform a report on the fiscal space and budgetary rules for the upcoming cabinet term, which is prepared by the Advisory Group on Fiscal Policy (Studiegroep Begrotingsruimte, SBR) at the request from the government. The independent forecasts and advisory report are published to inform the election debate and provide important inputs into the new government’s coalition agreement.
Source: Ministry of Finance, the Netherlands.
1.3.2. Responsive fiscal objectives and rules
Governments can also build more flexibility for adapting fiscal policy into the design of fiscal objectives and fiscal rules. This allows changes to fiscal policy without revising the objective or rules. One common approach is to use structural or cyclical measures that factor in the underlying state of the economy. For example, a budget balance rule can be set as a proportion of GDP, but use potential rather than headline GDP. Similarly, the limits set by an expenditure rule can exclude automatic stabilisers such as unemployment benefits.
There is an ongoing debate over the benefits and limitations of using structural or cyclical measures in fiscal rules. A key benefit of using these measures in fiscal objectives is to support a policy of economic stabilisation. That means they allow the government to provide fiscal stimulus when economic output is falling; and they require the government to run tighter fiscal policy when the economy is expanding. On the other hand, structural and cyclical measures of the economy are not directly observable, which makes them difficult to estimate, forecast and communicate. Data revisions are common and can be large. This complicates fiscal management and makes it harder for the public to understand how the government is performing relative to its fiscal objectives.
Though this debate is not settled, survey data shows that governments in the OECD make significant use of structural and cyclical measures for setting fiscal objectives and rules (OECD, 2023[5]). Out of the 34 countries that set limits on the budget balance, 24 countries use a structural or cyclical measure that takes into account the economic cycle and estimates what the budget balance would be if the economy were operating at full potential.
1.3.3. Escape clauses in fiscal objectives and rules
Escape clauses provide temporary flexibility for fiscal rules under exceptional circumstances, such as natural disasters, economic recessions, or national security emergencies. These clauses help maintain stable fiscal rules while allowing governments to respond to unforeseen shocks. However, they are less relevant for governments that rely on fiscal objectives to guide fiscal policy. These governments have more discretion to change fiscal policy, but they will usually need to make the case for a change in approach to the legislature, markets and general public in order to show they are using this discretion responsibly.
In 2023, there were 29 OECD countries with legislated fiscal rules (OECD, 2023[5]). Of these countries, 23 reported the existence of escape clauses, while 6 did not (Figure 1.2). Germany’s debt brake, for example, allows deviations subject to parliamentary approval and a plan for corrective action. Sweden, in contrast, relies on the principle of parliamentary responsibility, which allows deviations from the net lending target provided there is political support to do so.
Number of OECD countries, 2023
Note: Data for Lithuania and Mexico are not available.
Source: OECD (2023), Senior Budget Officials Survey on Budget Frameworks, Question 2.1.
When fiscal objectives and rules are too complex, they can become difficult to monitor and enforce. Simple objectives and rules are easier for policymakers and the public to understand, which helps build trust in fiscal governance and increases the likelihood of compliance. This is not just important for individual objectives or rules, but also for the overall fiscal policy framework.
1.4.1. Simple objectives and rules are predictable and easily understood
Each country will have its own benchmark for what makes a fiscal objective or rule simple enough. However, where governments are looking to simplify their fiscal objectives, they should aim to use established measures, straightforward calculation methods, and transparent reporting mechanisms. Or as (Minarik, 2024[6]) argues:
In the broadest sense, a simple budget rule would be built upon concepts that the public readily understands. And it should have targets that do not change substantially from year to year, and are at least logically consistent over time.
Clear objectives and rules include fiscal variables such as the budget balance, debt-to-GDP ratio, or government spending. These targets are important for fiscal management, can be fixed over time and do not require complex adjustments or calculations. Simple fiscal objectives and rules would also avoid regular revisions and minimise the mechanisms that allow adjustment for economic cycles, one-off events, or other contingencies.
1.4.2. Clear and coherent frameworks
Significant economic shocks like the financial crises in 1997 and 2008 prompted many countries to adopt more objectives and rules and to integrate new flexibilities. The result is a more complex system of fiscal objectives and rules that may be harder to understand. Difficulties replacing existing rules when new ones are adopted and the choice by some countries to rely primarily on a rules-based approach to constrain spending decisions have also contributed to the proliferation of fiscal objectives and rules. For European Union Member States, national fiscal rules must also coexist with those mandated by EU Treaties. This complex mix of fiscal objectives and rules can make the overall fiscal framework harder to understand and may even reduce the credibility of some limits.
Where governments choose to employ multiple fiscal objectives or fiscal rules, they should ensure that the overall fiscal policy framework remains coherent and can be easily communicated and understood. There is no universal template to follow, but there is some evidence that a long-term debt anchor that is translated into more concrete limits for the budget balance or total government expenditure would be appropriate for most countries (Moretti, Keller and Majercak, 2023[7]). Sweden’s fiscal framework, for example, uses a debt rule and a budget balance rule that are operationalised in multi-year expenditure ceilings through the annual budget process. Switzerland has integrated similar elements in its debt brake (Box 1.3).
Switzerland’s “debt brake” is a balance budget rule established in the Federal Constitution. The rule aims to stabilise or reduce the level of government debt. It requires the government to balance the federal budget over the economic cycle, so that expenditure is limited to the level of the structural (cyclically adjusted) revenue.
The debt brake is operationalised as an expenditure limit for the budget, which specifies the maximum amount the Confederation may spend in a financial year. At the end of the year, the expenditure limit is recalculated with new economic assumptions and the annual financial statements to show whether actual expenditure was within the revised limits.
Differences between the revised expenditure limit and actual spending are recorded in the “compensation account”. If the compensation account is in surplus, this is used to reduce public debt. If actual expenditures exceed the ceiling, then the compensation account records a deficit and the government will need to reduce spending in future financial years to offset that deficit.
In exceptional circumstances, such as an economic shock or natural disaster, extraordinary spending may be allowed in excess of the limits set by the debt brake. This requires a qualified majority for both chambers of the Parliament and is recorded in an amortisation account that must be cleared within the next six financial years.
The debt brake has proved an effective and enduring part of the fiscal policy framework in Switzerland. It has supported a reduction in public debt since its introduction in 2003 while offering sufficient flexibility for the government to increase spending to respond to crises.
Source: Federal Financial Administration, Switzerland.
Governments must make themselves accountable for the fiscal objectives and rules that they set. They can do this by ensuring that fiscal rules are disclosed and adequately enforced. This is particularly important as governments approach the limits of what fiscal objectives and fiscal rules allow.
1.5.1. Disclosing fiscal objectives and rules
Governments have different ways to communicate fiscal objectives and rules:
As legislation or other headline government commitments: The legislation which establishes fiscal rules offers an opportunity for public scrutiny and debate. The same is true for a coalition agreement or other political document. However, this needs to be supplemented with more information about how limits will be calculated and applied. Switzerland has a government webpage dedicated to explaining its debt brake, including the rationale for the rule, how it works, whether it works and how it is currently being applied.
Through the budget statement and associated documents: This will usually involve a discussion of what the objectives and rules are and how the budget is delivering on those objectives. Norway’s budget statement includes a discussion of revenues drawn from its sovereign wealth fund and how this relates to the limit on withdrawals set by the government.
Through regular reporting and supplementary estimates: Updates on implementation of the government’s fiscal objectives and rules should be provided with updates of the fiscal forecasts and any significant revisions to the budget. For example, they can be communicated through a mid-term budget review or supplementary budget. Australia reinforces accountability for the government’s fiscal objectives through disclosure and regular reporting (Box 1.4).
In Australia, the Charter of Budgetary Honesty Act 1998 requires the government to set out its fiscal objectives through a Fiscal Strategy Statement as part of the annual budget process. The objectives guide overall fiscal policy which are translated into the MTBF (the Forward Estimates).
The Charter creates a framework for the conduct of fiscal policy based on principles rather than a numerical fiscal rule. The government must set fiscal objectives following the “Principles of Sound Fiscal Management” described in general terms in the Charter. The fiscal objectives comprise the medium-term fiscal strategy (the Economic and Fiscal Strategy) in the annual budget documents.
The fiscal framework also establishes regular reporting on the government’s fiscal policy. An economic and fiscal outlook accompanies the budget and is updated in a mid-year budget review. A final budget outcome report is published to report against those plans. These documents are complemented by pre-election fiscal reporting and costing of the party platforms, as well as an Intergenerational Report which assesses the long-term sustainability of existing policies.
Source: Department of Finance, Australia.
1.5.2. Strengthening enforcement
Governments can choose to design fiscal objectives and rules that are enforceable. Rules with precise limits, set using headline measures and complemented with clear escape clauses leave less room for interpretation, making it easier to determine compliance or non-compliance. Using objectives or rules that limit public expenditure can also help. Unlike the budget deficit or the level of public debt, public expenditures can be limited through annual appropriations and monitored using budget execution data.
However, a key challenge for any fiscal framework is how to deal with breaches. Without adequate recourse and correction mechanisms, regular breaches can result in public finances not achieving the intended fiscal objectives and rules. Survey data shows that OECD countries use a combination of harder and softer approaches to encourage compliance:
Harder enforcement mechanisms apply financial consequences to the budget. For example, 12 countries reported using automatic correction mechanisms and six countries had systems for automatic sanctions. This includes Switzerland’s debt brake and the United States debt limit as well as corrective measured that have been adopted from EU law into national fiscal rules of member states.
Softer enforcement mechanisms rely on political mechanisms. For example, many countries require the government to make a statement to parliament explaining breaches to the fiscal rules or objectives (12 countries); or to propose corrective action (12 countries). In New Zealand, temporary departure from the principles of fiscal responsibility is permitted, but the Minister of Finance must advise parliament of (i) the reasons for the departure from those principles; and (ii) the approach the Government intends to take to return to those principles; and (iii) the period of time that the Government expects to take to return to those principles.
Table 1.2 shows that 16 out of 36 OECD countries reported using more than one type of enforcement mechanism. A combination of hard and soft mechanisms is used in half of these countries. In nine countries, only hard enforcement mechanisms are used, while in six only soft mechanisms are reported. Denmark and Slovakia were the countries that reported using the widest range of mechanisms (OECD, 2023[5]).
In contrast, seven countries reported that they had no legal enforcement procedure should a government breach its fiscal objectives. However, within that group, four countries (including Canada, Czechia and Türkiye) indicated that governments have a proven record of political commitment and implementation of corrective measures. This highlights the importance of political institutions for creating a culture of compliance with fiscal objectives and rules.
Note: Data for Lithuania and Mexico are not available. Other includes an established practice for reporting variations that is not a formal requirement (Australia); semi-automatic sanctions (Austria); requirements to explain a departure from principles of fiscal responsibility, including reasons for the departure, how the government intends to return to those principles and the period of time that the government expects to take to return to those principles (New Zealand); a requirement in the fiscal policy framework to return spending return fiscal policy to the limits set in fiscal objectives (Norway); and legislative procedural hurdles if Congressional limits are breached (United States).
Source: OECD (2023), Senior Budget Officials Survey on Budget Frameworks, Question 4.
References
[4] Fall, F. et al. (2015), “Prudent debt targets and fiscal frameworks”, OECD Economic Policy Papers, No. 15, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5jrxtjmmt9f7-en.
[6] Minarik, J. (2024), Fiscal Risks, Fiscal Sustainability and Rethinking Fiscal Rules, https://one.oecd.org/document/GOV/SBO(2024)10/en/pdf.
[3] Moretti, D., A. Keller and B. Chevauchez (2019), “Budgeting in Greece”, OECD Journal on Budgeting, Vol. 2019/2, https://doi.org/10.1787/e80aaae8-en.
[7] Moretti, D., A. Keller and M. Majercak (2023), “Medium-term and top-down budgeting in OECD countries”, OECD Journal on Budgeting, https://doi.org/10.1787/39425570-en.
[1] OECD (2024), OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2024 Issue 1: An unfolding recovery.
[5] OECD (2023), “2023 OECD Senior Budget Officials Survey on Budget Frameworks”, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/public-finance-and-budgets-database.html (accessed on 4 August 2025).
[2] Schick, A. (2003), The Role of Fiscal Rules in Budgeting, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2003/12/oecd-journal-on-budgeting-volume-3-issue-3_g1gh31d8/budget-v3-3-en.pdf.