This chapter presents key findings on consumption, production, trade, and prices of agricultural and fish commodities covered in the OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook, as well as developments in key sectoral indicators over the 2025-2034 period. It summarises a baseline scenario for the next decade based on specific assumptions about macroeconomic conditions, productivity trends, weather, consumer preferences, and agriculture and trade policies. Global consumption of agricultural commodities is projected to increase at a decelerated pace over the next decade due to slower population and income growth, coupled with saturated food demand in advanced economies. Most of the additional consumption is expected to take place in low- and middle-income countries, where urbanising populations with rising per capita incomes will consume relatively more livestock and fish products. The shift in dietary preferences will likely boost investment in livestock and aquaculture, increasing production. Consequently, global agricultural and fish production, especially animal-source foods, will lead to higher greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture. The chapter also presents a scenario that describes how combining productivity improvements with the widespread adoption of emission reduction technologies could reduce direct GHG emissions from agriculture and end hunger by 2034. The Outlook highlights the vital role of multilateral co-operation and effective international agricultural commodity markets in ensuring global food security and rural livelihoods. Projected demand and supply trends suggest a gradual decline in real international prices over the next decade, though changes in environmental, social, geopolitical, or economic factors would alter these projections.
OECD‑FAO Agricultural Outlook 2025‑2034
Abstract
The OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook is the result of a collaborative effort of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). This year’s report presents a consistent baseline scenario for the evolution of agricultural commodity and fish markets at national, regional, and global levels for the period 2025 to 2034.
The baseline projections are based on structured expert inputs. These projections are influenced by current market conditions (Section 1.1), as well as assumptions about macroeconomic, demographic, and policy developments (Section 1.2). The OECD-FAO Aglink-Cosimo model, which links sectors and countries covered in the Outlook, ensures consistency and global equilibrium across all markets.
In Section 1.6 using a scenario analysis, this Outlook highlights the role of a large‑scale implementation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction technologies in balancing food security and sustainability.
Figure 1.1 provides information on the current commodity situation which is the starting point of the projections. Due to differences in marketing years across commodities, data is presented for either the calendar year 2024 or the 2024/25 marketing year, as appropriate.
Note: All graphs expressed as an index where the average of the past decade (2015-24) is set to 100. Consumption refers to global consumption volumes. Price indices are weighted by the average global production value of the past decade as measured at real international prices. More information on market conditions and evolutions by commodity can be found in the commodity chapters.
Source: OECD/FAO (2025), ''OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook'', OECD Agriculture statistics (database), http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/1hc.
This baseline scenario generating 2025-2034 projections incorporates the commodity, policy, and country expertise of the OECD and the FAO, as well as input from collaborating member countries and international commodity bodies. The baseline projections discussed in this section are based on data and policies in place as of December 2024. The following macroeconomic trends are expected to influence the evolution of agricultural markets in the coming ten years.
Baseline process
Since 2004, the OECD and FAO have jointly produced the annual Agricultural Outlook, providing transparent and plausible projections for the next decade based on stakeholders’ consensus. These projections serve as a baseline for evaluating the impacts of policy changes and alternative scenario developments. The production process is continuously adjusted to reflect evolving requirements and conditions, while maintaining principles that limit subjective assumptions.
The OECD gathers agricultural market data and projections through country questionnaires that take into account national economic conditions and policies. The FAO draws on its institutional capacity and expertise to generate baseline projections. Both processes follow multiple steps involving database management, modelling, and post-model analysis, carried out over several months.
A rigorous, multi-tiered clearance process guarantees the quality of the joint outlook. The projections and findings are reviewed by the OECD Group on Commodity Markets and FAO commodity specialists, while final approval of the text is ensured by the OECD Working Party on Agricultural Policies and Markets and the FAO Chief Economist Stream management team. This established process ensures the development of a plausible and transparent baseline scenario, resulting in a widely recognised medium‑term agricultural outlook. Further details on the methodological framework and clearance process can be found in Annex B: Methodology.
Uncertainties surrounding the baseline
The baseline projections presented in this Outlook report are based on data and policies in effect as of December 2024 and the assumptions derived from them. Developments that occurred after this date–whether political, economic, environmental, or technological–were not considered.
Recent geopolitical developments have heightened short-term uncertainty surrounding international trade relations, regulatory cooperation, and global sustainability efforts. These evolving conditions will be closely monitored to assess whether they develop into structural changes with lasting implications for the medium-term outlook. Given the uncertainty about the nature, scope and duration of these changes, the decision was made to retain the original baseline projections in this report. If key drivers of agricultural markets and derived assumptions consistently diverge from the baseline assumptions, the potential impacts will be analysed through scenario-based simulations.
1.2.1. A slowing pace of global population growth with regional differences
Global population1 growth is projected to slow significantly, increasing by 729 million people reaching 8.8 billion by 2034. This corresponds to an average rate of 0.8% p.a. over the next ten years, down from 1.0% p.a. in the past decade (Figure 1.2). This deceleration is expected to lead to slower growth in global food demand. However, regional differences in population trends will shape the regional patterns of future demand. India will solidify its position as the most populous country (since 2023), growing at 0.8% annually and accounting for 17.9% of the world's population by 2034. Sub-Saharan Africa will experience the highest growth at 2.3% per year, reaching 17.5% of the global population by the end of the projection period. The Near East and North Africa will be the second fastest-growing region at 1.6% p.a. though still representing a smaller share at 6.3% by 2034.
In contrast, the population of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter “China”) is set to decline gradually at -0.3% per year over the next decade. However, it will remain the second most populous country with 15.7% of the global total by 2034. The population of Latin America and the Caribbean, and North America is expected to grow at 0.5% p.a. while in Europe and Central Asia it will remain fixed.
1.2.2. Stable global economic growth
Global per capita income,2 measured in constant United States dollars, is expected to grow at an average rate of 1.6% p.a. over the next decade. Growth will be primarily driven by emerging and developing Asian economies with India’s growth accelerating to 5.4% p.a. (up from 4.0% p.a. in the previous decade) and China growing at 3.8% p.a. as it transitions to a more mature economic phase. These middle-income countries will reinforce their role as the key drivers of global agricultural commodity demand. Latin America is also expected to outpace the global average with its larger economies contributing to a regional growth rate of 1.8% per year.
In advanced economies, income growth in Europe and Central Asia is expected to see a slight improvement while North America may experience a slowdown with both regions averaging 1.5% p.a. growth over the next ten years. Per capita income growth is projected to remain below the global average at 1.1% p.a. in Sub-Saharan Africa and 1.3% p.a. in the Near East and North Africa.
1.2.3. Easing of energy prices as fossil fuel demand weakens
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) (IEA, 2004[1]), growth in global energy demand for fossil fuels is expected to slow, reaching its peak before 2030 due to efficiency improvements, electrification, and the rapid expansion of renewable energy. This will potentially result in further easing of international energy prices.
The global reference oil price used in the Outlook, which peaked at USD 101/barrel in 2022, declined to USD 80/barrel in 2024 and is projected to decline further to USD 73/barrel in 2025. The Outlook expects that the global reference oil price will remain stable in real terms over the projection period. Following this trend, fertiliser prices, which spiked in 2022, are also projected to continue easing and remain stable in real terms over the next decade.
1.2.4. Existing policies are held constant in the baseline
Policies play an important role in agricultural, biofuel, and fisheries markets, and policy reforms usually trigger changes in market structures. The Outlook assumes current policies will remain in place and that no new policies are enacted. Only free trade agreements that have been ratified up to the end of December 2024 are considered in the Outlook.
1.2.5. Projections are subject to considerable uncertainty
The agricultural commodity market outlook is subject to various uncertainties, including environmental, social, geopolitical, and economic factors that could cause deviations from baseline projections.
The ongoing conflicts highlight persistent energy security risks with direct implications for production. While the immediate effects of the global energy crisis began to subside in 2023, the potential for further disruptions remains high because of the agri‑food sector's reliance on energy. Higher input costs, especially for fossil fuel-derived energy, have driven up food prices, exacerbating concerns over global food security. Scenario analysis in the 2023 Outlook indicated that rising synthetic fertiliser costs alone could significantly impact food prices. Box 1.2 elaborates on these uncertainties related to inputs by highlighting recent scenario analysis work on synthetic fertiliser markets and policies conducted at the OECD.
Conditions on synthetic fertiliser markets, which determine fertiliser application with direct implications for yields, have far-reaching impacts on food systems, macroeconomic economic stability and the environment. They are highly concentrated and closely linked to energy markets, making them very susceptible to shocks and supply disruptions. Many countries offer subsidies to encourage agricultural practices based on the use of fertilisers to ensure food security and support farmers’ livelihoods.
Using the partial equilibrium model Aglink-Cosimo, a recent OECD report explores the complex relationships between fertiliser markets, synthetic fertiliser policies, and their repercussions on agricultural markets, food security, and environmental sustainability over the medium term (Adenäuer, Laget and Cluff, 2024[2]). This report presents two separate scenario analyses: one examining potential supply shortages of fertiliser; and the other exploring the hypothetical elimination of fertiliser support in India.
The first scenario, involving a 20% reduction of nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P), and potassium (K) fertilisers supply first applied in 2025 only and then in both 2025 and 2026, addresses the major concern of supply shortages. This can be best interpreted as an increase in marginal production costs similar to the price shock observed in 2022. Supply shortages of fertilisers are a major concern for many countries not only since the war between the Russian Federation and Ukraine started, but also due to the broader geopolitical uncertainties affecting global trade and commodity markets.
The supply shortage scenario indicates that existing stocks can to some extent mitigate the negative short-term impacts on yields. However, prolonged shortages can have lasting adverse effects on the agricultural sector. Even modest reductions in yields would result in significant production shortfalls driving up food prices. Figure 1.3 shows that in a scenario where all three synthetic fertilisers are simultaneously affected within a single year (grey line), the FAO food price index could rise by as much as 6% between 2025 and 2028. In contrast, a scenario involving two consecutive shocks (green line) would lead to a more pronounced increase, pushing prices up to 13% over the same period.
The second scenario, focusing on the hypothetical elimination of synthetic fertiliser support in India, suggests that this policy change would prompt a rapid reduction in domestic fertiliser use, leading to a decrease in agricultural production and exports, while simultaneously causing an increase in imports. The decline in nitrogen prices and rise in rice prices, influenced by India's substantial role as both a nitrogen user and rice supplier, would have only a modest impact on global food prices and minor adverse impacts on food security worldwide.
The scenario suggests that global agricultural greenhouse gas emissions would decrease by a notable 7 Mt of CO2 equivalent due to the substantial reduction in fertiliser application in India and the moderate increase in fertiliser use elsewhere. This highlights the crucial link between domestic policies and global environmental sustainability goals.
The recent developments in the United States’ foreign policies, which occurred after the December 2024 assumption threshold, have introduced a degree of uncertainty to the current baseline projections, particularly with respect to international trade, food assistance and global sustainability initiatives.
Rising temperatures, shifting rainfall patterns, disruptions to ecosystem services, and more frequent extreme weather events are increasingly affecting agricultural yield trends. While some regions may benefit from longer growing seasons, others are becoming less suitable for cultivation. It is assumed that farmers will adapt by adjusting planting schedules, diversifying crop choices, and adopting integrated pest management strategies. However, the capacity to adapt remains uneven across regions. In this context, international trade plays a vital stabilising role. By enabling the movement of food from surplus to deficit regions, trade helps buffer local production shocks, thereby supporting stability of both supply and prices (Adenäuer, Frezal and Chatzopoulos, 2023[3]).
Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) risks, notably animal disease outbreaks, are an important source of uncertainty for trade in animal products. While farm-level production in species with rapid turnover, such as poultry, may recover relatively quickly following outbreaks like avian influenza, trade restrictions and structural adjustments can persist, potentially affecting long-term trade prospects. In contrast, diseases affecting livestock with longer life cycles, such as foot and mouth disease in cattle, can trigger prolonged trade restrictions and have serious economic repercussions due to extensive culling and the lengthy process of regaining disease-free status.
1.3.1. Emerging economies underpin consumption growth of agricultural commodities
Over the coming decade, the value of global consumption of agricultural and fish commodities is projected to grow by 13% from current levels by 2034 in constant USD, with nearly all the additional use expected to occur in middle- and low-income countries. This growth will be primarily driven by growing, more affluent and increasingly urban populations in these regions. Figure 1.4 shows how countries across different income levels allocate agricultural and fish commodities between food, feed, biofuel and other industrial use. Among these, food remains the primary driver of global agricultural demand.
India and Southeast Asian countries, which are driving most of the development among the lower middle-incomes countries, are expected to account for a growing 39% share of consumption growth by 2034, compared to 32% over the last ten years. Population growth, rising incomes and urbanization in the region are expected to fuel increasing demand for both staple foods and animal-based products, thereby supporting greater use of commodities for both food and feed.
In contrast, China which played a dominant role in driving global demand in the past decade, is projected to contribute only 13% of additional consumption growth by 2034, down from 32% over the previous decade. This shift reflects a declining population, slower disposable income growth and stabilising dietary patterns.
High growth in consumption is also expected in low-income countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa which is projected to contribute 14% of additional global agricultural commodity use over the next decade. While disposable household income gains in the region are expected to be more modest than in Asia, rapid population growth will generate strong food demand, especially for staple crops.
Food remains the primary use of agricultural commodities. In upper middle-income countries, feed use is projected to grow about 1.7 times faster than food use, driven by increased demand for animal-source foods. In contrast, in low-income countries, feed use is projected to grow only 1.1 times faster than food use of crops, underscoring their continued dependence on staple foods to meet basic dietary needs and support food security.
1.3.2. As incomes grow, consumption in low- and middle-income countries is projected to include more livestock and fish products
Daily per capita calorie intake (measured as food consumption3 net of estimated household waste) is projected to increase most strongly in lower middle-income countries followed by upper middle-income countries where a levelling off in total calorie consumption is expected towards the end of the decade (Figure 1.5). In low-income countries, modest gains in disposable household incomes allow only moderate increases in food consumption compared to middle-income countries. Consumers in high-income economies will increase their calorie intake only marginally as saturation points have been reached.
As incomes rise over the medium term, diets in low- and middle-income countries are projected to shift toward greater consumption of animal products. In contrast, no fundamental shift in dietary patterns is currently observable or expected in high-income countries, particularly with regard to meat consumption. Despite growing awareness and gains in availability, plant-based meat replacements still represent only a small share of total food consumption. Moreover, recent trends suggest that any reduction in meat consumption has largely been driven by price fluctuations rather than a sustained, preference-driven shift in eating habits. As a result, significant changes in consumption behaviour in high-income economies are unlikely to occur in the short term, with more pronounced adjustments potentially emerging over the longer term as generational preferences evolve.
The projected increase in food consumption from animal sources is particularly notable in lower middle-income countries, where daily per capita intake of livestock and fish products is expected to rise by about 25% on average. This growth is a positive trend toward improving nutrition, as these countries are expected to surpass the 300 kcal/day/person value identified in the Healthy Diet Basket (HDB)4 used by FAO to compute the cost and affordability of a healthy diet (Herforth et al., 2022[4]).
Low-income countries on the other hand are expected to continue to face major challenges in meeting global dietary requirements. By 2034, their per capita intake of nutrient‑rich animal foods is projected to reach only 143 kcal/day, well below the 300 kcal/day identified in the HDB. This slow inclusion of livestock and fish products highlights the difficulties to end all forms of malnutrition, particularly due to their role in supplying essential proteins and micronutrients necessary for healthy growth and development (FAO, 2023[5]; FAO, 2024[6]).
While the projections are presented in regional consumption patterns, it is crucial to consider that these numbers mask the unequal distribution of nutrients between and within countries and even households, which are assumed to persist over the medium term. Even in regions and countries where average intake appears adequate, consumers may still face deficiencies.
It is important to consider that both external drivers (such as conflict and extreme weather events) and internal factors within food systems, including low productivity, inadequate supply of nutritious foods, and an excessive availability of cheap, ultra‑processed and energy-dense foods high in fats, sugars, and/or salt, continue to raise the cost of nutritious food, making healthy diets increasingly unaffordable (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, 2024[7]). At the same time, the growing reliance on staples like maize and sugar, which provide calories but little nutritional value, further contributes to dietary deficiencies by displacing more nutrient-dense options and increases caloric intake without providing vital vitamins and minerals (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, 2019[8]; FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, 2020[9]).
In high-income countries, the projected consumption trends are driven by slowly evolving preferences and emerging health concerns, reinforced by policies aimed at reducing excessive intake of fats and caloric sweeteners. As a result, per capita consumption of fats and sweeteners is expected to decline while demand for nutrient-rich foods such as poultry, fish, fruits, and vegetables rises. The growing consumption of poultry and pigmeat compared to beef is driven by both health considerations and relative price differences.
The 2024 Outlook has shown that reducing food loss and waste (FLW) is a critical part of the global solution for ensuring food security and improving nutrition for a growing global population and enhancing environmental sustainability. Notably, a scenario analysis in the 2024 Outlook has estimated that halving food loss and waste by 2030, could reduce the number of undernourished people by 153 million.5
The recent OECD report Beyond Food Loss and Waste Reduction Targets (OECD, 2025[10]) and associated case studies reporting the food loss and waste policy environment in Australia (OECD, 2025[11]), France (OECD, 2025[12]) and Japan (OECD, 2024[13]) provide a comprehensive review of the international food loss and waste policy environment. This draws on data collected by the OECD from representatives of 42 national ministries and from the European Commission to support cross-country dialogue and accelerate the implementation of more effective evidence-based and context-specific FLW policies (Box 1.3).
In 2011, the FAO published first estimates on food loss and waste (FLW) which showed that around 30% of all food produced is either lost or wasted (FAO, 2011[14]). Since then, the need to reduce FLW has received significant international policy attention. Countries are committed to the 2030 SDG agenda that was adopted in 2015. Some countries have set FLW reduction targets that are more ambitious than those under their global commitments. For example, France has committed to halving FLW across all supply chains by 2030 and to achieving a 50% reduction in distribution and collective catering by 2025, extending to all stages by 2030.
Recent quantitative analysis undertaken by the OECD confirms that reducing FLW is a key policy lever to address the triple challenge of feeding a growing population, ensuring the livelihood of rural households, reducing GHG emissions and fulfilling sustainability commitments. It shows that achieving SDG 12.3 could reduce agricultural GHG emissions by 4% and lift 137 million people out of hunger by 2030.1 However, the analysis also identifies a potential loss in agricultural income due to reduced food demand, highlighting the need for policy makers to balance the associated benefits and costs when implementing their national FLW reduction strategies (Nenert et al., 2025[15]).
Efforts to reduce FLW have intensified since 2015, including the introduction of national FLW strategies. In many countries, multiple policy instruments are being used to address FLW, with the household and retail stages receiving the highest level of policy attention (Figure 1.7) through the implementation of soft policy instruments, such as awareness-raising campaigns and voluntary collaboration initiatives. However, unclear reduction targets, which often do not specify delivery dates and baseline levels, and the multiplication of policy initiatives could discourage compliance and commitment from stakeholders across the food supply chain.
Few countries conduct regular and dedicated evaluations of the impact of FLW policies, making it difficult to identify and scale up effective policy initiatives to maximise benefits for food systems. Japan, for example, evaluates the impact of its FLW strategy and associated policy instruments across several dimensions. Consumer awareness and behaviour change are assessed through an annual household survey, while economic and environmental outcomes were assessed through an ex post evaluation in 2023.
1. This result is similar to that of the previous analysis published in the 2024 Outlook, which estimated a reduction of 153 million people living in hunger as a consequence of halving FLW by 2030. The 16 million people difference between the latter and the results in this paper can be attributed to the implementation of the more refined cost structure of reducing FLW into the Aglink-Cosimo modelling framework and its effects on food demand.
1.3.3. Growing feed use is underpinned by herd expansions and increasing intensification of livestock and aquaculture production systems especially in middle-income countries
Over the projection period, total global inventories of cattle, sheep, pigs and poultry (aggregated in cattle-equivalent units) are projected to expand by 7%, whereas output of meat, dairy products and eggs (aggregated on a protein-basis) increases by 16.6%, indicating improvements in herd productivity. These trends are even more pronounced for lower middle-income countries, where livestock inventories are expected to increase by 10% and output by 43.6% by 2034. These continuing productivity improvements are supported by more intense feeding regimes, which, along with expanding animal herds, are projected to lead to a 15% increase in global feed consumption (on protein-equivalent basis).
Production efficiency varies globally due to differences in production technologies, livestock management and feeding practices and access to high-quality feed. Figure 1.8 shows the projected annual growth in feed protein consumption per productive animal unit compared to growth in productivity for non-ruminant livestock. This graph essentially depicts changes in feed protein input and animal protein output in pig and poultry production systems, with the diagonal line representing equal growth in both metrics. Points above the line indicate increasing efficiency, where animal protein production outpaces feed protein consumption, while points below the line indicate the opposite.
In lower middle-income countries, the shift towards more commercialized and feed-intensive production systems is expected to increase feed consumption per productive animal unit by 1.7% annually. This rate is nonetheless slower than the 2% growth in productivity, indicating improving total production efficiency in the non-ruminant livestock sector. A faster growth in the measured feed use intensity is projected for low‑income countries indicating the continuing structural change from backyard to commercial operations thereby outweighing projected animal productivity growth. In upper middle- and high-income countries, the projected growth in feed use intensity is marginal and aligns more closely with developments in productivity. Advances in animal genetics, feed technology and a shift towards a higher proportion of poultry in the total livestock herd are leading to improvements in production efficiencies in these industrialized countries.
The projections highlight that ongoing adoption of sustainable practices and technologies is expected to further enhance livestock production efficiency globally. Innovations such as precision feeding, improved disease management, use of food waste as livestock feed, and optimised breeding programs are likely to contribute to more efficient use of resources and better overall productivity. These advances will play an important role in meeting the growing global demand for animal protein while minimising their environmental impact.
Note: The size of the bubbles refers to the non-ruminant production (pig meat, poultry and eggs) in total protein during the base period 2022-24.
Source: OECD/FAO (2025), ''OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook'', OECD Agriculture statistics (database), http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/1hc.
1.3.4. Middle-income countries lead the expansion in biofuel use of primary agricultural commodities
Biofuels are liquid transport fuels derived from biomass and are used mostly in blends with fossil fuels to reduce GHG emissions and increase energy security. The production of biofuels creates additional demand for agricultural commodities. Maize and sugar products make up most of the feedstock for ethanol, while biodiesel production relies mainly on vegetable oils and used cooking oils, but the precise ranking varies from one biofuel-producing country to another (Table 1.1).
Notes: #numbers refer to country ranking in global production; percentages refer to the production share of countries in the base period.
In the OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2025-2034, biodiesel includes renewable diesel (also known as Hydrotreated Vegetable Oil or HVO), although these are different products.
Source: OECD/FAO (2025), ''OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook'', OECD Agriculture statistics (database), http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/1hc.
Global demand for biofuel is projected to grow at an average 0.9% p.a., driven by increasing transport fuel demand and supportive domestic policies. Over the coming years, most biofuel consumption growth is projected to come from middle-income countries, particularly Brazil and India for ethanol, and Indonesia for biodiesel.
As biofuel demand continues to rise, the range of production methods utilising non‑food biomass may change the use of key feedstock commodities (Figure 1.9). In the United States, a significant increase in the demand for vegetable oil and waste-based biofuels over the next decade may increase the supply of renewable diesel. However, concerns about fraud, particularly with biodiesel feedstock imports being falsely declared as waste-based, suggest that the United States may eventually impose restrictions on imports of these products. Furthermore, growth in biofuel use could come from sustainable aviation fuels (SAF), but their share remains insignificant in this baseline.
1.4.1. Growing consumption and shifting dietary preferences towards animal-source foods are expected to drive investments in livestock and aquaculture and increase production
Over the next decade, the gross value of global agricultural production (measured in constant USD) is projected to increase by 14% to 3.96 trillion USD in 2034. Livestock production is expected to lead this growth with a 16% increase, followed by crops at 14%, and fish and other aquatic foods at 12%. Middle-income countries in the Developed and East Asia, South and Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean regions are expected to remain the primary sources of global agricultural expansion (Figure 1.10), contributing 83% of global output growth, up from 79% in the previous decade.
The Asia Pacific region comprises the Developed and East Asia, which includes China, and the South and Southeast Asia sub-region, which includes India. The whole Asia Pacific region is particularly crucial for future global agricultural production and is projected to contribute 54% of additional global output. India is expected to lead the growth in Asia Pacific, accounting for 40% of the region's increase, followed by China, which, despite a declining role, will still contribute significantly. A sizeable share of global agricultural output growth is also expected from Latin America and the Caribbean, although its significance will moderate. In Sub-Saharan Africa and the Near East and North Africa regions, significant production growth is anticipated, increasing their combined share of additional global output to 19%, up from 13% in the previous decade. Production growth prospects in the industrialised regions of North America and Europe and Central Asia are expected to be limited growth potential due to resource constraints and regulations, with growth in the latter mainly driven by countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
The share of livestock in total agricultural production is projected to increase in the middle-income countries of Asia and the Near East and North Africa (Figure 1.11). Higher domestic demand for animal proteins due to rising incomes and populations in these regions, along with export opportunities, is expected to attract increased investments in the livestock and fish sectors, boosting production. Even in regions such as Latin America and the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the share of livestock production is stable or slightly declining, strong overall production growth will mean increased livestock production over the next decade.
China, which is driving the developments in the Developed and East Asia region, is expected to maintain its current share of livestock production in total agricultural production. In contrast, India, which is driving the developments in the South and Southeast Asia region, is projected to increase its share of livestock in total agricultural production significantly, underpinned by substantial increases of fish, poultry and dairy production by 2034. Although crops currently dominate agricultural output in Sub-Saharan Africa, a significant overall production increase of 29% in the livestock sector is projected by 2034, with poultry, beef, and dairy sectors contributing the largest volumes. In the Near East and North Africa, poultry and dairy are expected to be the primary growth leaders.
In almost all regions, the share of fish and aquaculture in total agricultural production is slightly declining. Although the total volume continues to grow, a significant slowdown in fish and aquaculture production is projected due to diminishing productivity gains globally, stemming from stricter environmental regulations and reduced availability of optimal production sites.
Despite continued growth in livestock and aquaculture production in middle‑income countries in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Africa, their growth potential is constrained because producers face limited access to advanced production technologies and receive fewer incentives due to low market prices, high input costs, and regulatory barriers. Addressing these challenges sustainably is crucial for realising the full growth potential of the livestock and aquaculture sectors in these regions.
1.4.2. Rising global agricultural and fish production, along with a shift towards higher animal production, is set to increase agricultural GHG emissions
Agriculture, forestry, and other land use (AFOLU) account for approximately 22% of global anthropogenic GHG emissions. These emissions are evenly split between direct on-farm emissions of methane and nitrous oxide, and indirect CO2 emissions from land use, land use change, and forestry (LULUCF) due to agricultural expansion. The Outlook focuses solely on the direct emissions associated with on-farm production and projects them based on historical data from FAOSTAT, following the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Tier 1 approach. This basic method applies emission factors to activities such as herd sizes, synthetic fertiliser application, rice cultivation per hectare, among others. While higher-tier methods that account for management practices would provide more precise estimates, they are beyond the scope of this Outlook.
Using this basic approach, the Outlook shows that the projected overall expansion of global agricultural and fish production, which will be partly based on growth in animal herds and croplands, particularly in middle-income countries, will increase direct GHG emissions over the next decade. Most of the projected increase is expected to occur in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, where ruminant herds are expanding (Figure 1.12). By 2034, direct GHG emissions from agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia are projected to increase by 14% and 8%, respectively. In contrast, emissions in industrialised Asia, North America and Europe and Central Asia will increase only marginally as ruminant production stagnates.
Sub-Saharan Africa has a population more than three times larger than that of North America and currently has over three times the beef cattle herd. However, its productivity, measures as output per animal, is only about one-tenth as high. Given the global impact of GHG emissions, prioritising low-yield regions for emission reduction efforts in the agriculture sector could bring substantial benefits. By reorienting ruminant farming and increasing productivity, fewer ruminants would be needed to produce the same or greater amount of animal protein, thereby reducing methane emissions from enteric fermentation and manure management. Such efforts would also improve livelihoods for rural communities where most ruminants are held. It should be emphasised that while cattle production in these regions is emission-intensive, the higher agricultural consumption in industrialised economies, particularly of livestock products, also contributes significantly to global direct agricultural GHG emissions. Therefore, addressing emissions requires a balanced approach that considers both production and consumption patterns globally.
Ruminants and other livestock production will account for about 70% of the projected global increase in direct agricultural GHG emissions, while synthetic fertilisers, another significant source of GHG emissions due to nitrous oxide release during fertilisation, are expected to contribute 28%. The Outlook does not account for GHG emissions from fertiliser production but including them would double their reported environmental footprint. Rice cultivation is another major source of direct agricultural GHG emissions as irrigated paddy fields emit substantial quantities of methane. However, the projected increase in rice production is expected to result mainly from yield improvements rather than expansion of paddy areas, thereby curbing emissions from rice cultivation.
It is important to note that while direct GHG emissions are a crucial component of AFOLU’s environmental footprint, they are not the only factor. Incorporating other factors into the sustainability metrics, such as the sector's impact on water resources, soil health and biodiversity, and its ability to sequester carbon, and promote environmental resilience, would contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of agri-environmental issues. Such an approach would support analyses of broad-based policy options to address and improve the sector’s environmental footprint beyond just focusing on GHG emissions.
1.4.3. Global agricultural growth will be driven by productivity gains, reducing the carbon intensity of the sector, but large productivity gaps will remain
Assuming a continued transition to more intensive production systems in low- and middle-income economies, the projections show that 83% of global crop production growth will be attributable to yield improvements. Similarly, a considerable proportion of growth in livestock and fish production is expected to result from productivity gains, although herd expansions will also play a significant role. Gradual adoption of better breeding techniques, improved farm management practices, increased use of inputs such as fertilisers and chemicals, and improved access to veterinary services for livestock are anticipated to progressively increase agricultural productivity in low- and middle-income countries.
Given that production growth will largely be driven by productivity improvements rather than expansions in cultivated land and livestock herds, the carbon intensity of agricultural production is projected to decline across all regions over the coming decade. Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are expected to experience the most substantial decreases in GHG emissions intensity, the emissions produced per unit of output or activity, in spite of increasing levels of direct GHG emissions. This is because it is generally easier to reduce emissions in initially more emissions-intensive production systems than in regions where yields are higher and the marginal gains from reducing emissions are lower.
Despite the projected growth in agricultural productivity in many low- and middle‑income countries, significant disparities relative to industrialised countries continue to exist. Figure 1.12 shows variations in yields across regions for selected crop commodities. Livestock and crop commodities such as maize and rice exhibit the widest spread in yields, due to differences in technologies and greater yield potential for these commodities. The Outlook does not project any significant changes in the distribution of yields over the next decade as shown in Figure 1.13.
Note: Productivity is measured as tonnes of grain per area harvested for crops, tonnes of milk per cow for dairy, tonnes of meat per 100 productive animals for beef and pork, and tonnes of meat per 1 000 productive hens for poultry. Each symbol represents the average yield for a given commodity within a region. The red lines correspond to the global average per commodity.
Source: OECD/FAO (2025), ''OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook'', OECD Agriculture statistics (database), http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/1hc.
While these disparities can be partly attributed to differences in agro-ecological conditions, gaps in access to finance, modern farming technologies, skilled labour and use of agronomic inputs are major contributing factors. To meet future food demand without increasing herd sizes, croplands and consequently agricultural GHG emissions, one potential pathway is to narrow existing technology gaps on currently reared herds and cultivated agricultural land, or more broadly, the sustainable intensification of agricultural systems. The FAO’s Hand-in-Hand initiative discussed in Box 1.4 is an evidence-based, country-owned and led initiative to accelerate agricultural transformation with the goal of eradicating poverty, ending hunger and malnutrition, and reducing inequalities.
The FAO Hand-in-Hand Initiative (HIH), launched in 2019, is designed to accelerate at-scale agri-food systems transformation and rural development by fostering targeted investments and partnerships. HIH encourages partnerships between its member governments and investors, creating national and regional investment opportunities. At the annual HIH Investment Forum, governments can present their agrifood investment priorities to drive food systems transformation in their countries.
Boosting agricultural productivity and reducing poverty and food insecurity
The HIH Initiative prioritises the world’s most vulnerable regions, targeting investments where agricultural productivity and rural economies are weakest. HIH leverages advanced analytics and geospatial data to determine the areas where interventions will have the highest impact, ensuring that resources reach the communities most in need. The OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook can serve as a guide in this process, providing economic projections and policy insights and identifying potential areas for action to support informed decision-making.
To increase productivity sustainably, the initiative promotes climate-smart agriculture, improved irrigation systems, and sustainable land management. These efforts ensure that technology gaps are addressed, enabling sustainable, locally driven solutions that contribute to long-term economic and environmental resilience. Some notable examples of productivity-enhancing projects include the following:
In Ethiopia, the initiative supports investments in high-potential agricultural areas such as the Bulbula Agro-Commodity Procurement Zones in Eastern Oromia, where investments in fertilisers, seed varieties, and agricultural machinery are expected to significantly boost wheat production and marketing (FAO, 2022[17]).
In Guatemala, territorial typologies developed through the HIH initiative have been integrated into the national public investment system and are now part of the government planning framework used to analyse all public investments, including the allocation of funds for irrigation and road infrastructure (FAO, 2024[18]).
The HIH Southern Africa investment plan, valued at nearly USD 553 million, focuses on irrigation systems to expand agro-industrialisation and mechanisation, and to enhance market trade integration (FAO, 2024[19]).
Strengthening rural economies and market access
The HIH Initiative acknowledges the significance of economic development in rural areas. Mobilizing public-private partnerships, it strengthens agricultural value chains from production to processing and distribution. The OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook complements this effort by providing forecasts on global growth patterns, helping policy makers align their agricultural strategies with global markets.
Promoting resilience and sustainability
Investments in renewable energy, agroforestry, and sustainable livestock management contribute to long-term sustainability. Efficient water and resource management are also priorities. Through soil conservation, reforestation efforts, and optimised irrigation techniques the initiative ensures productivity without depleting natural resources (FAO, 2024[20]).
A potential game-changer for global agriculture
When implemented by governments and partners including the private sector, banks, impact funds, global international financial institutions and international development partners, the HIH Initiative has the potential to reshape the future of global agrifood systems, making it more inclusive, productive and sustainable for future generations.
1.5.1. What are emission reduction technologies?
The agricultural sector is recognised not only as a contributor to Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions but also as a potential source of solutions. GHG emissions from agriculture, primarily methane (CH₄), nitrous oxide (N₂O), and carbon dioxide (CO₂), arise from a wide range of activities, including enteric fermentation in livestock, manure management, rice cultivation, fertiliser application, and land-use changes. As global food demand continues to rise, the challenge lies in reducing the environmental impact of agricultural production while simultaneously ensuring food security (Section 1.4.2).
The 2024 Outlook report (OECD/FAO, 2024[21]) featured a stylised scenario that simulated the impact of halving food losses along supply chains and reducing food waste at the retail and consumer levels by 2030, in line with Sustainable Development Goal 12.3. The scenario projected a potential 4% reduction in global agricultural GHG emissions by 2030, with this reduction occurring fairly evenly across countries regardless of income level. It also anticipated a decrease in food prices, leading to increased food intakes in low‑income countries (+10%) and lower-middle-income countries (+6%), ultimately reducing the number of undernourished people by 153 million (−26%) by 2030.
This year’s Outlook explores an additional pathway for reducing the environmental impact of agricultural production while eradicating undernourishment globally, focusing on the large‑scale adoption of emission reduction technologies (ERTs). In agriculture, ERTs encompass a broad range of innovations, tools, and practices designed to lower GHG emissions from farming systems without compromising productivity. These include both biological and technical interventions that address the main emission sources in crop and livestock systems. The following paragraphs provide examples of such ERTs currently being developed or implemented to reduce GHG emissions while maintaining or enhancing agricultural productivity.
In the livestock sector, ERTs primarily aim to reduce enteric methane emissions, improve feed efficiency, and enhance manure management systems. Diet management plays a central role, with strategies such as optimised grazing to enhance pasture yield and quality, improved forage digestibility and precision ration balancing supported by artificial intelligence. These approaches improve feed conversion efficiency and lower methane production during digestion. Feed additives such as 3-NOP and Bovaer, which are already authorised for use in the European Union, have proven effective in reducing emissions from ruminants, though their application remains challenging in the predominantly pasture‑based systems in low- and middle-income countries. The use of seaweed in ruminant diets offers further potential, although more research is needed to assess long‑term impacts and scalability. Reproductive management, disease prevention and treatment, as well as selective breeding can also significantly reduce methane emissions by enhancing feed-to-emissions performance.
Technologies for improved manure management offer another important opportunity for reducing emissions. Anaerobic digesters capture methane from stored manure and convert it into renewable biogas. Other technologies, such as solid-liquid separation, covered storage tanks, and optimised methods of manure application, help reduce direct methane emissions and nitrogen losses. Low-emission application techniques, such as dribble bars, have been shown to significantly reduce ammonia volatilisation and associated indirect emissions. However, in spite of their technical potential, these technologies have seen limited adoption in many regions. Barriers to their adoption include high upfront investment costs, inadequate infrastructure, and a lack of enabling policy frameworks or financial incentives. Consequently, farmers often lack the means or motivation to implement such practices, especially in areas with restricted access to credit or advisory services.
In crop production, ERTs focus on improving nutrient use efficiency, minimising soil disturbance, and enhancing soil carbon sequestration. Precision agriculture offers significant opportunities in this context, enabling the targeted application of inputs using GPS-guided equipment, real-time sensors and machine learning. Fertilisers and pesticides can be applied more accurately, reducing nitrous oxide emissions and limiting environmental runoff. Proper timing and methods of input application are also essential. Better synchronisation of fertiliser and manure use with crop nutrient demand, alongside the application of nitrification inhibitors and variable rate technologies, can substantially reduce emissions and nutrient losses.
In addition to input management, various soil and landscape practices contribute to emissions mitigation and carbon storage. Conservation tillage and no-till farming help retain soil organic carbon, while the use of winter cover crops and buffer strips reduces erosion and nitrogen leaching. In wetland areas, restoring peatlands and rewetting organic soils present high-impact opportunities for long-term carbon sequestration. Other innovative solutions, such as agrivoltaics, are being explored to integrate solar energy production with agricultural use.
Despite the broad range of available technologies, adoption remains limited, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. Obstacles include high initial costs, limited access to finance, insufficient policy incentives, and a general lack of awareness or technical support. In these countries, promoting low-cost, locally adapted practices—such as integrated nutrient and water management, organic matter recycling, agroforestry, and improved rotations—offers multiple co-benefits and serves as a practical entry point where access to capital-intensive solutions is limited.
1.5.2. Implementing emission reduction technologies in the Aglink-Cosimo model
As explained in Section 1.4.2, the Outlook focuses exclusively on direct GHG emissions from on-farm production. GHG emissions at historical periods are taken from FAOSTAT data, then projected using the IPCC’s Tier 1 guidelines. In the baseline scenario, emissions are calculated by applying commodity-specific emission factors to a set of direct production activities, including enteric fermentation, manure management, rice cultivation, synthetic fertiliser application, manure applied to soils and manure left on pasture.
While more detailed (higher tier) reporting would enable more accurate emission estimates, the lack of the necessary data at the global level currently limits the scope for modelling how producers might adopt ERTs. Consequently, to assess the potential impact of ERTs in global agriculture through scenario analysis using the Aglink-Cosimo model, alternative approaches have been developed to incorporate supply-side mitigation dynamics.
Reducing emissions through the implementation of ERTs, while maintaining production levels, requires producers to make additional investments which can sometimes be substantial. The relationship between the cost of implementation and the amount of emissions reduced varies by region and type of farming activity. These relationships are normally captured through marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs), which represent the cost-effectiveness of different mitigation options.
The MACCs used in this analysis are derived from the Global Biosphere Management Model (GLOBIOM), developed by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) (IIASA, 2023[22]). GLOBIOM explores how agricultural and land use decisions affect GHG emission levels. Incorporating this information into Aglink‑Cosimo allows the model to simulate how farmers might respond to financial incentives that make emissions more expensive. In such cases, producers are expected to adopt more efficient practices, such as improved feed, better livestock genetics, or upgraded equipment to reduce emissions without compromising output.
In practice, the emissions coefficient is the key variable adjusted in this scenario to reflect the possible reduction in emission intensity. These reductions represent the adoption of cleaner technologies and more efficient production systems. In the Aglink-Cosimo, this is implemented through emission coefficients that differ from the baseline, consistent with expected technological progress and structural change, though the underlying processes are not explicitly tracked due to the model’s partial equilibrium structure. The GLOBIOM model provides the marginal abatement cost, modelled by a carbon price of USD 60 per tonne of CO₂ equivalent. This serves as a proxy to connect the updated emission coefficients with the associated production costs. In Aglink-Cosimo, this cost is applied on top of the other production costs, assuming producers bear the full burden.
1.5.3. Emission reduction technologies require lower productivity increases to achieve the Zero Hunger target in a sustainable manner
The scenario developed in the 2022 edition of the OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook (OECD/FAO, 2022[23]) outlined a pathway to end global hunger by 2030 while maintaining GHG emissions from agriculture within the emission envelopes consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5–2°C. The analysis assumed accelerated investment in agricultural productivity and improved market access, coupled with targeted support for low-income and food-insecure regions.
To meet these dual objectives, the 2022 scenario required a 28% increase in global agricultural productivity over the next decade, three times larger than what would be achieved under the projected baseline trend. This productivity gain was necessary to meet rising food demand, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, while avoiding the need to expand agricultural land use, a key driver of GHG emissions. Although the approach focused on increasing productivity, it did not consider the widespread adoption of ERTs on the production side.
Building on the 2022 scenario, this Outlook introduces an updated scenario analysis incorporating ERTs that can mitigate GHG emissions from agricultural production, aligned with the marginal abatement cost under a hypothetical carbon price of USD 60 per tonne of CO₂ equivalent. The integration of mitigation technologies significantly alters the production-side requirements for meeting the dual targets. With widespread adoption of these ERTs, the overall productivity increase required to sufficiently increase food availability across all household income groups to achieve Zero Hunger6 and support a 7% reduction of GHG emission from the 2022-24 base period drops from 28% to 15% globally by 2034.7
The Zero Hunger target is reached by increasing average per capita income to the level sufficient to lower the Prevalence of Undernourishment (PoU) below the 2.5% threshold in all countries where it is projected above that level in the baseline. Food consumption in food-secure countries is assumed to remain as in the baseline. In lower‑middle income countries, the necessary increase in average calorie intake to alleviate hunger is estimated at 10% between the baseline and the scenario. In low-income countries a 35% rise would be required. These assumptions are depicted in Figure 1.14.
To achieve the Zero Hunger target, without assuming significant reductions in the inequality of access to food, a 10% increase in food production is necessary, especially in low- and lower-middle-income countries. To reduce the emissions from this additional production in order to achieve the targeted 7% reduction in global direct GHG emissions from on-farm production relative to current levels, productivity improvements and the widespread adoption of ERTs are needed. Figure 1.15 illustrates that the relative importance of these developments varies by region.
Note: This figure shows projected annual growth in direct GHG emissions from agriculture together with annual growth in the estimated net value of production of crop and livestock commodities covered in the Outlook (measured in constant USD 2014-16 prices). The size of the bubbles corresponds to the level of agricultural GHG emissions in 2034. Estimates are based on historical time series from the FAOSTAT Climate Change: Agrifood systems emissions databases which are extended with the Outlook database. CO2 equivalents are calculated using the global warming potential of each gas as reported in the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6). Emission types that are not related to any Outlook variable (organic soil cultivation and burning savannahs) are kept constant at their latest available value. The category 'Other' includes direct GHG emissions from burning crop residues, burning savanna, crop residues, and cultivation of organic soils. The net value of production uses own estimates for internal seed and feed use.
Source: FAOSTAT Emissions-Agriculture and Value of Agricultural Production databases, http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data, accessed January 2025; OECD/FAO (2025), “OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook”, OECD Agriculture statistics (database), http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/1hc.
In regions comprising a high share of low-income countries (Sub-Saharan Africa, Near East and North Africa, and South-East Asia), the increase in production dominates. This is particularly evident in Africa, where GHG emissions continue to rise under the scenario compared to the current situation. The main reason is that meeting the Zero Hunger target in these regions requires a significant increase in production.
In contrast, in more food-secure regions (Europe and Central Asia, North America, Latin America and Caribbean, and Developed and East Asia), the effects of productivity gains and the adoption of ERTs are more prominent. This leads to an absolute reduction in GHG emissions.
1.6.1. Trade flows between exporting and importing regions to grow
Following the WTO Agreement on Agriculture in January 1995 and China's accession to the WTO in December 2001, trade in agri-food commodities experienced significant growth. The proportion of production traded for commodities covered in the Outlook increased from 16% in 2000 to 23% in the base period of 2022-24, reflecting a trade sector growing at a faster rate than agricultural production.
The global agri-food trade has also demonstrated remarkable resilience over the past several years despite facing numerous disruptions. The COVID-19 pandemic, geopolitical conflicts, trade protectionism, and supply chain bottlenecks have all posed significant challenges. Yet the sector has managed to adapt and continue functioning, highlighting its robustness and resilience. However, since 2019, the share of production traded has stabilised, fluctuating between 22% and 23%.
Given that agricultural production is often geographically separated from the regions where food and feed demand are projected to grow the most, well-functioning multilateral cooperation and a rules-based trading system remain essential. These mechanisms ensure that food can be efficiently distributed from surplus to deficit regions, thereby supporting global food security and rural livelihoods. Assuming international agricultural commodity markets remain well-functioning, the Outlook projects that the share of consumed calories crossing international borders will stabilise at around 22%. This projection underscores the continued importance of international trade for the growth of the global agri-food sector and highlights the necessity of maintaining and strengthening current trade frameworks.
The increasing differentiation between agricultural commodity net-exporting and net-importing regions is expected to persist over the next decade (Figure 1.16). Net‑exporting regions such as Latin America, North America, and Europe and Central Asia are anticipated to increase their surplus volumes. Key exporters in Latin America such as Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, have experienced substantial growth in exports over the past decade and are projected to continue generating surpluses, solidifying the region’s status as the world's leading agricultural exporter. North America is expected to maintain its position as the second-largest exporter, with agricultural net exports rebounding after falling from their peak in 2020 and stabilising at a lower level. The Europe and Central Asia region became a net exporter in 2014, following agricultural restructuring and development and resulting productivity improvements due to foreign and domestic investments in the Black Sea countries.
In contrast, regions with significant population growth and an expanding middle class are projected to see their net imports rise in proportion to their increasing consumption. In South and Southeast Asia, income-driven demand and population growth in the Philippines, Malaysia, India, Viet Nam, and Thailand have transformed the region from a net exporter a decade ago to a net importer in the base period. Over the medium term, countries such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, as well as least developed nations in the region will drive the region’s import demand. In Sub-Saharan Africa, where global agri-food markets are crucial for supporting the food security needs of its rapidly growing population, net imports of basic food commodities are projected to increase by 55% by 2034. Nevertheless, Africa is growing exporter of fruits (Box 1.5). In the Near East and North Africa region, imports are expected to expand while exports decline. Population growth and limited domestic production prospects stemming from resource constraints will contribute to an expected 34% increase in net imports by 2034.
The fruit sector represents a critical source of nutrition and holds significant potential for income generation within an increasingly competitive global marketplace. The majority of fruit production in Africa is predominantly oriented towards domestic consumption. These fruits provide local populations a degree of access to essential micronutrients and dietary diversification albeit relatively limited, there has been a notable expansion in fruit trade in recent years.
Given the high economic returns per hectare associated with various fruit crops, sustainably developing this sector presents an opportunity to optimise the utilisation of the continent’s limited resources and contribute to reducing Africa’s trade deficit in essential food items. The sector can further strengthen food security by serving as a source of income for agricultural producers and improving household nutrition.
The most important fruits produced by both quantity and value are plantains and cooking bananas, which serve primarily as a staple due to their starchy qualities, followed by bananas. Leading fruit producing countries in Africa by production value include Algeria, South Africa, Egypt, Morocco and Nigeria.
Fruits traded within Africa vary substantially from those traded with external partners. Among African nations the most commonly traded fruits by value are apples, unspecified fruit juices, and bananas. In contrast, exports to non-African destinations are largely made up of citrus fruits and grapes, reflecting their higher unit values in export markets. This trend is driven almost entirely by an expansion in exports from South Africa, Egypt and Morocco, which have seen considerable growth over the past two decades (Figure 1.17).
Trends and prospects
According to the projections for banana and tropical fruit production detailed in Chapter 10 of this publication, the outlook for an increasing fruit production in Africa through 2034 is expected to be influenced by moderate expansion of cultivated area, coupled with persistently low productivity levels. Growth in consumption is expected to be only gradual due to limited income growth, environmental challenges, and geopolitical developments constraining consumer access and availability. The outlook for improved nutritional outcomes thereby appears uncertain.
Intra-African trade growth is expected to be facilitated by the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the continuing trend of urbanization, which supports the development of formal values chains of fruits. In terms of market potential beyond the continent, South Africa is anticipated to continue benefiting from rising demand from the Near East, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and increasingly also from markets in the Far East. Meanwhile, Morocco and Egypt are strategically positioned to meet the rising import demand from European markets. Growth is also expected for fruit exports from Kenya, in particular of avocados, in response to rising demand from world markets and investments into production expansion.
Key areas of development for further growth in the fruit sector across Africa include transportation infrastructure and cold chains maintenance. Challenges are particularly pronounced in landlocked countries, which face considerably greater difficulties in reaching international markets. Additionally, limited harvesting windows expose the sector to adverse weather risks further complicating production and marketing.
1.6.2. Trade plays a crucial role in enhancing food security, nutrition, and environmental sustainability
International agricultural trade plays a crucial role in balancing food deficits and surpluses across countries, stabilising food prices and providing consumers worldwide with more diverse and nutritious food. It also enables stakeholders across the agricultural and food industries to participate in global markets and agrifood value chains, thereby increasing their capacity to produce, earn income and purchase food.
In addition, by enabling the efficient exchange of products from regions with optimal production capabilities to areas of need and supported by environmental provisions and standards that promote sustainable agricultural practices in trade agreements, agricultural trade can promote more sustainable use of land, water, and other natural resources, reducing pressure on local ecosystems and lowering the sector’s global carbon footprint. However, the net impact of international agri-food trade on the environment is uncertain as the relocation of production to regions with less stringent environmental standards and the transportation of agricultural goods over long distances can contribute to greater greenhouse gas emissions.
It is essential that the current trading framework evolves to ensure food security and improved nutrition for food deficit populations, while also being environmentally sustainable, so that the benefits of trade do not come at the expense of the natural environment. Box 1.6 summarises research on the link between trade, nutrition and environmental sustainability. While the social and economic dimensions are also critical to sustainability, they remain difficult to quantify or model. Addressing these challenges will require the development of new analytical approaches and methodologies which are not the scope of the Aglink-Cosimo model.
Trade is an integral part of agrifood systems, linking producers and consumers across the globe. It enables the movement of food from surplus to deficit regions, contributing to food security, stabilising prices, and diversifying diets.
International trade has played a key role in enabling this nutritional transformation. In 2023, the value of global food and agricultural trade had reached USD 1.9 trillion. The calories traded more than doubled between 2000 and 2023. The diversity of foods available for consumption has expanded significantly with countries now accessing an average of 225 food items—far more than the average 120 items produced domestically (FAO, 2024[24]). Trade thus allows countries with limited agroecological resources to complement their domestic production with nutritious food imports, supporting dietary quality and food security. Empirical analysis suggests that trade openness tends to reduce stunting in children under five, regardless of a country’s income level.
However, trade can also contribute to increasing availability of energy-dense foods, high in fats, sugars and/or salt, although its effects on obesity are more heterogeneous and linked to national dietary patterns and food environments (FAO, 2024[24]). For strongly import-dependent countries, greater availability of ultra-processed foods through trade can accelerate shifts toward obesogenic diets.
Yet the environmental sustainability of the current trading model is not guaranteed. In low- and middle-income countries, rising incomes and shifting preferences are projected to increase the consumption of livestock and fish products over the next decade. At the same time, population growth will add pressure to meet higher aggregate protein demand. Livestock and aquaculture production are major contributors to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and trade can amplify these impacts depending on where and how food is produced. However, emissions intensities vary significantly. As such, under certain conditions, trade can reduce global emissions by reallocating production to more efficient regions, particularly where transport-related emissions are relatively minor (Avetisyan, Hertel and Sampson, 2013[25]).
However, this outcome depends on several factors. Structural constraints, trade policies, and national preferences can prevent environmentally efficient trade flows from materialising. Moreover, trade openness can also drive resource-intensive production, deforestation, and biodiversity loss if sustainability safeguards are not in place (FAO, 2022[26]). The net effect of trade on the environment and nutrition is therefore context‑dependent and often ambiguous.
Looking forward, policies that promote open and efficient global food markets, coupled with national regulations and sustainability standards, are essential. Regional trade agreements increasingly incorporate environmental provisions and promote voluntary certification schemes (FAO, 2022[26]). Aligning trade with environmental and nutrition goals will require investment in emissions-efficient production, better accounting of carbon footprints across value chains, and a nuanced understanding of when trade complements—or undermines—local food system resilience.
Note: Depending on FAO’s Supply Utilization Accounts, food items refer to individual foods such as blueberries and potatoes or to broader aggregates such as frozen vegetables and chocolate products.
1.7.1. Continued long-term decline in real global agricultural commodity prices hinges on sustained investment in productivity improvements
The Outlook uses prices at key international ports as reference prices to clear global agricultural commodity markets. Real global agricultural commodity prices are projected to follow a long-term declining trend, consistent with the assumptions of ongoing productivity improvements and normal weather conditions, which are expected to lower the marginal cost of production for most agricultural commodities (Figure 1.18).
Sustained investments in biotechnology, mechanisation and precision agriculture to improve agricultural productivity are fundamental for realising the projected decline in real agricultural commodity prices. Without such investments, the sector may struggle to achieve the necessary productivity gains, potentially resulting in higher production costs and increased commodity prices.
It is also important to recognise that the actual impact of changes in international commodity prices on local producers and consumers varies significantly. Factors such as transport costs, local currency movements, trade policies, and the degree of integration of domestic markets into the global trading system determine whether and to what extent international price signals are transmitted to domestic markets, influencing local food prices. High transport costs, for example, can dampen the effect of global price changes, making them less noticeable to local producers and consumers while fluctuations in local currencies can either amplify or mitigate the impact of global price shifts. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for policy makers aiming to stabilize local food prices and ensure food security.
1.7.2. Stochastic simulations show the possible variation in price projections
Price projections presented in this Outlook result from the interplay of fundamental supply and demand factors under expected weather and yield trends, and specific macroeconomic and policy assumptions. While the Outlook is based on the best information available, there is an unavoidable degree of uncertainty attached to the projections and underlying assumptions. Examples of such uncertainties include extreme weather events, crop and livestock disease outbreaks, policy shifts, and geopolitical tensions, which may affect production and trade prospects and cause unexpected market volatility.
The risk of food price volatility is notably high due to the increasingly price inelastic global demand for food, especially in middle and high-income countries. This inflexibility means that even minor disruptions in supply can trigger disproportionately large price fluctuations, impacting food affordability for vulnerable populations who may already be struggling to meet nutrient needs. Consequently, social protection measures such as food subsidies, targeted financial aid and robust safety nets remain crucial in mitigating the adverse effects of food price swings. An enabling economic and political environment that prioritizes investments in local food production, adopts a more disciplined trade policy approach, and enhances the efficiency and resilience of food supply chains is also necessary.
To evaluate the impacts of deviations from projected trends, a partial stochastic analysis (PSA) was conducted on the baseline projections. This analysis simulates potential future variability of the main determinants of prices using observed past variability. It considers fluctuations in global macroeconomic drivers and specific agricultural crop yields but excludes variability due to animal diseases or policy changes. Aggregated results from multiple PSA simulations, shown in Figure 1.19, indicate a 75% probability of prices staying within the blue range in any given year, and a 90% probability of remaining within the green range. An extreme event causing prices to fall outside these ranges has a 40% probability of occurring at least once during the projection period. The PSA analysis equips policy makers with an understanding of potential fiscal exposure arising from social assistance payments due to high food prices or risks for farmer livelihood in the event of low prices.
Note: Expected evolution of nominal prices under the baseline scenario of the Outlook (solid line) in relation to the stochastic outcomes shown in the blue 75% and green 90% confidence intervals.
Source: OECD/FAO (2025), ''OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook'', OECD Agriculture statistics (database), http://data-explorer.oecd.org/s/1hc.
References
[3] Adenäuer, M., C. Frezal and T. Chatzopoulos (2023), “Mitigating the impact of extreme weather events on agricultural markets through trade”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 198, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/aa584482-en.
[2] Adenäuer, M., E. Laget and M. Cluff (2024), “Fertile Futures: Scenario Analysis on the Interconnected Dynamics of Fertiliser and Agricultural Markets”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 207, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/b1606a57-en.
[25] Avetisyan, M., T. Hertel and G. Sampson (2013), “Is Local Food More Environmentally Friendly? The GHG Emissions Impacts of Consuming Imported versus Domestically Produced Food”, Environmental and Resource Economics, Vol. 58/3, pp. 415-462, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-013-9706-3.
[18] FAO (2024), Advancing public investment in agriculture to reduce rural poverty and end hunger: key developments in Guatemala under the Hand-in-Hand Initiative, https://www.fao.org/hand-in-hand/news/guatemala-hand-in-hand/en.
[20] FAO (2024), Hand-in-Hand (HIH) Targeted investments for sustainable and at-scale agrifood aystems development, https://openknowledge.fao.org/handle/20.500.14283/cd0917en.
[19] FAO (2024), Hand-in-Hand Regional Initiative for Southern Africa, https://www.fao.org/hand-in-hand/hih-IF-2024/southern-africa/en.
[24] FAO (2024), The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets 2024 - Trade and nutrition Policy coherence for healthy diets, https://doi.org/10.4060/cd2144en.
[6] FAO (2024), The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2024, FAO, https://doi.org/10.4060/cd0683en.
[5] FAO (2023), Contribution of terrestrial animal source food to healthy diets for improved nutrition and health outcomes, FAO, https://doi.org/10.4060/cc3912en.
[17] FAO (2022), Ethiopia Hand-in-Hand Initiative Investment Forum 2022, https://www.fao.org/hand-in-hand/investment-forum-2022/ethiopia/en (accessed on 2025).
[26] FAO (2022), The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets 2022 - The geograpgy of food and agricultural trade: Policy approaches for sustainable development, FAO, https://doi.org/10.4060/cc0471en.
[14] FAO (2011), Global Food Losses and Food Waste. Extent, Causes and Prevention, FAO, https://www.fao.org/4/mb060e/mb060e00.htm.
[7] FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO (2024), The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024, FAO; IFAD; UNICEF; WFP; WHO;, https://doi.org/10.4060/cd1254en.
[9] FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO (2020), The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2020, FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, https://doi.org/10.4060/ca9692en.
[8] FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO (2019), The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2019, FAO, https://doi.org/10.4060/ca5162en.
[4] Herforth, A. et al. (2022), Methods and options to monitor the cost and affordability of a healthy diet globally, FAO, https://doi.org/10.4060/cc1169en.
[1] IEA (2004), World Energy Outlook 2024, IEA, Paris, https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-outlook-2024.
[22] IIASA (2023), Global Biosphe Management Model (GLOBIOM) documentation, https://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/18996/1/GLOBIOM_Documentation.pdf.
[15] Nenert, C. et al. (2025), “The potential effects of reducing food loss and waste: Impacts on the triple challenge and cost-benefits analysis”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 222, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/bd2aedc6-en.
[11] OECD (2025), A Stocktaking of Food Loss and Waste Policies: Australia, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-issue-focus/food-loss-and-waste/A%20Stocktaking%20of%20FLW-Japan.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2025).
[12] OECD (2025), A Stocktaking of Food Loss and Waste Policies: France, OECD Publishing, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-issue-focus/food-loss-and-waste/A%20Stocktaking%20of%20FLW-France.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2025).
[10] OECD (2025), “Beyond food loss and waste reduction targets: Translating reduction ambitions into policy outcomes”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 214, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/59cf6c95-en.
[16] OECD (2025), “Beyond food loss and waste reduction targets: Translating reduction ambitions into policy outcomes”, OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Papers, No. 214, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/59cf6c95-en.
[13] OECD (2024), A Stocktaking of Food Loss and Waste Policies: Japan, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-issue-focus/food-loss-and-waste/A%20Stocktaking%20of%20FLW-Japan.pdf (accessed on 2 April 2025).
[21] OECD/FAO (2024), OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2024-2033, OECD Publishing, Paris/Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, https://doi.org/10.1787/4c5d2cfb-en.
[23] OECD/FAO (2022), OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2022-2031, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/f1b0b29c-en.
← 1. The Outlook uses the UN Medium-Variant projections from the 2024 Revision of the United Nations Population Prospects database.
← 2. National GDP and per capita income assumptions are based on the IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2024) until 2029 and extended until 2034.
← 3. In the Outlook, food consumption is measure as food availability net of estimated distributional waste.
← 4. The Healthy Diet Basket is the global standard used by FAO to compute the cost and affordability of a healthy diet and is based on the average food group proportions and recommendations across national food-based dietary guidelines (FBDGs). It is identified to meet a dietary energy intake target of 2330 kcal/person/day.
← 5. The scenario also projected a 4% reduction of global direct GHG emissions from agriculture. However, implementing measures to reduce food loss and waste would come with significant costs and require overcoming various challenges, such as the negative impact on producers' livelihoods due to decreased production and lower prices for their goods.
← 6. In this scenario, “Zero Hunger” is achieved when the Prevalence of Undernourishment (PoU) (SDG indicator 2.1.1) is below 2.5% in every country. The PoU calculation is a function of average calorie availability (DES), minimum dietary requirements (MDER) and inequality of access to food (CV) in a country. DES and dietary patterns in a country are a function of per-capita income and evolve accordingly. Per-capita income is adjusted to the level needed to increase DES such that calorie availability is higher than MDER for 97.5% of consumers while also adjusting dietary patterns to remain consistent with income levels. CVs are projected to follow long-term decreasing trends in most countries and their values remain at baseline levels in the scenario.
← 7. The two productivity increase figures are not fully comparable, as they are based on different base periods with varying initial productivity levels, and they project towards different target years. These differences, along with the inclusion of special technology in the 2025 scenario, should be noted as caveats when comparing the results.