This chapter analyses Ukraine’s measures to strengthen a culture of integrity in the public sector by striking a balance between a rules-based and a values-based approach. The chapter highlights Ukraine's strong system of interest and asset disclosure and notes that codes of conduct are missing for key politically appointed and elected officials. The chapter points out that adding perceived conflict of interest to the existing definition would promote better understanding of the concept. Finally, the chapter examines the submission and verification process of asset and interest declarations, highlighting a risk-based approach for submissions, ensuring clear objectives for corruption detection and prevention.
OECD Integrity and Anti‑Corruption Review of Ukraine
Abstract
Setting high standards of integrity for public officials is an integral component of a coherent and comprehensive public integrity system (OECD, 2017[1]). Implementation of high standards reflects the commitment to building a public service-oriented culture. Standards of conduct are the benchmark of public sector values, which are key to guiding the behaviour of public officials. Governments can set high standards of conduct through the legal framework, which helps to clarify expectations with respect to integrity values and ethical standards. Governments can safeguard standards through proportionate procedures to prevent and manage issues that could violate public integrity standards (such as conflict of interest), awareness raising and capacity-building and effective enforcement.
The goal of any integrity framework should be to increase integrity in the public sector, not simply to curb corruption. A common challenge for all types of integrity frameworks is to strike a balance between a rules-based and a values-based approach. Rules-based approaches focus on adherence to administrative procedures and setting minimum standards. A values-based approach focuses on enabling an environment that supports ethical behaviour. Values can guide decision-making processes across different functions, departments and teams (OECD, 2020[2]) (Table 2.1).
To promote public servants’ ethical decision-making driven by common values, it needs to be promoted through a culture of integrity across the whole public sector. Ukraine’s public administration and civil service are undergoing a comprehensive reform, including in areas such as the professionalisation of civil servants and improving job grading, salaries and HR, led by the National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service (NAUCS) and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (Marcinkowski, Butnaru and Rabrenović, 2024[3]). These reforms offer an opportunity to including more prominently a values-based approach.
The NAUCS’ annual survey of an organisational culture in public institutions (evaluating responses from civil servants from central and local government) indicates a positive dynamic in 2023 whereby public integrity is considered the core value of the civil service in Ukraine (stated by 81.5%). More respondents stated that integrity is encouraged and accompanied with practical actions in their public organisation in 2023 compared to 2021. In 2023, up to 80% of civil servants felt protected from requests to follow or undertake unlawful actions and instructions, while only 10% reported that they received such orders. The number of civil servants who do not feel protected from illegal or unethical orders from their managers has almost decreased by half (Figure 2.1).
Note: Monitoring surveys of civil servants in 2020, 2021 and 2023 were conducted using an anonymous online survey across Ukrainian territories. Responses from local government officials were not included in the latest report, as this survey was conducted for the first time for this audience and therefore data trends over time are not available. Questions in Figure 2.1. were not posed to respondents in the 2020 survey.
Source: National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service (2023[4]), Civl Service in Ukraine: Your Point of View (Analytical Report on the Results of Surveys of Civil Servants in 2020, 2021, 2022), https://nads.gov.ua/storage/app/sites/5/DIYALNIST/UPRAVLINJA%20PERSONALOM/Analitika%20ta%20doslidgenja/%20%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%96%D0%B4%D0%BA%D0%B0.pdf.
Since the Euromaidan Revolution in 2013-14, Ukraine has developed strict and transparent mechanisms of financial control as the main tool for ensuring the accountability of public officials and civil servants. High levels of mistrust and perceptions of impunity for corruption among citizens prior to 2014 led to increased and strict scrutiny of public officials in Ukraine. The information required for disclosure by declarants is broad, as is the scope of obliged declarants. Transparent and publicly available income and asset declarations have allowed civil society and specialised anti‑corruption bodies to detect unexplained wealth and illicit enrichment, as has the tool of lifestyle monitoring. However, while the asset declaration submission and verification processes are well established, Ukraine could strengthen the preventive use of interest declarations, supporting public officials in managing conflict of interest and promoting organisational cultures of integrity.
This chapter encourages Ukraine to review the current strict rules-based approach to balance it with elements of a values-based approach focusing on cultivating cultures of organisational integrity throughout the public sector. As such, this chapter provides recommendations on three main areas of public integrity in Ukraine to:
Introduce actionable principles of public integrity and ethical conduct, underpinned by behavioural insights.
Strengthen coherence between the frameworks on asset declarations and on managing conflict of interest.
Strengthen corruption prevention and improve enforcement in Ukraine’s asset and interest disclosure system with proportional sanctions applied.
Codes of ethics or codes of conduct make explicit the behaviour that is expected from public officials. A distinction between codes of ethics and codes of conduct can be made regarding their content and enforcement mechanisms. In general, codes of ethics identify the principles and values that guide behaviour and decision-making, while codes of conduct provide further guidance and clarify expected standards and prohibited situations. Hybrid codes combine public service values with more detailed guidance on how to apply integrity standards (OECD, 2020[2]). Additionally, in their aim to anticipate and prevent certain types of undesired behaviour, most codes describe specific prohibited actions (OECD, 2018[5]).
In Ukraine, there are several instruments that outline principles of ethical behaviour and conduct for public officials and civil servants that incorporate a combined approach of rules and values. The revision of the General Rules of Ethical Behaviour in 2023 and adoption of the Codes of Ethics for judges and lobbying entities in 2024 suggests that there is an increasing tendency from purely legal regulations towards a values-oriented approach designed to complement the various laws applying to public officials (Box 2.1).
Law on Prevention of Corruption sets the Rules of Ethical Conduct (Section VI, Art. 37-44) that outline seven principles (compliance with the law and ethical norms; acting in the public interest; political neutrality (does not apply to Members of Parliament); impartiality; competency and efficiency; safeguarding information; and refraining from executing illegal orders (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2015[6]).
Law on Civil Service 889-VIII (Art. 4) outlines ten principles of civil service: rule of law; acting within the law; professionalism; patriotism; integrity; efficiency; non-discrimination; political impartiality; transparency; and stability (of appointment, independence from political leadership) (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2016[7]).
Law on Service in Local Self-Government (Article 4) outlines 14 principles that should be complied with in the service of local self-government authorities (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2023[8]).
General Rules of Ethical Behaviour of Civil Servants and Officials of Local Self‑Government updated in 2023, outline principles and standards similar to the Rules of Ethical Conduct. All civil servants must familiarise themselves with the General Rules upon entering the civil service (National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service, 2016[9]).
Code of Judicial Ethics (Decision of the Congress of Judges, 18 September 2024) outlines conduct expected of judges both in and outside of official duties (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2024[10]) (see Chapter 4).
Rules of Ethical Conduct of Lobbying Entities (as stipulated in Article 6.1 of the Law on Lobbying 3606-IX) outlines general rules of ethical conduct for lobbying entities, and provisions for lobbying ‘subjects’ who interact with lobbying ‘objects’, clients and beneficiaries and other lobbying entities) (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2024[11]) (see Chapter 3).
Note: The General Rules of Ethical Behaviour and Officials of Local Self-Government was updated in 2023 to prohibit workplace mobbing.
Source: Government of Ukraine.
This section provides recommendations aimed at (1) expanding the scope of actors having specified ethical guidelines, (2) supporting the practical implementation of ethical guidelines by drawing on behavioural insights and (3) incorporating integrity-related indicators in the assessments of civil servants and public officials starting from their appointment and throughout their career.
2.2.1. To reinforce the value-based approach to building public integrity and strengthen the standards of conduct, Ukraine could adopt Codes of Ethics for MPs, members of the Government and political appointees
Members of Parliament (MPs) are exposed to specific challenges, and clear ethical standards are critical in helping to deal with them. For example, MPs may find themselves in conflict while serving constituents, advancing legislation or responding to the priorities of the political party. Similarly to MPs, members of the Government and appointed public officials with extensive decision-making powers may also be confronted with integrity challenges in conducting their official duties and should commit to demonstrating high standards in carrying out their mandate. These standards may be clarified in the legal and regulatory framework (OECD, 2020[2]). Having robust, clear and consistently enforced integrity standards, such as codes of conduct or ethics, can help navigate these challenges and prevent abuse of office and other forms of corruption, promoting and enabling adherence to high standards of integrity for elected and appointed public officials. Such codes should be tailored to their specific context to match the levels of exposure and decision-making responsibilities of political leadership (OECD, 2020[2]).
Despite the standards that currently outline broad ethical requirements for public officials and civil servants in Ukraine (Box 2.1 above), there are currently no dedicated integrity standards adopted specifically for public officials who are politically exposed or have a higher risk of corruption, including Members of Parliament (MPs), members of Government and political appointees (top-tier civil servants of the executive). In comparison, 17 OECD countries have dedicated codes of conduct covering all categories of public officials, 23 countries have a code covering members of Government and 22 countries cover MPs (Figure 2.2).
More politically exposed positions and responsibilities benefit from increased scrutiny and accountability. Therefore, codes of conduct or ethics that consider the levels of exposure and responsibilities of political leadership in Ukraine, such as members of Government, Ministers and other political appointees, can support them in adopting higher standards of behaviour (OECD, 2020[2]) (Box 2.2).
With regards to MPs, the Law on People’s Deputies of Ukraine 2790-XII (Про статус народного депутата України) (Art. 8) states that MPs should abide by “generally recognised moral standards” with respect for other MPs, public officials and citizens. It is prohibited for MPs to act in ways that preclude “morality, human and citizen rights and freedoms, and the legitimate interests of society and the state” and for MPs to use their mandate for personal reasons (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 1992[12]). However, while these provisions set high expectations of conduct, they do not provide clarity to MPs as to what specific conduct is permitted or applicable to all members.
The role of a code in clarifying standards of integrity of Members of Parliament has been noted at both national and international level, calling on Ukraine to develop a tailored code of ethics for this group of public officials (European Parliament, 2015[13]; GRECO, 2023[14]). GRECO recommended that a code could be developed with the direct participation of MPs and include detailed guidance on practical implementation. The State Anti‑Corruption Programme (SACP) 2023-2025 includes an activity for developing a Code of Ethics for MPs but, contrary to the GRECO recommendation, assigns the responsibility of fulfilling this activity to the NACP. The problem analysis in the SACP states that a legal foundation for MPs to adhere to ethical conduct is lacking and that existing rules of ethical behaviour are either enforced improperly or not at all, undermining the accountability of both leaders and legislators (NACP, 2023[15]).
The UK Ministerial Code outlines the expected standards of conduct for Ministers and how they fulfil their duties. Chapter 1 of the Code includes the Seven Principles of Public Life, which apply to all public officeholders, whether elected or appointed, nationally and locally, balancing the rules-based approach with the values of Selflessness, Integrity, Objectivity, Accountability, Openness, Honesty and Leadership.
Sources: UK Government (2024[16]), Ministerial Code, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ministerial-code; OECD (2024[17]), OECD Public Integrity Handbook, https://doi.org/10.1787/ac8ed8e8-en.
Note: Data available for 28 OECD countries.
Source: OECD (2024[18]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/ (accessed on 5 November 2024).
The Draft Law on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Regarding the Rules of Ethical Behaviour of People's Deputies of Ukraine (Code of Ethics), (Проект Закону про внесення змін до деяких законодавчих актів України щодо правил етичної поведінки народних депутатів України (Етичного кодексу)) (herein “draft law”) was registered in the Verkhovna Rada in 2022 (registration n° 8327) (Box 2.3). It proposes amendments to several other laws to define principles and rules of ethics for MPs and defines sanctions for breaches. However, the draft law has not passed the first reading in Parliament and its adoption is therefore pending. It is advisable for Ukraine to consider consolidating all integrity rules applicable to MPs into one policy rather than have them scattered in different legislative acts.
Ten principles of ethics for MPs
The draft law lists the following principles: integrity; dignity; responsibility; openness to society; leadership; respect for the law; respect for the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; inclusiveness; patriotism; professionalism.
Enforcement and sanctions for non-compliance
Violation of the principles of ethical conduct entails a warning and recommendations from the Committee.
For repeat violations in the same year, the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, based on recommendations of the Committee, announces the warning during a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada.
Repeat violations (twice in the same year) entail a compulsory training course on compliance of the norms and denial of the right to participate in plenary sessions (up to five) of the Verkhovna Rada. Repeat violations (more than twice) entail deprivation of the right to participate in meetings of the Verkhovna Rada, committees and temporary special/investigate committees for up to one month, or deprivation of payments from one to two months. These sanctions are also carried out by order of the Chairman, based on the recommendation of the Committee.
Information on violations is published on the website of the Verkhovna Rada, including the MP’s name, date and description of the violate and sanction(s) issued.
Source: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2022[19]), Draft Law on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Regarding the Rules of Ethical Behavior of People’s Deputies of Ukraine (Code of Ethics), https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/pubFile/1599031.
The draft law establishes the need for parliamentarians to act with integrity and honesty to ensure the prioritisation of the public interest in lawmaking and increase citizens’ trust in institutions. However, there are several ways the draft law could be strengthened to promote public integrity in Parliament and practices of lawmaking. For example, the current inclusion of 10 principles for ethical behaviour in the draft law outline broad expectations of behaviour. However, they include limited definitions, which are at times circular, for example, principle 5 on “leadership” is defined as
“The People’s Deputy, by his leadership and his example, supports and popularises the principles and rules of ethical behaviour of the People's Deputy. The People's Deputy works to strengthen democracy in Ukraine and around the world, ensuring the effective implementation of democratic procedures.” (Verkohvna Rada of Ukraine, 2024[20]).
Therefore, the principles could be supplemented with more detailed definitions that include relevant examples of specific, expected behaviours associated to be meaningful and applicable in real contexts. These examples should be identified and discussed jointly with parliamentarians. Beyond ensuring the relevance of the examples, such a participative exercise can also contribute to raising awareness and promoting commitment amongst parliamentarians. Furthermore, the principles could be balanced with concrete rules and standards, which are currently missing from the draft law. The rules should elaborate the procedures for identifying and managing situations that could give rise to ethical concerns for MPs, such as registering conflicts of interest, gifts and other benefits, engaging with lobbyists, post-employment restrictions, incompatibilities, and the relevant procedures for compliance. The good practice example from Austria could serve as a source of inspiration (Box 2.4).
In Austria, the 2008 Code of Conduct on the Prevention of Corruption in the Civil Service was updated in 2020 via working groups representing experts from the federal government, the Austrian states, cities and municipalities as well as non-state actors. The Code raises awareness of some of the possible risky, ambiguous or unethical situations civil servants may find themselves in. It also highlights their personal responsibility in ensuring their actions are law-abiding and duties are performed objectively.
The first section of the Code, “Abiding by the general principles of conduct”, outlines the five principles of the public sector – i.e. rule of law and loyalty, transparency, objectivity and fair treatment, integrity, and responsibility. This section also includes a “tip” and a “question of ethics” for each of the principles, aimed at providing a common understanding of how principles can be applied in daily choices and actions and facilitating their implementation.
Following this, the Code includes five additional sections outlining standards of conduct for relevant integrity areas – i.e. acceptance of gifts and other benefits, management of conflicts of interest, proper use of information, leadership responsibility and organisational responsibility. The tip and question for each section is supported by concrete examples of how such standards could be compromised or undermined in real life situations, providing further clarity to civil servants in navigating complex situations and making decisions that uphold the integrity of the civil service.
Source: Government of Austria (2020[21]), Code of Conduct on the Prevention of Corruption in the Civil Service: A Question of Ethics, https://oeffentlicherdienst.gv.at/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/VK_2020_barrierefrei_eng.pdf.
Sanctions for violating the draft law (as outlined in Box 2.3 above) could also be strengthened to have a sufficient deterrent effect on failure to adhere to the established legislative standards and enforce responsibility on parliamentarians to conduct their public duty with integrity. Proportional sanctions may range (in order of severity) from censure/reprimand, fines, temporary suspension from the plenary to exclusion from Parliament (OECD, 2020[2]; CoE, 2023[22]). For instance, sanctions for MPs in the UK for breaching the Code of Conduct include oral or written apologies, salary suspension, suspension from the service of the House for a specified period, or expulsion (UK Parliament, 2019[23]). Ukraine could therefore review and amend the current sanctions in the draft law to ensure they are sufficiently coercive to prevent and deter corruption.
2.2.2. NAUCS and NACP could apply a behavioural insights lens to identify concrete actions aimed at ensuring that current integrity standards translate into desired behavioural change and organisational cultures of integrity
Integrity standards established in laws, regulations and codes of conduct or ethics are merely clarifying the behaviours that are expected from public officials. The actual impact can only be achieved if these aspirational standards translate into actual behavioural change. As such, integrity policies can draw from an increasing field of knowledge from behavioural sciences and benefit from incorporating a behavioural lens when designing integrity policies to inform actions aimed at bridging the gap between rules on paper and behaviour (OECD, 2018[24]).
As a starting point, Ukraine can draw on findings from country-level of both the current challenges as well as priority areas to focus on. In 2023, the NAUCS used a survey to evaluate the organisational culture in the civil service at the central and regional levels, with a focus on measuring the evolution of behaviours and attitudes to improve public service efficiency. The survey took place in the framework of implementation of the Strategy for Reforming Public Administration of Ukraine for 2022–2025. The results found that 87.6% of respondents stated that adherence to ethical principles of the public service is important, that observing ethical standards is part of an organisation culture, and as such, codes (of conduct) should be rigorously introduced and applied, with sanctions for violations. Respondents also stated the importance of elevating the principle of professional conduct and introducing new organisational standards and norms (National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service, 2023[25]).
To dive deeper into the challenges that public officials face in taking ethical decisions and complying with existing integrity standards and procedures, NAUCS could apply the Behavioural Insights (BI) methodology to identify relevant desired or undesired behaviours, analyse potential cognitive biases or barriers that undermine them as well as enablers that could promote these behaviours. To this end, Ukraine could consider applying the OECD BASIC methodology (Box 2.5). For example, conducting a behavioural analysis could allow identifying barriers and biases that undermine public officials’ understanding and awareness of integrity values. This understanding can allow developing targeted interventions aimed at supporting ethical decision-making and could inform guidance on dealing with ethical dilemmas, conflict of interest or corruption risk management, amongst others.
Human behaviour and choices do not always stem from rational decisions. The influence of social dynamics as well as cognitive biases and limitations can have a significant impact on driving individual behaviour.
Drawing from rigorous research from behavioural economics and the behavioural sciences, Behavioural Insights (BI) can help public authorities understand why individuals behave as they do and pre-test which policy solutions are the most effective in enabling behavioural change before considering large‑scale implementation. Integrating BI into policy making can therefore allow governments to better anticipate the behavioural consequences of a policy and design and deliver more effective policies that improve citizen’s welfare.
Implementing the OECD BASIC toolkit in day-to-day work can help to analyse Behaviours, conduct an Analysis, develop Strategies, test them with Interventions, and scale up results for policy Change.
For example, this approach has been successfully applied when the OECD conducted an experiment with the Government of the Slovak Republic and applied the BASIC methodology to improve corruption risk management. To understand how corruption risk management could be improved or what was undermining its effectiveness, it was necessary to first investigate the behavioural barriers and biases that affect this issue in the Slovak public administration.
Sources: OECD (2019[26]), Tools and Ethics for Applied Behavioural Insights: The BASIC Toolkit, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9ea76a8f-en; adapted from Thaler, R. and S. Benartzi (2004[27]), “Save more tomorrow: Using behavioral economics to increase employee saving”, http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/380085 and the OECD presentation of the launch of OECD (2024[28]), Improving Corruption Risk Management in the Slovak Republic: Results from a 2023 Experiment in Applying Behavioural Insights to Public Integrity, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/45f8d2e0-en.
2.2.3. NAUCS and NACP could integrate public integrity principles throughout the civil service career, by promoting ethical leadership, cultivating and incentivising ethical behaviour and incorporating integrity related KPIs in performance evaluations
Ensuring that public institutions function ethically is essential to attract and retain civil servants who are committed to promoting a public service ethos. When civil servants uphold ethical standards, they contribute to creating a culture of integrity within public institutions and to the effectiveness of public policies. In Ukraine, the NAUCS and NACP are well placed to spearhead the promotion of public integrity principles within the civil service to cultivate, incentivise and reward ethical behaviour. The NAUCS has already developed support and guidance (National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service, 2024[29]) on integrity and anti‑corruption practices in HR and is encouraged to consider the following practices for a more targeted approach.
A public service selected on meritocracy and ability (talent, skills, experience, competence), as opposed to nepotism or patronage, can lead to better performance, translating into better policies and services. In Ukraine, under martial law, the scope for merit-based recruitment decreased due to special measures implemented in recruitment, dismissals, transfers, promotions and work organisation. Prioritisation of resources led to a significant decrease in allocated funds for civil servant salaries and training (OECD, 2024[30]). Nonetheless, 76.5% of respondents of the NAUCS’ survey fully or partially agreed that their public authority is capable of selecting and appointing specialists with the necessary professional knowledge, skills and ethical principles to relevant positions (National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service, 2023[25]).
To promote meritocracy, good practices could include integrity and reference checks during hiring, especially for senior positions. This includes interest disclosures of previous employment before taking office, requirements to resign certain positions upon taking up public employment, ethical guidance for new public officials, and “cooling-off” periods or other restrictions on taking up certain public sector positions (OECD, 2021[31]). Lviv City Council highlighted their strategy for promoting integrity in HR practices, which can mainstream integrity and strengthen a shared commitment to an ethical public sector (Box 2.6), which could be promoted as a good practice by NAUCS and the NACP to other public authorities in Ukraine.
Recruitment
Values for selection criteria
Selection criteria for new employees includes sharing the declared values of Lviv City Council (Lviv developed its Code of Ethical Conduct in 2019), proactive behaviour and leadership based on integrity, and social responsibility.
Competitive Commission
In accordance with Order of the Mayor n°. 1099 of 27 September 2024, the director of the personnel management office and head of the integrity and corruption prevention department must participate in the competition commission for filling vacant positions under the mayor’s purview.
Performance management
Decision n°. 867 of 18 August 2023 of the executive committee regulates bonuses for Lviv City Council executive bodies. Benevolence is listed as a performance indicator for employees.
Participation
Working Group of corruption assessment risks
Established by Ordinance n°. 76 of 19 May 2024, the working group is a permanent authority to advise and consult with on corruption risk assessment. The group develops corruption risk measures, exchanges information on consultations and plans for work on corruption risk assessments.
Commissions for official investigations
Representatives of the personnel management in official investigative commissions on corruption.
Training
Develop and conduct training events on integrity and corruption prevention for employees of the executive bodies of Lviv City Council and its communal institutions and organisations. Trainings are delivered for new recruits, before submitting asset and interest declarations, at employee’s request and in the HR Development Academy.
Source: Lviv City Council.
To reinforce ethical standards in the civil service, creating incentives that encourage civil servants to promote integrity in their day-to-day work can provide impetus for ethical behaviour and actions. NAUCS and the NACP could develop integrity incentives on what was achieved (specific integrity outputs and outcomes) and how it was achieved (integrity-related competencies), which could be assessed in an annual performance evaluation linked to specific objectives. Although Table 2.3 refers to integrity leaders, similar indicators could be used and adapted to civil servants. The integrity component of performance assessments should be supported with rewards and sanctions, where strong ethical behaviour could be identified for career development opportunities (OECD, 2020[2]).
Public officials have a duty to act in the public interest. Prioritising the public duty over personal interest ensures that policies are designed and implemented in a fair and unbiased way, and can strengthen the public’s trust in its policymakers, as well as the legitimacy and credibility of public policies (OECD, 2020[2]). All public officials can have legitimate private interests. Conflict of interest (herein “COI”) therefore cannot be avoided but can become problematic if they are not properly identified and managed. The purpose of a strong policy framework on COI is not to prohibit interests, but rather manage them. To this end, the OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity (OECD, 2017[1]) calls on adherents to set high standards of conduct for public officials through:
setting clear and proportionate procedures to help prevent violations of public integrity standards and to manage actual or potential conflicts of interest
providing easily accessible formal and informal guidance and consultation mechanisms to help public officials apply public integrity standards in their daily work as well as to manage conflict-of interest situations
averting the capture of public policies by narrow interest groups through managing conflict-of interest situations.
In addition, the Recommendation of the Council on OECD Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service (herein “OECD Guidelines”) (OECD, 2003[32]) provides four core principles for managing COI, as well as recommendations for developing and implementing a coherent COI policy framework (see Figure 2.4).
In line with the 2017 OECD Recommendation on Public Integrity and the 2003 OECD Recommendation on Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service the OECD Public Integrity Indicators (PII) measure the implementation of key aspects of COI policies. According to the PII, Ukraine fulfils most of the baseline criteria for safeguarding against conflict of interest and has 100% of the regulatory safeguards for COI in place and fulfils 67% of the criteria on practice (see Figure 2.5).
Source: OECD (2003[32]), Recommendation of the Council on OECD Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0316.
Source: OECD (2024[18]), OECD Public Integrity Indicators Database, https://data-explorer.oecd.org/ (accessed on 5 November 2024).
The PII criteria confirm that Ukraine’s COI legislation includes incompatibilities between public functions and other public or private activities, and defines circumstances that can lead to a COI situation. The regulations oblige public officials to manage COI situations, and they define institutional responsibilities as well as submission, compliance, and content verification procedures for asset and interest declarations. Thus, any public official, member of the government, parliament, highest bodies of judiciary, as well as public employees in a high-rank position must submit an asset and interest declaration. Sanctions for breaches of COI provisions are defined and proportional to the severity of the offence. The PII assessment of Ukraine’s COI management practice is closely linked to monitoring and verifying interest declarations, which in Ukraine is combined with asset declarations (analysed in the next section).
Ukraine’s high PII score in the COI section indicates that all required components of the relevant policy framework (as outlined in Figure 2.4) are in place. However, analysis reveals several gaps between the regulations and the practice that undermine policy coherence and that could be addressed in Ukraine, as is proposed in this section:
First, the COI definitions as provided in the Law on Prevention of Corruption 1700-VII (Про запобігання корупції, herein “LPC”) do not encompass all types of COI and lack clarity. The main issue in defining COI in the LPC is that the law establishes two distinct definitions for real and potential COI, respectively, without capturing perceived or apparent COI, which is equally important for prevention. This creates a lack of awareness and understanding among public officials regarding the broad scope of their responsibilities, as well as an absence of proactive management and self-reflection about one’s interests.
Second, there is confusion among public officials in the interpretation of definitions of COI and private interests. The lack of a uniform interpretation of the COI definition makes implementation and compliance with COI regulations challenging for public officials in Ukraine, resulting in a high number of administrative offences relating to violations of regulations for preventing and managing COI. In fact, almost 90% of administrative corruption offences, reported by the National Police and NACP (totalling 1273 out of 1390 protocols in 2023) and adjudicated in the courts (totalling 1678 out of 1914 in 2023) are violations of the requirements for preventing and managing COI (Art. 1727 Code of Administrative Offences, CAO) (NACP, 2023[33]). This indicates the need to re-assess the COI definition and provide consistent guidance for its interpretation that would enhance public officials’ understanding and awareness of COI situations.
Third, there is an imbalance between individual responsibility and over-reliance on managers’ actions and enforcement to address COI, which leaves little space to actively develop and implement a prevention function in the COI policy framework. In Ukraine, there is a disproportionate emphasis on managers’ responsibility to resolve COI and too little on public officials’ own accountability. Thus, complementing the existing legal COI definitions by adding perceived (or apparent) COI could encourage self-reflection and awareness about COI situations.
Finally, there is a lack of evidence-based, systemic monitoring of the implementation of COI policies, undermining transparency and accountability of public officials and evaluation and improvement of the policy. Public organisations and authorised persons (Anti‑Corruption Officers, ACO) are not obligated by law to proactively identify and keep records of emerging COI, or regarding the prevention or management of the ad hoc COI situations, unless COI becomes detected as a violation. This reactive approach limits the ability to anticipate and address potential conflicts before they escalate. Thus, the NACP is lacking a centralised overview to assess the effectiveness of COI management, monitor emerging risks and explore opportunities for corruption prevention.
2.3.1. Ukraine is encouraged to complete the adjustment of the COI legal framework as foreseen in the SACP
COI management is a holistic policy framework, in which regulations and practice reinforce each other to provide a coherent and consistent approach to identifying, preventing and managing COI situations (OECD, 2003[32]). Policy adjustments to the evolving practice are also key to ensure the policy is performing as intended and should follow a comprehensive evaluation of the framework (OECD, 2017[1]).
In Ukraine, the COI policy framework is established in the LPC, which includes the main definitions, scope, obligations and measures for resolving COI situations (see Box 2.7).
Definitions (Art. 1, LPC):
Potential conflict of interest is a person's private interest in the area in which he/she exercises his/her official or representative powers, which may affect the objectivity or impartiality of his/her decision-making, or the performance or non-performance of actions during the exercise of these powers.
Real conflict of interest is a contradiction between the private interest of a person and his/her official or representative powers, which affects the objectivity or impartiality of his/her decisions and (non-)commitment of actions in exercising these powers.
Private interest: tangible or intangible interest of a person, including those arising from personal, familial, friendly, or other off-duty relationships with individuals or legal entities, as well as those arising from membership or activity in social, political, religious or other organisations.
Scope of application of COI regulations (Art. 3, LPC):
Persons authorised (or equated) to perform the functions of the state or local self-government.
Restrictions (Section IV, Art. 22-27, 351, 36, LPC):
Restrictions and limitations on using official powers or one's position, receiving gifts or undue benefits, part-time work and combination with other types of activities, working with close persons, the presence of corporate rights, post-employment restrictions.
Obligations for public officials (Art. 28, LPC):
take measures to prevent the occurrence of a real or potential COI
notify the supervisor/collegial body/NACP about real or potential COI (depending on the position)
not to take action and not to make decisions in conditions of a real COI
take measures to resolve a real or potential COI.
Measures for resolving COI (Art. 29, LPC):
Resolution measures imposed by senior management:
removal from performing a task, taking actions, or making a decision in COI
application of external control over the performance of the relevant task by a person in COI
restriction of access to certain information
revision of the scope of official powers
transfer to another position
transfer management of enterprise and corporate rights or shares to another person within 60 days
dismissal.
Resolution measures undertaken by public officials:
A public official can independently decide to liquidate the private interest subject to proof given to the manager and head of the public body.
Institutional responsibilities (Art. 11-13, LPC):
Regarding COI, NACP is responsible for monitoring and control over the implementation of legislative acts on ethical behaviour, including COI prevention and management. Within its mandate, the NACP provides clarifications, advice and methodological guidance on the application of COI regulations. In addition, the NACP issues orders to the heads of public entities to notify them about detected COI violations and prompt them to initiate internal investigations, as necessary. These orders are mandatory, and heads of public entities are required to share the results of the internal investigation within ten days from the receipt of the order.
The authorised units/persons for prevention and detection of corruption (Anti‑Corruption Officers, ACO) are responsible for, among other areas on corruption prevention, detection and risk management, identifying COI in public authorities, facilitating its management, and informing the head of the relevant body and the NACP about the identification of a COI and measure taken for its management (Art. 131, Para 4 (6), LPC).
Liability (Art. 651, LPC):
Criminal, administrative, civil and disciplinary liability is established for persons committing corruption-related offences within the scope of the LPC, including offences relating to COI violations and in line with national laws (e.g. Criminal Code (CC) and Code of Administrative Offences (CAO)).
Register of corrupt individuals: Persons with criminal, administrative, disciplinary or civil liability for committing corruption or corruption-related offences are subject to enter the Unified State Register of Persons Who Have Committed Corruption or Corruption-Related Offenses, maintained by the NACP (Art. 59, LPC).
Sources: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2015[6]), Law on Corruption Prevention 1700-VII, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/1700-18#top; Criminal Code, Code on Administrative Offences (CAO).
Under the National Anti‑Corruption Strategy (NACS) 2021-25, Ukraine has committed to adjusting its COI policy framework. The SACP lists seven expected strategic results that foresee amendments in the legislation related to COI, six of which remain in progress (NACP, n.d.[34]). The deadline for completing the SACP tasks has been postponed from 2024 to 2025 (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2024[35]), therefore Ukraine is encouraged to continue pursuing the SACP’s commitments towards legislation amendments to align with international standards (Box 2.8).
Ukraine’s NACS 2021-2025 outlines a problem statement related to conflict-of-interest and lists seven expected strategic results. The status of each indicator is given accordingly.
1. Most corruption offences and all crime-related corruption involve conflicts of interest. Preventing and settling conflicts of interest are hindered by legislative weaknesses and insufficient risk-based mechanisms for identifying conflicts of interest:
Clarify the legislative definitions of “real” and “potential” conflict-of-interest and “private interest” to promote understanding and application (partially completed).
Improve legislative procedures to report conflict-of-interest and settlement measures, including for officials with no direct manager and elected officials (not started).
Improve internal and external conflict resolution methods (not started).
Determine situations where certain decisions or actions are prohibited to prevent conflicts (partially completed).
Improve mechanisms that do not allow individuals to make decisions related to legal entities in which they hold corporate rights (not started).
Use risk-based methods to monitor and manage compliance with rules that prevent conflicts of interest and check decision-making; specifically, use IT tools to track decisions and legal transactions (partially completed).
Amend the Law “On Service in Local Self-Government bodies” and the Law “On Local Self-Government” to prevent conflict of interest, with the possibility to combine posts in local self-government authorities with the status of deputies of local councils (completed).
Source: Adapted from NACP (2021[36]), Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2021-2025, National Agency on Corruption Prevention, Ukraine.
2.3.2. Ukraine should revise the definition of conflict of interest (COI) to include perceived COI, while providing consistent guidance and training to enhance public officials’ understanding, responsibility, accountability, and compliance
Promoting individual responsibility and personal example is a key aspect of COI management, as outlined in the OECD Recommendation on Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service (OECD, 2003[32]). This approach emphasises that:
Public officials are expected to act at all times so that their integrity serves as an example to other public officials and the public.
Public officials should accept responsibility for arranging their private-capacity affairs, as far as reasonably possible to prevent conflicts of interest arising on appointment to public office and thereafter.
Public officials should accept responsibility for identifying and resolving conflicts in favour of the public interest when a conflict does arise.
Public officials and public organisations are expected to demonstrate their commitment to integrity and professionalism through their application of effective COI policy and practice.
According to the NACS and the SACP, existing definitions of real and potential COI and private interests lack clarity. In particular, the definition of real COI in Ukraine is based on a “contradiction” between private interests and official/representative powers. This creates challenges in understanding the meaning of the term “contradiction”, assuming that not all private interests affect the impartial exercise of powers and duties. To this end, the NACS and the SACP could include measures to refine the definitions of real and potential COI.
The distinction between real and potential COI is a positive element in Ukraine’s COI policy framework. Recognising the uncertainty of the terms used to define COI, the OECD tools propose a clear all‑encompassing definition that is simple to understand and apply (Box 2.9).
Recognising that countries have different historical, legal and public service traditions, which may impact on the way conflict-of-interest situations have been understood, the OECD Guidelines developed a definition of “conflict of interest” which is intended to be simple and practical, to assist effective identification and management of conflict situations:
A “conflict of interest” involves a conflict between the public duty and private interests of a public official, in which the public official’s private-capacity interests could improperly influence the performance of their official duties and responsibilities.
On this basis, a “conflict of interest” involves a situation or relationship which can be current or may have occurred in the past. Defined in this way, “conflict of interest” has the same meaning as actual conflict of interest.
By contrast, a perceived or apparent conflict of interest exists where it appears that an official’s private interests could improperly influence the performance of their duties, but this is not in fact the case.
A potential conflict of interest occurs where a public official holds a private interest which would constitute a conflict of interest if the relevant circumstances were to change in the future.
It is important to note that this definitional approach is necessary to be consistent with the policy position which recognises that conflicts of interest will arise and must be managed and resolved appropriately.
Source: OECD (2003[32]), Recommendation of the Council on OECD Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0316.
The OECD definitional approach also includes perceived COI, which are not currently covered in Ukraine’s legislation or methodologies/guidance resources on the NACP website. Indeed, perceived COI can be as damaging to the public’s trust in institutions as an actual conflict and should therefore be treated in the same way (see Figure 2.6).
Source: OECD (2003[32]), Recommendation of the Council on OECD Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Service, https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0316.
Including perceived COI in the definition strengthens the baseline to test situations in which there appears to be a COI and determine their timely occurrence. The rationale is that a COI should be viewed and dealt with as a dynamic situation that can materialise on an ad hoc basis. All public officials have private capacity interests, such as financial holdings, family relationships and friendships, and relationships with past employers and clients. Over time, these interests appear and disappear, change and evolve. The critical point for the assessment of a COI is when public officials are required to participate in an official action that could affect these private interests. Prior to that time, COI are merely potential. Fully understanding that conflicts of interest occur in specific situations in which official activities intersect with private interests enables governments to anticipate the circumstances may be perceived as COI, or that are likely to transform from perceived into actual COI and address them before that occurs. This approach allows public officials to consider how to proactively address and manage COI in a way that best promotes the public interest (World Bank/OECD/UNODC, 2020[37]).
Ukraine could consider introducing in its normative standards a comprehensive definition that captures all three elements of COI (real, potential and perceived). Covering the complete range of COI circumstances can ensure that public officials are equipped with the full information required to effectively respond in most situations where conflicts may arise. In contrast to the definition of real COI that relies on third-party management of COI involving senior management and external actors, such as anti‑corruption bodies or conflict-of-interest commissions, perceived COI encourages constant self-reflection about one’s interests against the public interest and promotes a proactive approach to managing COI.
Proactively managing perceived COI has a preventive effect and the necessary shift towards the prevention of COI in Ukraine could build upon increasing this individual awareness of and responsibility for dealing with perceived COI. Furthermore, pro-active management of COI is a way for public officials to protect themselves against possible allegations of misconduct and, particularly concerning leaders, is a robust illustration of leading by and setting a good example to peers.
OECD countries have different approaches to introducing this concept, whether in the law or in codes of conduct (see Box 2.10).
France’s Law on Transparency in Public Life (Article 2) defines a conflict of interest as any situation where there is interference between the public interest and an individual's public or private interests, which could influence or appear to influence the independent, impartial and objective performance of [public] duty. This applies to members of Government, local elected officials and public officials, as well as public officials in administrative and/or independent authorities.
In the United States, employees of the executive branch are required to follow ethical rules outlined in the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch (Section 2635.502), which outlines regulations and restrictions on personal and business relationships. It stipulates that if an official’s actions or behaviour could create an impression of bias or an apparent conflict of interest, they must seek guidance.
Sources: Government of France (2013[38]), Law No. 2013‑907 relating to Transparency in Public Life, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000028056315/; U.S. Office of Government Ethics (2017[39]), Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-5/chapter-XVI/subchapter-B/part-2635/subpart-E/section-2635.502.
2.3.3. Ukraine could strengthen the enforcement of COI regulations by ensuring that administrative judicial authorities establish a clear and satisfactory standard of proof and consistent case law
Article 172-7 of the Code on Administrative Offences (CAO) penalises the violation of requirements for the prevention and settlement of COI. In particular, failure to notify a person in cases and in accordance with the procedure established by law about the presence of a real COI results in the imposition of a fine. Administrative sanctions also apply to actions or decisions taken in conditions of real COI and repeated violations. The CAO defines, a real COI as a “contradiction between a person’s private interest and his/her official or representative powers, which affect the objectivity or impartiality of decision-making, or the performance or non-performance of actions in the exercise of those powers”. This definition aligns with the definition of COI provided in LPC.
Challenges persist in ensuring accountability for violations and effectively enforcing regulations on administrative liability. In 2023, courts found insufficient evidence or deemed the offence insignificant in nearly one-third of COI-related cases (511 out of 1,703). Of these, 461 cases lacked substantive evidence, and 50 were considered insignificant (NACP, 2023[33]) These rulings, based on protocols produced by the National Police or the NACP, underscore inconsistencies in evidence assessment and differing standards of proof between the NACP and administrative courts.
The SACP indicates that judicial practice often focuses on proving a “contradiction” between a public official’s duties and private interests rather than determining whether private interests could unduly influence or impact public policy (NACP, n.d.[40]). This approach risks undermining impartiality and public interest principles. To address this, The NACP submitted an amendment of the LPC to the Ministry of Justice (letter No. 10-03/29106-23 dated 29 November 2023), proposing clarifications of the terms "real conflict-of-interest", "potential conflict-of-interest", "private interest", as well as defining “public interest” in the LPC (NACP, 2023[41]). These amendments also propose prohibiting officials from making decisions affecting themselves, close persons, or entities where they or close persons are beneficiaries, with limited exceptions. The NACP is co‑ordinating these revisions with the Ministry of Justice. While these efforts are still ongoing, administrative judicial authorities could establish a standard of proof that would be in line with national laws and fundamental legal principles and serve accountability in case of COI-related violations. A comprehensive analysis of case law and practical challenges faced by investigative and judicial officers in substantiating COI-related cases would further enhance enforcement consistency.
2.3.4. Ukraine could increase effectiveness of enforcement in the disclosure system by improving the procedure for administrative liability for corruption-related offences
A functional disclosure system is resource-intensive but essential to ensure public officials' accountability and foster citizens' trust in public service. This requires balancing prevention and enforcement of detected violations (OECD, 2020[2]; 2017[1]; 2003[32]).
In Ukraine, the specialised anti‑corruption bodies have been instrumental in tackling high-level corruption cases (see Chapter 4). The disclosure system supports these efforts by providing evidence for investigations and procedures. The NACP detects illicit enrichment and unexplained wealth, forwarding evidence to competent authorities for enforcement or confiscation. These functions complement the work of anti‑corruption law enforcement and the High Anti‑Corruption Court (HACC).
Most protocols generated by the NACP address administrative liabilities related to COI or non-compliance with legal instructions (Box 2.11). While these cases are less visible, effective enforcement of administrative regulations is crucial for the integrity of the prevention system. Administrative liability can help ensure compliance, raise awareness among public officials, and help deter potential corruption. Moreover, court rulings have a role in shaping regulatory interpretations, influencing compliance practices and strengthening institutional norms.
The protocol on an administrative offence related to corruption by an official of the National Police or by an authorised person at the NACP initiates the procedure for bringing a public official to administrative responsibility. The requirements for the protocol are set in the CAO (Art. 256). The court returns the protocol if the requirements are not met.
Grounds for drawing up a protocol on an administrative offence are:
Corruption-related offences defined in the CAO (Art. 1724-9) include violations of restrictions on part-time work and ancillary activities, receiving gifts, violations of financial control and COI prevention and management requirements, illegal use of information, and failure to take measures against corruption.
Non-compliance with the instructions of the NACP (Art. 18846, CAO).
Violations of the procedures of the political financial control (Art. 21215,21, CAO).
Statute of limitations: 6 months from the offence detection but no later than two years from the date of the offence commission. As a rule, a court considers a case within 15 days from the date the protocol reaches the court (Art. 277, CAO).
The right to appeal is accorded to a person who has been brought to administrative responsibility, his/her legal representative, defender, victim, and his/her representative within ten days from the date of the ruling (Art. 294, CAO).
Source: Code of Administrative Offences.
The effectiveness of handling corruption-related administrative offences remains low. In 2023, administrative courts examined only 55% of cases (1,884 out of 3,464) initiated based on protocols submitted by the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) and the National Police. Nearly one in five cases (18.6% or 638 cases) was returned, primarily due to procedural deficiencies in the protocols. Among the cases examined, almost half of the accused individuals (920 out of 1,909) were not held liable, mainly because the courts either did not establish the existence of an administrative offence or the statute of limitations had expired (NACP, 2023[33]). Over the past three years, according to NACP officials interviewed on-site, up to 70% of cases initiated based on its protocols were dismissed without a substantive ruling, undermining the credibility of the enforcement system. Several factors contribute to this issue, including the insufficient quality of protocols, inconsistent judicial practice, the lack of procedural standing for the NACP in court hearings (which limits the court’s ability to clarify case details), and the inability of protocol initiators to appeal decisions, as only the accused has the right to do so.
To strengthen enforcement, enhance compliance, and improve the effectiveness of Ukraine’s disclosure system, Ukraine could:
Improve the quality of protocols to ensure compliance with procedural requirements.
Grant the NACP procedural standing in court hearings for cases initiated based on its protocols and allow it to appeal court decisions.
Conduct a comprehensive analysis of case law and challenges faced by enforcement and judicial bodies to identify systemic issues and best practices.
2.3.5. The NACP could develop a record-tracking mechanism for ad hoc COI management to enable COI policy monitoring and evaluation
COI prevention requires reliable reporting to ensure reasonable management of COI situations. Public officials should have clear and explicit guidance on COI reporting protocols. This provides certainty of what is expected of them when reporting their interests and enables managers to make informed and appropriate decisions based on complete disclosure. Public officials need certainty and assurance that reporting their private interests is not automatically considered a breach or violation. Similarly, public authorities should demonstrate to the public that a specific conflict has been appropriately identified and managed. To enable reliable reporting and management, registrations of ad hoc COI, as well as the arrangements for resolving conflicts, should be documented. Further disclosure of information about a COI resolution may also be appropriate in supporting the overall policy objective, for example by demonstrating how the disclosure of a specific conflict of interest was recorded and considered in the minutes of a relevant meeting (OECD, 2003[32]).
Introduce a clear protocol for reporting ad hoc COI situations and a record-keeping mechanism in public organisations
In Ukraine, in addition to the annual disclosure of private interest in the asset and interest declarations (see Section 2.4), there is a provision to report ad hoc conflict of interest, as outlined in the LPC (Art. 28 (1) (2)). This states that public officials are obliged to report to their manager an ad hoc conflict of interest no later than the next working day from the day they learned or should have learned about the existence of a real or potential COI. However, neither the law nor the NACP’s methodological guidance provides information regarding how reports are made by public officials, and how the manager or ACO receives and stores them. The NACP advises making written reports about COI, suggesting that reports should be made in line with the authority’s existing record-keeping requirements (NACP, 2024[42]). However, this recommendation of the NACP is not compulsory (see Figure 2.7).
Note: For public officials that do not have a direct superior, a report can be made to the NACP, or to a collegial or statutory body in the exercise of their powers.
Source: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2015[6]), Law on Corruption Prevention 1700-VII, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/1700-18#top.
The absence of specific guidance on what information should be included in a report and how the report should be submitted and stored has at least two systemic implications for the functioning of the overall COI framework. First, it undermines the COI prevention function, as the undefined and unregulated practice and form of reporting leaves space for inaccurate reporting. It also puts the public official at risk of being accused of a violation if a COI is improperly reported. Second, managers and ACOs are also at risk, as there is no clear guidance on how to receive and store the report and manage data protection and confidentiality.
Given its leading role as the central authority for corruption prevention, the NACP could design and disseminate a standardised protocol for reporting ad hoc interests. This can be shared with ACOs through the online Integrity Portal, and with public officials through onboarding meetings, ethics trainings or awareness-raising activities conducted by the ACO. The standard reporting procedures for ad hoc COI should be clear and enforceable. Further, the protocols should be linked to the commitments and evidence of how COI situations are managed, which can support systemic monitoring and assessment of COI policy implementation (Box 2.12).
The Department of Education in the Queensland Government of Australia outlines a comprehensive conflict-of-interest procedure for employees and managers according to three stages: i) identify and declare, ii) report and iii) manage.
The disclosure of a COI is recorded. A copy of the completed declaration and management plan is kept on the employee’s personal file and a copy is provided to the employee. Records must be managed in accordance with departmental record-keeping requirements and the 2002 Public Records Act.
Responsibilities of employees:
Recognise and disclose any actual, perceived, or potential Conflict of Interest (COI) promptly.
Complete and submit the department's COI Declaration Form.
Refrain from acting on COI-related issues without authorisation.
Collaborate on creating and implementing a COI Management Plan.
Report any change in circumstances affecting the COI.
Participate in COI and risk management reviews.
Follow all relevant department policies and procedures linked to COI situations.
Report misconduct or corruption related to COIs to Integrity and Employee Relations (IER).
Requirements for managers:
Ensure employees understand and comply with COI disclosure obligations.
Verify that COIs are declared and documented in the Declaration Form and Management Plan.
Inform employees that further action on disclosed COIs requires authorisation.
Review COI disclosures, seek clarification as needed, and determine appropriate actions.
Regularly reassess and update COI mitigation strategies and management plans.
Notify IER immediately of any suspected fraud according to the department’s Code of Conduct.
Source: Queensland Government (2023[43]), Conflict of Interest Procedure, https://ppr.qed.qld.gov.au/attachment/Conflict-of-interest%20procedure.pdf.
Develop a monitoring and evaluation mechanism for the conflict-of-interest framework
The OECD Guidelines also include mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of the COI framework. Over time, organisations should ensure that the framework remains effective and relevant in dealing with current and anticipated conflicts in a continuously evolving environment and adapt the framework as necessary (OECD, 2003[32]).
The NACP is responsible for monitoring the anti‑corruption policy, as well as for the monitoring and control of COI, although the latter is not clearly specified in the law (Art. 12, LPC). Currently however, there is no systematic overview in Ukraine on whether public organisations are effectively preventing and managing COI situations that may arise.
In 2024, the NACP initiated an assessment of the effectiveness of ACOs, including their central task of COI prevention and facilitation of COI management (NACP, 2024[44]). Such an assessment included three questions about i) the occurrence of COI in the public entity, ii) methods for COI detection and iii) whether all COI cases were managed/resolved. However, as of January 2025, only six assessments had been conducted out of over 3 000 reports submitted. Further, the NACP reported to conduct annual COI monitoring, 95 of which were accomplished in June 2024. However, the information published on this basis refers to the number of orders issued for the violations and has little analytical value (Kyiv City State Administration, 2024[45]). This leaves the NACP without any sufficient or systematic evidence base to monitor and assess how public organisations implement COI prevention mechanisms in practice.
The NACP could implement a monitoring and evaluation mechanism to assess the effectiveness of the COI prevention and management framework across public organisations. Such a mechanism could build upon a systematic work with ACO’s assessments, the recorded information on ad hoc COI reports, and the interest disclosure data in the Register of declarations (see next section) serve as useful inputs to inform the effectiveness of the overall system. Other inputs could include survey data, for example, the NACP could also co-operate with NAUCS and incorporate questions seeking to measure civil servants’ awareness and attitudes towards conflict-of-interest prevention and management.
2.3.6. The NACP should establish institutional responsibility to track post-employment restrictions to reduce the implementation and monitoring gap
Movement of public officials across sectors (known as the revolving door) is a primary conflict-of-interest concern and risk (OECD, 2003[32]). While selecting candidates with relevant experience to the sector or topics is key to effectively transfer knowledge, there is a risk that privileged information and connections gained from public office could give companies an unfair advantage if left unregulated.
The LPC establishes a cooling-off period of one year for senior appointed and elected public officials before they can work with private entities or organisations whose activities they were supervising or regulating prior to the termination of their official duties (Art. 26). These public officials are also prohibited from representing the interests of any person in cases, including cases pending in court, where the opposing party is the body or organisation where they were employed at the time when their employment ended.
A critical oversight in the LPC is that no authority is mandated to enforce this regulation. Although such information could be obtained from verifying asset and interest declarations, the law does not state that verification of declarations is used for post-employment regulation and this practice is not employed by NACP authorised persons. The opacity of movement of public officials between sectors leaves the regulation open to abuse and creates opportunities for undue influence, where personal interests could be prioritised over the public interest.
Establishing legal provisions on oversight measures can be a useful first step in monitoring and enforcing a post-public employment policy (OECD, 2020[2]). The NACP could be granted institutional responsibility for overseeing compliance with the regulation on post-employment restrictions similar to their existing mandate to verify asset and interest declarations. This would entail a legislative amendment to their functions outlined in the LPC and an increase in resources to ensure operationalisation. It would also require a legal obligation for certain high-risk public officials leaving office to declare their intention or confirmation of future employment and receive an opinion from the NACP on compliance with the law. This information could be cross-checked with other databases the NACP already has access for asset and interest verification, such as data on tax and income (see Box 2.13).
The High Authority for Transparency in Public Life (HATVP) is responsible for pre-and post-public employment, monitoring asset and interest declarations and supervising lobbying activities. The High Authority exercises its control before the appointment for certain public positions (e.g. ministerial advisers), during the functions when the public official projects to create or to take over a business while holding a public office, and after the end of office before joining any private activity. In line with Article 23 of Law n°. 2013-907 relating to transparency in public life, the HATVP scrutinises high-level public officials’ (ministers, mayors of large cities, heads of regulatory agencies, high-level civil servants) post-public employment activities for potential criminal, ethical and foreign influence risks. The Act of 6 August 2019 expanded the High Authority's mission by granting it new competences and allowing hierarchical authorities to refer matters related to post-public employment of civil servants to the High Authority if serious doubts remain after consulting the ethics officer. The scope of activities subject to approval includes self-employment and paid activities within a company or public or private interest group engaged in commercial or industrial relations with the state.
The HATVP begins its investigation either after being notified by the person pursuing the activity, by the hierarchical authority or when discovering that a given individual is carrying out an unauthorised activity. They must render an opinion within two months in which the criminal, ethical and foreign influence risks are assessed. The individual under investigation can present evidence during the investigation. The investigation may result in individuals receiving a compatibility opinion, a compatibility opinion with restrictions applicable for a three-year period, or an incompatibility opinion that prohibits them from performing the activity for a three-year period. The investigation can yield an incompatibility opinion if the High Authority established that the risks assessed during the control are too high for the public official to engage in the planned activity or when the High Authority has not received sufficient information from the individual subject to investigation. Upon conclusion of the investigation, the High Authority notifies the opinion to the administration, the public official and the company or private-sector organisation that the public official intends to join. The opinions of the High Authority are binding.
In the event of an incompatibility opinion, the individual concerned cannot join the company and any contracts concluded in violation of this opinion are rendered null and void. If a former public official continues to perform an activity in violation of an incompatibility opinion or does not respect the restrictions included in the compatibility opinion, the public official exposes themself to a risk of illegal interest-taking, which can lead to a five-year jail sentence and a EUR 500 000 fine.
Source: Government of France (2013[38]), Law No. 2013-907 relating to Transparency in Public Life, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000028056315/.
Disclosure of public officials’ assets and interests is a cornerstone for transparency and accountability in a public integrity framework. Regular disclosure can strengthen accountability, and safeguard mechanisms against undue influence and bias in public decision making (OECD, 2020[2]). Used alone, asset declarations are mainly a corruption detection tool to verify illicit enrichment post factum, as opposed to interest disclosures, which are used to report, manage, and thus prevent conflict of interest (OECD, 2023[46]). Verification of asset declarations covers the disclosure of financial interests of public officials that can reveal inconsistencies and detect unjustified wealth when comparing financial information over time. When combined, asset and interest declaration forms can be used to identify unjustified acquisition and variation of assets, as well as prevent conflict of interest and promote transparency and integrity, and ultimately hold public officials accountable (World Bank, 2021[47]). Disclosure can also help detect and prevent unethical behaviours and abuse of power in the public service, as well as risks of money laundering and corruption (Rossi, Pop and Berger, 2017[48]).
Following the 2013-14 Euromaidan Revolution, anti‑corruption reforms in Ukraine ensured that all public officials and their family members are obliged to disclose their assets and interests (“Declaration of a person authorised to perform the functions of state or local government”). Ukraine’s disclosure system is comprehensive in its scope and has strict enforcement grounds that ensure broad compliance of public officials. All information is submitted electronically, collected, and verified in the Unified Register of Declarations of Persons Authorised to Perform the Functions of State or Local Government1 (herein “Register”), managed by the NACP. The registry ensures high level of transparency of disclosures and enables authorities and civil society to use disclosed information for corruption detection and reporting to law enforcement.
The functioning of the Register and thus the entire disclosure system in Ukraine has been disrupted twice in the last five years, and subject to significant regulatory and methodological changes. In 2020, the system was suspended by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (Case No. 1-24/2020(393/20) of 27 October 2020) that ruled the following as unconstitutional: the NACP’s powers on financial control and conflict of interest on declarations, and provisions on verifications and providing NACP with requested information; open access to the Register; provisions on administrative or criminal liability for providing false information; and provisions to settle conflict of interest for high-risk and high-level public officials. After being briefly resumed in 2021, the Register was again suspended for security reasons due to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The NACP did not conduct any control and verification of declarations until October 2023, although some public officials published their asset and interest declarations voluntarily to maintain trust proactively. Due to high public demand to reopen the Register and reinstate submissions and verification (Electronic Petition of Ukraine, 2023[49]), the obligation for public officials to disclose their assets and interests was restored end of 2023 (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2023[50]). As a result of almost three years’ backlog (2021-2023), the NACP received ca. 2.5 million declarations in the first quarter of 2024, which became a major challenge for the NACP’s verification capacity. The NACP relies on automated controls and ‘logical and arithmetic control’ to address the capacity challenge.
Considering the volatile conditions for the operation of the disclosure system, this section focuses on the following issues:
Ukraine’s policy framework for asset disclosure requires a comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness and outcomes of the asset declaration system. This evaluation should determine whether the system’s initial design assumptions remain adequate, especially given the sporadic adjustments made to comply with martial law requirements, societal demands, and the forthcoming 2026–2030 National Anti‑Corruption Strategy. Key areas of focus include the scope of obliged persons, the reliability of the verification methodology, the practicality of lifestyle monitoring – particularly as it was the only legally permitted control method in 2022 following the suspension of the declaration system – and the (unintended) impact of reputational sanctions, considering the challenge of retaining civil servants.
The COI prevention function of the disclosure system is limited in practice, as NACP’s priorities focus on detection of illicit enrichment and unexplained wealth. As Ukraine’s disclosure system combines both asset and interest declarations, ensuring the effective use of the interest declaration with the purpose of COI prevention is encouraged to promote and strengthen integrity, transparency and accountability in public policymaking.
The war has exacerbated the flow of assets from Ukraine abroad, creating an additional challenge to effectively detect illicit assets in other jurisdictions, a task that requires stronger international co‑operation.
The outcomes of the disclosure system are limited by the proportionally low numbers of court rulings, questioning the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms. This issue can be addressed by improving the quality of NACP’s protocols and introducing the right to appeal for the accusing side.
2.4.1. The NACP should assess the impact of disclosure regulations in practice to adjust its scope, control functions and sanctions to evolving conditions
There are several conditions for an effective asset and interest disclosure system. The obligations for disclosure should, at a minimum, cover public officials who have greater influence over decision-making, and who may generally have increased risks of conflict of interest and corruption. The scope of information requested should cover a broad range of categories to trace monetary and non-monetary forms of assets, income, and interests. To ensure compliance with disclosure obligations, thorough monitoring is required to check if the information is provided on time, is correct and complete. Prioritising controls through a risk-based procedure is also necessary when the scope of information disclosed is broad and/or the frequency of reporting is higher. Further, a risk-based approach to the full verification procedures foresees systemic work on corruption risks to align and adjust methodologies to evolving risks. This requires both dedicated analytical staff as well as technological possibilities to cross-check data with other databases and registries (OECD, 2020[2]).
In Ukraine, Chapter 7 of the LPC (“Financial Control”) defines the scope of obliged persons and information involved in disclosure, and the rules and procedures of publishing, controlling and verifying declarations (see Box 2.14).
Scope (Art. 45-46, LPC):
three types of declarations: annual, upon dismissal, candidate for high-level position
broad list of elected and appointed officials who hold responsible positions (note to Art. 51‑3, LPC), including civil service categories A and B, local self-government officials of category 1-3 (listed in the Art. 14, Law on Service in Local Self-Government Bodies).
Information types to be disclosed:
assets, including moveable and immovable assets; securities, including shares and bonds; other corporate rights; legal entities, trusts; intangible assets, including cryptocurrencies, intellectual property rights; income of all types and its sources; financial assets, foreign bank accounts; gifts including in cash; financial obligations, including loans, expenses or transactions that affect ownership rights or create financial obligations
interests, including paid and unpaid current and previous work positions, also part-time work, and information on the legal or physical entity; membership or participation in governing, auditing or supervisory bodies of public/civic, professional, regulatory, and self-governing associations and organisations.
Transparency and interoperability (Art. 47, LPC):
All declarations are submitted in electronic form and published through the Register1 maintained by the NACP.
The Register has almost 1.7 million users and up to 74% of data in declarations can be cross-checked via access to 20 other state databases and registers. The NACP as well as specially authorised anti‑corruption agencies (NABU, SBI, ARMA) have full access to declarations (including to restricted information). The public has 24-hour access to redacted versions (no private data) of all declarations in the public part of the register that is free to access and can be downloaded in machine-readable format.
Control and verification of declarations (Art. 511-4, LPC):
The declarations undergo three types of basic control: for timeliness; correctness and completeness; and logical and arithmetic control (LAC), under NACPs responsibility.
Declarations of the officials who hold particularly responsible positions (listed in the note to Art. 513, LPC ) and positions associated with the high-level corruption risks (defined by the NACP, (2023[51])), and other declarations with inconsistencies identified through the LAC are the subject to full verification by the NACP. The full verification includes the reliability check of the declared information, the accuracy of the assets assessment, conflict of interest check, illegal enrichment.
The NACP conducts lifestyle monitoring, both on a selective basis as well as based on information from individuals, legal entities, the media and open sources to establish compliance between the standard of living of public officials and their family members against their declared assets and income.
Liability (Art. 651, LPC):
Criminal and administrative liability is established for persons committing corruption-related offences within the scope of the LPC, including offences relating to financial control violations and in line with national laws (e.g. CC and CAO).
Register of corrupt individuals: Persons with criminal, administrative, disciplinary or civil liability for committing corruption or corruption-related offences are subject to entry into the Unified State Register of Persons Who Have Committed Corruption or Corruption-Related Offenses maintained by the NACP (Art. 59, LPC).
Notes:
1. See https://public.nazk.gov.ua/.
2. See https://corruptinfo.nazk.gov.ua/.
Sources: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2015[6]), Law on Corruption Prevention 1700-VII, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/1700-18#top; Criminal Code; Code on Administrative Offences (CAO).
Notwithstanding the high level of maturity of Ukraine’s comprehensive and operational asset and interest declaration system, three systemic issues regarding the scope, control and sanctioning indicate the need for re-assessment of the disclosure policy framework and its impact.
Re-assess the feasibility of the broad scope of obliged declarants in the LPC to promote effective risk-based control
Compared to international standards, the scope of obliged declarants in Ukraine is broad, as all public officials as well as special categories of officials are required to submit a declaration (approx. 700 000 individuals in total). The disclosure system is however only effective if meaningful verification of the high-risk declarations as a priority is ensured to prevent and detect corruption. In Ukraine’s multi‑layered control system, only full verification allows for identifying violations (Table 2.4).
Notes: All declarations go through the first three controls. *Also referred to as “short verification” or “quick checks”.
Sources: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2015[6]), Law on Corruption Prevention 1700-VII, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/1700-18#top; NACP (2021[53]), Order no. 553/21, 31.08.2021, on the Approval of the Procedure for Conducting Control on Completeness of Declaration of a Person Authorised to Perform the Functions of the State or Local Self-government, National Agency on Corruption Prevention, Kyiv, Ukraine; NACP (2021[54]), Order no. 256/23, 16.11.2023, on the Approval of the Procedure for Conducting a Full Verification of the Declaration of Persons Authorised to Perform the Functions of State or Local Government, https://www.reestrnpa.gov.ua/REESTR/RNAweb.nsf/alldocact2/re41039$0000_00_00?OpenDocument&link4&g-recaptcha-response=03AFcWeA549goRZtqPksgoeTxLzt64ffjFwi7KYYeb9RH-sFwm_h7Yh6KB8h6ooqu705Df29nCdPnJI1oht7Ag8PYJiHJ2Llb6gTLmKBS_gmyYvYDY5wbIaMwg_ebPfE1d0Qj-WrIv.
The LPC provides for mandatory full verification of declarations of the officials who hold especially responsible positions (Art. 513) or positions associated with the high level of corruption risks (defined per NACP order n°. 249/23), which provides an extensive list of people. For example, it includes civil service of category B (with 38 500 civil servants as of 2024 (National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service, 2024[52])), as well as local self-governance civil servants of categories 1-3. Judges, prosecutors and investigators also fall under this category. In comparison to the extensive list of obliged declarants, the NACP reported in 2024 only 715 completed full verifications, with 335 in progress.2
In addition to the high-risk positions that undergo full verification by default, all other declarations identified as high-risk via the LAC are also subject to full verification. Statistics from the Register suggest that as of December 2024, there are ca. half a million high risk declarations, of which only 13 600 passed the automatic control, which is an approach to full verification of the declarations that fall within the lower risk range.3 Even if the NACP increases the proportion of the automated full verifications to 75%, as initially planned, this will not cover the entire range of high-risk declarations.
This significant gap between legislation and practice indicates the need to reassess the feasibility and potentially unintended impact of having such a broad list of persons submitting declarations. In terms of efficiency, the overwhelming list can detract human and technical resources away from systematic checks of high-level public officials with high corruption risks. It can also undermine accountability and trust regarding objective control of asset declarations.
The NACP could therefore re-assess the scope of declarants to enforce a risk-based approach for disclosure system, which could improve the efficiency of verification and oversight for key influential positions in public office. Proportionality for submitting asset and interest declarations allows for a tailored and gradual approach that considers the functions occupied, the potential risks, and levels of seniority and exposure. There is no universal standard on defining the scope of obliged declarants; this should reflect the national corruption-risk assessment (World Bank, n.d.[55]).
Assessing the reliability of the methodologies for control and verification of declarations
The often-changing methodologies of control and verification of declarations in Ukraine require thorough monitoring and testing to verify they are having the intended impact. The control and full verification procedures are defined in Ukraine via NACP orders to i) analyse completeness (n°. 553/21), ii) select declarations for the full verification (n°. 284/23) and iii) for conducting full verification (n°. 256/23), as shown in Table 2.4 above. Figure 2.8 shows the workflow for the LAC and automated verifications.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on NACP (2024[56]), “What happens to your tax return after you submit it?”, https://nazk.gov.ua/uk/novyny/scho-vidbuvaetsya-z-vashoyu-deklaratsiyu-pislya-ii-podannya/.
Different stakeholders have raised concerns regarding different aspects of this methodology for control and verification. An overarching issue is the lack of co‑ordination between ACOs and the NACP to track the submission rate of declarations. In response to the 2024 OECD PII questionnaire, the NACP was not able to confirm the percentage of MPs or high-level public officials who submit declarations, as this task is devolved directly to ACOs who do not (and are not obliged to) track submission rates. Further, as indicated in the Review of Anti‑Corruption Reforms in Ukraine under the Fifth Round of Monitoring of the Istanbul Action Plan, there is a lack of transparency of regulations for verification processes (OECD, 2024[57]). While some of the regulations were published end-2023, verification of classified personnel still lacks transparency and accountability. Civil society organisations have questioned the quality of automated full checks in low-risk cases, in which the cross-checking of declarations with other databases can produce false positives if not manually verified due to the various and differing quality of data in other registries (TI Ukraine, 2024[58]). In 2023, the Commission for Conducting Independent Assessment of the Effectiveness of the NACP questioned the credibility of the risk-based approach of verification through the LAC (Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 2023[59]).
To improve the effectiveness and reliability of declaration verification and reduce the scope for errors, verification procedures should be carefully monitored and tested. Ukraine is encouraged to analyse examples of false positives in the LAC methodology and find ways to avoid them, for example by revising the rules or improving technical requirements for the declaration form. These improvements would refine the risk-based verification process by ensuring that only genuinely low-risk declarations undergo automated verification and those with higher risks receive thorough scrutiny.
Ukraine should ensure alignment between full verification of declarations and lifestyle monitoring
Lifestyle monitoring gained particular importance to ensure accountability during martial law in 2022-23, when regular publication and control of declarations was suspended and lifestyle monitoring, as a separate financial control tool, was the only financial control permitted for public officials. The NACP implements lifestyle monitoring to establish if a public official’s living standards, and that of their family members, are in proportion to their declared income and assets. Controls are conducted based on open-source information (i.e. media) and third-party reports (Art. 514, LPC). The NACP can refer cases to specialised anti‑corruption bodies if signs of corruption or a corruption-related offence have been detected following lifestyle monitoring. The NACP reported that in 2023, based on the results of lifestyle monitoring, they submitted 33 materials totalling UAH 98 million to SAPO under Article 290 of the Civil Procedure Code of Ukraine, which aimed to initiate court proceedings to recognise assets as unjustified and their confiscation in favour of the state. Four of these materials totalling UAH 13 million were filed with the High Anti‑Corruption Court (HACC). In 2024, 20 materials amounting to UAH 90 million were submitted by the NACP to SAPO, of which nine cases worth UAH 24 million were submitted to the HACC, highlighting the increasing effectiveness of the procedure.
Once the state has established sufficient evidence to show a public official’s assets were illegally acquired, based on lifestyle monitoring, it is the public official’s responsibility to disprove the allegation and prove the legal origins or acquisition of assets in question (Art. 81.2, Civil Procedure Code). Thus, on the enforcement side, lifestyle monitoring can trigger a civic confiscation procedure under the jurisdiction of the High Anti‑Corruption Court (HACC). Confiscation of unexplained wealth is not punishment of a crime, as no proof of crime is needed to trigger the mechanism (Art. 290-292, Civil Procedural Code). However, if the monetary limit of unexplained wealth reaches the upper limit of UAH 6 500 tax-free minimum incomes,4 it becomes a case of illicit enrichment under the Criminal Code (Art. 3685).
As an additional tool of financial control, lifestyle monitoring supports the NACP’s objective to detect illicit enrichment. The NACP should ensure the timely exchange of information is ensured between officials in charge of verification of declarations and lifestyle monitoring to support thorough verification of potential illicit assets or ill-gotten wealth.
Assess the dissuasive effect and proportionality of reputational damage to public officials through their entry into the register of corrupt officials based on disciplinary, civil or administrative offences
Ukraine has strong enforcement mechanisms for compliance with the disclosure obligations, ranging from the disciplinary to administrative and criminal liability. Indeed, the PII data (OECD, 2024[60]) shows that there is high compliance among top-tier stakeholders with the obligation to submit declarations. However, in addition to the conventional enforcement mechanisms, Ukraine relies on the deterrent effect of reputational damage through entry into the Unified State Register of Persons Who Have Committed Corruption or Corruption-Related Offenses5 (herein “Register of corrupt officials”), maintained by the NACP (Art. 59, LPC). The Register is publicly accessible, indicating the name and the offence associated with the person. With a total of 51 448 entries since 2011, the Register of corrupt officials is broadly consulted by the public, but also in private sector due diligence and civil service career assessments. Entry in the Register of corrupt officials is lifelong and cannot be challenged in court. The only exception is if the person joins the Armed Forces or intelligence services, or if the court verdict is revoked or the disciplinary sanction is cancelled.
According to the LPC and the regulation about the functioning of the Register of corrupt officials, (NACP, 2018[61]), there are several peculiarities that require evidence-based assessment of their effects to avoid unintended impact.
Proportionality: Individuals who have been brought to criminal, administrative, disciplinary or civil liability for committing corruption or corruption-related offence are added to the Register by the NACP. Between 2019 (when the NACP began overseeing the Register of corrupt officials) and 2024, out of 27 745 total entries, 66% were related to administrative offences (18 361), most of which were for violations of financial control obligations (15 536) and 6% for disciplinary liability (1 567).6 In practice, this means that many entries to the Register of corrupt officials occurred because a public official did not comply with the deadline to submit a declaration or did not report their change of financial status on time. This raises the question about the proportionality of reputational damage of being included in the same register as those convicted under criminal law for corruption offences.
Legal justification: Entries based on disciplinary liability are made without any court decision. The lack of judicial justification bears the risk that the Register of corrupt officials can be misused as a tool of political or personal retaliation.
Civil services workflow: In view of the shortage of personnel in the civil service (almost every fifth position is vacant in 2024 (National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service, 2024[52]) and the increasing demand for integrity checks, the disproportional reputational damage could block or hinder the career of thousands of civil servants, while the deterrent effect of punishment for minor mistakes can have an overall negative effect on the motivation to join the civil service.
The NACP should consider conducting an evaluation of the effects of the Register of corrupt officials to ensure it serves the deterrent purpose of corruption prevention and excludes or mitigates unintended impacts that may potentially arise from the issues listed above.
2.4.2. The NACP could strengthen the prevention function of its disclosure system by expanding information related to conflict-of-interest situations and ensuring risk-based control
Disclosure systems can be designed for corruption detection as well as for COI prevention. As a rule, financial monitoring, based on asset declarations, provides necessary information for institutional and public oversight to detect corruption and identify illicit enrichment. In contrast, interest disclosures are appropriate to report, manage and thus prevent conflicts of interest (OECD, 2003[32]; 2023[46]). Most disclosure systems combine the obligation to report both assets and interests, although the prevention function is often overlooked. For effective prevention, the disclosure of interests should contain sufficient detail to make an adequately informed decision about the appropriate resolution. Responsibility for providing an accurate and complete disclosure rests with the individual public official (OECD, 2003[32]) (see Table 2.5).
In Ukraine, since the declaration system was reinstated in 2023, the NACP publicly stated that its priority was to use the system to detect illicit enrichment, unexplained wealth, and undeclared assets, as it had previously done (NACP, 2024[56]). While Ukraine has a mature system of financial control and transparent disclosure, using the system to prevent COI is underdeveloped. ACOs have the function to prevent and support COI management in public organisations and conduct the first screening of asset and interest declarations. However, discussions during the focus group with ACOs, individual consultations and NACP’s report on ACOs indicate that ACOs do not systematically fulfil this task of COI prevention. The NACP’s assessment of ACO’s performance also show that it is an exception rather than the rule that ACOs use information from declarations to identify COI for prevention purposes (NACP, 2024[44]).
Source: Rossi, I., L. Pop and T. Berger (2017[48]), Getting the Full Picture on Public Officials: A How-To Guide for Effective Financial Disclosure, http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0953-8.
The SACP identified the issue of the weak use of declarations for COI detection (NACP, n.d.[40]) and proposed two ways to address this. First, in the process of verifying declarations, the NACP developed an automatic function to narrow the range and extraction of information in the Register of Declarations to identify the risks of COI-related violations. In particular, three sets of rules were created to identify violations regarding i) obtained gifts (Art. 23, LPC), ii) combining public service with other types of activities (Art. 25, LPC) and iii) in the area of close personal relationships within the public sector (Art. 27, LPC) (NACP, 2023[62]). These algorithms give a weighted COI risk, among others, which influences the risk ranking of the declaration and its potential selection for full verification (NACP, 2024[56]). The COI check is one of the four stages of the full verification process (NACP, 2024[63]). If signs of COI are detected, the authorised person of the NACP, who is responsible for conducting the full inspection, transfers the materials to the authorised person responsible for drawing up reports on administrative offences to decide if there are grounds for such a protocol. Between January and September 2024, the NACP reported to have identified 15 cases of COI-related violations, which is quite low compared to thousands of reported COI cases in the courts (2 707 COI cases reached the courts in 2023).
Second, the SACP provides for the implementation of a separate digital system called “Hidden Interests”, which was designed to combine information from the Register of Declarations, assets (including beneficial ownership) of family members, and information from the ProZorro public procurement system. The tool is in its pilot stage. However, the SACP states the purpose of this tool is not to prevent COI but to “effectively identify decisions and legal transactions made in conditions of a conflict of interest [and] ensure proper response to violations identified” (NACP, n.d.[64]).
Develop tools and mechanisms for systemic use of disclosed data for corruption prevention
Ukraine could improve the use of data from the disclosure system for corruption prevention in two ways. First, by designing digital solutions to integrate data cross-checking with other databases to identify risks prior to transactions. While it is impossible to perform ex ante checks in all cases, it is worth systematising COI prevention in procedures with high corruption risks, such as public procurement or hiring in public service. For example, the “Hidden Interests” or a similar tool could be designed to check procurement contracts with high corruption risks, such as those with a high value or those in high-risk sectors. Box 2.15 explores how Romania has developed digital tools to carry out such checks.
Second, Ukraine could support ACOs in their skills and capacities to analyse data and information in declarations to prevent real and potential COI. This can be done upon employment by comparing the information about the person’s private interests with the upcoming public duties and responsibilities. Further, the declarations can be also used to conduct checks for ad hoc COI, related to certain decisions or functions. While some ACOs are performing these tasks and can serve as good practice in Ukraine, this approach is not systematic, primarily due to the lack of ACOs capacities and prioritisation of other tasks. The NACP could reinforce ACOs prevention function by including more relevant indicators in the ACOs effectiveness assessments. Prevention through the declaration analysis can be also included in the corruption risk assessment methodology that ACOs perform.
Romania’s PREVENT system is a digital platform that aims to prevent conflicts of interest in awarding public procurement contracts. The system was developed to respond to the problem that authorities, despite imposing sanctions for corruption offences, were unable to recover funds spent on contracts awarded through the public procurement process. PREVENT allows for a more preventative approach by cross-referencing data provided through an online form with other national databases to flag possible integrity risks ex-ante. This reduces the likelihood of losing public funds to public procurement corruption.
When announcing a tender, contracting authorities are obliged to fill out an integrity form containing information on the procurement procedure, the decision-maker(s), the bidders, and any measures to remove potential conflicts of interest ordered as a result of an integrity warning. PREVENT then analyses the data and checks it against the Trade Registry and Personnel Records and Database Administration. If these databases confirm the existence of a conflict of interest due to family ties between the contracting authorities and a contractor, subcontractor or third party, PREVENT issues a warning and the contracting authority is obliged to resolve the conflict-of-interest situation. The National Integrity Agency of Romania monitors whether a contracting authority takes appropriate action and can open an investigation if it does not.
Source: European Commission (2023[65]), Handbook of Good Practices in the Fight against Corruption, http://dx.doi.org/10.2837/575157.
Revise the scope of information required in the interest disclosure to make it useful for prevention
The NACP should consider re-assessing the scope of information provided in the asset and interest declarations through the lens of prevention and re-think how data is used. The disclosure obligations in Ukraine have a very broad scope (see Table 2.6).
While Ukraine already requests most of disclosure requirements as outlined by international standards, a few key elements could be supported through additional measures or are missing:
Post-employment work and activities: As mentioned above, Ukraine does not track post-employment work and activities (OECD, 2024[66]), despite the LPC establishing a cooling-off period of one year for senior appointed and elected public officials before they can work with private entities or organisations whose activities they were supervising or regulating prior to the termination of their official duties (Art. 26). However, there is no monitoring of this regulation. The opacity of movement of public officials between sectors leaves the regulation open to abuse and creates opportunities for undue influence.
Pre-tenure employment and activities: The declaration requests information on previous or existing work, including part-time, paid and voluntary. Good practices in pre-public employment can also include integrity checks and/or reference checks during hiring, requirements to resign certain positions upon taking up public employment, and “cooling-off” periods or other restrictions on lobbyists taking up certain public sector positions (OECD, 2021[31]). The interest declarations filed upon entering employment could request for such information to be included in the Register.
Sponsored travel: This item could be declared in a separate section if it is not declared as a gift. The LPC does not make any reference to sponsored travel either under gifts (Art. 23) or separately.
Reporting requirement specified in the Law on Prevention of Corruption
Note: All sections stipulated in the LPC are included in Ukraine’s asset and interest declaration form. They are applicable to the declarant’s family members except for the section to declare expenses. Property, objects or assets that have been recognised as destroyed in the war in Ukraine are not declared.
1. MPs are not obliged to report a residence under 752m that has been rented or used by them and whose costs have been compensated.
2. Gifts, including gifts given as cash by one person or by a group of people, are only declared if the values exceed five subsistence minimums. Income that covers expenditures for business trips is exempt.
3. Declared only if the total value of all monetary assets exceeds 50 subsistence minimums.
4. Foreign bank accounts must be declared to the NACP within 20 days from being opened.
5. Declared only if the value exceeds 50 subsistence minimums.
Sources: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (2015[6]), Law on Corruption Prevention 1700-VII, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/1700-18#top; World Bank/OECD/UNODC (2020[37]), Preventing and Managing Conflicts in the Public Sector: Good Practice Guide, https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2020/Preventing-and-Managing-Conflicts-of-Interest-in-the-Public-Sector-Good-Practices-Guide.pdf.
Introducing actionable principles of public integrity and ethical conduct
To reinforce the value-based approach to building public integrity and strengthen the standards of conduct, Ukraine could adopt Codes of Ethics for MPs, members of the Government and political appointees.
NAUCS and NACP could apply a behavioural insights lens to identify concrete actions aimed at ensuring that current integrity standards translate into desired behavioural change and organisational cultures of integrity.
NAUCS and NACP could integrate public integrity principles throughout the civil service career, by promoting ethical leadership, cultivating and incentivising ethical behaviour and incorporating integrity related KPIs in performance evaluations.
Ensuring coherence of the conflict-of-interest policy framework in Ukraine
Ukraine is encouraged to complete the adjustment of the COI legal framework as foreseen in the SACP.
Ukraine should revise the definition of conflict of interest (COI) to include perceived COI, while providing consistent guidance and training to enhance public officials’ understanding, responsibility, accountability, and compliance.
Ukraine could strengthen the enforcement of COI regulations by ensuring that administrative judicial authorities establish a clear and satisfactory standard of proof and consistent case law.
Ukraine could increase effectiveness of enforcement in COI disclosure by improving the procedure for administrative liability for corruption-related offences.
The NACP could develop a record-tracking mechanism for ad hoc COI management to enable COI policy monitoring and evaluation.
The NACP should establish institutional responsibility to track post-employment restrictions to reduce the implementation and monitoring gap.
Strengthening Ukraine’s asset and interest declaration disclosure system
The NACP should assess the impact of disclosure regulations in practice to adjust its scope, control functions and sanctions to evolving conditions.
The NACP could strengthen the prevention function of its disclosure system by expanding information related to conflict-of-interest situations and ensuring risk-based control.
References
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[65] European Commission (2023), Handbook of Good Practices in the Fight against Corruption, Publications Office of the European Union, https://doi.org/10.2837/575157.
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[51] NACP (2023), Order no. 249/23, 06.11.2023, on the Approval of the List of Positions with High and Increased Levels of Corruption Risks, National Agency on Corruption Prevention, Kyiv, Ukraine, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/z1966-23#Text.
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[54] NACP (2021), Order no. 256/23, 16.11.2023, on the Approval of the Procedure for Conducting a Full Verification of the Declaration of Persons Authorised to Perform the Functions of State or Local Government, National Agency on Corruption Prevention, Kyiv, Ukraine, https://www.reestrnpa.gov.ua/REESTR/RNAweb.nsf/alldocact2/re41039$0000_00_00?OpenDocument&link4&g-recaptcha-response=03AFcWeA549goRZtqPksgoeTxLzt64ffjFwi7KYYeb9RH-sFwm_h7Yh6KB8h6ooqu705Df29nCdPnJI1oht7Ag8PYJiHJ2Llb6gTLmKBS_gmyYvYDY5wbIaMwg_ebPfE1d0Qj-WrIv.
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← 4. In 2024, illicit enrichment is defined above UAH 9 841 000 (ca. EUR 224 000).