This chapter analyses inward foreign direct investment (FDI) trends and impacts in ASEAN Member States (AMS). It examines the evolution of FDI over time, disaggregated by AMS, source economies and sectors. The chapter then assesses the role of FDI in supporting structural transformation in AMS, with particular attention to the growing prominence of foreign investment in digital activities and renewable energy. It concludes by examining the contribution of FDI to job creation and multiple dimensions of job quality, including skills, wages, training and gender equality.
OECD Review of Investment Policies in ASEAN
Mobilising Investment for the Green and Digital Transitions
Abstract
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has played a central role in ASEAN’s development path and is increasingly shaping economic transformation towards more advanced, digitally oriented, and greener structures. Investment inflows have expanded strongly since the early 2000s and have proved resilient to successive global shocks. Inward FDI reached a record USD 225 billion in 2024, equivalent to around 15% of global flows. Over the same period, ASEAN’s inward FDI stock increased more than twelvefold, reaching about 7% of the global total, a higher share than in other large emerging regions. This reflects a sustained accumulation of foreign capital and a long‑term commitment by foreign investors.
Although most AMS have benefited from rising inflows, their distribution remains uneven. Singapore continues to dominate as the main destination for foreign investment and has further consolidated this position in recent years. A second group of larger economies, comprising Indonesia, Viet Nam, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, together receives around one third of total inflows, while smaller economies attract more limited volumes, generally below 4%. The structural importance of FDI has increased across most AMS over the past decade. Inward FDI stocks, measured as a share of GDP, have risen steadily and now average around 59% (excluding Singapore), above the OECD average of 53%.
The sectoral composition of FDI has shifted markedly over the past two decades. Services have become the dominant destination for foreign investment, accounting for around three quarters of inflows in recent years, driven in particular by finance and insurance and by trade‑ and logistics‑related activities. Manufacturing continues to attract substantial foreign investment, especially in economies that are closely integrated into regional production networks, but its relative importance has declined compared with the early 2000s. Resource‑based activities still draw investment in some countries but no longer dominate at the regional level.
Greenfield investment and cross‑border mergers & acquisitions (M&As) highlight a clear shift of FDI towards more capital‑ and technology‑intensive activities. Between 2016‐2020 and 2021‐2025, manufacturing became the dominant destination, with its share of greenfield investment rising by 15 percentage points to 54%, alongside a stronger focus on medium- and high-technology segments such as semiconductors, electronic components and batteries. Services rose from 24% to 28%, with information and communication technologies (ICT) accounting for over two-thirds of projects. Cross‑border M&A activity has become more concentrated, with fewer but larger deals. Services remain dominant at around 59% of total value, but with a marked shift towards ICT-related activities, while manufacturing has risen to about 31%, also reflecting a greater focus on technology-intensive segments. Together, these patterns indicate a reallocation of foreign investment towards more productive, technology‑driven activities that support structural transformation across ASEAN.
Digital investment has expanded particularly rapidly since 2020. Greenfield projects in ICT manufacturing and digital services surged during and after the COVID-19 pandemic, now accounting for more than half of total greenfield investment. The composition of digital investment varies widely across ASEAN economies. Some, notably Viet Nam, Singapore and Malaysia, attracted large ICT manufacturing projects, building on established comparative advantages and existing specialisation in regional electronics value chains. In most AMS, however, growth in digital investment has been broader‑based, spanning both manufacturing and services.
Investment related to renewable energy has also gained prominence, pointing to a growing role for foreign investors in supporting energy‑transition objectives. Renewable projects were marginal in the early 2000s but have become the dominant component of greenfield investment in the energy sector since around 2020, alongside a marked decline in investment in fossil fuels. Over the past decade, renewables accounted for about 40% of energy‑related greenfield investment, although the balance between renewable and non‑renewable projects varies substantially across countries. Some economies, including the Philippines, Thailand and Cambodia, attract almost exclusively renewable‑energy projects, while others continue to receive a more mixed portfolio.
These compositional shifts have affected both the scale and nature of FDI-related job creation. Between 2021 and 2025, greenfield FDI generated around 1.6 million jobs in ASEAN, equivalent to around 6% of the region’s overall net employment growth during this period and accounting for about 13% of global FDI-driven job creation. While FDI-driven job creation increased slightly, by around 7% compared to the 2016‐2020 period, FDI generated fewer jobs per USD 1 billion invested across most sectors. This decline reflects the growing orientation of foreign investment into more capital‑ and technology‑intensive activities. Manufacturing remains the main source of such jobs, largely in electronics and electrical equipment, while services accounted for a bit less than one quarter, mainly through ICT‑related activities. The share of FDI‑related jobs linked to digital activities rose from around 20% to about 44%, while renewable energy accounted for a marginal share of around 1%. Lower job creation does not imply weaker economic benefits. Jobs generated in more capital‑ and technology‑intensive activities tend to be more skill‑intensive. Consistent with this pattern, foreign firms in most AMS provide more favourable job outcomes than domestic firms, most consistently through higher wages and stronger opportunities for skills development.
2.2.1. ASEAN has strengthened its position as destination for FDI
FDI has played a central role in Southeast Asia’s development strategy since the late 1980s, accompanying the region’s progressive integration into international markets and the expansion of export‑oriented production. Over time, FDI inflows have exhibited a broadly upward trajectory, demonstrating considerable resilience in the face of successive global economic downturns, including the global financial crisis and the COVID‑19 pandemic. More recently, inflows have increased at a faster pace. From the mid‑2010s onwards, FDI flows to the eleven AMS have accelerated, reaching a record level of USD 225 billion in 2024 (Figure 2.1). As a result, the AMS now account for around 15% of global inward FDI, one of the highest shares among dynamic emerging regions. Over the same period, AMS have maintained a stable position in global trade, with exports consistently representing around 8% of the global total, reflecting a high degree of openness and continued integration into international markets.
FDI inflows (USD billion and share of global inflows) and exports (share of global exports), 2000-2024
Note: FDI data definitions are provided in Box 2.1.
Source: Based on UNCTAD (2026[1]), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) statistics on flows and stocks, https://unctadstat.unctad.org/.
This chapter draws on multiple sources and types of FDI data to provide a comprehensive view of investment trends in ASEAN. Each type of data captures a distinct dimension of FDI activity:
Official FDI statistics (2000-2024), as reported by national authorities and compiled by international organisations, are based on the Balance of Payments (BoP) and International Investment Position (IIP) statistical frameworks. FDI is defined as a cross-border investment in which an investor from one economy acquires a lasting interest, typically reflected by ownership of at least 10% of voting power, in an enterprise resident in another economy. Official FDI statistics are typically reported in terms of FDI flows and FDI stocks (positions). FDI flows capture new cross-border direct investment transactions recorded over a given period (usually a year). By contrast, FDI stocks measure the cumulative value of direct investment positions at a specific point in time (generally end-year or end-quarter), reflecting the accumulation of past flows as well as valuation changes. Official FDI statistics used in this report are drawn from UNCTAD and the ASEAN Secretariat. At the time this report was published, data for 2025 were not yet available.
Greenfield FDI (2003-2025) refers to the establishment of new facilities or the expansion of existing operations by foreign investors, typically associated with capital formation and job creation. Data used in this report are sourced from the Financial Times’ fDi Markets database, which tracks project-level announcements across countries, sectors, and activities. Greenfield data cover the period 2000-2025 and are disaggregated by destination country, source country, sector, and type of activity. While not directly comparable to official FDI statistics, as they capture announced rather than realised investment flows, they offer valuable forward-looking insights. Some domestic elements may be included in reported project values (e.g. if a foreign investor receives a local loan), and the data follow a proprietary classification system that has been mapped to International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (two-digit, revision 4).
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) (2016-2025) involve the partial or full acquisition of existing enterprises by foreign investors. These transactions may not result in new productive capacity but can bring important benefits through capital infusion, restructuring, or knowledge transfer. M&A data used in this report are sourced from LSEG (formerly Refinitiv) and cover cross-border transactions in the ASEAN region between 201 and 2025. They are disaggregated by destination and origin country, as well as by sector. While the number of transactions provides a robust measure of investment activity, deal values are disclosed in only about 52% of cases, limiting analysis of value trends.
To support comparability across these data sources, a harmonised sectoral aggregation based on ISIC Rev.4 (two-digit level) is applied throughout the chapter. This classification distinguishes primary activities (A-B), manufacturing (10-33), energy (35 and E), construction (F), trade and logistics (G-H), information and communication (58-63), finance (K), real estate (L), and other services (I, M-N, P-R). This breakdown is applied as consistently as possible across datasets, including greenfield FDI, M&A, official FDI statistics and job creation analysis, subject to data availability and classification constraints.
Source: World Bank (2024[2]), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS; Financial Times (2025[3]), FDI Markets (database), https://www.fdimarkets.com/; LSEG (2025[4]), https://www.lseg.com/en/investor-relations/refinitiv-acquisition-documents.
Beyond annual inflows, longer‑term indicators point to a strengthening of ASEAN’s position as a destination for sustained foreign investment. Inward FDI stock expanded more than twelvefold between 2003 and 2024, rising from around USD 286 billion to USD 3.59 trillion. Over the same period, ASEAN’s share of global FDI stock more than doubled, from just over 3% to around 7% (Figure 2.2). Unlike inflows, which can fluctuate significantly from year to year, FDI stock provides an indication of the scale and durability of foreign investor presence, reflecting the extent to which multinational enterprises have located productive assets, service activities and management functions in the region. On this measure, ASEAN has consistently exceeded South Asia (SA) and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and by 2017 it had also surpassed Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).
AMS’s growing importance as investment destinations is driven by a set of structural features and policy settings that continue to shape foreign investor decisions. Large and growing domestic markets in several Member States are increasingly attracting market‑seeking investment (ASEAN, 2025[5]). At the same time, the role of many AMS as part of a regional production base remains important for efficiency‑seeking and diversification‑oriented investment. Recent evidence also points to multinational enterprises choosing ASEAN economies to diversify risks and manage costs (IMF, 2025[6]). These investment patterns were further supported by generally open investment regimes and gradual improvements in the operating environment, including better transport and digital connectivity and incremental progress in reducing intra‑ASEAN barriers (OECD, 2019[7]; 2023[8]).
Inward FDI stock (USD million and share of global stock) by region, 2000-2024
Note: Bars refer to inward FDI stock values by region, measured in USD billion on the left-hand axis. The lines refer to regional shares of global inward FDI stock, measured as a percentage on the right-hand axis. FDI data definitions are provided in Box 2.1.
Source: Based on UNCTAD (2026[1]), https://unctadstat.unctad.org/.
2.2.2. FDI has played a growing important role across most AMS economies
With few exceptions, FDI inflows have increased across most AMS over recent years. Comparing the 2015‑2019 and 2020‑2024 periods, inflows rose in the majority of economies, with declines limited to Brunei Darussalam, Lao PDR and Timor‑Leste. While this confirms a broad‑based expansion of investment across the region, the distribution of inflows remains highly uneven. Singapore continues to play a dominant role as ASEAN’s main investment hub, attracting around 62% of total FDI flows to the region in 2020‑2024. This is well above the shares received by the next largest host economies, Indonesia, Viet Nam, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, which together accounted for around one‑third of regional inflows. Smaller ASEAN economies received only marginal amounts, with a combined share of less than 4% (Figure 2.3). The concentration of inflows in Singapore has also increased over time. Compared with 2015‑2019, Singapore’s share of regional FDI flows rose by around eight percentage points in 2020‑2024, further widening the gap with the other major host economies. Over the same period, the combined share of the five next largest recipients declined by around four percentage points.
FDI inflows by AMS, 2015-2019 and 2020-2024
Note: FDI data definitions are provided in Box 2.1.
Source: Based on ASEANStats (2026[9]), https://data.aseanstats.org/.
FDI stock-to-GDP ratios vary widely across ASEAN economies, reflecting significant differences in the structural role of foreign investment. In 2024, ratios ranged from particularly high levels in Singapore and Cambodia to much lower levels in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Brunei Darussalam (Figure 2.4). At the regional level, the aggregate ratio stands at around 59% when Singapore is excluded, above the OECD average of approximately 53%. Over the past decade, these ratios have generally increased across most AMS, reaching historically high levels in several countries and underscoring the growing importance of foreign investment in the region.
FDI stock (share of GDP), 2024 and 2015
Source: Based on UNCTAD (2026[1]), https://unctadstat.unctad.org/.
ASEAN investor base is geographically diverse, although recent trends point to a gradual concentration of inflows among a smaller number of major source economies. Over 2020-2024, the United States emerged as the largest investor, accounting for over 20% of total inflows, followed by intra‑ASEAN investment (around 13%), the European Union (11%), Japan (9%) and the People’s Republic of China (hereafter ‘China’) (8%). The composition of investment has shifted over time. The United States increased its share by around 8 percentage points, while more modest gains were recorded for the European Union and China. By contrast, the shares of investment originating from ASEAN and Japan declined, by around 5 and 3 percentage points respectively, despite continued growth in intra‑ASEAN investment in absolute terms. The share of investment from the rest of the world also fell slightly, reinforcing evidence of increasing concentration of FDI among established source economies.
FDI inflows by source (share of ASEAN inflows), 2015-2019 and 2020-2024
Note: FDI data definitions are provided in Box 2.1.
Source: Based on ASEANStats (2026[9]), https://data.aseanstats.org/.
2.2.3. The bulk of FDI inflows is directed to services
Over 2020-2024, FDI inflows into ASEAN became increasingly concentrated in services, which accounted for around 72% of total inflows, up 11 percentage points from 2015-2019 (Figure 2.6). This continues a long‑term structural shift underway since the early 2000s, when services represented only about half of FDI inflows (OECD, 2019[7]). The recent expansion has been driven primarily by finance and insurance, whose share rose sharply, from 29% to 40%, largely reflecting increased inflows into Singapore. Other service activities, notably wholesale and retail trade and transportation and storage, have also attracted growing shares of investment. Manufacturing remains the second‑largest destination for FDI in ASEAN, but its relative importance declined, from around 27% in 2015-2019 to about 20% in 2020-2024, reinforcing the broader reorientation of investment towards services.
FDI inflows (share of total), 2015-2019 and 2020-2024
Note: FDI data definitions are provided in Box 2.1.
Source: Based on ASEANStats (2026[9]), https://data.aseanstats.org/.
The ASEAN regional aggregate masks substantial heterogeneity across its Member States (Figure 2.7). Manufacturing accounts for at least half of total FDI inflows in several countries, most notably Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia and Thailand, and remains a significant destination in Indonesia and Cambodia. By contrast, services dominate in Singapore, where finance, trade and logistics together account for nearly 90% of inflows. Services also represent a sizeable share of investment in Cambodia, Thailand and Indonesia, albeit with different sectoral compositions. Other economies exhibit markedly different investment profiles. In Myanmar, FDI inflows are concentrated largely in primary and energy‑related activities, while in Lao PDR a substantial share of investment is recorded in energy.
FDI inflows (share of total, %), 2020-2024
Note: Primary includes Agriculture, forestry, and fishing and Mining and quarrying. FDI data definitions are provided in Box 2.1. Data are unavailable for Timor-Leste and Viet Nam.
Source: Based on ASEANStats (2026[9]), https://data.aseanstats.org/.
2.2.4. Greenfield FDI and cross‑border M&A deals are prevalent in high value‑added and technology‑intensive activities
Data on greenfield investment and cross‑border M&A provide insight into the composition of foreign investment entering ASEAN. Total greenfield investment increased by 16% between 2016‐2020 and 2021‐2025, rising from USD 500 billion to USD 581 billion. Manufacturing became the dominant destination, absorbing nearly 54% of greenfield FDI in 2021-2025, an increase of 15 percentage points compared with 2016-2020 (Figure 2.8, Panel A). The overall share of services increased by four percentage points, alongside a reallocation within services towards information and communication activities, while investment in construction and energy fell sharply.
Note: FDI data definitions are provided in Box 2.1.
Source: Based on Financial Times (2025[3]), https://www.fdimarkets.com/.
Between 2016-2020 and 2021-2025, investment in medium‑high‑technology manufacturing increased significantly, rising from 17% to 32%. This shift has been driven in particular by growth in electronics and electrification‑related industries. Greenfield investment expanded markedly in semiconductors and other electronic components, batteries and accumulators, and other electrical equipment. By contrast, several traditional industries recorded important contractions, notably chemicals, basic metals, fossil fuels, and textiles. Within services, investment has increasingly shifted towards ICT activities. The share of ICT services in total greenfield investment rose by 13 percentage points between 2016‐2020 and 2021‐2025, reaching 20%, and reinforcing evidence of a broader move towards higher value-added activities.
Sectoral greenfield investment patterns vary markedly across AMS. Manufacturing accounts for more than half of total greenfield investment in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Viet Nam, and also represents a substantial share in Cambodia and Lao PDR (Figure 2.8, Panel B). In Cambodia and Lao PDR, construction attracts a significant share of investment, while energy‑related activities play a central role in Myanmar and the Philippines. By contrast, services dominate in Brunei Darussalam and Timor‑Leste, with a strong concentration in ICT‑related activities. ICT also accounts for a notable share of investment in Malaysia and Thailand.
Cross‑border M&A into ASEAN has become increasingly concentrated in recent years, in line with global developments. Between 2016-2020 and 2021-2025, the number of disclosed cross‑border M&A deals declined by around 33%, while the total value of transactions increased by about 20%, indicating a shift towards fewer but larger deals. During 2021-2025, services accounted for around 59% of total M&A deal value, manufacturing for about 31%, with primary, energy and construction together representing the remaining 9% (Figure 2.9, Panel A). Relative to 2016-2020, the share of services increased by one percentage point, although a significant reallocation occurred within the sector. ICT‑related activities expanded markedly, rising from 4% to 28% and accounting for nearly half of total M&A value in services. This growth largely displaced investment in finance, real estate and trade‑ and logistics‑related activities. Manufacturing also increased its share by around 13 percentage points, reflecting a shift towards more technology‑intensive activities, while the shares of primary, energy and construction sectors declined over the period.
The sectoral composition of cross‑border M&A differs significantly across AMS. Manufacturing plays a relatively larger role in Viet Nam, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia (Figure 2.9, Panel B). By contrast, resource‑based activities are more prominent in Brunei Darussalam, primarily in primary sector, and in Lao PDR, where M&A activity is more strongly concentrated in energy‑related sectors. Finance dominates M&A activity in Cambodia and Thailand and also accounts for a significant share in Myanmar and Malaysia. ICT activities represent a substantial share in Singapore, Myanmar and Indonesia.
Note: The figures are based on the value of disclosed cross-border M&A deals. Deal values are reported for 51% of transactions in the database, so results should be interpreted with caution as disclosure gaps may affect comparability across sectors and countries. FDI data definitions are provided in Box 2.1.
Source: Based on LSEG (Refinitiv) Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions Database, https://www.lseg.com/.
2.3.1. Greenfield FDI is supporting productivity improvements across AMS
FDI can play an important role in supporting productivity improvements and economic upgrading in host countries. Foreign affiliates often operate with higher productivity levels than domestic firms, reflecting superior technologies, more advanced production processes, and stronger managerial practices. Beyond direct effects within foreign‑owned firms, FDI can contribute to broader productivity gains through indirect spillovers to the domestic economy (OECD, 2019[10]). These spillovers may arise through multiple channels, including backward and forward linkages with local suppliers and customers, labour mobility, demonstration effects, and intensified competition, which can incentivise domestic firms to adopt more efficient technologies and practices (Javorcik, 2004[11]). Participation of foreign firms in global value chains further exposes domestic firms to international standards, facilitating learning and the diffusion of innovation across sectors (Kowalski et al., 2015[12]). The extent to which these mechanisms translate into productivity gains, however, depends on host‑country conditions, such as absorptive capacity, human capital, and the quality of the business environment (OECD, 2022[13]).
Across ASEAN, labour productivity levels vary widely across sectors and countries, reflecting differences in capital intensity, technological adoption, and the sectoral allocation of economic activity. Some economies have already undergone substantial structural transformation, with labour and production shifting towards higher value‑added activities, while others continue to face scope for further upgrading and productivity growth. In this context, the contribution of FDI to productivity outcomes depends not only on the volume of investment, but also on its sectoral distribution and its alignment with domestic capabilities. Greenfield FDI in ASEAN is largely concentrated in sectors with medium‑ to high‑productivity levels, albeit with important exceptions. Manufacturing, transport, and utilities account for significant shares of incoming investment, and exhibit higher productivity than sectors such as construction, trade and hospitality, community services, and agriculture (Figure 2.10). By contrast, mining and finance, despite their comparatively high labour productivity, attract relatively smaller shares of greenfield FDI.
Note: Labour productivity is measured as gross value added per worker (USD, constant prices, PPP) and refers to 2023. Greenfield FDI is averaged over 2021-2025 to account for annual volatility.
Source: Based on Asian Productivity Organisation (APO), National Accounts and Employment Statistics, https://www.apo-tokyo.org/; Financial Times (2025[3]), FDI Markets, https://www.fdimarkets.com/.
A closer look at sectoral composition reveals important differences in productivity and technology intensity within broadly defined sectors. In manufacturing, for example, productivity levels vary substantially across activities, with more technology‑intensive segments such as electronics displaying higher productivity than more labour-intensive activities such as textiles. While productivity indicators are not available at this fine level of sectoral disaggregation, the composition of greenfield FDI provides insights into potential productivity implications. Around 60% of greenfield FDI into manufacturing is directed towards relatively more technology‑intensive activities, including electronics, electrical equipment, chemicals, and motor vehicles. This suggests that, even within manufacturing, FDI in ASEAN is tilted towards activities with greater potential for productivity gains and technological upgrading. While this pattern may partly reflect investors’ preference for activities that are already relatively productive, existing studies provide evidence of a positive contribution of FDI to productivity performance in ASEAN economies. For example, Zhang and Yang (2022[14]) find that FDI has a positive and statistically significant impact on manufacturing productivity in Malaysia, while Huynh et al. (2021[15]) report similar evidence for Viet Nam.
2.3.2. Foreign firms tend to be more productive, innovative and integrated in GVCs
OECD FDI Qualities Indicators based on World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) suggest that foreign firms tend to be more productive than domestic firms in most ASEAN economies, as reflected in a positive labour productivity premium (Figure 2.11, Panel A) (Box 2.2). On average, this premium amounts to around 64% across ASEAN, exceeding the corresponding estimate for OECD countries, which stands at approximately 54%. The size of the productivity premium varies substantially across countries, pointing to differences in the sectoral allocation of foreign investment, firm‑level characteristics, and domestic productive capacities. In Viet Nam, for instance, foreign firms are estimated to be nearly three times as productive as domestic firms, corresponding to a premium of around 190%. In contrast, productivity differences are smaller in Cambodia, Singapore, and Myanmar, and in some cases slightly favour domestic firms. In Singapore, this pattern likely reflects the presence of highly productive domestic firms that are closely integrated into international markets and operate near the global productivity frontier. In Myanmar, by contrast, the absence of a positive premium may be driven by the limited number and narrow sectoral concentration of foreign firms, as well as data and compositional effects.
While this productivity premium points to the potential contribution of foreign firms to aggregate productivity, it may also reflect a selection effect induced by foreign competition. In some cases, highly productive foreign firms can increase competitive pressures on domestic enterprises, potentially crowding out firms that are less able to compete (OECD, 2023[16]). The benefits of foreign investment may also remain limited where domestic firms lack the absorptive capacity, supplier linkages, skills or technology base needed to benefit from spillovers. As a result, productivity gains associated with foreign firms may be concentrated among a narrower set of firms, sectors or locations, potentially widening disparities between foreign and domestic enterprises, as well as across workers and regions.
The indicators also point to a general, though not uniform, innovation advantage among foreign enterprises across AMS. On average, foreign firms are more likely than domestic firms to engage in research and development (R&D) activities. However, this pattern does not hold uniformly across countries, as evidenced in Viet Nam, Brunei Darussalam, and Timor‑Leste, where domestic firms report higher rates of R&D engagement than foreign firms (Figure 2.11, Panel B). Beyond higher engagement in innovation inputs, foreign firms also tend to perform better in translating these efforts into observable outcomes. In most ASEAN economies, foreign firms report higher rates of introducing new or significantly improved products and production processes (Figure 2.11, Panels C and D). At the same time, considerable cross‑country variation persists, suggesting that innovation outcomes reflect not only firm ownership, but also factors such as sectoral composition, absorptive capacity, competitive pressures, and the broader policy and institutional environment in which firms operate.
Firm performance by ownership and AMS, 2016-2025
Note: The indicator in Panel A measures the relative difference in average labour productivity between foreign owned and domestic firms, calculated as the difference divided by the average productivity of domestic firms. Positive values indicate that foreign firms are more productive than domestic firms, while negative values indicate the opposite. The indicators in Panels B-D are based on firm level survey responses. Specifically, firms were asked whether, in the past three years, they had: (i) invested in research and development (Panel B); (ii) introduced new or significantly improved production processes (Panel C); and (iii) introduced new or significantly improved products or services (Panel D). Regional averages are calculated as simple averages. Figures are based on the latest available World Bank Enterprise Survey wave for each country: Brunei Darussalam (2025), Cambodia (2023), Indonesia (2023), Lao PDR (2024), Malaysia (2024), Myanmar (2016), Philippines (2023), Singapore (2023), Thailand (2025), Timor-Leste (2021) and Viet Nam (2023).
Source: Based on OECD (2026[17]), FDI Qualities Indicators, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/dashboards/fdi-qualities-indicators-visualisation-platform.html.
The OECD FDI Qualities Indicators offer a comprehensive framework for assessing how FDI contributes to sustainable development across economic, social, and environmental dimensions. Developed under the OECD FDI Qualities Initiative, the indicators move beyond measuring the volume of FDI flows to evaluate its impact in key policy areas, including productivity and innovation, digital transformation, employment and job quality, skills development, gender equality, and the green transition. The indicators are constructed using comparable, publicly available data from both national and international sources and are designed to enable benchmarking across countries, sectors and over time.
Sector-level indicators rely on official FDI statistics and commercial databases on greenfield investment and mergers and acquisitions (M&A). These indicators allow for comparisons between foreign and domestic investment across key sectors and are used to explore correlations with socio-economic outcomes (e.g. productivity).
Indicators based on firm-level data are based on national business surveys and internationally comparable microdata sources, such as the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES). These indicators allow to assess the performance of foreign firms relative to domestic counterparts across various dimensions. While WBES data are widely used and designed to be broadly representative of formal firms, comparisons across countries should be interpreted with care, as survey coverage and timing can differ and samples often focus more on the formal private sector and manufacturing.
Source: OECD (2022[13]; 2019[10]); and OECD (2026[17]), FDI Qualities Indicators, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/dashboards/fdi-qualities-indicators-visualisation-platform.html.
Foreign firms in most AMS also tend to be more strongly integrated into international trade and GVCs than domestic firms. In nearly all economies, foreign firms report substantially higher shares of direct exports in total sales. On average, exports account for around 18% of sales among foreign firms in ASEAN, compared to less than 2% for domestic firms, with a similar, though less pronounced, gap observed in the OECD (around 22% versus 8%) (Figure 2.12, Panel A). These differences are particularly stark in some countries. In Myanmar, for example, foreign firms export around 65% of their output, compared to less than 5% among domestic firms, and sizeable gaps are evident across most ASEAN economies. A similar pattern emerges on the input side. Foreign firms are more likely to source intermediate inputs from abroad, reflecting their deeper embedding in cross‑border production networks and stronger participation in GVCs (Figure 2.12, Panel B).
Share of direct exports in total sales and share of foreign inputs in total inputs, by firm ownership and country, 2016-2025
Note: Indicators based on the following questions: firms were asked (i) what percentage of their sales are direct exports (Panel A); and (ii) what percentage of their material inputs and supplies are of foreign origin (Panel B). Regional averages are calculated as simple averages. Figures are based on the latest available World Bank Enterprise Survey wave for each country: Brunei Darussalam (2025), Cambodia (2023), Indonesia (2023), Lao PDR (2024), Malaysia (2024), Myanmar (2016), Philippines (2023), Singapore (2023), Thailand (2025), Timor-Leste (2021) and Viet Nam (2023).
Source: Based on OECD (2026[17]), FDI Qualities Indicators, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/dashboards/fdi-qualities-indicators-visualisation-platform.html.
2.3.3. Greenfield FDI in digital sectors is expanding rapidly
Over the past decade, digital sectors have become an increasingly prominent feature of ASEAN’s greenfield investment landscape. These sectors encompass digital services (e.g. software development, cloud computing), ICT‑related manufacturing (ICT goods and electronic components), as well as telecommunications. A marked acceleration in digital investment occurred starting in 2020, following the first outbreak of COVID‑19. Prior to that period, investment in digital-related projects accounted for between 6% and 22% of total greenfield FDI. From 2021 onwards, however, digital greenfield investment rose sharply, exceeding USD 40 billion per year. As a result, the share of digital investment increased substantially, from 16% in 2019, the year preceding the COVID‑19 pandemic, to around 55% in 2025 (Figure 2.13).
Greenfield FDI in ASEAN, by digital component (USD million) and as a share of total ASEAN
Note: Digital sectors include digital services, ICT goods, electric components, and telecommunications. Note: FDI data definitions are provided in Box 2.1.
Source: Based on Financial Times (2025[3]), FDI Markets, https://www.fdimarkets.com/.
The rise in digital greenfield FDI has unfolded at varying scales and across distinct segments of the digital economy in AMS. In some economies, the expansion has been driven primarily by ICT-related manufacturing, reflecting longstanding comparative advantages in these activities. This appears to be the case in Viet Nam and Singapore, and to some extent Malaysia, which have developed competitive positions across a range of products within electronics and electrical equipment (Figure 2.14). Although at a smaller scale, a similar orientation towards ICT manufacturing is also evident in Lao PDR and Cambodia, suggesting emerging integration into regional electronics value chains. In many ASEAN countries, however, the growth in digital investment spans both services and manufacturing, pointing to a more broad-based expansion across multiple segments of the economy. Timor-Leste and Brunei Darussalam stand out as the only economies with a large share of investment concentrated in telecommunications.
Greenfield FDI by AMS and digital component (USD million)
Note: FDI data definitions are provided in Box 2.1.
Source: Based on Financial Times (2025[3]), FDI Markets, https://www.fdimarkets.com/.
2.3.4. Greenfield FDI in renewable energy is gaining prominence
Greenfield FDI in renewable energy has played an increasingly important role in shaping ASEAN’s investment dynamics, particularly since around 2020. This expansion reflects rising demand for clean and renewable power, underpinned by the region’s rapidly growing energy needs as urbanisation accelerates and economic growth remains strong (ACE, 2024[18]). Over the period 2003-2013, renewable energy accounted for only a small share of greenfield FDI in ASEAN, both in absolute terms and relative to other energy investments. Its role increased gradually over the following decade (2014-2019), but a more pronounced shift occurred after 2020, when renewable‑related projects became the dominant component of greenfield FDI in the energy sector (Figure 2.15, Panel A). This shift is even more evident when considering cumulative investment over the past two decades. During 2003-2014, renewable energy accounted for around 3% of total greenfield FDI and approximately 13% of investment in the energy sector (Figure 2.15, Panel B). In the most recent decade (2015-2025), these shares rose to about 8% of total greenfield FDI and 40% of energy‑related investment. Notably, this increase coincided with a decline in fossil fuel investment, whose share fell from around 24% to about 12% of total greenfield FDI, against a backdrop of an overall contraction in energy investment (around −14%).
Energy greenfield FDI in ASEAN: renewable vs fossil fuel, annual and 2016-2020 and 2021-2025
Note: FDI data definitions are provided in Box 2.1. Renewable projects include new generation assets, such as solar, wind, hydropower or geothermal facilities, as well as associated transmission and storage infrastructure.
Source: Based on Financial Times (2025[3]), https://www.fdimarkets.com/.
The energy profile of greenfield FDI varies markedly across ASEAN economies, with a small number of countries accounting for the bulk of investment in renewable energy. Among economies receiving the highest volumes of energy‑related FDI, the Philippines and Thailand attract investment that is almost entirely directed towards renewable energy, while Viet Nam receives predominantly inflows in renewable energy alongside a non‑negligible share of investment in fossil fuels (Figure 2.16, Panel A). Indonesia also attracts substantial inflows in renewable energy, but these are accompanied by an even larger share of investment in fossil fuels. Indonesia also attracts substantial inflows into renewable energy, however, these are accompanied by an even larger share of investment in fossil fuels. Similarly, in Singapore, the share of investment in fossil fuels exceeds that in renewable energy. Among AMS with lower volumes of energy‑related FDI, investment patterns also differ significantly (Figure 2.16, Panel B). Cambodia receives greenfield FDI exclusively in renewable energy, while Lao PDR records predominantly inflows in renewable energy, with only a limited non‑renewable component. Malaysia’s energy‑related greenfield FDI is more evenly balanced between renewable and non‑renewable sources, whereas Myanmar continues to attract energy investment predominantly oriented towards fossil fuels.
Renewable greenfield FDI by AMS and renewable energy source (USD million), 2021-2025
Note: Timor-Leste recorded no greenfield FDI projects in energy in 2020-2024. FDI data definitions are provided in Box 2.1.
Source: Based on Financial Times (2025[3]), https://www.fdimarkets.com/.
2.3.5. Foreign firms are more likely to adopt environmentally sustainable practices and to use digital solutions
Foreign investors can play an important role in advancing the green transition by introducing cleaner technologies, accelerating low‑carbon innovation, supporting the development of green infrastructure, and helping to diffuse environmentally sustainable production and management practices throughout the economy (OECD, 2022[13]). The OECD FDI Qualities Indicators show that foreign firms in ASEAN tend to adopt environmentally sustainable practices more frequently than domestic firms (Box 2.2). In most AMS for which data are available, a larger share of foreign firms report monitoring their emissions. On average, around 21% of foreign firms in ASEAN monitor emissions, compared to 9% of domestic firms, with a similar though more pronounced pattern observed in the OECD (around 35% versus 17%) (Figure 2.17, Panel A). Evidence on energy‑management practices, available only for Indonesia, also points to higher adoption rates among foreign‑owned firms, suggesting that foreign investors may contribute to the diffusion of more advanced environmental management practices (Figure 2.17, Panel B).
Note: Indicators based on the following questions: whether the establishment adopted energy management measures (Panel A); and whether the establishment monitors its CO₂ emissions (Panel B). Regional averages are calculated as simple averages. Figures are based on the latest available World Bank Enterprise Survey wave for each country: Brunei Darussalam (2025), Cambodia (2023), Indonesia (2023), Lao PDR (2024), Malaysia (2024), Myanmar (2016), Philippines (2023), Singapore (2023), Thailand (2025), Timor-Leste (2021) and Viet Nam (2023).
Source: Based on OECD (2026[17]), FDI Qualities Indicators, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/dashboards/fdi-qualities-indicators-visualisation-platform.html.
Foreign investors can also act as important catalysts for digital transformation by introducing advanced technologies, modern management systems, and data‑driven business practices. Through their integration into GVCs, foreign firms are often among the earliest adopters of digital tools, processes, and standards. This early adoption can facilitate the diffusion of new technologies, contribute to the development of digital infrastructure, and raise operational efficiency across host economies (OECD, forthcoming[19]). As a result, the presence of foreign firms can help accelerate the uptake of digital business practices among domestic firms, including SMEs, and support broader efforts to build more competitive and digitally enabled economies. FDI Qualities Indicators are consistent with this pattern in ASEAN. In most AMS, foreign firms display higher adoption rates of digital business practices than domestic firms. With only a few exceptions, foreign firms are more likely to use websites to interact with clients and suppliers (Figure 2.18, Panel A), and they also tend to make greater use of electronic payments in transactions with both suppliers and customers (Figure 2.18, Panel B).
Note: Indicators based on the following questions: (i) whether the establishment uses a website to interact with clients or suppliers (Panel A); (ii) whether at least 50% of payments to suppliers and from customers are made electronically (Panel B). Regional averages are calculated as simple averages. Figures are based on the latest available World Bank Enterprise Survey wave for each country: Brunei Darussalam (2025), Cambodia (2023), Indonesia (2023), Lao PDR (2024), Malaysia (2024), Myanmar (2016), Philippines (2023), Singapore (2023), Thailand (2025), Timor-Leste (2021) and Viet Nam (2023).
Source: Based on OECD (2026[17]), FDI Qualities Indicators, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/dashboards/fdi-qualities-indicators-visualisation-platform.html.
2.4.1. Greenfield FDI job creation has been driven by electronics and ICT services
Greenfield FDI has been a significant source of employment creation in ASEAN. Over the period 2021-2025, it generated approximately 1.6 million jobs, equivalent to around 6% of the region’s overall net employment growth during this period and accounting for about 13% of global FDI-driven job creation (Financial Times, 2025[3]). Manufacturing dominated greenfield FDI‑related job creation during 2021-2025, accounting for around 70% of newly created jobs (Figure 2.19). This was driven primarily by investments in electronics and electrical equipment, particularly semiconductors, communications equipment and batteries. Services accounted for a further 22% of job creation, led mainly by ICT activities and, to a lesser extent, other service industries. By contrast, resource‑based and energy‑related activities contributed considerably less, representing less than 8% of total jobs created.
Between 2016‐2020 and 2021‐2025, total FDI-related job creation increased slightly, by around 7%. Job creation became more concentrated in manufacturing and ICT services: the share of manufacturing rose by 13 percentage points, while that of ICT services increased by 4 percentage points. By contrast, the number of jobs created declined markedly, both in absolute and relative terms, in most other sectors, particularly in construction, where it fell by 13 percentage points.
Greenfield job creation in ASEAN by sector, 2016-2020 and 2021-2025
Note: Jobs represent the total expected direct employment from greenfield investment projects announced in each period, aggregated across AMS. FDI data definitions and sectoral grouping information are provided in Box 2.1. Other services includes social services, business and administrative services, hospitality, arts and recreation.
Source: OECD based on Financial Times (2025[3]), https://www.fdimarkets.com/.
Job creation associated with digital and greenfield investments expanded rapidly over the period. Total expected employment in digital sectors nearly doubled, rising from around 300 000 jobs in 2016-2020 to almost 700 000 in 2021-2025. As a result, their share of total greenfield FDI‑related job creation increased markedly, from 20% to 44% (Figure 2.20, Panel A). This expansion was driven primarily by digital-related manufacturing, particularly ICT goods and electronic components, while growth in digital services remained more moderate and telecommunications recorded a slight decline. Job creation linked to renewable‑energy investments also increased, albeit from a much lower base. Employment generated by renewable projects rose from about 6 900 jobs in 2016-2020 to 15 500 in 2021-2025, raising their share of total greenfield FDI‑related jobs from 0.5% to 1% (Figure 2.20, Panel B).
Note: Jobs represent the total expected direct employment from greenfield investment projects announced in each period.
Source: OECD based on Financial Times (2025[3]), https://www.fdimarkets.com/.
2.4.2. Greenfield investment projects are creating fewer jobs per dollar invested due to their more technology intensive nature
In ASEAN, job intensity, measured as the number of jobs created per unit of capital invested, varies widely across sectors (Figure 2.21). Social services and business support and professional services are the most labor-intensive, generating around 17 300 and 12 600 jobs per USD 1 billion invested, respectively. Manufacturing generates roughly 3 600 jobs per USD 1 billion, though outcomes differ markedly across industries, ranging from around 96 000 jobs in leather products to just over 200 in coke and refined petroleum. By contrast, ICT services and energy are far less employment-intensive, generating around 1 300 and fewer than 250 jobs per USD 1 billion, respectively.
Job intensity has declined across most sectors over time, with the notable exceptions of social services and consumer services and creative industries. In social sectors, job intensity has increased markedly, driven by large-scale projects in human health and social work activities in Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines, which have generated substantial employment relative to the volume of capital invested. By contrast, the broader downward trend observed across the remaining sectors reflects a shift towards more capital- and technology-intensive projects. Rising automation and the diffusion of digital technologies may have contributed to a further decline in the number of direct jobs created per dollar invested, particularly in advanced manufacturing and infrastructure-related sectors (ILO, 2026[20]).
Job created per USD 1 billion of greenfield FDI invested by sector, ASEAN, 2016-2020 vs 2021-2025
Note: Social services includes education, health and social work; Business support and professional services include professional, scientific and technical activities, and administrative and support services; and Consumer services and creative industries include accommodation and food services, and arts, entertainment and recreation.
Source: OECD based on Financial Times (2025[3]), https://www.fdimarkets.com/.
Job intensity varies markedly across digital sectors. Digital manufacturing is relatively more labour-intensive. Electrical components and ICT goods generate around 4 200 and 3 200 jobs per USD 1 billion invested during 2021‐2025, respectively, close to the overall manufacturing average of about 3 600 jobs per USD 1 billion (Figure 2.22). By contrast, digital services create significantly fewer jobs per dollar invested, at around 1 300 jobs per USD 1 billion, while telecommunications are even less employment‑intensive, generating roughly 500 jobs per USD 1 billion. As a result, countries attracting a higher share of digital greenfield FDI tend to exhibit lower overall job intensity (Figure 2.23). This pattern reflects the capital‑ and knowledge‑intensive nature of many digital investments, which rely more on advanced technologies and specialised skills and therefore generate fewer direct jobs. Importantly, lower job intensity does not imply weaker economic impact: digital projects typically create more skilled and better‑paid employment and can generate significant productivity spillovers across the wider economy.
Jobs created per USD 1 billion of greenfield FD invested by digital components within ISIC, ASEAN, 2021-2025
Source: OECD based on Financial Times (2025[3]), https://www.fdimarkets.com/.
Job intensity (jobs created per USD 1 billion of greenfield FDI) and the share of digital greenfield FDI, by AMS, 2021-2025
Source: OECD based on Financial Times (2025[3]), https://www.fdimarkets.com/.
2.4.3. Employment in sectors attracting greenfield investment is more skill intensive
Greenfield FDI in ASEAN is concentrated in more skill-intensive activities than those that characterise overall employment structures (Figure 2.24). Across most AMS, the imputed skill level of FDI-related jobs exceeds the national average, with particularly large gaps observed in lower-income economies such as the Philippines, Lao PDR, and Timor-Leste (Box 2.3). This reflects the sectoral composition of greenfield investment, which is often directed towards activities that rely on advanced technologies and specialised knowledge. As a result, while such sectors, particularly digital industries and renewable energy, tend to generate fewer jobs per unit of capital invested, they create employment that is more skill-intensive, which is associated with better paid work that is more likely to be formal. These differences highlight a structural gap between the types of jobs associated with foreign investment and those prevailing in domestic labour markets, underscoring the importance of aligning skills development and labour market policies with evolving investment patterns.
Greenfield FDI skill intensity compared with national employment skill profiles, by AMS
Note: Skill intensity is measured as an index from 0 (low skill) to 2 (high skill). FDI values are imputed using sectoral employment skill shares from ILOSTAT. The underlying labour force survey data cover the following country-year pairs: Brunei Darussalam (2023), Cambodia (2023), Indonesia (2023), Lao PDR (2022), Myanmar (2019), Philippines (2023), Singapore (2024), Thailand (2023), Timor-Leste (2022) and Viet Nam (2024). See Box 2.3 for methodology.
Source: OECD calculations based on Financial Times (2025[3]), https://www.fdimarkets.com; and ILOSTAT, https://ilostat.ilo.org.
To compare the skill content of jobs associated with greenfield FDI across AMS, an indicator of the skill composition of FDI-related employment is constructed using national labour force survey data. As direct occupational information for foreign affiliates is not available on a comparable basis across countries, the skill mix of FDI jobs is imputed using the observed occupational structure of domestic employment within each sector. The approach comprises three steps:
1. Mapping FDI activities to sectors: Greenfield FDI job counts from fDi Markets are classified according to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC Rev. 4) at the 2-digit level, ensuring consistency with labour force survey data.
2. Applying sectoral skill distributions: For each country and benchmark year, labour force surveys provide the shares of workers in low-, medium- and high-skill occupations within each sector. These shares are applied to FDI job counts, assuming that the occupational structure of FDI-related job creation follows that of domestic employment within the same sectors.
3. Reducing short-term volatility: FDI job counts are aggregated over three-year periods to smooth annual fluctuations. The sectoral skill structure from the benchmark year is applied to the corresponding period.
The resulting indicator is a skill intensity index ranging from 0 (low-skill intensive) to 2 (high-skill intensive), calculated as the weighted average of sectoral skill shares applied to FDI employment.
2.4.4. Foreign firms tend to offer better quality jobs
Beyond the number of jobs created, foreign firms can also shape the quality of employment in host economies. Job quality encompasses multiple dimensions, including wage levels, access to training and opportunities for skills development, working conditions, and the extent to which employment opportunities are inclusive across different segments of the workforce, particularly for groups that face greater barriers to labour‑market participation.
Across most AMS, foreign firms are associated with more favourable job outcomes than domestic firms, although the magnitude and pattern of these differences vary across countries and indicators. Wage differentials stand out as the most consistent feature: foreign firms pay higher average wages in the majority of AMS, with particularly large premiums observed in Viet Nam and Malaysia (Figure 2.25, Panel A). On average, the foreign‑firm wage premium in ASEAN (33.7%) exceeds that observed in OECD economies (22.0%), although substantial cross‑country heterogeneity remains, including limited or even negative gaps in some cases. Differences in workforce composition are generally more modest (Figure 2.25, Panel B), though notable exceptions exist. Foreign firms employ a higher share of skilled workers in Lao PDR, while the opposite pattern is observed in several countries, including Viet Nam, Thailand and Myanmar, where domestic firms report higher shares, with the largest disparity recorded in Myanmar. In other economies, such as Malaysia and the Philippines, differences are small, indicating no systematic foreign‑firm advantage in skill composition. By contrast, foreign firms are more likely than domestic firms to provide formal training in most AMS, reinforcing their potential role in skills development, with Timor‑Leste representing a notable exception (Figure 2.25, Panel C).
The association between foreign ownership and more favourable job outcomes is also observed in other regions. Multinational enterprises typically operate in more productive, capital‑intensive and technology‑driven sectors, which raises demand for skilled labour and supports higher wage premiums (OECD, 2019[10]; 2022[13]). Their integration into global value chains, compliance with international standards, and access to superior financial, technological and managerial resources further enhance their ability to provide formal training and invest in human‑capital development. However, the magnitude of these advantages varies across countries, reflecting differences in the sectoral composition of inward FDI and domestic labour‑market characteristics. In economies where foreign investment is concentrated in lower‑skill segments of production, differences in employment outcomes between foreign and domestic firms tend to be smaller and may, in some cases, be reversed.
Differences in gender‑related employment outcomes between foreign and domestic firms vary across AMS (Figure 2.25, Panel D). In several economies, most notably Cambodia, Myanmar, Viet Nam and Lao PDR, foreign firms employ a significantly higher share of women, reflecting their greater presence in manufacturing industries such as garments and electronics. By contrast, in economies including Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, domestic firms report higher female employment shares, albeit with generally smaller differences. At the regional level, female employment shares are broadly similar across foreign and domestic firms, suggesting no systematic advantage associated with foreign ownership. International evidence indicates that gender differences between foreign and domestic firms are shaped by additional factors, including the country of origin of multinational enterprises, corporate culture, and adherence to global labour‑standards frameworks (Kodama, Javorcik and Abe, 2018[21]; Tang and Zhang, 2021[22]). These characteristics can influence recruitment and retention practices, workplace policies, and opportunities for career advancement, thereby shaping gender outcomes within foreign‑owned firms.
Note: Indicators based on the following questions: (i) total annual labour costs and number of permanent full-time employees, used to compute average wages and the foreign-domestic wage gap (Panel A); (ii) share of production workers classified as skilled (Panel B); (iii) whether the establishment offers formal training to its permanent, full-time employees, aggregated as the share of firms providing formal training (Panel C); and (iv) share of permanent full-time employees that are female (Panel D). Regional averages are calculated as simple averages. Figures are based on the latest available World Bank Enterprise Survey wave for each country: Brunei Darussalam (2025), Cambodia (2023), Indonesia (2023), Lao PDR (2024), Malaysia (2024), Myanmar (2016), Philippines (2023), Singapore (2023), Thailand (2025), Timor-Leste (2021) and Viet Nam (2023).
Source: Based on OECD (2026[17]), FDI Qualities Indicators, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/dashboards/fdi-qualities-indicators-visualisation-platform.html.
References
[18] ACE (2024), 8th ASEAN Energy Outlook, https://storage.googleapis.com/aceweb-bucket-261225/pdf/publication/8th%20ASEAN%20Energy%20Outlook_SInO1OrPHSdovI5igUIm1SVQHgSGYPAkyoE6aL7R.pdf.
[5] ASEAN (2025), Unlocking Opportunities in an Integrated Market: FMCG Expansion from ASEAN to the Global Stage, https://asean-bac.org/news-and-press-releases/unlocking-opportunities-in-an-integrated-market-fmcg-expansion-from-asean-to-the-global-stage.
[9] ASEAN Secretariat (2026), ASEANstats.
[3] Financial Times (2025), FDI Markets, https://www.fdimarkets.com/.
[15] Huynh, H. et al. (2021), “Productivity Spillover from FDI to Domestic Firms across Six Regions in Vietnam”, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, Vol. 57/1, pp. 59-75, https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2018.1562892.
[20] ILO (2026), Navigating Generative AI’s transformations in ASEAN labour markets, International Labour Organization, https://www.ilo.org/resource/article/navigating-generative-ai%E2%80%99s-transformations-asean-labour-markets.
[6] IMF (2025), Regional economic outlook. Asia and Pacific: Navigating trade headwinds and rebalancing growth, International Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/reo/apd/2025/october/english/text.pdf.
[11] Javorcik, B. (2004), “Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers Through Backward Linkages”, American Economic Review, Vol. 94/3, pp. 605–627, https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/0002828041464605.
[21] Kodama, N., B. Javorcik and Y. Abe (2018), “Transplanting corporate culture across international borders: Foreign direct investment and female employment in Japan”, The World Economy, Vol. 41/1, pp. 1148–1165, https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/worlde/v41y2018.
[12] Kowalski, J. et al. (2015), “Participation of Developing Countries in Global Value Chains”, OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 179, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/5js33lfw0xxn-en.
[4] LSEG (2025), Mergers and acquisitions (M&A), https://www.lseg.com/en/investor-relations/refinitiv-acquisition-documents.
[17] OECD (2026), FDI Qualities Indicators, https://www.oecd.org/en/data/dashboards/fdi-qualities-indicators-visualisation-platform.html.
[8] OECD (2023), “Enabling sustainable investment in ASEAN”, OECD Business and Finance Policy Papers, No. 23, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/eb34f287-en.
[16] OECD (2023), Policy Toolkit for Strengthening FDI and SME Linkages, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/688bde9a-en.
[13] OECD (2022), FDI Qualities Policy Toolkit, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7ba74100-en.
[10] OECD (2019), FDI Qualities Indicators: Measuring the sustainable development impacts of investment, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/0894dfba-en.
[7] OECD (2019), OECD Investment Policy Review of Southeast Asia, OECD Investment Policy Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7becd771-en.
[19] OECD (forthcoming), Investment Policy Framework for Digital Transformation, OECD Publishing, Paris.
[22] Tang, H. and Y. Zhang (2021), “Do Multinationals Transfer Culture? Evidence on Female Employment in China”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 133, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2021.103518.
[1] UNCTAD (2026), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) statistics on flows and stocks, UN Trade and Development, https://unctadstat.unctad.org/.
[2] World Bank (2024), Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.WD.GD.ZS.
[14] Zhang, M. and R. Yang (2022), “FDI and spillovers: New evidence from Malaysia’s manufacturing sector”, Review of Development Economics, Vol. 26/2, pp. 847-877, https://doi.org/10.1111/rode.12857.