Between 2009 and 2024, export restrictions on CRMs increased fivefold. The most significant rises occurred in the early 2010s, when the OECD began regularly collecting data and monitoring these measures amid growing policy tensions following the 2010‑11 episode of economic coercion involving China’s rare earths exports to Japan.1
OECD Inventory of Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials 2026
Monitoring the Use of Export Restrictions Amidst Growing Market and Policy Tensions
Number of exported raw material products subject to at least one export restriction measure
Note: This figure compiles all types of measures in place across all covered raw materials and all implementing countries. It takes into account the stock of measures in place at the beginning of the period, as well as new measures implemented since and discontinued measures.
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]).
Though the number of export restrictions in place increased fivefold over the past 15 years, in 2024, the overall number of export restrictions was only marginally higher than the previous year’s, marking an annual growth rate of 0.6%. This contrasts with the growth rate of 3.4% registered in 2023 and is closer to the 2021 (+0.6%) and 2022 (+0.8%) growth rates.
A partial normalisation of conditions in several mineral markets may explain the deceleration of the pace of growth of export restrictions imposed in 2024. The stronger uptake observed in 2022‑2023 coincided with a sharp increase in raw material and energy prices following the Russian Federation’s (hereafter, Russia) invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Figure 2.2), as well as heightened geopolitical tensions. In 2024, several of these tensions eased.
Monthly prices of selected raw materials, index 2015=100
Source: IMF’s Primary Commodity Price System (IMF, 2026[3]).
Over the full sample period of the Inventory (2009‑2024), India, China, Argentina, Viet Nam, and Burundi ranked among the top five countries by number of new export restrictions introduced, together accounting for over half of all measures implemented during this period (Figure 2.3).
Country shares in the increase in the total number of export restriction measures between 2009 and 2024
Note: Data refer to net additions in the period 01 January 2009 to 27 December 2024 (and not 31 December 2024), to account for the fact that some countries require by law that certain measures introduced during the course of the year be withdrawn on the last day of the year and reinstated on the first day of the following year. Country abbreviations: ARG-Argentina; BDI-Burundi; CHN-China (People’s Republic of); COD-Democratic Republic of the Congo; EGY-Egypt; ETH-Ethiopia; GAB-Gabon; IDN-Indonesia; IND-India; MMR-Myanmar; MNG-Mongolia; SAU-Saudi Arabia; SEN-Senegal; UKR-Ukraine; VNM-Viet Nam; ZMB-Zambia.
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]).
Yet, the export restrictions adopted in 2024 were imposed by a more geographically diverse set of countries than in previous years. In 2024, several resource-rich economies in Africa and Central Asia contributed to the increase. Myanmar accounted for the largest share of newly affected products (21.7%), followed by Sierra Leone (14.2%) and Nigeria (12.8%). Other notable contributors included Angola, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Rwanda and Argentina (Figure 2.4). 2
Countries with largest net additions of new measures in 2024
Note: Data refer to net additions in the period 31 December 2023 to 30 December 2024 to account for the fact that some countries require by law that certain measures introduced during the course of the year be withdrawn on the last day of the year and reinstated on the first day of the following year. Country abbreviations: AGO-Angola; ARE-United Arab Emirates; ARG-Argentina; BLR-Belarus; CHN-China (People’s Republic of); EGY-Egypt; IDN-Indonesia; JOR-Jordan; KAZ-Kazakhstan; KGZ-Kyrgyzstan; MMR-Myanmar; NGA-Nigeria; PHL-Philippines; RUS-Russia; RWA-Rwanda; SLE-Sierra Leone; THA-Thailand; UKR-Ukraine; UZB-Uzbekistan; VNM-Viet Nam; ZWE-Zimbabwe.
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]).
In several countries, the introduction of new measures in 2024 primarily took the form of export or fiscal taxes3 applied across a broad range of raw materials (see also Figure 2.11). For example, Myanmar introduced price-contingent tax rates across multiple products, including wood products, manganese, nickel, tin, antimony and rare-earth elements, as well as waste and scrap materials. Sierra Leone introduced fiscal taxes on exports targeting titanium, zirconium, germanium and manganese, while Rwanda implemented export taxes on several base metals in raw form, including tin and tungsten.
Other countries relied more extensively on licensing requirements or quantitative restrictions. Nigeria introduced licensing requirements covering niobium, tantalum and vanadium products, as well as waste and scrap materials. Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic introduced export prohibitions affecting metal waste and scrap products, while Angola introduced a temporary export quota on ferrous and non-ferrous metal waste.
Several measures introduced or extended in 2024 also targeted upstream segments of mineral supply chains, like ores and concentrates, as well as waste and scrap, with waste and scrap representing an important source of recoverable minerals through recycling. Argentina introduced licensing requirements on copper ores and various metal waste products, while the United Arab Emirates implemented export taxes on scrap metals including iron, steel, copper and aluminium. Other measures focused on specific upstream materials, such as Zimbabwe’s export tax on lithium compounds and Viet Nam’s revised export taxes on titanium ores and concentrates and unwrought tin.
Finally, in some cases, governments reintroduced or extended existing export restrictions. Ukraine reintroduced export quotas and licensing requirements on coking coal and precious-metal scrap, while Belarus reinstated temporary export prohibitions on certain metal waste products. Egypt and the Philippines extended temporary export tax regimes covering minerals and wood products.
At the same time, a number of previously existing export restrictions were removed or allowed to expire in 2024. These removals partly offset the introduction of new measures and help explain the relative stabilisation in the overall number of export restrictions observed in 2024. For example, Argentina discontinued its export prohibition regime on waste and scrap of iron and steel and removed a licensing requirement on several waste and scrap products. In other cases, governments revised existing frameworks, such as China’s VAT rebates on copper and aluminium products.
Breaking down changes in the incidence of export restrictions by material shows that products such as tantalum, lithium, tin, manganese, nickel, cobalt and several non-ferrous minor metals including vanadium and niobium, recorded some of the highest increases in 2024 relative to 2023 (Figure 2.5). By contrast, aluminium, magnesium and fluorspar are among the materials that experienced greater liberalisation over the same period.
Increase factor for the scaled incidence of export restrictions* between 2023 and 2024
Note: *The scaled incidence is the number of export restrictions recorded for the product divided by the number of Harmonized System codes that describe that product. Increase factor = scaled count of measures in place in December 2024 / scaled count of measures in place in January 2023. Products are ordered by increase factor between 2023 and 2024. Only products with the increase factor above 1 are shown.
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]).
Waste and scrap products continue to face the highest incidence of export restrictions across all categories of industrial raw materials. This reflects both environmental concerns related to their export for disposal, and increasing interest in leveraging the circular economy as a source of supply for certain metals and minerals (Figure 2.6).
Over the period 2009‑2024, export restrictions on ores and minerals—the raw materials located upstream in critical raw material supply chains—increased more rapidly than those in other segments of the supply chain. They increased nearly twice as fast as restrictions on materials such as metals or chemical compounds, which are more refined forms of CRMs (centre panel of Figure 2.6). This trend correlates with the high and increasing concentration of production, imports, and exports in the upstream segments of the supply chain.4 It is also broadly aligned with the policy rationale of supporting domestic downstream industries through limits on upstream exports.
Initial scaled incidence (per Harmonised System code) of export restrictions by sector, increase factor, and current scaled incidence
Note: The scaled incidence is the number of export restrictions recorded for the product divided by the number of Harmonized System codes that describe that product category. Products are ordered by the scaled incidence in 2024. Increase factor = scaled count of measures in place in December 2024 / scaled count of measures in place in January 2009.
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]).
At a more detailed product level, and over this larger sample period, the materials that saw the largest increase in export restrictions include unprocessed or marginally processed forms of molybdenum, potash, tungsten, zirconium, and germanium (Figure 2.7). By contrast, for ores of copper, aluminium and tin, for example, the adoption of new export restrictions was rarer.5
Initial scaled incidence (per HS code) of export restrictions by product-sector*, increase factor**, and current scaled incidence
Notes: *All specific HS6 raw material products are classified into the following “sectors” which aim to capture the different stages of processing or types of products: precious metals and stones (PM), ores and minerals (OM), chemical compounds (CC), non-ferrous minor metals (NFMM), non-ferrous base metals (NFBM), waste and scrap (WS), ferrous metals (FM).
**Only non-waste and scrap sectors with above average (5.14) increase factors for the period 2009‑2024 are shown.
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]).
The global share of CRM trade covered by these measures also rose markedly in the 2009‑2024 period. Between 2022 and 2024, on average, approximately 16% of global trade in raw materials was subject to at least one export restriction measure, compared with 12.4% in the 2009‑2011 period. These averages mask substantial variation across products; for instance, around 70% of global exports of cobalt and manganese were subject to at least one export restriction in 2022‑2024. Similarly high levels of exposure were also observed for graphite (47%), rare-earth elements (45%), and tin (41%) (Figure 2.8).
For some minerals, the high share of trade covered reflects stronger adoption of restrictions compared with 2009‑2011. This is the case for cobalt, nickel, iron and steel, molybdenum, and precious metal ores and concentrates. For other minerals, like natural graphite, rare-earth elements, palladium and platinum, the share of mineral trade covered by export restrictions remained high, as it already was in 2009‑2011.6
Share in global exports of a given mineral (%) facing at least one export restriction
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]) and BACI database.
When trade subject to at least one export restriction is expressed as a share of a country's total CRM imports, it becomes clear that some countries face far more restrictions than others. For some countries, this share increased between 2009‑2011 and 2022‑2024, reflecting both the growing incidence of restrictions and shifts in sourcing patterns toward suppliers applying such measures. In other cases, exposure declined due to reduced reliance on restricted sources or from suppliers easing their restrictions (Figure 2.9). In the most recent period of 2022‑24, exposure was especially pronounced for some industrialised importers such as the United Kingdom, Korea and Japan while it was somewhat lower for larger and more diversified importers such as the United States and the European Union.
Share of imports facing at least one restriction by country in percentages
Note: Calculation based on the value of imports in USD.
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]) and BACI database.
With respect to the type of export restrictions adopted, export taxes and licensing requirements contributed most to the growth of the global stock of export restrictions between 2009 and 2024. They were also the two most frequently used restriction types in 2024. This aligns with the fact that, under WTO rules, quantitative export restrictions are generally prohibited, whereas export taxes and licensing requirements are allowed under certain conditions.7
In this context it is striking that the use of export prohibitions—the most restrictive measures—increased sharply after 2019 (Figure 2.10), although their use declined somewhat in 2024, possibly in response to falling CRM prices. Still, in 2024, export prohibitions accounted for about one-quarter of newly introduced measures, with export quotas adding another 12% (Figure 2.11).
Number of countries applying at least one export restriction by type over time
Note: The export taxes category includes export taxes, export surtaxes, and fiscal taxes on exports.
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]).
Revenue generation has been the fastest-growing officially stated rationale for export restrictions since the early 2010s.8 In 2024, it was the most cited reason on record, accounting for over 47% of newly introduced measures.
Type of new measures introduced in 2023 and 2024
Note: The export taxes category includes export taxes, export surtaxes, and fiscal taxes on exports.
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]).
At the same time, several industrial policy objectives—such as safeguarding domestic supply, promoting further processing and value addition, and protecting local downstream industries—appeared frequently since the early 2010s, although in 2024 these objectives were cited less often than in previous years.
Rationales related to monitoring and controlling export activity, including natural resource conservation, have declined somewhat since 2009 but, in 2024, they remained relatively stable compared with recent years (Figure 2.12).
Principal purpose of measures introduced (when the purpose is stated)
Note: “Industrial policy” covers the following sub-categories of stated purposes: “Safeguard domestic supply”, “Product is strategic for the economy”, “Promote further processing / value added”; “Protect local downstream industry”; “Control” covers the following sub-categories of stated purposes: “Monitoring / control of export activity” and “Conservation of natural resources”.
Source: OECD Inventory on Export Restrictions on Critical Raw Materials (OECD, 2026[2]).
← 1. See e.g. (OECD, 2024[6]).
← 2. These statistics refer to net additions in the period 31 December 2023 to 27 December 2024. This allows to capture measures that are introduced during the course of the year and then withdrawn on the last day of the year – before being reinstated in the first day of the following year – which is a common practice in several jurisdictions.
← 3. An export tax is a tax collected on goods or commodities when they leave a customs territory. A fiscal export tax refers to a tax that is not levied at the border but applies exclusively to, or discriminates against, goods or commodities intended for export.
← 5. To focus on specific materials, calculations in Figures 2.7 and 2.8 exclude waste and scrap products, which is a separate aggregated category.
← 6. Two things can explain changes in the global incidence of export restrictions as a share of affected trade. The first is that trade flows grow from exporters that have export restrictions in place, meaning that a greater share of global trade is covered by these measures. The second is that trade not formerly subject to export restrictions is targeted by new measures. By the same token, decreases tend to result from a shift away from trade flows with high restriction incidence, or a decline in restrictions affecting existing flows.
← 7. As stipulated by Article VIII of the GATT, the allowed measures must not cause unjustifiable trade distortions.
← 8. Based on measures where information on the officially stated purpose of export restrictions is available.