Perceptions and evaluations of public institutions are partially shaped by how governments plan for and manage long-term and complex challenges. This chapter explores public perceptions of government competencies and values in relation to complex decision making. It investigates how people assess government reliability in light of ongoing and future challenges, such as regulating new technologies to help the public use them responsibly, being prepared for emergencies, or reducing greenhouse gas emissions. It also addresses the degree to which individuals believe that these decisions are made with integrity and for the public good, and whether they are subject to institutional checks and balances. The chapter finally illustrates how Latin Americans participate in political activities, how much they believe they can influence policymaking, and their expectations of government's openness and responsiveness to public input.
OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean 2025 Results
Abstract
Key findings
Perceptions of decision making on complex policy issues play a decisive role in shaping trust mostly for the national government, but also the civil service. People who believe that government adequately balances intergenerational interests, makes decisions based on the best available evidence, and is held accountable by the legislature are more likely to have high or moderately high trust in the national government and the civil service.
A narrow majority is confident that governments can tackle long-term policy problems, such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions (52%) and co-operate with other stakeholders (51%), but there is scepticism about emergency preparedness. Only 40% of people believe their governments are ready to protect lives during large-scale emergencies. Positive perceptions of emergency preparedness and long-term policy competence are strongly associated with higher trust in institutions
The proportions of Latin Americans who believe that decisions reflect the public interest and are taken free from the interference of special interests are lower. 37% believe powerful interests steer public policy away from the public good, 36% trust legislatures to hold governments accountable, and just 31% find it likely that courts act independently of political pressure.
People feel able to (and do) participate in politics, but they do not feel their voices are heard. While 51% feel able to participate in politics, only 25% believe people like them have a say in government decisions. This mismatch risks fuelling cynicism and disengagement, while feeling heard correlates with trust in national-level institutions.
The relationship between perceptions of complex decision making and trust are largely consistent between the LAC region and OECD countries, with two caveats. The association between these public governance drivers and trust in the civil service is more pronounced in LAC countries than across the OECD. And while the association between perceptions of political voice and trust are similar in LAC and the OECD when it comes to the civil service and legislatures, the impact is smaller in the region when it comes to the national government.
How can public institutions improve and foster trust?
Continue to invest in governments’ capacity in the face of complex challenges to increase trust, in particular in the national government, by fostering inclusive, consensus-driven policymaking, and ensuring that initiatives reach vulnerable groups. Likewise, to enhance perceptions about governments’ capacity of regulating new technologies to help the public use them responsibly, governments can strengthen national digital government strategies, prioritising efforts to enable an inclusive and user-centric approach digital transformation (OECD/CAF, 2023[1]), and continue committing to use artificial intelligence in a trustworthy manner (OECD, 2025[2]).
Strengthen initiatives fostering public integrity. Governments could improve and develop comprehensive regulatory frameworks that shield public policies from vested interests, particularly regarding lobbying and management of conflicts of interest, and ensure that these are applied in practice. They should also continue increasing efforts to enhance their strategic integrity frameworks and ensure that public officials are committed to uphold the public interest.
Boost responsiveness of public institutions and meaningful engagement. Although many people in the region feel able to and do participate in politics, few believe they can actually influence policymaking. Governments could better communicate how public feedback is used, extend the adoption of meaningful participatory methods, and leverage their efforts on civic education programmes.
Improve efforts to safeguard accountability by reinforcing legislative and judicial independence to uphold democratic accountability and restore trust in institutions.
People's expectations, perceptions, and their relationship with public institutions are shaped not only by their day-to-day interactions with these institutions, but also by how governments address complex policy challenges. This includes setting policy agendas and leading decision-making processes that address major societal challenges. In a context marked by profound transformations, such as population ageing and the digital transition, public institutions must respond swiftly and at scale. In addition, in democracies, people expect representative institutions to uphold checks and balances, ensure meaningful public engagement, and respect fundamental rights.
Findings from the OECD Trust Survey in LAC indicate that many Latin Americans express relative optimism regarding their governments’ ability to address complex challenges and their responsiveness to public preferences on key policy issues.1 These moderately positive perceptions, which in some cases are more positive than the average across OECD countries, could offer a foundation for building an agenda for trust not only in the national government, but also the civil service, in the region. As of today, perceptions that policies take into account intergenerational needs, and draw on the best available evidence, are the main drivers of trust in national governments. They are also significant levers of trust in local government, the civil service, and national legislatures.
Yet, when considering more immediate concerns, public perceptions are less optimistic. People in LAC countries are fairly sceptical about their governments’ preparedness for emergencies and their ability to help people and businesses navigate the responsible use of emerging technologies. These concerns, which can contribute to lower levels of trust in the national government, may be linked to recent experiences, such as the management and aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic and of multiple natural disasters. In addition, persistent concerns about a lack of integrity and fairness, both among high-level political officials and in policymaking processes, continue to fuel doubts about governments’ capacity to make competent and ethical decisions.
Finally, there are also widespread concerns about insufficient checks and balances and opportunities to make people’s views count. Only about one-third of respondents in LAC countries (similar to their OECD peers) believe that national legislatures effectively hold governments accountable, and only a quarter think that ordinary citizens have a meaningful say in what the government does. To restore trust, governments should reflect on how the perceptions of political voice can be enhanced.
Results of the OECD Trust Survey suggest a mixed picture regarding Latin Americans' perceptions of government reliability and ability to handle complex challenges. On average, people express greater confidence in their governments' preparedness to manage certain long-term challenges, and less confidence in their ability to respond to emergencies or regulate new technologies (such as AI or digital applications) appropriately to help business and citizens use them responsibly.
Public perceptions of government institutions’ readiness to protect lives and their ability to address complex challenges are both significant drivers of trust. In particular, positive perceptions of emergency preparedness are among the three most significant drivers of trust in local government (associated with a 3.6 percentage points increase in probability of having high or moderately high trust, holding other variables constant). They are also associated with trust in the civil service (2.4 percentage points), national government, and legislatures (2 percentage points).
In addition, results of regression analysis show that positive perceptions of governments’ ability to balance intergenerational interests is the driver most strongly associated with trust in national government (7.5 percentage points) and are also associated with an increased probability of high or moderately high trust in the civil service (2.9 percentage points) and national legislatures (2.6 percentage points). As such, these are critical areas where governments in the region should invest - primarily to strengthen resilience against current and future risks, but also to support public trust.
4.1.1. Many Latin Americans express concerns about the reliability of public institutions in responding to emergencies or adapting to new technologies
While still in its early stages, Latin American and Caribbean countries have made progress in institutionalising foresight and adopting long-term strategic planning. Several countries in the region have established dedicated foresight units or divisions, such as the Office of Planning and Budget (OPP) in Uruguay or the National Centre for Strategic Planning (CEPLAN) in Peru. Yet a challenge for the region remains ensuring the long-term stability, institutional continuity, and influence of these foresight bodies within the policymaking process (ECLAC, 2021[3]).
On average, 40% of respondents across countries in LAC believe their government institutions would be prepared to protect lives in the event of an emergency, while a similar share (43%) believe they would not (Figure 4.1). This contrasts with results across OECD countries, where a majority of 53% believe their government institutions would be ready to respond effectively to emergencies.
Share of population who find it likely or unlikely that government institutions are ready to protect people’s lives in a large-scale emergency, 2023 or 2025
Note: The figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question “If there were a large-scale emergency, how likely do you think it is that government institutions would be ready to protect people’s lives?”. The “likely” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “unlikely” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice. “OECD” presents the unweighted average across 30 OECD including the four LAC OECD countries in 2023. “LAC” presents the unweighted average across the ten LAC countries, gathered in 2023 for the OECD LAC countries and in 2025 for the non-OECD LAC countries.
Source: 2023 OECD Trust Survey and 2025 OECD Trust Survey in LAC.
Differences across countries are large. In Mexico, Chile and Costa Rica, around half of the population finds it likely that institutions would be ready to protect their lives, while in Peru or Paraguay, these shares are of 24% and 31%, respectively. The differences across countries, as well as compared to OECD’s results, could be related to vulnerability to disasters and environmental risks (Cabral-Ramírez, Niño-Barrero and DiBella, 2025[4]; OECD, 2024[5]) and economic conditions. In particular, in countries where per-capita GDP is lower, crises may hit harder; there are fewer resources available to tackle them, and other pre-existing challenges could make people more vulnerable than their counterparts in higher-income countries. Analysis of population groups within countries finds that people reporting economic insecurity are 16 percentage points less likely to believe that their governments would protect their lives in case of a large-scale emergency.
Beyond concerns about government preparedness for crises and emergencies, many people in LAC also appear worried about how governments are handling several aspects of the digital transition.
Several countries in the region have adopted strategies and initiatives aimed at strengthening digital governance, though challenges remain in achieving a sustainable and integrated digital transformation. Public expectations regarding technology governance are high. On average, 82% of respondents in the region believe that helping workers adapt to automation, digitalisation, and new technologies should be a priority for governments, above the OECD average of 77%.
At the same time, only 42% of respondents in LAC countries believe that their government would regulate new technologies (such as artificial intelligence or digital applications) appropriately and help businesses and individuals use them responsibly. This proportion is very similar to the average share across the OECD (41%). Shares across countries range from 33% in Peru to 53% in Mexico (Figure 4.2).
Share of population who find it likely or unlikely that government will regulate new technologies appropriately and help businesses and individuals use them responsibly, 2023 or 2025
Note: The figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question “If new technologies (for example artificial intelligence or digital applications) became available, how likely do you think it is that the federal/central/national government will regulate them appropriately and help businesses and citizens use them responsibly?”. The “likely” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “unlikely” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice. “OECD” presents the unweighted average across 30 OECD including the four LAC OECD countries in 2023. “LAC” presents the unweighted average across the ten LAC countries, gathered in 2023 for the OECD LAC countries and in 2025 for the non-OECD LAC.
Source: 2023 OECD Trust Survey and 2025 LAC Trust Survey.
4.1.2. Yet half of Latin Americans are optimistic about their government's ability to tackle long-term challenges with intergenerational trade-offs
The complexity and uncertainty surrounding long-term policy issues, such as environmental issues or balancing the needs of present and future generations, make them especially challenging for governments to address.
In 2024, Latin America and the Caribbean faced a series of unprecedented environmental disasters (OECD, 2024[5]) with far-reaching impacts. These included Ecuador’s worst drought in 60 years, severe flooding in Porto Alegre, and devastating wildfires in the Amazon and Valparaíso, among others. At the same time, countries in the region have increasingly invested in targeted initiatives and long-term adaptation strategies to changes in weather and temperatures (Carter, Tye and Aguilar, 2022[6]; OECD, 2023[7]; OECD, 2024[8]), that seems to be bearing fruit.
Indeed, Trust Survey results suggest that many people in the region are confident in their governments’ ability to manage complex, intergenerational policy challenges. On average, 52% of respondents in LAC countries believe their country will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the next ten years. Similarly, nearly half (46%) express confidence that their government will adequately balance the interests of current and future generations, the main driver of trust in the national government across LAC and the OECD (Annex A). These figures are notably higher than those reported across OECD countries, where only 42% and 37% of respondents, respectively, share such optimism (Figure 4.3). Confidence levels in most of LAC countries (with the exception of Brazil and Costa Rica) are higher among younger respondents. The gap is particularly large in Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru (see Figure 2.8 in Chapter 2).
Share of population reporting confidence in the capabilities of government institutions to achieve policy objective, 2023 or 2025
Note: The figure presents the unweighted OECD and LAC averages for responses to the following questions: (1) “If new technologies (for example artificial intelligence or digital applications) became available, how likely do you think it is that the national government will regulate them appropriately and help businesses and citizens use them responsibly?”, (2) “On a scale of 0 to 10, how confident are you that the national government adequately balances the interests of current and future generations?”, and (3) “On a scale of 0 to 10, how confident are you that [COUNTRY] will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the next ten years?”. The “likely/confident” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “unlikely/not confident” is the aggregation of responses from 1-4; and “do not know” was a separate answer choice. “OECD” presents the unweighted average across 30 OECD including the four LAC OECD countries in 2023. “LAC” presents the unweighted average across the ten LAC countries, gathered in 2023 for the OECD LAC countries and in 2025 for the non-OECD LAC countries.
Source: 2023 OECD Trust Survey and 2025 OECD Trust Survey in LAC.
Positive perceptions among respondents in LAC countries could be linked to the fact that a majority (51%) express confidence in their government’s ability to collaborate with other national stakeholders, including private sector organisations and trade unions, to better address long-term challenges (Figure 4.4). Chile offers a strong example of systemic, multistakeholder policymaking to mitigate environmental challenges. For example, the enactment of a Framework Law on Climate Change promoted cross-party and cross-sector collaboration, and stands out as a valuable model for the region (OECD, 2024[8]).2
Share of population reporting confidence in their government’s ability to co-operate with other national stakeholders and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 2023 or 2025
Note: The figure presents the share who indicate confidence (aggregation of responses 6-10 on the 0-10 scale) in the responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, how confident are you that [COUNTRY] will succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the next ten years?” and “On a scale of 0 to 10, how confident are you in the national government’s ability to co-operate with other national stakeholders, such as private sector organisations and trade unions to better tackle long-term challenges?”. “LAC” presents the unweighted average across the ten LAC countries, gathered in 2023 for the OECD LAC countries and in 2025 for the non-OECD LAC concerning the first question, and the unweighted average across the seven LAC countries, gathered in 2023 for Chile (OECD, 2024[8]), and in 2025 for the non-OECD LAC.
Source: (OECD, 2024[8]). and 2025 OECD Trust Survey in LACConcerns about political voice and accountability are extended in LAC
The values and principles that guide government actions and policymaking processes are just as important to public trust as the outcomes themselves (Brezzi et al., 2021[9]; Van de Walle and Migchelbrink, 2020[10]). Inclusive, fair, and accessible governance fosters co-operation, mutual respect, and a sense of dignity, strengthening people’s trust in public officials and institutions. However, in LAC countries, as in many OECD countries, more people believe it is likely that governments would promote policies benefiting private interests at the expense of the public good (Figure 4.5), undermining trust. At the same time, while a majority of Latin Americans (51%) feel confident in their own ability to participate in politics, an even larger share (58%) believes that, regardless of their engagement, they have little to no influence on policy outcomes. This gap can fuel cynicism and political disaffection.
People in LAC countries tend to view their governments as slightly more responsive than respondents in OECD countries do, although scepticism remains. Many respondents question whether their governments consider public input gathered during consultations, respond adequately to people’s preferences during policy design and implementation, or provide sufficient opportunities for meaningful participation. In particular, positive perceptions of the opportunity to voice opinions in decisions affecting one’s community are the main driver of trust in local governments in LAC (associated with a 4.7 percentage points increase in the probability of having high or moderately high trust in the local government, holding other variables constant), as they are across the OECD. Similarly, feeling that one can influence what governments do are associated with a higher probability of trust in national governments (1.7 percentage points), legislatures (3 percentage points), and the civil service (2 percentage points). The association between this perception of political voice and trust in the national government is less pronounced in LAC than across the OECD.
In addition to being responsive and accountable to people, public institutions must also be accountable to one another. Perceptions of institutional accountability across the LAC region remain low and addressing this weakness could significantly enhance trust. Regression analysis shows that when people view legislatures as holding governments accountable, they are more likely to place high or moderately high trust in national governments (3.4 percentage points), legislatures (2.5 percentage points), and the civil service (1.9 percentage points).
4.2.1. Many people believe powerful groups are steering public policies away from the public interest
Ensuring open and equal access to policymaking is fundamental to healthy democratic life and the effectiveness of public policies. Inclusive processes allow policymakers to be better informed, ensure that diverse interests are fairly represented in outcomes, and prevent the overrepresentation of powerful groups at the expense of those with less influence. However, consistent with historical patterns,3 results from the OECD Trust Survey in LAC reveal widespread concerns that vested interests may exert undue influence on public policies. When this occurs, economic inequalities risk being reproduced and exacerbated in political outcomes.
On average, 45% of respondents across LAC countries believe it is likely that their national government would accept the demands of a corporation promoting a policy beneficial to its industry but harmful to society at large. Meanwhile, 33% believe the government would reject such demands, slightly above the average across OECD countries (30%). This share varies across countries. In Peru, 39% think governments would resist corporate influence, compared to only 28% in Brazil and Mexico (Figure 4.5). Differences could be related not only to experiences or assumptions, but also to different expectations, standards and understandings of what could be considered as undue influence harmful to the public good.
Share of population who find it likely or unlikely that the government would refuse the corporation’s demand, 2023 or 2025
Note: The figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question “If a corporation promoted a policy that benefited its industry but could be harmful to society as a whole, how likely do you think it is that the national government would agree to the corporation’s demand?”. For ease of analysis, the direction of the answers were turned around, to match a share of likely with a positive meaning. In detail, the share of ‘likely the government agree to’ of the original question corresponds to ‘unlikely government refuses’ above. The “likely” proportion is therefore the aggregation of responses from 0-4 on the scale of the original question; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “unlikely” is the aggregation of responses from 6-10; and “Do not know” was a separate answer choice. “OECD” presents the unweighted average across 30 OECD including the four LAC OECD countries in 2023. “LAC” presents the unweighted average across the ten LAC countries, gathered in 2023 for the OECD LAC countries and in 2025 for the non-OECD LAC.
Source: 2023 OECD Trust Survey and 2025 OECD Trust Survey in LAC.
Public concerns are even larger when it comes to the integrity of high-level public officials. Nearly half of respondents (49%) believe it is unlikely that a policymaker would refuse a well-paid job in the private sector offered in exchange of a political favour. In contrast, only 36% believe it is likely that the official would refuse to grant such a favour. Perceptions of revolving doors and undue influence are generally pessimistic across Latin America and the Caribbean, with relatively small differences across population groups and countries. Focusing on country levels results, respondents in Ecuador express the most positive views, while those in Mexico report the most negative perceptions (Figure 4.6).
Share of population who find it likely or unlikely that a high-level political official would refuse to grant a political favour in return for a well-paid private sector job, 2023 or 2025
Note: The figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question “If a politician was offered a well-paid job in the private sector in exchange for a political favour, how likely do you think it is that they would refuse it?”. The “likely” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “unlikely” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Do not know” was a separate answer choice. “OECD” presents the unweighted average across 30 OECD including the four LAC OECD countries in 2023. “LAC” presents the unweighted average across the 10 LAC countries, gathered in 2023 for the OECD LAC countries and in 2025 for the non-OECD LAC.
Source: 2023 OECD Trust Survey and 2025 OECD Trust Survey in LAC.
Effective regulations on conflict of interest and lobbying are critical to safeguarding public policy from capture by special interests and ensuring decisions serve the public good, alongside strong strategic integrity frameworks and anticorruption institutions. Lobbying and influence in policymaking have become more complex, involving a broader range of actors and activities that may merit regulation (OECD, 2021[11]). Despite this, regulatory frameworks remain limited across the LAC region, and where they do exist, enforcement challenges persist. Only Chile, Mexico, and Peru define lobbying activities in their legal frameworks, and of these, only Chile and Mexico maintain publicly accessible online lobbying registers (OECD, 2024[5]) (OECD, 2024[5]).
4.2.2. People feel able to and participate in politics, but they do not feel their voices are heard
Political participation, public trust, and democracy are mutually reinforcing. Engagement in political activities can strengthen civic and democratic values, confer legitimacy on political systems, and enhance trust in public institutions (Prats and Meunier, 2021[12]; Prats, Smid and Ferrin, 2024[13]). People who feel they have a say in government decisions or are confident in participating in politics are about twice as likely to have high or moderately high trust in the national government (see Chapter 2). Moreover, the perception of lacking political voice may reflect broader concerns about undue influence (see Section 4.2.1).
On average, a majority (51%) of Latin Americans report feeling able to participate in politics, significantly higher than the OECD average of 40%. This may in part reflect the region’s leadership in adopting innovative participatory mechanisms, such as participatory budgeting and deliberative democratic processes (Selee and Peruzzotti, 2009[14]; OECD, 2020[15]). Perceptions vary widely across countries: the lowest share is found in Brazil (42%), while the Dominican Republic (59%) and Ecuador (56%) report the highest levels (Figure 4.7). Importantly, in every LAC country surveyed, the share of people who feel able to participate in politics exceeds the OECD average. Women (except in Brazil), younger people (except in Guatemala), and people who have lower levels of education feel less confident in their ability to participate compared to men, older cohorts and more educated people.
Share of population who feel or do not feel confident in their own ability to participate in politics, 2023 or 2025
Note: The figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question ”How confident are you in your own ability to participate in politics?”. The “confident” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “Not confident” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Do not know” was a separate answer choice. “OECD” presents the unweighted average across 30 OECD including the four LAC OECD countries in 2023. “LAC” presents the unweighted average across the ten LAC countries, gathered in 2023 for the OECD LAC countries and in 2025 for the non-OECD LAC.
Source: 2023 OECD Trust Survey and 2025 OECD Trust Survey in LAC.
Reflecting on the findings above, people in LAC report higher levels of political participation compared to their OECD peers (Figure 4.8). The region’s tradition of compulsory voting has likely contributed to a culture of political engagement (Carey and Horiuchi, 2017[16]). Similar to respondents in OECD countries, approximately eight in ten (77%) of Latin Americans report having voted in the most recent national elections, and about half (51%) reported voting in local elections. However, Latin Americans appear more inclined to engage in collective forms of participation, such as volunteering for social or environmental causes (17%), attending trade union or political party meetings (13%), or participating in street protests and demonstrations (11%). In contrast, fewer indicate engaging in individual protest actions like boycotting products for political reasons (5%).
Share of population who participated in the respective political activity over the last 12 months, 2023 or 2025
Note: The figure shows the unweighted averages of the share of population who answered “yes” to one of the given activity in the question “Over the last 12 months, have you done any of the following activities?”. “OECD” presents the unweighted average across 30 OECD including the four LAC OECD countries in 2023. “LAC” presents the unweighted average across the ten LAC countries, gathered in 2023 for the OECD LAC countries and in 2025 for the non-OECD LAC. Apart from the “None of these” option, respondents can select more than one response choice and therefore the total across rows exceeds 100%.
Source: 2023 OECD Trust Survey and 2025 OECD Trust Survey in LAC.
At the same time, only one in four respondents (25%) across LAC countries feel that people like them have a say in what the government does (Figure 4.9, Panel A). With the exception of Mexico, where 45% of respondents report feeling that they have influence over government decisions, all other LAC countries fall below the OECD average of 30%. Crucially, having a say is highly correlated with trust in the national government at the country level (Figure 4.9, Panel B), and is a significant driver of trust in the national government, the legislature, and the civil service. Compared to findings across the OECD, this relationship of perceived political voice and trust is similar for the legislature and the civil service, but is less pronounced for the national government.
Note: Panel A: The figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question ‘’How much would you say the political system in [COUNTRY] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?’’. Panel B: The chart illustrates the percentage of respondents reporting “likely” to the question: “How much would you say the political system in your country allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?” or answering “high or moderately high trust” to the question: “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust national government?”. The “likely” or “high or moderately high trust” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale. “OECD” presents the unweighted average across 30 OECD including the four LAC OECD countries in 2023. “LAC” presents the unweighted average across the ten LAC countries, gathered in 2023 for the OECD LAC countries and in 2025 for the non-OECD LAC countries.
Source: 2023 OECD Trust Survey and 2025 OECD Trust Survey in LAC.
Similarly, many people in LAC believe that governments are unresponsive to what the public has to say about policies, though their share is smaller than across the OECD. 44% of respondents believe that if a majority of people expressed a view against a national policy, the government would change it, compared to 38% who believe it would not change. The respective OECD averages are 37% and 42%, respectively. There is considerable variation across LAC countries, ranging from 34% in Peru who say a government would likely change a policy to 51% in the Dominican Republic (Figure 4.10).
Share of population who find it likely or unlikely that government would change a national policy if over half of the people expressed a view against it, 2023 or 2025
Note: The figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question “If over half of the people in [COUNTRY] clearly expressed a view against a national policy, how likely do you think it is that it would be changed?”. The “likely” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “unlikely” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice. “OECD” presents the unweighted average across 30 OECD including the four LAC OECD countries in 2023. “LAC” presents the unweighted average across the ten LAC countries, gathered in 2023 for the OECD LAC countries and in 2025 for the non-OECD LAC countries.
Source: 2023 OECD Trust Survey and 2025 OECD Trust Survey in LAC.
Even when considering decisions that directly affect their own communities, or occasions when they are explicitly asked for feedback, many Latin Americans remain sceptical that their input will be considered. Just over one-third of respondents (38%) believe they would have the opportunity to voice their opinions in decisions affecting their community, slightly below the OECD average of 41%. Similarly, only about 36% believe that their input in public consultations would be taken into account, which is nonetheless above the OECD average of 32%. At the national level, the share of the population that sees these dimensions positively does not reach a majority in any LAC country, although Ecuador has the most positive perception regarding the government’s responsiveness to public consultations (49%), and Mexico leads in terms of perceived opportunities to voice opinions at the local level (46%) (Figure 4.11).
Note: The figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the questions “If a decision affecting your local community is to be made by the local government, how likely do you think it is that you would have an opportunity to voice your opinion?” (Panel A) and “If you participated in a public consultation on reforming a policy area, how likely do you think it is that the government would adopt the opinions expressed in the consultation?” (Panel B). The “likely” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “unlikely” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Don't know” was a separate answer choice. “OECD” presents the unweighted average across 30 OECD including the four LAC OECD countries in 2023. “LAC” presents the unweighted average across the ten LAC countries, gathered in 2023 for the OECD LAC countries and in 2025 for the non-OECD LAC countries.
Source: 2023 OECD Trust Survey and 2025 OECD Trust Survey in LAC.
The OECD Trust Survey in LAC illustrates an apparent discrepancy between people’s perceptions of the political system and their perceived influence within it. While many Latin Americans report feeling able to engage in public life, far fewer believe that their participation leads to meaningful impact or that they are heard. This mismatch of expectations can fuel disillusionment and reorient people away from participation within the political system (Box 4.1). This, in turn, may give rise to cynicism and erode traditional representative institutions (Prats and Meunier, 2021[12]).
Individuals who report no trust in their government are often portrayed as politically disengaged or disenchanted with politics. However, data from the 2021 OECD Trust Survey suggests that while part of that group across OECD countries is indeed disengaged, a significant share engages politically in various ways while feeling that they lack political voice (Prats, Smid and Ferrin, 2024[13]). Throughout LAC, 16% of respondents report no trust in their national government, by selecting ‘0’ on a 0–10 response scale, similar to the average across the OECD (15%). Among this group, however, 43% feel confident in their ability to participate in politics, but only 6% believe they have a say in what the government does.
In terms of political engagement, a large majority (77%) of those with no trust report being engaged in at least one form of political participation, as well as express similar levels of participation in elections than those with higher levels of trust (potentially explained by compulsory vote in the region). However, those with no trust are more engaged in unconventional political activities than “trusters”, such as posting political content (+1.9 percentage points), boycotting products for political reasons (+2.1 percentage points) or participating in demonstrations (+1.5 percentage points). People who report zero trust in their national government are 2.8 percentage points less likely to have participated in a public consultation than people who have some or high trust in government, on average, across LAC (Figure 4.12).
Percentage points difference in participation in political activities in the previous year between people who stated no trust (=0) compared to people exhibiting some or high trust (1-10) in the national government, 2023 and 2025
Note: The figure presents the LAC distributions of responses to the question “Over the last 12 months, have you done any of the following activities?”. Shown here is the difference in the proportion of people who have participated in any of the activities among those who report no trust in the national government (response “0”) and those who reported higher trust in the national government (responses 1-10).
How to read: On the left end of the figure, a negative value indicates that this form of political participation is less prevalent among the distrusting group (who answered 0 on the response scale) across LAC countries, compared to those who indicated trust levels of 1-10. On the right end of the figure, a positive value indicates that this form of political participation is more prevalent among the distrusting group across LAC countries.
Source: 2023 OECD Trust Survey, 2025 OECD Trust Survey in LAC.
4.2.3. Pessimism about checks and balances suggests that institutional accountability may be at risk
One of the fundamental tenets of democracy is the system of checks and balances between branches of government. This is intended to safeguard institutions from any attempt of abuse of power. For example, strong and independent legislative and judicial branches are essential to uphold accountability and safeguard democratic resilience.
Positive public perceptions of accountability between branches of government, are a key driver of trust in national governments, legislatures, local governments, and the civil service in LAC. On average, only around a third (36%) of respondents across LAC countries believe it is likely that the legislative branch effectively holds the national government accountable, for example, by questioning ministers or reviewing the national budget. There is substantial variation across countries: in Chile, Brazil, and Ecuador, perceptions are more positive, with shares exceeding the OECD average of 38% by over five percentage points. In contrast, Peru, Guatemala and Paraguay report much lower levels of confidence, with only one in five respondents expressing trust in the legislature’s ability to hold the executive to account (Figure 4.13).
Share of population who find it likely or unlikely that the national legislature holds the national government accountable, 2023 or 2025
Note: The figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question “How likely do you think it is that the national parliament would effectively hold the national government accountable for their policies and behaviour, for instance by questioning a minister or reviewing the budget?”. The “likely” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “unlikely” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Do not know” was a separate answer choice. “OECD” presents the unweighted average across 30 OECD including the four LAC OECD countries in 2023. “LAC” presents the unweighted average across the ten LAC countries, gathered in 2023 for the OECD LAC countries and in 2025 for the non-OECD LAC countries.
Source: 2023 OECD Trust Survey and 2025 OECD Trust Survey in LAC
Perceived weaknesses in checks and balances across branches of government are also reflected in widespread public scepticism regarding the independence of the judiciary from political power. On average, only 31% of respondents believe that a court would make a decision free from political influence if the decision could negatively influence the government’s image (Figure 4.14). National-level responses range from 26% in Peru to 36% in the Dominican Republic and Ecuador, all below the average for 22 OECD countries in 2021 of 42% (OECD, 2022[17]).
Share of population who find it likely or unlikely that courts take a decision affecting the government free from political pressure, 2025
Note: The figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question “If a court is about to make a decision that could negatively impact on the government’s image, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the court would make the decision free from political influence?”. The “likely” proportion is the aggregation of responses from 6-10 on the scale; “neutral” is equal to a response of 5; “unlikely” is the aggregation of responses from 0-4; and “Do not know” was a separate answer choice. “LAC” presents the unweighted average across the 6 non-OECD LAC countries.
Source: 2025 OECD Trust Survey in LAC
The proportion of respondents who believe in the judiciary’s independence (31%) aligns closely with those reporting high or moderately high trust in courts and the judicial system (36%), both on average and at the country level (Figure 4.15 and (OECD, 2022[17])). Perceptions of political interference in judicial decisions may indicate unequal access to justice (De Micheli and Taylor, 2022[18]), where some people benefit from preferential treatment. This perceived bias in the judicial system could contribute to lower trust in courts and explain the significant trust gap between Latin America and OECD countries (see Chapter 1).
Share of population finding it likely that courts take decisions free from political influence and who have high or moderately high confidence in courts and the judicial system, 2023 or 2025
Note: The figure presents the within-country distributions of responses to the question “On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust courts and the judicial system?” and “If a court is about to make a decision that could negatively impact on the government’s image, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the court would make the decision free from political influence?”. The share with high or moderately high trust/who find it likely correspond to those who select an answer from 6 to 10 on the 0-10 response scale. “OECD” presents the unweighted average across 30 OECD including the four LAC OECD countries in 2023. “LAC” presents the unweighted average across the ten (trust in courts)/ six (decision free from influence) LAC countries, gathered in 2023 for the OECD LAC countries and in 2025 for the non-OECD LAC countries.
Source: 2023 OECD Trust Survey and 2025 OECD Trust Survey in LAC.
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← 1. This relative optimism may be influenced, in part, by political transitions. In many cases, new governments have fresh mandates and new agendas to which people react with increasing hopes, boosting the legitimacy of the system and public trust (Hooghe and Stiers, 2016[19]). These transitions are often accompanied by a stronger and more prolonged “honeymoon” period in public opinion, particularly within presidential systems (Martínez-Gallardo et al., 2024[20]).
← 2. In Chile, perceptions of the government’s ability to co-operate with stakeholders, such as the private sector or trade unions, to address long-term challenges was found as the most significant driver of trust in the national government. Individuals who are confident in the government’s ability to co-operate are 11.6 percentage points more likely to have high or moderately high trust in national government in Chile (OECD, 2024[8]). This survey question was first implemented in the country survey (not across OECD countries) and included in the LAC questionnaire. However, regression analysis for the six LAC countries found it was not a significant driver of trust for the region.
← 3. Since Latinobarometro has started collecting data in 2004 until 2024, on average, 73% of Latin Americans reported to believe their country is governed by a few powerful groups in their own interest, compared to 23% who believe that is governed for the good of all.