Pensions at a Glance 2025: Belgium
Table of contents
This country note shows how Belgium compares with other OECD countries in Pensions at a Glance 2025. This edition covers recent pension reforms and includes a focus on gender pension gaps.
The Belgian gender pension gap is high in international comparison. Based on Eurostat data, the average pension of women was 31% lower than that of men in 2024, while the OECD-average gap was 23%. One caveat with the measure is that large lump-sum payouts can cause substantial fluctuations due to the limited sample size, as is particularly the case for occupational pensions in Belgium. Nonetheless, the gap was on average 29% over the last five years in Belgium, well above the OECD average. While the gender pension gap indicates that women individually receive substantially lower pensions than men in Belgium, the gender gap in disposable income – i.e. total household income corrected for the number of household members – among people aged 65+ is only 8.1%, below the OECD average of 10.3%.
The Belgian gender pension gap is largely the consequence of mandatory earnings-related pensions, and is exacerbated by occupational pensions, where the gap is more substantial. By contrast, survivor’s pensions, credited periods and the minimum pension have a strongly mitigating impact. The gender pension gap takes into account survivor’s pensions, which reduces the gender gap in mandatory earnings-related pensions by 39% in Belgium and by 38% on average in the OECD. Due to credited parental leave, a 5-year employment break to provide childcare to two children has virtually no impact on the future pension of a woman making average earnings in Belgium, while in the OECD on average this reduces her future pension by 5%. Belgium is also among the OECD countries with the longest credited periods for providing long-term care to family members in the OECD. Furthermore, the minimum pension levels are relatively high.
The share of women among earnings-related pension recipients (excluding survivor’s pensions) is much smaller than in the full population aged 65+. Whereas in the OECD on average, the share of women among old-age pension recipients is 6 percentage points lower than the share among older people, this gap is 15 percentage points in Belgium. Luxembourg is the only Western European country where the gap is wider. Spousal supplements, benefits provided to couples in which one of the spouses has little or no pension entitlements, are likely part of the explanation in Belgium as women with very small pension entitlements have to give up their own pensions so that their partners can receive a pension at 75% instead of 60% of the reference wage. Belgium is one of only four OECD countries still providing such supplements alongside Japan, Korea and the United States, although the government agreement foresees in their phasing-out except for minimum pensions. Several European countries abolished supplements for financially dependent spouses over the past decades, including France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom between 2010 and 2015.
The gender pension gap may decline in the future as Belgium experienced a very strong reduction in the gender gap in expected lifetime earnings from 51% in 2002 to 29% in 2022. On average across OECD countries, that gap dropped from 49% to 35% over the same period. The Belgian gap in lifetime earnings now is particularly driven by the gender gap in working hours and to some extent by the gap in expected career duration, whereas the gap in hourly wages has a limited impact. Compared to men, women on average work 6 fewer hours per week and earn 7% less per hour, and their careers are 3.7 years shorter. A study quoted in the report indeed projects that the gender pension gap will decline to under 10% by 2050.
Belgium, together with Luxembourg as well as Hungary for women, is exceptional in the OECD for not applying any penalties in case of early retirement. Belgium does not have a pension bonus either, although it does have a flat-rate incentive to work beyond becoming eligible to retirement (known as the “pension bonus”). Bonuses and penalties increase or decrease pension benefits to adjust the pensions to the change in duration of pension uptake, and in addition potentially to create incentives to delay retirement. A bonus or penalty is actuarially neutral if taking up the pension one year later or earlier does not change the total discounted amount of already accumulated pensions the person can expect to receive in her life. When bonuses and penalties are absent or below actuarially neutral rates, there effectively is an implicit tax on employment of people around the retirement age, as an extra year worked results in a decline in pension wealth.
Belgium’s plan to introduce a bonus and penalty of 5% per year is close to the actuarially neutral rate (estimated at 5.1%). It would therefore remove disincentives to delay pension take-up beyond the moment a person becomes eligible to (early) retirement. However, the bonus or penalty would only apply to people with at least or fewer than, respectively, 35 years effectively worked. Such career-length conditions undermine the effectiveness of the bonus and penalty as they conflict with the principle of actuarial neutrality, and means that there remains a disincentive to work longer for large groups of people – notably those for whom working longer is likely to be more attainable as they have had limited periods of illness or unemployment. The career-length condition may even deepen inequalities, as it would result in a larger impact on women and people with long-term illness.
% difference of average pension of women relative to average pension of men, 2024 or latest
Source: Figure 2.1.
Bonus/penalty when retiring one year after/before the normal retirement age, contributory schemes
Source: Figure 1.9.
Men and women leave the labour market at a very early age in Belgium, at 62.4 and 60.6 years respectively, compared to OECD averages of 64.7 and 63.6 years. Men and women leave the labour market earlier only in Luxembourg, Slovenia and Türkiye, and men leave earlier in France and Spain. With public expenditure on pensions set to increase from 13.1% of GDP to 15.1% over the next 30 years, which would be the second highest in the OECD after Spain, raising the average age of labour-market exit would mitigate this increase. Linking the statutory retirement age to life expectancy once it reaches 67 in 2030 can contribute to improving the financial situation of the pension system without reducing pension benefits. Increasing the statutory retirement age by two-thirds of life-expectancy gains roughly keeps the share of adult life that people can expect to spend in retirement constant across cohorts. One in four OECD countries now link retirement ages to life expectancy.
Older people’s incomes are relatively low, but large redistribution leads to low inequality
The average labour market exit age is among the lowest in the OECD
Total pension spending is above average while contribution rates are below average
Future net replacement rates for low and average earners are around the OECD average
Contact
Wouter DE TAVERNIER (✉ wouter.detavernier@oecd.org)
Andrew REILLY (✉ andrew.reilly@oecd.org)
This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of the Member countries of the OECD.
This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.
The statistical data for Israel are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights, East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank under the terms of international law.
The full book is available in English: OECD (2025), Pensions at a Glance 2025: OECD and G20 Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/e40274c1-en.
© OECD 2025
Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0)
This work is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence. By using this work, you accept to be bound by the terms of this licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Attribution – you must cite the work.
Translations – you must cite the original work, identify changes to the original and add the following text: In the event of any discrepancy between the original work and the translation, only the text of the original work should be considered valid.
Adaptations – you must cite the original work and add the following text: This is an adaptation of an original work by the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed in this adaptation should not be reported as representing the official views of the OECD or of its Member countries.
Third-party material – the licence does not apply to third-party material in the work. If using such material, you are responsible for obtaining permission from the third party and for any claims of infringement.
You must not use the OECD logo, visual identity or cover image without express permission or suggest the OECD endorses your use of the work.
Any dispute arising under this licence shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Arbitration Rules 2012. The seat of arbitration shall be Paris (France). The number of arbitrators shall be one.