This chapter reviews the development of Kazakhstan’s competition law and enforcement framework since the 2016 OECD Peer Review. It outlines the legislative reform packages adopted between 2015 and 2025, including key amendments related to anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominance and merger control. The chapter also summarises the main findings and recommendations of the 2016 Peer Review and highlights areas where subsequent reforms appear to reflect these recommendations.
OECD Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy: Kazakhstan 2025
Abstract
Kazakhstan’s first Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy took place in 2015-2016 under the OECD-Kazakhstan Country Programme (2015–2019), which supported national reforms across various sectors. Presented at the OECD Global Forum on Competition in December 2015—with Colombia, Finland, the UK, and Romania as examiners—the review assessed developments from 2010 to 2014 and offered recommendations to align Kazakhstan’s competition framework with OECD standards and best practices (see Box 2.1).
The 2016 Peer Review made a number of key recommendations related to certain aspects of Kazakhstan’s competition law framework, and to the Agency’s enforcement practices.
With respect to restrictive agreements, OECD recommended to (i) cease prosecuting parallel price increases without proving collusion, (ii) abolish the strict prohibition of vertical agreements involving exclusivity, (iii) move the intellectual property exemption into the general exemption framework, (iv) abolish the prohibition of restrictive agreements only on grounds of infringement of consumers’ rights, and (v) give the competition authority more powerful investigation tools (e.g. unannounced inspections).
Relating to the abuse of dominance, OECD recommended (i) an abolishment of the register of dominant undertakings, (ii) an introduction of a more effect-based analysis and (iii) a shift in focus from price control to exclusionary conduct.
Regarding concentration control, OECD recommended Kazakhstan to (i) introduce clearly and easily defined notification thresholds, (ii) clearly define information requirements, (iii) conduct an effects-based analysis on a case-by-case basis, (iv) start using structural remedies, (v) publish merger decisions, and (vi) introduce procedural rules to guarantee a right to be heard.
With respect to institutional framework, OECD recommended (i) an establishment of a competition authority as an independent state authority, (ii) prioritisation of the work, (iii) introduction of procedural rights of market entities involved, (iv) extension of legal deadlines for proceedings, and (v) specialisation of review courts, as well as sufficient time for review.
As reflected in this report, several recommendations made by the OECD were implemented by Kazakhstan, which demonstrates the country’s willingness to engage in reform. The establishment of a competition authority outside the government has been emphasised by various stakeholders as a particularly important development.
Source: OECD (2016[1]), Competition Law and Policy in Kazakhstan: A Peer Review, https://doi.org/10.1787/08f78cd0-en.
Following this process, in 2016, Kazakhstan became a Participant in the OECD Competition Committee, marking a significant step in its co-operation with the OECD competition community. Since then, Kazakhstan has actively engaged in the work of the Committee, benefiting from international experience to further refine its competition policy.
In parallel with the 2016 OECD Peer Review, Kazakhstan was already preparing a first large reform of the national competition law after the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan called for reforming the competition authority and aligning competition law with the OECD standards in his “100 concrete steps” agenda. Some of the reforms and amendments went in the direction suggested by the OECD recommendations.
On 29 October 2015, Kazakhstan adopted the Entrepreneur Code1, a unified legal framework aimed at safeguarding entrepreneurial freedom and regulating the relationship between businesses and the state. It covers key areas including: (i) competition law, (ii) state regulation (permits, supervision, technical and price regulation), (iii) state participation in the economy (e.g. monopolies), (iv) support for private entrepreneurship—particularly SMEs, agriculture, and innovation, (v) public-private partnerships, and (vi) the functioning of market entities and business associations. The Entrepreneur Code incorporated existing provisions from the Law on Competition and introduced notable reforms. These included abolishing the Register of Dominant Undertakings, introducing preliminary reviews of restrictive agreements, and allowing notifications prior to investigations. It also restricted the creation and expansion of SOEs to limit state involvement—collectively known as the 1st antimonopoly package (Figure 2.1).
In 2016, the 2nd antimonopoly package2 extended investigation periods from two to three months, modified the IP exemption from restrictions on agreements, expanded the definition of concerted actions, broadened the notification system, and introduced an antimonopoly compliance regime to prevent future violations.
The 3rd antimonopoly package (2018)3 added rules on anti-competitive actions in public procurement and clarified the investigative powers of officials, including the ability to copy documents and record evidence.
The 4th antimonopoly package (2020)4 granted the Agency price monitoring powers to detect potential violations—despite the 2016 Peer Review highlighting the limitations of using competition law to control price increases. It also extended the deadline for implementing notifications from 10 to 30 days and reduced the number of legal grounds for state participation in the economy from seven to five.
The 5th antimonopoly package (2022)5 introduced the essential facilities doctrine, classifying refusal of access as an abuse of dominance. It institutionalised monitoring trustees in merger control, introduced the concept of “special rights” for SOEs acting as single operators, and empowered the Agency to monitor equal access to state support, treating failure to do so as anti-competitive behaviour by public authorities.
More recently, in 2024, an additional set of amendments on competition was adopted, introducing the concept of “conglomerates” and assigning responsibility to the Agency for creating a register of conglomerates and monitoring their activities. In addition, the new reform eliminated the suspensive effect of administrative acts—including notifications, orders to initiate investigations, and investigation findings—in the event of an appeal. The law also amended the merger control regime, reducing the scope of the ex-ante approach and prioritising the ex-post regime.6
The 6th antimonopoly package was submitted to Parliament in 2025. The draft law introduces new criteria for determining dominance in digital markets (such as the number of users and the volume of transactions conducted on a platform), the implementation of antimonopoly audits (analogous to tax audits), the establishment of obligations to adopt antimonopoly compliance measures in cases of systematic violations, and the expansion of regulation of economic concentration. This includes the requirement to approve decisions on the transfer of large state-owned assets to market participants, the co‑ordination of intra-group transactions based on indirect indicators of affiliation, the reduction of the merger notification threshold from 50% to 25%, among other provisions. Adoption of the draft law is expected by the end of the current year.
Note: The boxes are positioned approximately at the time of year when the legislative package was adopted.
The overview of Kazakhstan’s recent competition law reforms highlights the extensive developments as well as changes that the competition regime has undergone since the 2016 Peer Review. OECD commends Kazakhstan for its willingness to undergo reforms and to constantly seek to improve its competition policy by refining the competition law framework and practice.
At the same time, OECD notes the high frequency of changes to legislation and regulatory acts. This makes the reforms difficult to follow, not only for smaller market entities with less resources, but also for investors in general, and for the judiciary system which has to uphold the competition law. Predictability is important for a thriving business environment. Thus, there is a need to strike a balance between reform and stability. Moreover, this also places a burden on the judiciary which must frequently review their application of the law in light of new rules.
References
[1] OECD (2016), Competition Law and Policy in Kazakhstan: A Peer Review, Competition Law and Policy Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/08f78cd0-en.
← 1. The Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 29 October 2015, no. 375-V LRK.
← 2. Law on Amendments and Additions to Certain Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Competition and State Support of Housing Construction (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 28 December 2016, no. 34-VІ ZRK).
← 3. Law on Amendments and Additions to Certain Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Improving the Regulation of Entrepreneurial Activity (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 24 May 2018, no. 156-VІ ZRK).
← 4. Law on Amendments and Additions to Certain Legislative Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Improving the Business Climate (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 29 June 2020, no. 352-VI ZRK).
← 5. Law on amendments and additions to some legislative acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the development of competition (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 3 January 2022, no. 101-VII ZRK).
← 6. Law on amendments and additions to some legislative acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the issues of doing business (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated 6 April 2024, no. 71-VIII ZRK).