This chapter examines Ukraine’s evolving approach to strategic planning in the context of war and recovery and offers targeted policy recommendations to support a more coherent and forward-looking planning system. Building on Ukraine’s demonstrated institutional resilience, the chapter assesses the current state of planning and identifies key governance gaps that hinder the country’s ability to prioritise and deliver on urgent recovery and reform goals. It outlines four interdependent priorities to reinforce Ukraine’s planning system: clarifying institutional roles and leadership, defining a hierarchy of development priorities, improving the quality and alignment of strategies, and strengthening performance monitoring and accountability. Drawing on international recovery experiences and international good practices, the chapter provides guidance for building a planning architecture that is nationally owned, strategically sequenced, and fit for both post-war recovery and long-term development.
Public Governance Review of Ukraine
Abstract
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has inflicted devastating human, social and economic consequences on the country, while placing extraordinary demands on its government. Despite these unprecedented pressures, Ukraine’s government has demonstrated resilience by preserving institutional continuity and maintaining essential governance functions. However, the complexity of the recovery ahead, coupled with Ukraine’s aspiration to join the European Union, requires a more structured, strategic, and unified approach to planning across the public sector. Planning during wartime, for recovery, and for the longer-term must ensure that government priorities are clear, resources are used effectively, and societal needs are met in a coherent and transparent manner. Strategic planning is not just an administrative exercise; it is a vehicle for rebuilding the country’s future.
Ukraine must navigate a triple challenge: rebuilding essential infrastructure and services as part of its reconstruction efforts, advancing reform progress in line with EU integration, and maintaining macroeconomic stability and social cohesion in the context of fiscal constraints and wartime volatility. To meet these challenges, the recovery process must be not only fast but also forward-looking, nationally owned, and strategically sequenced. However, persistent fragmentation in planning roles, limited capacities across ministries, and the proliferation of development partner initiatives have revealed some structural weaknesses in Ukraine’s current planning approach. These gaps risk undermining coherence and reducing the government’s ability to implement its most urgent priorities.
In the context of war and limited resources, Ukraine’s current approach to strategic planning remains more a collection of parallel documents and activities than a cohesive system. While important formal procedures have been introduced in recent years, notably the Government Priority Action Plan (GPAP), which has helped translate political priorities into operational directions even during wartime, these efforts are not yet consistently applied, lack legal hierarchy, and are not guided by a unified vision. Institutional responsibilities for planning are fragmented, and many planning instruments continue to operate in silos, disconnected from budgeting processes or performance frameworks. This chapter does not assess Ukraine’s planning system as fully developed but instead seeks to support the emergence of one: a more integrated and coherent planning architecture capable of guiding recovery and reform.
If well-organised, strategic planning can serve as a roadmap for national recovery, turning vision into action, rebuilding trust, and enabling Ukraine to move from survival to sustainable renewal. Drawing lessons from international recovery experiences, such as Japan’s long-term governance response to the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake (see Box 2.1), can help Ukraine develop the governance structures and strategic clarity needed to steer a coherent and forward-looking recovery that serves all Ukrainians. Japan’s experience highlights the importance of institutional co-ordination, planning across multiple phases of recovery, and sustaining political commitment, challenges also faced by Ukraine. This means ensuring coherence across planning documents, linking plans with budgets and public investment pipelines, and integrating performance monitoring systems that focus on outcomes rather than processes in a war context and in a recovery context.
To that end, this chapter identifies three interdependent priorities to reinforce the strategic planning system and drive the reform and recovery process:
Further formalising and clarifying roles and responsibilities on strategic planning by identifying and empowering a leading institution steering planning efforts as part of a complex and polycentric national planning system, to replace the current fragmented approach and bring greater coherence to planning responsibilities across government. This is even more important in a recovery and reconstruction context to ensure all efforts are mobilised and aligned towards common objectives and use of resources.
Establishing a coherent and prioritised planning architecture by defining a clear hierarchy of planning documents and priorities across governance levels and timeframes. This includes embedding quality assurance and review mechanisms, ensuring alignment with national budgets and capacity realities, and strengthening cross-sectoral co-ordination at early stages of planning.
Strengthening performance management and monitoring systems to reinforce accountability for results and support real-time adjustments based on implementation progress.
By focusing on these three foundational and interlinked elements, Ukraine can build a strategic planning system that is not only fit for post-war recovery, but also aligned with EU accession requirements and capable of supporting long-term development for its citizens and businesses, as post-war economic recovery will be one of the fundamental drivers for overall future of Ukraine (OECD, 2025[1]).
To operationalise these three priorities, this planning chapter is structured around a detailed assessment of Ukraine’s existing strategic planning landscape. Followed by an assessment of key enablers and obstacles, including institutional leadership and co-ordination, the quality and alignment of planning processes, and the role of public participation and multi-level governance. Next it outlines ways to institutionalise more robust performance monitoring and evaluation mechanisms across government. Each section concludes with targeted recommendations to support Ukraine’s recovery objectives through a more strategic, co-ordinated, and outcome-driven planning approach. The chapter concludes with a consolidated set of recommendations to strengthen the overall strategic planning system. These recommendations support a future-oriented planning model that is institutionally anchored, prioritised, and performance-based.
Current fragmentation and challenges
Ukraine has taken initial steps toward strengthening its strategic planning approach since 2018, with several institutional and procedural improvements gradually helping to increase co-ordination and structure in government planning. The introduction of the Government Priority Action Plan (GPAP) as an annual implementation tool, the refinement of the Cabinet of Ministers’ Rules of Procedure (RoP), and the establishment of a medium-term framework for planning represent tangible progress. Notably, many of these procedures have remained operational despite the immense pressure of Russia’s full-scale invasion, underscoring the resilience and institutional maturity of Ukraine’s governance system. As the recent SIGMA monitoring report (OECD, 2024[2]) noted, sectoral strategies have gradually improved in quality, and legal frameworks for policy co-ordination and planning have been reinforced.
While Ukraine’s strategic planning efforts have made progress in recent years, significant challenges remain. The 2024 SIGMA assessment (OECD, 2024[2]) found that the overall quality of policy planning has improved since 2018, particularly due to enhanced regulatory frameworks for sector strategies (SIGMA Principle 3). Basic requirements for strategy preparation, including objectives and cost estimates, have been formalised and applied in practice, and reporting obligations have expanded to include sectoral strategies and EU integration commitments (SIGMA Principles 3 and 5). However, the assessment also highlights that Ukraine lacks a formal hierarchy of planning documents and clear legal provisions defining their type, timeframe, and coherence mechanisms. As a result, the Rules of Procedure (notably Articles 57 and 87) remain the main regulatory basis for strategic planning, despite covering only limited elements such as GPAP preparation and strategy submission. One of the core issues is thus the absence of a unified legal and procedural framework that defines the hierarchy of planning documents, delineates institutional roles, and establishes co-ordination mechanisms to steer the system. This fragmentation continues to hinder the effectiveness of Ukraine’s strategic planning approach, particularly under conditions of war and recovery, where coherence, prioritisation, and alignment with EU integration processes (Principle 4) are essential. This reflects the importance of strategic coherence and institutional clarity outlined in the SIGMA Principles of Public Administration (OECD, 2023[3]) and in the OECD Policy Framework on Sound Public Governance (OECD, 2020[4]), which highlight the need for integrated planning and co-ordination across the public administration to support resilient governance systems.
While a comprehensive planning law has been discussed in Ukraine since early 2000s, with a draft circulated by the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture since early 2024, there is no consensus on the immediate necessity across institutions. In August 2025, the Government approved the Concept of the National Strategic Planning System (Cabinet of Ministers’ Order No. 853), which outlines a pathway for building the system through the adoption of a law on strategic planning. According to information provided by the Ministry of Economy, a questionnaire survey among members of a dedicated Working Group (composed of representatives of the Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Development, Ministry of Defence, and the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers) found that 65% of respondents consider it necessary to legally establish the system and hierarchy of strategic planning documents at the national level, and 71% consider it necessary to legally embed the principle of cascading higher-level national objectives (defined in the long-term development strategy) into other strategic documents. Stakeholders consulted in the fact-finding phase of this Review nevertheless emphasise that decrees, rules of procedure, and specific regulations may be more appropriate to strengthen and codify the existing system before embedding it in law. This approach aligns with the OECD findings that legal frameworks should evolve based on tested practice rather than be put in place prematurely. Few OECD member countries have a law on strategic planning in place, and most rely on well-established institutions, roles and procedures embedded in manuals, guidelines and decrees.
In contexts with limited capacity and dynamic reform needs, governments can benefit from more flexible instruments such as decrees and procedural guidance that enable adaptation while institutional roles are clarified, and performance mechanisms are strengthened. These instruments can provide much-needed structure while allowing for adaptability, particularly given the shifting priorities linked to recovery, EU integration, and long-term development. This approach would not prevent Ukraine from doing inventory of the existing laws and regulations and cutting down historic baggage that has proven to be non-working. At the same time, the Government has committed, through the Concept of the National Strategic Planning System (adopted by CMU Order No. 853 of 13 August 2025), to codifying roles and responsibilities in a new framework law. While this is a welcome development, the Concept is framed primarily around socio-economic planning, and it will be important to ensure that cross-cutting national priorities such as security, green transition, and EU accession are fully integrated. According to the Ministry of Economy, only legislation can provide the necessary legal basis for clarifying institutional mandates, in line with the Constitution of Ukraine.
The fragmentation of Ukraine’s strategic planning system is compounded by blurred mandates and overlapping responsibilities among key actors, including the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (SCMU), the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture (MoECO), and other line ministries. Each contributes to planning in different ways, and since 2021 the SCMU has been vested with co-ordination powers under the CMU Rules of Procedure. In particular, the SCMU ensures methodological support for the preparation of government programme documents and monitors their implementation (§60), and during expert review verifies draft acts for consistency with programme goals, checks for overlaps, and assesses the realism of objectives and indicators (§52). The 2021 amendments to the Rules of Procedure have contributed to improvements in strategy quality by standardising requirements and enabling SCMU to provide structured methodological support, including consultations and recommendations, to central executive bodies during the drafting process. Nevertheless, the proliferation of unco-ordinated planning documents persists, and a clearer delineation of roles across institutions remains needed to support coherence and delivery.
Stakeholders consulted during the fact-finding phase of the Review and responses to the OECD questionnaire indicate that the current institutional arrangements lack clarity. For instance, roles in approving and co-ordinating strategies are inconsistently assigned, with overlaps observed between SCMU and the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture. This is particularly evident in the implementation phase, where neither institution holds a definitive mandate for ensuring cross-ministerial delivery. At the same time, there are cases where mandates are already more clearly defined: for example, under the Ukraine Facility Plan, the Ministry of Economy serves as National Co-ordinator with powers set out in law and secondary legislation. This illustrates both the importance and the limits of current arrangements: some functions are regulated, while others remain fragmented. While the Concept of the National Strategic Planning System sets out to define these institutional roles through law, practical arrangements for whole-of-government co-ordination will remain essential. Ensuring that these roles are defined from a whole-of-government perspective, and not only within the socio-economic domain, will be essential.
Given this complex institutional configuration, it is essential to clarify roles and responsibilities across government to reduce duplication and ensure coherence. The overview below outlines the main bodies currently engaged in strategic planning and recovery governance:
Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (SCMU): The main centre-of-government body supporting daily Cabinet operations and responsible for preparing the Government Programme, the Government Priority Action Plan, and the medium-term action plan. Since 2021, SCMU has also been vested with co-ordination functions under the CMU Rules of Procedure, including methodological support and expert review of draft acts. These provisions give it a formal role in supporting strategic planning. While these provisions have contributed to improvements in planning quality through standardised requirements and structured methodological support, fragmentation of planning documents persists, and SCMU's mandate to act as the whole-of-government co-ordinator is not yet fully consolidated.
Reforms Delivery Office (RDO) within the SCMU: An externally funded unit supporting the implementation of priority reforms and co-ordination with donors. The RDO acts as the Secretariat of the Ukraine Donor Platform and is valued for its ability to get the Prime Minister’s attention, though it is not a delivery unit in the classical sense as its functioning is a lot broader.
Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture (MoECO): Responsible for economic, agricultural, and environmental policy, MoECO plays an important role in strategic planning within its areas of competence. In recent years, it has co-ordinated several significant planning processes, including contributing to the preparation of the National Economic Strategy until 2030 (adopted in 2021) and serving as National Co-ordinator for Ukraine's Plan under the Ukraine Facility. Both processes were conducted with the participation of civil society and multiple government stakeholders. MoECO's portfolio was further expanded to agriculture and environment in July 2025.
Ministry of Finance (MoF): Leads fiscal planning and manages public resources. MoF has a critical role in aligning strategic priorities with the state budget, but is often involved too late in planning processes, reducing its impact on feasibility assessments.
Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories (MDCT): Co-ordinates regional and territorial recovery, oversees state policy on infrastructure, and serves as the main liaison with local governments. It plays a lead role in vertical planning and the design of recovery frameworks. However, its role in strategic planning co-ordination with the centre of government, including the SCMU, remains insufficiently defined.
State Agency for Restoration and Infrastructure Development (SARDI): A specialised agency under the Ministry for Development that implements large-scale infrastructure projects and supports local recovery based on regional and municipal needs.
As highlighted in the OECD’s compendium Steering from the Centre of Government in Times of Complexity (OECD, 2024[5]), effective strategic planning requires clear mandates, institutional leadership, and strong co-ordination capacity. In Ukraine, the absence of an empowered central planning authority has resulted in gaps, duplication, and diluted accountability. Strengthening the mandate of a single lead institution is essential. The SCMU is well positioned for this role: it already manages the GP and GPAP, issues planning guidance, and has consolidated its leadership during wartime. Formalising its role as the steering institution would enhance coherence across central and local levels and streamline co-ordination with development partners. Other core institutions would retain important supporting functions. For example, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) typically reviews costings; the Ministry of Justice (or a dedicated entity in the CoG) ensures legal conformity; and the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture (MoECO) reviews alignment with economic and environmental priorities (OECD, 2017[6]). Clarifying these complementary roles would reinforce collective accountability while empowering SCMU to drive whole-of-government planning.
Another major challenge facing Ukraine is the lack of a system-wide quality assurance and control mechanism. In the absence of clear standards, ministries sometimes initiate new strategies that duplicate existing efforts or pursue goals that are not aligned with national objectives or available resources. The proliferation of strategic documents, some initiated under donor pressure or linked to project cycles, makes it difficult to steer and prioritise reform implementation. While there is no single regulation-based quality control process for strategies, the SCMU has established a practice of methodological support and review. Some draft strategies are reviewed during development, while others are assessed after submission to government, with recommendations provided and ministries sometimes asked to resubmit revised drafts. However, this approach is not yet consistently applied across all strategies and lacks a formal basis in regulation.
Moreover, public and stakeholder engagement in strategic planning remains limited. While the legal framework includes mechanisms for consultation, notably the 2010 resolution on public participation and the newly adopted Law on Public Consultations, these are not consistently applied in practice. Civic engagement in recovery planning, in particular, remains constrained by capacity gaps and competing priorities, and engagement mechanisms such as DREAM or public consultations around local recovery plans are still relatively nascent.
The above discussed challenges point not to a lack of effort, but to the need for a more consolidated and future-proof approach to strategic planning, one that can evolve from today’s practices into a genuinely systemic architecture for recovery and reform. In August 2025, the Government approved the Concept of the National Strategic Planning System and the Action Plan for its implementation (CMU Order No. 853), which foresees comprehensive legislative reform through a new framework law. The law is expected to introduce institutional innovations, including clarification of the tasks and powers of the ministry or a potential “centre of government” body in co-ordinating strategic planning, and defining the roles of other participants in the system.
To strengthen Ukraine’s planning framework, several steps are essential. First, the SCMU could be formally designated as the lead institution for strategic planning, with a clear mandate to co-ordinate horizontally across ministries. Its role in vertical co-ordination with regional and local levels should also be clarified in relation to the responsibilities of the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories. Strengthening the SCMU’s capacity in cross-government planning would also be needed to support this co-ordination mandate. Second, quality assurance and review processes should be institutionalised within the SCMU’s planning oversight function, ensuring all strategic documents are coherent, feasible, and aligned with national priorities. This would also require strong political backing from the Prime Minister to prevent circumvention of the SCMU’s co-ordination role through ad hoc or informal decision-making. Third, MoECO’s role could focus on its core policy mandates (economy, agriculture, environment), while contributing to the system through economic and environmental expertise in its own strategic documents and in reviews of submissions to the Cabinet of Ministers. Finally, efforts to expand public engagement and transparency in planning processes must continue, especially in the context of Ukraine’s broader democratic and EU accession goals. The following sections of this chapter examine each of these elements in greater detail, offering practical recommendations to strengthen co-ordination, clarify institutional roles, and improve the quality of strategic planning in Ukraine.
International experience also highlights the value of clear institutional mandates and phased, long-term planning in post-crisis contexts. Japan’s response to the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake provides useful lessons on how to structure recovery governance, co-ordinate across levels of government, and build a shared national vision (see Box 2.1).
As a significant multilocation disaster in recent Japan’s history, the Great East Japan Earthquake necessitated comprehensive multi-level reconstruction governance, serving as an exemplary model for governmental arrangements for an effective recovery and reconstruction.
Japan’s reconstruction, lasting over 10 years, consisted of different stages with various government mechanisms in place. First, as an immediate response, the government established an emergency disaster control headquarters and an independent reconstruction design council (RDC). The RDC, consisting of highly respected intellectuals, academics, religious figures and elected officials, was tasked to adapt the existing recovery strategy. Within two months, the RDC proposed a consultative vision for the reconstruction that served as a basis for the government’s Basic Guidelines and Basic Act for Reconstruction. The Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction set specific principles and policies for nationwide reconstruction, including putting people at the centre, making municipalities the main actors accountable for reconstruction while being supported by financial and technical support from central and regional levels. This highlights how Japan leveraged early national consultation for setting the nationwide recovery and reconstruction. Within this stage, the first supplementary budget for recovery was also adopted.
Second, based on the timely provided national guidelines, earthquake-afflicted prefectures and municipalities formulated their respective recovery plans. The development process included task force meetings with experts, residents and community representatives. Importantly, these plans initially were not intended to be comprehensive, their goal rather was to reach consensus among residents on the recovery vision. The regional and local level plans evolved as their entered consultations with ministries and elected officials. Recognising the strained capacity of municipalities due to population loss, the central government allocated two private sector consultants per municipality to deliver technical services in relation to damage assessment and engineering analysis. Furthermore, the national government provided supplementary budget resources to prefectures for reconstruction efforts.
The third and the longest stage consisted of establishing a reconstruction agency and special zones for reconstruction and providing flexible grants and policies to support municipalities. Similar as Ukraine, Japan created a national reconstruction agency for 10 years. The agency was headed by the prime minister and ensured co-ordination, control and supervision of nationwide reconstruction efforts (see Figure 1). The agency served as a “one-stop-shop” for local authorities and had three regional branches in the most-affected prefectures. The established special zones for reconstruction allowed the most affected municipalities to benefit from special arrangements, such as tax incentives, new systems for land use, deregulation policies and facilitated procedures for housing, industry and services.
Japan’s experience offers several crucial lessons for government arrangements that could also be beneficial for Ukraine, notably:
An early on, shared vision for recovery and reconstruction that recognises local characteristics and is perceived legitimate by key stakeholders and citizens can reduce the risk of a proliferation of strategies, external plans and
The Reconstruction Agency as a standalone entity has enjoyed the highest political ownership in Japan, ensuring a cross-cutting government approach to recovery and reconstruction.
Municipalities and prefectures remained accountable for their own reconstruction efforts while the national government provided them with guidance through general principles, technical support and policies such as the special zone for reconstruction.
Citizens and experts were consulted throughout all reconstruction stages by different levels of governments, putting people at the centre of reconstruction.
Throughout the recovery and reconstruction process, the needs and requirements by municipalities, regions and citizens were changing, implying the necessity for government arrangements and policies to be flexible and adjust accordingly.
Current fragmentation and challenges in recovery planning
Recovery governance in Ukraine is fragmented. The SCMU, MoECO, and MDCT all play roles in developing plans, but no single institution is formally designated to lead recovery planning and co-ordinate delivery.
In order to strengthen recovery planning Ukraine could:
Clarify institutional leadership by designating SCMU as the lead entity for recovery planning, with formal authority to co-ordinate inter-ministerial input and donor alignment.
Define supporting roles for MoECO, MDCT, and the Recovery Agency focused on implementation and sector-specific recovery domains (e.g. infrastructure, regional development).
Use existing instruments (e.g. Government Committees, RoP) rather than developing an expansive legal framework before the system is consolidated in practice.
Strengthening co-ordination and accountability
Despite progress in establishing co-ordination mechanisms, Ukraine’s strategic planning remains fragmented. The SIGMA Monitoring Report (OECD, 2024[2]) highlights that co-ordination in sector strategy development is still insufficient, while the OECD Policy Framework (OECD, 2020[4]) underscores the need for institutionalised, whole-of-government mechanisms. Without clear frameworks and prioritisation, ministries risk duplicating efforts rather than advancing implementation.
The SCMU’s Directorate of Public Policy Co-ordination and Strategic Planning plays a central role in co-ordinating strategic planning. In line ministries, strategic planning units, referred to as expert groups, are designated as focal points for co-ordination with the SCMU. However, these units face serious capacity gaps, lacking staff, tools, and structured guidance. Many line ministries rely on informal networks due to the absence of clear procedures, and methodological support from SCMU remains limited. Lessons from OECD countries show that Centres of Government can address such gaps through guidance, feedback, and training (OECD, 2023[8]). Ukraine could draw on these practices to empower SCMU not only as a co-ordinator but as a centre of expertise and support for strategic planning across all levels of government. Key line Ministries can also play important roles of providing expertise in their own areas, such as regulations for the MoJ, costs for the Ministry of Finance, and economic policy for the MoECO.
Note: n=24; Respondents to the survey were asked: “What support does CoG provide to line ministries and other agencies to develop strategy documents, plans and instruments?”.
Source: (OECD, 2023[8])
While the SCMU and ministries rely on a range of co-ordination mechanisms, many remain informal or ad hoc such as messenger-based communication between state secretaries or occasional working groups. These informal tools have proven useful in times of crisis, yet they lack institutional sustainability and accountability. Strengthening formal interministerial co-ordination structures such as regular strategic planning councils, formal networks of ministerial focal points, and structured collaboration with the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy, Agriculture and Environment would enhance coherence and reduce policy fragmentation. This could build on the expert groups already present within SCMU and sectoral working groups, transforming them into more systematic instruments of whole-of-government co-ordination.
Consulted CoGs in OECD Member countries (OECD, 2023[9]) indicated that the most commonly used co-ordination tools are interdepartmental taskforces, expert groups, and advisory groups (see Figure 2.3). Effective co-ordination bodies often depend on strong leadership, the involvement of appropriate representatives, and a well-defined purpose. Inter-departmental co-ordination arrangements can serve different purposes and have different benefits, for instance:
They provide a forum for high-level political monitoring and decision-making and co-ordination across different ministries.
They can help to ensure that policies are aligned with/integrated into the government programme’s strategic priorities and objectives.
They can facilitate the development of cross-cutting policies that address complex, multidimensional issues that require input from multiple ministries.
Note: n=26. Respondents to the OECD survey were asked: “What enabling mechanisms does the CoG leverage to support co‑ordination and coherence?”.
Source: (OECD, 2023[9])
Many of the current co-ordination and hierarchy gaps in Ukraine’s planning system stem from the absence of a clear procedural and legal foundation. Although the Rules of Procedure (Government of Ukraine, 2012[10])(Article 24) stipulate that ministries should align their strategies with the overarching Government Programme, there is no structured mechanism or enforcement process to ensure this alignment. As confirmed in SCMU’s questionnaire responses, this leads to fragmented and inconsistent practices across ministries.
As a result, strategic planning documents are frequently developed in silos. Under the current CMU Rules of Procedure, ministries are not required to consult the SCMU in advance when preparing strategies, which limits opportunities for coherence and early co-ordination. Drafts may be submitted for Cabinet approval without meaningful engagement from other ministries or MoF, resulting in weak alignment between strategic priorities and budget allocations. Although the MoF formally reviews strategies before adoption, it is typically not involved early enough in the planning cycle to assess financial feasibility. Strengthening procedural tools and enabling earlier, structured engagement between SCMU, MoF, and line ministries is essential to support coherent, financially viable, whole-of-government planning (see also section 3.2 on linking planning with budgeting).
Ukraine has created inter-ministerial platforms such as the Strategic Investment Council and sectoral working groups, but these often lack the weight to drive implementation. Regular, structured co-ordination forums remain absent. OECD countries like Finland have established ministerial committees and thematic groups under CoG leadership to ensure policy coherence and strategic alignment (see Box 2.2).
Finland has established several co-ordination mechanisms to support strategy and decision-making supported by the CoG, particularly the Government Strategic Department. They bring together different line ministries and are usually shared by one or two lead ministries, depending on the topic. Finland has created:
Four permanent Ministerial Committees on Finance, Economic Policy, European Union (EU) Affairs and Foreign and Security Policy that play a key role in co ordinating government policies and revise key proposals before they are submitted to the weekly meetings of the Cabinet.
Thematic working groups focusing on a few government priorities (e.g., the Ministerial Working Group on Developing the Digital Transformation, the Data Economy and Public Administration) that help steer, monitor and implement those priorities. Working groups will be adjusted, cancelled or renewed depending on the evolving government priorities.
Functional working groups on research and foresight that inform and co-ordinate all government work on these functions.
Source: (OECD, 2024[5])
Despite the above discussed limitations, Ukraine’s institutional landscape offers a foundation that could be built upon. The SCMU and line ministries have established working-level planning units, called expert groups, that can serve as a co-ordination backbone, provided their roles and responsibilities are better formalised. Regular co-ordination meetings led by SCMU, supported by clear terms of reference and guidance tools, could improve alignment and strategic coherence.
Importantly, SCMU’s co-ordination role must also extend beyond the formulation of strategies to include performance management and accountability. Strategic planning in Ukraine is still too often an input-driven, document-heavy exercise. If the system is to shift toward results-based planning, the SCMU must be empowered to monitor the implementation of strategies, the GP and the GPAP in a systematic manner. This includes ensuring that line ministries define measurable policy objectives and track progress accordingly. The SIGMA monitoring report (OECD, 2024[2]) noted that less than half of Ukraine’s central government strategies include a full set of indicators, and monitoring is rarely embedded at the planning stage, weakening the accountability role of SCMU in implementation oversight. Recent efforts to define participants and roles in the planning system, including through the Concept, will need to be extended and linked to practical mechanisms for whole-of-government monitoring and accountability. Strengthening accountability mechanisms would not only increase the credibility of planning efforts but also help prioritise scarce resources and adjust actions based on performance.
To this end, SCMU could institutionalise regular inter-ministerial co-ordination meetings to discuss the design and implementation of strategic priorities. Its expert groups must be further capacitated to support line ministries, particularly in linking strategic objectives to performance indicators and fiscal planning. Formalising the roles of expert groups in ministries and enhancing their engagement with SCMU can improve both vertical and horizontal coherence. These steps are essential to transform strategic planning into a tool for integrated policy delivery, especially as Ukraine navigates the complexities of post-war recovery and EU accession.
Ukraine’s recovery planning remains fragmented, with overlapping mandates and informal co-ordination mechanisms. Multiple actors contribute, SCMU, MoECO, MDCT, MoF, but no single institution is formally empowered to lead. Recovery strategies are often disconnected from donor pipelines, and regional and monitoring feedback loops are weakly integrated.
In order to strengthen co-ordination and accountability for recovery planning, Ukraine could:
Mandate SCMU to formally lead recovery co-ordination, both across domestic institutions and in interface with international partners and donors, supported by strengthened institutional capacity.
Establish a dedicated inter-ministerial recovery task force, chaired by SCMU, and involving notably the MoECO, the MDCT and the MoF to align planning, implementation, and resource mobilisation efforts.
Create formal feedback loops between recovery implementation and planning, ensuring that insights from the DREAM system and other monitoring tools are used to adjust strategies and flag delivery risks.
Institutionalise public-facing reporting mechanisms on recovery progress, drawing on models like France’s DITP, to promote transparency and citizen accountability.
Defining a hierarchy of planning documents
A clear and operational hierarchy of planning documents is essential to align long-term vision, medium-term priorities, and short-term actions. The OECD’s work on Centre of Government and strategic planning (OECD, 2024[5]) and the OECD SIGMA Principles of Public Administration (OECD, 2023[3]), highlight the need to cascade objectives across levels and timeframes and to ensure mutual reinforcement between national, sectoral, and regional strategies. While a planning law could help formalise such a hierarchy, several OECD countries have taken a more flexible approach using decrees and regulations. In Ukraine, the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture has drafted such a law, which could provide a formal anchor for the planning system if internal consensus is reached. Romania’s experience illustrates how executive regulations can bring coherence and hierarchy without requiring legislation (see Box 2.3).
In recent efforts to refine its strategic planning framework, Romania has implemented Government Decisions (GD) 379/2022 and 427/2022 to bring clarity and structure to its governmental strategies. At the core of these enhancements is the establishment of a well-defined hierarchy within the strategic planning landscape, as outlined in GD 427/2022. This effectively lays out the hierarchy of Romanian government strategies, differentiating between sectoral (focusing on specific domains) and intersectoral (addressing cross-cutting issues) approaches. This ensures all strategies align with national priorities outlined in overarching documents like the Government Program, promoting coherence and avoiding duplication of efforts.
Both decisions underscore the importance of aligning various strategies to achieve overarching goals. GD 427/2022 assigns to the General Secretariat of the Government (GSG) the crucial role of verifying proposed strategies against national priorities. GD 379/2022 further reinforces this by advocating for complementarity and integrated approaches across strategies. This emphasis on alignment helps ensure efficient resource allocation in order to maximise the impact of its strategic planning efforts.
Specifically, GD 379/2022 also underscores the integration of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development into the Romanian strategic planning framework. This ensures that Romania's strategic initiatives not only serve national interests but also align with global sustainability goals, illustrating a forward-thinking and holistic approach to strategic planning.
Source: (OECD, 2023[11])
One of the key challenges facing Ukraine’s current strategic planning efforts is the absence of a well-defined and consistently applied hierarchy of planning documents. Currently, different plans such as the GPAP, sectoral strategies, regional development strategies, and recovery planning efforts operate in parallel with limited co-ordination, leading to overlaps, inconsistencies, and missed opportunities for synergy. In particular, while the GPAP preparation process includes requirements for ministries to incorporate commitments from the Reform Matrix and EU integration documents, stakeholders consulted in the framework of this Review noted that systematic cross-referencing and harmonised monitoring across the GPAP, the Reform Matrix, and the National Action Plan for the Implementation of the Association Agreement (NAPIAA) remains limited in practice, illustrating the systemic gaps that still exist.
Ukraine has taken significant steps to strengthen EU integration planning through the establishment of a new co-ordination architecture for accession, including the Interagency Working Group and 36 dedicated negotiation groups created under Cabinet Resolution No. 987 (August 2024), and the development of a new National Programme for the Adaptation of Ukrainian Legislation (NPAA) which was approved on April 1st 2026, and led by the Deputy-Prime-Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration and the Government Office on Coordination of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. Monitoring is supported through the “Accession Pulse” digital system managed by GOCEEI. While these developments mark important progress, stakeholders consulted in the framework of this Review noted that the GPAP, NAPIAA, and Reform Matrix still operate in parallel, without systematic cross-referencing or harmonised monitoring frameworks. This results in overlapping timelines and fragmented priorities. While responses to the OECD questionnaire indicate that a number of ministries tend to approach the GPAP primarily as an annual reporting obligation, the SCMU considers it the government's core short-term planning instrument, designed to translate policy priorities into operational tasks for the year ahead. Bridging this gap in perception will be important for the GPAP's long-term value in supporting policy coherence, particularly as EU integration becomes an overarching priority. Its role in the planning system could be strengthened further by better linking it to longer-term strategic objectives and by clarifying its place in a formal planning hierarchy.
This fragmentation is especially problematic in a context where priorities are urgent, and resources are limited. The war has further complicated efforts to develop a coherent planning framework. For example, the National Economic Strategy 2030, approved in 2021, contains elements that may no longer fully reflect Ukraine’s current context. Consulted stakeholders provided diverging views on its status: while some noted that a review process is under way, others were unaware of any formal revision. At the same time, new strategies often emerge in response to donor requirements or sector-specific crises. As a result, the planning system risks becoming reactive rather than steering policy in a proactive and integrated manner.
Consulted stakeholders noted the importance of agreeing on the hierarchy of planning documents as a prerequisite for improving alignment and delivery. Whether this is done through a dedicated law or formal guidance, the key is achieving a shared understanding across institutions of how long-, medium-, and short-term planning instruments relate to each other, and which document should sit at the top of the hierarchy.
Although the recent SIGMA assessment of Ukraine (OECD, 2024[2]) recognises improvements since 2018, including the introduction of formal requirements for sector strategies and multi-year programming, strategic documents are still often developed without clear vertical integration or performance frameworks. There is no unifying strategic vision that links national priorities to local plans in a way that guides both top-down steering and bottom-up responsiveness. While regional and community strategies are increasingly aligned with the State Strategy for Regional Development, their consistency with national-level plans such as the GPAP and other horizontal priorities remains weak.
A clearer hierarchy of strategic documents is needed, not only to clarify roles and priorities, but to enable effective recovery and strategic co-ordination across government. The Government Programme should serve as the core medium-term policy document, reflecting the Government’s political priorities over its mandate. The GPAP, in turn, is an annual implementation plan, translating selected priorities of the Government Programme into short-term actions. A long-term document providing a vision for Ukraine could also be developed in the future as the main driver and reference for all reforms, for instance a Ukraine 2050 vision that could gather all forces and priorities around long-term objectives. These should be further operationalised through sectoral and regional strategies, which must be explicitly required to cascade from the national level and refer to both the GPAP and broader policy frameworks such as the budget and EU accession commitments. Current practices, where sector strategies are developed in isolation and approved without strong co-ordination or fiscal scrutiny, must be revised. The 2024 SIGMA assessment (OECD, 2024[2]) confirms that Ukraine’s Rules of Procedure do not require sectoral strategies to explicitly align with the GPAP or with multi-year fiscal frameworks, further compounding fragmentation risks.
A top-level strategic planning framework building on the Government Programme and aligned with recovery and EU integration goals could serve as the anchor document, with the GPAP functioning as its annual operational arm. This framework should be co-ordinated by the SCMU and structured through government resolutions and clear operational procedures, in co-ordination with other key institutions such as the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture and the Ministry of Finance, rather than through a revival of older planning models such as the National Economic Strategy, which lacked integration and whole-of-government ownership. Equally, its role must be recognised not only as a co-ordination tool but also as an accountability instrument, with a robust performance management system to track progress across different government levels. Latvia’s approach to strategic planning offers useful lessons for Ukraine in building a unified medium-term framework that balances national priorities, budgeting constraints and stakeholder involvement.
In 2020, the Latvian government and parliament approved the National Development Plan 2021-2027. The plan defines the strategic goals, priorities, measures and indicative investment needs for seven years to achieve sustainable and balanced development. The NDP2027 sets 4 strategic goals for 2027 in 6 priority areas and 18 directions for key policies.
The creation of the NDP2027 was centrally led by the Cross-Sectoral Co-ordination Centre (PKC), a CoG entity now integrated into the State Chancellery, with a mandate to develop a long-term strategic approach to public policy making. The unique position of the PKC made it possible to develop the NDP coherently and collaboratively in accordance with the Latvian Sustainable Development Strategy 2030 and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
In addition, the NDP incorporates engagement with citizens, experts and other stakeholders. Over 150 different stakeholders work in six working groups organised by the PKC under the prime minister’s authority. These activities helped the CoG gather insights from different groups, providing valuable input for the plans while building advocacy.
The plan outlines the long-term vision and how it translates into operational plans, including information on indicators, responsible authorities and funding.
Finally, the NDP2027 was created in line with the resources available in the country. Policy changes are supported by public investment from the national budget, European Union (EU) funds and other financial instruments. In this context, abrupt crises might change financial possibilities, as was the case with the COVID-19 pandemic and the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility response to it.
EU integration is becoming a key driver of Ukraine’s strategic planning architecture. The Ministry of Justice leads the preparation of the NPAA, supported by GOCEEI through the “Accession Pulse” system, while a national delegation and 36 thematic groups steer negotiations on the acquis. However, integration of EU planning into broader budgetary and strategic cycles remains limited. Closer co-ordination between the NPAA, GPAP, and national frameworks will be essential to leverage EU instruments like the Ukraine Facility and ensure coherence with domestic priorities. This will require close collaboration between SCMU, the Government Office on Coordination of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, the Ministry of Justice, GOCEEI, and the Ministry of Finance.
Despite recent progress such as the launch of the NPAA and the development of Ukraine Facility pipelines, Ukraine still lacks a unified framework that links immediate recovery needs with medium-term reconstruction and long-term development goals. Recovery efforts are spread across disconnected instruments: the GPAP, sectoral strategies, regional plans, and donor-driven programmes often operate without a shared sequencing logic or institutional architecture.
The GPAP includes a recovery pillar, but its annual scope limits its function as a strategic anchor. It is not systematically linked to regional plans or EU-aligned investment pipelines. Ministries and regions act with limited guidance on how their efforts fit into a broader recovery strategy, weakening prioritisation and budget alignment.
In order to strengthen coherence in recovery planning Ukraine could:
Develop a unified strategic recovery framework that clarifies the hierarchy of documents, from a long-term national vision to sectoral and regional action plans, and explains how these relate to the NPAA and Ukraine Facility.
Use the DREAM platform to monitor the flow and integration of recovery plans from local to national levels.
Ensure downstream reforms reinforce this hierarchy, including the consolidation of documents (see Addressing the proliferation of planning documents and their quality), improved vertical co-ordination (see Strengthen vertical co-ordination), and alignment with budgeting tools (see Linking planning to budgeting).
Addressing the proliferation of planning documents and their quality
Like many countries, Ukraine faces a proliferation of fragmented or overlapping strategic documents. Ministries often prepare strategies in silos, with limited co-ordination with the SCMU or other sectors. While some documents are well designed, others are narrow or donor-driven, lacking coherence with national priorities. Ukraine does not yet have a comprehensive, publicly accessible strategy registry. Although the SCMU tracks some adopted strategies internally and provides methodological support during drafting, this process is not fully formalised, applied consistently, and not used as a governance tool to streamline or reconcile documents. Lithuania’s experience illustrates how consolidating and registering strategic documents can help rationalise planning (see Box 2.5).
As a result, weak and redundant strategies persist in the system, and even well-conceived plans can be diluted by conflicting or unco-ordinated priorities. This creates inefficiencies not only in planning but also in budgeting, monitoring, and donor engagement. In some cases, strategies are developed primarily to meet international partner expectations, particularly in sectors receiving large volumes of technical assistance. These risks reinforcing the logic of form over function, where “having a strategy” is prioritised over “having the right strategy.”
To address this issue, Ukraine should establish a quality assurance function within the SCMU, with involvement from other key institutions. This function would assess draft strategies before Cabinet submission for their consistency, feasibility, and policy coherence. While the SCMU already reviews some drafts, this practice is not yet standardised or legally mandated. Formalising the process through a Cabinet resolution or amendment to the Rules of Procedure would align with SIGMA’s findings (OECD, 2024[2]), which noted that only a minority of draft strategies submitted to government are accompanied by feasibility assessments or reviewed against a formal checklist by SCMU.
In 2015, Lithuania had over 250 strategic documents and nearly 1,800 monitoring indicators, leading to duplication and weak policy focus. In response, the government adopted a new Law on Strategic Management in 2020, establishing a results-oriented planning system with a clear legal framework. This law defined the hierarchy and types of planning documents, their link with the budget process, and clarified institutional responsibilities. A new methodology supported its implementation, guiding how sectoral and regional plans align with overarching goals.
As a result, Lithuania developed a registry of strategic documents and reduced the number of strategic documents to around 30, integrating them into a cohesive structure from long-term vision (e.g. Lithuania 2050) to sectoral and regional development plans. This approach enabled more coherent planning, performance-based budgeting, and simplified co-ordination across government.
Source: (OECD, 2024[13])
In various OECD member countries, the Centre of Government also assumes a review function for documents submitted to the Cabinet. This includes verifying whether proposals align with government priorities, follow required procedures, and meet financial, legal, and consultation standards. According to the 2023 OECD CoG Survey, 66% of OECD governments identified this quality control function as a top or significant priority. In some countries, this function is shared with specialised bodies, such as Ministries of Finance or Justice, but the CoG retains overall responsibility for ensuring coherence and procedural rigour (OECD, 2023[8]). In Ukraine, the CMU Rules of Procedure already assign the SCMU a review function: it examines draft acts for compliance with the Government Programme, checks adherence to procedural requirements (including public consultation), verifies legal conformity, and prepares an expert opinion. This provides a basic foundation for quality assurance. However, current practice shows that reviews are not always systematic or sufficiently robust to ensure that strategies and policies are coherent, feasible, and aligned with national priorities. Formalising and strengthening this review role for SCMU could help improve the consistency and alignment of strategic documents submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers. While the SCMU would oversee this review process, other key players need to be involved in Ukraine to revise strategic and policy proposals from their perspectives. The MoF should review the costing associated with the proposal, as is also the case in OECD Member countries, the MoJ revise the legal conformity and impacts of the proposal, and the MoECO its economic soundness and alignment with economic objectives. Czechia has for instance defined clear rules of procedures that are implemented through an online platform called eKLEP to support robust review processes of proposals from multiple perspectives submitted to the Council of Ministers (OECD, 2023[14]).
Note: n=24; Respondents to the survey were asked: “When reviewing draft policy proposals, legislation, or other policy documents, which aspects does the CoG ensure?”
Source: (OECD, 2023[8])
In addition, SCMU could launch a full strategy audit and create a public strategy registry, building on digital tools such as the DREAM system. The Concept of the National Strategic Planning System (CMU Order No. 853 of 13 August 2025) foresees the audit of all existing strategic documents as part of the implementation of a new framework law, as well as the creation of an IT platform with expanded functionality. This platform is intended to include features such as a registry of strategies and integrated monitoring tools. Such a registry should include meta-data on each strategy’s status, coverage, action plan, financial linkage, and alignment with GPAP and recovery goals. If implemented effectively, this would not only serve as a transparency tool but also provide a basis for regular reviews and a strategic reconciliation process. Through this mechanism, overlapping, outdated, or narrowly defined strategies could be merged, retired, or updated to serve broader policy goals. Czechia has implemented such a registry of strategies at all levels through an online platform accessible to all (OECD, 2023[14]).
To prevent future fragmentation, the strategy development process should be restructured to ensure broader consultation and strategic coherence from the outset. Ministries should be required to conduct early-stage co-ordination with the SCMU, MoF, and other relevant ministries before drafting a strategy. The purpose of this step would be to clarify the strategic relevance of the proposed initiative, assess its alignment with higher-level national objectives, and ensure that financial, economic, and cross-sectoral implications are taken into account from the beginning. In practice, this would mean that SCMU could provide guidance on coherence with government priorities and existing strategies, the MoF could advise on fiscal feasibility, and other ministries could flag overlaps or interdependencies. This process could be guided by revised methodological guidelines and facilitated through newly formalised expert groups or strategy focal points. Moreover, public consultation should be embedded early in the process in line with the new Law on Public Consultations, not just as a final step.
As highlighted by consulted stakeholders in the framework of this review, sustained efforts are also needed to build capacity for better planning. Many ministry staff lack experience in designing strategies based on evidence, scenarios, and measurable objectives. SCMU’s ongoing work to develop updated methodological guidance is promising, but should be accompanied by training programmes, peer exchange opportunities, and access to technical assistance. These efforts should also include the dissemination of clear templates, checklists, and written guidance to standardise good practice across government. For strategies with a strong local component, institutional co-ordination with the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories (MDCT) should also be strengthened and clearly delineated. Over time, this should reduce reliance on donor-driven strategy preparation and empower national actors to develop policy documents that are both meaningful and implementable.
Finally, the significant human resource constraints facing Ukraine’s public administration exacerbated by the war, European integration demands, staff burnout, and demographic pressures, mean that strategic planning reforms must be pragmatic and targeted. Overly complex planning systems risk overwhelming limited institutional capacities and reducing implementation effectiveness. Simplification of planning documents, clearer prioritisation, and the reduction of duplicative processes are essential not only for coherence but also for sustaining the capacity of government institutions and staff.
Reducing the number of strategies while improving their quality is also not a question of centralisation versus decentralisation, but of coherence, efficiency, and impact. Ukraine’s recovery and long-term development depend not on having more strategies, but on having better ones. Fewer, clearer, and better aligned with the nation’s overarching goals and fiscal constraints.
Ukraine’s recovery planning continues to suffer from fragmentation. Many recovery strategies are developed in response to donor timelines or funding opportunities but lack alignment with national priorities or sectoral frameworks. Strategies are often narrowly scoped and unco-ordinated, undermining coherence and limiting impact.
A further challenge is the absence of a formal quality control process. Draft strategies are not consistently reviewed for feasibility, costing, or strategic alignment. Without action plans, performance criteria, or links to national frameworks like the GPAP, many recovery documents remain disconnected from implementation and budgeting.
In order to strengthen recovery planning Ukraine could:
Create a unified recovery strategy registry (building on the DREAM platform) to catalogue and assess the status, relevance, and alignment of all existing recovery plans.
Mandate pre-screening of all draft recovery strategies by the SCMU for coherence with the GPAP, sectoral objectives, and national recovery priorities before approval.
Launch a strategy reconciliation process to consolidate, merge, or retire outdated or duplicative recovery strategies—ensuring that the focus remains on scalable, high-impact initiatives.
Develop clear templates to guide ministries and regional actors in drafting recovery strategies, including required sections on objectives, actions, costs, and links to other plans.
Enhancing public participation and transparency in strategic planning
Well-planned and transparent strategic planning is a core principle of resilient, democratic governance, as outlined in the OECD Recommendation of the Council on Open Government (OECD/LEGAL/0438) (OECD, 2017[15]), and the OECD Declaration on Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy (OECD/LEGAL/0484) (OECD, 2022[16]). These principles are particularly relevant for Ukraine’s recovery and EU accession, where public confidence and legitimacy are essential. While legal provisions for public consultation exist, such as Resolution No. 996 (2010) and the new Law on Public Consultations, actual implementation remains limited, particularly given the ongoing war and competing priorities. In this context, broad-based public consultations are challenging to organise. Nevertheless, gradually strengthening structured engagement, especially in recovery and reconstruction planning, remains important to ensure legitimacy, local ownership, and trust.
Many strategies are developed with minimal structured engagement of civil society, businesses, or citizens, especially at local level, where awareness and capacity are limited. Consultations, where they occur, tend to happen late in the process and offer limited opportunity to shape priorities. Consulted stakeholders in the framework of this review noted that feedback is rarely analysed or reflected in final documents, and feedback loops are generally absent.
In the recovery context, this lack of engagement is particularly problematic. Reconstruction planning requires not only technical expertise and central co-ordination, but also local knowledge, legitimacy, and buy-in. Citizens, municipalities, and businesses are key actors in implementing recovery measures, and in many cases they will bear the social and financial costs of reconstruction. Their early involvement is thus critical to ensure the relevance, feasibility, and sustainability of recovery strategies.
Recent initiatives, such as the DREAM digital platform, offer promising avenues to increase transparency. The platform allows users to track recovery projects, access planning documents, and, in the future, could offer functionalities for citizen feedback and participatory monitoring. However, such tools must be accompanied by stronger procedures for structured dialogue.
To address these challenges, Ukraine should institutionalise public consultation as a formal requirement throughout the strategic planning process, not just at the final stages. This should apply at both national and local levels and be supported by clear timelines, accessible materials, and user-friendly platforms for engagement. The new Law on Public Consultations offers a legal basis to strengthen these practices and should be fully implemented in co-ordination with the broader planning reforms.
Moreover, the capacity of local authorities, CSOs, and representative associations needs to be strengthened. This includes training on how to design and moderate participatory processes, how to incorporate feedback into strategy development, and how to manage expectations in a complex, resource-constrained environment. The Ministry for Development, Territories and Infrastructure Development, in co-operation with donor programmes such as U-LEAD and GIZ, already supports some municipalities in this regard. These efforts should be expanded, with a particular focus on communities most affected by the war.
Finally, the role of businesses in strategic planning for recovery merits attention. The private sector will be instrumental in financing, implementing, and sustaining recovery efforts, particularly in infrastructure, housing, and energy. As noted in the OECD Economic Survey of Ukraine (OECD, 2025[1]), engaging businesses early in the planning process increases the likelihood that projects will be viable, bankable, and aligned with market realities. Mechanisms such as public-private advisory councils or regional recovery forums could be formalised to ensure that the voice of the business community is reflected in national and regional plans.
To attract private investment and ensure viable recovery projects, ministries should engage business representatives, especially SMEs, early in the planning cycle. This is particularly critical in sectors like infrastructure, energy, digital services, and the green transition. Government platforms like DREAM can support this engagement by providing real-time data and facilitating transparent consultations but must evolve beyond data repositories into interactive planning tools.
Enhancing public participation is not merely a procedural obligation but a substantive requirement for effective planning that works for all. As elaborated in the dedicated chapter 4 of this Review on “Citizen participation for a more resilient democracy for more effective policies in Ukraine”, participation must become a core feature of Ukraine’s recovery planning. That chapter outlines a vision for participatory governance that includes, among other proposals, the organisation of a Conference for Reconstruction bringing together citizens, civil society, experts, and government actors to jointly deliberate on Ukraine’s reconstruction priorities. Embedding these kinds of mechanisms in the strategic planning cycle will be key to building resilience, legitimacy, and public trust, foundations that are essential for both recovery and Ukraine’s EU accession process.
Recovery planning will only be effective and legitimate if it reflects the needs of citizens, civil society, and businesses. Yet stakeholder engagement in Ukraine’s recovery remains largely ad hoc or donor driven. Public consultations are not standardised, and recovery strategies rarely incorporate systematic input from affected communities or economic actors.
While the Law on Public Consultations and the DREAM platform offer new tools, their use in recovery planning remains limited. Businesses, despite their central role in financing and implementing reconstruction, are often engaged too late. The war understandably constrains participation, but recovery planning offers an opportunity to embed long-term practices of co-design and transparency.
To make recovery planning more participatory and accountable, Ukraine could:
Operationalise the new Law on Public Consultations by issuing clear implementation guidance for recovery-related consultations at both central and local levels.
Embed citizen feedback loops into DREAM’s modules, enabling real-time commenting and oversight of recovery projects.
Create advisory platforms for business and civil society, co-chaired by SCMU or MDCT, to consult on priorities in areas such as infrastructure, housing, and local services.
Support local governments in building consultation capacity, including through model templates, digital tools, and targeted capacity-building initiatives.
Increase transparency by publishing recovery plans, performance reports, and financial data in accessible and user-friendly formats.
Strengthen vertical co-ordination
Ukraine’s decentralisation reforms since 2014 laid important groundwork for regional development, but vertical co-ordination challenges persist. The OECD’s Review Rebuilding Ukraine by Reinforcing Regional and Municipal Governance (OECD, 2022[17]) noted that dormant co-ordination bodies, overlapping mandates, and limited municipal capacity continue to hinder strategic alignment. These issues have been amplified by the war, which has tested the resilience of frontline and host regions and blurred governance roles, particularly through the rise of military administrations and the dual accountability of regional governors to the President rather than the Cabinet of Ministers. “Host regions” refers to those areas, particularly in central and western Ukraine, that have received significant numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing conflict zones, placing substantial pressure on local infrastructure, services, and governance systems. Furthermore, local governments often lack strategic guidance and tools, complicating alignment with national planning.
Although regional strategies are legally required to align with the State Strategy for Regional Development (2021–2027), this is not consistently enforced. Mechanisms such as the review procedure under CMU Resolution No. 816 (2023) exist, but co-ordination with the MDCT and SCMU remains ad hoc. Recovery planning is further complicated by population displacement, infrastructure damage, and diverging regional priorities. A one-size-fits-all approach is no longer viable; subsidiarity and central support must go hand in hand.
To improve co-ordination, Ukraine could build on decentralisation reforms and digital tools by developing a national framework for regional recovery and development planning. Based on the Law “On the Principles of State Regional Policy” and the recommendations of the OECD’s Review: Rebuilding Ukraine by Reinforcing Regional and Municipal Governance (OECD, 2022[17]), such a framework could define minimum standards for regional strategies, clarify roles, and establish review procedures. Reactivating key bodies like the Inter-Departmental Co-ordination Commission for Regional Development would also help ensure regular dialogue and reduce fragmentation.
The DREAM system offers strong potential as a co-ordination and transparency tool. With over 5 800 local recovery projects already included, it could evolve into a full-fledged instrument to align local and national priorities, track project implementation, and support needs-based investment decisions. Consulted regional authorities in the framework of this Review noted that while DREAM is a promising tool for vertical alignment, its use remains uneven across oblasts and hromadas, and local governments often lack the training to use it for effective planning.
Building on these efforts, cascading national objectives into local planning processes is particularly critical for reconstruction and regional recovery. The Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories and the Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture, together with SCMU, have begun working on guidelines and data systems to support regional and municipal governments in aligning their strategies with national objectives (including through DREAM and SDG frameworks). These efforts need to be expanded and anchored within the strategic planning system itself, ensuring that local plans are not just compliant with national goals, but also allow for local priority setting and responsiveness.
To support this, SCMU could pilot a multi-level governance model (see Box 2.6) that explicitly integrates GPAP objectives into regional and local action plans. This model should define not only the hierarchy of documents but also the mechanisms for translating national priorities into actionable regional strategies. Such a model would allow for better alignment between recovery projects, regional investment pipelines, and central-level priorities. Moreover, it would help clarify roles between SCMU, the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories (MDCT), and regional actors, who are currently operating without clearly defined responsibilities for planning coherence. The leadership of such a model, and of the accompanying co-ordination mechanisms, could be shared with the MDCT given its role at regional and local levels.
To support vertical co-ordination on strategic planning and development, Poland established the Co-ordinating Committee for Development Policy as a permanent inter-ministerial committee with sub-committees linked to regional development issues (e.g., Sub-committee for Rural Areas Development, Sub-committee for Territorial Dimension). The committee carries out analysis and drafts documents to facilitate the implementation of the country’s Strategy for Responsible Development, which has a strong territorial dimension.
Besides strategic co-ordination, several mechanisms support vertical co-ordination, including support to capacity building, funding instruments and contractualization. Poland has developed “territorial contracts” between line Ministries and local governments, that aim to support the co-ordination of activities undertaken by the national and local government targeted at achieving common objectives and help redistribute state budget and fund activities to realise national objectives and co-fund investments.
Source: (OECD, 2021[18])
Attention should be paid to building a balance between central steering and local flexibility. Planning documents must leave space for bottom-up articulation of needs and adaptation to local circumstances, especially in regions affected differently by war. Ensuring alignment across levels while preserving the autonomy and creativity of regional actors will be key to the success of Ukraine’s long-term recovery and EU integration process.
Stronger intermediaries are also needed. Oblast administrations could play a more proactive role in aggregating local needs, cascading central guidance, and co-ordinating regional plans, while hromadas (local level entity similar to a municipality) would remain responsible for implementation. This approach would help Ukraine balance bottom-up recovery priorities with top-down strategic alignment, ensuring both responsiveness and coherence.
Effective recovery requires co-ordinated action across all levels of government. Yet municipalities, the frontline for reconstruction and service delivery, are often excluded from upstream planning and lack capacity to engage. Oblast administrations could serve as critical intermediaries but lack a formal mandate and tools to align local recovery plans with national strategies.
Many local recovery plans are developed in isolation, using inconsistent formats and with limited technical capacity. As a result, they are weakly connected to national priorities, fiscal frameworks, or donor pipelines, risking duplication, inefficiencies, and missed investment opportunities.
To enhance whole-of-government recovery co-ordination, Ukraine could:
Formally designate oblast administrations as co-ordination hubs, responsible for aggregating, quality-checking, and transmitting municipal recovery plans to central authorities.
Standardise formats for local recovery planning to ensure alignment with national strategies and fiscal frameworks (e.g. public investment priorities, GPAP).
Leverage the DREAM system as a vertical co-ordination tool, ensuring that data from local and regional levels feeds into national dashboards and progress monitoring.
Provide tailored technical assistance to local governments, in partnership with U-LEAD, GIZ, SURGe and others, to strengthen planning, costing, and monitoring capacities.
Encourage co-financing and cross-level collaboration, particularly for infrastructure, energy, housing, and social services.
Revive and strengthen the Government Committee on Recovery of Ukraine as a formal intergovernmental co-ordination platform, with clear procedures for associating the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers (SCMU), Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories (MDCT) and key regional stakeholders.
Revive and strengthen the Inter-Departmental Co-ordination Commission for Regional Development as a formal intergovernmental co-ordination platform, with clear procedures for associating the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers (SCMU), the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories and key regional stakeholders. Strengthening the role of this Commission could help ensure coherence across levels of government and support the implementation of the national recovery plan and State Regional Policy.
Performance monitoring
Strengthening performance monitoring is essential for Ukraine to ensure that strategic priorities translate into measurable results. OECD countries have increasingly recognised the importance of institutionalising performance frameworks that generate evidence on what works and support accountability. The OECD Recommendation on Policy Evaluation (OECD/LEGAL/0478) (OECD, 2022[19]) further encourages governments to embed evaluation mechanisms across the policy cycle and to promote systematic use of evidence in decision-making. Its accompanying Implementation Toolkit (OECD, 2024[20]) offers practical guidance for developing fit-for-purpose evaluation systems and improving strategic steering. These principles provide a useful reference point for Ukraine’s ongoing reforms, especially as it seeks to align national priorities with recovery needs and international standards.
As further indicated in the OECD’s Policy Framework on Sound Public Governance (OECD, 2020[4]), evidence is crucial for effective strategic planning. Performance information, particularly when collected systematically and used in structured performance dialogues, helps governments measure progress against policy targets and outcomes. It reveals whether actions are delivering intended results and enables mid-course corrections if implementation is off-track. Establishing effective feedback loops that integrate this evidence into decision-making is essential for adapting strategy and ensuring results. In the 2023 OECD CoG Survey, monitoring whole-of-government performance was identified as a clear priority by most Centres of Government.
Latvia’s approach (see Box 2.7) demonstrates how a centre of government body can play a proactive role in monitoring national development policies across planning cycles, offering a useful model for Ukraine as it seeks to strengthen continuity, oversight and results orientation in its recovery and strategic planning processes.
Note: n=26. Respondents to the OECD survey were asked: “How much of a priority are the following functions in the CoG? [Monitoring whole-of-government performance]”.
Source: (OECD, 2023[8])
Latvia aimed to create a flexible and measurable monitoring framework to connect policy planning with the country’s longer-term vision. The objective of the system is to monitor and maintain sector-specific priorities and budget alignment with national development priorities.
The state policy planning framework manages, adjusts and monitors the different levels of policy planning documents, changes in political actors (governments) and their priorities. It includes managing long-term development plans, the government’s medium- to short-term action plans and sector plans.
At defined periods, line ministries report to the CoG on the progress of the plans and explain the implementation of tasks that have not been sufficiently achieved. The existing system is flexible, as it provides continuity for national long-term development; meanwhile, if political actors change, it allows revision of adopted long-term development planning documents and offers new solutions.
Additionally, the Government Project Monitoring Office, an internal body in the Prime Minister’s Office, also serves an important monitoring function. This office monitors selected public policies and serves as an important source of information for the Latvian Central Council on its portfolio of specific strategic projects.
Source: (OECD, 2024[5])
Despite regulatory provisions, particularly in the Rules of Procedure of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, which stipulate that implementation reports should be produced, performance monitoring remains inconsistent and underdeveloped. A major challenge lies in the lack of a harmonised and fully institutionalised monitoring system. While several digital tools and data platforms exist, their use remains fragmented and unco-ordinated. These include the DREAM system for regional recovery project tracking, the Accession Pulse platform, managed by the Government Office for Co-ordination of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration (GOCEEI), for monitoring EU integration commitments, the e-Government platform for service delivery, and various ministerial dashboards and internal databases such as those supporting GPAP monitoring.
In addition, Ukraine maintains the Reform Matrix, a transparency and mapping tool that compiles international and EU-related reform commitments from multiple documents. While not a performance framework per se, the Reform Matrix offers an important reference point for aligning planning and monitoring instruments. However, ministries differ in their approach to data entry, indicator development, and progress tracking. This results in variable quality, lack of comparability, and unclear accountability lines. Moreover, ministries and local authorities are not always equipped with the analytical skills or guidance to formulate relevant performance indicators, assess policy effectiveness, or use results for decision-making.
As Ukraine advances in its EU accession process and public administration reform, greater interoperability, standardisation, and co-ordination across monitoring systems, particularly among SCMU, GOCEEI, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Finance, will be essential to ensure strategic alignment and transparency.
Recent efforts show some promise. The SCMU has developed a monitoring system to track not just tasks under the GPAP but also the sub-measures within each task, assigning responsibility to individual ministry staff and SCMU verifiers. This system also includes percentage indicators of task completion and offers visualisation tools for decision-makers. However, coverage remains incomplete, and the system has yet to become a fully integrated performance management tool used in day-to-day strategic governance.
Notably, the practice of convening quarterly and annual reviews with state secretaries and ministers to reflect on progress against targets is a positive step (see UK practice in Box 2.8). These performance dialogues help identify implementation bottlenecks and reallocate resources when necessary. The SCMU's practice of issuing detailed recommendations for the following year, based on an assessment of the current year’s delivery record, also contributes to institutional learning. A coherent, government-wide performance framework would help consolidate these emerging practices into a more systematic approach to strategic steering and public accountability.
To move forward, Ukraine could institutionalise performance reviews as a core component of its strategic planning process. This means requiring ministries to set clear policy objectives and KPIs at the planning stage, integrating monitoring frameworks directly into the strategy design. The recently adopted Concept of the National Strategic Planning System (CMU Order No. 853 of 13 August 2025) foresees the establishment of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, particularly for strategic planning documents in the sphere of socio-economic development. This is a positive development, though ensuring these provisions translate into a broader whole-of-government approach rather than remaining limited to the socio-economic domain will be crucial. A whole-of-government dashboard that tracks implementation, bottlenecks, and outcomes could help decision-makers, donors, and citizens assess progress in real time.
Lessons from OECD countries can guide this reform. The UK’s performance framework, where cross-government objectives are translated into concrete departmental plans with regular public updates, is one potential model (see Box 2.8). Another is France’s real-time performance pilot system developed by the DITP (see Box 2.9), which links governance, data, and citizen accountability through a national performance dashboard. This system not only tracks outcomes but is used to solve implementation problems and engage citizens with tangible results. For Ukraine, adapting such approaches will require consolidating efforts under a single, integrated framework, rather than multiplying parallel systems. Creating additional unlinked monitoring tools risks overburdening civil servants and undermining coherence, a problem that already affects the current landscape. Ensuring that monitoring reforms translate into streamlined, system-wide monitoring arrangements will be essential to shift the focus from activity-based reporting toward outcome-oriented accountability.
Monthly and six-monthly state of affairs presented to the Prime Minister
The UK introduced reporting routines at the heart of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU), which provides the rhythm for the unit’s work. There are two reporting routines to the Prime Minister: monthly delivery notes and six-monthly delivery reports.
The monthly delivery notes summarise progress for each of the Prime Minister’s priorities. They highlight the main issues encountered in a short and data driven fashion and describe what is planned. Where necessary, some notes can be even more frequent.
Six-monthly delivery reports are designed to be a comprehensive assessment of the state of play for all the Prime Minister’s priority areas in a given department. They are written by the Head of the PMDU for the Prime Minister and copied to the secretary of state and lead officials. Usually, the drafts are discussed with the lead officials first. Each priority’s delivery report is just one page and is intended to:
Report progress against trajectories for the priority.
Outline what success looked like for the priority over the next six months.
Determine the best path forward and identify key actions that needed to be taken.
Reveal areas of disagreement between the delivery unit and the lead department.
Act as a reference document against which to chart progress.
Next generation platforms for performance information as used in the United Kingdom
In 2019, the CoG in the United Kingdom started moving towards real-time performance tracking. Triggered by the preparation of Brexit and sped-up by the Covid-19 pandemic, the new internal delivery dashboard, called “Government Performance App” was extended to the top 200 and top 35 government priorities (Government Major Project Portfolio – GMPP). It provides an up-to-date situational picture and allows for early identification of performance risks.
The Government Performance App (GPA) is managed by the Cabinet Office and the HM Treasury and fed by the different departments leading the government priority projects. Consistently with standard operational procedures, at least each four weeks lead departments are requested to co-ordinate with “contributing” departments and agencies and regularly provide the CoG with information on progress against milestones and deliverables, and related schedules, on expenditures, and on major concerns. In relation to the whole project, each milestone, and expenditures, the Senior Responsible Owners (SROs) of projects in the GMPP also provide their own assessment (on track/off track/pending) and qualitative commentaries in relation to actions planned or taken, deviation from planned schedule, and budget/forecast variance.
The GPA ensures up-to-date information, which is used for drafting monthly delivery notes presenting the state of affairs to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister's Delivery Unit has full access to information; though focusing on a limited number of key policies, it can get a structured situational overview of progress on the overall Government Major Project Portfolio and draw general conclusions.
Source: (OECD, 2022[21]);
The French State has several public policy evaluation bodies, but they all rely on an ex-post evaluation method. To address this, France wanted to set up, through its Interministerial Directorate for Public Transformation (DITP), a system aimed at improving the management and monitoring of public policies. This system has three objectives:
1. to provide the Government with a regular and real-time overview of the state of policies throughout the country and their impact on French users and citizens;
2. to detect and assess difficulties in implementing these policies in order to quickly provide concrete solutions;
3. to initiate an accountability process towards citizens by publishing the results.
To meet these objectives, the DITP has set up a governance system to monitor public policies through data and results. Indicators have been defined to evaluate each public policy. Based on these indicators, national and local officials are responsible for defining targets and achieving results. The achievement of these results is the subject of interministerial monitoring meetings that make it possible to align the various objectives and make decisions. To share these results with local and national officials, the DITP has developed a tool to monitor public policies through data and results. Thus, the PILOTE digital dashboard makes it possible to visualize and comment on the results obtained (in the form of progress rates for various indicators) throughout the territory.
From PILOTE, national and local stakeholders can exchange and report the actions necessary to successfully implement the policies followed. Some of these indicators and their data are published as open data via the data.gouv.fr portal and the public action barometer, which has not been updated since July 2024 following the French National Assembly dissolution. They allow each citizen to know the impact of each policy for their department, region and at the national level. This mode of governance through data and the tools used have enabled a new dialogue between stakeholders at the local and national level, by breaking down the traditional silos of the administration. It makes it possible to evaluate the performance of senior executives. In this respect, the prefects, responsible for the deployment of these policies at the departmental or regional level, are evaluated each year. Part of their compensation is now determined based on the results transmitted via PILOTE. From now on, 50 policies are monitored in PILOTE. Their results are analysed using nearly 250 indicators. Their deadlines are set for the year 2026.
Transparency and public accountability must be cornerstones of Ukraine’s performance management approach. Beyond internal reporting, results from strategic plans and government priorities should be actively communicated to citizens, civil society, and international partners. France’s experience with real-time monitoring dashboards under its Interministerial Directorate for Public Transformation (DITP) offers one example: a system designed not only to improve policy delivery, but also to enable open communication of progress and outcomes to the public. Ukraine could draw on this approach to complement existing monitoring systems, helping reinforce trust in government, attract investment, and demonstrate progress toward recovery and reform.
To ensure whole-of-government accountability, Ukraine’s performance monitoring system should also better integrate the contributions of regional and local authorities, particularly as they play an increasing role in implementing recovery priorities. Oblast administrations and municipalities should be systematically involved in reporting on the progress of recovery projects and policy actions. This calls for expanding the reach of national monitoring tools to include local implementation data. Platforms such as the DREAM ecosystem and emerging regional planning dashboards provide promising entry points to enable real-time, decentralised tracking of progress, and should be further institutionalised within Ukraine’s monitoring system.
In summary, Ukraine has laid the groundwork for performance monitoring through legal mandates and promising pilot systems. The challenge ahead is to consolidate these efforts into a coherent performance management system that enhances government accountability, supports mid-course corrections, and ultimately improves outcomes for citizens.
Transparent, real-time monitoring is essential to steer Ukraine’s recovery and maintain public trust. While platforms like GPAP and DREAM lay the groundwork for performance-based governance, they currently operate in silos, with no unified framework to link recovery goals, budget allocations, and service delivery outcomes.
Ministries and local actors often use separate tools, and data are not consistently comparable or co-ordinated. This limits the government’s ability to track progress, adjust course, and communicate results to citizens and donors. A common performance architecture is needed to ensure coherence, learning, and accountability across all levels of recovery planning.
To strengthen performance monitoring in support of recovery, Ukraine could:
Develop a dedicated recovery performance framework that includes core indicators for infrastructure, housing, public services, and economy, to be tracked across national, regional, and local levels.
Systematically integrate performance metrics into all recovery strategies and action plans, ensuring each has measurable targets, baseline data, and timelines.
Mandate regular (at least annual) performance reviews for recovery priorities using dashboards accessible to both policymakers and the public.
Expand the use of the DREAM platform as a real-time implementation monitoring tool, ensuring full participation by local governments and linking it to SCMU’s broader GPAP tracking.
Strengthen SCMU’s role in verifying, analysing, and reporting on recovery data, including through cross-ministerial performance dialogues and follow-up mechanisms.
Ensure transparency and accountability by publishing simplified recovery performance updates that inform donors, parliament, and citizens about tangible progress and remaining gaps.
Linking planning to budgeting
A planning system cannot function effectively if not supported by a strong link to the budget. The OECD Recommendation on Budgetary Governance (OECD/LEGAL/0410) (OECD, 2015[23]) emphasises the need for governments to align strategic priorities with budget allocations and to ensure that financial decisions are informed by performance and policy evidence. In particular, the Recommendation calls for budget frameworks that are forward-looking, transparent, and outcome-oriented, enabling governments to plan sustainably and allocate resources to where they can have the greatest impact. This is especially critical in Ukraine’s current context, where the scale of recovery needs and the fiscal constraints imposed by war demand rigorous prioritisation and a realistic alignment of strategies with available funding.
In Ukraine, however, planning and budgeting remain too often decoupled. Line ministries frequently develop ambitious strategic plans that are not aligned with actual budgetary envelopes or medium-term fiscal priorities. This disconnect undermines implementation and leads to the proliferation of underfunded or unimplementable plans, weakening trust in both the planning and budgeting systems.
This challenge is not unique to Ukraine. Linking strategic planning with the budget remains a common issue across OECD countries. According to the 2023 OECD Centres of Government Survey (OECD, 2023[8]), only half of surveyed OECD governments report that their Centre of Government works closely with the Central Budget Authority to strengthen the connection between plans and budget instruments. In around 21% of OECD countries, mechanisms to ensure this alignment remain limited, highlighting the importance of institutionalised co-ordination and structured processes to close this gap (see Figure 2.6).
Note: n=24. Respondents to the survey were asked: “How does the CoG ensure that the national strategies are properly financed and respect the parameters of the country's fiscal framework?”
Source: (OECD, 2023[8])
A key challenge is the limited role of the Ministry of Finance (MoF) during the early stages of strategy development. While the MoF formally reviews draft strategies before they are submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers, it is often not engaged during the upstream conceptualisation of sectoral strategies. This late-stage involvement makes it harder to influence the design of strategies to ensure financial feasibility and weakens the capacity of the government to allocate resources effectively. According to questionnaire responses in the framework of this Review, SCMU and MoF collaborate in some aspects of GPAP costing but have no structured co-ordination process during the early design phase of sectoral strategies.
Part of the explanation lies in institutional memory. During earlier attempts to co-ordinate state target programmes, the MoF was formally involved in reviewing financing sources. However, when funding did not materialise despite formal commitments, the MoF did not re-engage substantively in early planning processes. Today, ministries do not consistently include cost estimates in their strategic plans, and when they do, they often lack the precision and realism needed for reliable budgeting.
To address this, Ukraine should gradually institutionalise a more integrated and performance-based approach to budgeting. This would require that all strategic documents, whether sectoral, regional or cross-cutting, include a financial feasibility assessment validated by the MoF before they are approved. Clearer procedures should be introduced to align the annual and medium-term budget frameworks with national strategic priorities. For example, during the preparation of the Government Priority Action Plan (GPAP), the SCMU already engages with the MoF to discuss the financial viability of proposals, but this practice should be extended and formalised across the strategic planning cycle.
International good practices underscore the importance of collaborative planning between finance ministries and the centre of government. Estonia’s approach (see Box 2.10) offers a valuable model: the Ministry of Finance and the Government Office co-lead structured annual dialogues with line ministries to align strategic objectives with budget envelopes. These joint processes ensure that strategies are grounded in financial reality and supported by both policy and fiscal expertise from the outset of the planning cycle.
Estonia offers a compelling example of how strategic planning can be effectively integrated with budgetary processes. Its approach is built on early and structured collaboration between the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the strategic planning unit at the centre of government. Joint planning meetings are held annually before the start of the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) cycle, allowing both strategic priorities and financial constraints to shape government work plans.
Crucially, the MoF is involved from the outset in the preparation of strategic plans, reviewing concept notes and participating in co-design workshops. This ensures that financial feasibility is considered early, and helps prevent misalignments between ambition and available resources.
In addition, joint co-ordination mechanisms between the Government Office and the MoF guide the refinement of performance areas, development strategies, and programme indicators. This collaboration facilitates alignment between policy goals, performance metrics, and funding allocations—reducing duplication and enabling results-based decision-making.
Estonia’s experience demonstrates how clear division of roles, continuous dialogue, and a shared commitment to whole-of-government priorities can build a credible and realistic planning and budgeting system. For Ukraine, these practices highlight the value of early MoF engagement, joint indicator design, and structured co-ordination tools to improve implementation feasibility and accountability.
Source: (OECD, 2024[13])
The ongoing reform of Ukraine’s public investment management (PIM) system also offers a critical opportunity to better link strategic planning and budgeting. The roadmap on public investment reform adopted in December 2023 sets out a number of measures to establish a single project pipeline and align investment proposals with strategic priorities. These reforms should be more clearly embedded in the broader planning framework, with the Strategic Investment Council playing a key role in prioritising investments based on both policy relevance and fiscal space.
Performance-based budgeting should also be gradually implemented. By tying budget allocations to measurable policy outcomes, Ukraine can ensure that limited fiscal resources are channeled toward programmes that deliver impact. This would require ministries to develop strategies with clear performance indicators and targets, which in turn would guide budgetary decisions. International experience suggests that while performance-based budgeting is complex to operationalise, incremental progress, such as introducing pilot sectors or tying a portion of budget allocation to results, can yield real benefits.
Ultimately, aligning planning with budgeting is not just a technical issue; it is a governance imperative. Ukraine’s ability to recover, rebuild, and meet the expectations of its citizens and partners depends on a planning system that reflects fiscal realities and a budgeting system that is guided by strategic goals. This integration is especially urgent in a post-war context where both needs and resources are immense but constrained.
The scale of Ukraine’s reconstruction needs far exceeds available domestic resources. External support will remain critical, but aligning this support with national recovery priorities and fiscal realities remains a major challenge.
Current recovery frameworks are often developed without realistic costing or early involvement of the Ministry of Finance, resulting in underfunded or disconnected project pipelines. Donor funding risks fragmentation unless financial flows are linked to a unified recovery framework. Without greater integration between planning and budgeting, Ukraine may struggle to prioritise effectively and deliver high-impact results.
To bridge the gap between recovery ambition and available resources, Ukraine could:
Institutionalise early-stage engagement between SCMU, the Ministry of Finance, and line ministries during the preparation of recovery strategies and investment plans.
Ensure all major recovery plans are accompanied by feasibility assessments that outline costing scenarios and funding sources, including donor contributions and co-financing mechanisms.
Leverage the Strategic Investment Council and multi-donor platforms (e.g., the Ukraine Facility, Multi-agency Donor Co-ordination Platform) to align financial planning with national priorities and steer funding where most needed.
Develop a transparent, public-facing system to track recovery-related expenditures and outcomes, involving the SCMU, the MoF and the RDO, reinforcing trust and supporting co-ordination with international partners.
Ukraine’s reform and recovery efforts must rest on a strategic planning system that delivers on national priorities while remaining responsive to urgent needs and constrained resources. A clear hierarchy of planning documents, rigorous quality assurance mechanisms, and strong institutional leadership are fundamental components of this system. Strategic planning must evolve beyond formality and ensure coherence, accountability, and implementation across all levels of government. Ukraine has taken an important step in this direction with the adoption of the Concept of the National Strategic Planning System (CMU Order No. 853 of 13 August 2025) and its Action Plan, which set out a pathway for building a more structured planning system. Translating this into practice will require sustained effort to ensure a whole-of-government perspective that goes beyond the socio-economic sphere, and to sequence reforms in a way that reflects institutional realities and the pace of change.
Strategic planning is not just an administrative exercise; it is a vehicle for rebuilding the country’s future. Drawing on global lessons and good practices, Ukraine has the opportunity to build a system that channels national resilience into long-term transformation. If recovery efforts are rooted in shared priorities, strong leadership, and structured planning, they can enable Ukraine not only to rebuild but to reimagine its governance and development trajectory. Moving from commitment to results will require practical measures that go beyond any single document: effective co-ordination across institutions, sustained capacity building, and transparent monitoring systems that keep implementation on track and allow for adjustment as circumstances evolve.
To reflect Ukraine’s current circumstances and future ambitions, the recommendations in this chapter are organised into three groups. EU integration is a cross-cutting priority reflected in all three groups: immediate actions to sustain resilience, recovery measures to anchor reconstruction in EU-related reforms, and long-term steps to consolidate institutional alignment with European standards. Immediate priorities focus on sustaining resilience and ensuring coherence under current conditions. Recovery and reconstruction priorities highlight measures to be taken as institutional and financial capacity expand during the rebuilding phase. Long-term development and EU integration priorities look further ahead, outlining reforms that will consolidate Ukraine’s planning system and align it with European standards. Together, these sequenced actions offer a pragmatic yet ambitious pathway for strengthening strategic planning as a driver of recovery, reform, and development. They should be pursued in a sequenced and adaptive manner, ensuring that legislative and institutional reforms are complemented by practical mechanisms to deliver coherence and accountability across government.
The recommendations in this chapter do not prescribe a single institutional model or detailed legislative provisions. Instead, they identify core governance functions and design principles observed across OECD member countries, including: (i) a clearly mandated whole-of-government co-ordination function at the centre of government; (ii) a coherent hierarchy of strategic planning documents linked to budgeting and performance monitoring; (iii) mechanisms for cross-ministerial co-ordination, quality assurance, and stakeholder engagement; and (iv) sufficient flexibility to operate effectively under crisis, recovery, and EU integration conditions.
OECD experience shows that these functions can be fulfilled and distributed across institutions in different ways depending on national context, legal traditions, and the pace of reform. The purpose of this Review is therefore to support Ukrainian authorities in strengthening these core functions, rather than to prescribe specific institutional arrangements or legislative solutions. The recommendations below are intended to support its translation into practice, while addressing governance functions that go beyond the Concept's current scope and will be essential for a whole-of-government planning system.
Immediate priorities to sustain resilience and coherence under current conditions
Clarify institutional leadership
Designate a clear whole-of-government co-ordinating entity at the centre of government, with a formal mandate to steer strategic planning.
Reinforce the mandate of the whole-of-government co-ordinator through relevant amendments to the Rules of Procedure and government resolutions, and resource its planning capacities adequately.
Ensure the co-ordinator (SCMU or a future body) has capacity for methodological guidance, feedback, and training to strengthen planning quality.
Kickstarting co-ordination mechanisms between SCMU and line ministries
Establish a network of planning focal points across ministries, with regular interministerial meetings.
Use existing committees (e.g. the Government Committee on Recovery and Regional Development) to align sectoral and recovery strategies with regional actors.
Ensuring fiscal realism and budget alignment
Ensure fiscal realism of plans by engaging the MoF early and at review stage.
Align GPAP priorities more closely with the medium-term budget framework and EU reform matrices.
Recovery priorities to build the foundations for reconstruction
Building a coherent hierarchy of planning documents
Establish a coherent and well-defined hierarchy of planning documents, distinguishing long-term vision, medium-term government programme, annual operational planning, and sectoral and regional strategies, with clear rules for cascading objectives across levels.
Ensure planning guidance sets clear rules for coherence, budgeting links, and EU alignment, whether through updated Rules of Procedure, government resolutions, or future legislation.
Institutionalising whole-of-government co-ordination
Introduce formal procedures to align GPAP, sector strategies, and EU integration planning instruments early in the policy cycle.
Leverage EU accession mechanisms (Interagency Working Group, negotiation clusters) to reinforce alignment.
Consolidating and improving the quality of planning documents
Conduct the strategy audit foreseen in the Concept to consolidate overlapping or outdated documents.
Establish a central register of planning documents (linked to DREAM and the planned IT platform).
Institutionalise a quality assurance process led by SCMU, with feasibility checks in co-ordination with MoF, MoECO, and MoJ.
Provide updated templates, guidance, and training to help ministries and local governments produce focused, outcome-oriented strategies.
Deepening central-local co-ordination
Revive co-ordination bodies such as the Inter-Departmental Commission for Regional Development, with municipal participation.
Support oblasts in aggregating and reviewing municipal strategies, acting as intermediaries with SCMU and MDCT.
Provide tailored assistance and digital tools to help local authorities turn national priorities into local action.
Embedding performance management in delivery
Require all strategies to include objectives, indicators, and evaluation provisions.
Establish a government-wide monitoring system under SCMU, integrating existing tools such as GPAP tracking and the DREAM platform into a coherent performance framework.
Hold structured performance dialogues (quarterly or semi-annual) between SCMU, ministries, and local governments.
Long-term development to consolidate reforms
Formalising the planning hierarchy
Develop a formal hierarchy distinguishing short-, medium-, and long-term instruments, including EU integration plans.
Consider an overarching guidance document linking long-term objectives (e.g. 2030–2035) with sectoral and operational strategies.
Use the Reform Matrix as a mapping tool to align domestic, international, and EU commitments.
Enhancing public participation and transparency in strategic planning
Institutionalise consultation mechanisms throughout the planning cycle; for major strategies, use collaborative working groups once conditions allow.
Implement the Law on Public Consultations with digital tools, guidance, and support for ministries and local governments.
Create advisory platforms for business and civil society, led by SCMU, to consult on priorities (e.g. infrastructure, housing, services). MDCT could support these platforms with digital participation tools (Diia, DREAM).
Increase transparency by publishing monitoring data and performance of key strategies on accessible dashboards.
Institutionalising performance-informed budgeting
Institutionalise performance-informed budgeting by linking allocations to monitoring data from strategies and GPAP.
Ensure the Strategic Investment Council and donor platforms are guided by prioritised, costed plans reflecting fiscal space.
Define clear rules and mechanisms for integrating strategic and budget planning, with strong MoF involvement from the early stages of strategy development.
Sustaining performance and accountability mechanisms.
Establish clear mechanisms for monitoring, evaluation, and policy adjustment, and embed them in planning guidance and future legislative frameworks as the system matures.
Improve interoperability with other performance tools (Accession Pulse, Reform Matrix, EU systems).
Publish results transparently on dashboards to strengthen accountability and citizen trust.
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