This chapter provides an overview of Ukraine’s ongoing efforts to reinforce information integrity and the specific challenges to the information space posed in that country. It reviews and provides recommendations concerning the country’s efforts to enhance the transparency, accountability, and plurality of information sources; implement reforms that seek to reinforce institutional architecture to build information integrity; and strengthen societal resilience in the effort to uphold freedom of opinion and expression. It takes into account the current wartime conditions and the need to plan for information integrity under future peace time.
Public Governance Review of Ukraine
Abstract
Ukraine has long been a target of information attacks that seek to weaken trust in governmental institutions, polarise Ukrainian society, and undermine Ukraine as a trusted international actor. This constant pressure on the information ecosystem, which from the Spring of 2014 has been undertaken as part of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, highlights the necessity for Ukraine’s government and society to adapt and strengthen information integrity, and uphold freedom of opinion and expression.
Information integrity is the result of an information environment that promotes access to accurate, reliable, evidence-based, and plural information sources and that enable individuals to be exposed to plural and diverse ideas, make informed choices, and better exercise their rights (OECD, 2024[1]). As such, it is an essential component of democratic governance, transparency, and trust. Ukraine, particularly due to its geopolitical position and Russia’s ongoing war of aggression, confronts heightened risks from the spread of adversarial threats in the information space and the need to reinforce information integrity and resilience. Informed by the framework put forward in the OECD Recommendation on Information Integrity (see Box 3.1), this chapter analyses Ukraine’s efforts to reinforce information integrity largely undertaken since 2014.
Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine and the associated attacks on Ukraine’s information ecosystem are taking place in the wider context of a multi-year reform process in the country. Reforms in the information space can be separated into two distinct phases. First, the period between the Euromaidan revolution and Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 until the start of the full-scale war in February 2022 saw a focus on aligning Ukraine with European Union policies by enhancing transparency in the information space, building government institutions aimed at countering adversarial threats in the information space, strengthening co-operation between governmental and non-governmental actors in the field of strengthening information integrity, and expanding media and information literacy initiatives.
Second, the response to the war and increased scale of information attacks following Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 led to a heightened focus on public policy responses to threats in the information space in a war context. Since 2022, the Ukrainian government has increased efforts to build its own capacity to counter hostile information threats, work with civil society organisations to strengthen societal resilience, as well as continue with reforms that seek to align Ukraine’s legal framework with the European Union’s. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has amplified the human and financial resource constraints on independent and local media, increased reliance on international donors, and led to the introduction of restrictions to speech via martial law that will need to be reversed once the war ends.
Ukraine is navigating a delicate balance between national security interests and freedom of expression amid Russia's ongoing information warfare. Reinforcing information integrity in Ukraine must therefore be grounded in democratic values and undertaken in an effort to maintain and continue the country’s ongoing reforms while appreciating its unique present context. As noted in the Recommendation on Information Integrity, policy interventions in this space should be lawful, justified, proportionate, and should respect human rights laws and obligations (OECD, 2024[1]). Public policies that reinforce information integrity are only meaningful and effective in democratic systems where governments uphold human rights. To that end, efforts to protect and promote democratic space should be grounded in efforts to reinforce media pluralism, protect freedom of opinion and of expression, privacy, the rule of law, and independence of judicial and legislative oversight mechanisms (OECD, 2024[1]).
The Recommendation on Information Integrity was adopted by the OECD Council on 17 December 2024 on the proposal of the Public Governance Committee (PGC). The Recommendation aims to establish a wide-ranging and applicable policy framework for Adherents to address threats posed by information manipulation and to put in place measures that promote information integrity in line with the universal human rights of freedom of opinion and expression.
The development of the Recommendation built on a multi-year process of research, analysis, and events and involved consultations both within and outside the OECD. The Recommendation complements other existing national and international standards aimed at guaranteeing press freedom and universal human rights, including freedom of opinion and expression.
Building on the detailed policy framework outlined in the OECD report Facts not Fakes: Tackling Disinformation, Strengthening Information Integrity, the Recommendation provides an ambitious and actionable international standard that will help governments develop a systemic approach to foster information integrity, relying on a multi-stakeholder approach. It provides guidance for policymakers in democratic governments under three mutually reinforcing building blocks, which together recommend that Adherents:
1. “Strengthen societal resilience” through promoting media literacy and critical thinking skills to provide individuals the capacity and knowledge to navigate the information environment effectively and responsibly, as well as through working with actors across society to develop greater understanding of the evolution of the information landscape and promoting innovation and research;
2. “Enhance the transparency, accountability, and plurality of information sources” by focusing on the role played by digital platforms and traditional media and journalists; and
3. “Upgrade institutional architecture and open government practices” by providing strategic guidance, clear and transparent mandates, and capacity building and sufficient resources to upgrade governmental institutions to respond effectively.
The national security considerations during wartime present Ukraine with the need to defend against both physical and information warfare while protecting fundamental values. While international guidance allows for restrictions on civic freedoms in scenarios relevant to Ukraine’s war context, these are restricted to times of an officially proclaimed public emergency which threatens the life of the nation, or when provided for by law and to the extent necessary for the protection of national security. Such restrictions, furthermore, should be time-bound, exercised on a temporary basis, include safeguards such as sunset clauses, and be subject to independent review by the legislature, and the restrictions should be precise, necessary, proportionate, and as unintrusive as possible (OECD, 2024[2]). In response to the invasion and ongoing war, the martial law of 2022 noted that “constitutional rights and freedoms of a person and citizen…may be temporarily restricted for the period of martial law (The Office of the President of Ukraine, 2022[3]).” The martial law also aligns with Articles 111 and 436-2 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, which were in place prior to the martial law, and which criminalise supporting armed aggression against Ukraine, legitimising the temporary occupation of Ukrainian territory, or shifting accountability of the aggressor state's actions, as well as criminalise the “justification, recognition as legitimate, or denial of the armed aggression of Russia (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2025[4]).”
That said, even in this context, Ukraine has in many instances continued to expand its democratic reform agenda. The country has implemented a new media law that has brought Ukraine more closely in line with international frameworks, created a single media regulator for television, radio, print media, and streaming services, as well as increased transparency of media ownership. The law has also introduced an innovative co-regulatory mechanism where media actors can establish their own codes of conduct and expert committees to participate in developing information integrity policies; topics could include, for example, establishing clear rules for when an influencer is considered to be online media.
To date, Ukraine has complied with the conditions set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Council of Europe has assessed its legal exemptions (“derogations”) to its obligations with respect to freedom of expression as being validly declared, though also clarified that the derogations should be understood as temporary and as ‘a continuing process’, given the ongoing wartime context (Council of Europe, 2025[5]). Unlike many governments that restrict internet access during security crises, Ukraine has maintained connectivity and journalists continue to report on highly sensitive issues of alleged military leadership misconduct corruption (Dvorovyi, Cherevka and Benequista, 2023[6]). Ukrainian civil society also remains actively engaged in monitoring media reforms and implementation, and following the start of the war, public support for democratic values, including free speech increased (Dvorovyi, Cherevka and Benequista, 2023[6]).
In Ukraine’s context, reinforcing information integrity requires putting in place a whole-of-society approach that helps provide oversight for government action, as well as builds societal resilience to information threats. As discussed in the final section of this chapter, bringing together actors from across society to monitor government action and the implementation of legislation, as well as independent judicial review and legislative oversight, will provide crucial checks and help ensure government actions remain proportionate to the national security threats faced. Furthermore, building resilience by equipping citizens to distinguish credible information will also help maintain free discourse. Media co-regulation, as seen in Ukraine's model, can help develop context-specific standards while preserving industry independence. International organisations, such as the Council of Europe, OECD, UNESCO, among others, can provide external assessments of Ukrainian policies’ alignment with global human rights standards. Over the medium-term, Ukraine should focus on building its information space in line with international standards, notably as part of its broader EU integration process, and prepare for when restrictions are no longer justified.
Reform history and policy setting in Ukraine
Ukraine has undertaken considerable legislative reforms aiming at enhancing freedom of speech and transparency since 2014. Up to the invasion in February 2022, the media landscape was becoming more plural, the country pursued efforts to curtail corruption and promote transparency, and reforms were undertaken to support media integrity and local democratic participation (Fernandez Gibaja and Hudson, 2022[7]). Reforms following the 2014 Euromaidan demonstrations broadly sought to bring Ukraine closer to the European Union, including reduced legal pressure on the media and political influence of state-owned outlets, as well as improvements to the law on access to information, increased autonomy of the broadcasting regulator, and legislation introducing mandatory disclosure of media ownership and final beneficiaries (Freedom House, 2015[8]; Freedom House, 2016[9]). These reforms have resulted in improved international standing regarding press freedom, where Ukraine’s position improved from 97th to 62nd (out of 180 countries evaluated) between 2021 and 2025 (Reporters without Borders, 2025[10]).
Nevertheless, the implementation of the reform efforts faced obstacles even during the period prior to the full-scale invasion in February 2022. Regulatory bodies, such as the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting, were constrained by financial, technological, and human resource limitations. Ukraine has also been targeted throughout this time by hostile information interference campaigns,1 mostly Russian. Malign actors attempt to interfere in the information space through co-ordinated networks that include official government communications, state-sponsored media, social media influencers, and proxy sources. These networks often manipulate content to promote malign and inauthentic narratives while maintaining plausible deniability and making it difficult for audiences to distinguish fact from propaganda (Global Affairs Canada, 2024[11]) (VIGINUM, 2025[12]). Russian information operations against Ukraine also target international audiences, which has led the government to focus on responding with a global perspective, as well.
The spread of hostile information interference campaigns in Ukraine reflects wider challenges related to the shift in how information is produced and distributed in the last two decades, where platform and algorithm designs can amplify the spread of information, provide new avenues for engagement and manipulation, and alter who and what people trust (OECD, 2024[13]). Ukraine has undertaken its reform efforts in this rapidly changing information environment, all of which has been magnified by Russian aggression.
The information space in Ukraine during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine
Russian interference in the information space has significantly increased since Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. In turn, Ukraine’s comprehensive response to Russian hybrid warfare threats (including both information and cyber threats)has built upon progress made in strengthening the information and media environment since 2014: establishing institutional mechanisms to respond directly to information and cyber threats; improved co-ordination between governmental and non-governmental actors; upgraded government strategic communication and efforts to provide accurate public information; and strengthening resilience of the media environment (OECD, 2022[14]).
Since 2022, campaigns driven by Russia have largely aimed to justify the invasion, for example by portraying Ukraine as a threat or claiming to protect Russian-speaking populations, demoralise the Ukrainian population and armed forces, divide international support, and obscure war crimes (OECD, 2022[15]). In addition, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is notable for the extent to which it is being waged and shared online. While social media have played a role in previous wars, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has illustrated how social media is changing the way war can be chronicled, experienced and understood (The Economist, 2022[16]).
This change is largely due to the rapid rise in internet coverage and the use of social media in Ukraine. According to the Ministry of Digital Transformation, immediately before the start of the Russian’s full-scale invasion, 96% of Ukrainians had access to 4G mobile networks from at least one operator (January 2022), compared to 76% in 2019 (The Economist, 2022[16]). According to data provided by the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, in October 2025, 60.5% of mobile terminals in Ukraine operated on 4G networks and 23.4% on 5G networks (Ministry of Digital Transformation, 2025[17]).
This transition to faster networks continues to support changes in news consumption habits. In 2024, 90% of Ukrainians used smartphones to access news, highlighting the shift toward mobile news consumption (Internews network, 2024[18]). This trend is especially pronounced among internally displaced persons, frontline residents, and the military, who rely heavily on mobile devices and platforms like Telegram for information (Bezchotnikova and Zrazhevska, 2024[19]). The start of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine also saw a large increase in the use of social networks as a source of news. In 2024, 84% of respondents identified social media as their primary news source, up from 76% in 2023, and 40% relied exclusively on social media for news. On the contrary, the use of online news websites as the primary source declined from 41% in 2023 to 30% in 2024 (Internews network, 2024[18]).
Television has remained the primary news source for about 30% of respondents, while radio and print media are not the primary source for many. Telegram has emerged as the leading platform for news dissemination, with 73% of Ukrainians using it for news in 2024. The platform is used by Ukrainian government institutions and policy-makers, as well as non-governmental actors and the media. Its popularity is attributed to its immediacy and low data requirements, making it accessible even in areas with limited internet connectivity (Internews network, 2024[18]).
In this context and based on the OECD Recommendation on Information Integrity, this chapter covers the country’s efforts to implement reforms that seek to:
Enhance the transparency, accountability, and plurality of information sources.
Reinforce institutional architecture to build information integrity; and
Strengthen societal resilience.
Building information integrity rests in large part on ensuring public policies help promote transparent and diverse media and information spaces. Given the role of the actors that produce content and the channels via which it is distributed, namely online and social media platforms and traditional media, ensuring that policies support transparency and freedom of opinion and expression is critical.
In Ukraine, the context of its ongoing reform process and Russia’s war of aggression reiterate the importance of putting in place public policies that promote democratic engagement. This includes ensuring that the country’s laws align with international frameworks that uphold freedom of opinion and expression and that policy interventions are lawful, justified, proportionate, and respecting of human rights laws and obligations. Moving forward, it will be important to continue to ensure that laws passed in the context of Russia’s war of aggression are not used to unduly restrict freedom of opinion and expression.
Reform efforts should continue to align Ukraine’s legal context with international frameworks that uphold freedom of opinion and expression
The war in Ukraine has reiterated the benefits of policies that increase transparency in the information space. Information posted on online platforms has helped give a voice to underrepresented groups and plays an increasingly important role in analysing the war, physical and information threats, and even in documenting war crimes. Such open-source intelligence, or OSINT, can include satellite images, videos, and pictures (OHCHR and Human Rights Center at UC Berkeley, School of Law, 2022[20]). Platforms also, however, serve as spaces for actors to spread manipulated content, often aimed at increasing polarisation and reducing trust in public institutions, which can affect people’s perceptions and influence and mainstream media coverage. More fully understanding how information is shared, the sources of hostile information threats and what interventions are most successful – all within the bounds of ensuring user privacy and freedom of expression – are relevant for responding to disinformation related to the war in Ukraine and beyond (OECD, 2022[14]).
The legal framework in this space should align with international standards and continue to support Ukraine’s broader EU integration process. For example, the Council of Europe recommended that tools and initiatives designed to restrict the activities of malign foreign actors be “targeted and…address a specific security problem,” that they “provide a clear, complete, and understandable justification” for action, and to “ensure the competence of the national regulator to regulate of online platforms in accordance with the EU and Council of Europe standards (Council of Europe, 2025[21]).”
On a more operational level, the Center for Countering Disinformation (CCD) shares evidence-based analytical reports to platforms, which cite violations of Ukrainian law and provide context to platform moderators. These reports seek to reduce manipulative content and content that might provoke panic by flagging notifications of false reports about air defence failures, deepfake videos of political or military figures, messages designed to incite panic about energy blackouts or bombings and calls to violence.
Ukraine’s efforts to engage with online platforms on countering hostile information threats and promoting information integrity are limited by many of the same issues governments elsewhere face in the absence of clearly defined and transparent relationships with platforms that promote freedom of speech. This situation is made more complicated in that Ukraine is not a member of the European Union, though Ukrainian institutions are trying to overcome this limitation in part by establishing closer co-operation between the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting and partner institutions in EU member states.
For its part, the National Council monitors YouTube, Telegram (see Box 3.2 for discussions on policy discussions related to Telegram in Ukraine), and other online platforms for war-related disinformation, hate speech, and content endangering children. If violations are found, they follow the standard content reporting procedures of each platform (e.g., flagging via YouTube’s community reporting system). The National Council has also signed a memorandum of understanding with the Center for Countering Disinformation on information exchange and co-ordination of activities.
Ukraine also focuses on tackling information manipulation tactics and techniques. For example, operating bot farms and engaging in artificial amplification techniques, such as creating fake social media accounts to manipulate public opinion, could be punished under several provisions of the Criminal Code, including: Article 361: Unauthorised Interference in Information Systems; Article 361-2: Unauthorised Sale or Distribution of Restricted Information; Article 190: Fraud; and Article 259: Knowingly False Notification of Threats (Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, 2023[22]).
Criminal proceedings against violators largely target actors who are running the bot farms rather than the platforms on which they operate. For example, in 2022, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) dismantled operations of 35 bot farms physically operating in Ukrainian territory, most of which were acting in the interests of Russian intelligence services and used to spread content designed to destabilise the country (Security Service of Ukraine, 2022[23]). In 2023, the Cyber Police dismantled a network involving more than 100 individuals who operated bot farms using approximately 150 000 SIM cards, which allowed them to simulate the activity of internet users and hide real identities when accessing the internet. These fake accounts were used to spread hostile propaganda, distribute illegal content, and engage in internet fraud (The Ministry of Interior of Ukraine, 2023[24]).
The use of Telegram as a source of information grew rapidly following the 2022 invasion. In 2021, 40% of Ukrainians used Telegram, and 20% used it as a source of news, whereas by 2024, 81% used Telegram, and 73% used is as a main source of the news from online platforms, compared to 19% for YouTube and 16% for Facebook.
Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation has found that Russia uses Telegram to target the Ukrainian population to sow discord and to gather sensitive data. In addition, the suspected use of Telegram for unlawful information operations have led to calls for blocking Telegram in Ukraine. These calls have met considerable opposition given that Ukrainian government institutions, politicians, non-governmental actors, and the media use the platform, including for public communication, for example through the accounts of the Office of the President, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defence.
In 2024, 9% of Ukrainians supported a complete ban of Telegram; most Ukrainians (54%) believe that it should not be banned completely, though instead face specific restrictions and controls, such as blocking certain channels. At the same time, support for the ban would be noticeably higher (60%) if Telegram would refuse to block the channels used by Russia for spreading disinformation.
In 2024, the National Co-ordination Center for Cybersecurity (NCCC) restricted the use of Telegram in government agencies, military, and critical infrastructure facilities due to security concerns, and the CCD published a list of trusted Telegram channels, including channels of governmental institutions, public officials, state companies, and public media outlets.
In 2025, Ukraine put forward the draft law “On Amending Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding the Regulation of Activities of Information-Sharing Platforms through which Mass Information is Disseminated”, largely with the intent to reduce the threats to national security posed by Telegram. In doing so, the draft law proposes a framework that, while seeking to provide clarity on online platforms, offers what the Council of Europe has found to be duplicative, overly general, and potentially intrusive requirements, pointing to the inherent challenges of policy making in this space.
Efforts should continue to ensure national security considerations in the context of the war are not used to unduly restrict freedom of opinion and expression
Ukraine’s reforms since 2014 have continued to result in improved international standing in freedom of opinion and expression. The World Press Freedom Index showed that in 2025, Ukraine’s position has improved to 62nd from 97th in 2021 (out of 180 countries evaluated) and from 126th in 2013 (Reporters without Borders, 2025[10]) (Reporters without Borders, 2014[29]). Ukraine also has a dynamic community of investigative journalists and independent media and civil society organisations. Together, these reforms have been largely in line with obligations to protect and defend freedom of opinion expression, as well as recommendations to foster public interest information ecosystems that promote access to information and protect independent and pluralistic media (OECD, 2024[2]) (OECD, 2024[1]).
Outlets such as Slidstvo.Info, Bihus.Info, Ukrainska Pravda, and Schemes (Skhemy) have exposed illicit enrichment and corruption schemes involving state procurement, defence spending, and judicial corruption leading to criminal cases and dismissals of high-ranking officials. These organisations continue to operate independently, increasingly relying on diverse funding sources – including grants from international donors and Ukrainian supporters, independent fundraising campaigns, and the development of hybrid business models – to help ensure their sustainability in a challenging economic environment and reduce their vulnerability to political pressure. Additionally, CSOs such as Detector Media and the Institute of Mass Information monitor compliance with media standards, support investigations, and advocate for journalists’ rights. This ecosystem creates a buffer against attempts to suppress or co-opt critical voices.
In the context of the ongoing war, Ukraine’s martial law provides broad regulatory measures over media and communications, and separate Security Council and regulatory decisions have banned or restricted specific outlets deemed threats to national security. These measures, while justified by wartime security, require oversight from independent actors and civil society, both during the war and for post-war re-evaluation, amid Ukraine's broader EU alignment efforts. The country’s martial law, which is the primary influence on Ukraine’s expanded regulatory powers following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, is in tension with the country’s broad effort to align its policies more closely to the European Union. President Volodymyr Zelensky enacted this decree (Presidential Decree No. 64/2022) on 24 February 2022 and declared martial law across Ukraine in response to Russia’s full-scale invasion.
The decree stated that, “in connection with the introduction of martial law in Ukraine, constitutional rights and freedoms of a person and citizen…may be temporarily restricted for the period of martial law (The Office of the President of Ukraine, 2022[3]).” The decree authorised potential limits, including to Article 34 of the Ukrainian Constitution, which states that, “Everyone is guaranteed the right to freedom of thought and speech, and to the free expression of his or her views and beliefs,” and that “everyone has the right to freely collect, store, use and disseminate information by oral, written or other means of his or her choice. The exercise of these rights may be restricted by law in the interests of national security, territorial indivisibility or public order, with the purpose of preventing disturbances or crimes, protecting the health of the population, the reputation or rights of other persons, preventing the publication of information received confidentially, or supporting the authority and impartiality of justice”. Notably, this decree does not affect Article 15 of the Ukrainian Constitution, which prohibits censorship (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 1996[30]).
In 2024, the Ukrainian parliament discussed several amendments to the Criminal Code, including new powers that seek to expand control over the information space in the context of the war. As noted by the Council of Europe, these amendments should be updated to include an explicit protection for the disclosure of confidential information in the public interest, including by safeguarding the rights of journalists and protecting whistleblowers (Council of Europe, 2025[5]). These amendments have not been adopted by the Verkhovna Rada, and the process of public discussion is ongoing.
The range of restrictions put in place by the government in response to the war largely cover restrictions on outlets, language, content, and internet access more widely. Importantly, the laws specify that any restrictions must comply with the European Convention on Human Rights requiring that limitations on freedom of expression be lawful, proportionate, and necessary in a democratic society. They are also in line with Article 4 of the ICCPR and Article 15 of the ECHR, which allow for derogations to the right to freedom of expression (though not freedom of opinion), “in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation” but only “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation” and “provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law (Council of Europe, 2025[5]).
Protecting media and speech freedoms is essential in democratic societies. Likewise, reducing harassment and attacks on journalists – particularly difficult in the context of Russia’s armed aggression – and ensuring media pluralism while avoiding capture by other interests, remain critical to strengthening the media environment in Ukraine and beyond (OECD, 2022[31]). Moving forward, Ukraine should continue to ensure that its legal environment meets it legal obligations, that the laws are not applied arbitrarily, and that provisions are directed to an actual, clear, present or imminent danger (Council of Europe, 2025[5]; OECD, 2022[31]; OECD, 2024[2]). Ultimately, the sweeping powers granted to the state should be analysed in the specific context of Ukraine’s security concerns and not be used to justify the imposition of restrictions on freedom of opinion and expression more widely.
Limits on outlets and channels
Prior to the start of the full-scale aggression, restrictions in the information space sought to reduce Russian influence by limiting the impact of Russian state-backed outlets and favouring Ukrainian-language media. Ukraine first implemented bans on information outlets linked to Russia following the aggression in 2014, when Ukraine banned 14 TV channels for “spreading war propaganda” (Reuters, 2014[32]). In 2017, the Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 133/2017 enacted the decision of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine to impose sanctions on a range of individuals and legal entities, particularly targeting Russian companies and online services, including social networks like VKontakte and Odnoklassniki, as well as the companies Mail.ru and Yandex, in response to cyber and information threats (The Office of the President of Ukraine, 2017[33]).
Between 2014 and 2021, a series of presidential decrees resulted in the blocking of 633 internet resources, including Russian media outlets, payment systems like Webmoney and Qiwi, and websites associated with the occupation authorities of Crimea. One of the most prominent examples of this policy was the ban in 2021 on three Ukrainian television channels: 112 Ukraine, NewsOne, and ZIK. In 2021, Ukraine used the Law on Sanctions to impose restrictions on three TV channels linked to pro-Russian politician Taras Kozak, citing national security threats. The martial law has also been used to ban outlets connected with the spread of Russian-linked hostile information campaigns, including the websites rodina.news and all-news.net, though its application has been found to be proportional, overall (European Commission, 2024[34]). While many blocked outlets were based in Russia (Dvorovyi, 2021[35]) the government has banned channels and pages of sanctioned Russian propagandists on YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and Telegram (Freedom House, 2024[36]).
In addition, Article 126 of Law No. 2849-IX on Media establishes the procedure for designating individuals and entities that pose a threat to national security through media activities. This list is kept by the Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communications (MCSC), based on inputs from the National Security and Defence Council, the Security Service of Ukraine, and the National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting. Inclusion on the list can lead to restrictions on licensing, distribution, and audience access in Ukraine. Notably, the law also provides a judicial appeal mechanism and mandates that decisions must be well-founded, clearly defined, and allow for the possibility of appeal (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2025[37]).
Freedom House flagged the independent media regulator’s (National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine, NCTRB) ability to close news sites that are not officially registered as media without a court order, and a prominent media outlet raised concerns over political pressure that was seen as threatening to its independence (Freedom House, 2025[38]). In 2022, media outlets affiliated with opposition politicians have faced administrative hurdles or and removed from a terrestrial broadcasting channel under justifications that were criticised as being not sufficiently transparent, which could potentially have a chilling effect. Moving forward, Ukrainian authorities’ powers in this space should be guided by transparency and alignment with international standards to avoid undue restrictions on freedom of expression and being misused against voices critical of the government.
Moving forward, the application of these legislative powers should be applied transparently and without discrimination, informed by oversight and scrutiny from civil society and the EU. Specifically, the European Commission noted that while restrictions on outlets and channels introduced by Ukraine since the start of the war are “legitimately rooted in national security concerns,” it also notes that “the Ukrainian government should provide a clear vision for the re-establishment of rights and freedoms after martial law ends (Freedom House, 2024[36]; European Commission, 2023[39]).”
Ukrainian language requirements
In an effort to strengthen the position of the Ukrainian language and reduce the influence of other languages, particularly Russian, which had dominated the information space, Ukraine passed a law on 16 January 2022 – one month before Russia’s full-scale military invasion – requiring all national print media to be published in Ukrainian. Publications in other languages are permitted if accompanied by an identical Ukrainian version released simultaneously, though exceptions apply to media published in Crimean Tatar, English, or other official EU languages.
Article 40 of the Law on Media stipulates the use of the Ukrainian language in audio and audiovisual media and sets mandatory quotas for programs, films, songs, and news broadcasts depending on the type of broadcaster (national, regional, local), format, and languages of national minorities. The law requires that at least 90% of television content during prime time on national and regional TV channels be in the Ukrainian language, and at least 80% for local TV channels. While the law does not detail specific language requirements for online content, it does emphasise the importance of Ukrainian language use in digital media (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2025[37]).
Internet access restrictions
In December 2020, Parliament adopted the Law on Electronic Communications, which provides for the possibility of temporarily limiting internet access in the context of antiterrorist operations. The law also allows for internet access restrictions during states of emergency or martial law, when “special rules” may be introduced regarding “the connection and transmission of information through computer networks.”2 Similar powers are granted to the military under martial law. These provisions, however, have not yet been applied in practice (Freedom House, 2024[36]), in part because they were adopted before the start of the full-scale invasion and were designed for a more limited context of local anti-terrorist operations. Moving forward, it would be advisable to continue to restrain from using this tool and to be transparent about process and motivation of its use.
Content limits
Ukraine's wartime legal framework, including its martial law, enables the enforcement of restrictions on specific types of content, based on current legislation, including the Law on Media (Articles 36 and 119). While the country has largely balanced its national security considerations during wartime with continued protections of universal human rights, these restrictions focus on criminalising pro-Russian propaganda, denial of Russian aggression, calls against territorial integrity, and unauthorised disclosure of military information during the war (see Box 3.3).
Since the start of the war in 2022, several individuals have been charged under the laws that prohibit public calls for the infringement of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, that criminalise collaboration with “aggressor states,” and that criminalise the justification, recognition as legitimate, or denial of the armed aggression of Russian against Ukraine. These charges sometimes solely concern online activities, while other charges include material collaboration with the Russian military or intelligence agencies (Freedom House, 2024[36]).
Criminal Code of Ukraine Article 110, which prohibits public calls for the infringement of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and Article 111-1, which states that Ukrainian citizens who engage in propaganda within educational institutions with the aim of supporting armed aggression against Ukraine, legitimising the temporary occupation of Ukrainian territory, or shifting accountability of the aggressor state's actions, may be imprisoned.
Criminal Code of Ukraine Article 114-2, which establishes criminal liability for the unauthorised dissemination of information during martial law or a state of emergency about the movement, transportation, or location of weapons, ammunition, troops, or other military formations.
Criminal Code of Ukraine Article 436-2, which criminalises justifying, recognising as legitimate, or denying the armed aggression of Russia against Ukraine since 2014, including misrepresenting it as an internal civil conflict or glorifying participants involved in the aggression.
Ukraine's Law on Media Article 36, which prohibits the dissemination of calls for violent change, overthrow of the constitutional order, initiation or conduct of an aggressive war or military conflict, violation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, elimination of Ukraine's independence, information that justifies or promotes such actions. The law also bans any form of propaganda supporting the Russian government, its war against Ukraine, and the use of associated symbols that are equated with terrorism and Nazi ideology. Beyond the immediate context of the war, the law forbids the glorification of communist and Nazi regimes, content promoting drug use, cruelty, or violence. Additionally, the law bans information that denies or disparages the existence the Ukrainian language, nation, or statehood. The National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine, together with its joint regulatory body, is tasked with developing and approving criteria for classifying information as violating requirements of this article.
Ukraine's Law on Media Chapter IX, which outlines exceptional regulations for media during a time of armed aggression. These provisions take effect when the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine officially recognises a state as an aggressor or occupying power. This law restricts Ukrainian media from disseminating content that misrepresents the war; prevents outlets from being owned, controlled, or funded by citizens or organisations linked to Russia; prevents the registration and distribution of foreign media affiliated with Russia based on the public registry that identifies such services.
The application of martial law has also resulted in reporting restrictions for journalists, especially on the frontline. For example, Ukrainian authorities have increased control over the flow of information, especially concerning military operations, troop movements, and battlefield outcomes. Journalists wishing to report from the frontlines must obtain official accreditation from the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Accredited journalists often must be accompanied with military units or guided by military press officers, which can restrict their freedom to move and investigate independently. Some frontline areas or liberated zones are declared off-limits to media for operational or security reasons. Journalists can be denied access or detained if found reporting without permission or violating security protocols. According to Chief of Ukrainian Armed Forces Order No. 73, it is prohibited to publicly share sensitive military information during wartime, including troop locations, unit names, equipment details, and operational plans. This ban applies to both military personnel and media representatives, aiming to protect national security and prevent intelligence leaks to the enemy. Violations of these rules may result in legal consequences under Ukrainian law (Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, 2024[40]). In addition to government restrictions, journalists report great self-censoring; a 2023 study found that 78% of respondents linked the Russian invasion to a rise in such cases (ZMINA, 2023[41])
Despite these restrictions, the European Commission has noted that the application of the powers the Ukrainian government has under martial law to restrict individual rights and freedoms have been “largely in proportion to the security situation and have generally been applied with caution.” The Commission also notes that “the government has maintained its overall respect for fundamental rights and has shown its commitment to protecting them and further aligning with the EU acquis, despite the restraints due to the ongoing war and martial law (European Commission, 2024[34]).”
The Ukrainian media environment has undergone a series of reforms though continues to face weaknesses and vulnerabilities
Ukraine’s efforts to strengthen its media sector since 2014 have been a driving force of its efforts to reinforce information integrity. The importance of an independent and pluralistic media sector is in line with the OECD Recommendation on Information Integrity, as well as the Council of Europe’s guidelines in this area, which call on building a healthy media ecosystem that provides a steady and abundant supply of quality information by recognised trustworthy sources (Council of Europe, 2023[42]).
The establishment of a public broadcaster, Suspilne (Public Broadcasting Company of Ukraine, originally known as UA:PBC), in January 2017 was part of Ukraine’s efforts to meet European standards and practices. Following its registration, Suspilne focused on capacity strengthening and the adoption of strategic documents to solidify its independence. The Council of Europe has supported the implementation of Suspilne’s strategic plans and policies, including with a focus on improving internal controls and strengthening transparency and accountability. For example, in 2024, the CoE supported the revision of Suspilne’s regulations related to elections to its Management Board to align with standards of democratic governance and media independence. The Council of Europe will continue to monitor elections, ensuring that the process remains transparent and free from external influence as part of its continued co-operation with Suspilne (Council of Europe, 2025[43]).
Independent media organisations in Ukraine have noted Suspilne’s high – and improving – quality (Institute of Mass Information, 2021[44]) ((n.a.), 2025[45]). At the same time, it has faced funding shortages, particularly since the full-scale invasion. Per Ukrainian legislation, the public broadcaster is set to receive 0,2% of the total budget spending, though this amount is actually lower given that during the war, defence spending is excluded from these budgetary calculations. That said, funding for Suspilne rose roughly 17% in 2025 compared to 2024 (UAH 1,85 billion to UAH 2,18 billion) (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2024[46]), and rose by a further UAH 297 million in 2026, increasing the budget for the National Public Broadcasting Company to UAH 2.47 billion (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2025[47]). Moving forward, a continued focus on ensuring long-term funding stability for the public broadcaster will help it to function stably and to maintain necessary levels of coverage and staffing (Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law, 2024[48]).
Alongside Suspilne’s formalisation and professionalisation, the 2015 Law No. 917-VIII on Reforming State and Communal Print Media required privatisation of state-owned printed media (OECD, 2022[15]). Several other relevant reforms and changes came about following the 2014 Euromaidan demonstrations, which broadly sought to bring Ukraine closer to the European Union, including reduced legal pressure on the media and political influence of state-owned outlets, as well as improvements to the law on access to information, increased autonomy of the broadcasting regulator, and legislation introducing mandatory disclosure of media ownership and final beneficiaries (Freedom House, 2015[8]; Freedom House, 2016[9]) (Freedom House, 2016[9]). The success of these reforms was reflected in the jump in the country’s World Press Freedom Index Rank from 2014 to 2016. Ukraine’s score remained relatively stable until 2022, when it dropped slightly due to the challenges and threats to journalists due to the war (Reporters Without Borders, 2022[49]).3
While Ukraine's media landscape is diverse, it remains partly controlled by oligarchs who own the majority of the national TV channels (Reporters without Borders, 2024[50]). Many Ukrainian media outlets depend on funding from a small group of owners, making them vulnerable to political and economic pressure. To counteract this, Ukraine passed Law No. 1780-IX “On the Prevention of Threats to National Security Related to the Excessive Influence of Persons Who Have Significant Economic and Political Weight in Public Life (Oligarchs)” on 23 September 2021, which sought to reduce the disproportionate influence of oligarchs on Ukraine's political and economic system.
As the result of the law, former President Petro Poroshenko transferred ownership of his two major television channels to their employees in 2021, and in 2022, Rinat Akhmetov, at that time Ukraine's wealthiest individual, declared his intention to sell his media assets. That said, the Venice Commission noted in 2023 that the “Law on Prevention of Threats to National Security Related to Excessive Influence of Persons with Significant Economic and Political Weight in Public Life (Oligarchs)” took a “personal approach” that sought to identify persons as “oligarchs” through specific criteria, such as wealth and media ownership, rather than pursuing a multi-sectoral, systemic approach. Notably, the new Law on Media addresses the transparency issues that the Law on Oligarchs sought to tackle in the media sphere. Unlike the Law on Oligarchs, which is a separate instrument with its own procedures, the Law on Media contains mechanisms for identifying opaque ownership structures and limiting the influence of individuals on editorial policies of media outlets. The National Council has also adopted several bylaws and launched the relevant procedures for registration, reporting, and monitoring of media entities in accordance with the new legal requirements.
Indeed, a strength of the Ukrainian legal framework in the information space is its emphasis on transparency of media ownership. In 2015, Law No. 674-VIII "On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding Ensuring Transparency of Media Ownership and Implementation of the Principles of State Policy in the Sphere of Television and Radio Broadcasting" (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2015[51]) mandated that television and radio broadcasters disclose detailed ownership information, including ultimate beneficial owners, to the National Council and on their websites. This initiative was further strengthened in 2022 in the new Law on Media (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2025[37]), which expanded transparency requirements to encompass a broader range of media types, including online platforms and video-sharing services. The law also prohibits media entities from maintaining any ownership or financial ties with aggressor states, explicitly targeting Russian influence.
These legislative actions have both made media ownership more transparent and have strengthened resilience of Ukraine's information space against foreign interference, serving as a potential model for other countries confronting similar challenges. This move toward increased transparency has been supported by journalist investigations and engagement with civil society. It aligns with the call in the OECD Recommendation on Information Integrity to promote transparency and diversity of media ownership, and encourage editorial independence in an effort to prevent undue influence (OECD, 2024[1]). As evidence of the law’s impact, in 2024, the transparency of Ukraine's leading online media outlets increased to 80% (up from 68% in 2023), primarily due to more media organisations disclosing information about their ownership and leadership (Institute of Mass Information, 2024[52]).
Despite the increased transparency of media ownership, however, the war has made implementation of its media sector reforms more challenging. Examples remain of media actors avoiding full disclosure of their ownership, sometimes using intermediaries or holding companies. This is especially problematic in the online media sector, where registration and transparency requirements are weaker or voluntary, enabling individuals to buy domains anonymously.
Public policy in the media sector in response to the wartime context
These reforms have taken place in the context of the specific and very real harms brought by Russia’s ongoing invasions and interference in Ukraine’s physical and information spaces. Journalists have faced enormous challenges since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine and have had to adapt quickly to the new reality. According to a Reporters without Borders, based on data from the Institute of Mass Information, between the beginning of the Russian aggression in February 2022 and February 2026, 175 abuses against journalists in Ukraine by Russian forces were documented, including war crimes such as killings, injuries, and detentions. Furthermore, 16 journalists have been killed in the line of duty, at least 53 have been injured (many by drones in 2025), and 26 are currently detained by Russia (Reporters Without Borders, 2026[53]). The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression also noted that journalists have been “targeted, tortured, kidnapped, attacked and killed, or refused safe passage from cities and regions under siege” (UN, 2022[54]).
In addition to physical threats, the Russian invasion has weakened the Ukrainian economy and caused media outlets to lose subscribers and advertisers. Combined with material destruction, the disruption of supply chains, and the forced exile of employees, many Ukrainian media outlets are facing threats to their survival. Between 2022 and 2024, at least 235 Ukrainian media outlets have closed, while others have reduced their activity and temporarily laid-off their employees without pay (Reporters without Borders, 2025[10]). Local and print media have been the most affected in the face of these challenges. In 2021, 70% of local media outlets said they could cover more than 90% of their own expenses without outside help; by 2023, only 14% of them could do so, illustrating a sharp drop in financial independence (Reporters without Borders, 2024[50]). These economic losses have also had negative impacts on economic resources available to CSOs and other actors in the Ukrainian information space.
In response to this evolving and increasingly difficult context, the Ukrainian government has developed several mechanisms and programs designed to support media and journalists. Ukraine’s reforms since 2014 have also helped lay the ground for a more resilient media and information ecosystem, and policy responses that strengthen the environment in which information is created and shared have proven to be relevant in the context of the war. Continuing to promote and maintain a diverse and independent media sector will help ensure the free flow of information; in the context of Ukraine, this will mean supporting independent civil society and media organisations whose operations have been destroyed, as well as continuing to advocate for free speech and the promotion of democratic values.
In response to funding constraints, the government, along with international organisations and CSOs, implements media development programs that offer training, resources, and funding to journalists and media outlets, which are essential for improving journalistic standards and facilitating investigative journalism. Specialised programs also support regional and local media by providing financial assistance, grants, and capacity-building initiatives to strengthen community journalism and promote diversity and plurality.
A considerable part of Ukrainian media has also been heavily dependent on foreign funding. Indeed, most projects in this space were made possible due to the support of international donors; a review conducted by the Ukraine Institute of Media and Communication found that none of the projects assessed received funding from Ukrainian non-media businesses (Ukrainian Institute of Media and Communication, 2024[55]). Media, especially regional, cannot afford to invest financial and personnel resources in the production of content that does not bring profit. Recent changes in financial support by foreign governments will have a considerable impact on Ukraine media outlets, and the biggest impact of the decrease of foreign funding will likely be felt by regional, local, and investigative media (IMI, 2025[56]).
In addition to the threat to the information environment, there are specific concerns that Russia will seek to exploit emerging gaps in Ukraine’s information space created by foreign funding cuts. With far fewer credible sources able to report on local news stories across Ukraine, there are concerns that inauthentic and misleading content spread by Russia will become more difficult to counter (Tahir, 2025[57]).
Beyond funding issues, Ukraine has implemented several policy initiatives focused on the media sector. For example, at the end of 2022, the new Law on Media (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2025[37]) was prepared to align Ukraine more closely with the EU's Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD). It introduced considerable changes in the existing media regulatory landscape, including giving new powers to the National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine, which now has the mandate to regulate most media sources, including online sources.
The Law on Media also establishes a system of voluntary registration, which affords registered outlets more protections, for example receiving media status and enabling journalists to be accredited, which grants them access to state institutions. It is not mandatory for online media to register as such with the government, although the law is not limited by how media is disseminated so they are able to do so should they choose. Notably, most of the key online sites have registered (Freedom House, 2024[36]). As for influencers, there are no mandatory registration processes, and the law allows the National Council to ban unregistered entities from operating in the online media sphere, with subsequent notification of the Communications Services Regulator.
In an effort to provide consistent news coverage during the war, the Ukrainian government created the United News TV Marathon shortly following the outset of the full-scale aggression in 2022. Ukraine’s President signed a decree on 18 March requiring all national TV channels to broadcast through one platform, for which the government would provide funding. In 2025, the budget for the United News TV Marathon is UAH 738 million (EUR 15 million) (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2024[46]), though the Marathon has continued to lose viewership, with only 26% of the population watching in 2025, down from 47% in 2024 and from 54% in 2023 (Detector Media, 2025[58]). Only 32% believed the Marathon should continue until the end of the war, with 10% supporting its continuation post-war (Internews network, 2024[18]). Another opinion poll in September 2024 showed that 51% of respondents agree (35% strongly, 16% somewhat) that the Marathon has lost its relevance (CHESNO Movement, 2024[59]). Nevertheless, as of September 2025, 86% of Ukrainians are aware of the marathon; 42% of the population watches weekly, and 53% watch at least several times a month, up six percentage points from the previous year (Internews Ukraine, 2025[60]).
These findings reflect the larger concerns raised by the continuation of the United News TV Marathon. Given the government’s oversight and funding of the TV Marathon, questions have been raised as to whether it is the best platform for enabling a free exchange of views among Ukrainians (European Commission, 2024[34]), and it has been criticised for potential impact of freedom of speech, inefficient use of financial resources, and potentially having a negative impact on the trust of Ukraine population and of government institutions when quality coverage from both public and private Ukrainian broadcasters is already available. The United News TV Marathon also risks limiting the plurality of voices on national television and increases the risk that editorial decisions will reflect political considerations.
The European Commission called for a reassessment of whether this is the best platform for enabling a free exchange of views among Ukrainians (European Commission, 2024[34]). In May 2024, the United News TV Marathon was partially reshaped, providing more autonomy for Suspilne and enabling it to launch its own round-the-clock broadcasting.
On 26 June 2024, the government adopted the roadmap to support the re-establishment of a pluralistic, transparent, and independent media space after the end of martial law, following consultations with civil society. The roadmap provides a thorough concept for the post-war recovery of the media landscape, access to public information and measures to combat disinformation (European Commission, 2024[34]). Efforts such as these will be essential as the country takes steps to ensure it prepares for the post-war context even while fighting the war.
Governments are adapting their institutions and policy frameworks to respond to foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) threats and to create an enabling environment for accurate, reliable, and plural information to thrive. The objective for governments is to identify policy measures that reinforce information integrity, while avoiding actions that lead to greater information control over the information ecosystem (OECD, 2024[13]). In Ukraine, the effort to continue the reform process undertaken since 2014 while responding to the urgent threats posed by the ongoing war have acted as a catalyst for the government to put in place the institutional architecture – including strategic and planning documents, offices and units tasked with responding to the threats identified, and efforts to strengthen institutional capacity – to respond in a co-ordinated and comprehensive way.
Adding measurement components to strategic and planning documents can help the government reinforce information integrity and strengthen transparency
As part of governments’ efforts to put in place the institutional support needed to help reinforce information integrity, strategic frameworks play a critical role in supporting a coherent vision and effective response. National strategies can provide clarity by establishing institutional responsibilities, preventing duplication of efforts, and helping avoid information asymmetries across government (OECD, 2024[13]). That said, a strategy document is not an end in itself, but a means to guide the design of policy measures and evaluation timeframes to assess the efficiency and progress of the policies implemented (OECD, 2020[61]).
Strategies often cover operational aspects, such as designating focal points and identifying the functions of co-ordination mechanism(s), as well as set time frames to ensure the efficient implementation and evaluation of progress (see Box 3.4 for an overview of the Netherlands’ national strategy). Beyond national strategies, and particularly due to the multifaceted nature of this phenomenon, guidance on responding to hostile information threats and reinforcing information integrity is in many countries included as part of other national strategic documents. This is the case in Australia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Slovak Republic.
In December 2022, the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Ministry of Justice and Security, and Ministry of Education, Culture and Science presented to the House of Representatives a renewed government-wide strategy to protect the free and open public debate against disinformation.
In the document, they present their national strategy as an effective approach to tackling disinformation centred on the values and fundamental rights of the rule of law, such as the freedom of speech and press. An important point of the Netherlands’ strategy is that they highlight that qualifying disinformation as such and conducting fact-checking are not primary duties for the government. The document does note, however, that where national security, public health, or social and/or economic stability are at stake, the government can act and debunk false and misleading information.
The strategy outlines that the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations has a co-ordinating responsibility for the policy against disinformation and acts as the primary point of contact within the national government and toward municipal and provincial authorities. The ministry is to conduct this role by promoting collaboration between authorities in this area and by fulfilling a knowledge function. The strategy also emphasises the need for international co-ordination mechanisms, the European Rapid Alert System, the Hybrid Centre of Excellence and the NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence and international fora such as the European Union, G7, and the OECD. This strategy updates the first government-wide disinformation policy presented in 2019 (Parliamentary Documents II 2019/2020, 30821, no. 91).
The OECD Recommendation on Information Integrity noted the value that developing and implementing a national strategy can have as a means of supporting a coherent vision and a comprehensive approach to reinforcing information integrity and upholding universal human rights. Whether focused specifically on information integrity or included as part of other official documents such as strategies on digitalisation, democracy, trust, national security, public communication, or education, the Recommendation highlights the importance of describing objectives, time frames, scope, and operational aspects of governments’ efforts in this space. The OECD Recommendation also stresses the importance of monitoring a strategy’s implementation by collecting credible and relevant evidence and providing recommendations for their improvement, with particular attention paid to upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms (OECD, 2024[1]).
In Ukraine, the President signed the new “Information Security Strategy” in 2021 (The Presidential Office of Ukraine, 2021[63]), which replaced the 2016 “Information Security Doctrine”. The 2021 strategy addresses the threats from Russian disinformation and propaganda and outlines measures to protect national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and democratic stability.
The "Implementation Plan of Information Security Strategy until 2025” was subsequently drafted and approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on 30 March 2023 to provide specific implementing actions for the Strategy (Order Number 272-r) (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2023[64]). The document outlines strategic measures designed to ensure information security in Ukraine, aiming to counteract disinformation, enhance information literacy, foster national identity, promote Ukrainian culture, protect human rights and freedoms, and reintegrate temporarily occupied territories into the national information space.
The implementation plan is structured around several strategic goals, each having specific tasks, responsible entities, execution timelines, and performance indicators. The plan also allocates responsibility among multiple governmental bodies, including the MCSC, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting, Security Service of Ukraine, and other central executive bodies.
Ukraine’s strategy takes a broad, proactive approach to defending the country’s information space and building national resilience. It focuses on identifying and stopping hostile information threats early, working with international partners, and tightening laws against harmful propaganda. At the same time, it boosts the defence forces’ ability to respond to information threats with better training and resources. It also puts a strong emphasis on protecting Ukraine’s online space, promoting national culture and identity, and keeping people in temporarily occupied territories connected with accurate historical narratives. Clear and unified communication during crises, international campaigns to strengthen Ukraine’s image, and efforts to build media literacy across society are all key parts of the strategy. Protecting journalists and supporting free expression complement the strategy’s objectives to create a united, informed, and resilient population in Ukraine.
The Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communication, in co-operation with other institutions, is working on a new Information Security Strategy, scheduled for release by the end of 2025. The updated strategy will have additional elements pertaining to foreign information interference and media literacy with a focus on resilience of society and individuals. The strategy is being developed with input from multiple stakeholders, including government, academia, civil society, and other experts.
Moving forward, it may be useful to use documents such as the strategy and implementation plan to create clearer definitions of important terms, such as “disinformation”, “information manipulation”, and “artificial amplification”. Clear definitions will help avoid internal confusion, structure engagement with platforms, and provide legal clarity in administrative or criminal proceedings.
The Ukrainian government has not yet published any public reports on the implementation of the plan, and while the plan provides a comprehensive overview of how to implement the strategy, it would be useful moving forward to clarify indicators for success. Measures of success would be useful in evaluating the strategy document and would enable monitoring of its implementation by collecting credible and relevant evidence and indicate areas for improvement. Along those lines, the government should consider recent developments in the information space regarding both the threats it faces and its experience gained since the start of Russia’s war of aggression, as well as to provide more detailed descriptions of the functions of the different Ukrainian government institutions involved in the strengthening of the information integrity as it updates its strategic approach.
Reducing fragmentation of the government’s institutional responses
A multifaceted challenge like reinforcing information integrity involves multiple actors and approaches and should be addressed in a co-ordinated and strategic manner. The scale and speed of the proliferation of false and misleading content has made countries aware of the need to develop a comprehensive view of how to improve the level of integrity in the information space. To this end, governments are increasingly setting up or upgrading their co-ordination mechanisms (OECD, 2024[13]).
The OECD Recommendation on Information Integrity recommends that countries develop and upgrade their institutional architecture to strengthen information integrity. Notably, this can be achieved by providing clear and transparent mandates to the relevant agencies, offices, units, or co-ordination mechanisms and connecting sectoral priorities to enable information-sharing and avoid duplication of efforts. Appropriate institutional architecture also requires well-defined internal governance mechanisms with appropriate checks and balances to enable timely and effective responses to information integrity risks during crises, including, as appropriate, dialogue mechanisms with other sector actors and civil society (OECD, 2024[1]).
The Recommendation also points to the importance of governments putting in place transparent and clear processes for engaging with online platforms as well as guidelines and oversight mechanisms with robust reporting mechanisms to help protect privacy, national security, and freedom of opinion and expression. These recommendations aim to create predictable guidelines for public officials' interactions with online platforms, civil society, and academia, ensuring accountability while upholding freedom of speech (OECD, 2024[1]).
Governments are increasingly setting up or upgrading their co-ordination mechanisms (OECD, 2024[13]). Co-ordination mechanisms vary widely and can consist of central offices or inter-agency task forces composed of public servants from across the government. The latter generally have focused mandates and scope (OECD, 2024[13]) (see Figure 3.1). For example, several countries have put in place national-level co-ordination bodies that focus on detecting and characterising hostile information operations orchestrated by foreign agents, including France’s Service for Vigilance and Protection against Foreign Digital Interference (VIGINUM) (see Box 3.5).
Source: (OECD, 2024[13])
In February 2026, France has adopted its first national strategy to combat information manipulation. This document sets out a clear ambition, structured around four pillars:
to mobilise the Nation in strengthening the resilience of democracy;
to engage online platforms and artificial intelligence services in safeguarding public debate;
to consolidate our national capabilities for detecting, attributing and responding to foreign digital interference;
and to act alongside European and international counterparts to ensure a free, open and secure information space.
Under the authority of the Prime Minister, the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN) coordinates this strategy, drawing in particular on the Service for Vigilance and Protection against Foreign Digital Interference (VIGINUM), created by the Decree no. 2021-922 of 13 July 2021 (updated by the Decree no. 2026-70 of 11 February 2026).
VIGINUM’s main mission consists in detecting, analyzing and documenting, through the analysis of publicly available online content, foreign digital interferences, a form of information manipulation campaigns that relies on four criteria provided by decree:
the implication of a foreign State or non-State actor;
the use of inauthentic means;
the use of inaccurate or misleading content;
an impact on France’s fundamental interests.
VIGINUM also supports the SGDSN in co-ordinating an inter-ministerial network composed of administrations and services contributing directly or indirectly to the fight against foreign digital interferences: the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of the Armed Forces. It’s notable within this network that response options are discussed and proposed on a case-by-case basis to the political level.
In close coordination with the Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, VIGINUM is also contributing to the international cooperation on the fight against information manipulation, both at the European and the international levels, through several bilateral and multilateral exchanges, such as the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism and the OECD.
Since 11 February 2026, VIGINUM consolidated its leading role at the national level with three new missions: raise awareness among the general public, through the creation of an Academy for the fight against foreign information manipulation, document and conduct foresight analysis of foreign digital interferences (FDI) and develop innovative tools and methodologies useful in this field.
A fundamental element of VIGINUM is that it operates within a rigorous legal and ethical framework, notably defined by the Decree no. 2021-1587 of 7 December 2021. The latter is the result of consultations with parliamentary representatives and legal work with the French Council of State, based on its authorisation to consult, collect, and use, in an automated way, personal data publicly available online. The control of the management of the personal data collected online is supervised by the CNIL (the French National Commission for Information Technology and Civil Liberties). In addition, an ethical and scientific committee attached to the SGDSN has been set up to follow VIGINUM’s activities. A representative of the highest French administrative court (the French Council of State) chairs the committee, which brings together qualified representatives from the fields of diplomacy, law enforcement, science, and media.
Source: (SGDNS, 2022[65]; OECD, 2024[13])
Ukrainian institutions focused on reinforcing information integrity
Within Ukraine, various ministries and agencies work on reinforcing information integrity. The institutional architecture in place in Ukraine has developed rapidly and offers many lessons for other actors, particularly related to the ability of the government to create and distribute official information, exchange data internally and with external partners on information threats and actors, and crisis communication. That said, co-ordination challenges between government offices and units can lead to inefficiencies and overlaps. See Box 3.6 for an overview of the relevant institutions, agencies, or offices, which are responsible for identifying, responding to, or otherwise tackling hostile information threats in Ukraine.
The 2022 invasion increased the urgency to respond to co-ordinated information attacks. The scale of the interference campaigns demanded faster and more cohesive actions across government institutions, as well as increased collaboration with international organisations and civil society. The new centres Ukraine set up to counter disinformation were in part designed to provide more structured intergovernmental co-ordination. The invasion also reiterated the importance of building on efforts made prior to 2022 to work with civil society and media partners to develop and put in place awareness raising campaigns and training to help the public identify inauthentic information and to establish clear communication channels for rapid information sharing.4 Specifically related to strengthening information integrity, in 2021, Ukraine established two centres:
The Center for Countering Disinformation (CCD) under the National Security and Defence Council (NSDC), and
The Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security (CSCIS) under the Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communications.
The Center for Countering Disinformation (CCD) is a working body of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine and focuses on monitoring and information threat analysis as well as implementing measures to counter threats to the information security of Ukraine.
The Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communications is the main body within the central executive authority that supports the formation and implementation of public policy in the areas of culture, public communication diplomacy, media, and publishing. It also plays a significant role in co-ordinating efforts to promote information integrity, engaging both internal and international stakeholders, including collaboration with governmental entities, civil society organisations, media outlets, and international partners to develop strategies and initiatives aimed at reinforcing information integrity.
The Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security (CSCIS) initially was created as the part of the information agency Ukrinform; since the beginning of 2025, it has become an independent agency under the Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communications.
The Ministry of Defence co-ordinates the creation and development of strategic communications in the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces as a component of the national strategic communication function, and primarily focuses on supporting the sustainability and adaptability of the function to respond to challenges and threats.
The Security Service carries out information and analytical work related to internal and external activities by state authorities and the governments of Ukraine, focusing specifically on issues related to the national security of Ukraine.
Note: This information was provided by the Government of Ukraine in response to the questions: “Please fill out the below information for all institutions, agencies or offices that are responsible for identifying, responding to, or otherwise tackling threats of disinformation in Ukraine. If possible and relevant, please include information for offices in crisis management and response, intelligence, armed services, and law enforcement, as well as ministries focused on specific policy areas (digital, trade, cultural issues, etc.). Please also shortly describe their roles” and “What cross-institutional co-ordinating mechanisms does Ukraine have in the field of fighting disinformation and more general strengthening information integrity, working groups etc)? Which institution (if any) oversees this co-ordination? Which institutions participate in these co-ordination bodies?”
Source: Government of Ukraine
The Center for Countering Disinformation (CCD) is a Ukrainian state body under the National Security and Defence Council, established in March 2021 to safeguard Ukraine's information space. The CCD co-operates with and operates as an integral part of the Ukrainian national security and defence system. Beside the publicly visible part of the work, a considerable part of its activities are classified because of the potential impact to national security.
Its primary functions include monitoring and analysing the information environment, tracking and analysing disinformation narratives and threats targeting Ukraine's national security, particularly from external actors, combating propaganda and destructive information campaigns, and preventing attempts to manipulate public opinion. The CCD provides analytical materials to the National Security and Defence Council, develops strategic communications, and participates in creating methodologies to detect manipulative content. Additionally, it promotes media literacy through educational initiatives and collaborates with civil society and international partners to enhance information security and resilience against information threats. The CCD also co-ordinates with Ukrainian ministries, security agencies, and international partners to provide analytical insights, strategic advice, and recommendations for countering disinformation.
Since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine began in February 2022, the CCD has also conducted debunking activities on Telegram, and X (Twitter), Facebook, and other platforms. The CCD provides the Ukrainian government with an official, expert means of countering Russia’s hostile information campaigns. To-date, most of its communications have focused on presenting examples of manipulated or false content, updates on military developments, and posts that aim to help build media and information literacy by explaining how information and psychological operations are developed.
The Center for Strategic Communication and Information Security (CSCIS), for its part, focuses more on developing information campaigns to counter external threats and information attacks from Russia. Its key functions include conducting information campaigns to raise awareness and counter hostile information threats, as well as creating messages for co-ordinated government communication and to develop narratives to counter topics that are heavily targeted by adversaries. The CSCIS also addresses specific challenges related to the information space, especially during crises or events requiring co-ordinated responses from multiple agencies. As part of its efforts, the CSCIS monitors information attacks and tracks information threats to inform their efforts to respond, put in place preventive measures, and increase public awareness. The CSCIS also helps produce public communication materials designed to counter disinformation to share through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassies, military, and other offices and agencies.
Through the Annual Kyiv StratCom Forum, the CSCIS provides a public platform for discussing issues and developing solutions to reinforce information integrity. In addition, the database of Russian information attacks against Ukraine that the CSCIS publishes helps establish an online source of information to respond to information threats, inform media and information literacy activities, and strengthen the resilience of Ukrainian society by building understanding of information threats (The Centre for Strategic Communication, 2025[66]).
While there is significant complementarity between the two offices, mandates and activities can often overlap, particularly due to the primary focus on responding to the national security threats posed by the war. One such area of potential overlap is that both centres are monitoring the information space and are producing both public and classified analytical products based on their monitoring. In addition, processes for engagement with online platforms are not clearly outlined in legislation or guidance documents, and both centres have strategic communication functions, though the CCD positions itself as more national security and defence oriented. For example, the head of the CCD provides regular updates on Russian physical attacks against Ukrainian infrastructure and on Russian information operations. Both centres also organise and participate in media information literacy and awareness rising activities.
Such shared activities do not automatically imply unnecessary overlap or duplication. Indeed, such arrangements can promote resilience and enable efficiencies, particularly around tools, resources, and capacity sharing. For example, in 2021, Ukraine's National Security and Defence Council implemented a shared platform to integrate and analyse data for national security monitoring, including a system to collect information related to information integrity and hostile information threats identified by a range of state institutions. The system allowed decision makers through the National Security and Defence Council mechanism to have an overview of the developments in the state information space (National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, 2021[67]). This system was temporarily stopped following the full-scale invasion due to operational security reasons.
Furthermore, flexible co-ordination mechanisms have been put in place. Government officials have created ad hoc working groups, which include representatives from multiple institutions, to respond to information threats and try to develop a common strategic approach. Representatives from government and civil society alike have noted that deficiencies and formal systems are often made-up for by strong personal connections across government and between government and civil society. The primary challenges with such informal arrangements are that it is harder to secure the appropriate level of representation, meeting regularity, and clarity of expected outcomes.
There are also informal and semi-formal co-ordination mechanisms organised and run via chat groups and online messaging services. Such groups can include representatives from different central and regional level governmental institutions – for example, public officials responsible for strategic communication in different institutions – as well as mixed groups including representatives from non-governmental organisations, which enable more rapid information exchange and co-ordination. That said, these mechanisms can raise concerns regarding the longer-term ability to build institutional memory and continuity as individuals change roles, as well as more broadly to transparency, oversight, and operational security.
Currently, Ukraine lacks a fully co-ordinated strategic communication system. Interviewees suggested that clearer structure and mandate for the relevant offices, or even the creation of a single centre that could manage the necessary information sharing, public communication functions, and strategic guidance, would streamline the country’s ability to respond to information threats and build information integrity. Increased harmonisation of the offices’ mandates would also help strengthen the financial and staffing capacity of the government’s activities in this space. The nature and magnitude of the information threats reiterate the pressing need to invest in necessary human resources and technological solutions. In addition, the counter disinformation offices face considerable skill gaps – for example, identifying staff with proficient English and other languages to efficiently interact with foreign audiences, data analysts, foreign government counterparts, and platforms.
National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine
Beyond the institutions dedicated specifically to countering disinformation, the National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting plays a critical role in reinforcing information integrity given its mandate to oversee state policy related to television, radio, and publishing. Such independent regulatory mechanisms can play an important role in identifying and understanding systemic risks to the information space; investigating and monitoring broadcasters’ and online information platforms’ compliance with applicable legislation; and issuing recommendations to help broadcasters and online information platforms address potential threats (OECD, 2024[1]).
One of the strategic directions of the National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting is the introduction of media support tools and the promotion of media literacy among media professionals. To this end, the National Council created a working group on media literacy, which includes experts from the national regulator and experts from Ukrainian civil society organisations, including the Ukrainian Institute of Media and Communication, the Institute for Regional Press Development, Women in Media, Social Perspective, the Media Reform Centre, the StopFake educational platform, and the Suspilnist Foundation.
The National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting conducted a survey of media professionals in October 2024, and the Media Literacy Working Group published an analyticalreport based on the survey results in May 2025 (National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine, 2025[68]). The National Council takes the results of the survey into account when planning its work to support the media and improve the level of media literacy of media professionals, and is currently working on developing a media guidelines manual with the assistance of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Support Programme for Ukraine.
Another important area of work for the National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine is co-operation with European regulators. Ukraine is a member of the European Platform of Regulatory Authorities (EPRA), which includes all national broadcast regulators of the Council of Europe states and serves as a platform for international exchange. In 2024, the National Council was also invited to join the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services (ERGA) as an observer. The National Council has also signed bilateral memoranda of co-operation with several regulators and co-operates with international partners and organisations, including the United Nations (UN), UNESCO, and the Council of Europe.
Similar to the CCD and CSIS, the National Council faces financial and human resources constraints threatening its ability to fulfil its mandate to provide independent oversight of the information space. The Law on Media (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2025[37]) states that the funding of the National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting must amount to at least 0.022% of the revenues of the General Fund of the State Budget of Ukraine from the previous year. The financing for the National Council is provided as a separate line item in the State Budget, ensuring its institutional independence. In addition to the state budget, additional sources of funding include at least 4% of actual revenues from payments for the use of the radio frequency spectrum (although this provision was temporarily suspended for 2023-2025) and international technical assistance funds (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2025[37]). In 2023, due to the martial law and budget constraints caused by the war, the Ukrainian Parliament suspended the automatic budget guarantee. This means that despite a slight increase, the budget allocation for 2025 is only UAH 230,5 million (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2024[46]), amounting to roughly 40% less than the required financing.
This financial situation has made it difficult to provide competitive salaries to personnel, which is particularly relevant given the specialised nature of the required staff. The shortage of funding also affects the ability for the National Council to implement projects, such as the online system for media licensing and registration (Digital Security Lab Ukraine, 2024[69]).
The fragmented nature of institutional co-ordination in Ukraine remains a significant barrier to effective governance of information integrity. While interactions between institutions have improved, they are still inconsistent. Co-ordination gaps often result in delayed or contradictory responses to threats in the information space, weakening overall governance effectiveness.
Strengthening institutional capacities
The urgent, immediate, and rapidly evolving threats facing Ukraine’s information space require the government to invest in capacity-building programs to help public officials develop skills to analyse and respond to hostile information threats. Such support could include adapted training and upskilling at all levels of government and providing adequate human, technical, and financial resources to effectively detect, monitor, and counter the spread of disinformation and other forms of information manipulation, without impinging on freedom of opinion and expression (OECD, 2024[13]). Efforts to enhance technical and professional expertise are particularly important given the rapid changes in the tools and techniques used to create and share information, particularly related to specific skills related to the use of AI.
Ukraine has provided capacity building initiatives for public officials at the central and local levels, though they currently largely cover public officials working on strategic communication, rather than to a wider cohort. Ukrainian government institutions have received considerable support from OECD member states, the EU and other international organisations, and the EU and Ukraine have expanded co-operation in countering hybrid threats (including foreign information threats). The bilateral security agreement signed on 27 June 2024 includes measures focused on countering foreign information manipulation and interference and building information resilience.
Ukraine’s efforts to build the capacities of central and local level public officials in the field of information integrity are concentrated in two main workstreams. The first is on strengthening awareness and media and information literacy of public officials. Government officials and representatives of non-governmental organisations noted gaps in the awareness and skills of public officials, potentially leading to vulnerabilities to information attacks. That said, recent research does not fully support that suggestion, as it found that 89% of public sector respondents showed above-average (72%) or high (17%) media literacy, with only 11% showing below average scores. These rates are considerably higher than similar results among the general population (18-65 years), where only 7% have high media literacy and 28% are low or below average. Furthermore, the research found that 46% of public sector respondents are highly sensitive to distorted content, compared to 31% among general population (Detector Media, 2025[70]).
Second, capacity building efforts are focused on training public officials with the skills needed to respond and engage effectively in the information space, including through strategic communication skills and crisis communication. Research shows that only 31% of respondents from the public sector attended media literacy trainings or courses. While this percentage is still higher than 7% among general population, 20% have never heard of such initiatives (Detector Media, 2025[70]).
Notably, the CSCIS has created a School for Strategic Communications and Information Security, with the support of the United Kingdom Government Communication Service and Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (Center for Strategic Communication and Information Security, 2025[71]). The school’s two main training programs for public officials are “Russian Disinformation and Ways to Counter It” and “Strategic Communications in Public Administration: Crisis Response Strategies.” The school also published the manual “Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine: Winning on the information front”, which is modelled on UK Resist 2.0 manual (Center for Strategic Communication and Information Security, 2023[72]). The school also carried out trainings focused on communication campaign planning and crisis communications for representatives of local administrations and local self-government bodies.
Between 2022 and the beginning of 2025, the school conducted 169 training sessions, reaching a total of 1,998 participants. In 2024, it also held eight regional trainings for communicators of regional military administrations (about 166 people) and ten trainings for employees responsible for communication in state bodies (more than 200 people) ((n.a.), 2025[45]). The focus on trainings at the sub-national level is particularly relevant, given that civil servants at regional and municipal levels are often susceptible to hostile information attacks and yet do not necessarily have the resources or same level of access to information compared to officials in the national administration.
In 2025, the MCSC national media literacy project ‘Filter’ implemented an educational project for public officials on the use of AI technologies, partnering with the Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law and supported by UNESCO and the government of Japan. In February 2025, the training programme had received 1,450 applications and had graduated 781 public officials (Filter, 2025[73]).
Participants in the trainings for public officials have reported mixed results depending on their design and quality. Some trainings that focus on practical skills and capabilities development, such as data analysis and the use of information space monitoring tools and techniques, were useful in building Ukrainian institutions’ capabilities to monitor and counter information attacks. In other cases, the practical experience and skills of Ukrainian public officials was on the same level as – or even higher than – the skills of foreign experts providing the training.
Given Ukrainian institutions’ long experience of being on the frontline of information attacks, there is less of a need for basic or introductory capacity building products. Ultimately, while there is constant demand from Ukrainian institutions, and particularly from CCD and CSC, for capacity building, concentrating such efforts on data analytics and AI skills for more efficient detection and countering of FIMI threats would be the priority. It is along these lines that international co-operation and support, particularly with OECD member states, could be most useful.
Strengthening information integrity requires concerted efforts to build societal resilience by addressing the root causes of crises while strengthening the capacities and resources of the population to understand, resist, and recover from the challenges they face in the information space. To that end, public policies should focus on strengthening users’ abilities to recognise reliable sources of information and increasing resilience to malign interference in the information space, building bridges with communities to better understand citizens’ needs and challenges in the information space, as well as expanding on existing legal frameworks and initiatives to further develop tools for governments and civil society to work together to build resilience (Council of Europe, 2023[42]).
On the individual level, strengthening societal resilience involves governments investing in digital, media, and information literacy to help people critically assess content and make informed decisions. In addition, strengthening societal resilience requires building and strengthening relationships between the government, citizens, and civil society in ways that are effective and meaningful.
Strengthening engagement between civil society, the public, and the government to build information integrity is rooted in efforts to protect and strengthen civic space, which is understood as set of legal, policy, institutional, and practical conditions necessary for non-governmental actors to access information, express themselves, associate and participate in public life. As such, these efforts ultimately foster more open, transparent, and collaborative initiatives where both individuals and institutions reinforce efforts to strengthen the information ecosystem and engage constructively within it (OECD, 2022[31]; OECD, 2024[2]).
In this context, this chapter will review Ukraine’s efforts to build public awareness and media and information literacy skills, as well as put in place opportunities to help ensure the relationship between the government and civil society is effective and meaningful and helps support information integrity.
Insufficient public awareness and media and information literacy skills
Enhancing individuals’ understanding of – and skills to operate in – modern information environments is a critical component of building societal resilience. Media and information literacy is a useful tool to help build this understanding. Specifically, media and information literacy refers to a set of skills and competencies that enable citizens to critically, effectively, and responsibly access, understand, use, and engage with information and media, both online and off-line. Notably, this can include digital literacy, news literacy, media literacy, algorithm literacy, and AI literacy (OECD, 2024[1]).
These skills are particularly relevant in Ukraine’s context, given the constant information attacks. Many Ukrainians are uncertain about which sources to trust, leading to scepticism and lower civic engagement. Notably, 62% of Ukrainians in a recent survey emphasised the challenges posed by disinformation (similar to the 64% in 2023) (Detector Media, 2025[58]). That said, findings in Ukraine have also shown inconsistent skills regarding media and information literacy. Detector Media found that the share of Ukrainians with above-average media literacy declined from 81% in 2022 to 72% in 2024, though still higher than in 2020 (51%). Broadly, the indicators assess Ukrainians' understanding of the media's role, their use and trust in various news sources, digital skills, awareness of artificial intelligence, and topics such as media ownership awareness, formation analysis habits, online behaviour, and the abilities to critically evaluate media content (Detector Media, 2025[58]). While the vast majority of the country has demonstrated at least basic digital literacy skills, the lowest levels of media literacy were recorded in older populations, people with lower levels of education, and less financially well-off groups of the population. These findings might be explained by population fatigue and stricter criteria by researchers for evaluation (for example, criteria for AI literacy were added in 2024). Specifically regarding AI, the Ministry of Digital Transformation’s 2025 biennial nationwide digital literacy survey found that 42% of adults and 70% of teenagers already use AI tools for learning, work, or everyday tasks (Ministry of Digital Transformation, 2025[74]).
At the same time, older adults in Ukraine show adaptability in managing information during wartime. A national survey of 1,186 adults aged 60+ found that 88.5% used the internet for news and 85.1% to stay in touch with family and friends. Focus groups revealed that participants, even with minimal training, employed techniques they had learned and adapted their media routines, with 70.2% feeling confident in their abilities to distinguish accurate content (Pasitselska, 2024[75]).
The Ukrainian government has acknowledged the importance of building media and information literacy as a means of strengthening societal resilience to information integrity threats. Ukraine’s Information Security Strategy of 15 October 2021 identified insufficient levels of media literacy as a main threat that can facilitate malign actors’ efforts to manipulate public opinion and conduct destructive information operations, and included enhancing media literacy as one of the country’s strategic goals (President of Ukraine, 2021[76]). Additionally, in November 2025, the Ministry of Digital Transformation, together with the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection, the National Cybersecurity Co-ordination Center, and Better Regulation Delivery Office, presented the draft National Cyber Hygiene Strategy, which outlines how Ukraine will systematically develop a culture of safe online behaviour by 2030. Focusing on building such skills will remain a priority as the information environment continues to change based on the evolution of AI technologies. What effects these technologies have on the public’s engagement and trust of content they see will need to be factored into ongoing initiatives. Considering how to employ AI technologies to upgrade both media literacy and awareness raising efforts themselves will also be an important avenue to explore.
Institutionally, MCSC serves as the main co-ordinating body for media literacy (see Box 3.7 for information on the strategy of the Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communication of Ukraine for media literacy development until 2026). In 2021, MCSS established the national media literacy project Filter, which consolidates various media literacy initiatives and provides resources and trainings for educators and others (Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communications of Ukraine, 2025[77]).
The Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communication approved its “Strategy for Media Literacy Development until 2026” on 24 May 2024 in response to European Union (EU) Directive 2010/13 on Audiovisual Media Services, the Law of Ukraine “On Media” (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2025[37]), and the Information Security Strategy of Ukraine (2021).
The 2021 Information Security Strategy identifies increasing the level of media literacy in society as one of its main goals. It emphasises that “Ukraine’s society must be protected from the destructive influence of disinformation and manipulative information, and the media environment must be socially responsible and function stably.”
The strategy proposes to highlight the following competencies that a media-literate person should possess:
“Information and media literacy: The ability to critically evaluate content from various sources and to use media services in an ethical and responsible way.
Resilience to information influences. Ability to fact check and use critical thinking:
Digital literacy: Adhering to digital hygiene rules in everyday life.
Responsible creation and dissemination of personal content.”
The strategy prioritises integrating media literacy into lifelong education, targeting educators, students, older adults, and vulnerable populations, including internally displaced persons, to ensure comprehensive outreach.
Key elements of the strategy are collaboration between government institutions, civil society, media entities, and international organisations, as well as a reliance on evidence-based practices to effectively respond to evolving media landscapes and technological advancements. The strategy includes benchmarks for measuring success by emphasising increased public awareness and improved critical evaluation skills. Regular monitoring and evaluation activities will be essential to ensure continuous improvement and responsiveness to emerging challenges in the media environment.
One of the flagship events co-ordinated by the Filter project is the annual National Media Literacy Day, which aligns with UNESCO’s Global Media and Information Literacy Week. International partners, including UNDP, UNESCO, and the Government of Japan, also support this project. Ukraine held its third National Media Literacy Test on 17 October 2024. The test involved 236,000 participants and assessed skills in media reliability, social media dynamics, ethical content interaction, fact-checking abilities, and cybersecurity awareness; at least 20 000 participants took the test from occupied territories. While participation in this activity grew more than five-fold between 2023 and 2024, only 8% of participants achieved the top status (Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communications of Ukraine, 2024[79]). In 2025, a larger share of participants in the test were aged 36 and older compared to previous years, indicating greater interest from a wider segment of the population (UNDP, 2025[80]). Notably, the national digital education platform Diia.Education offers educational materials on countering disinformation (seven modules) as well as on artificial intelligence (22 modules).
For its part, in 2023, the Center for Countering Disinformation (CCD), with support from the European Union Advisory Mission (EUAM), published the "Handbook on Countering Disinformation", which was created to help build public understanding of threats in the information space, particularly those targeting Ukraine (Center for Countering Disinformation, 2023[26]). In addition, the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security regularly discloses Russian hostile propaganda activities (Center for Strategic Communication and Information Security, 2025[81]). Similarly, in 2023-2024, the organisation Smart Angel, with financial support from the European Union and in co-operation with a wide range of Ukrainian government and civil society partners5 carried out the Information and Awareness Campaign against Disinformation, which created media products with the involvement of expert organisations (Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security, 2024[82]).
In addition to government-backed efforts, media and CSOs are also actively engaged in awareness raising and media literacy strengthening initiatives. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale aggression in 2022, Ukrainian media have significantly expanded projects focused on media literacy and information space awareness, producing videos, podcasts, articles, and educational programs. Research in 2022-2024 found 158 media projects (103 by national outlets and 55 by regional ones) focused on media literacy and countering disinformation, of which two-thirds were regular and ongoing initiatives. While most projects targeted adults through videos, articles, and podcasts, very few initiatives were designed for children, teenagers, or other vulnerable groups (Ukrainian Institute of Media and Communication, 2024[55]). More recently, Detector Media, in co-operation with UNESCO, launched the "Media Literacy is Freedom" campaign, emphasising the importance of media and information literacy and helping Ukrainians navigate the flow of information (UNESCO, n.d.[83]).
Despite these efforts, interviews with Ukrainian stakeholders from both government and civil society met during the review suggest that media literacy training programs are too fragmented and do not reach a wide enough range of the population. Given that trainings focused on raising awareness to information threats, understanding propaganda methods, and building skills to operate in the information environment are delivered by a wide range of governmental and non-governmental actors, concerns were expressed about consistency and sustainability of efforts. The fragmentation of efforts has also limited the statistics and amount of information on the extent of these activities and their impact.
In addition to media and digital literacy efforts targeting the population at large, Ukraine has also made significant progress in introducing media literacy within the education system. The implementation of media literacy is included in the state standards for primary, secondary, and higher education, which compares favourably to the OECD average, in which 54% of 15-year-old students reported that they were trained at school to recognise whether information is biased or not (OECD, 2021[84]). These figures were highest in Australia, Canada, Denmark and the United States (more than 70%) and lowest in Israel, Latvia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Switzerland (less than 45%) (OECD, 2021[85]). The State Standard of Basic Secondary Education, approved by the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 898 of 30 September 2020, defines the requirements for mandatory learning outcomes and competencies of students and contains significant potential for media education (Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2020[86]).
Media and information literacy is not taught as separate course, but as an integrated component of the civic education courses throughout elementary and high school. Media literacy is also taught in schools as part of extracurricular activities, including through trainings delivered by civil society organisations.
For example, the Learn to Discern (L2D) program is operated by the international non-governmental organisation IREX, in collaboration with Ukraine's Ministry of Education and Science. The programme aims to equip students, teachers, and parents with critical thinking skills to identify and resist hostile propaganda and inauthentic content. Through 2024, the program had been active in 2,000 schools (about 16% of the country's schools), engaging more than 5,000 teachers (IREX, 2024[87]).
In addition to direct media literacy campaigns in schools, organisations have focused on building the capacity of teachers to implement such programs. For example, the Academy of Ukrainian press launched the Media Education and Media Literacy online platform in 2013. This is an interactive platform for exchange among media teachers that promotes transparency and information exchange in the media education environment. The Academy, with the support of foreign donors, has published manuals for teachers on media literacy6 (Academy of Ukrainian Press, n.d.[88]). A leading Ukrainian online education platform “Prometheus”, with the support of the Czech government, has also created the free "Media Literacy for Educators" course. This 60-hour online program is designed to enhance educators' understanding of media, protect against information threats, and enable educators to teach these skills to students. The course covers topics such as media influence, internet safety, and cyberbullying prevention, aiming to develop critical media literacy competencies among teachers, school leaders, and educational trainers (Media Literacy for Educators, 2025[89]).
The focus moving forward will be to improve the understanding of the impact of media and information literacy activities and to better co-ordinate across government and non-government actors. The MCSC’s media literacy development strategy highlights the need to create “effective tools for regular monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of media literacy programmes to constantly improve and adapt to changing conditions” (Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communications of Ukraine, 2024[90]). Currently, the measurement of media literacy initiatives is largely based on partial information from publicly available media literacy assessments, such as Detector Media’s media literacy index. Such research does not often include data on school children, or the impact of initiatives undertaken via the school system. There is also no systemic use of measurement tools comparing results before and after media literacy courses. Indicators of media literacy initiatives often assess attendance numbers or generalised opinion polls, rather than specific analysis of the skills learned or capacities developed in the courses provided.
The efforts to understand impact and subsequently translate that into improved media and information literacy initiatives would also benefit from improved co-ordination between governmental and non-governmental institutions (International media support, 2024[91]). The MCSC’s Filter project plays a role in co-ordination, but interviewees flagged that it would be worth considering the establishment of a more formal body that could include government representatives (for example from the Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communications, Centre for Countering Disinformation, National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting, Ministry of Education, and other institutions) and non-governmental actors working in the field, such as the Dutch Media Literacy Framework or Finland National Media Education Policy. In addition to more effective lessons sharing and measurement, more systematic co-ordination could facilitate efforts to avoid overlaps and duplication, as well as more easily identify potentially underserved populations.
Opportunities exist to help ensure the relationship between the government and civil society is constructive and helps support information integrity
Strengthening participation by and engagement with the public, civil society, and media will be essential as countries look to strengthen information integrity. A whole-of-society approach, grounded in the protection and promotion of civic space and freedom of opinion and expression, is necessary given the fundamental role that individuals and non-governmental partners have in promoting healthy information and democratic spaces (OECD, 2024[2]). Broadly, fostering an enabling environment for CSOs that facilitates their positive contribution to society through their ability to in advocate for diverse needs, provide policy expertise, monitor government actions, contribute to public debates, and deliver services. For CSOs to operate effectively, the legal environment governing their activities is particularly important (OECD, 2024[2]). Specifically related to the information space, the OECD Recommendation on Information Integrity recognises that building information integrity requires actors across society to act together to develop, implement, and evaluate comprehensive and evidence-based public policies in support of information integrity (OECD, 2024[1]).
Since 2014, Ukraine has developed a rich civil society landscape supporting the media sector. For example, civil society organisations (CSOs) focus on hostile information threats, conduct monitoring and debunking activities, as well as produce research and indices, such as the Freedom of Speech Barometer developed by the Institute of Mass Information, the Ukrainian partner of Reporters without Borders.7 Civil society has quickly responded to the Russian information threat, a testament to experience gathered since 2014. As Russia’s war against Ukraine continues, maintaining the country’s reform momentum since 2014 and strengthening the enabling environment in which CSOs, journalists, and watchdog organisations operate will become ever more vital for Ukraine’s information environment (OECD, 2022[15]).
Civil society has emerged as an indispensable partner in upholding information integrity in Ukraine. Indeed, Ukrainian government institutions have expanded their co-operation with media and Ukrainian CSOs working on information integrity considerably since the outset of Russia’s full-scale aggression. Organisations including the Institute of Mass Information and Texty have been instrumental in monitoring, reporting, and advocating transparency and accountability in media operations. Their analyses regularly highlight significant vulnerabilities, exposing attempts at information manipulation and holding media and government actors accountable. These organisations have provided evidence-based assessments and recommendations that influence policy reforms.
Three main areas of co-operation have emerged between government institutions and CSOs. The first is largely around co-operation in monitoring and responding to information space and FIMI threats. Even though many of these efforts are done in parallel and sometimes overlap – both with each other, and with efforts of Ukrainian government institutions – the wide range of actors in this space enables fast and flexible identification of, and response to, such threats (Helmus and Holynska, 2024[92]). Government institutions, notably the CCD and CSCIS, co-operate regularly with CSOs on characterising Russian information attacks by identifying the actors engaged, the technologies used, and messages and campaigns. Collaboration in monitoring the threats also facilitates engagement around joint responses to information attacks, including the creation of common strategic messages, debunking activities, and the disclosure of methods used for FIMI attacks.
A second avenue for collaboration has been around building understanding and awareness of hostile information threats. Government institutions benefit from the analytical and research work of CSOs, which can help avoid duplication of resource allocation for critical analytical and research data necessary for policy making and implementation. Such awareness raising also takes the form of specific activities, including programmes that target schools, segments of the population outside of the education system, as well as trainings for government officials in such areas as OSINT, data analytics, and improved identification of interference methodologies.
Third, civil society and media organisations inform and engage with the government on policy reforms (see Chapter 4 on public participation), for example through consulting governmental institutions on legal reforms related to information integrity, including in the development of the new Law on Media and its amendments. In 2025, government representatives and civil society organisations co-operated to publish a guide for strengthening collaboration between online platforms, media and civil society in Ukraine (see Box 3.8).
In 2025 Ukraine published a guide, “For risk management in the context of emergencies, armed conflicts and crises,” which provides recommendations for relations between online platforms, media, and civil society in Ukraine. It provides recommendations for online platforms on how to protect the rights of Ukrainian users to access information.
The document was developed by representatives of state institutions, CSOs, and the media, including the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Freedom of Speech and the Director of the Department of Information Policy and Information Security at the MCSC. It was published by “Internews-Ukraine” and “International Media Support”, with support of Government of Japan and UNESCO.
The guide includes recommendations for online platforms on how to ensure freedom of expression and opinion online, including:
Keep content documenting war crimes.
Ensure access to verified public information during the war in Ukraine.
Take into account the local context.
Co-operate more actively with local representatives to help ensure access to verified information in temporarily occupied territories.
Civil society and media organisations also participate in co-regulation taskforces, for example the newly established taskforce created by the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting (see Box 3.9).
Articles 92-93 of the Law on Media outlines the principles of co-regulation. It allows creation of the joint task forces for co-regulation of the different aspects of the media sphere. The scope of co-regulation includes setting rules for content dissemination, such as classifying content harmful to children, defining prohibited content, setting advertising standards, as well as criteria for identifying online media and thematic media services.
The five co-regulatory bodies are to cover audiovisual media services, audio media services, print media, online media, and video sharing platforms. The creation of these bodies involves forming task forces that must arrange and hold constituent general meetings between representatives of media outlets and organisation and develop draft charters for the five co-regulatory bodies.
These task-forces consist of representatives the National Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting, media and CSOs. For example, taskforce for online media includes representatives of Institute of Mass Information, Detector Media, Bukvy, Podrobnosti.ua, Espresso and others.
The most important sources of income for the largest CSOs working on information integrity in Ukraine, such as Detector Media, the Institute of Mass Communications (IMI), Internews-Ukraine, Texty, and Molfar are project grants from international donors. Some CSOs can complement this grant funding with voluntary donations and incomes from commercial activities, for example, consulting services or providing income-generating media products, though foreign funding remains the most important source.
Many of the co-operation engagements between governments and civil society organisations are neither formal nor systematic. They are often based on personal contacts and goodwill from both sides. On the one hand, such a set-up allows for flexible responses to information attacks and other threats to information integrity. On the other hand, a lack of oversight or systematised approach can lead to unclear rules of co-operation, a lack of transparency, and risks of overlap, where different government institutions may engage with organisations on the same topic or issue independently. Increased transparency around the engagements, activities, and purpose of the government’s engagement with online platforms and CSOs can also help ensure that freedom of opinion and expression is upheld and enable external scrutiny that such actions are necessary.
To tackle these issues, the MCSC has created an Expert Group gathering representatives of the media, CSOs, academics and governmental institutions as a way to engage with non-governmental stakeholders, obtain an overview of ongoing activities and results, and discuss proposals for future co-operation. For example, the Expert Group analysed issues such as the suspension of foreign financial support to Ukrainian media and CSOs and is consulted by the Ministry for the development of the new Information Security Strategy.
While this model of interaction between governmental and non-governmental actors in the field of information integrity reflects the needs for responding to crises, building capacities rapidly, and relying on external partners for technical support in the context of the war due to the shortage of the financial and other resources, the government should consider putting in place clearer mechanisms for engagement, both to reduce threats posed by the current model and prepare for the post-war environment. As discussed further in Chapter 4, in March 2025, Ukraine’s Cabinet of Ministers approved the Action Plan 2025–2026 for the implementation of the National Strategy for the Promotion of Civil Society 2021–2026. This Action Plan touches on several issues, including reducing barriers for new organisations through simplified registration processes, expanding digital access to services and participation tools and improving public consultations by developing best practice guides and training public servants (CSO Meter, 2025[95]).
Moving forward, the Government of Ukraine could focus on implementing its Action Plan, which is largely in line with OECD guidance on putting in place an enabling environment for CSOs, including establishing transparent, accessible and fair registration procedures and putting in place reporting requirements for publicly funded CSOs that are robust, but not overly burdensome (OECD, 2024[2]). Protecting and strengthening civic space in this way will be an essential step in developing and implement comprehensive and concrete avenues for government and the civil society to work together in support of information integrity.
Immediate priorities to sustain resilience and coherence under current conditions
Define the functions and co-ordination mechanisms of institutional actors working in information integrity more clearly or establish a centralised governmental agency with clear mandates to monitor information threats, develop responses, and co-ordinate actions against hostile information threats across different sectors. Such an agency could be part of the of the Office of the President or the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (SCMU) to ensure cross-sectoral co-ordination and strategic oversight.
Develop unified strategic communication frameworks and formal inter-agency co-operation mechanisms based on OECD best practices. Such frameworks would help strengthen institutional responses and help to fill skills gaps by, for example, more readily identifying staff with proficient English and other languages to interact with foreign audiences, conduct data analysis, and engage with foreign government counterparts and platforms. Clarifying inter-agency co-operation could also help prevent delays or contradictory responses to threats in the information space.
Strengthen capacity-building and scenario-based exercises to support the activities of, and capacity building efforts for, relevant officials at the national, regional, and local level to foster inter-agency understanding and effective response capabilities. Given the competencies in Ukrainian institutions in identifying and responding to information threats, capacity building efforts should focus on issues such as data analytics and AI skills to strengthen officials’ ability to detect and counter FIMI threats.
Enforce laws requiring transparency in media ownership and funding sources to mitigate undue influence from political and financial interests.
Promote independent journalism and build on previous reforms, including maintaining independence and sustainable funding for the recently established public broadcaster Suspilne to help ensure it plays a constructive role in society, particularly through investments in professional development, digital transformation, and regional bureaus.
Establish or appoint a government official tasked with facilitating international co-operation in the field of information integrity.
Recovery priorities to build the foundations for reconstruction
Continue to focus on rebuilding from the war and expanding upon the country’s media reforms in an effort to reinforce freedom of opinion and expression. To this end, the government can update and implement its strategy, with the active and substantive engagement of national and international civil society, to ensure the country restores rights to freedom of opinion and expression at a time when restrictions are no longer justified.
Update the Implementation Plan of the Information Security Strategy to include methods to measure impact, including qualitative and quantitative indicators. Increase transparency and build government capacity by outlining in the Implementation Plan how the insights gained in monitoring the implementation of the Strategy feed into policy design and implementation processes.
Develop comprehensive frameworks to guide more transparent interactions between the government, online platforms, civil society organisations, and academia, including clear selection and engagement processes, transparent information-sharing protocols, and independent oversight mechanisms. Developing transparent processes and related guidance for public officials would help increase transparency around how and under what circumstances the government shares information with external actors, help ensure freedom of expression is upheld, and strengthen accountability for actions in this space.
Establish a formal platform or multi-stakeholder co-ordination body on information integrity (e.g., under the Filter project) to align governmental and CSO-led efforts or promote joint initiatives across ministries, CSOs, schools, and international partners to scale and target interventions more effectively. Improving co-ordination would help increase the systematisation, transparency, and regularity of interaction between governmental institutions and CSOs to co-operate in monitoring and responding to information space and FIMI threats, build understanding and awareness of hostile information threats, inform and engage with the government on policy reforms, and help strengthen media and information literacy initiatives.
Integrate media literacy into the national curriculum and support efforts to expand media literacy offerings at colleges and universities, focused on helping students learn how to critically assess news sources, review the threats and opportunities of AI technologies, and understand digital threats.
Explore more active employment of AI technologies to upgrade media literacy and awareness raising efforts.
Build monitoring and impact assessment capacity to the government’s media and information literacy support activities to help assess whether initiatives achieve their educational goals and objectives and identify program strengths and weaknesses.
Long-term development to consolidate reforms
Continue to align legislative efforts in Ukraine with relevant international frameworks that promote transparency, accountability, and freedom of opinion and expression. Independent judicial and legislative oversight must be empowered to ensure adequate balance between national security needs and freedom of expression in the information space.
Update the Information Security Strategy of 2021, informed by changes in the information space and lessons learned to-date, including those driven by the expanding use of AI and changing platform dynamics. An updated strategy could provide clearer and more transparent definitions, guidance on co-ordination between government institutions on information integrity issues, and insight on interactions between governmental and non-governmental actors working in the field of information integrity.
Further develop international co-operation, particularly with OECD member states, for sharing best practices and technological advancements, including around international exchanges and joint initiatives to monitor and respond to cross-border hostile information campaigns.
Build on and implement Ukraine’s Action Plan 2025–2026 for the implementation of the National Strategy for the Promotion of Civil Society 2021–2026 to strengthen the enabling environment for CSOs via transparent, accessible and fair registration procedures and putting in place robust but not overly burdensome reporting requirements for publicly funded CSOs.
Further develop co-operation mechanisms between online platforms, civil society, research and academic partners, media and journalists to provide clear processes to share analysis and research to help avoid duplication of resource allocation for data necessary for policy making and implementation.
Expand the availability and support the creation of age- and audience-specific media and information literacy content offered for educators, public officials, journalists, and the public to enhance individuals’ understanding of – and skills to operate in – modern information environments.
References
[45] (n.a.) (2025), Interview for OECD fact finding mission.
[88] Academy of Ukrainian Press (n.d.), Media Education and Media Literacy online platform, https://www.aup.com.ua/en/portal-medialiteracy/.
[19] Bezchotnikova, S. and N. Zrazhevska (2024), “UKRAINIAN MEDIALANDSCAPE IN THE TIME OF WAR (2022–2024): TRANSFORMATION, RESPONSE TO THE WAR, DYNAMICS OF MEDIA CONSUMPTION”, Integrated communications, Vol. 18/2, pp. 6-14, https://doi.org/10.28925/2524-2644.2024.181.
[26] Center for Countering Disinformation (2023), Manual on Countering Disinformation, Center for Countering Disinformation, https://cpd.gov.ua/announcement/posibnyk-z-protydiyi-dezinformacziyi/.
[81] Center for Strategic Communication and Information Security (2025), Monitoring, https://spravdi.gov.ua/dosldzhennya-ta-analtika/monitoryng/.
[71] Center for Strategic Communication and Information Security (2025), School for Strategic Communications and Information Security, https://spravdi.gov.ua/en/school-of-countering-disinformation/.
[72] Center for Strategic Communication and Information Security (2023), Manual “Russia’s Hybrid War against Ukraine. How to win on the information front”, https://spravdi.gov.ua/en/manual-russias-hybrid-war-against-ukraine-how-to-win-on-the-information-front/.
[82] Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security (2024), Media literacy as a key to combating russian propaganda: challenges and solutions for Ukraine, https://spravdi.gov.ua/en/media-literacy-as-a-key-to-combating-russian-propaganda-challenges-and-solutions-for-ukraine/?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
[48] Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law (2024), Зберегти Суспільне мовлення – зберегти демократію (заява громадських організацій), https://cedem.org.ua/news/zberegty-suspilne-movlennya/.
[59] CHESNO Movement (2024), Survey: Only 17% of Ukrainians consider the “United News” telethon relevant, https://www.chesno.org/post/6099/.
[40] Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2024), Order No. 73 of 3 March 2022 on the Organisation of Interaction between the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Other Components of the Defence Forces, and Media Representatives during Martial Law, as amended through Order No. 51 of 3 February 2024, Ministry of Defe, https://www.mil.gov.ua/content/files/nakaz73_zi_zminamu_2024.pdf.
[5] Council of Europe (2025), Legal Opinion On the Draft Law of Ukraine ‘On Amendments to the Criminal Code of Ukraine, https://rm.coe.int/lex-02-legalopinion-ukraine-amendments-to-ccu-reg-no-10242-eng/1680b3f156?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
[21] Council of Europe (2025), Legal Opinion: On the Draft Law of Ukraine “On Amending Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding the Regulation of Activities of Information-Sharing Platforms through which Mass Information is Disseminated”, https://rm.coe.int/lex-09-legal-opinion-ukraine/1680b5ebc7.
[43] Council of Europe (2025), Suspilne election process as a key step in protecting media independence, https://www.coe.int/en/web/kyiv/-/suspilne-election-process-as-a-key-step-in-protecting-media-independence?utm_source=chatgpt.com.
[42] Council of Europe (2023), Guidance Note on countering the spread of online mis- and disinformation through fact-checking and platform design solutions in a human rights compliant manner, https://rm.coe.int/cdmsi-2023-015-msi-inf-guidance-note/1680add25e.
[95] CSO Meter (2025), Ukraine: Government approves 2025-2026 Roadmap for Civil Society Development, https://csometer.info/updates/ukraine-government-approves-2025-2026-roadmap-civil-society-development.
[70] Detector Media (2025), Media Literacy Index of Government Authorities and Local Self‑Governance Representatives, https://en.detector.media/post/media-literacy-index-of-government-authorities-and-local-self-governance-representatives.
[58] Detector Media (2025), Media Literacy Index of Ukrainians: 2020–2024 Fifth Wave, https://en.detector.media/post/media-literacy-index-of-ukrainians-2020-2024-fifth-wave.
[69] Digital Security Lab Ukraine (2024), Monthly digest on media and digital rights regulation in Ukraine, November 2024, https://dslua.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/Digest-17-November-2024.pdf.
[35] Dvorovyi, M. (2021), Sanctions and Website Blocking in Ukraine: How to Quietly Open Pandora’s Box, https://dslua.org/publications/sanktsii-ta-blokuvannia-saytiv-v-ukraini-iak-nepomitno-vidkryty-skrynku-pandory-analitychnyy-zvit/.
[6] Dvorovyi, M., A. Cherevka and N. Benequista (2023), Summit for Democracy: Trends in News Media’s Future, Forged in Ukraine, https://www.justsecurity.org/85791/summit-for-democracy-trends-in-news-medias-future-forged-in-ukraine/.
[34] European Commission (2024), Ukraine 2024 Report, https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/1924a044-b30f-48a2-99c1-50edeac14da1_en?filename=Ukraine+Report+2024.pdf&fbclid=IwY2xjawGQEthleHRuA2FlbQIxMAABHefty13e6n_gcv7MV12WS06MpRKMFno4mns9WGei_o83g7eTz_HMJoKk8g_aem_6HyCL9ssYviI9xN1T7n4IQ.
[39] European Commission (2023), Commission Staff Working Document Ukraine 2023 Report, https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/bb61ea6d-dda6-4117-9347-a7191ecefc3f_en?filename=SWD_2023_699%20Ukraine%20report.pdf.
[7] Fernandez Gibaja, A. and A. Hudson (2022), The Ukraine Crisis and the Struggle to Defend Democracy in Europe and Beyond: Rising Stakes in the Struggle for Democracy, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance,, https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/ukraine-war-and-struggle-defend-democracy-europe-and-beyond.
[73] Filter (2025), Штучний інтелект: Просвітницька революція для молоді та держслужбовців, https://filter.mkip.gov.ua/shtuchnyj-intelekt-prosvitnyczka-revolyucziya-dlya-molodi-ta-derzhsluzhbovcziv/.
[38] Freedom House (2025), Freedom in the World 2025, https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/freedom-world/2025.
[36] Freedom House (2024), Freedom on the Net 2024, https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/freedom-net/2024.
[9] Freedom House (2016), Nations in Transit 2016 - Ukraine, https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/nations-transit/2016.
[8] Freedom House (2015), Freedom of the Press 2015, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FreedomofthePress_2015_FINAL.pdf.
[11] Global Affairs Canada (2024), Russia’s use of disinformation and information manipulation, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/response_conflict-reponse_conflits/crisis-crises/ukraine-disinfo-desinfo.aspx?lang=eng.
[62] Government of the Netherlands (2023), , https://merlin.obs.coe.int/article/9694 (accessed on 2023).
[92] Helmus, T. and K. Holynska (2024), Ukrainian Resistance to Russian Disinformation: Lessons for Future Conflict, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2771-1.html.
[56] IMI (2025), 59,2% of journalists predict US international grant suspension to have catastrophic impact – IMI survey, https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/59-2-of-journalists-predict-us-international-grant-suspension-to-have-catastrophic-impact-imi-survey-i66439.
[93] IMS; Internews Ukraine (2025), GUIDE FOR RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF EMERGENCIES, ARMED CONFLICTS AND CRISES, https://webportal.nrada.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Guideline-English.pdf.
[52] Institute of Mass Information (2024), Transparency of Ukrainian Online Media Increased to 80% in 2024, https://imi.org.ua/monitorings/doslidzhennya-imi-prozorist-onlajn-media-ukrayiny-zrosla-do-78-u-2024-rotsi-i64056.
[44] Institute of Mass Information (2021), Compliance with Professional Standards in Online Media: The 1st Wave of Monitoring in 2021, https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/compliance-with-professional-standards-in-online-media-the-1st-wave-of-monitoring-in-2021-i38434.
[91] International media support (2024), Statements of the International Conference on Media Literacy and Media Self-Regulation, https://www.mediasupport.org/publication/media-literacy-lessons-from-ukraine/.
[18] Internews network (2024), Українські медіа: ставлення та довіра у 2024 році, https://www.youtube.com/live/H-AVBhfRb-Q.
[25] Internews network (2021), Ставлення населення до медіа та споживання різних типів медіа 2021, https://imi.org.ua/upload/media/2021/11/17/61951144dc1fc-usaid-internews-media-report-2021-ukr.pdf.
[60] Internews Ukraine (2025), Ukrainian Media: News Consumption and Trust in 202, https://internews.ua/themes/internews/assets/img/media-research/Ukrainian_Media_News_Consumption_and_Trust_in_2025_ukr.pdf.
[87] IREX (2024), IREX expands Learn to Discern with new AI initiatives in Ukraine, https://www.irex.org/news/irex-expands-learn-discern-new-ai-initiatives-ukraine.
[27] Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (2024), Ukrainians’ perception of the threat of the spread of Russian propaganda in social networks and their attitude towards the Telegram ban, https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1428&page=1.
[89] Media Literacy for Educators (2025), Media literacy for educators, https://prometheus.org.ua/prometheus-free/mediagramotnist-dlya-osvityan/.
[77] Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communications of Ukraine (2025), National Media Literacy Project “Filter”, https://filter.mkip.gov.ua/.
[79] Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communications of Ukraine (2024), Announcing 50 Winners of the National Media Literacy Test, Filter, https://filter.mkip.gov.ua/nationalmedialiteracytestwinners/.
[78] Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communications of Ukraine (2024), THE STRATEGY OF THE.
[90] Ministry of Culture and Strategic Communications of Ukraine (2024), THE STRATEGY OF THE MINISTRY OF CULTURE AND INFORMATION POLICY OF UKRAINE FOR MEDIA LITERACY DEVELOPMENT UNTIL 2026, https://filter.mkip.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/strategyeng.pdf.
[74] Ministry of Digital Transformation (2025), Digital State UA, https://digitalstate.gov.ua/news/govtech/96-of-ukrainians-now-have-digital-skills.
[17] Ministry of Digital Transformation (2025), Interview.
[22] Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine (2023), Cyber police expose bot-farm organizers who spread hostile propaganda and engaged in Internet fraud, https://mvs.gov.ua/en/news/kiberpoliciia-vikrila-organizatoriv-botoferm-iaki-posiriuvali-vorozu-propagandu-ta-zaimalisia-internet-saxraistvami.
[94] National Council of Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine (2023), A Working Group Has Been Formed to Initiate the Process of Establishing a Co-Regulation Body in the Field of Online Media, https://webportal.nrada.gov.ua/sformovano-robochu-grupu-yaka-zapochatkovuye-protses-stvorennya-organu-spivregulyuvannya-u-sferi-onlajn-media/.
[68] National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine (2025), One of the strategic directions of the National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting is the introduction of media support tools and promotion of media literacy among media professionals. To this end, a working group on media literac, https://webportal.nrada.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Analitychnyj-zvit-Robochoyi-grupy.pdf.
[28] National Security and Defence Council (2024), The NCCC has decided to restrict the use of Telegram in government agencies, military formations, and critical infrastructure facilities, https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/en/Diialnist/6994.html.
[67] National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (2021), A modern information-analytical system “COTA” developed and put into operation at the NSDC Staff, https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/en/Diialnist/5011.html.
[13] OECD (2024), Facts not Fakes: Tackling Disinformation, Strengthening Information Integrity, OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/d909ff7a-en.
[2] OECD (2024), Practical Guide for Policymakers on Protecting and Promoting Civic Space, OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/6c908b48-en.
[1] OECD (2024), Recommendation of the Council on Information Integrity, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0505.
[14] OECD (2022), Disinformation and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, https://www.oecd.org/ukraine-hub/policy-responses/disinformation-and-russia-s-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine-37186bde/.
[15] OECD (2022), “Disinformation and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: Threats and governance responses”, OECD Policy Responses on the Impacts of the War in Ukraine, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/37186bde-en.
[31] OECD (2022), The Protection and Promotion of Civic Space: Strengthening Alignment with nternational Standards and Guidance, OECD Publishing, https://doi.org/10.1787/d234e975-en.
[85] OECD (2021), 21st-Century Readers: Developing Literacy Skills in a Digital World, OECD Publishing.
[84] OECD (2021), Are 15-year-olds prepared to deal with fake news and misinformation?, OECD Publishing, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2021/05/are-15-year-olds-prepared-to-deal-with-fake-news-and-misinformation_b25edda6/6ad5395e-en.pdf.
[61] OECD (2020), OECD Public Integrity Handbook, OECD Publishing,Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac8ed8e8-en.
[20] OHCHR and Human Rights Center at UC Berkeley, School of Law (2022), Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations, https://www.ohchr.org/en/publications/policy-and-methodological-publications/berkeley-protocol-digital-open-source.
[75] Pasitselska, O. (2024), “Frontline Knowledge: Digital Media Literacy of Older Adults in Ukraine”, Media and Communication, Vol. 12, https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.8277.
[76] President of Ukraine (2021), ecree No. 685/2021 on the Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated October 15, 2021, “On the Information Security Strategy”, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/685/2021#Text.
[53] Reporters Without Borders (2026), Reporting under Russian fire: more than 175 journalists victims of abuse in Ukraine in the past four years, https://rsf.org/en/175-journalists-victims-abuse-ukraine.
[49] Reporters Without Borders (2022), World Press Freedom Index 2022, https://rsf.org/en/index.
[10] Reporters without Borders (2025), World Press Freedom Index, https://rsf.org/en/index?year=2025.
[50] Reporters without Borders (2024), From Resilience to Recovery: Securing the Future of Ukrainian Media, https://rsf.org/en/rsf-s-new-report-calls-creation-fund-rebuild-ukraine-s-media-landscape.
[29] Reporters without Borders (2014), World Press Freedom Index 2013, https://rsf.org/en/node/79174.
[86] Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (2020), Some Issues of the State Standard of Basic Secondary Education, Resolution No. 898, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/898-2020-%D0%BF#Text.
[32] Reuters (2014), Ukraine bans Russian TV channels for airing war ’propaganda’, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/ukraine-bans-russian-tv-channels-for-airing-war-propaganda-idUSKBN0GJ1QM/.
[23] Security Service of Ukraine (2022), SSU neutralizes 35 bot farms and initiates increased responsibility for their creation, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-zneshkodyla-35-botoferm-ta-initsiiuie-posylennia-vidpovidalnosti-za-yikh-stvorennia.
[65] SGDNS (2022), , https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/notre-organisation/composantes/service-de-vigilance-et-protection-contre-les-ingerences-numeriques.
[57] Tahir, M. (2025), US funding cuts create openings for Russian disinformation in Ukraine, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/us-funding-cuts-create-openings-for-russian-disinformation-in-ukraine/.
[66] The Centre for Strategic Communication (2025), Про Центр, https://spravdi.gov.ua/pro-nas/.
[16] The Economist (2022), The invasion of Ukraine is not the first social media war, but it is the most viral, https://www.economist.com/international/the-invasion-of-ukraine-is-not-the-first-social-media-war-but-it-is-the-most-viral/21808456.
[24] The Ministry of Interior of Ukraine (2023), Cyber police expose bot-farm organizers who spread hostile propaganda and engaged in Internet fraud, https://mvs.gov.ua/en/news/kiberpoliciia-vikrila-organizatoriv-botoferm-iaki-posiriuvali-vorozu-propagandu-ta-zaimalisia-internet-saxraistvami.
[3] The Office of the President of Ukraine (2022), On the Introduction of Martial Law in Ukraine.
[33] The Office of the President of Ukraine (2017), Decree No. 133/2017 on the Application of Personal Special Economic and Other Restrictive Measures (Sanctions), https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/1332017-21850.
[63] The Presidential Office of Ukraine (2021), УКАЗ ПРЕЗИДЕНТА УКРАЇНИ №685/2021 Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 15 жовтня 2021 року “Про Стратегію інформаційної безпеки”, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/6852021-41069.
[55] Ukrainian Institute of Media and Communication (2024), Overview of Media Projects Countering Disinformation in Wartime: Analytical Note, https://internetfreedom.org.ua/ua/pages-2/291-ohliad-mediaproiektiv-z-protydii-dezinformatsii-v-umovakh-viiny-analitychna-zapyska.
[54] UN (2022), Ukraine: Journalists targeted and in danger, warn top rights experts, UN News, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/05/1117462.
[80] UNDP (2025), Audience Ages Up, Awareness Grows: Key findings of 2025 National Media Literacy Test released in Kyiv, https://www.undp.org/ukraine/press-releases/audience-ages-awareness-grows-key-findings-2025-national-media-literacy-test-released-kyiv.
[83] UNESCO (n.d.), , https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/unescos-campaigns-media-and-information-literacy-empower-millions-ukraine-think-critically.
[4] Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2025), Criminal Code of Ukraine, Law No. 2341-III of 5 April 2001, as amended by 1 February 2025, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2341-14#Text.
[37] Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2025), Law of Ukraine “On Media” No. 2849-IX as amended from 1 January 2025, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2849-20#Text.
[47] Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2025), Law of Ukraine No. 4695-IX “On the State Budget of Ukraine for 2026”, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4695-20#Text.
[46] Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2024), Law of Ukraine on the State Budget of Ukraine for 2025, No. 4059-IX, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/4059-20#Text.
[64] Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2023), Про затвердження плану заходів з реалізації Стратегії інформаційної безпеки на період до 2025 року, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/272-2023-%D1%80#Text.
[51] Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2015), Law No. 674-VIII “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine Concerning Ensuring Transparency of Media Ownership and Implementing the Principles of State Policy in the Sphere of Television and Radio Broadcasting”, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/674-19#Text.
[30] Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (1996), Constitution of Ukraine, 254к/96-ВР, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80#Tex.
[12] VIGINUM (2025), War in Ukraine: Three years of Russian, https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/2025-02/20250224_TLP-CLEAR_NP_SGDSN_VIGINUM_War%20in%20Ukraine_Three%20years%20of%20Russian%20information%20operations_1.0_VF.pdf.
[41] ZMINA (2023), During war, freedom of speech preserved in Ukraine but united telethon should be stopped – survey of journalists, https://zmina.ua/en/event-en/during-war-freedom-of-speech-preserved-in-ukraine-but-united-telethon-should-be-stopped-survey-of-journalists/.
← 1. Note that Ukrainian institutions often refer to these as Informational and Psychological Operations (IPSOs).
← 2. See zakon.rada.gov.ua/go/1089-20 for the text of Law No. 1089‑IX “On Electronic Communications” for specific language
← 3. Footnote: The Press Freedom Index is an annual ranking of 180 countries and territories compiled by Reporters Without Borders, used to compare the level of press freedom enjoyed by journalists and media; in 2022, Ukraine ranked 106 out of 180 countries and territories. See https://rsf.org/en/index-methodologie-2022?year=2022&data_type=general for additional information.
← 4. In response to the question on the OECD questionnaire: What are the main lessons learned for intergovernmental co-ordination of fighting against disinformation/strengthening information integrity both before full scale invasion and after it’s beginning? What specifically changed in this regard after February 2022?
← 5. Including Ukraine’s Ministry of Information Policy and Culture, Ministry of Digital Transformation, Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security, Center for Countering Disinformation (under the National Security and Defense Council), the National Police of Ukraine (Cyber Police), the Office of the President of Ukraine; Detector Media, Vox Ukraine, Stop Fake, the Ukrainian Institute of Media and Communication, the Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law, and the National Media Literacy Project “Filter”.
← 6. For example, Media Literacy During War: Theory, Methodology, and Interactivity, O. Volosheniuk & V. Ivanova (Eds.), Kyiv: Academy of Ukrainian Press, Center for Free Press, 2023
← 7. Other relevant Ukrainian CSOs include the Lviv Media Forum, which was founded in 2013 to develop and promote best practices in Ukraine’s media environment; Detector Media (previously Telekritika), which has been monitoring television news coverage since 2003 in support of raising journalistic standards; and Ukraine World, which provides updates on anti-democracy narratives shared by Ukrainian and Russian media.