Pierre-Alain Pionnier
OECD Economic Surveys: Lithuania 2025
Abstract
Since independence, Lithuania has caught up with Western European productivity levels more rapidly than neighbouring countries, but a gap remains. While bold reforms in recent years have significantly improved Lithuania’s product market regulations and insolvency framework, there is room to further support productivity growth. Avenues include strengthening competition on retail energy markets, developing domestic capital markets, increasing R&D spending, and improving digital skills. Further strengthening the public integrity framework by monitoring the post-public employment activities of high-ranking public officials, reinforcing leadership support for integrity measures in the administration, and encouraging whistleblowing would contribute to limit perceived corruption and thereby further reinforce the business environment.
Labour productivity growth is the key to sustaining living standards, and it becomes particularly important in a context of population ageing. Lithuania’s working-age (20-64) population is set to decline from 60% to just above 50% of the total population between 2020 and 2050 (United Nations, 2022[1]) (Chapter 4). This will weigh on GDP per capita unless productivity can be increased to compensate for this trend.
While labour productivity in Lithuania was below the levels of Estonia and Poland and around 25% the level of Germany in 2000, it then outpaced Poland, caught up with Estonia and reached 50% of the level of Germany in 2022 (Figure 2.1). Absolute productivity growth and the speed of convergence with Germany remain higher than in the other Baltic countries. They slowed down significantly after the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-09 but increased again after 2016.
Labour productivity in market sectors, Germany = 100
Note: Labour productivity is defined as value-added divided by total hours worked by employees and self-employed workers, and market sectors are defined as total economy less real-estate, public administration, education and health activities (L, O, P, Q in in the ISIC-rev.4 classification). Value-added and productivity in those excluded sectors are subject to national accounts conventions and difficult to interpret. The comparison across countries is based on chain-linked value added at 2017 prices and 2017 industry-level value-added Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs), aggregated to match market sectors using value-added weights.
Source: (Inklaar, Marapin and Gräler, 2023[2]) for industry-level PPPs, OECD Databases on National Accounts, OECD calculations
Aggregate labour productivity growth is largely driven by within-industry productivity developments. The movement of workers away from agriculture before 2008 and away from construction during the GFC contributed positively to aggregate labour productivity, but only to a limited extent. The lockdown of contact-intensive industries during the pandemic also triggered reallocation effects, but these were short-lived and did not contribute much to labour productivity growth between 2019 and 2021. Consistently with the evidence in other OECD countries, the aggregate productivity impact of reallocations across sectors has been small in Lithuania (Pionnier, Zinni and Luu, 2023[3]) (Figure 2.2, Panel A).
After a sharp decline during the GFC, aggregate productivity growth progressively regained momentum in the following decade before slowing down again after 2019. The productivity slowdown during the GFC and the subsequent rebound can be largely traced back to market services. Nevertheless, a structural slowdown in the manufacturing sector after 2007 added to cyclical developments in services. The slowdown in aggregate productivity growth after 2019 can be mainly attributed to transport and accommodation. Since this sector was temporarily hit by the COVID-19 pandemic, part of the related productivity slowdown is likely to be reverted in the coming years (Figure 2.2, Panel B).
Even though capital accumulation played a stronger role over the last years, labour productivity growth has largely been driven by multifactor productivity (MFP) developments since 2009, the starting date of MFP time series for Lithuania (Luiss Lab of European Economics, 2023[4]).
Note: Same definitions of labour productivity and market sectors as in Figure 2.1. The within-industry effect presented in Panel A is broken down into the contributions of specific industries in Panel B. All calculations are done at the A21 level of the ISIC rev.4 classification.
Source: OECD Compendium of Productivity Indicators (2024[5])
Competition has a key role to play to maintain the necessary competitive pressures on incumbent firms and enhance within-industry productivity developments. Product market regulations (PMRs) are meant to address legitimate policy objectives in many cases, but they may also constitute barriers to market entry and competition. Following reforms implemented since 2018, Lithuania has become the OECD country with the least restrictive PMRs in 2023 (Figure 2.3, Panel A). The most significant reforms since 2018 include the regulation of interactions with stakeholders, the governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the administrative requirements for creating businesses. In particular, the regulation of lobbying activities was modified in 2021 to require public officials involved in the regulatory process to make their agendas available online to increase transparency in interactions with interest groups. Moreover, the SOE ownership model has been centralised between 2019 and 2023, which is an effective way to separate the exercise of ownership rights from regulation activities and to exert a consistent governance across SOEs. Lastly, all administrative requirements for creating businesses can now be found on a single website, which lowers barriers to entry for small firms. All these reforms support a more competitive business environment, which is ultimately beneficial to productivity (Figure 2.3, Panel B). Among professional services, the notary profession continues to face high barriers to entry and conduct, but their activities do not include the incorporation of businesses, hence the impact on economic activity may be limited.
Regulation in the energy sector is an area for further improvement. While retail energy markets are formally open to competition, retail energy prices remain regulated. The deregulation of retail electricity prices was initially planned for 2023 but has been postponed to 2026. There is currently no such plan for retail gas prices. Moreover, the available evidence shows that rates of consumer switching between providers are low. In the retail gas market, less than 1% of consumers have switched provider and the largest supplier enjoys a 99% market share on the household market (International Energy Agency, 2021, p. 129[6]), which shows that competition is not effective in practice. New entrants are financially unable to compete against low regulated prices that can only be offered by incumbents. Removing price regulation would alleviate this barrier (Lewis and Granroth-Wilding, 2021[7]). While price regulation contributes to energy affordability in a country where a significant share of households have difficulties to keep their dwelling warm (OECD, 2024[8]), the current policy is not targeted towards low-income households and may deter investments in energy efficiency improvements of dwellings (Chapter 3). Lastly, energy suppliers are facing uncertainties regarding the regulatory environment. A more active communication of the regulator towards new entrants would help improve the situation (Lewis and Granroth-Wilding, 2021[7]).
Note: Panel A: Index scale 0 to 6 from most to least competition-friendly regulation. 2018 PMR values have been recalculated to be comparable with 2023. The OECD is an unweighted cross-country average. Panel B: Multifactor productivity (MFP) is the part of value-added that is not explained by labour and capital inputs.
Source: OECD PMR Database; OECD Economic Outlook Database 114 (MFP)
Sound insolvency frameworks contribute to an efficient allocation of resources across firms by facilitating corporate restructuring, allowing a timely exit of non-viable companies and a partial recovery of outstanding debts, preventing the failure of viable firms, and promoting entrepreneurship by offering a second chance to honest failed entrepreneurs. Lithuania has significantly improved its insolvency framework since 2016 (Figure 2.4). The main reforms concern corporate debt restructuring and the establishment of procedures for the early detection and resolution of debt distress. Both creditors and debtors now have the possibility to initiate debt restructuring, a majority of creditors may impose a restructuring plan to other creditors, and new financing to pursue business operations in periods of financial difficulties gets priority over previous financing. Moreover, procedures under which a court can quickly approve a debt restructuring plan negotiated before the initiation of insolvency proceedings have been introduced, and such pre-insolvency plans may be imposed by a majority of creditors.
OECD Insolvency framework indicator, 2022
Note: The scores for the three components of the indicator are scaled from 0 to 1, with lower scores indicating more favourable insolvency frameworks. The treatment of failed entrepreneurs includes all factors affecting the ability of failed entrepreneurs to start a new business (e.g. obligation of repaying past debt due to bankruptcy). Prevention and streamlining refers to mechanisms allowing the early detection and resolution of debt distress. Restructuring tools refer to the way debt restructuring is organised (e.g. ability of creditors to initiate debt restructuring, and possibility for a minority of shareholders to block a restructuring plan).
Source: (André and Demmou, 2022[9])
2.3.1. Developing capital markets to alleviate financial constraints
Banks currently play a dominant role in the financing of Lithuanian firms, but a significant proportion of firms are facing financial constraints (Figure 2.5). Alternative sources of financing are largely underdeveloped. For example, stock market capitalisation is limited, even accounting for the small size of the Lithuanian economy (Figure 2.6).
Encouraging the development of non-bank capital markets would help to reduce financial constraints and support productivity growth by facilitating investment in intangibles, research and development (R&D), and technological innovation (Carvajal and Bebczuk, 2019[10]). Beyond fostering productivity and economic growth, the further development of private capital markets is essential to finance investments into renewable energy sources and the green transition more generally (Chapter 3).
Developing domestic capital markets requires increasing the supply and demand of non-bank capital simultaneously, an issue that has been well identified by the Lithuanian authorities (Bank of Lithuania, 2022[11]). Increasing supply requires mobilising domestic and foreign institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, and leveraging digital financing. Listing a wider range of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may contribute to increase demand for domestic capital financing at the same time.
Proportion of financially constrained firms (2023, %)
Note: Credit constrained firms include those dissatisfied with the amount of finance obtained, those that sought external finance but did not receive it, and those that did not seek external finance because they thought borrowing costs would be too high or they would be turned down. Results are averaged over the last two survey waves to limit volatility.
Source: European Investment Bank Investment Survey (2024 wave, relating to the year 2023)
Value of listed shares (% of GDP, 2023)
Source: European Central Bank, OECD Database on Annual National Accounts, OECD calculations
Beyond strengthening the financial sustainability of the pension system (Chapter 4), the second and third pension pillars can contribute to the development of capital markets, especially if they continue to expand. Nevertheless, pension funds operating in Lithuania only invest 10% of their assets in the domestic economy (Bank of Lithuania, 2022, p. 10[11]). This may be related to the strict rules applying to pension funds in Lithuania, which prohibit investment in real-estate and unlisted securities, while most Lithuanian firms are unlisted. Regulation is needed to protect retirement savings and ensure that households are willing to invest in defined-contributions pension schemes, but those rules are stricter than in other EU countries. For example, pension funds can invest up to 50% of their assets in bonds of unlisted corporations in Estonia. In Poland, while the proportion of assets that pension funds can invest in equity is capped, there is no distinction between listed and unlisted securities (OECD, 2022[12]). In this context, there is room to soften the rules applying to pension funds to provide more opportunities to invest in Lithuania while protecting retirement savings.
Given the rapid expansion of the Fintech sector in Lithuania (Chapter 1), digital finance may also facilitate the financing of firms. In particular, the use of new data sources and analytics can allow assessing the creditworthiness of prospective borrowers more efficiently and facilitate the use of immaterial collateral to raise funds, enhance the underwriting decision-making process and improve the lending portfolio management. It can also allow for the provision of credit ratings to ‘unscored’ clients with limited credit history, thus promoting financial inclusion of underbanked populations and supporting the financing of the real economy (OECD, 2023[13]) (World Bank, 2022[14]). Early empirical evidence shows that the digitalisation of the financial sector translates into higher productivity in downstream industries (Bontadini et al., 2024[15]).
Attracting Fintech firms specialised in activities such as peer-to-peer lending, crowdfunding and factoring, and providing adequate regulation to ensure that they are allowed to finance Lithuanian firms are preconditions to alleviate domestic financial constraints, but this is not enough. For example, although the Lithuanian regulation allows crowdfunding loans and securities, only a few firms use crowdfunding for debt security issuance, while it is not used in practice for equity issuance (Bank of Lithuania, 2022, p. 22[11]). Sufficient digital infrastructure including secured electronic transaction systems to be used as data sources by digital lenders, as well as sufficient financial literacy in the population are also needed. While measures to limit the use of cash in the economy will be key to support the roll-out of electronic transaction systems (Chapter 1), there is also room to improve digital financial literacy to reap the benefits of digital finance (OECD, 2023[16]).
In order to attract new investors, increase the volume traded on the Lithuanian stock market, and create a dynamic that would be beneficial to private firms, listing a wider range of SOEs could be considered. This strategy has been implemented in other countries and former SOEs are estimated to represent up to 20% of global market capitalisation. Empirical evidence shows that the listing of SOEs is likely to have a sustained impact on the development of capital markets in countries offering macroeconomic stability, a sound management of public finances, a large SOE listing pipeline, and a domestic institutional investor base (World Bank, 2021[17]). In this context, low public debt (Chapter 1), the fact that only five SOEs have been listed so far, and the on-going development of domestic pension funds are key advantages for Lithuania. Nevertheless, this strategy should only be implemented following a wider reflection about the role of the state in the economy, the sectors in which it should keep majority holdings, and how to use the revenues from the listing of SOEs. The possibility to invest part of the revenues in the development of renewable energy sources for which funding is unclear at this stage (Chapter 3) should be part of this reflection.
Venture capital may also be an important source of funding for innovative start-ups with a high-risk profile. While the venture capital market in Lithuania is more developed than in neighbouring Latvia, it is significantly lagging behind the one in Estonia (0.04% vs. 0.15% of GDP in 2023). Public intervention has a role to play in fostering the development of this source of funding. In line with empirical evidence showing that public investment in venture capital is more efficient when occurring jointly with private capital (Demmou and Franco, 2021[18]), Lithuania has recently invested into two new venture capital funds where private capital and/or private management are involved (Table 2.1).
2.3.2. Public support to innovation and digitalisation
Lithuania invests comparatively little in R&D, a key driver of innovation and productivity growth. Smaller firms lag behind larger counterparts in terms of innovation (OECD, 2022[19]). At 1.0% of GDP, overall R&D spending in 2022 was significantly lower than the EU (2.0%) and OECD averages (2.7%) (Figure 2.7, Panel A). Business investment in R&D is especially low by OECD standards, which may be related to low government support (Figure 2.7, Panel B). While Lithuania’s available tax incentives for business R&D are generous, only few firms take advantage of these incentives. This may be explained by uncertainty regarding the definition of eligible R&D expenditure, lengthy application procedures, and limited awareness of the scheme. As advocated in the previous Economic Survey of Lithuania (OECD, 2022[19]), a rebalancing of R&D support from tax incentives towards direct public funding may be helpful, especially for small innovative firms which are more likely to be financially constrained. No action has been taken so far (Table 2.1).
Note: Lithuania’s gross expenditure on R&D increased to 1.1% of GDP in 2023, from 1.0% in 2022.
Source: OECD Databases on R&D
Lithuania has a performing digital infrastructure, with close to 90% of households having access to a high-speed broadband above 100Mbps in 2022. Nevertheless, digital take-up is still limited, with nearly 80% of firms having low or very low digital intensity (Figure 2.8, Panel A). This can be related to the fact that only half of Lithuanians have above basic digital skills (Figure 2.8, Panel B).
Source: Eurostat Database on Digital Economy and Society
Insufficient digital skills tend to prevent lower-productivity firms, which are less able to attract the most qualified workforce, from reaping the productivity gains from investments in digital technologies (Figure 2.9). This may partly explain why smaller Lithuanian firms lag behind their European counterparts when it comes to the adoption of cloud computing while larger firms fare as well as the European peers. This may impair the further adoption of other advanced technologies such as big data analytics and artificial intelligence for which cloud computing is a prerequisite (OECD, 2024, pp. 99-100[20]). Boosting the acquisition of digital skills would thus help avoid a persistent digital divide across firms.
Productivity gain in most productive firms without skill shortages = 100
Note: Note: Estimated effect on TFP of adoption of a mix of digital technologies (high-speed broadband, cloud computing, ERP and CRM software) for two categories of firms: the 25% most productive firms in each industry, and those between the 50th and the 75th percentiles of the productivity distribution in each industry (“less productive firms”).
Source: (Sorbe et al., 2019[21])
Both initial and lifelong education can contribute to the diffusion of digital skills. The 2021 reform of the primary and lower-secondary school system is a step in the right direction that holds promises both to reinforce basic skills and rationalise the school network to increase the efficiency of the education system (Chapter 1). The new school curriculum includes a stronger focus on digital literacy, with teaching of computer programming starting at primary level. Moreover, 10,000 students of grades 5-8 are expected to benefit from a newly created entrepreneurship programme until 2030. The purpose of the programme is to teach students how to develop and apply digital skills in practice and how to create various digital products including mobile applications, magazines, electronic books, video material, computer games. In grades 9-12, these students will be taught how to sell their creations on the market, including via e-commerce. The government also tries to limit the digital divide across socio-economic groups by providing electronic devices to students from disadvantaged backgrounds. Moreover, around 1,000 government-financed scholarships have been offered to students enrolled in ICT, engineering and mathematics programmes at regional higher education institutions. The impact of the new school curriculum and of these scholarships on the development of digital skills should be evaluated regularly, and adjustments made if needed.
As recommended in the previous Economic Survey (OECD, 2022[19]), Lithuania has also launched a national lifelong learning platform serving as a one-stop shop for adult education in 2024, and 50% of the available funding is planned to be allocated to the development of digital and technological skills (Table 2.1). An “employer window” is currently being developed to help employers provide training to their employees. This platform is complemented with government support to companies engaged in the upskilling and reskilling of their workforce in the areas of ICT, health and biotechnologies, and new production processes. Building on this progress, the channelling of all lifelong learning financing through the new platform could be considered. Moreover, it will be crucial to evaluate the quality of the courses provided through this platform and ensure that they actually contribute to increase the skills and employability of workers. Such evaluations could benefit from the joint project on impact evaluation by the OECD and the European Commission in which Lithuania is involved (OECD, 2024[22]). If it turned out that current funding is insufficient to make a significant difference, increased targeting towards the groups that are most in need of training should be considered.
Challenges related to corruption and public sector integrity may reduce economic efficiency, lead to a waste of public resources, widen economic and social inequalities, and reduce trust in institutions (OECD, 2017[23]). Determined policy action in this area is important to improve economic performance and reinforce trust in institutions.
Lithuania has a strong anti-corruption system and is one of the best performers across many areas of the OECD Public Integrity Indicators (Figure 2.10, Panel A). Particular strengths are the quality of its anti-corruption strategy, described in the National Anti-Corruption Agenda 2022-2033 (Government of Lithuania, 2022[24]), its conflict-of-interest-prevention system, and its internal audit and corruption risk management systems. Lithuania is one of the few OECD countries where there is evidence of widespread use of corruption risk management in public institutions.
Note: The scores for all components of the anti-corruption and public integrity framework are scaled from 0 to 100%.
Source: OECD Anti-Corruption and Integrity Outlook (2024[25])
Despite this strong framework and recent progress (Table 2.2), there is still room for improvement. The National Anti-Corruption Agenda 2022-2033 is generally high-quality compared to other OECD countries’ anti-corruption strategies (OECD, 2023[26]). It contains outcome-level indicators to support implementation and is supported by regular monitoring reports. Moreover, the process of overhauling the strategy has been supported by Lithuania’s “Map of Corruption”, an annual survey of Lithuanian citizens, civil servants and company managers by the Special Investigation Service (STT) allowing the self-monitoring of corruption issues in the country (Special Investigation Service, 2023[27]). However, no end of term evaluation was produced for the previous National Anti-Corruption Agenda, which was due to expire in 2025 but terminated with the adoption of the new Agenda. This undermines the continuity of strategic planning and the ability of those drafting the strategy to learn from past experiences. In line with recent improvements in the transparency of the policy-making process, as advocated in the 2022 Economic Survey of Lithuania (Table 2.2), many stakeholders were consulted in the development of the strategy, but noted that their views were not taken into account in the final document.
Despite recent efforts to increase transparency in political finance, Lithuanians are among the Europeans most likely to perceive that links between business and politicians generate corruption (Figure 2.11, Panel A). While there are many possible explanations for this, one common risk area is the “revolving door” whereby public officials grant favours to businesses or interest groups in exchange for offers of employment. Lithuania does not systematically collect data on the post-public employment activities of senior public officials, which could be considered to enhance transparency, albeit for a limited period after leaving the public service to balance public integrity with privacy concerns.
In other areas of public integrity like lobbying and political party financing, Lithuania has been more proactive in the disclosure of data and has developed high-quality digital platforms. Nevertheless, while the Transparent Legislative Process Information System provides information on the topics where lobbyists have been most active in each legislative cycle, the Law on Lobbying Activities does not require the collection and dissemination of information on lobbying expenses. This is an area for further improvement.
While conflict-of-interests regulations are strong and submission rates of interest declarations are high in practice, more effort is needed to instill a culture of integrity in public institutions (OECD, 2023[26]). Leadership support for integrity measures is inconsistent, ethics advisers require more guidance on how to cultivate integrity in their institutions, and adequate resources are needed to ensure a timely and concrete follow-up when conflict-of-interest declarations reveal possible issues.
Trust in whistleblowing channels also remains low, and further measures are needed to reassure whistleblowers that they will be protected if they act. Despite the adoption of the new Law on the Protection of Whistleblowers in 2017, which includes measures such as financial rewards for valuable disclosures, compensation for any detrimental effects experienced by whistleblowers and protection for their family members, the proportion of the population willing to report corruption has hardly changed in recent years and remains below 20%. This is even though the Map of Corruption states that around half of citizens and three quarters of corporate managers know where to report corruption (OECD, 2023[26]). To further encourage the reporting of corruption Lithuania may expand awareness raising campaigns highlighting protection measures for whistleblowers, existing reporting channels, and cumulative amounts of taxpayer money recovered following reported corruption cases.
Note: Panel B shows the point estimate and the margin of error. Panel D shows sector-based subcomponents of the “Control of Corruption” indicator by the Varieties of Democracy Project.
Source: Transparency International; World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators; and Varieties of Democracy Project, V-Dem Dataset v12
Lithuania’s framework for fighting foreign bribery is also considered sound, but in its latest evaluation of Lithuania, the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Transactions mentioned a few areas for improvement, some of them relating to concrete implementation. In particular, Lithuania is encouraged to investigate foreign bribery allegations promptly and proactively, routinely seek confiscation against bribers, as well as amend its legislation to eliminate the requirement of shareholder culpability in order to hold a legal entity criminally liable and make the process of redress for retribution easier for whistleblowers (OECD, 2023[28]).
Finally, further work is needed to improve integrity at the local level (OECD, 2023[26]). While control and audit systems are strong at the level of central government, the inconsistent application of integrity measures at the subnational level has resulted in weak accountability mechanisms and control and audit systems that lack independence.
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