OECD Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy: Kazakhstan 2025

1. History and foundations

Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of the institutional, political and economic context within which competition policy operates in Kazakhstan. It briefly outlines the country’s historical development, key economic indicators, integration into global markets, its privatisation policies and recent governance reforms.

The Republic of Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan) is located mostly in Central Asia, sharing borders with the Russian Federation (Russia) to the north; the People’s Republic of China (China) to the east; and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to the south. Kazakhstan is the largest landlocked country in the world and its ninth-largest territory, covering more than 2.7 million square kilometres (Statista, 2024[1]; Republic of Kazakhstan, 2024[2]). More than half of the country’s landscape consists of desert and semi-desert, whereas forests only occupy 5.5%.

Kazakhstan’s current state borders were established in 1936 as one of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) constituent regions (OECD, 2016[3]). In Soviet times, especially after the Second World War, Kazakhstan’s economic and social structures were transformed from a traditional nomadic and pastoral lifestyle to create an industrialised and urbanised society. Throughout that period, more than 40 new cities and 500 large-scale industrial complexes were built in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan gained independence on 16 December 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The adherence of Kazakhstan to several international organisations since the early 1990s, has been one of the main drivers of a modernisation of the country competition policy regime. Since 1992, Kazakhstan has been a member of the United Nations (UN) and actively participates in various UN bodies such as the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and specialised agencies including the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). Kazakhstan also joined other international organisations such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2010 and the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2015. It is also a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

With a population of approximately 20 million people, Kazakhstan is among the least densely populated countries in the world (Republic of Kazakhstan, 2024[4]). Kazakhstan has 17 regions and 89 cities, three of which hold national significance.1 Astana, the capital; Almaty, the most populous city and former capital until 1997; and Shymkent (Republic of Kazakhstan, 2024[5]). Over 60% of the country’s total population lives in urban areas (Republic of Kazakhstan, 2024[4]). Kazakhstan is an ethnically mixed country (Republic of Kazakhstan, 2023[6]), with 130 ethnic groups present in Kazakhstan, including Uzbeks (3%), Ukrainians (2%) and Uyghurs (1.5%) (Republic of Kazakhstan, 2024[2]). Kazakhstan’s official language is Kazakh, but Russian bears the status of language for inter-ethnic communication (Republic of Kazakhstan, 2024[2]).

1.1. Economic context

1.1.1. Domestic economy

After an economic slump following its independence in 1991, in the three decades after 1996, the country’s annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate averaged 4.6%, increasing per-capita GDP 20-fold (from USD 700 to USD 14 000) (OECD, 2024[7]). Kazakhstan is the largest economy in Central Asia. In 2023, Kazakhstan’s GDP stood at USD 259.7 billion and per-capita GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) was USD 39 332, still about 40% below the OECD average of USD 58 955 and 11% below Russia’s GDP per capita of USD 44 103 (World Bank, 2024[8]; 2024[9]). In 2022, 5.2% of the population lived below the national poverty line and the unemployment rate was 4.9% (ADB, 2024[10]).

Trade

Kazakhstan’s economy is heavily dependent on resource extraction. Its main export commodities are oil, coal, metals, chemicals and grain, while its main import products are machinery, equipment and other consumer goods. In 2022, exports amounted to USD 76 billion, and imports were USD 31 billion (World Bank, 2024[11]). China and Italy were the biggest export markets, and Russia was the biggest supplier of imports (World Bank, 2024[11]). Between 1991 and 2022, trade on average represented 79.3% of Kazakhstan’s GDP, while exports of goods and services amounted to 42.6% of GDP on average (OECD, 2024[12]). In 2022, these figures stood at 68% and 41.8% respectively, against an OECD average of 64% and 30.8%, making Kazakhstan rather an open economy (OECD, 2024[12]).

Hydrocarbons and other minerals are the main source of national income and economic growth for Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan possesses some of the world’s largest natural resource reserves and produces more energy than required for domestic demand, creating a substantial energy surplus which has remained stable over the last two decades. Kazakhstan exports around 80% of its oil and is the largest oil producer in Central Asia (IEA, 2022[13]). Additionally, Kazakhstan is the world’s largest supplier of uranium (contributing 43% of the global supply), and is home to metal deposits such as zinc, copper, iron and gold. As a result, Kazakhstan’s energy sector has served as a source of fiscal resilience for the government during economic downturns, such as helping offset significant public spending during the COVID-19 pandemic (OECD, 2023[14]). The country’s economy remains vulnerable to fluctuations in global oil and gas demand and prices, although the government has been attempting to mitigate its dependence through policies to diversify trade, as well as a privatisation programme to support a more diversified national economy.

Kazakhstan is a founding member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the integrated common market created in January 2015 to promote trade liberalisation among five post-Soviet states - Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. The EAEU market is critical for Kazakhstan’s export manufacturers, with non-resource goods (e.g. machinery and chemical products) comprising over half of all products exported to EAEU countries (Kazakhstan, 2024[15]). Additionally, Kazakhstan was granted special customs status by the EAEU, permitting the country to also join the World Trade Organization (WTO) in November 2015. Kazakhstan’s membership in both organisations allows for Kazakhstan to have lower rates of import customs duties in comparison with the Unified Customs Tariffs required by the EAEU. Consequently, Kazakhstan’s participation in the WTO and EAEU has exposed it to more competition from abroad.

Foreign direct investment

Kazakhstan’s total inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) over the last 30 years stands at USD 341 billion, accounting for 70% of FDI inflow to Central Asia (Kazakh Invest, 2024[16]). Kazakhstan reached an all-time high of gross FDI inflow in 2012 (USD 28.8 billion), and its top foreign investors are from the Netherlands, US, Switzerland, China and the United Kingdom (Kazakh Invest, 2024[16]). Attracting foreign investment has increasingly become a priority for Kazakhstan. In 2018, Kazakhstan officially opened the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC) to attract foreign investment to Kazakhstan.

Several policies to improve the business environment have been adopted in recent years, in order to attract more private investment. In 2017, Kazakhstan adopted a National Investment Strategy (2018-2022), with assistance from the World Bank. While the Strategy aimed to increase inward FDI by 25% in five years, the volume of gross FDI actually grew much more modestly, from USD 20.76 billion in 2017 to USD 23.7 billion in 2021 (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2024[17]). The Strategy was updated in June 2022 (until 2026), with the aim of increasing the level of FDI to USD 25.5 billion in its final year. In 2020, the President announced a new reform agenda, the “New Economic Course”, which broadly aims to enhance the investment climate. A new Investment Policy Concept of 2026 was adopted in 2022, reflecting the government’s intentions to further reduce state monopolies and oligopolies (Republic of Kazakhstan, 2022[18]). This concept aims to 1) promote fixed capital investment from 16.3% of GDP in 2021 to 25.1% by 2026 and 2) increase the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to USD 25.5 billion by 2026 (Kazakh Invest, 2024[16]). National competition policy reform and implementation should be seen in light of this wider policy drive to improve the business environment.

Recent challenges

Since the publication in 2016 of a first peer review of Kazakhstan’s competition law and policy (OECD, 2016[3]), Kazakhstan’s economy has faced multiple challenges, including volatile global oil prices, the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The pandemic caused Kazakhstan’s GDP to contract by 2% in 2020, negatively impacting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in sectors such as trade, tourism and catering (OECD, 2024[7]). Since February 2022, Kazakhstan has been especially impacted by Russia’s war against Ukraine because most of its energy exports pass through Russia via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, and the potential for additional disruptions remains a source of uncertainty as the war continues (IEA, 2022[13]). Shortly after the war began, Kazakhstan’s currency, the tenge (KZT), lost 20% of its value against the US dollar, leading to high inflation which peaked at 21% in February 2022 (IMF, 2023[19]). The price rises were contributing factors to a political upheaval which shook the country in early 2022.

Kazakhstan's economy is estimated to have grown by 4.0% in 2024, down from 5.1% in 2023. A temporary acceleration to 4.5–5.0% growth is projected for 2025, supported by a one-off surge in oil production, export growth and continued fiscal stimulus. Growth is expected to moderate post-2025 due to persistently low productivity and declining investment, highlighting the need for diversification and new growth levers, in addition to a more transparent and conducive investment climate for private firms (World Bank, 2025[20]).

1.1.2.  State presence and privatisation

As a post-Soviet country, the state remains omnipresent in the economy of Kazakhstan and is an active market participant in numerous sectors. The OECD Review of the Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises in Kazakhstan (2024[7]) found that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are present in at least 20 out of 30 sectors of the economy (including education, health, mining, transport, energy and manufacturing) and account for 6.2% of national employment. In 2021, the largest state holding company Samruk-Kazyna’s revenues amounted to 14% of Kazakhstan’s GDP.

Competition and pro-competition regulations are vital to foster innovation, business dynamism, productivity, investment and employment. For 25 years, the OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) indicators have been the leading metric of pro-competitive regulatory settings. These indicators assess the alignment of a country’s regulatory framework with international best practices, measuring both economy-wide and sector-specific regulatory barriers to entry and competition. The 2018 OECD Product Market Regulation Indicators (PMR) confirm the strong state presence in Kazakhstan. They found for instance that Government involvement in Kazakhstan’s network sectors (utilities, infrastructure and telecommunications) was significantly above the OECD average, and also far above that of the other non-OECD member states surveyed at the time (Vitale et al., 2020[21]). Throughout the fact-finding mission for the present Peer Review report, the OECD found that the state remains present in several sectors and can act as a restrictive factor on market competition, which may overall hamper the ability of the national competition authority to strongly enforce competition law.

Conscious of the dominating role of the state in the economy, successive Kazakh governments have seen privatisation as a key element in transforming the Kazakh economy (Box 1.1). Even so, the state retains an overwhelming presence across the economy, often to the detriment of competition (OECD, 2024[7]). Following a 2024 Presidential Decree on measures to liberalise the economy, a National Privatisation Office was established under the Agency for the Protection and Development of Competition of the Republic of Kazakhstan (abbreviated to AZRK in Russian, Kazakhstan’s competition authority, henceforward just “the Agency”).2 This Office is responsible for analysing the activities of SOEs to determine whether they should be privatised, as well as submitting proposals to the government for firms to be included in the list of SOEs considered for privatisation. This list is also kept by the National Privatisation Office. For instance, the Comprehensive Privatisation Plan for 2021–2025 includes 637 SOEs, but the National Privatisation Office made a proposal in 2024 to include another 549 SOEs on the list. The National Privatisation Office also monitors the privatisation process and can make proposals for improvement.

To ensure competitive markets, the OECD promotes competitive neutrality, “a principle according to which all enterprises are provided a level playing field” with respect to state ownership, regulation or activity in the market. In 2021, the OECD adopted the Recommendation of the Council on Competitive Neutrality [OECD/LEGAL/0462] and in 2024, a Competitive Neutrality Toolkit was released (OECD, 2024[22]), which provides a set of tools to identify government policies that may distort the level playing field. Ensuring that principles of competitive neutrality are adhered to in all markets, would significantly support the competitive environment in Kazakhstan (see also Chapter 6).

Box 1.1. Waves of privatisation in Kazakhstan

First wave of privatisation (1991–2014)

The first wave of privatisation began after the collapse of the Soviet Union and it can essentially be divided into four stages:

• First stage (1991–1992) focused on the sale of agriculture, utilities, small industrial enterprises, construction and some other sectors. Employees were given priority over other applicants in the privatisation process.

• Second stage (1993–1995) implemented the transformation of state assets into joint-stock companies owned by the state and then sought mass privatisation through issuance of coupons to citizens for investment in state-owned enterprises.

• Third stage (1996–1998) focused on energy, telecommunications, and mining sectors. Privatisation was not carried out with coupons but rather with monetary transactions, such as auctions, tenders or direct sales.

• Fourth stage (1999–2013) sought to provide a legal framework and ensure more efficient management of state property.

Second wave of privatisation (2014–present)

The second wave of privatisation started in 2014 when the government adopted the Comprehensive Privatisation Plan for 2014–2016. The plan included an extensive list of SOEs (under both state and local ownership) that would be privatised. Two Comprehensive Privatisation Plans followed, one for the 2016–2020 period and another for 2021–2025 period. The latter is currently being implemented.

According to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of National Economy, 93% of the 2016-2020 privatisation plan was achieved, bringing proceeds of KZT 629 billion or USD 1.4 billion proceeds (out of 864 assets, 503 were sold, 302 liquidated, 59 transferred to the next plan).

Sources: Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 31 March 2014, no. 280; Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 30 December 2015, no. 1141; Decree of the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 29 December 2020, no. 908; OECD (2017[23]), Towards a More Effective, Strategic and Accountable State in Kazakhstan; OECD (2024[7]), OECD Review of the Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises in Kazakhstan.

1.1.3. Competitiveness

According to the IMD World Competitiveness Ranking 2024, Kazakhstan ranked 35 out of 64 economies surveyed, with Government Efficiency scoring higher (59.7 out of 100) than the three other main factors of Business Efficiency (54.2), Economic Performance (46.7) and Infrastructure (35.2) (IMD, 2024[24]). Kazakhstan improved its ranking by two positions compared to the previous year and was the only country in Central Asia that was included in the 2024 ranking.

Even so, the low intensity of Kazakhstan’s domestic competition continues to prove challenging for the country’s economic development. For intensity of local competition, Kazakhstan scored 4.54 (on a scale of 1-7, with 7 being the best), below the world median of 5.09 (World Bank, 2017[25]). Kazakhstan also scored lower (3.85) than the world median of 4.5 for the prevalence of foreign ownership of companies in its economy, which was significantly caused by the high rate of state involvement in the economy (World Bank, 2017[26]).

Kazakhstan has been striving to improve the domestic competitive environment since the 2016 OECD Peer Review by passing reforms which aim to lower the barriers to entry for business owners and level the playing field so that SMEs have greater opportunities to compete with more established firms. The process for opening and operating a business (including registration and license management) has hence become significantly easier over the years. During 2017 and 2018, Kazakhstan introduced pro-business measures, such as reducing the time required for value-added tax (VAT) registration (from nine days to five), established an electronic customs declaration system, reduced customs administrative fees and made commercial case judgements publicly available. Kazakhstan ranked 28th in the World Bank’s Doing Business 2019 report, which looked at the ease of conducting business in the world’s top 30 economies (World Bank, 2018[27]). Furthermore, the share of SMEs in Kazakhstan’s employment and gross value added (GVA) has risen steadily since 2005. While the total number of SMEs has increased, firm growth has largely been in (often non-tradable) sectors with relatively low levels of internationalisation and productivity (OECD, 2023[14]).

1.2.  Political context

1.2.1. Institutional framework

Executive branch

Kazakhstan is a presidential republic with a notable concentration of power in the executive branch. This aspect has not changed since the country was peer reviewed by the OECD in 2016 (OECD, 2016[3]). The President serves as the head of state and is elected by popular vote for a non-renewable term of seven years.3 Since the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan has had two presidents. The first president, who was appointed in 1990, Nursultan Nazarbayev, governed for nearly 30 years until his resignation in March 2019. Following this, the Chair of the Senate, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, assumed the role of acting Head of State. He was subsequently elected President in early elections held in June 2019. During this transitional period, the First President retained several constitutionally defined powers, including the chairmanship of the Security Council, leadership of the ruling Amanat party (until November 2021), and the honorary title of Elbasy (“Leader of the Nation”), which conferred a distinct legal status. The consolidation of executive authority under President Tokayev was completed in January 2022, amid heightened socio-political unrest, when he assumed chairmanship of the Security Council. He was re-elected for a new term in November 2022. Under current legislation, his mandate runs until 2029.

The Prime Minister is appointed by the President, with approval from the lower chamber of Parliament. As the head of government, the Prime Minister leads the Cabinet of Ministers, which includes a first deputy prime minister, six deputy prime ministers and 21 ministers (Republic of Kazakhstan, 2024[28]).4 The members of the Cabinet are also appointed by the President based on recommendations from the Prime Minister. Olzhas Bektenov is the current prime minister since February 2024, after serving as President Tokayev’s Chief of Staff. The length of the Prime Minister’s mandate in office is at the President’s discretion.

Legislative branch

Kazakhstan has a bicameral Parliament, consisting of an upper chamber (the Senate) and a lower chamber (the Mazhilis).

The Senate is composed of 50 senators, ten of whom are appointed by the President, including five recommended by the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan.5 The other 40 senators consist of two representatives from each region of the country, as well as the three cities of national significance, and they are voted in by councillors from local legislative assemblies (maslikhats) rather than by the general electorate (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2024[29]). Senators serve a term of six years and half of the assembly is renewed every three years.

There have been eight convocations6 of the Mazhilis with varying numbers of members. The ongoing eighth convocation is comprised of 98 members who were popularly elected by a mixed system,7 with 69 deputies elected from party lists and 29 deputies elected from single-mandate districts (Republic of Kazakhstan, 2024[30]). The number of members in the Mazhilis was reduced from 107 to 98 following constitutional amendments in 2022, which abolished nine seats previously reserved for representatives of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2024[31]). Members of the Mazhilis serve a term of five years and are eligible for re-election.

The 2023 parliamentary elections marked the first time that independent candidates were allowed to participate, which resulted in them winning five seats in the Mazhilis (Abishev, 2023[32]). While the political spectrum has no official distinctions of the right, left and centre, the main party, Amanat, can be characterised as centre-right. According to the BTI Transformation Index, Ak Zhol and People’s Party of Kazakhstan position themselves as opponents but typically vote in line with Amanat (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2024[17]). Although the Mazhilis is perceived as more democratic than the Senate, it has been largely dominated by the ruling party since Amanat’s establishment in 1999, which holds 62 seats out of the 98 possible. The remaining seats are shared among five other parties and independent candidates (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2024[31]).

Judicial branch

The judicial branch is considered to be an independent state branch of power, and it is formed by the Supreme Court of Kazakhstan, regional courts and district courts (OECD, 2024[7]). The Supreme Court is the country’s highest judicial authority, and it is headed by the Chair of the Supreme Court, who is elected by the Senate at the proposal of the President for a five-year term.8 There are two tiers below the Supreme Court – the appellate courts and special district/general district courts. The Supreme Court and appellate courts categorise their cases as civil, criminal or administrative whereas the special district/general district courts do not (Kambaliyev, Kassilgov and Tkachev, 2024[33]).

1.2.2. Presidential power

In 1990, as part of the Soviet Union’s process of perestroika (reform), the Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan designated Nursultan Nazarbayev as the country’s first President of the Republic. Under his leadership, Kazakhstan declared independence in 1991 and launched a strategy focused on economic development and a foreign policy aimed at building balanced relations with key international partners, including Russia, China, the United States, and the European Union (Cornell and Starr, 2020[34]) This period of domestic political development was marked by institutional transformation, including the use of referendums, which led to an expansion of presidential powers. The resignation of the First President in 2019 marked a significant turning point in the political history of the country and was accompanied by the transfer of powers to the then-Chairman of the Senate, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who was subsequently elected President (World Bank, 2019[35]).

At the beginning of his time in office, President Tokayev maintained his close relationship with Mr Nazarbayev, enabling him to remain as the leader of the then-named Nur Otan party and as lifetime chair of the National Security Council. In January 2022, a sharp increase in liquefied gas prices triggered a wave of public discontent, which manifested in large-scale protests that began in Zhanaozen and spread to other regions of the country. Although the protests were initially economic in nature, they later evolved into broader socio-political demands, including calls for institutional change (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2024[17]). In response, the authorities initiated a reform of the public administration and referendum was held in June 2022 which reduced the president’s powers and strengthened the Mazhilis (Freedom House, 2024[36]; EBRD, 2022[37]).

The return to price regulation in Kazakhstan’s competition policy may reflect lingering public pressure over affordability and inequality, as seen in the 2022 protests. It suggests that political stability is being pursued, in part, through greater state intervention in markets—marking a shift from market liberalisation to a more controlled approach to economic governance.

In the context of ongoing reforms, the institutional distribution of powers among branches of government continues to evolve. Since 2012, the Mazhilis has incorporated elements of multi-party representation; however, in practice, the Amanat party maintains a dominant position, currently holding 62 of 98 seats. This contributes to a high degree of alignment between the legislative and executive branches. The executive has traditionally held a leading role in national governance. During the transitional period prior to January 2022, several former high-ranking officials continued to exert influence, which, according to some observers, may have constrained progress in certain areas of institutional reform.

In the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index for 2023, Kazakhstan ranked 93 out of 180 countries and scored a relatively low 39 out of 100 (whereby 0 means highly corrupt and 100 means very clean) (Transparency International, 2023[38]). This is, however, a notable improvement from the OECD’s 2016 Review. Kazakhstan has implemented several anti-corruption reforms. In 2015, Kazakhstan adopted an Anti-Corruption Law and an anti-corruption strategy for 2015-2025, which focuses on preventing conditions favourable to corruption within civil service, quasi-state and private sectors, and judiciary and law enforcement bodies. The Agency for Civil Service Affairs and Anti-Corruption that was established in 2014 transformed into the current Anti-Corruption Agency in 2019 (Transparency International, 2024[39]). The following year, Kazakhstan joined the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). The Anti-Corruption Agency reports directly to the President and oversees the Anti-Corruption Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2022-2026, which aims to address key corruption issues such as the lack of transparency in procurement and the high level of state participation in the economy (Republic of Kazakhstan, 2023[40]).

Kazakhstan has been an active participant in the OECD’s Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia and implementing Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan (IAP) since its inception in 2003. The 2024 Baseline Report highlighted Kazakhstan’s efforts to amend its laws, build anti-corruption institutions, and implement measures to detect, investigate, and prosecute corruption cases. While progress was noted, the report also identified areas for improvement and follow-up. According to the 2024 OECD report, significant challenges remain in addressing corruption and unfair practices across various levels of public administration, including within state-owned enterprises—particularly in sectors with high state involvement such as oil and gas. The report highlights the need to further strengthen the implementation of anti-corruption programmes by enhancing transparency, ensuring sustainable institutional oversight, and promoting co‑ordinated engagement of all relevant stakeholders. It also notes that questions persist regarding the extent to which different ownership structures contribute to the effectiveness of these programmes and align with established standards in integrity and anti-corruption policy (OECD, 2024[7]).

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[35] World Bank (2019), Kazakhstan Economic Update - Sustaining Growth Momentum, https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/701941576757728380/kazakhstan-economic-update-sustaining-growth-momentum.

[27] World Bank (2018), Kazakhstan Among World’s Top 30 Economies in Ease of Doing Business, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/10/31/kazakhstan-among-worlds-top-30-economies-in-ease-of-doing-business.

[25] World Bank (2017), Intensity of local competition, 1-7 (best), https://prosperitydata360.worldbank.org/en/indicator/WEF+GCIHH+EOSQ099.

[26] World Bank (2017), Prevalence of foreign ownership, 1-7 (best), https://prosperitydata360.worldbank.org/en/indicator/WEF+GCIHH+EOSQ094.

Notes

← 1.  According to Kazakhstan’s Bureau of National Statistics, cities of national significance are “settlements which have special republican importance or a population of more than one million people.”

← 2.  Order of the Chair of the Agency for Protection and Development of Competition of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 28 May 2024, no. 130/NҚ.

← 3.  On 17 September 2022, President Tokayev mandated the one-time presidential term limit by signing the “Law on Amendments and Additions to the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan” (No. 142-VII KRZ).

← 4.  As of October 2024, the Minister of National Economy and the Minister of Foreign Affairs hold the position of both Deputy-Prime Ministers and Ministers of their respective portfolio.

← 5.  Established in 1995, the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan is an advisory body chaired by the President that aims to represent the interests of various ethnic groups in Kazakhstan.

← 6.  A parliamentary “convocation” is the period during which elected deputies serve following parliamentary elections until the next elections or the dissolution of parliament. In Kazakhstan, the parliament operates in convocations, which begin after elections and end before the next elections.

← 7.  The Mazhilis define a mixed electoral system as “proportional representation in the territory of a single national electoral district, as well as in single-mandate territorial electoral districts.”

← 8.  Constitutional Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 25 December 2000, no. 132.