Ukraine’s public governance has shown remarkable resilience in response to Russia’s war of aggression. This chapter highlights how Ukraine’s governance adapted under pressure. It is structured in three parts: the first focuses on the wartime impact on public governance in Ukraine; the second identifies key actions taken to strengthen government resilience throughout the wartime; and the third highlights the need for Ukraine to continuously invest in public trust and democratic resilience of its governance. The chapter links to the topics explored in subsequent chapters of the Review, underscoring the importance of democratic, resilient and human-centred public governance for Ukraine’s recovery, EU integration and long-term growth and development.
Public Governance Review of Ukraine
Abstract
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has had a devastating impact on Ukrainian lives and the economy. Since February 2022, at least 14,999 civilians have been killed and 40,601 injured (HRMMU, 2025[1]), although actual numbers are likely considerably higher. Widespread destruction has displaced people and businesses across and beyond Ukraine’s borders. As of December 2025, nearly 6 million Ukrainian citizens have been registered as refugees globally (UNHCR, 2025[2]) and more than 3.6 million people have been internally displaced (International Organization for Migration, 2025[3]). Between 2021 and 2023, mobilisation and displacement led to a 40% reduction in the working-age population, even accounting for the partial return of those initially displaced abroad (OECD, 2025[4]). The destruction of 13% of the total housing stock has impacted more than 2.5 million households. Losses in the housing sector alone, including additional rental costs for displaced citizens, demolition and waste removal, and increased public expenditures, are estimated at USD 26.8 billion (Kyiv School of Economics, 2026[5]). By the end of 2024, direct war-related damage across sectors accounted for 170 billion US dollars (USD), an evaluation that is set to increase as the war continues (World Bank, 2025[6]). Beyond direct physical damage, the broader economic losses from the conflict, encompassing lost income, reduced output and additional war-related costs across all sectors, are estimated at USD 0.6 trillion in value added terms through the end of 2026, equivalent to more than three times Ukraine's pre-war GDP (Kyiv School of Economics, 2026[5]).
Ukraine’s public sector has borne the full weight of wartime impacts. These range from the physical attacks on public servants and infrastructure destruction to fundamental shifts in priorities, operations and financing across all levels of government. According to the National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service, at least 5,134 public servants have been captured in temporarily occupied or active war territories, 140 killed during the full-scale war and 4,316 drafted to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service, 2024[7]). Although it represents only a small fraction of total damage, destruction to Ukraine’s public administration’s infrastructure is estimated at USD 433.2 million, with total financial losses in the public sector at least USD 2.8 billion (World Bank, 2025[6]). Sharp increases in defence spending and taxes have widened deficits and raised public debts, as noted in the OECD Economic Survey of Ukraine (OECD, 2025[4]) Defence financing alone increased nearly tenfold between 2021 and 2022, from approximately USD 4.4 billion to USD 38.5 billion, and had reached approximately USD 68.9 billion by 2025 – figures that illustrate the extraordinary fiscal reorientation the war has demanded (Kyiv School of Economics, 2026[5]). This in turn has put pressure on meeting public spending needs while the war continues.
To ensure continuity of operations and maintain reform implementation, Ukraine’s public service leveraged agile working practices and built on high government digitalisation. Russia’s regular cyber-attacks against Ukraine since 2014, targeting media, energy, business, financial, non-profit and public sectors (European Parliament, 2022[8]), compelled the public administration of Ukraine to adopt unconventional communication approaches, such as alternative email systems and personal phone messengers. These new working practices enabled faster issue resolution for Ukraine’s public administration, though it often lacked procedural formality.
The war has also altered public policy and administrative procedures. Defence and security, the economy, recovery, EU integration and social cohesion have moved to the top of the government’s agenda (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2025[9]). In the midst of war, Ukraine has also been reforming its veteran, health, digital and infrastructure policies while facing challenges such as decreasing public trust and little opportunity for long-term strategic vision (Hres and Balanchuk, 2025[10]). The Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law was enacted on the first day of the full-scale war. It introduced a “special legal regime” that provides state, military and local self-government entities with the powers needed to repel threats to Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity (Verkhovna Rada, n.d.[11]). The Law also places temporary limits on the constitutional rights and freedoms of individuals and legitimate interests of businesses (Verkhovna Rada, n.d.[11]). Under martial law, the government of Ukraine adapted its administrative procedures, including rules governing how public authorities are organised, accountability and reporting requirements, and employment and procurement processes (OECD, 2024[12]) (OECD, 2025[4]). Some of these measures, as highlighted by the 2023 SIGMA Monitoring Report of the Public Administration in Ukraine (OECD, 2024[12]), have had a negative impact on the performance of the Ukrainian public administration, especially when it concerns transparency and openness. As the war continues, the government of Ukraine will need to continue to guarantee that the imposed restrictions are being applied proportionally and fairly and are not used for discriminatory purposes (OECD, 2024[13]).
Under the constant pressure of war, Ukraine’s civil servants – the workforce of the government – have shown strong resilience and commitment. Individually and collectively, they have continued working and driving progress even when that progress faces near-constant setbacks. They have been continually facing war-related security risks while simultaneously managing heavy workload stemming from the rapidly changing environment. Additionally, low and fragmented pay, high turnover rates, salary freezes and cuts to budget since the beginning of the war have further strained the public service (OECD, 2025[4]).
Responding to the war has also demanded changes in Ukraine’s government machinery. The government assigned the Ministry for Communities and Territories Development key responsibilities for restoration policies. This evolved in the merger of the two agencies - the State Agency for Infrastructure Projects and State Agency for Motor Roads - into a single entity named the State Agency for Reconstruction and Development of Infrastructure, which now manages recovery projects for housing, energy, and military infrastructure alongside road maintenance. With the objective of consolidating public entities and transferring functions so as to strengthen Ukraine’s economic potential and wartime response (President of Ukraine, 2025[14]), the government reshuffle in July 2025 brought further changes to the government composition. In this regard, the Economy, Agriculture, and Environment portfolios were merged into one Ministry of Economy, Environment and Agriculture.
This chapter acknowledges the resilience of Ukraine’s public administration under extraordinary pressure. While the war has tested the country’s people, institutions and policy frameworks, the government has shown remarkable capacity to adapt. Following a discussion of crucial actions that have helped the Ukrainian government preserve public governance throughout the ongoing war, the chapter turns to resilience in the longer-term. It draws on the analysis from the main topics selected for this Public Governance Review of Ukraine – namely, strategic planning, information integrity, citizen participation, the public service and AI use in internal operations and public service delivery - emphasising the importance of continued and future action to strengthen public institutions and reinforce resilient democratic governance, underpinned by public trust. The chapter builds on the OECD work with Ukraine, notably the 2023 SIGMA Monitoring Report of the Public Administration in Ukraine (OECD, 2024[12]), the 2025 Economic Survey of Ukraine (OECD, 2025[4]) and the 2025 Integrity and Anti-Corruption Review of Ukraine (OECD, 2025[15]).
Since the full-scale invasion began, resilience has emerged as a defining characteristic, evident not only in Ukrainian society but also the government's response to wartime adversities (United Nations, 2025[16]), (Bidenko, 2025[17]). In the context of public governance, resilience refers to the capacity of government systems to withstand disruptions while continuing to deliver outcomes for citizens (OECD, 2021[18]) Strengthening this capacity requires continuous investment in institutions, processes and co-ordination mechanisms that can adapt under pressure and recover swiftly.
Building upon the OECD’s work on public governance resilience (Box 1.1), the following sections illustrate the actions that Ukraine has taken to shape the resilience of its public governance. This illustrates how the government mobilised resources, personnel and expertise to respond effectively to wartime challenges. They reflect both pre-existing measures and wartime adaptations and offer practical insights for strengthening resilience in Ukraine and beyond. While the individual impact of each element is difficult to quantify, taken together, they provide a valuable lens for understanding government resilience through crisis.
Resilient governments adapt to and recover from shocks while maintaining their core functions
Resilience in governance refers to the capacity of systems to absorb and recover from disruptions and adapt to changing conditions while maintaining the same public functions. Resilient governments can withstand disruptions that affect their inputs (such as civil servants, funds and infrastructure) and processes (policy making, budgeting, service delivery, and others). They act to minimise disruption impact and efficiently maintain operations throughout the disturbance and recovery phase. Resilient governments learn from the disturbance, its absorption and the subsequent recovery, aiming to adapt the governance inputs, processes and mechanisms to better respond to future challenges. Hence, resilient governments implement anticipatory risk management and preparedness and response strategies for future disruptions.
More regular and complex crises require continuous investments in government resilience
The operating environment for governments is evolving with persistent and interconnected, rather than transitory, crises becoming a norm. This reality, shaped by a complex mix of geopolitical, economic, technological, social and environmental changes, compels governments to maintain and constantly improve service delivery and outcomes for citizens. The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine stand as a direct example of this environment, constituting a significant stress test for many countries, but particularly Ukraine.
Democracies should strengthen their government resilience without costs to public trust and transparency
Democratic government resilience to shocks requires responses both at speed and scale while upholding democratic standards and principles. This requires governments to mobilise, innovate and plan its disruption response and put in place governance mechanisms that maintain transparency and boost public trust in government institutions.
Source: (OECD, 2021[18]), (OECD, 2023[19])
Functioning institutions
Throughout the war, Ukraine has kept its government institutions operational. While day-to-day work has been affected by the war, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (CMU) maintained its policy making and co-ordination functions. For instance, weekly and ad-hoc meetings have allowed the government to take more rapid and effective decisions. The Parliament of Ukraine, the Verkhovna Rada, continued holding regular, in-person sessions and implemented its annual Plans of Legislative Work.
By maintaining its governance frameworks, Ukraine absorbed the shocks of war and accelerated its recovery. From February 24, 2022 to the beginning of 2026, the Verkhovna Rada adopted more than 1000 laws, and the CMU issued around 6000 resolutions and 5000 decrees. These actions safeguarded policy implementation, and enabled adjustments to social, education and employment policies with defence efforts and public needs (Marchuk, n.d.[20]). These legislative and policy measures enable Ukraine to respond to changing priorities and needs as the war continues.
Prioritisation and planning
Since the first days of the war, the government of Ukraine has demonstrated flexibility in prioritisation and planning. Prioritisation is an indispensable planning tool for governments that enables credible promises and consistent delivery (OECD, 2024[21]), even amid resource constraints. Wartime conditions have forced Ukraine’s government to constantly reconfigure its activities and priorities, often doing it with limited time and resources.
To this end, Ukraine’s Government Priority Action Plan (GPAP) has played a key role in supporting wartime policy prioritisation. Traditionally a tool to translate the Government Programme’s medium-term objectives into annual actions, the GPAP has become Ukraine’s central planning document during the full-scale war. Instead of adopting separate recovery plans, a practice tested in 2022, the government aligned policies under the GPAP, providing strategic direction from 2023 to 2025. This approach reduced duplication and avoided wasting resources on parallel strategies. The GPAP now brings together critical actions across domains, including wartime response, recovery, and EU integration reforms. Importantly, the government continues integrating international obligations into its annual GPAPs to ensure a holistic planning approach. However, as a short-term document, the GPAP cannot replace the medium- to long-term recovery strategies needed for sustainable growth and development.
Reliable service delivery and communication
The government of Ukraine has ensured reliable service delivery to its citizens and businesses. The 2023 SIGMA Monitoring Report commended the government’s ability to restore services quickly and, in some cases, even expand the accessibility of its services in the first months of the war (OECD, 2024[12]). As the war continues, the number of provided services has returned to the pre-war level, with over 20 million citizens served by the Administrative Service Centres (ASCs) network in 2024 (Diia, 2024[22]). Citizen satisfaction with received services has been growing despite the ongoing war. In 2024, for example, 84% of state e-government service users reported very positive experiences, an increase by 5 percentage points from 2023 (78.5%) (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2025[23]).
The resilience of Ukraine's public services during the war is a direct result of its hybrid delivery model, developed through transformative reforms since 2014. This system, which combines digital platforms with physical one-stop-shop centres, has allowed citizens to access services in a convenient way. In this manner, the Unified State Web Portal of Electronic Services (Diia portal), the main digital government platform, has facilitated continuous access to over 150 services via its website and 60 services through its mobile application. The number of Diia users has reached 20 million, representing roughly half of Ukraine’s population (Diia, 2024[24]). Ukraine continues expanding its ASCs network, a trend already documented in the 2023 SIGMA’s assessment (OECD, 2024[12]) The number of ASCs in Ukraine grew by 210 since the latest SIGMA report, reaching 1,337 centres by the end of 2024 (Diia, 2024[22]). 32 mobile ASCs have allowed citizens to receive administrative and social services in more remote regions and reclaimed territories. In complement, 82 Diia Centres provide crucial information on basic administrative services, online service support and business advice to visitors.
Beyond service delivery, Ukraine’s advanced government digitalisation has supported the continuity of its internal administrative and communication processes. Launched in 2020 and crucial during the COVID-19 pandemic, the “Trembita” interoperability system enables interdepartmental data exchange between state bodies and local self-government bodies. This in turn allows citizens and businesses to access services and communicate with public authorities. The system is actively developing, with more than 290 government institutions and organisations being part of it and 14 billion transactions made up to 2024. Amidst the war, the government has faced challenges in the system adoption, such as connectivity smoothness for state agencies, which the government is trying to overcome through the development of a new version. The “Trembita 2.0” aims to further align with international standards, improve connectivity and strengthen security.
Advancing the public administration reform agenda
In addition to bolstering its institutions, policy prioritisation and delivery to citizens during the war, the government of Ukraine has continued to prioritise public administration reform (PAR). A well-functioning and effective public administration is of paramount importance for a country’s resilience as it ensures policy implementation and assists decision makers in crisis response.
Ukraine’s public administration modernisation agenda, structured around the Public Administration Reform Strategy 2022–2025 (PARS) and the Public Finance Management Strategy 2022–2025 (PFMS), has remained a top government priority. The PARS strives to establish a professional, efficient, effective, and accountable public administration system aligned with European standards to enhance governance, service delivery, and trust in state institutions (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2021[25]). The PFMS complements PARS by focusing on building “a modern, sustainable and effective public financial management system” (Ministry of Finance, 2021[26]). Both strategies set policy objectives, define actions, specific indicators and targets and establish clear responsibility and timelines for implementation. Despite wartime disruptions, Ukraine shows continued commitment to PAR reform. Using SIGMA’s methodology, the implementation rate of both strategies has been growing, reaching 89% in 2024 (Figure 1.1).
% of fully implemented activities during the years indicated.
Note: The 2024 data do not include the Public Finance Management Strategy 2022-2025 measures that were temporarily suspended or required additional time due to wartime circumstances.
Source: (OECD, 2024[12])for 2017-2022. Author’s own calculations for 2023 and 2024 based on the annual monitoring reports for the Public Administration Reform Strategy 2022-2025 and the Public Finance Management Strategy 2022-2025.
Two key enablers - a comprehensive strategic framework and established co-ordination mechanisms - have been essential for progressing on PAR despite the ongoing war. According to the latest SIGMA report, both PARS and PFMS cover all areas of the SIGMA Principles of Public Administration (OECD, 2024[12]) OECD analysis also shows alignment between Ukraine’s priorities for PAR and those of OECD Members (Figure 1.2). Importantly, the PAR framework has helped Ukraine both implement reforms and align with EU accession objectives. In addition, the PAR agenda continued to benefit from improved management, leadership and co-ordination mechanisms since SIGMA's assessment (OECD, 2024[12]) The high-level PAR Co-ordination Council has driven implementation across government. While co-ordination is already strong, more regular meetings could further improve effectiveness. As PARS and PFMS near completion in 2025, the upcoming public administration reform agenda provides an opportunity to embed resilience more systematically into Ukraine’s governance model, for example through commitments on participation, agility, leadership and innovation up to 2030.
% of OECD countries focusing on a particular policy area within their PAM initiatives.
Note: n=30 OECD countries. Thematic areas in blue fully addressed in Ukraine’s Strategy for Public Administration Reform in Ukraine for 2022-2025 and the Public Finance Management Strategy 2022-2025; in yellow, areas moderately addressed and necessitate further improvements.
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on desk research.
External support and partnerships
Collaboration with external stakeholders can be instrumental to increase the quality of policies and expand capacities to implement government priorities (OECD, 2023[27]). Ukraine’s strategic and continuous investments in partnerships with allied countries, international organisations and businesses have mobilised broad international support. The support secured has helped fortify Ukraine’s government, strengthening its internal morale and enabling the funding of essential functions. Many international partners interviewed reported collaborative relationship with Ukraine’s authorities despite the ongoing war.
Over the last three years, Ukraine has seen large inflows of humanitarian, technical and financial assistance. From 2022 to 2025, Ukraine received a continuous flow of financial and humanitarian aid, with a total value of about EUR 80 billion per year (Kiel Institute for the World Economy, 2025[28]). As showcased in the OECD Economic Survey of Ukraine, grants and loans from foreign partners helped fund the current account deficit (OECD, 2025[4]). Nearly USD 4.5 billion in foreign direct investment made up2.5% of Ukraine’s GDP in 2023, and USD 3.1 billion entered the country in the first three quarters of 2024 (OECD, 2025[4]). By working together with the United Nations Refugee Agency and other partners, Ukraine’s Ministry for Communities and Territories Development has been able to roll out multi-service protection centres to provide tailored administrative assistance for especially vulnerable people (UNHCR, 2025[29]). While external assistance has been critical for Ukraine’s wartime response, long-term development will require a more balanced approach to financial management.
While Ukraine’s government has demonstrated incredible resilience in response to Russia’s full-scale war, further efforts are needed to build stronger democratic governance for the future. Recovery, modernisation and EU integration will require Ukraine to continue strengthening its democratic governance, ensuring that public institutions are accountable and responsive to all citizens’ needs. Maintaining democratic resilience requires strong and high-quality institutions that ensure representative government and citizen participatory engagement and protect fundamental rights, while implementing governmental checks and balances and enhancing an impartial administration (OECD, 2023[19]). As highlighted in the OECD Economic Survey of Ukraine, the country faces a range of widespread challenges, from massive economic and infrastructure damages to labour and energy shortages, population displacement and increasing poverty (OECD, 2025[4]) Addressing these issues will require responses that are not only resilient but also stable, accountable, and people-centred.
An overarching issue is the practical challenge Ukraine has faced in maintaining democratic processes during wartime. Citizens consistently report a strong aspiration for Ukraine to evolve into a fully functioning democracy (National Democratic Institute, 2024[30]). The high societal approval of Ukraine’s European integration course is also strongly associated with the country’s democratic future, rule of law and human rights (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, n.d.[31]), (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 2025[32]). At the same time, security risks and institutional constraints raise concerns about transparency, accountability, and the feasibility of reforms. To this end, defence efforts and the restrictions put in place by martial law have frozen various reform efforts (OECD, 2025[4]). Some of the newly adopted or changed laws, including the Law on Public Consultation, are structured to take full effect only after martial law ends. Looking forward, Ukraine’s democratic future will depend on the successful implementation of democratic reforms and public trust in the chosen path forward.
The erosion of public confidence in government highlights a critical need to strengthen democratic resilience in Ukraine. Confidence in the national government has been fluctuating in Ukraine, from 24% in 2014 to 21% in 2021, with the highest point at 37% in 2019 (Gallup World Poll, 2023[33]). Following the start of the full-scale war, public confidence in the government soared, reaching the highest 62% in 2022 (Gallup World Poll, 2023[33]). This tendency, explained by the “rally around the flag” effect, has helped Ukraine boost both resilience and responsiveness to the aggression in the first year. While Ukrainian public confidence in national government was above the OECD average in 2022, Ukraine experienced a declining trend in public trust as the war continued to 47% in 2023 and to 28% in 2024 (Figure 1.3). This drop poses a significant challenge for Ukraine’s government as it signals a growing gap between what citizens expect and what institutions deliver. Improving trust levels can support reform implementation and unite people around shared vision, both critical to Ukraine’s prosperous post-war trajectory.
Related to this, promoting public sector integrity is essential for strengthening democratic resilience in Ukraine. The OECD Integrity and Anti-Corruption Review of Ukraine underscored Ukraine’s significant progress in the fight against corruption even during the full-scale war (OECD, 2025[15]). The government has made strides in fostering transparency, accountability and integrity through measures like open data, digitalisation and independence of anti-corruption entities (OECD, 2025[15]). The commitment to fight corruption and accompanying reforms have translated into a robust public integrity framework that shows high compliance with OECD standards (OECD, 2025[15]). Moreover, Ukraine has been successful in decreasing public experience of everyday corruption, with 15% of citizens reporting they have experienced corruption in 2024 compared to over 70% in 2015 (OECD, 2025[15]).
% of people who answered “yes” to “Do you have confidence in the national government?”.
Nevertheless, corruption risks remain very high in Ukraine in the context of the war. Massive displacement of people and businesses, market disruptions and the need to restrict public access to certain information due to security risks are a few factors that can aggravate corruption risks. Citizens’ perception of corruption remains high, and their desire for justice has reached historic levels. To this end, 92% of citizens consider corruption as a severe national issue and intolerance of corruption has risen to 54% in 2024 (OECD, 2025[15]). In July 2025, Ukrainians held their first public protest since the full-scale war began, gathering after the lawmakers adopted a bill that would significantly limit the powers of the anti-corruption bodies. The several days protests, which occurred despite the martial law ban on assembly, underscored the significant importance of integrity to Ukrainian people and compelled lawmakers into reversing the legislation.
To continue boosting democratic resilience through anti-corruption measures, Ukraine needs to invest into a coherent public integrity system. This requires enhancing implementation, results-orientation monitoring and evaluation of the anti‑corruption framework, fostering a culture of integrity in the public sector and improving accountability of public policy making (OECD, 2025[15]), among the other measures to fight against corruption.
Beyond addressing these broad governance challenges, Ukraine must take additional steps to reinforce public trust and democratic resilience. This report – the Public Governance Review of Ukraine – focuses on specific measures, supporting transformative reforms and strengthening democratic governance in Ukraine. The rest of this chapter summarises the governance topics covered in this Review, including planning capabilities, information integrity, citizen participation to public service development and the use of artificial intelligence (AI) in internal operations and public services.
Coherent planning system
Ukraine’s long-term recovery and EU integration depend on a coherent planning system across institutions and levels of the government. Chapter 2 of the Review examines Ukraine’s existing planning practices, identifying crucial actions to develop a comprehensive framework that will support Ukraine’s democratic recovery and resilience in the years ahead. While Ukraine has addressed short-term wartime priorities, sustainable development depends on combining immediate crisis response with long-term, whole-of-government planning (OECD, 2023[19]). To build its democratic future, Ukraine must have plans that are coherent, transparent and responsive to citizens.
Information integrity
Given rapid and unprecedented developments in the information space, democratic governance can be threatened by the spread of false or misleading information, outlining the importance of information integrity as discussed in Chapter 3. Ukraine is a target of systematic disinformation attacks (EUvsDisinfo, 2025[35]), which seek to undermine public trust in government institutions, among other goals. To strengthen resilience, Ukraine must balance efforts to counter threats in the information space with the protection of democratic freedoms, in particular freedom of expression. To safeguard the foundational elements of consensus-building, namely, freedom of expression and open debate, democratic countries need to implement policies that guarantee transparency, accountability and plurality of information sources (OECD, 2024[36]) In addition, this requires fostering societal resilience and upgrading governance measures to maintain the integrity of the information space (OECD, 2024[36]). This includes policies aimed at building digital, media and information integrity on individual basis and strengthening collaborative relationships between the public, civil society and the government. Building upon the OECD Recommendation on Information Integrity, Chapter 3 reviews the approaches of the Ukrainian government to combatting disinformation and proposes tangible recommendations in alignment with the three policy pillars of the Recommendation.
Citizen participation
As discussed in Chapter 4, a core strength of democratic governance lies in enabling citizen participation throughout the policymaking cycle. This includes electoral processes, institutionalised consultation mechanisms, social dialogue, and broader forms of civic engagement (OECD, 2023[19]). In Ukraine, strong public demand for involving different people has persisted throughout the war, pushing the government to expand participation while balancing security concerns. Chapter 4 reviews Ukraine’s initiatives aimed at strengthening participation and proposes practical steps to support policymaking that addresses different people's needs both during and after the war. Meaningful public involvement, and confidence that citizens’ views influence decisions, are key drivers of trust (OECD, 2024[37]). In future disruptions, the most resilient governments will be those that embed citizen input in both crisis response and long-term planning (OECD, 2021[18]). In Ukraine’s case, tailoring engagement to reflect diverse regional needs, which have been shaped unevenly by the war, will be particularly important (International Organization for Migration, 2025[38]).
Civil service
Democratic resilience is not possible without public servants that uphold democratic principles and values and are effective and resilient as individuals as underlined in Chapter 5. It further relies on a learning culture that supports continuous, career-long development across all levels of the administration (OECD, 2023[27]). Building on SIGMA’s work in public service, Chapter 5 of this Review further supports the government of Ukraine in its public service development, a long-standing priority for Ukraine. The Chapter identifies the most-needed skills for Ukraine’s future and suggests procedures that support the learning and development system of public administration. Interviewed stakeholders during OECD fact-finding process stressed the importance of EU-related knowledge among Ukrainian public servants to accelerate the integration process. Ukraine will benefit from investing in the development of skills and capabilities that is aligned across government and forward looking, allowing public servants to embody innovation and resilience.
Trustworthy AI for more effective governance
Chapter 6, the final section of this Review, supports the government of Ukraine in leveraging AI for effective and responsible internal operations and service delivery. Transforming businesses and citizen daily life, AI provides massive opportunities also for public governance. It can allow governments to increase their productivity in policymaking and service delivery, boost the ability to anticipate social trends and user needs and enhance oversight and risk detection (OECD, 2024[39]) Considering existing and future workforce challenges and recovery needs, it is vital for Ukraine’s government to further integrate AI in its public administration to foster its responsiveness, productivity and resilience. For example, by automating routine administrative tasks, AI can facilitate the strategic reallocation of Ukraine’s public workforce towards more productive sectors of the economy. Ukraine’s extensive experience with rapid and effective digitalisation reforms can be a pivotal enabler for the government to maximise the use of AI in the public sector. However, as a democracy, Ukraine must ensure that AI deployment is transparent, accountable, and risk sensitive. Chapter 6 assists the government of Ukraine to this end.
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