OECD Public Governance Reviews: Palestinian Authority

4. Public Administration Reform Areas for Improvement and Reform in the Palestinian Authority

Abstract

Based on the challenges and opportunities identified in previous chapters, this section provides an overview of identified areas of improvement to support and effective development and implementation of PAR in the Palestinian Authority.

Overview of identified areas of improvement

Based on these findings, the Review has identified the following areas of improvement that would concretely strengthen the Palestinian Authority’s efforts for public administration reform:

• Developing a coherent strategic framework for public administration reform

• Strengthening the evidence base for public administration reform

• Improved institutional leadership on public administration reform

• Improving institutional co-ordination on public administration reform

• Improving the prioritisation of public administration reform objectives

• Effective operationalisation of public administration reform objectives

• Effective monitoring and reporting practices for public administration reform

• Leveraging costing and expenditure efforts for public administration reform

• Leveraging Human Resources Management for public administration reform

• Improving accountability and transparency for public administration reform through stakeholder participation

Developing a coherent strategic framework for public administration reform

As highlighted in the OECD Policy Framework on Sound Public Governance (OECD, 2020[1]) and the OECD/SIGMA Principles of Public Administration (OECD, 2018[2]), a well-functioning public administration is a precondition for implementing policies successfully while ensuring the effectiveness of expenditures. It enables governments to achieve their policy objectives in all sectors and ensures the proper implementation of political decisions and legal rules, leading towards economic development and democratisation. On the contrary, ineffective public administration causes delays, inefficient of public resources, uncertainty, and integrity challenges. These in turn can have direct impact on trust in government (OECD, 2022[3]).

Achieving an efficient public administration for sound public governance requires reforms in diverse, though closely interlinked, policy areas. When these reforms are planned and implemented in a fragmented manner and on an ad hoc basis, they may not enhance the functioning of the public administration as initially expected. For instance, improving the professionalism of civil servants cannot bring the foreseen benefits if the administration is not rationally organised and if accountability lines between the CoG and line institutions are not clearly establish, or if procedures are not harmonised across institutions. Therefore, efforts to realise PAR should be approached sequentially with a whole-of-government approach that ensures the harmonisation and integration of reform measures.

There is not a univocal vision for setting up the strategic framework for PAR. Reforms can take the form of either a comprehensive document covering the different PAR areas or, as is the case for the PA’s approach consist of separate strategic documents targeting dedicated PAR areas. Several governments in the MENA region have launched whole-of state strategies which leverage governance reforms to support the development of their societies and economies (see Box 4.1).

Box 4.1. Whole-of-government strategies for PAR in MENA countries

Egypt Vision 2030. Sustainable Development Strategy

This is Egypt’s first such strategy; It guides ongoing reform efforts to match the 17 SDGs, as well as the African Agenda 2063. In particular, it covers economic, social and environmental dimensions of SDGs and outlines strategic targets and sub-targets to achieve the goals; key performance indicators as well as expected challenges. Public administration reform agenda is specifically highlighted as a priority within the strategy.

Saudi Vision 2030

Launched in 2016, it promotes several Realisation Programmes underpinning three main strategic objectives. These latter pivot around an “ambitious Nation” (through enhanced government effectiveness and enabled society responsibility); a “thriving economy” (to be achieved through economic diversification and growth as well as more employment); and a “vibrant society” (based on Islamic and national identity and enjoying a fulfilling and healthy life).

Qatar National Vision 2030

Dating back to 2008, it is structured around four pillars covering “economic development” (ensuring efficient management of the national economy, taking a responsible approach towards natural resource management and working to develop a knowledge-based economy); “social development” (encouraging the adoption of Islamic philosophy and humanitarian and family values, as well as sport and physical activity); “human development” (improving education and health care, and increasing cultural awareness and employment opportunities) and “environmental development” (advancing the technological frontier, conducting environmental awareness campaigns and promoting sustainable urban growth).

UAE Vision 2030 Master Plan

The plan is a comprehensive set of strategic policies that cover the Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030, Environment Vision 2030 (Abu Dhabi), Plan Abu Dhabi 2030, Abu Dhabi Transportation Mobility Management Strategy, Surface Transport Master Plan (Abu Dhabi), Dubai Autonomous Transportation Strategy, Dubai Industrial Strategy 2030, Dubai 3D Printing Strategy and UN’s 2030 Agenda.

Morocco New Development Model 2035

Adopted in 2021, the new Development Model is “designed by Moroccans, with Moroccans and for Moroccans”, having benefitted from insights and ideas discussed in a commission made up of citizens with different and complementary backgrounds. According to the Government, the Model embodies a new way of looking at development, one that is more participative, involving all stakeholders. Through the Model, the Government commits to achieving several targets by 2035, making progress in terms of economy, human capital, inclusion, durability as well as governance and administration.

Source: (Government of Jordan, 2014[4]) (Government of Egypt, n.d.[5]) (Government of Saudi Arabia, n.d.[6]) (Government of the UAE, n.d.[7]) (Government of Qatar, n.d.[8]) (Government of Morocco, n.d.[9]).

In the PA’s existing approach, strengthening, and further aligning the current co-ordination and management structures would lead to increased results. If the PA were to change its approach and move towards the development of a single PAR strategy encompassing the different PAR areas, this would need reflection and planning. The development of a concept paper could in this case act as a first step. This paper would need to include the key milestones and identify the most important stakeholders with their related roles and contributions. Furthermore, the leadership and composition of working bodies, the overall timeframe of the entire process, the resources needed for all parts of the strategy development, and the details of the planned internal and external consultations would ideally be included. Results-based management, as introduced in the NDP but not further operationalised, would also offer an important driver for reforms, and would ideally be further pursued. As introduced with the new strategic planning approach, a well-prioritised and result-oriented GP (which is expected to include indicators and targets to be achieved through the strategic projects) has the potential to streamline reforms. A lead institution at the centre of government with a clear mandate and strong authority over the relevant ministries and non-ministerial institutions would be needed to strengthen the alignment of PAR efforts.

Strengthening the evidence base for public administration reform

As recognised by the OECD’s Policy Framework on Sound Public Governance (OECD, 2020[1]), it is important to note that there is a strong link between the overall success of public reforms and the care with which those reforms have been planned. To this aim strategic plans are to be informed with the best available evidence. A well-informed analysis of the current situation allows for the identification of major problems and their root causes, as well as the challenges and opportunities for reform. The problem analysis should be well planned to ensure its timely completion: defining the scope, choosing the relevant analytical methods and tools that are to be used, preparing relevant questions, selecting key data collection methods and data sources, and determining the key involved institutions and stakeholders with their corresponding responsibilities. Moreover, proper analysis should be given sufficient time depending on the available resources and the complexity of the internal and external consultation process needed to develop and validate the findings of the analysis.

Stakeholders during the OECD’s fact-finding missions have identified that the PA has a rising interest in strengthening its evidence base. Respondents to the OECD questionnaire mentioned that focus groups and interviews are the most common methods used for problem analysis and policy identification for PAR in the PA. In some cases, other methods are used as well. These include systematic reviews, evaluation reports, national statistics, administrative data, and reports by international organisations. It is important that these methods are further strengthened by the inclusions of performance information, audit reports, internal and external evaluations, expenditure reports and the respective institutions that create these insights to create a robust evidence base for PAR.

The early involvement of the civil society together with institutional stakeholders would also positively impact the problem analysis efforts as this would contribute towards ensuring that strategic frameworks address the most pressing needs in the society. As is the case with the elaboration of the Cross-Cutting Gender Strategy and the Cross-Cutting Integrity and Anticorruption strategy, there are good examples within the PA of the early involvement of internal and external stakeholders in problem analysis (i.e., decision-makers, managers, technical staff, external service users, NGOs, research centres, academia, the private sector, etc.). However, external stakeholders shared during OECD’s fact-finding missions that they often struggle with receiving feedback on their contributions towards problem analysis. Nevertheless, while practices for engagement appear to be uneven across institutions, the PA could build further on these experiences.

When revising the existing Handbook 2017-2022, the PA needs to consider setting clearer standard procedures and quality requirements for the involvement of all the relevant institutional and non-state stakeholders during the stages of problem identification, discussion, and validation of the analytical results. In this way, the PA would benefit from a wider range of insights which would ensure that all views are taken into consideration and that the most pressing issues are sufficiently identified. They could take the form of a legally binding regulatory framework for inter-institutional and public consultations or detailed, mandatory guidelines emanating by the CoG. In both cases, a quality control mechanism in line institutions and at the CoG is best placed to ensure their consistent application. Ideally, these standard procedures for problem analysis should be integrated within a wider regulatory framework or guidelines concerning the entire policy cycle. The recently introduced new Guidelines 2024-2029 could addressing these issues more effectively.

Improved institutional leadership on public administration reform

As recognised by OECD/SIGMA’s Toolkit for the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of public administration reform and sector strategies (OECD, 2018[2]), effective and efficient implementation of PAR is strongly benefited by clear and strong leadership at the CoG that is able to steer the overall reforms. This includes the development of the strategic and operational documents, and the co-ordination and monitoring of its implementation. Leadership and managerial responsibilities should be cascaded down throughout the public administration and include accountability measures. For each dedicated area of reform, one lead institution should be further identified and assigned official managerial responsibilities to ensure its effectiveness.

Given its cross-cutting nature, PAR also requires a collective commitment. The level of leadership at the political and top administrative levels, as well as the perceptions of the decision-makers about the importance of the PAR agenda are critical success factors. In several OECD countries PAR leadership is placed at the level of the Centre of Government (CoG), more specifically at the level of the Prime Minister or Deputy-Prime Minister to ensure sufficient authority to co-ordinate the numerous involved institutions and to ensure a uniform approach towards policy development (see Box 4.2 and Box 4.3).

Box 4.2. The role of the CoG in PAR

According to the traditional OECD definition, the Centre of government (CoG) is the body or group of bodies that provides direct support and advice to the head of government and the CoM. The CoG is known under different labels in different countries, such as the Chancellery, Cabinet Office, Office of the President, and Presidency of the CoM. From its traditional role of serving the executive from an administrative perspective, the CoG is now playing a more active role in policy development and co-ordination across OECD members. The centre in many countries now provides services that range from strategic planning to real-time policy advice and intelligence, and from leading major cross-departmental policy initiatives to monitoring progress and outcomes.

More recently, OECD countries have widened the scope of the CoG that not only refers to the presidency or its equivalent but also includes ministries with a key and leading role in defining, implementing and follow-up strategic policies. This new definition integrates the Ministry of Finance (where policy priorities are matched with resources) and the Ministry of Planning, when it exists (with a key role in designing policy priorities across the administration and how these contribute to an overall strategic plan). In other cases, and depending on the institutional situation of a country, other ministries or key strategic organisations can also be considered as part of the CoG for their whole-of-government and cross-governmental co-ordination role. It can be the case of Ministries of Public Administration or governmental bodies in charge of Human resources Management, digital government, or regulatory policy.

Country examples of centres of government leading PAR efforts

• In Finland, while overall reform is led by the Ministry of Finance, the PMO is responsible for reform of the Government’s policymaking processes and strategic policymaking.

• In Ireland, the Secretary General to the President chairs the Civil Service Management Board, which oversees implementation of the overall Civil Service Renewal Plan.

• The State Chancellery in Latvia launched the public administration reform Plan 2020, focusing on achieving a ‘results orientated and efficient public administration and human resources policy’, which includes, reducing administrative burdens (“zero bureaucracy”), increasing public e-services, revision of small institutions and consolidation of support functions into shared service centres, and regular expenditure reviews.

• New Zealand’s Better Public Services reform programme is jointly led by the three ‘central agencies’ (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Treasury, and the State Services Commission) and includes several publicly reported policy ‘Result Areas’ with targets, the establishment of whole-of-government ‘functional leadership’ roles in the areas of ICT, procurement, policy, and legal services, as well as a programme to build leadership capability across government.

Source: (OECD, 2017[10]); (OECD, 2018[11]).

Box 4.3. Strengthening the role of the centre of government in strategic planning in Morocco  

In Morocco, the Services of the Head of Government (SCG) were established in 2012 in order to better support the Head of Government, particularly in the co-ordination of public policies and in the achievement of the 5-year governmental programme objectives. The creation of the SCG also aimed to improve decision-making in particular at the Council of Government, for which the SCG have been proposing items on the agenda and reviewing the consistency of the proposals with the government programme during the preparation process of the meeting. The SCG have also enabled greater agility at the centre of government to respond to national issues and immediate or long-term challenges for Morocco.

The role of the SCG was further reinforced in the framework of the implementation of the Government Programme 2021-2026. They have a leading role in steering the implementation of government priorities in co-ordination with line Ministries; they support decision-making by the Head of Government; they ensure the co-ordination and alignment of strategies and policies, providing expertise both on legal and substance matters ;they also contribute extensively to the preparation of the annual budget law by establishing the strategic framework driving the budget distribution that is then validated by the Head of Government for validation before discussions with the Ministry of Economy and Finances. 

Moreover, the SCG team is in charge of monitoring the implementation of the strategic priorities and of ensuring that new laws and strategies are line both with the Government Programme and the long-term New Development Model. In addition to these functions, the SCG has been developing a role of delivery unit to steer more specifically some key priorities and accompany line ministries in the development and implementation of those priorities in connection with their sectoral strategies. 

Source: (OECD, 2023[12]).

The PA has not identified a lead institution for PAR in the centre of government. The 2002 Basic Law contains limited provisions about the policy development and implementation process. However, it offers an overview of the various institutions involved in the process1. In order to identify a PAR lead institution at the CoG, there are many valid options for the Palestinian Authority to consider, such as:

• The General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers (GS) is identified as the main institution in charge for the implementation and evaluation of the GRA. It is tasked with establishing and leading an inter-institutional governmental team in charge of the follow-up and monitoring of reform implementation. The GS also monitors the implementation of the National Development Plan, against the Strategic Results Framework.

• The Prime Minister’s Office leads and co-ordinates the strategic planning process for the National Development Plan, and which has recently established The National Committee for Planning at the Cabinet level that assess legislative, administrative, and financial reform needs.

Leadership and managerial responsibilities should also be cascaded down throughout the public administration with one lead institution clearly identified for each PAR area and dedicated sub-areas. This entails a delegation of responsibility from the lead PAR institution through the institutions leading individual PAR areas, towards the other contributing institutions regarding the achievement of planned objectives. To work efficiently, delegation of responsibility requires a regular top-down and bottom-up flow of information. In some OECD countries, relations are regulated through mandate letters or administrative agreements clarifying commitments, performance expectations, and reporting lines between the CoG and line ministries (see Box 4.4). In the MENA region, some countries like Tunisia adopted performance programmes between the CoG and line ministries, and performance contracts between line ministries and subordinated institutions. In the PA, the Palestinian Anti-Corruption Commission provides an example in this regard, it has signed agreements with all the relevant institutions contributing towards the implementation of the Cross-Cutting Strategy for Integrity and Anti-corruption.

Box 4.4. Mandate Letters in Canada

Mandate Letter to the Minister of Public Services and Procurement

Mandate letters outline the objectives of each minister’s performance expectations, as well as the challenges they are tasked to address. For instance, in the mandate letter destined to the former Minister of Public Services and Procurement, Filomena Tassi, by the Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau, the continuation of the prioritisation of the procurement of the critical supplies necessary to respond to COVID-19 are highlighted, alongside the need to leverage the government's purchasing power in order to increase access to economic opportunity for a greater diversity of Canadians. In addition, the mandate letter stresses the need to ensure that federal procurement practices support Canada’s transition to a green economy.

To achieve these objectives, the Minister of Public Services and Procurement are tasked to deliver the following commitments:

• Continue to procure COVID-19 therapeutics, tests, and vaccines, for adults and children, to ensure all Canadians have access to free booster shots and second-generation vaccines as needed.

• Continue the modernisation of procurement practices so they support Canada’s economic policy goals, including balanced procurement opportunities with Canada’s trading partners, provide value for money, are open and transparent and require suppliers of goods and services to apply the highest ethical and sustainability standards across their supply chains.

• To ensure that a whole-of-government approach is taken, support the Minister of Labour in introducing legislation to eradicate forced labour from Canadian supply chains and ensure Canadian businesses operating abroad do not contribute to human rights abuses.

• Continue to advance government-wide initiatives to increase the diversity of bidders on government contracts, including small businesses and businesses led by Indigenous Peoples, Black and racialised Canadians, women, LGBTQ2 Canadians and other under-represented groups.

• Lead the implementation of the requirement for federal departments and agencies to ensure a minimum of 5 per cent of the total value of federal contracts are held by Indigenous businesses.

• Strengthen federal procurement practices to prioritise reusable and recyclable products in support of our goal of zero plastic waste and work with the Minister of Innovation, Science, and Industry to support procurement of Canadian clean technology.

• Continue working with the Minister of Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard and the Minister of National Defence, with the support of the Minister of Innovation, Science, and Industry, to renew the fleets of the Canadian Coast Guard and Royal Canadian Navy, advance the shipbuilding industry, including the process to add a third Canadian shipyard as a strategic partner to the National Shipbuilding Strategy, create middle class jobs and ensure Canada has the modern ships needed.

• Continue to improve crossings in the National Capital Region, moving forward with Budget 2019 commitments to replace the Alexandra Bridge, addressing the demonstrated need for an additional National Capital Region crossing with the Long-Term Integrated Interprovincial Crossings Plan led by the National Capital Commission (NCC), and investing to rehabilitate and maintain existing crossings, including the Chaudière and Macdonald-Cartier bridges.

• Work with the President of the Treasury Board to resolve outstanding Phoenix Pay System issues for public servants once and for all, while advancing work through Shared Services Canada on the Next Generation Pay and Human Resources System.

• Ensure that Canada Post provides the high-quality service that Canadians expect at a reasonable price and better reaches Canadians in rural and remote areas. You will be supported in this work by the Minister of Rural Economic Development.

• Advance work to rehabilitate and reinvigorate places and buildings of national significance under the responsibility of the NCC and Public Services and Procurement Canada. 

• Ensure the ongoing delivery of defence procurements in support of Canada’s Defence Policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged.

• Work with the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Infrastructure and Communities and the Minister of Natural Resources to introduce a new Buy Clean Strategy to support and prioritise the use of made-in-Canada low-carbon products in Canadian infrastructure projects.

Source: (Government of Canada, 2021[13]).

In the PA lead institutions have been identified for most of the PAR areas. Still, there are some areas that would benefit from better identified leadership:

• Regarding policy development, co-ordination, and monitoring, both the PMO and the GS have policy development responsibilities, the former mainly concerning the development of the NDP, the latter regarding the GRA.

• On the organisation and functioning of public administration, the GRA identifies the GS as the lead institution for reform measures aimed at restructuring public administration and government functions. However, the Basic Law assigns to the GPC a mandate to “upgrade and develop public administration“ (Article 87 of the Basic Law). Both institutions participate in the Presidential Higher Committee for Administrative and Legal Reforms which is tasked to deal with, among other issues, institutional mergers, and a rationalisation of organisational costs.

• On service delivery (beyond e-services) the GS has a mandate. It could be further identified as the lead institution to boost administrative simplification processes and to enhance the accessibility and quality of in-person services.

Finally, during the OECD’s fact-finding mission interlocutors shared that individual responsibility and accountability could be more clearly defined within each lead or contributing institution, this can be done through internal notes and updated job descriptions. This point was also emphasised by civil society organisations. As recognised by the consulted stakeholders, this might need a cultural change to create the required enabling environment.

Improving institutional co-ordination on public administration reform

As highlighted in the OECD/SIGMA’s Toolkit for the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of public administration reform and sector strategies (OECD, 2018[2]), due to the cross-cutting nature of PAR and the multiple institutions involved in the implementation of the reforms, it is desirable to have dedicated steering and co-ordination structures to oversee the implementation. The formation of the structures, the institutions (and often appointed individuals), their roles and responsibilities, and the working procedures of the structures should be formalised in a separate decision or explained in PAR strategic documents.

In the PA, different committees currently deal with PAR-related issues. The President established the Higher Committee for Administrative and Legal Reform while Decree 21 of 2020 provides for Permanent Ministerial Committees, among which the Administrative Committee has been active since April 2022, and the possibility to establish ad hoc technical committees. While not in place yet, the GRA also provides for the establishment of governmental teams under the chairmanship of the GS. The mandates of these co-ordination fora are somehow overlapping, not entirely clear, or not fit for purpose with none of them including all the relevant institutional stakeholders.

Co-ordination on PAR at the CoG

To establish a stronger co-ordination for PAR at the CoG, the PA can either enlarge the membership of existing bodies and extend their scope or establish new ones. When doing so it is recommended to clearly set the membership, mandate, working procedures, and responsibilities of each involved institution or individual in a dedicated decision.

To ensure effectiveness, it is beneficial to establish a body both at the political level, for example through a PAR council or ministerial committee, and at the technical level, for example in the form of an inter-ministerial working group. The political body may be chaired by the Head of the lead CoG institution, while the technical body could be headed by a top-level civil servant such as the deputy of the same institution. The membership of the political body should be at the level of Head of institution while the technical body would ideally involve technical experts, possibly at senior civil service level. Both bodies should encompass all the main institutions with responsibilities on PAR implementation. Moreover, it is advisable in both cases to also involve key external stakeholders such as representatives of the civil society, the private sector and academia. This would enhance the accountability, the credibility of reforms and institutional adherence to them. An active role of the civil society would imply that the agenda of the meetings and related preparatory documents are made available in advance. By making the minutes and conclusions of the meetings publicly available, civil society would be allowed to play its oversight role.

The main mandate of the political-level structure is to steer and oversee the design and implementation of the whole strategic framework for PAR and to decide on policy issues based on well-prepared materials by the technical committee. It could review periodic and ad hoc reports presenting progress against objectives and implemented activities, attainment of targets, budgetary issues, etc. In doing so it provides strategic advice and discuss PAR-related draft decisions such as draft strategic documents, laws, and regulations, concept papers, etc. before they go forward to the CoM for approval. This body co-ordinates and harmonises diverging opinions and takes decisions to address implementation challenges and disputes if the resolution has failed at the administrative level. Ideally, the political-level structure meets quarterly, or at least every six months to ensure a good flow of operations.

The inter-institutional technical body is expected to ensure harmonisation among the different PAR areas, and technical co-ordination. The committee is ideally chaired by the Deputy Head or a top senior representative of the CoG institution leading the overall PAR agenda. It is advisable that its membership encompass representatives of the institutions leading the different PAR areas, senior representatives of the GS, PMO, OoP, MoF, the Diwan, representatives of the civil society, and other members on invitation in function of specific discussion points. It is advisable that the technical-level structure meets at least quarterly.

While being an important starting point, the creation of political and technical inter-institutional bodies is not sufficient to ensure sound management of the PAR agenda. Their functioning needs to be well organised and based on robust evidence. Along with political support and dedicated leadership, the quality of the working documents that support decision-making at the political and technical level is of utmost importance. To this aim, it is advisable that the CoM appoints a technical secretariat within the institution leading the overall PAR agenda to support the practical organisation of the meetings. This secretariat may be tasked with preparing meeting agendas, managing invitations, co-ordinating the preparation of the working materials, reviewing their quality in line with predefined standards and ensuring their timely circulation, selecting suitable non-permanent participants (NGO’s, academia, private sector) for the meetings, preparing memos and drafting policy decisions, preparing and circulating minutes and decisions after the respective meetings, and ensuring that decision made by the bodies are duly taken into account and followed. The latter is only possible if decisions taken assign tasks to clearly identified institutions.

In future, it would be important to consider the above when setting the mandate and composition of inter-institutional co-ordination groups established for each pillar of the GP. This point was also emphasised by civil society organisations.

Co-ordination on thematic PAR areas

At the level of thematic PAR areas, the PA may want to consider maintaining the existing structures as provided by the Handbook 2017-2022, and the MTBPM. Notably the Sector Strategy Groups (SSG) and the PMTs. Despite the renewed focus on interinstitutional co-operation, the new Guidelines 2024-2029 do not mention neither the SPBAG and the SSG, which are the fora involving all relevant institutions, nor civil society.

These working groups oversee and discuss implementation progress and identify gaps and conflicting views among the implementing institutions. They develop and approve materials such as reports, and policy notes, and discuss PAR-related draft decisions before they are sent to the inter-ministerial body for endorsement or directly to the political level structure for policy deliberation. Moreover, based on the analytical and operational information available, they discuss any necessary changes to the dedicated PAR strategy and action plan. Due to their technical co-ordination role, it is also advisable that they meet at least once a month and no less than quarterly. Attention should also be paid to the organisation of meetings of the SSGs and the quality of the received input.

Improving the prioritisation of public administration reform objectives

Experiences across the OECD show that governments often try to address too many problems through their strategic documents, endangering the successful achievement of the set objectives due to unfocused delivery and scarce resources that do not always allow to address all problems simultaneously (OECD, 2018[2]). To respond to this threat, prioritisation should be an important early stage of the strategic planning process and should be derived from the problem-analysis phase. As highlighted in OECD’s Policy Framework on Sound Public Governance, a sound prioritisation process can lead to more realistic commitments and better designed interventions which in turn can help governments develop more credible plans (OECD, 2020[1]) (see Annex B).

Interviewees consulted during the OECD’s fact-finding missions and capacity building activities recognised that the PA’s plans for PAR are often too ambitious and not consistent with the limited financial resources and administrative capacities of the government. Addressing this issue requires effective prioritisation, notably through specifying what really matter and by then setting the most relevant objectives. Prioritisation efforts lead to more credible commitments and better-designed interventions which can help governments to develop more effective policies. Through this exercise, line ministries and non-ministerial institutions would be able to propose a narrower and more realistic set of priorities to the PMO in preparation of the next NDP. Within their respective areas of responsibility, they would be able to focus on more limited programmes better fitting the budgetary ceilings set by the MoF. Too many objectives and programmes split the scarce resources and may lead to unfocused and suboptimal delivery of envisioned policies and reforms for PAR.

Prioritisation can be based on urgency, importance, the administrative capacities, and the available resources. Prioritisation exercises, at the level of each PAR strategy should build on the evidence collected during the problem analysis phase, including consultations with both internal and external stakeholders, and be accompanied with initial suggestions for strategic issues to be addressed. They should involve high-ranking officials holding decision-making power such as high representatives of the major implementing institutions and the heads of the PMTs. Discussions should be well prepared and supported with prioritisation tools (see Box 4.5). Active moderation of discussions should grant all participants the opportunity to actively contribute.

Objective setting can be achieved through a series of inclusive joint meetings or workshops with all stakeholders, which are used to agree on well formulated objectives. The result of this process should be the ‘story’ of the strategy, told in a logical and sequential way. In the PA, PAR objectives tend to be formulated in the form of activities: e.g., development of legislation, elaboration of reports, establishment of administrative or technical structures, development of IT systems, etc. Instead, objectives should clarify the expected improvement compared to the current state of play: e.g., improvement of the quality and accessibility of public services. This can be obtained through elaborating surveys and assessments, developing legislation, digitalising services, etc. In addition, it is important to remind that setting objectives is not a one-off exercise. It may be necessary to revise the objectives several times before they are finalised. For example, after setting indicators with their corresponding baseline and targets, and after planning and costing the actions.

The different steps for prioritisation and objective setting should be clearly presented in methodological guidelines. An option for the PA’s consideration is to integrate detailed guidance in the review of the Handbook 2017-2022. The new Guidelines 2024-2029 could provide more detailed guidance, and tools. Moreover, prioritisation is expected to be performed within the PBMG, which only includes members of the lead institution. Ideally, prioritisation should involve other contributing institutions as well as external stakeholders.

Consistent application of these procedural steps should be verified throughout the process. Other governments or research institutions within the OECD have also developed fit-for-purpose prioritisation of reforms which could be of interest to the Palestinian Authority, most notably the prioritisation framework of the UK (see Box 4.6).

Box 4.5. OECD prioritisation methodologies and country examples

SIGMA Prioritisation Tool for PAR strategy development

The application of the SIGMA Prioritisation Tool should be co-ordinated by the lead PAR institution and its use should involve all implementing institutions. The use of this prioritisation tool involves the following key steps (OECD, 2018[2]):

Table 4.1. SIGMA Prioritisation Tool for PAR strategy development

No.	Step	Institution
1.	Review of the questionnaire to adjust it to country-specific conditions; decision on participating institutions.	PAR/thematic lead institution
2.	Launch of the self-assessment process. This step may involve organising a joint workshop to explain the purpose of the assessment and how to answer the questions, or alternatively this can be done via a circular letter.	PAR/thematic lead institution
3.	Carry out self-assessment:	Participating institutions
3.1.	Assess the current state of play.
3.2.	Provide a quantitative evaluation of the current state of play.
3.3.	Identify main actions.
4.	Analysis and summary of self-assessment results.	PAR/thematic lead institution (with external assistance if required)
5.	Organise a workshop(s) to discuss and agree the ‘skeleton’ PAR or sector strategy:
5.1.	Facilitate a high-level workshop to discuss and agree on the core problems and the relative urgency of the PAR or sector interventions and actions.	Organiser – PAR/thematic lead institution Participants – ministers, other senior-level management
5.2.	Facilitate an additional operational-level workshop to agree on further details of the agreed actions.	Organiser – PAR/thematic lead institution Participants – participating institutions

Using regulatory impact assessments prioritise state interventions and achieve public policy goals

Beyond planning mechanisms, regulations are a valuable tool for achieving social, economic, and environmental priority goals. To maximise efficiency and minimise potential negative externalities, Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIAs) provide decision-makers with crucial information on whether and how to regulate to achieve public policy objectives and defend their decision to intervene or not (OECD, 2020[14]).

The OECD best practice principles for RIAs suggest the quality of RIAs depends on systemic identification of problems and sound data governance strategy and systems. The OECD has developed best practice principles for RIAs which could provide the Palestinian Authority with a “practical instrument to better design and implement their RIA systems and strategies” to achieve public objectives. These principles are structured around five pillars:

• Commitment and buy-in for RIAs

• Governance of RIAs – having the right setup or system design

• Embedding RIAs through strengthening the capacity and accountability of the administration

• Targeted and appropriate RIA methodology

• Continuous monitoring, evaluation, and improvement of RIAs

Budget-related prioritisation functions in the CoG in the UK

A budget helps determine the extent to which a plan is realistic, and a plan helps prioritise the allocation of resources so it can be achieved. A plan that is disconnected from the budget sets out a vision without the practical means to achieve it.

Although the relationship between budgeting and planning contains an inherent logic, it can be difficult to implement in a government where the functions are not co-ordinated closely. It should not be necessary to have a structural solution such as a single organisation to have a co-ordinated approach. A co-ordinated approach highlights the importance of well-defined governance arrangements that articulate the functional responsibilities and expertise of each organisation, the flow of information that is to occur and the decisions and outputs that are to result from the co-ordination.

The CoG has a role in lifting sights above the detailed requirements to identify the initiatives that matter most across government. In the UK, the CoG (Cabinet Office) focuses principally on strategy, prioritisation, and accountability in relation to the budget.

The CoG in the United Kingdom is principally the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office. Many of the functions performed by the HM Treasury are also relevant to the CoG. On budgeting, the Treasury focuses on budget strategy, prioritisation, and accountability. These functions are also of key interest to the Prime Minister’s Office and the Cabinet Office. Budget strategy includes the prime minister’s involvement in the early stages of the budget process. Prioritisation is largely on the flagship initiatives that help define the government’s policy agenda, and the accountability functions can refer to transparency, delivery and guidance on standards and methodologies. The emphasis applied to budget strategy, prioritisation and accountability can vary depending on the priorities of the prime minister of the day and the needs of the government.

As an example, in 2002, the then prime minister, Tony Blair, established a delivery unit to strengthen the CoG’s accountability role by monitoring the progress of the government’s flagship priorities. Subsequent prime ministers have changed the focus of the unit. The enduring aspects of each function were the ones that were complementary and not duplicative of the functions performed by other ministries.

Source: (OECD, 2018[2]); (OECD, 2020[14]).

Box 4.6. Prioritisation in the UK: A focus on outcomes

In 2010, the UK government wanted to signal the priorities they wished to focus on for both civil servants and the public sector frontline – as well as citizens. To this end, they created a dedicated cabinet sub-committee to identify the top priorities for the whole of government. The committee began by asking each department to put forward their priorities which resulted in siloed and numerous priorities. It came to realise that the change it wanted to effect to meet the needs of citizens would only be achieved by departments working together, not focusing just on, what they could do on their own. For example, in order to raise employment levels, it was vital that the policies and programmes of the Department of Work and Pensions were aligned with those of the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, the Department for Education, the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the Department for Communities and the Department of Health and Social Care. From the departmental priorities, the committee thus brokered a set of priorities that reflected the administration’s vision for change – and at the same time changed the way in which government operated through the need for cross-departmental agreement on programmes to achieve the results desired and how progress would be measured. By working collectively and focusing on results, the government had a stronger chance to achieve something in their time in office.

More recently in 2021, the UK government introduced Outcome Delivery Plans, building on, and improving the previous Single Departmental Plans. These plans set out how each UK government department is working towards the delivery of its priority outcomes. Outcome Delivery Plans place a greater emphasis on joint working between departments, enabling departments to plan together to deliver shared outcomes. Outcome Delivery Plans also set out plans for delivering critical enabling activities that are crucial to the successful delivery of outcomes, including: attracting and investing in great people; embracing new ideas; and strengthening functional expertise to support the delivery of better outcomes. Additionally, Outcome Delivery Plans also set out how departments are working towards becoming more sustainable and how work contributes to the delivery of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the government’s equality objectives, to ensure government departments contribute to these overarching whole-of-government priorities.

Source: (OECD, 2020[14]).

Effective operationalisation of public administration reform objectives

As recognised by OECD/SIGMA’s Toolkit for the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of public administration reform and sector strategies (OECD, 2018[2]) and as recommended in the OECD Review Rule of Law and Governance in the Palestinian Authority: Delivering Better Policies and Legislation for People (OECD, 2022[15]) are aligned and associated with clear outputs, operational responsibilities, and a concrete implementation timeframe. Actions related to business as usual should not be included. It is advisable to limit the number of actions to concentrate efforts on the implementation of the most impactful actions and the actions for which resources have been allocated.

Actions should also be defined in an inclusive and participatory way, the responsible institutions in the PA are encouraged to devote sufficient time to organise and run several interactive sessions such as working group meetings, focus groups and brainstorming sessions. Hereby involving all the contributing institutions to fully ensure that the results of the problem analysis, the defined problems and their causes are well understood, the best set of reform-oriented actions are designed to tackle them, and that roles and responsibilities are clear and agreed on. Moreover, to ensure consistent implementation, actions should be cascaded down from the institution responsible for a certain PAR area to contributing ministries and non-ministerial institutions taking into account leadership and accountability and ensuring that the respective action plans are aligned.

With that in mind, the PA may build on the tables proposed in the new strategic planning guidelines 2024-20292 which have the potential to further clarify implementation responsibilities, and accountability lines towards the achievement of joint results.

Effective monitoring and reporting practices for public administration reform

Monitoring is a key management tool to identify implementation barriers and improve the decision-making process, to robust the supply of management and data (also useful for evaluations), and to enhance accountability. It is advisable that the monitoring, reporting, and evaluation system is developed and set up when adopting the strategy, detailing the various roles and responsibilities. However, monitoring is a complex task, which requires a legal basis to undertake monitoring; macro-level guidance on when and how to carry out monitoring and finally clearly mandated institutional actors with allocated resources to oversee or carry out monitoring efforts (OECD, 2021[16]).

At the CoG, the GS has an overall mandate regarding monitoring and reporting. It developed the Strategic Results Framework to monitor the implementation of the NDP, follows the implementation of its plans and programmes, and prepares annual reports on the overall implementation. The GS is also in charge of monitoring the implementation of the GRA. Consulted stakeholders during OECD’s fact-finding missions clarified that the monitoring system for both the NDP and the GRA is the same. The workflow and co-ordination practices between the GS and the monitoring units in line ministries and non-ministerial institutions could not be verified.

Concretely, according to the Handbook 2017-2022 and the MTBPM, the monitoring of the NDP and the GRA happens in the different PMTs within ministries and non-ministerial institutions. However, the new Guidelines 2024-2029 do not explicitly confirm this approach. They simply state that LMA have to explicitly describe the monitoring arrangements in the strategic document.

The PMTs monitor the implementation of the annual action plans, notably of the programmes and projects under their responsibility. In particular they monitor the achievement of the outputs (often formulated as activities) outlined in the annual action plans and in the respective programme. Monitoring the achievement of outcomes is not a regular practice. To the extent to which monitoring findings, beyond potential delays in implementation, are discussed in the management bodies at technical and political level could not be verified. There appear to be no current administrative arrangements to share monitoring information efficiently and constantly among CoG institutions as consulted stakeholders mentioned during the fact-finding missions that the PMO only receives information once per year on specific request.

According to the Palestinian Voluntary National Review on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030ASD), the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), supported by a senior level steering committee, leads the implementation and monitoring of SDGs. The CoM also established 12 working groups tasked with mapping and monitoring the targets and indicators relevant to their associated SDGs. In line with the 2030 Agenda, the PA made efforts to align the SDGs, the NPA, and thematic and cross-cutting strategies. To this aim, the 2016 Handbook for Strategic Planning, as well as the new Guidelines 2024-2029, requires public institutions to highlight the contribution of such strategies to the achievement of the SDGs. Likewise, the PMO ensures the full integration of the priority SDGs into the various parts of the NPA. While the implementation of the SDGs is monitored by the PMO, the GS oversees reporting against the indicators of the NDP’s Strategic Results Framework and is responsible for monitoring the implementation of the GRA. Due to the unavailability of annual monitoring reports, it is not possible to assess the implementation speed. Without legal provisions concerning the publication of monitoring reports, and in the absence of an adopted Law on Access to Information, the civil society and the public have little opportunity to be informed about government performance. Moreover, during the fact-finding missions, representatives of civil society reported that they are not involved in any discussion about reform progress with the government and they are not involved in monitoring and evaluation of public policies. Assessment conducted by civil society organisations are funded by development partners.

Consulted institutional stakeholders reported an overall lack of harmonised institutional practices, unclear division of responsibilities, and insufficient co-ordination efforts by the CoG. They added that there is no comprehensive legal framework for monitoring the implementation of the NDP and thematic and cross-cutting strategies. Though there are no full-fledged guidelines for monitoring public policies across institutions, the GS’ General Directorate for Monitoring and Evaluation issues quarterly report templates rather than outlining the data collection and monitoring process to the monitoring units established in most ministries. While consulted institutions consider them as not sufficiently detailed, these could not be further analysed.

The thematic PAR strategies have their own monitoring frameworks, but their quality is uneven:

• The Technology and Public Administration Strategy 2021-2023 is the strategic document that presents the highest level of quality. It outlines both output and outcome indicators, includes intermediate and final targets and related deadlines for achievement. It also provides for a general description of its monitoring arrangements.

• The Sectoral Strategy of the Civil Service 2021-2023 mainly outlines output indicators and includes deadlines for achievements.

• The National Cross-Sectoral Strategy for Integrity and Anti-Corruption 2020-2022 mainly identifies output level indicators and includes a few outcome indicators. Deadlines for implementation could be further specified and the monitoring arrangements better clarified.

• The Cross-Sectoral Gender Strategy 2021-2023 identifies both output and outcome indicators. However, baselines are not provided for the outcome-level indicators. Deadlines for achievement are specified, as are the monitoring arrangements.

Several challenges can be further identified. None of the monitoring frameworks clarify how each indicator should be measured and what data are needed, which institution owns the necessary data, whether data exist or must be produced and therefore if a budget should be allocated. Further institutional arrangements for monitoring and reporting are also not uniform across the PA’s public institutions due to the lack of official mandate for dedicated monitoring and evaluation departments. In practice, some line ministries such as the Ministry of Health have specific monitoring and evaluation units. Others combine the planning function with monitoring and evaluation. Some institutions only have individual focal points.

Most consulted institutions reported capacity issues and indicated the inability to collect data and the consequent unavailability of information on important indicators among the major challenges related to monitoring. They also confirmed that identification and formulation of indicators is not a regular practice and is often not sufficiently precise. This makes them unsuitable for systematic measurement. The OECD experience shows that indicators and especially their baselines and targets are sometimes ignored at the development stage, leaving the strategy as an unspecified document that does not properly guide implementers. The wider audience is therefore left without a clear measurable and traceable definition of the ambitions of the government in reforming the public administration (OECD, 2018[2]).

As recognised by OECD/SIGMA’s Toolkit for the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of public administration reform and sector strategies (OECD, 2018[2]), to ensure its effectiveness, a strategic document should provide a description of institutional arrangements for monitoring, reporting, and evaluating PAR efforts. The proper allocation of responsibilities for implementation and monitoring, and the clarification of internal accountability lines are hereby of critical importance. These responsibilities are about data collection for each indicator, reporting on progress against each indicator/milestones/final targets, and analysis of the reasons behind good or bad performance. It is advisable that each objective has at least one and no more than three impact or outcome indicators, and each action should have at least one output indicator. It is recommended to not increase the number of indicators, to manage the workload and costs of monitoring, since it is a comprehensive and work-intensive process.

It is also important to remember that good indicators include a set of fundamental quality requirements, such as baselines, interim and final targets, deadlines for completion, information/data needed, information/data owner, frequency of collection of information/data needed, calculation methods, and a budget where additional resources to measure them are needed (e.g., for surveys). Ministerial and non-ministerial institutions would greatly benefit of clear instructions guidance, and tools, concerning the formulation of indicators. It was not possible to observe the presence of all these requirements in any of the assessed monitoring frameworks. This may be developed by the GS and included in the revised Handbook 2017-2022. However, it is also possible that guidance is outlined in internal documents that could not be verified by the OECD. The new Guidelines 2024-2029 do not provide more detailed instructions, nor specific tools or templates, to formulate indicators.

Along with the suitability of an indicator to measure the expected improvements the choice of outcome indicators should be guided by the actual possibility to be measured. There may be several reasons hindering measurability of indicators, e.g., the necessary information is collected sporadically or too infrequency, or data must be produced but there is no available budget to do it. Therefore, the PA is encouraged to develop indicators which can be effectively measured rather than ‘perfect indicators’ that would be difficult to monitor in practice. To avoid this, the PA may want to consider assessing the soundness of its indicators in accordance with Box 4.7 and replace those that do not include sufficiently precise descriptions, measurement, responsibility as well as a baseline, an intermediate target, and a final target to facilitate monitoring and evaluation. To increase accountability, the PA could also consider uploading and publishing the indicators included in the PAR strategies in a public dashboard (see Box 4.8).

Box 4.7. Defining and presenting indicators

Indicators can be categorised into three categories according to what is measured: input indicators, output indicators, and outcome indicators. The three different indicators can all be part of a framework to monitor the effectiveness of policies, but it is important that each type of indicator is used to monitor only the aspects of a policy it is designed to monitor.

• Input: these indicators measure the resources spent on policies (money, staff, and time). Thus, they are measures of efforts.

• Output: these indicators measure how efficiently policies are executed. They are produced because policymakers expect them to contribute to desirable outcomes.

• Outcome/Impact: these indicators measure what results are achieved by the outputs. Outcome indicators are used to monitor the effective of policies in achieving their objectives.

Indicators need to be accompanied by information that helps interpret their significance. That is why, regardless of their typology, all indicators should be presented in a way that provides enough information:

• Description of the indicator: name, unit of measurement, data source and formula.

• Responsibility for the indicator: institution, department, or authority responsible for gathering the data.

• Frequency of data collection and update of the indicator.

• Baseline that serves as a starting point to measure progress.

• Target or expected result.

Source: (OECD, 2016[17]).

Box 4.8. Dashboard approach in France

The Minister of Public Transformation and Service launched the barometer of public action results on January 13th, 2021: "Measures that change your life: the results of our action". Responsible for co-ordinating the monitoring of all priority government reforms, the Interministerial Directorate for Public Transformation (DITP) was mobilised to design and deploy the barometer of public action results. The objective was to enable French citizens to measure the progress of these public policies in their daily lives.

It displays the status and the concrete results of 25 priority reforms carried out by the government. These cover eight essential dimensions of everyday life for citizens:

• Ecological transition

• Employment and the economy

• Health, family, and disability

• Education

• Security

• Culture

• Public services

• Housing

For each policy, using quantified data, this barometer presents the state of implementation in 2020 and the government's target for 2022. All data is available in open data so that everyone can use them. It will be regularly updated and enriched with new policies, so that French citizens can measure the progress of government action. It is also a real tool for accelerating the execution of reforms at national, regional, and local level.

The DITP will intervene over time to steer the reporting of data from the departments, in co-operation with those responsible for each priority reform in the ministries and the barometer will be updated every three months.

Source: (Government of France, 2022[18]).

Some consulted stakeholders also reported the need for more transparency around monitoring. In the absence of the PLC, interviewees welcomed a reinforced role of the State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau (SAACB) and of internal audit units in monitoring and evaluating performance. The State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau (SAACB) conducts financial and performance audits following specific request from the PMO or the OoP based on the main strategic frameworks: the NPA/NDP, the Strategic Results Framework and the 2030ASD. However, as reported by consulted institutional stakeholders, the monitoring frameworks are mainly output-based. The lack of solid monitoring and evaluation frameworks with clear, realistic, and measurable outcome indicators, along with gaps in data availability, considerably limits its ability to conduct comprehensive performance audits. Overall, the SAACB is not closely associated to the annual monitoring exercise. Even though the SAACB has the good practice of following up on the implementation of its recommendations, currently it lacks an enforcement mechanism. In view of enhancing integrity, transparency and good governance, the thematic Strategy for Public Finance Management 2021-2023 includes measures aimed to improve the legal environment regulating the work of the State Audit & Administrative Control Bureau, including the application of Supreme Audit Institution principles, and to strengthen implementation of SAACB’s recommendations.

The PA may want to consider to systematically associate the SAACB throughout the process of monitoring PAR efforts. The SAACB has a full and professional department engaged in performance audits which can provide useful inputs regarding efficiency, effectiveness, and economy. Such a role is consistent with major trends in the OECD member countries where State Audit Institutions have gradually widened and increased their contribution to good governance beyond its traditional oversight role. The Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI) in several OECD countries provide insight to improve the functioning of processes and programmes, and foresight to help governments in adapting to future trends and risks (see Box 4.9). The administrative and financial independence of public audit and control institutions is paramount to ensure the integrity and accountability of the public administration.

Box 4.9. State Audit Institutions (SAI) in Brazil and Canada

The SAI of Brazil – audit for national development policy

Objective

A series of audits took place between 2009 and 2013 that focused on national policy for regional development and aimed to understand and identify structural features that may be responsible for any successes and performance gaps.

The dedication of effort and time in these audits was justified by the number of public resources invested in the national policy for regional development (around BRL ten billion annually) and the importance of the issue to national development.

Types

Compliance audit, guidance.

Scope and methodology

The scope included the whole governance structure for managing the national policy for regional development, including its formulation, rules, actors, monitoring and evaluations systems, transparency, plans and finance resources - as public funds dedicated to loans for entrepreneurships with favourable interest rates, tax expenditures and budget expenses.

To capture a systemic view of the policy, the TCU included the following: Usage of many teams for auditing the various public agencies and finance tools, distributed by the Brazilian regions elected by the policy, co-ordinated by a common guidance and audit questions provided by the preliminary audit; assessment of compliance between the actions and the legal conception of the policy; usage of many performance audit tools (indicators analysis; problem tree method; mapping the logical model of the policy; stakeholder analysis; survey; consultation to experts); a study of international models, together with the executive bodies and agents responsible for the policy management ; and a strong interaction and open debate with the executive bodies and agents responsible for the policy management.

Criteria

Country laws, key national indicators, entity objectives, international standards, other.

Resources

This comprehensive work involved six audits and 214 business days at a cost of BRL 988 000 (approximately USD 325 000).

Outcomes

The main findings (and related recommendations) were:

• The policy had not been assessed since it started.

• The predicted monitoring and evaluation system had not been built.

• There were no appropriate indicators of performance to guide the management and ensure transparency for the citizens.

• The formulation of the policy did not consider mechanisms to fight the major causes of the problems.

• There was no strong alignment between the diagnostic that guided the policy formulation and the regulation for using the majority of finance resources. There was a lack of co-ordination between the federal agencies concerning the policy.

• There was a lack of co-ordination between the federal, state, and local level concerning the policy planning and implementation.

Many measures were adopted after the recommendations, these are listed below:

• The responsible government body promoted an assessment of the policy that covers the time between its formalisation and the year after the first audit recommendations.

• There was a stronger investment in developing the monitoring and evaluation system.

• A new set of indicators is being used and others are being developed by the government agencies.

• A new conception for the policy was formulated after intensive stakeholder participation across the country. This led to a new project of law and regulation for the policy that considers the need to improve the governance of the policy, especially regarding co-ordination issues.

Good practices used

The TCU adopted a systemic approach to assessing the policy that allowed for the identification of structural issues responsible for the results and the lack of performance.

Recommendations for improvements were made on the governance of the policy and its delivery.

Lessons learned

The capability for providing deeper insights and better foresights concerning a complex public policy depends on knowledge building during at least mid-term work, intensive interaction with experts and policy managers, and usage of a range of appropriate tools.

The SAI of Canada – assessing programme evaluation in the Federal Government

Objective

The government of Canada has had several policies on the evaluation of programme effectiveness since the 1970s. The Office of the Auditor General of Canada has conducted audits of the evaluation function several times, most recently in 2009 with a follow-up in 2013. The objective of these audits was to determine whether the relevant central agency and affected departments were meeting needs for information on programme effectiveness, and whether they were identifying and making needed improvements to the function.

Type

Performance audit.

Scope and methodology

The audits covered the central agency responsible for the government's policy on programme evaluation (the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat) and selected departments subject to the policy. These departments were selected to reflect a cross-section of programme types.

The initial planning phase of the first evaluation audit included broad consultations with experts in the field of programme evaluation and public administration. The decision on audit timing reflected the introduction of a revised policy on evaluation in 2009. The audit methodology included reviewing samples of completed evaluation reports and assessing departmental compliance with the policy.

Criteria

Country laws (The Financial Administration Act requires evaluation of certain types of programmes) and key national indicators (The Treasury Board Policy on Evaluation and its associated directive and standard). Resources The resources committed to the initial 2009 audit were 9 100 staff-hours at a cost of CAD 1.4 million (Canadian dollars). The resources committed to the 2013 follow-up were 6 100 staff hours at a cost of CAD 1.1 million. The team consisted of approximately six members, one of whom was an experienced programme evaluator. Consultants were rarely used.

Outcomes

The six departments OAG examined followed systematic processes to plan their effectiveness evaluations and completed most of the evaluations they had planned. However, each department’s evaluations during the audit period covered a relatively low proportion of its total programme expenses: between 5% and 13% annually across the six departments. The actual rate of coverage was even lower because many of the effectiveness evaluations OAG reviewed did not adequately assess programme effectiveness. Departments had often not gathered the performance information needed to evaluate whether programmes were effective. Of the 23 evaluation reports OAG reviewed, 17 had inadequate data, which limited the assessment of programme effectiveness.

The departments OAG examined said that it remains a challenge to find experienced evaluators and that they had made extensive use of contractors to meet requirements. Departments expressed concern about their capacity to evaluate all direct programme spending from 2013, as required by the 2009 policy on evaluation. To ensure full coverage (which includes grants and contributions), departments will have to evaluate an average of 20% of their direct programme spending each year of the five-year cycle.

The Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat has introduced initiatives to address the need for improvements in evaluation across government. However, it did not provide sustained support for effectiveness evaluation. In particular, it made little progress on developing tools to assist departments with the long-standing problem of a lack of sufficient data for evaluating programme effectiveness. With the exception one department that has processes in place to identify needed improvements, the audited departments do not regularly identify and address weaknesses in effectiveness evaluation. The audit report included recommendations related to several of the findings summarised above. The criteria for this audit were set out in the audit plan accepted by the audited departments.

Good practices used

Since the beginning of evaluation audits in the 1970s, the evaluation function has had periods of comparative strength and weakness, some of which were documented by OAG audits. Overall, the function has strengthened, partly due to a more coherent policy framework and to capacity building within departments. Audit findings have been taken into account by the responsible central agency as it reviewed and refined its policies on effectiveness evaluation.

Lessons learned

Periodic attention by the SAI to the evaluation function over a 30-year period has contributed to its strengthening.

Source: (OECD, 2016[19]).

Leveraging costing and expenditure efforts for public administration reform

A strategy is only valuable if it can be put into practise. The OECD’s experience demonstrates that one of the major challenges to effective reform is a lack of funding to carry out the planned initiatives. Therefore, the OECD/SIGMA "Toolkit for the preparation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of public administration reform and sector strategies" (OECD, 2018[2]), acknowledges that creating a strategy is not only a way to understand what a country identifies as the main issues and how and to what extent it wants to address these issues, but also a way to foresee what resources are needed to make the desired changes.

The two main overarching frameworks for PAR, notably the NDP and the GRA, do not provide an overall estimation of the financial resources needed for their implementation. This can be explained by the uncertainty of financial circumstances such as current financial challenges in the PA regarding collecting revenues, the inability to maintain a firm control over the public budget given PA’s dependency on external sources of funding, and lack of control over the annual budget. This is a serious obstacle to planning and budgeting. In the absence of a mid-term budgetary process, budgeting and mid-term strategic planning in the PA remain two separate exercises. The annual budget is issued when strategies and action plans are already finalised. Consequently, the budget cannot be used as a management and implementation tool that allows for the tracking of reforms.

During the OECD’s fact-finding missions interlocutors clarified that the MoF establishes ceilings for the different ministries or non-ministerial institutions based on the available resources and of previous ministries/institutions expenditure levels before the official launch of the budgeting process. Within the respective ceilings, each ministry or non-ministerial institution estimates the costs of the annual action plans, distributes allocated resources to different programmes and send their own budget studies to the MoF. The GPC, in co-ordination with other related institutions, participates in the planning and monitoring of staff expenditures. For each programme, a Programme Management Team calculates the costs of each planned output. In this regard, there are two key issues to consider. Firstly, the cost estimations are an output-based process due to the absence of a mid-term budgetary framework. Estimating costs of the envisaged improvements (reforms and outcomes) is not required. This negatively affects the possibility to assess the effectiveness of expenditures. Secondly, consulted government interlocutors reported that there are no detailed methodological guidelines available for cost estimation.

Meetings between the MoF and the different institutions are usually organised to discuss financial needs in relation to the respective goals and objectives of a policy programme. However, according to consulted institutional interlocutors, due to the PA’s challenging financial situation, the financial requests mainly focus on salaries or structural costs. Only a small share of requests is related towards investments. This explains why institutions often refer to external donors for funding. To allow more accurate cost estimates, it is necessary to break down actions into activities and their required inputs. Usually, costing requires a classification of types of activities (i.e., technical assistance, workshops, training, publications, awareness and information campaigns, purchase or development of IT systems, construction of public buildings, purchase of equipment, hiring new people or reorganisation, etc. and the definition of reference unit prices. Calculated estimates can then be aggregated by objective. This would give the decision-makers a reliable indication of costs of expected improvements, the opportunity to assess efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditures, and the possibility to re-appraise the originally set objectives and targets for PAR. Moreover, considering the harsh financial circumstances in the PA, the identification of sources of financing (own budget or external aid) is a fundamental aspect of the costing and the prioritisation process.

The annual action plans are adjusted during the annual budget preparation process. In line with annual ceilings allocated to each ministry or institution, the latter may reduce the quantity of expected outputs or postpone their achievements to the following year. On the other hand, the review of the multi-annual strategies following the reduction of annual ceilings is not laid out in the MTBPM. Consulted stakeholders confirmed that this indeed does not happen. Taking this into account, the annual action plans seem more reliable and financially sustainable than their reference strategic documents. As confirmed by consulted government interlocutors, there is no evidence that detailed and reliable cost estimations take place during the drafting stage of strategies. This is also recognised by the MoF in the Sectoral Strategy for Public Finance Management 2021 – 2023, which envisages reform measures to improve cost estimations and to better link strategic planning and budgeting processes.

Despite being provided by the MTBPM, budget tables do not differentiate among temporary, one-off, and recurrent costs and the sources of funding, public budget, or external sources, are not always identified either. Regarding potential gaps between ambitions and resources available, as already mentioned there is inconsistency between the Handbook 2017-2022 and the MTBPM. Furthermore, the calculation method is not clear, and therefore, their accurateness and reliability cannot be confirmed. The new Guidelines 2024-2029 do not add methodological guidelines and tools to make cost estimates more reliable. Instead, they propose a budget table requiring LMA to provide cost estimates (operational and developmental costs) for each expected result3. It would be useful if the table also included information about (internal or external) sources of financing.

As part of the reforms of public financial management systems undertaken in the MENA region, tools like the Governmental Financial Management Information System (GFMIS) were introduced in several countries such as in Egypt and Jordan (see Box 4.10) to improve the efficiency of the system by strengthening transparency and implementing international control criteria and safeguards​. The main objective of a GFMIS is to support proper budget execution, including daily financial operations and debt management. These tools can notably be essential for helping detect irregularities and provide input to the control and audit institutions.

Box 4.10. The GFMIS in Egypt and Jordan aim to support the integration of public financial management processes  

Egypt

The Financial Control Manual defines the objectives for implementing the GFMIS:

• Directly linking the different budget authorities/units and accounting units to the Ministry of Finance

• Reducing the time taken to receive results of works and reports

• Approving a unified design for the databases of the standard government applications

• Issuing overall and detailed reports to monitor government spending from the state budget

• Obtaining clear indications on the volume of spending in due time, to help prioritising spending and rationalising it

• Providing the data needed to ascertain the availability of cash in due time and the amounts needed to fulfil obligations/liabilities with greater efficiency and as little cost as possible, while assisting decision-makers by determining the deficit or surplus

• Being able to compare revenues and expenditures, enabling the burden of debt service interest to be reduced in the case of deficits and investment increased in the case of surplus, and helping to plan the issue of treasury bonds and bills

• Carrying out all government financial payment and collection operations centrally through the e-payment and e-collection system

• Comparing expected and actual cash flows to show the degree and cause of any deviation, to take it into consideration when drawing up future expectations.

Jordan

The GFMIS is used for:  

• Providing an electronic financial system that manages the financial processes in all budget institutions

• Enhancing the accountability and transparency of the public sector accounting system

• Improving the budget cycle to enhance the effectiveness of governmental performance and provide quality services to the citizens

• Appling procedures to control the allocation of financial resources in the budget law and unify the government systems for information and the financial and accounting database.

Source: (OECD, 2017[20]).

Leveraging Human Resources Management for public administration reform

Human Resources Management (HRM) is a key area of PAR and a country’s public administration, covering areas such as setting objectives, calculating staff costs, and getting the right capabilities in place. Establishing sound HRM policies is crucial as it affect the functioning of the entire public administration (OECD, 2018[2]); (OECD, 2020[1]). Public employees play a key role in achieving society’s objectives as they enable innovation and economic prosperity, ensure access and quality of essential public services, and protect citizens from a range of threats. All of this underlines the fact that a professional, capable, and responsive public service can be a fundamental driver of citizens’ trust in public institutions. Reform efforts led by the GPC have modernised HRM through for instance further digitalising the recruitment process by providing greater flexibility for candidates to apply online or establishing competency frameworks to inform performance management. However, the nature of work in the public sector is changing rapidly, and the capabilities of public servants and those who lead them are constantly being required to adjust. To keep pace, governments look for new ways to develop and manage skilled, committed, and trusted public workforces (OECD, 2019[21]).

In the past years, the Palestinian Authority has focused on managing the existing workforce rather than systematic recourse to external recruitment, as well as government policies to boost early retirement. Civil servants in the PA are distributed across 86 ministerial and non-ministerial governmental departments, with a total number of 85,945 civil servants at the end of 2019 and approximately 70% of those being concentrated in the Ministries of Education and Health (General Personnel Council, 2022[22]). In the coming years, the GPC expects to continue this trend of minimising external recruitment and encouraging early retirement in accordance with specific standards to decrease public expenditure.

The Palestinian Authority inherited a fragmented public pension system upon its creation in 1994, reflecting the various administrative cultures that had ruled the regions of the West Bank and Gaza over the previous century. The World Bank has called for a parametric pension reform in the PA, i.e., changing the existing values of pension programme parameters within politically and demographically acceptable limits to prevent the pension deficit from exceeding tolerable levels as defined by the government (see e.g. (Chand and Jaeger, 1996[23])). Recommendations include increasing the retirement age of 60 (or 55 through early retirement), tightening the criteria for disability and survivorship pensions, and bringing the overall pension level in line with international practices to make it more affordable (World Bank, 2022[24]).

The 1998 civil service law [Law No. (4) of 1998 on issuing a Law on Civil Servants] is the legal framework governing the civil service in the PA as well as its 2005 amendments to that law [Law No. (4) of 2005 amending Civil Service Law No. (4) of 1998]. The assumptions in this framework about human capital management and public service capability are largely outdated. Articles 39 and 40, for example, reflect a sanctions-based approach to performance management where civil servants are punished or warned for poor performance rather than supported to develop their skills. Many public administrations across the OECD recognise that performance management should instead be about putting systems in places to identify root causes of poor performance and supporting staff to improve their performance through concrete learning opportunities.

A new draft civil service law prepared by the GPC is currently waiting for final approval from the Cabinet. New provisions are intended to boost the flexibility of the GPC to manage the workforce of the Palestinian Authority, such as establishing career paths based on competency frameworks, designing job classification tables, and developing greater IT co-ordination between government departments, the GPC, and the MoF to facilitate document management and electronic signatures. The revised civil service law can provide an opportunity to modernise concepts of public management and strengthen the link with the public administration reform agenda and provide a stronger basis to follow up on PAR monitoring and evaluation. Reinstating regular meetings of the Committee on updating the civil service law (paused during the COVID-19 pandemic) committee would be a good opportunity to build consensus around the framework for civil service reform and transformation.

The 1998 Civil Service law establishes various duties and functions of civil servants. Apart from a vague reference to the duties of civil servants to “develop […] scientific and practical skills and competences” (Article 66), the 1998 law generally does not refer to competencies or their importance. Articles 5 and 7 establish the functions of human resource departments in line Ministries and the GPC, respectively, but neither refer to competency development. In this light, it is encouraging to see that the draft 2022 civil service law places a greater emphasis on competency development. The terminology related to job competencies is defined in the preamble, and Article 7 on the duties of the GPC has been expanded to include specific reference to preparing career paths based on the competency framework. Subsequent articles note the role of competencies in the National School of Administration (Article 46), and Article 84 on the duties and conduct of civil servants has also been expanded to state the obligation to develop “public performance competency” in addition to basic technical knowledge such as laws and regulations.

Moreover, the challenge of managing the public sector workforce efficiently in the context of fiscal and budgetary pressure means that performance management is also a particularly valuable tool to get the best out of the workforce. Applied well, competency frameworks can help improve the fairness and effectiveness of performance management processes by setting common standards across a range of tangible areas. But performance management can prove tricky to carry out effectively, particularly in parts of the public sector where goals or objectives may be difficult to quantify.

The Palestinian civil service is a particularly attractive employer in the local labour market due to an underdeveloped private sector and comparatively attractive working conditions. It also benefits from high candidate volume for a small number of posts. This places a premium on recruitment and selection processes working efficiently to make sure that the small number of candidates who do succeed in recruitment processes are being tested for competencies that reflect the types of challenges they will deal with. A recruitment process that only tests a narrow range of skills, such as knowledge of legislation, for example, is ill suited to selecting candidates whose job will be to oversee a cross-governmental change management process, for example.

Appointment of, for instance, senior civil servants need to be merit-based as this has a direct impact on public administration performance and PAR capacity. As nepotism is detrimental for PAR; the new civil service law should provide the necessary guarantees and processes to facilitate an impartial and merit-based recruitment. The Recommendation of the Council on Public Service Leadership and Capability (OECD, 2019[21]), encourages governments to recruit, select and promote candidates through transparent, open, and merit-based processes, to guarantee fair and equal treatment, in particular by:

• Communicating employment opportunities widely and ensuring equal access for all suitably qualified candidates.

• Carrying out a rigorous and impartial candidate selection process based on criteria and methods appropriate for the role and in which the results are transparent and contestable.

• Filling vacancies in a timely manner to remain competitive and meet operational staffing needs.

• Encouraging diversity.

• Ensuring effective oversight and recourse mechanisms to monitor compliance and address complaints

• Explaining public sector roles in an attractive way.

To make recruitment and selection procedures more objective and efficient, many OECD countries conduct centralised competition processes. To develop a successful model for centralised competition, the Palestinian Authority could consider the example of the Public Appointments Service, which manages recruitment for the Irish civil service (see Box 4.11).

Box 4.11. The Public Appointments Service in Ireland: an independent and merit-based selection

The Public Appointments Service derives its mandate and was established under the Public Service Management (Recruitment and Appointments) Acts 2004 to 2013. Most Public Appointments Service recruitment campaigns are carried out under the Office of the Commission for Public Service Appointments (CPSA) Codes of Practice. These Codes of Practice set out guidelines and standards for internal and external recruitment in the public service.

Publicjobs.ie is recognised as the leading recruiter for Public Sector jobs in Ireland. They provide an open and transparent recruitment process to identify top-quality candidates for public sector roles, with a formidable reputation for independent and merit-based selection. They support the Irish Government to deliver high-quality public services through the recruitment of a diverse, highly talented and committed workforce that reflects the diversity of the society that it serves. The Publicjobs.ie website provides information on career opportunities for candidates interested in joining the Public Sector.

The services provided include:

• Recruiting for positions in the Civil and Public Service.

• Recruiting for some senior positions in the Local Authorities, Health Service Executive, Harbour Authorities, Fisheries Boards and Vocational Education Committees.

• Selecting candidates for promotion within the Civil Service through inter-departmental tests and interviews.

• Assisting other public service organisations, such as the Nursing Careers Centre, with open

• recruitment.

• Assisting the Top-Level Appointments Committee in making senior appointments within the Civil Service.

• Providing recruitment, consultancy and training to client organisations and public bodies.

Source: (Government of Ireland, 2022[25]).

As in many administrations across the OECD membership, the skills and competencies needed in the Palestinian administration are changing rapidly as the role of the public servant continues to evolve. The objectives of the various national strategic documents and thematic strategies call for modern learning and development systems to boost workforce capability. This means valuing not just technical knowledge, but a broader range of competencies, behaviours, and socioemotional skills. Moreover, it is worth noting that most Palestinian civil servants have open-ended contracts and stay in administration for most or all their careers. This means that while they might have been hired based on a particular skill set or capability, the pace of change means that continual investment in learning is necessary.

This increased need for high-level cognitive and complex social-interaction competencies is leading to new learning and training needs. These competencies contribute to aspects of effective leadership, crisis and change management, innovation and more. They are also capabilities that are being called upon in a variety of positions, making acquiring them essential for organisational and workforce resilience, flexibility, and mobility. Fit-for-purpose learning systems and strategies that enable public servants to upgrade their skills, and acquire new ones, are therefore essential for keeping up with challenges, mitigating skill depreciation, and addressing capacity and competency gaps. The PA has a strong basis on which to build in this area, particularly through a dedicated public administration school – the National School of Public Administration. The school was established by decree in 2016 and focuses on building the professional capacity of public servants, including through leadership development programmes. Improving the focus on transversal competences, and on their application in recruitment, is one part of building capability in the Palestinian civil service. To further develop and strengthen the capacity for PAR, the PA could roll out capacity building trainings on administrative reform and change management for technical and high-level civil servants together with the National School of Public Administration.

Improving accountability and transparency for public administration reform through stakeholder participation

The OECD Policy Framework on Sound Public Governance (OECD, 2020[1]) and the OECD Recommendation on Open Government (OECD, 2017[26]) [OECD/LEGAL/0438] identify openness and transparency in governance and policymaking as a key pillar of public governance reforms. Openness and transparency policies are crucial to the proper functioning of government and include the accessibility and disclosure of information and data both upon request and in a proactive manner Stakeholder engagement is defined in the Recommendation on Open Government (OECD, 2017[26]) [OECD/LEGAL/0438] as all the ways in which stakeholders can be involved in the policy cycle and in service design and delivery, including:

• Information: an initial level of participation characterised by a one-way relationship in which the government produces and delivers information to stakeholders. It covers both on-demand provision of information and “proactive” measures by the government to disseminate information.

• Consultation: a more advanced level of participation that entails a two-way relationship in which stakeholders provide feedback to the government and vice-versa. It is based on the prior definition of the issue for which views are being sought and requires the provision of relevant information, in addition to feedback on the outcomes of the process.

• Engagement: when stakeholders are given the opportunity and the necessary resources (e.g., information, data and digital tools) to collaborate during all phases of the policy-cycle and in the service design and delivery.

Stakeholder engagement also improves the evidence base for policymaking and reduces implementation costs. Public consultations in particular serve to help with the identification and discussion of problems and solutions. They also have a positive impact on the ownership, credibility, responsiveness, and relevance of the administrative reform process, and reduce confrontations during the implementation of policies as they help to ensure a more inclusive and responsive governance that is based on societal needs.

The PA’s National Policy Agenda “Putting Citizens First” focuses on the rights of citizens towards freedom, justice, basic services, economic opportunities, safety, and prosperity. It reflects the societal transformation advocated by the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and more specifically SDG 16 on “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions” as it includes a mutual focus on the impoverished, marginalised, and vulnerable groups by leaving no one behind. This cannot be done without protected civic space and allowing people to actively participate in the entire policy cycle. In the absence of a functioning PLC and considering weaknesses in the institutional oversight mechanisms, civil society plays a crucial role in keeping the public sector accountable in the PA.

To concretise the “putting citizens first” approach, stakeholders’ participation (including information, consultation, and engagement) would ideally become a solid institutionalised routine anchored in a clear set of rules inspired by international good practices and quality criteria. While the PA issued Guidelines on Public Consultations in 2018, further recognising the importance of stakeholder engagement “throughout the legislation preparation process”, the OECD Review Rule of Law and Governance in the Palestinian Authority: Delivering Better Policies and Legislation for People (OECD, 2022[15]), reported that these guidelines are not legally binding and that their application across the PA’s line ministries is inconsistent. It is therefore advisable to institutionalise stakeholders’ participation through a legally binding framework or through a revision of the Handbook 2017-2022 that grants all stakeholders equal and fair opportunities for consultation as recommended by the OECD Recommendation on Open Government (OECD, 2017[26]) [OECD/LEGAL/0438]. This can be strengthened by a variety of methods such as accessible mechanisms, plain and clear communication, awareness raising efforts and by the establishment of a quality control mechanism ensuring a consistent application of consultation procedures. The recently issued new Guidelines 2024-2029 do not provide more detailed quality requirements and procedural guidance.

While the current version of the Handbook 2017-2022 mentions the key role of the civil society and the private sector, interviewed CSOs during the fact-finding missions shared that they are currently not involved in decision-making and co-ordination committees and highlighted the lack of participatory approach as one of the main governance issues. Likewise, consultations in preparation of laws and strategies are not systematically organised. As such the level of consultation of the civil society depending on the willingness of the lead institutions. While interviewed CSO’s mentioned that they received invitations for consultation by various institutions such as the GPC, the Anticorruption Commission, the Ministry of Women Affairs, and the Diwan, there is no structured approach leading to an unclear follow-up process. To better structure stakeholder participation, many countries across the OECD have set up dedicated policy advisory bodies with a wide range of functions, from shaping the policy agenda, to identifying policy options, creating evidence, promoting legitimacy when a particular policy option is chosen, or evaluation (OECD, 2017[27]). A policy advisory body could further support the PA’s stakeholder participation. This would also be a way to systemise how the government gathers interdisciplinary expertise, by systematically including research institutions, academia, CSOs, and think-tanks presents the example of Chile’s permanent Advisory Council for the Modernisation of the State that may be of interest for the PA see (Box 4.12).

Another principal element for the PA to concretise the “putting citizens first” principle and to enable active participation of the civil society and the private sector in the policy cycle, is improving the overall access to information. Interviews with various institutional interlocutors during the OECD’s fact-finding missions clarified that a 2018 draft law exists but is currently awaiting adoption. In the meantime, archiving of public records forms a crucial step. These efforts could be based on the sound practices on archiving and simplifying and analysing business processes from the PA’s Ministry of Interior as identified during the OECD’s fact-finding missions to the PA. Leveraging this administrative data can then also feed the evidence base for PAR. However, even without a dedicated access to information law, progress reports and strategic and planning documents, should be made publicly available. This is especially the case regarding the existing PAR committees where the meeting agenda’s, work plans, minutes could be made available on the PA’s web portal. Further extending the membership of the technical committees to the civil society and the private sector - at least as an observer – would be key to strengthen these efforts as well. While creating dedicated workshops in 2023 on GRA progress is a good step forward, the participants could not be verified by the OECD. The above-mentioned policy advisory body see (Box 4.12) could contribute towards solving the issue of identifying the relevant external stakeholders to include.

Box 4.12. Chile: The Permanent Advisory Council for the Modernisation of the State

The Permanent Advisory Council for the Modernisation of the State (referred as the ‘’Council’’ hereinafter) was created by Supreme Decree and is administratively dependent on the Ministry General Secretariat of the Presidency. This body includes 12 councillors and a President of the Council, all appointed by the President of Chile and with recognised experience in public and/or private management. The councillors are representatives from the government, municipalities, academia, CSOs, think tanks and the private sector. The Council also has an Executive Secretary serving as a permanent contact between the Council itself and the State Modernisation Secretariat.

The aim of the Council is to provide advice to the President of Chile in the analysis and evaluation of policies, plans, and programmes related to the modernisation reform of the State. Acting as an advisory body, this council provides long-term vision and contributes to a sense of urgency and continuity to the modernisation process. This advisory body also functions as a co-ordinating body that align other government advisory entities whose objectives are directly related to matters of modernisation of the State and public management.

Source: (Republic of Chile, 2022[28]).

References

[23] Chand, S. and A. Jaeger (1996), “Aging populations and public pension schemes”, IMF Occasional Paper, Vol. 147.

[22] General Personnel Council (2022), Civil Service Sectoral Strategy 2021-2023.

[13] Government of Canada (2021), Minister of Public Services and Procurement Mandate Letter.

[5] Government of Egypt (n.d.), 2030: Vision of Egypt, https://arabdevelopmentportal.com/sites/default/files/publication/sds_egypt_vision_2030.pdf.

[18] Government of France (2022), “Transforming the French Civil Service to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century”.

[25] Government of Ireland (2022), “Publicjobs.ie: Ireland’s Premier Public Sector Recruitment Website”, https://www.publicjobs.ie/en/.

[4] Government of Jordan (2014), Jordan 2025: A National Vision and Strategy, https://gbd.gov.jo/Uploads/Files/jordan-2025/2025-en.pdf.

[9] Government of Morocco (n.d.), Morocco New Development Model, https://www.csmd.ma/documents/CSMD_Report_EN.pdf.

[8] Government of Qatar (n.d.), Qatar National Vision 2030, https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/about-qatar/national-vision2030/.

[6] Government of Saudi Arabia (n.d.), Saudi Vision 2030, https://www.vision2030.gov.sa/en/.

[7] Government of the UAE (n.d.), UAE Vision 2030 Master Plan, https://u.ae/en/more/uae-future/2021-2030.

[12] OECD (2023), Maroc: Pour Une Administration Résiliente au Service des Citoyens, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/1a0272c0-fr.pdf?expires=1710755717&id=id&accname=ocid84004878&checksum=A1D5CA4103812FD4A5ED48C19D721271.

[3] OECD (2022), Building Trust to Reinforce Democracy: Main Findings from the 2021 OECD Survey on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions, Building Trust in Public Institutions, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b407f99c-en.

[15] OECD (2022), Rule of Law and Governance in the Palestinian Authority: Delivering Better Policies and Legislation for People, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/68ffa992-en.

[16] OECD (2021), “Strengthening performance monitoring in Peru: guidance tools from an OECD perspective”.

[1] OECD (2020), Policy Framework on Sound Public Governance: Baseline Features of Governments that Work Well, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/c03e01b3-en.

[14] OECD (2020), Regulatory Impact Assessment, OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/7a9638cb-en.

[21] OECD (2019), “Recommendation of the Council on OECD Legal Instruments Public Service Leadership and Capability”.

[11] OECD (2018), “Centre Stage 2: The organisation and functions of the centre of government in OECD countries”.

[2] OECD (2018), “Toolkit for the preparation, implementation, monitoring, reporting and evaluation of public administration reform and sector strategies: GUIDANCE FOR SIGMA PARTNERS”.

[20] OECD (2017), Investing in Climate, Investing in Growth, https://www.oecd.org/env/investing-in-climate-investing-in-growth-9789264273528-en.htm.

[27] OECD (2017), Policy Advisory Systems: Supporting Good Governance and Sound Public Decision Making, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264283664-en.

[26] OECD (2017), Recommendation of the Council on Open Government.

[10] OECD (2017), Towards a New Partnership with Citizens: Jordan’s Decentralisation Reform, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264275461-en.

[19] OECD (2016), Supreme Audit Institutions and Good Governance: Oversight, Insight and Foresight, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264263871-en.

[17] OECD (2016), “Using Outcome Indicators to Improve Policies: Methods, Design Strategies and Implementation”.

[28] Republic of Chile (2022), Consejo.

[24] World Bank (2022), Wage Bill and Employment Diagnostic : Key Drivers and Policy Recommendations, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099320012152224196/pdf/P17870707ee3d60d0b5460a16a39379461.pdf.

Notes

← 1.  More detailed information about the mandate of CoG institutions is outlined in specific regulatory documents: Council of Ministers’ Decree no. (21) from 2020 Concerning the Regulation of the Prime Minister’s Office; references to the regulatory documents concerning the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers, and the OoP could not be identified.

← 2.  PMO (Feb. 2023), Ministry and agency strategy guidelines for the strategic planning cycle 2024-2029 – Table A1: Strategic objective and results overview with government programme; Table A2: Strategic objective and results overview with SDGS; and Table B1: Policy intervention overview.

← 3.  PMO (Feb. 2023), Ministry and agency strategy guidelines for the strategic planning cycle 2024-2029 – Table C: Budget overview 2024-2029.