Mobilised private finance through official development finance interventions followed an upward trend over 2012-2024, totalling more than USD 600 billion over the entire period and reaching an annual peak of USD 77 billion mobilised in 2024 (USD 75 billion in 2023 constant prices), a 28.2% increase from 2020 (Figure 1.1).
Private Finance Mobilisation Report 2026
Mobilised private finance followed an upward trend over 2012-2024, while the financing gap continued to widen
USD billion, constant 2023 prices
Note: Left-hand axis shows mobilised private finance by official development finance interventions in USD constant 2023 prices. Right-hand axis shows ODA by DAC countries in USD constant 2023 prices measured on a flow basis through 2017 and on grant equivalent basis from 2018 onward.
Yet, volumes of private finance mobilised remain below expectations and needs. While financing and investment gaps are growing, and private finance mobilisation is becoming an increasingly important priority for development actors, only USD 13.4 billion of official development finance was disbursed in 2024 in support of private sector development, including through private sector instruments1(PSI) and other mobilisation activities.2 Recognising this challenge, the Sevilla Commitment at FFD4 called on development providers to increase the mobilisation ratio of private finance by strengthening the use of risk-sharing and blended finance instruments (UN, 2025[2]).
Recent OECD projections suggest that financing and development needs are increasing at a faster pace than available resources, contributing to the widening Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) financing gap, including for climate-related goals. If this gap continues to grow at its 2015-2022 rate, when it increased from USD 2.5 to USD 4.0 trillion, the annual gap could reach USD 6.4 trillion by 2030 – a 156% increase since 2015 (OECD, 2025[3]). Current crises and the additional needs stemming from critical situations of recent years are further widening the SDG financing gap, particularly as pertains to social sectors in LICs and LDCs (UN, 2024[4]). A major part of the overall financing gap relates to climate and biodiversity, with needs outstripping resources to achieve the adaptation, resilience and nature goals set forth in the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (Bhattacharya et al., 2023[5]). Scaling private finance mobilisation can play an important role in delivering on development and climate commitments, and providers have made this one of the main areas of focus of their development co-operation policies.
Three leveraging mechanisms accounted for the largest share of private finance mobilised for sustainable development
Alongside the increase in of mobilised private finance over 2021-2024 has been a proliferation of different leveraging mechanisms (Box 1.1). The three main leveraging mechanisms that mobilised the largest volumes over this period were direct investment in companies or special purpose vehicles (DICs), guarantees, and syndicated loans, which together accounted for 70% of the annual average of private finance mobilised (Figure 1.2).
Guarantees were the primary mechanism for mobilising private finance between 2021 and 2024, with volumes mobilised via guarantees increasing dramatically, by 32%, in 2024 over 2023. As shown in Figure 1.2, DICs were the second-most frequently used instrument, with finance mobilised remaining relatively stable over these four years with only a slight dip between 2022 and 2023. Syndicated loans also played a significant part in the same period, accounting for an average of 20% of mobilised private finance per year. This latter trend may reflect strong demand for large‑scale financing, particularly in infrastructure, energy and other capital‑intensive sectors. Syndicated structures enable lenders to distribute risk while providing borrowers with access to substantial funding under more flexible terms. Mobilised private finance through shares in collective investment vehicles (CIVs), credit lines and simple co‑financing remain comparatively modest, yet these instruments continue to play a valuable role in specific contexts such as small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) financing, small‑scale project co‑funding and support for projects with limited bankability.
Percentage of total
Source: OECD (2026[1]), OECD Dashboard on Private Finance Mobilisation.
Development finance providers mobilise private finance through a variety of different leveraging mechanisms.
Guarantees pertain to legally binding arrangements in which the guarantor commits to cover part or all of the obligations – be they loans, equity investments or other financial instruments – should the borrower default or the investment lose value. These guarantees are typically extended on the assumption that without such backing, private investors would not have engaged in the financing.
Syndicated loans are defined as loans provided by a group of lenders or a syndicate that work together to provide funds for a single borrower, with the aim to spread the risk of a borrower default across multiple lenders and thereby encourage private sector participation.
Shares in CIVs are those invested in entities that allow investors to pool their money and jointly invest in a portfolio of companies. A CIV can either have a flat structure or have its capital divided in tranches with different risk and return profiles.
DICs includes on-balance-sheet investments in corporate entities, including SPVs, that are conducted without any intermediary. As such, official investments in companies constitute a key leveraging instrument for private sector development.
Credit lines cover a standing credit amount that can be drawn upon at any time up to a specific amount and within a given time frame. Local financial institutions decide how much of the agreed funding they wish to draw down, and interest is paid only on the borrowed amount. The main objective of credit lines is to support the private sector through the intermediation of the local financial institution.
Simple co-financing encompasses various business partnerships, business-to-business (B2B) programmes, business surveys and matching programmes, including result-based approaches. The measurement of private finance mobilised is based on the additionality assumption that the private sector would not have invested without the official finance interventions.
In addition to these traditional financial mechanisms, official providers have increasingly focused on innovative capital market instruments to unlock additional sources of finance and help bridge the financing gap. These innovations span outcome‑based and sustainable bonds – such as green, social, sustainability and sustainability‑linked (GSSS) bonds – as well as emerging instruments like blue and biodiversity bonds.
Source: OECD DAC, Handbook on measuring and reporting on private finance mobilisation.
Mobilised private finance targeted regions and countries differently depending on various factors including the income group, as well as the information on risks and opportunities associated with the respective geographic area and country. In this regard, if returns are sought, this will affect both the choice to invest in the region as well as the specific instrument or mechanism to use.
Most-targeted regions
Over 2021-2024, most of the mobilised private finance targeted projects in Africa, which accounted for 30% of the total or USD 19.7 billion on average). The largest volumes in Africa were mobilised via guarantees (31%) and DICs (24%), followed by syndicated loans and shares in CIVs (each 14%). By contrast, credit lines (12%) and simple co-financing arrangements (5%) were the least-deployed mechanisms in Africa (Figure 1.3). Within the region, South Africa was the top beneficiary country of mobilised private finance (USD 1.7 billion on average), mainly through DICs or SPVs, guarantees, and syndicated loans
Over the same period, LAC was the second largest beneficiary region of mobilised private finance, accounting for USD 18 billion per year on average over 2021-2024 or 28% of the total. Syndicated loans and DICs were the most prominent mechanisms used to leverage private finance in the region, accounting for 31% and 23%, respectively (Figure 1.3). Other leveraging mechanisms, such as guarantees (19%), also remained key instruments to mobilise private capital. Brazil was by far the top beneficiary country from mobilised private finance, within the region but also across all regions, with an amount equal to USD 6.5 billion over 2021-2024, mainly driven via DICs and syndicated loans and amounting to USD 2.3 and USD 1.9 billion per year on average, respectively.
In Asia, an average of USD 16.5 billion per year was mobilised from the private sector over 2021-2024, mainly through DICs (33%) (Figure 1.3). Within the Asia region, India was the top beneficiary country, with USD 5.7 billion of mobilised private finance per year on average. Among other regions, Europe and Oceania benefitted the least, accounting for 11% (of which 20% was concentrated in Türkiye) and 0.1% of the total, respectively, over the period.
Percentage of total
Source: OECD (2026[1]), OECD Dashboard on Private Finance Mobilisation.
Top recipient countries
Globally, Brazil and India were the primary beneficiaries of mobilised private finance in 2021-2024, accounting for 24% of total country-allocable mobilised private finance, followed by Mozambique, Türkiye, Morocco and Mexico (Figure 1.4). While it became the main beneficiary country of mobilised private finance during this period, Brazil also established itself as an active player thanks to several initiatives aligned with the mobilisation agenda, including support to extraordinary bond transactions, and through the increasingly active domestic development banks and their engagement in blended finance with focus on climate and biodiversity (Taskin, Bellesi and Moller, 2020[6]) (Box 1.2).
USD billion, annual average, constant 2023 prices
Source: OECD (2026[1]), OECD Dashboard on Private Finance Mobilisation.
Distribution across recipient income levels
The lion’s share of mobilised private finance went to MICs in 2021-2024, while countries most in need scarcely benefitted. Middle-income countries (MICs) accounted for 69% of total mobilised private finance on average over 2021-20243 (Figure 1.5). Within this category, upper middle- income countries (UMICs) were the main recipients of private finance mobilised over this period, followed by lower middle-income countries (LMICs). By contrast, only 8% of mobilised private finance targeted projects in LDCs. This distribution is consistent with deeper structural constraints affecting investment in poorer and more fragile markets, where limited market depth, higher perceived macroeconomic and political risks, smaller domestic financial sectors, and weaker investment pipelines constrain the ability of private capital to participate in development finance transactions (OECD/UNCDF, 2020[7]; OECD, 2011[8]). Overall, mobilised private finance has scarcely benefitted countries most in need, including those experiencing fragility such as small island developing states (SIDS). This trend, combined with the limited track record of such transactions, reinforces risk perceptions among private investors, further discouraging them in investing in these contexts (Basile and Neunuebel, 2019[9]). In addition, at the regional, provincial and municipal levels, territorial data are scarce, which hinders understanding of the nuances, concentration and disparities in the distribution of private finance within countries.
Percentage
Source: OECD (2026[1]), OECD Dashboard on Private Finance Mobilisation.
Attracting private finance towards fragile contexts and SIDS remains particularly challenging
Fragile contexts4 and SIDS are among the most challenging environments in which to attract and mobilise private finance. Between 2021 and 2024, average annual mobilised private finance amounted to just USD 5.7 billion for fragile contexts and USD 1.1 billion for SIDS, together representing around 5% of the total mobilised over the period. In fragile contexts, DICs and guarantees were the most widely used instruments to leverage private finance, while shares in CIVs along with syndicated loans and guarantees were the predominant mechanisms for mobilisation in SIDS (Figure 1.6). It is expected that the emergence of innovative capital market instruments, including GSSS bonds and blue bonds, may help attract pools of capital towards these sensitive regions.
The Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF) is an initiative led by Brazil to mobilise large-scale finance for the protection, sustainable management and restoration of tropical forests. It aims to direct financial resources toward preserving tropical forests and mitigate the impacts of climate change by protecting vital biomes, reducing carbon emissions, and conserving global biodiversity. Through contributions from high-income countries and multilateral development banks, the Facility will provide financial incentives to countries that maintain tropical forests, helping preserve areas critical to global environmental stability while also benefiting local communities that protect biodiversity.
Biodiversity challenge
Tropical forests are key enablers of climate and biodiversity conservation and offer significant value to the natural ecosystems and local populations. Their loss due to the cumulative negative impacts of climate change would lead to higher global temperatures that in turn would fuel further forest loss and degradation. Nonetheless, tropical forests are being lost due to the lack of a stable, long-term funding mechanism to generate sufficient resources to help developing countries maintain and preserve tropical forests.
Finance providers and instrument
Countries with tropical forests, together with their development partners, will participate in the TFFF. To capitalize the TFFF, sovereign investors from developed countries can raise funds through instruments such as government bonds or global money markets or allocate existing resources (e.g. from sovereign wealth funds or central bank reserves) and provide this capital to the Facility at their relatively low cost of funding. Private investor sponsors and philanthropic organisations would also be invited to participate in the Facility.
Blended finance solution
The TFFF is based on a blended finance structure. It will borrow resources from the governments of high-income countries, multilateral organisations and institutional investors at interest rates aligned with their risk levels and then invest in a higher-yielding portfolio – that is, it will invest in riskier assets with higher expected returns. The income generated by these investments will be used to compensate, through grants or performance-based rewards, countries with significant tropical forest areas that meet certain conservation targets. Funding tropical forest conservation in this way could result in a return that, according to initial estimates, would pay up to USD 4 per hectare annually to eligible countries.
Source: de Nevers, Lay and Wolosin (2018[10]), The Tropical Forest Finance Facility, https://www.cgdev.org/publication/tropical-forest-finance-facility; Global Foundation (2024[11]), The Tropical Forests Forever Facility: A Proposed Multilateral Investment Fund to Reward Tropical Forest Conservation and Restoration, https://globalfoundation.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/Brazil-Government-Tropical-Forests-Forever-Initiative.pdf; World Economic Forum (World Economic Forum, 2024[12]), 4 investable pathways to help protect, manage and restore nature in Brazil, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/11/investable-pathways-protect-manage-restore-nature-brazil/.
Mobilised private finance remains significantly lower in fragile contexts and LDCs, where economic, environmental and political risks play a decisive role in investment allocation (Basile and Neunuebel, 2019[9]). In these settings, blending opportunities are shaped by heightened risk perceptions, low-income levels and structural weaknesses in local economies. Beyond these risk perceptions, structural characteristics of many LDC and fragile economies – including their smaller market size, limited diversification of productive sectors and underdeveloped financial systems – constrain the scale and replicability of private investment opportunities (OECD/UNCDF, 2020[7]). Inadequate infrastructure, limited institutional capacity, unpredictable regulatory frameworks and other legacies of poor governance further constrain private sector development and create substantial barriers to investment (Collier et al., 2021[13]). Additionally, infrastructure gaps, limited access to reliable energy and transport networks, and thin domestic financial markets increase transaction costs and make investments less attractive to private actors. As a result, mobilising private finance in fragile and conflict‑affected contexts requires tailored instruments and higher levels of risk sharing (Box 1.3).
In these challenging contexts, as in developing countries overall, most mobilised private finance in practice is channelled through multilateral institutions, which accounted for an annual average of 66% of the total amounts mobilised in fragile contexts and 73% of the total mobilised in SIDS between 2021 and 2024 (Figure 1.7).
USD billion, annual average, constant 2023 prices, and percentage
Source: OECD (2026[1]), OECD Dashboard on Private Finance Mobilisation.
Share of each recipient category
Source: OECD (2026[1]), OECD Dashboard on Private Finance Mobilisation.
Conflict‑affected contexts face significant challenges in attracting private capital. Ukraine provides a recent example, with constraints including an unstable environment due to the ongoing war and a weak investment climate.
Ukraine faces numerous challenges in attracting private capital, including an unstable environment due to the ongoing war and a weak investment climate. So far on average over 2021-2024, USD 1.2 billion of private finance has been mobilised towards Ukraine, mainly using instruments such as loan portfolio guarantees and political risk and war risk insurance (Bandura and Stazi, 2025[14]; US International Development Finance Corporation, 2024[15]). Other instruments such as equity investments remain sparsely used.
As Ukraine’s reconstruction requirements are vast, significant private finance is needed to complement limited public funding. Ukraine’s immediate reconstruction and recovery priorities at national and community level include housing, demining, infrastructure and social services, energy, and transport. However, there are also long-term investment opportunities to decentralise energy supply and heating systems, shifting away from large, centralised networks towards more local, flexible and resilient solutions, as well as to develop the minerals and mining industry and add higher value to the food crop sector.
Blended finance is being tested in Ukraine, and the learning experience can be applied to other crisis settings. Ukraine’s rebuilding efforts also present an opportunity to integrate sustainability and innovation, allowing it to also serve as a test case for blended finance in post-conflict recovery. Given that the private sector will play a critical role in the rebuilding of Ukraine, flexible concessional funds from partners are crucial to de-risk high-impact projects and mobilise private sector investment in critical sectors and prepare for the reconstruction phase (IFC, 2024[16]).
Source: Bandura and Stazi (2025[14]), "Blended finance in fragile contexts: Ukraine as a test case", https://www.environmental-finance.com/content/analysis/blended-finance-in-fragile-contexts-ukraine-as-a-test-case.html; US International Development Finance Corporation (2024[15]), "DFC Commits $50 Million in New Political Risk Insurance to Expand War Insurance for Businesses in Ukraine", https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-commits-50-million-new-political-risk-insurance-expand-war-insurance; IFC (2024[16]), What we do: Blended concessional finance in cross-cutting areas, https://www.ifc.org/en/what-we-do/sector-expertise/blended-finance/cross-cutting-solutions.
Mobilised private finance is unevenly distributed across sectors. This reflects differences in commercial viability and in the level of concessionality required for investments, technologies and sectors, both of which vary by project and local context at a given point in time (Lankes, 2021[17]). These conditions are not static: even within similar geographic settings, they evolve over time, making the deployment of blended finance inherently complex and context specific. As a result, disparities in mobilised private finance are particularly pronounced between social sectors and those sectors more directly linked to economic activity (Figure 1.8).
Economic infrastructure and services remains the top beneficiary sector of private finance mobilised
Between 2021 and 2024, almost two‑thirds (70%) of mobilised private finance supported projects in economic infrastructure and services (Figure 1.8). Within this category, banking and business services accounted for the largest share (41.8%) followed by the energy sector (13.7%). Mobilisation in these sectors relied primarily on guarantees, shares in CIVs and DICs, with credit lines playing a particularly important role for banking and business services and syndications in the energy sector.
Economic infrastructure and services consistently attract the largest share of private investment, reflecting the comparatively stronger bankability of projects in these sectors. Relative to other areas, such investments in this sector tend to be more standardised and are underpinned by clearer and more predictable revenue streams, particularly in energy and large‑scale infrastructure (Beusmans, 2024[18]) (Box 1.3). Energy projects, in particular, typically feature stable expected cash flows and are often supported by sector‑specific regulatory and policy frameworks – including power purchase agreements (PPAs), tariff guarantees and public support schemes – that play a critical role in mitigating revenue, demand and policy risks, enhancing their attractiveness to private investors (European Commission, 2024[19]). Similarly, economic and green infrastructure projects tend to be more appealing to private investors due to business models centred on public‑private partnerships (PPPs) and to their suitability for fixed‑income instruments – such as green, social, sustainability and sustainability‑linked (GSSS) bonds – that support long‑term financing needs (Dembele, Schwarz and Horrocks, 2021[20]).
The production sector has emerged as the second‑largest recipient of mobilised private finance globally, largely driven by industry, mining and construction and agriculture and fisheries, which attracted on average USD 14.1 billion and USD 3.6 billion, respectively. Within industry, mining and construction, syndicated loans and guarantees were the predominant mobilisation instruments, leveraging approximately USD 2.6 billion and USD 1.0 billion per year on average, respectively, reflecting the capital‑intensive nature and relatively predictable revenue profiles of projects in this subsector. In agriculture and fisheries, private finance mobilisation relied mostly on syndicated loans, which accounted for an average of USD 0.9 billion, pointing to more limited use of risk‑sharing instruments in contexts characterised by higher exposure to production and market risks. By contrast, the trade policies and regulations subsector remained the least attractive to private investors, accounting for just 0.6% of total private finance mobilised within the production sector, underscoring persistent challenges in mobilising private capital for policy‑oriented and non‑revenue‑generating interventions.
Percentage of total
Source: OECD (2026[1]), OECD Dashboard on Private Finance Mobilisation.
Lowest mobilisation levels observed in social sectors
Social sectors, including social infrastructure and services, received the smallest share of mobilised private finance, averaging annually USD 3.1 billion over 2021-2024, equivalent to just 6% of the total. Within these sectors, the subsectors of health and population and water supply and sanitation accounted for the largest shares of mobilisation, averaging USD 2.1 billion and USD 1.9 billion, respectively. Education and other social services were the least supported, receiving only USD 0.6 billion and USD 0.9 billion, respectively, on average over this period.
This comparatively small share of mobilisation towards social sectors is striking considering that social and development needs are concentrated in LICs and LDCs, which face significant constraints to attracting private investment overall (OECD/UNCDF, 2020[7]). In many frontier markets, development needs are concentrated in sectors such as basic infrastructure, health, water and education, where revenue models are weak and financial returns often insufficient to attract commercial investors without substantial public support. Given the small investment ticket sizes, insufficient returns, limited in-house expertise, and fact that transactions tend to be time- and resource-intensive, social sectors, particularly in challenging contexts, will typically require direct sovereign lending or MDBs to extend sovereign loans along with ODA grants, and therefore alternative sources of financing, including blending, are only part of the solution (OECD, 2022[21]). This highlights the structural limits of mobilisation in certain contexts where the underlying economics of projects or sectors may not allow for significant private participation even with risk mitigation instruments (Kharas, 2025[22]). The limited number of transactions in such contexts, and thus the absence of an evidence base, is another factor affecting the bankability of projects: the lack of transparent information dissuades new market participants as the risks and opportunities of investing in frontier markets remain unclear. These conditions make it harder to attract private finance in social sector programmes that can deliver greater development impact (Convergence, 2024[23]).
The financing profile of social sectors is another important feature that helps explains why it has received the lowest share of mobilised private finance for development. Generally, education and health are deemed to be within the domain and mandate of governments and to be reliant on public investments. However, sovereign actors in emerging markets and developing economies EMDEs and LICs are facing significant challenges including constrained public budgets and macroeconomic concerns. In this context, blended finance approaches can, where feasible, offer an alternative by mobilising private finance to support social investments (Convergence, 2024[23]), as shown in the example in Box 1.4. While private finance in health and education remains nascent, there has been an increase in the use of innovative financial instruments to unlock alternative sources of financing in these sectors. For instance, outcome-based approaches, including impact bonds and social bonds, are being used at a much higher rate in social sectors because their goal is to creative positive social outcomes, although issuances of such bonds remain stable (University of Oxford, 2026[24]; Luxembourg Green Exchange, 2025[25]). Likewise, GSSS bonds can be used strategically to increase financing for social sectors as the capital provided by GSSS bond issuances can be deployed towards greater environmental, development and social results (Dembele, Schwarz and Horrocks, 2021[20]).
The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) development project for the promotion of mini grids for rural electrification (Pro Mini Grids) was designed to provide renewably sourced electricity to 40 villages in rural Uganda, where electrification rates are particularly low. The programme supported the government of Uganda in securing private investments for solar mini grids in 15 villages in the south of the country and 25 in the north of the country. As part of the business model, the project provided subsidies on capital expenditures for generation assets and support for project aggregation. In addition, technical assistance for contract preparation was also put in place to simplify and standardise the procedures and a larger ticket size was created for investors to pursue.
Investment barriers
As the GIZ programme recognises, mini-grid energy programmes can also present some challenges due to their intrinsic features. Off-grid renewables and mini-grid solutions are often too small to attract the attention of commercial investors, while their disaggregated nature and the relatively high cost of conducting due diligence can be additional barriers to investment. In addition, such programmes do not benefit from the stability of pricing structures such as net-metering or PPAs, which set the financial returns for investments in electricity generation capacity and guarantee stable returns for investors.
Financing solution
In general, mini-grid access projects rely on some form of subsidy to account for the high upfront capital cost and the low ability of consumers to pay. Under the GIZ programme, Winch Energy, the winner of the tender, was eligible to receive a subsidy of up to 80% of the total upfront capital cost, including generation and distribution infrastructure and connections, under a results-based financing approach designed to catalyse private investment. Another important feature of this approach is the bundling of several mini grids into a single contract, hence allowing for larger project sizes and economies of scale.
The initial aim of the programme was to mobilise private investment for 50-60% of the capital costs of generation, which would account for 30-40 % of total capital expenditures on the generation, distribution and connection costs. To achieve these targets, subsidies for generation capital costs were increased, leading to a final private sector contribution equivalent to around 20% of overall project capital costs, including generation, distribution, and connections.
Source: OECD (2022[26]), “OECD blended finance guidance for clean energy”, https://doi.org/10.1787/596e2436-en; Pérez-López, Diego (2020[27]), Uganda: A Bundled Approach to Mini-Grid Tendering, https://www.get-transform.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Success-in-Rural-Electrification_Case-Study-Uganda.pdf.
Jordan is one of the most water-scarce countries in the world. The extensive stress on its water infrastructure from scarce water resources, combined with high population growth is considered the greatest constraint on growth and development in the country. The As-Samra Wastewater Treatment Plant was initially designed to treat wastewater for the 2.3 million inhabitants of Amman and supply quality irrigation water to the surrounding region. However, due to rapid population growth and a large influx of refugees, the plant was reaching its capacity limits and needed to be expanded. A financing solution was designed to support a programme to increase its capacity to treat wastewater from Amman and Zarqa governorates, including for non-domestic use, and protect existing agriculture from the potential consequences of pollution from untreated wastewater.
Financing solution
The financing solution consists of a blended finance package that includes a funding commitment from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), created by the United States in 2004, in partnership with the Samra Wastewater Treatment Plant Company Limited (SPC), a private company that built the original plant and operates under a concession from the government of Jordan. Under this arrangement, the MCC compact (i.e. the grant agreement between MCC and the Government of Jordan) covered half the cost of construction and the SPC provided debt and equity funding to cover the remaining construction costs, project development and design, project management, and interest costs. Due to the grant nature of the MCC’s investment, the expansion project was more affordable for the Jordan and financially attractive for the SPC and Jordanian banks. The public funds provided as viability gap funding within the financial package were critical to structure the deal and lower the cost of capital, which in turn improved the bankability of the project.
Results and lessons learned
As a result of the plant expansion, freshwater availability increased for approximately 375,000 households in the Zarqa governorate and neighbouring Amman, enhancing water supply services for both domestic and non-domestic uses.
This example illustrates how funding a viability gap can play a critical role in lowering the capital costs of a project and allow it to be financially viable. The blended finance approach allowed the SPC to provide the debt component of the package and decreased the costs of capital that otherwise would have made the plant expansion project too expensive for the government of Jordan.
Source: World Bank (2016[28]), Blended Financing for the Expansion of the As-Samra Wastewater Treatment Plant in Jordan, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/959621472041167619/pdf/107976-Jordan.pdf; MCC (2020[29]), As-Samra Wastewater Treatment Plant Expansion Project, As-Samra Wastewater Treatment Plant Expansion Project; (OECD, 2022[21]).
Private finance mobilisation has become a central pillar of the international climate agenda. Mobilising additional capital from a broad range of commercial actors in both developed and developing countries is critical to closing the large and persistent financing gap for climate investments, particularly investments in clean energy systems, agriculture, forestry and other land use activities as well as in climate adaptation and resilience (OECD, 2023[30]).
Key challenges persist, particularly for adaptation financing. Adaptation investments face distinct constraints that make mobilisation harder than mitigation investments: many adaptation needs are small ticket and geographically dispersed, revenue streams can be weak or non-commercial, outcomes are highly context specific and uncertain, benefits often accrue publicly or over long time horizons, and all of these factors raise transaction costs, complicate additionality assessment and limit private investor appetite (OECD, 2022[31]; OECD, 2023[30]; OECD, forthcoming[32]).
Roughly 40% of mobilised private finance supported climate action, with most of it directed towards mitigation
Over 2021-2024, USD 26.2 billion of mobilised private finance each year, or about 40% of the total, supported climate action (Figure 1.9). Of this amount, nearly 70% targeted mitigation-only activities, 22% supported both mitigation and adaptation, and 8% targeted adaptation-only activities. DICs were the most widely used leveraging mechanisms, representing 27% of private finance mobilised for climate action, followed by syndicated loans (23%) and guarantees (19%). This disparity highlights the challenge of attracting private investment for adaptation as compared with mitigation and points to the relevance of tailored instruments and patient, transformative interventions, such as blended finance facilities that provide support across the project lifecycle and help de-risk investments to crowd in private capital (Box 1.6).
Percentage of total and percentage of climate action total
Source: OECD (2026[1]), OECD Dashboard on Private Finance Mobilisation.
Mobilised private finance for climate action was distributed more evenly across the main regions than mobilised private finance as a whole. LAC was the main beneficiary region, accounting for 35%, followed by Asia (25%) and Africa (22%) of total mobilised for climate-relevant activities over 2021-2024. ODA-eligible countries in Europe benefitted from USD 2.7 billion of this finance per year on average (Figure 1.10).
USD billion, annual average, constant 2023 prices and percentage
Source: OECD (2026[1]), OECD Dashboard on Private Finance Mobilisation.
Climate Investor Two (CI2) is a blended finance facility focused on delivering sustainable infrastructure solutions in water, sanitation and ocean sectors across emerging markets. Aiming for a total fund size of USD 1 billion, CI2 had secured USD 855 million in commitments by the end of 2022 at its second financial close. Within its targeted sectors, CI2 supports a diverse range of projects including watershed protection, bulk water supply, desalination, wastewater treatment and reuse, waste-to-energy plants, green shipping and ports, and coastal ecosystem preservation, among others.
Actors involved
Climate Investor Two is backed by a consortium including FMO, SNV Netherlands Development Organisation, WWF, and Climate Fund Managers, reflecting a broad multi-stakeholder structure.
DFIs are critical at all three stages of the fund – to provide donor capital in the form of development loans for the development fund, to provide first-loss capital at the construction stage and to de-risk the refinancing fund alongside institutional investors. DFIs also often provide guidance on climate adaptation screening and monitoring.
By structuring new investable securities, the facility expands institutional investors’ exposure across pre-operational, operational, and performance phases. CI2’s ultimate goal is to catalyse private investment through the involvement of local financial actors.
Financial model
The facility combines funding from the public and private sectors, along with contributions from DFIs, using a co-ordinated approach in mutually beneficial and complementary ways. Public donors primarily support the early development phase of projects, which is typically too risky for private investors, while also playing a key role in drawing in private capital at the construction phase, where returns are more visible and risks better defined.
The CI2 business model provides financing across the full project lifecycle, from initial design through to construction and post-construction refinancing. To do this, it operates through three separate funds aligned with each stage: the development fund finances up to 50% of the planning and development stage of projects, including through loans and technical assistance (targeting USD 90 million); the construction equity fund covers up to 70% of the construction phase of projects through equity (targeting USD 1 billion); and the refinancing fund is intended to provide long-term senior debt once the project is fully operational (also targeting USD 1 billion).
Source: OECD (2023[33]), Scaling Up Adaptation Finance in Developing Countries: Challenges and Opportunities for International Providers, https://doi.org/10.1787/b0878862-en; Climate Policy Initiative (2025[34]), Climate Investor Two (web page), https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/gca-africa-adaptation-finance/case_studies/climate-investor-two-2/; Climate Fund Managers (n.d.[35]), Funds: Climate Investor Two (Cl2), https://climatefundmanagers.com/funds/#ci2; United Nations (n.d.[36]), Dutch Fund for Climate and Development – Climate Investor 2, https://sdgs.un.org/partnerships/dutch-fund-climate-and-development-climate-investor-2.
Upper middle-income countries were the largest beneficiaries of mobilised private climate finance
UMICs were the main beneficiaries of mobilised private climate finance over 2021-2024, receiving 46% of the total private finance mobilised for climate action. Within this recipient group, most of mobilised private finance for climate action targeted mitigation projects and only 3% targeted adaptation exclusively. The next-largest beneficiaries of climate finance mobilised for climate were LMICs (32%), with only 26% of their total mobilisation targeting mitigation-only projects (Figure 1.11Figure 1.11). This breakdown underscores the persistent financing gap for adaptation, which was particularly significant in lower-income and more vulnerable countries with limited private sector incentives and structural constraints such as weaker domestic capacities, higher perceived risks and debt sustainability challenges. These findings suggest that blended finance approaches need to better align with the country context so that instruments and risk mitigation instruments are suited to the specific needs of adaptation finance.
Percentage of the total for the income group
Source: OECD (2024[37]), Climate and development finance FAQ, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/insights/data-explainers/2024/12/climate-and-development-finance-faq.html#CDF2; OECD (2026[1]), OECD Data Explorer CRS – Private: Mobilised private finance for development, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/n2; OECD (2024[37]), OECD Dashboard on Private Finance Mobilisation.
Note: OECD DAC statistics on mobilisation also constitute the main source of data for the OECD monitoring of progress towards the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) USD 100 billion goal. However, figures for mobilised private finance used in this context differ from those presented in DAC statistical outputs such as this report. The main reason is that figures for private climate finance mobilised by multilateral organisations included for monitoring the USD 100 billion goal only include the share of mobilisation and outflows from multilateral organisations that can be attributed to developed countries. As a result, figures presented in this report should not be compared directly with climate finance aggregates presented in the context of OECD tracking of the UNFCCC climate goal.
OECD data remain key to tracking and monitoring progress towards the USD 100 billion climate finance goal …
Since 2015, at the request of donor countries, the OECD has been tracking progress towards the USD 100 billion annual climate finance goal, initially set to be achieved by 2020 and now prolonged to 2025. The most recent assessment, published in 2024 and covering data up to 2022, confirms that the goal was met for the first time in 2022, with USD 115.9 billion provided and mobilised for climate action (OECD, 2024[38]). These assessments offer a disaggregated analysis of climate finance flows by climate objective, financial instrument, leveraging mechanism and recipient geography.
It is important to note that the methodology used for tracking progress towards the USD 100 billion climate goal only includes the share of mobilisation and outflows from multilateral organisations that can be attributed to developed countries (see also the explanatory note to Figure 1.11), and the figures produced in this context hence differ from the figures presented in this report. However, the trends identified are consistent with the findings presented in this report, with mobilised private climate finance predominantly targeting mitigation activities, accounting for over 95% of the total between 2016 and 2023, and largely directed to UMICs. Mobilised private climate finance also followed an upward trend in recent years, but its overall volume remains modest. Continued efforts are required to increase the effectiveness of public finance in mobilising private finance (OECD, 2023[30]).
The New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance, agreed at COP29 in 2024 for the period 2026-2035, provides a broader and more ambitious framework relative to the previous climate finance goal, both in scale and scope. It includes both a goal to mobilise USD 300 billion annually by 2035 and an overarching call to scale up total climate finance to USD 1.3 trillion per year by the same year. As highlighted in analysis by the OECD-IEA Climate Change Expert Group, even though further clarification is needed regarding the scope and interaction of these two quantitative elements, the NCQG decision nonetheless sends a strong signal (Falduto and Jachnik, 2025[39]): it creates new entry points and incentives for scaling up the mobilisation of private finance through targeted public finance interventions as well as the catalysation of larger levels of private finance through public policy interventions and enabling public policy frameworks.
… as well as towards financial and technical assistance for industry decarbonisation
Mobilising finance and investment for industry decarbonisation in EMDEs is crucial to support industrial transformation towards a net-zero pathway. The industry sector accounts for as much as 40% of total energy-related global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, with three subsectors – steel, cement and chemicals – forming the bulk of these emissions (Climate Club, 2023[40]).
In the context of the Climate Club5, the OECD published the first-ever mapping of financial and technical assistance for industry decarbonisation in EMDEs (OECD/Climate Club, 2024[41]). Using OECD data on mitigation-related development finance (public bilateral and multilateral and private finance mobilised) for the steel, cement and chemical sectors, the mapping report provides an overview of trends in support towards industry decarbonisation in these contexts. The initial edition highlighted the relatively limited level of support directed towards industry, noting that industry decarbonisation in EMDEs has so far received insufficient financial and technical assistance. Building on these findings, the global pledge on Scaling International Assistance for Industry Decarbonisation was launched at COP29 (Climate Club, 2024[42]). In this joint commitment, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and the Climate Investment Funds (CIF) pledge to scale industry decarbonisation support to USD 1.3 billion, catalyse additional pledges from governments and philanthropies, and mobilise investments from the private sector in the lead-up to COP30.
To support the implementation of this global pledge, the mapping has been updated to monitor progress and identify new trends in international assistance for industry decarbonisation in EMDEs (OECD, 2026[43])6. The update covers the period of 2012-2023 and confirms that financial and technical assistance for industry decarbonisation in EMDEs remains insufficient for the sector to be aligned with a net-zero pathway. It also shows that only USD 2 billion was mobilised for mitigation-related activities pertaining to the steel, cement and chemical sectors (Figure 1.12).
Even so, financial assistance for industry decarbonisation has increased remarkably in recent years. The 2026 update of the mapping shows that total mitigation-related private finance mobilised since 2012 (cumulative amount since 2012) has increased by two thirds in just three years (2021-2023). However, the increase does not reflect a structural shift in support for industry decarbonisation. Rather, it was primarily driven by the overall rise in ODA as well as the increasing share of mitigation-related flows observed during this period. Therefore, channelling industry development finance towards further mitigation-related activities will be crucial to sustaining the efforts observed in recent years despite the challenging ODA outlook.
USD billion, cumulative amounts, 2023 constant prices
Source: OECD (2026[43]), Mapping financial and technical assistance for industry decarbonisation in emerging markets and developing economies in 2000-2023: Sustaining the momentum, https://doi.org/10.1787/2344cee3-en; OECD (2026[1]), OECD Data Explorer CRS – Private: Mobilised private finance for development, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/n2; OECD Dashboard on Private Finance Mobilisation.
Note: The period 2012-2020 was the period analysed in the first edition of the mapping. The period 2021-2023 includes new added data available from the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database since the first edition of the mapping.
In terms of recipients of private sector finance for climate action, there is room to target additional countries, especially in regions that face the unique challenge of growing their economies while decarbonising their industry. Between 2012 and 2023, Nigeria received the largest share of the cumulated amount mobilised (roughly 20%) followed by Senegal (13%), Türkiye (approximately 10%), Bangladesh (10%) and Mexico (7%) (Figure 1.13). At the same time, there has been a notable recent shift in focus towards the Africa region, which received 70% of the total private finance mobilised for mitigation between 2021 and 2023. However, the most-targeted recipients do not include major steel, cement and chemical manufacturing countries such as those in Southeast Asia). Consequently, there is still considerable space to increase the impact of mobilised private finance on global emissions reduction for these sectors.
USD billion, cumulative amounts, 2023 constant prices
Source: OECD (2026[43]), Mapping financial and technical assistance for industry decarbonisation in emerging markets and developing economies in 2000-2023: Sustaining the momentum, https://doi.org/10.1787/2344cee3-en; OECD (2026[1]), OECD Data Explorer CRS – Private: Mobilised private finance for development, http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/n2; OECD Dashboard on Private Finance Mobilisation.
Note: The period 2012-2020 was the period analysed in the first edition of the mapping. The period 2021-2023 includes new added data available from the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database since the first edition of the mapping.
Finally, regarding impacts on CO2 emissions reductions, it is important to note that the mobilised support recorded has increasingly targeted industrial projects, with growing attention to the integration of disruptive technologies. Previously, recipient projects largely focused on incremental emissions reductions rather than on disruptive approaches, and most of the assistance provided was aimed at improving energy efficiency, circular economy approaches and waste management. Since 2022, however, emerging trends indicate a growing emphasis on projects involving deep decarbonisation technologies such as clean hydrogen. This apparent shift has the potential to amplify the impact of the private finance mobilised for industry decarbonisation on CO2 emissions reductions.
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← 1. PSIs are financial instruments extended by DFIs and similar vehicles established by donors to build markets in developing countries and invest in private sector activities to support the countries’ economic development and welfare. These instruments include loans to the private sector, equity investments, mezzanine finance instruments, reimbursable grants and guarantees. For further detail, see https://one.oecd.org/document/DCD/DAC/STAT(2024)15/en/pdf.
← 2. Mobilisation activities refer to a broader range of development finance interventions that unlock and channel commercial finance towards sustainable development objectives in developing countries.
← 3. This represents nearly 90% of country‑allocable mobilised private finance (i.e. excluding amounts not assigned to individual countries that accounted for over 23% of total mobilised private finance in 2021-2024).
← 4. Fragile contexts present a combination of exposure to risk and insufficient resilience of a state, system and/or community to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks, according to OECD definitions and analysis. For further discussion, see https://doi.org/10.1787/81982370-en.
← 5. The Climate Club is an inclusive high-level forum for industry decarbonisation with a total membership of 46 economies, as of October 2025.
← 6. Note that figures in this subsection use cumulative amounts – not annual amounts as the rest of the report – between 2012 and 2023.