This chapter discusses strategic approaches to deliver implementable, investable NDCs building on insights from countries’ experiences. It explores how robust governance arrangements can help to secure political ownership and buy-in for NDCs across government, and mainstream NDCs in national, sectoral and local policy planning processes, legislative and regulatory frameworks. The chapter also explores the importance of engaging key stakeholders beyond government throughout the NDC cycle to secure social acceptance for ambitious climate action and inform just and equitable transition plans. It discusses insights from emerging models and approaches, including country platforms and Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs), that facilitate collaboration between public and private sector actors and can help to unlock finance to support country priorities, including NDCs.
Investing in Climate for Growth and Development
Abstract
Current siloed approaches to NDCs limit ownership across government, hindering effective delivery. While 48% of countries indicate they have integrated their current NDC targets in national legislative, regulatory, and planning processes (UNFCCC, 2024[1]), in practice, NDCs are often developed in isolation by Ministries of Environment, without clear integration in existing planning and reporting processes at the national, sectoral and local level. While this siloed approach may reflect wider political-economy considerations and dynamics in a country, it risks relegating NDCs to the sidelines. This in turn leads to sectoral ministries focusing on delivering their current mandates; while limited linkages to wider strategic documents, such as national development plans, undermines the prioritisation of NDCs by relevant actors (Gerhard, Ellis and Abebe, 2022[2]). Moreover, synergies and insights from parallel reporting processes through BTRs, are often overlooked leading to inefficiencies and missed opportunities for learning. For example, the first BTRs provide insights from experiences on financing NDCs that could enhance implementation of the next NDCs, including by strengthened MRV systems and establishing robust institutional arrangements to track and report on climate finance (Lo Re et al., 2025[3]).
Formalised inter-governmental co-ordination structures that define clear institutional roles, responsibilities and timelines for action, can strengthen accountability for NDC delivery across government. Government stakeholders can play different roles across the NDC cycle (see Table 7.1). The role and configuration of different government actors will depend on the national context, institutional capacities and starting points. Establishing robust inter-governmental co-ordination mechanisms to underpin the NDC cycle (or climate action more broadly) can improve engagement with line ministries responsible for managing the short-term impacts of ambitious climate goals (e.g. Ministries of Finance, Labour, Industry). It can also help to mainstream NDCs in relevant national, sectoral and local processes, ensure targets set are ambitious and robust, and increase confidence among the private sector that NDC commitments will be delivered. Well-structured governance arrangements can also support meaningful engagement with stakeholders beyond government, including civil society, academia, business, and investors (see Section 7.3).
Early engagement of key actors with cross-departmental mandates and conveying power, including Ministries of Finance and centres of government such as the Office of the President or Prime Minister, can secure buy-in for NDCs. Government partners that can support Ministries of Environment in delivering NDCs include those with cross-departmental responsibilities such as Ministries of Finance, Development, Economy, Planning who provide critical entry points for driving climate action across government departments (Gerhard, Ellis and Abebe, 2022[2]). Some countries have set up inter-governmental co-ordination mechanisms in the centre of government (CoG) to support their NDC process. For example, in the Philippines the Climate Change Commission is an autonomous body under the Office of the President that is responsible for inter-governmental co-ordination on climate change and has supported integration of the current NDC in relevant national and sectoral plans. However, in practice co-ordination efforts have had varying results and several implementation challenges remain (see Box 7.1).
In their current NDC, the Philippines commits to reducing cumulative GHG emissions by 990 MtCO2e (75% below business-as-usual projections) between 2020 and 2030. Reaching this target is estimated to cost USD 72 billion (CCC and DENR, 2023[4]). While the emission reduction target is ambitious compared to NDC targets adopted among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries (CCC and DENR, 2023[4]; World Bank Group, 2022[5]; Qiu, Seah and Martinus, 2024[6]), 2.71% of the 75% reduction is unconditional, while the remaining 72.29% requires significant international support.
In 2009, the Philippines legislated1 an independent, autonomous body to co-ordinate climate policy across national agencies and sectors, including their NDC – the Climate Change Commission (CCC) - composed of representatives of relevant government agencies, business, international organisations, and groups representing women, youth and local governments under the Office of the President (Congress of the Philippines, 2011[7]). This cross-government legislative basis for climate policy makes the Philippines an exception among most ASEAN countries where climate policy is governed by environment ministries, with the exception of Brunei Darussalam, Singapore and Thailand.
The CCC oversees the NDC Technical Working Group (TWG) composed of line ministries involved in NDC implementation. The TWG co-ordinates relevant sectoral agencies, local governments and/or private sector partners which implement policies and measures (PAMs). Implementing bodies then measure, report, and verify (MRV) their activities and report to the TWG which oversees the amendment of PAMs by relevant line ministries (CCC and DENR, 2023[4]).
The governance structure underpinning the NDC aligned with a whole-of-government approach (CCC and DENR, 2023[4]), supports cross-departmental co-ordination on climate action and has helped embed the NDC in relevant national and sectoral strategies. For instance, the Philippine Development Plan identifies the importance of local government capacity building, exploring low-carbon technologies in emissions-intensive industries such as steel and cement while securing green jobs, enhancing carbon accounting, and promoting the uptake of electric vehicles to support NDC commitments (National Economic and Development Authority, 2023[8]). The current NDC is also mainstreamed in the Philippine Energy Plan 2023-2050 (PEP) which is significant given 59% of total GHG reductions in the NDC are expected from the energy sector (CCC and DENR, 2023[4]; DENR, 2023[9]). Amongst other things, the PEP harmonises the targets and timelines of the Climate Change Action Plan and the National Adaptation Plan with the NDC (DENR, 2023[9]). In the context of clean energy scenario modelling, the PEP reports GHG emissions reductions in the energy sector of 52.9 MtCO2e between 2020 and 2022, exceeding the NDC target by around 15%, alongside further avoided emissions from renewable energy generation (DENR, 2023[9]). The PEP also notes the development of tools and methodologies to support monitoring, reporting and verification of the NDC such as the GHG Inventory, National Grid Emission Factors, and the enhanced Philippine Emissions Pathways Calculator.
Despite these notable institutional arrangements and efforts to mainstream the NDC in relevant national and sectoral policies in the Philippines, there have been some concerns expressed around co‑ordination on NDCs and climate action between local and national governments (Sulistiawati, 2023[10]) and the ability to implement the ambitious targets set out in the current NDC (Yap, 2021[11]).
Note: Case box drafted by Edward Bayliss (OECD)
1. In the Republic Act No. 10174, amending the Republic Act No. 9729 (known as the “Climate Change Act 2009”). The Act created the Climate Change Commission (Section 3), defined its whole-of-government, whole-of-society composition (Section 4), and allocated its functions (Section 7).
Ministries of Finance (MoFs) are a critical partner to engage throughout the NDC process. There are various opportunities for MoFs to accelerate climate action (see Figure 7.1) depending on the institutional mandates, structures, capacities and enabling environment in different countries. In the NDC process, the MoF can inform the development of robust investment plans and strategies to unlock finance for NDCs (Chapter 8) and support implementation by mainstreaming NDCs in capital investment plans, fiscal policies, budget planning and expenditure frameworks, financial policy and regulation (Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, 2023[12]). The MoF can also play an important role in the evaluation phase by developing tools and systems to monitor, track, and report finance flows and evaluate the allocation of spending for NDCs (NDC Partnership and Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, 2024[13]). The 2024 Climate Action Statement by the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action (COFMCA) identifies an increasing number of climate policy actions by MoFs in its 60 member countries, including actions that relate to the NDC process (Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, 2024[14]). Some countries such as Uganda have set up dedicated unit in the MoF to support its NDC and broader climate objectives (see Box 7.2). Other countries such as Denmark have updated the mission of its MoF to support climate action across the economy (Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, 2023[15]), and in Rwanda the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning plays a leading role in the implementation of its current NDC (see Box 8.10).
In a growing number of countries, the Ministry of Finance is taking a leading role in driving investment for NDC implementation. In Uganda, a national Climate Finance Facility was launched in 2023 by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) and the Uganda Development Bank to mobilise capital and provide tailored products for green investments with blended financial instruments. The Climate Finance Facility was developed by the MFPED and the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) with support from UNDP and UNEP.
The MFPED developed the Public Investment Financing Strategy (PIFS), to explore and provide guidance on how Uganda can significantly mobilise resources to meet climate finance needs in its updated NDC. The PIFS is part of broader support to the Integrated National Financing Framework (INFF) which strengthens finance for national sustainable development priorities and the SDGs at the country level. To reinforce governance of these processes, a special Climate Finance Unit was established in the MFPED to support the government in mobilising climate finance for NDC implementation.
Note: Case box drafted by: Susanne Olbrisch, Christopher Marc Lilyblad, Snezana Marstijepovic and Lisa Baumgartner (UNDP)
To secure buy-in from relevant government stakeholders, NDCs need to demonstrate they add value to existing processes and deliver wider benefits, alongside investments to enhance capacities and establish robust governance structures for engagement. In some countries, despite the establishment of inter-government co-ordination mechanisms to support the NDC, implementation remains a challenge (see Box 7.1) and it is difficult to sustain the co-ordination over time. Consultations with MDBs highlighted limited buy-in for NDCs across different ministries and the disconnect between national and local governments, among the main challenges currently faced. Despite positive steps in some countries, the engagement of MoFs in the NDC process remains limited. In a survey conducted in 2021 among 45 member countries of the COFMCA, only about a quarter indicated that their MoF was involved in different stages of the NDC process (Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, 2022[19]). The MoFs continue to face a challenging context with many competing priorities (Co-Chairs of the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, 2024[20]). Barriers to engaging in the NDC (and LT-LEDS) process include a weak institutional basis for MoF involvement in the process, limited expertise and technical capacities among staff (Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, 2023[12]). To ensure other government stakeholders are invested in the process, it is important to set out why the NDC is relevant for them. For example, for MoFs, framing ambitious NDCs as a tool to mobilise resources from different sources that can support MoF core priorities of macro stability, growth and responsible management of the public finances can help to bring these important actors on board (Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, 2023[12]). In some countries, capacity constraints limit the ability of government stakeholders, at the sectoral and subnational level to meaningfully engage in the NDC process. Strengthening capacities can help to build and maintain ownership across government, for example building MoFs staff capacities and analytical capabilities alongside efforts to establish robust governance structures can enhance MoF engagement across the NDC cycle (Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, 2023[12]).
Anchoring NDCs in wider strategic planning processes, including a country’s national development plan and long-term climate strategy is important to reconcile NDCs with growth and development goals. Providing clarity on how an NDC supports a country’s longer-term goals can strengthen political ownership, enhance policy coherence, and better align with longer term financing trajectories of investors. Consultations with MDBs highlighted the importance of aligning long-term net‑zero ambitions, with near-term NDC targets and short-term project pipelines, and how sequencing NDC updates with the development or revision of long-term climate strategies could support alignment. Despite various calls for countries to align NDCs with LT-LEDS, most recently in the GST1 (UNFCCC, 2023[21]), there is currently limited alignment between NDCs, national development plans,1 LT-LEDS,2 net-zero targets and NAPs. For example, in current NDCs, while 50% of Parties provided quantifiable information on their long-term mitigation visions, strategies or net-zero targets up to and beyond 2050, only 33% of Parties identified domestic mitigation measures in the context of longer-term measures and targets in their LT-LEDS and/or other national long-term strategies or laws (UNFCCC, 2024[1]). Approaches to aligning NDCs with long-term strategies can vary according to different country contexts and starting points. Some countries have taken steps to co-ordinate institutional arrangements and stakeholder consultations between different processes. For example, Costa Rica used climate modelling, stakeholder consultations and 1.5°C aligned decarbonisation trajectories from its long-term climate strategy to inform preparations of its 2020 NDC update and enhance coherence across the different processes (see Box 7.3).
Costa Rica’s long-term strategy, known as the National Decarbonisation Plan (NDP), was launched in 2019 and aims to achieve net zero GHG emissions by 2050. The NDP is viewed by the Government as being aligned with the global 1.5°C temperature goal.
In developing the NDP, stakeholders and representatives of various sectors were consulted, and modelling analysis was conducted to generate sectoral GHG emission pathways towards the 2050 target. Once a 2050 GHG emission reduction target was set for each sector, a back casting approach was used to define mid-term (2023-2030) sectoral emission reduction targets and decarbonisation trajectories which were in turn used to outline mid- and long-term policy options to reach the targets. This work, alongside scenario workshops with stakeholders to define actions towards the 2030 (and 2050) targets in each sector informed the development of Costa Rica’s 2020 NDC update which is aligned with the 1.5°C goal as it builds on the decarbonisation trajectories in the NDP.
The close interlinkages and alignment between the NDC and NDP are recognised in several Government documents. For example, the 2022 review of the NDP, after its first phase (Cimientos, spanning 2018 to 2022) emphasised the role of Costa Rica’s NDC as a guide for ambition-setting in key targets of the NDP like public transport decarbonization (objective 1.2.2) or the technological transformation of the industrial sector (objective 6.1.1). Equally, the review highlighted the role of the NDP in influencing the development of the 2020 NDC, in particular in integrating human rights and gender issues. Costa Rica’s first Biennial Transparency Report (BTR), submitted in December 2024 further highlights the alignment of the NDC with the long-term objectives set out in the NDP.
Note: Case box drafted by Ana Diaz Vidal (OECD)
Early engagement with key actors, including economic and planning agencies, can help to operationalise alignment between NDCs and wider development planning processes. Some countries use Integrated National Financing Frameworks (INFFs) to align their NDC with national development goals and broader financial strategies. Introduced in the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda, INFFs take a holistic approach to mobilising, aligning, and governing public and private resources to support delivery of the SDGs and provide important signals of the government’s priorities and strategic orientation for prospective investment opportunities (INFF Facility, 2025[24]). Of the 85 countries that have adopted the INFF approach to date, 12 have used it to support their current NDC including Gambia and Thailand (UNDP, 2024[25]) (see Box 7.4). There are different analytical tools and resources available to help countries align their climate and development objectives, such as the World Bank Group’s Country Climate and Development Reports (CCDRs) (World Bank Group, 2025[26]). Early engagement with planning agencies can also help to integrate NDCs in infrastructure planning and delivery. Among OECD countries, 69% (20 out of 29 for which data is available) provide infrastructure guidelines for climate change adaptation and 66% (19 countries) for climate change mitigation, however only 35% (9 out of 26) of OECD countries systematically use climate resilience criteria to inform the selection and prioritisation of infrastructure projects (OECD, 2023[27]). Better integration of climate considerations in infrastructure project prioritisation and appraisal processes as well as monitoring and reporting can help to scale up investments for climate action and support NDC delivery.
Launched in 2024, The Gambia's Integrated National Financing (INFF) Strategy supports implementation of the Recovery-Focused National Development Plan (RF-NDP) for 2023-2027 and the 2021 NDC. The INFF aims to enhance planning, sector co-ordination, and climate action in line with The Gambia’s 1.5°C-aligned NDC, encouraging private sector engagement, public-private partnerships, and international support for sustainable development and innovative solutions in infrastructure, agriculture, and social protection. It seeks to improve coherence and co-ordination in line with The Gambia’s 2024 Development Finance Assessment (DFA) and identifies reforms to attract investment and better align finance with development needs by:
Mobilising the full potential of domestic public finance;
Maximising the contribution of private finance to green economic and social transformation and leverage innovative sources of finance;
Ensuring stronger linkages of domestic and external financing sources with results;
Leveraging commitment of all stakeholders responsible for mobilising different finance sources;
Promote more integrated and comprehensive planning and budgeting;
Support co-operation and co-ordination among different areas of government.
Strategic actions include creating harmonised development priorities, strengthening institutions, enhancing monitoring processes, enacting key climate legislation such as the Climate Change Act and Carbon Trading Bill, embedding climate considerations into national planning via climate budget tagging, and establishing a national climate fund for disaster response and community adaptation efforts. By integrating financing discussions in national policy dialogues, planning, and monitoring frameworks, the INFF aims to engage all stakeholder and institutional efforts in a coherent development and financing strategy aligned with the NDC.
The RF-NDP 2023-2027 aims to support sustainable development aligned with the 2021 NDC and related legal frameworks with a focus on improving Public Financial Management (PFM) to support sustainable investments, increase revenue, enhance spending efficiency, and achieve macro-fiscal and environmental stability. A key initiative is strengthening the Climate Finance Unit at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs for climate budget tracking. The RF-NDP seeks to shift from ad-hoc, external funding to a more cohesive approach that integrates national budgeting and resource mobilisation, prioritising climate finance in line with reforms to enhance national ownership, PFM, and attract impactful private investments to support sustainability objectives. It also supports the integration of the INFF with forecasting tools to assess potential impacts of reforms, emphasising economic and social impacts of the transformation.
Note: Case box drafted by Susanne Olbrisch, Christopher Marc Lilyblad, Snezana Marstijepovic and Lisa Baumgartner (UNDP)
Close engagement of sectoral line ministries can help to mainstream NDCs in relevant sectoral policy portfolios and legislative decisions, improve policy coherence and establish accountability for NDC delivery. Engaging key government actors can support the delivery of economy-wide NDC targets and mainstream key issues such as gender and human rights in the NDC process (NDC Partnership, 2024[31]). Leveraging existing mechanisms, rather than creating new parallel processes to deliver NDCs, can help to improve policy coherence and increase buy-in for NDC implementation. For example in Chile, effective stakeholder engagement, cross-ministerial collaboration and multi-level governance supports implementation of the current NDC, underpinned by a strong legislative foundation in the Climate Change Framework Law (see Box 7.5 ). Similarly in South Africa, the Climate Change Act underpins the development of co-ordinated sectoral strategies for adaptation and mitigation to support NDC implementation (see Box 7.6).
Chile’s Climate Change Framework Law as the backbone of NDC implementation
Chile’s 2022 Climate Change Framework Law mainstreamed the implementation of its current NDCs across 17 government ministries, with sectors held accountable for their sectoral carbon budgets through budgetary sanctions. Sectors were allocated a sectoral carbon budget based on Chile’s NDC and LTS and developed sectoral mitigation and adaptation plans that include a financing strategy and detailed descriptions of measures at national, regional and local levels. The Climate Change Framework Law mandated the update of the Financial Strategy for Climate Change, led by the Ministry of Finance, to integrate current NDC targets in long-term financial plans, working in close co‑operation with the Ministry for Environment, and including a section on public and private engagement.
The Climate Change Framework Law also decentralised NDC design and delivery across levels of government, setting up two structures that contribute to the NDC consultation and implementation process. At the national level, it established the National Council for Sustainability and Climate Change, bringing together representatives from civil society, academia and corporate sector to enhance public participation in climate policy. At the subnational level, it established 16 Regional Climate Change Committees (CORECC) which are developing and implementing regional climate action plans in collaboration with the central government, municipalities and other non-state and subnational actors to implement the country’s current NDC.
Engaging the private sector and other non-governmental actors in the NDC process
The design of Chile’s current NDC was informed by extensive stakeholder consultations within government and with external actors - including civil society, regional groups, indigenous communities, the private sector and academia - through the “Mesa NDC” (NDC table) process. This stakeholder engagement, in the form of “participación temprana” (early engagement from the NDC design stage) helped enhance public acceptance of the final NDC and secure collaboration with the private sector. It led, inter alia, to the closure of eleven coal-fired power plants to date, nine more in the pipeline for 2025 and will conclude with the closure of the remaining eight coal-powered plants in the country by 2040.
In addition to this, as reported in the first Biannual Transparency Report (BTR), Chile has engaged the private sector in NDC implementation. The Agency for Sustainability and Climate Change has signed over 216 Clean Production Agreements (CPAs) with over 9,521 private companies providing sustainability diagnostics, audits and technical assistance to companies to implement green production. Between 2020 and 2030 CPAs are expected to contribute a reduction of 2,270,000 tCO2e, in line with Chile’s NDC emission reduction commitment.
Chile’s current NDC has also informed other climate-related projects including Chile’s Green Taxonomy that is co-ordinated by the Ministry for Environment and engages nine sectoral ministries in its design and implementation. The taxonomy is based on Chile’s 2020 NDC objectives and the objectives of public and private financial actors, including public and private banks, insurance companies, brokers, pension and investment fund administrators and the commission for financial markets.
Note: Case box drafted by Ana Diaz Vidal (OECD)
South Africa’s Climate Change Act (2024) is at the core of establishing co-ordinated sectoral strategies for both adaptation and mitigation to support the 2030 economy-wide NDC.
The Act mandates the development by 2026 of a National Adaptation Plan aligned with South Africa’s current NDC, to be followed by the development of Sectoral Adaptation Strategies by 21 national departments and state-owned entities.
The Climate Change Act also mandates the establishment of quantitative and qualitative Sectoral Emission Targets (SETs) in seven sectors, spanning agriculture, industry, energy, mining, human settlements, transport, and environment. The SETs are underpinned by sectoral policies and measures (PAMs) such as regulatory and economic measures, direct government action and information programmes. Draft SETs published in 2024 are based on South Africa’s 2030 NDC and will contribute to the development of subsequent NDCs. National government departments are responsible for defining the SETs, based on socio-economic and scientific considerations in each sector, for monitoring and tracking, and for reviewing the targets every five years to ensure alignment with new NDC objectives. The first round of SETs includes sectoral cumulative emission targets for the 2026-2030 period but also qualitative indicators such as best practice sharing in agriculture, the development of a green industrial strategy, updating the energy demand side management programme and other sectoral PAMs. Work is also underway to develop long-term SETs to 2050 that will guide the country towards achieving its goal of net-zero emissions.
The Presidential Climate Commission (PCC) is an independent, multistakeholder body established in 2020 and composed of 22 commissioners including ministers, civil society and private sector representatives. The PCC is mandated to oversee and facilitate a just and equitable transition towards a low-emissions and climate-resilient economy. The PCC is central to facilitating the development of the Sectoral Adaptation Strategies with knowledge inputs and commissioning pilot projects, while also supporting the NDC’s mitigation objectives through technical support.
Note: Case box drafted by Ana Diaz Vidal (OECD)
Subnational governments, including cities, states, districts, regional and local governments, have a pivotal role to play in driving local climate action to help meet NDC ambitions. Subnational governments can support all pillars of the Paris Agreement from mitigation (e.g. given urban areas are estimated to be responsible for 70% of global GHG emissions, (IPCC, 2023[44]), to adaptation (e.g. given the local specificities of climate risks (OECD, 2023[45]; OECD, 2023[46]), and finance. In 2019, subnational governments were found to be responsible for an average of 63% of climate-significant public expenditure and 69% of climate-significant public investment in 33 OECD and EU countries (OECD, 2022[47]). Countries will not be able to achieve the targets set in their NDCs without the support of regional and local governments. Cities in particular will need to play an important role; 50% of the global population now live in cities, which are responsible for 70% of GHG emissions (IEA, 2021[48]). In 23 out of 38 OECD countries, at least one city or region has already set a net zero or carbon neutrality target that is more ambitious than the respective national target (OECD, 2023[49]). An estimated 90% of global urban GHG emissions can be cut by technically feasible and widely available measures – but almost all require co‑operation between different levels of government (CUT, 2019[50]). Despite their potential contribution to climate efforts, most current NDCs do not include subnational climate action – for example, an analysis of 194 NDCs submitted before June 2023 found that only 53 NDCs have strong urban content (UN-Habitat, UNDP and SDU.Resilience, 2024[51]).
While the role of subnational governments in supporting accelerated climate action is increasingly recognised, there remains room for further improvement. Globally, tackling climate change is an increasing priority for national urban policy (NUPs) which play a critical role in guiding sustainable development in the urban space. According to global monitoring of NUPs conducted by the OECD and UN-Habitat, the share of NUPs that give extensive attention to climate resilience increased significantly from 13% in 2018 to 49% in 2024 (OECD/UN-Habitat, 2024[52]). While formulating a common vision and strategy for sustainable urban development in line with NDCs, NUPs can also provide instruments (e.g. regulations, incentives) for cities and other actors to implement NDCs in cities. Under the Coalition for High Ambition Multilevel Partnerships (CHAMP) for Climate Action, 74 countries have committed to enhance co-operation with subnational governments in the planning, financing, implementing, and monitoring of their climate plans and strategies, including their next NDCs (LGMA and Bloomberg Philanthropies, 2024[53]). Efforts to enhance engagement of subnational actors in the next round of NDCs can build on insights from experiences (see Box 7.7).
NDCs are a key opportunity to set expectations for subnational governments’ climate action and reflect local commitments. As GHG emissions profiles and exposure to climate hazards vary from place to place, a locally tailored policy response is required and the OECD’s ‘Territorial Approach to Climate Action and Resilience’ (TACAR) provides a comprehensive framework in this regard (OECD, 2023[49]).
An OECD analysis of current NDCs (16 OECD countries and the EU)1 submitted to the UNFCCC as of September 2023 focused on three key approaches to integrating subnational climate action in NDCs: (i) acknowledging the GHG emissions reduction commitments of cities and regions, (ii) explicitly identifying initiatives and calling for effective public and private funding and financing to support local climate action, (iii) involving cities and regions in NDC development. The analysis revealed that most national governments have incorporated local perspectives on climate action into their NDCs in one way or another, although the extent varies across countries (OECD, 2023[49]):
A limited number of countries pay substantial attention to the targets set by their regions or cities. For instance, Canada was the first country to dedicate a section of its NDC in 2021 to discuss the diverse climate commitments and actions undertaken by its provinces and territories, and also included written submissions received from its provinces and territories in an appendix to its NDC. As set out in Canada’s first BTR, provinces and territories are developing and implementing various cross-cutting measures, including carbon pricing, mitigation targets and strategies, and investment vehicles to support the overall emission reduction target and efforts to transition Canada’s economy to net-zero (Government of Canada, 2024[54]).
Some NDCs explicitly mention programmes designed to promote local climate action for implementing NDCs. For instance, Japan’s Green Challenge, led by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, places emphasis on cross-sectoral decarbonisation with a special focus on urban development, transport and infrastructure while Japan's Regional Decarbonization Roadmap fosters collaboration between national and local governments to implement region-specific decarbonisation initiatives. Japan has also established Decarbonization Leading Areas as pilot projects that utilise local resources like renewable energy and energy-efficient technologies, while addressing broader local challenges such as aging populations and economic stagnation. These region-specific efforts, supported by the national government through funding and technical assistance, help local governments align their actions with Japan’s 2050 carbon neutrality goal, and ensure local and national efforts are synchronised.
Despite these efforts, there remains room for improvement in engaging subnational governments in the NDC process through dedicated co-ordination mechanisms with lessons to be learn from current experiences. For example, in Canada the Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act mandates the Minister of Environment and Climate Change Canada to facilitate opportunities for provincial and territorial governments to make submissions when the government establishes emission reduction targets or plans.
Note: Case box drafted by Tadashi Matsumoto, Isabelle Chatry, Eleanor West and Celia Zuberec (OECD)
1. The analysis focused on the section titled “information to facilitate transparency, clarity, and understanding of nationally determined contributions”, as mandated by the Paris Agreement under Article 4.
Robust multi-level co‑ordination mechanisms, underpinned by legal and institutional frameworks, financing mechanisms that create incentives for local climate action, and strengthened capacities at the national and subnational level, can support NDC delivery. Engaging subnational governments throughout the NDC process can enhance alignment between local and national climate goals (WRI, 2024[55]), ensure relevant subnational data, trends, targets, risks, policies and actions are integrated in NDC design and inform subsequent tracking of progress in BTRs (Naidoo et al., 2024[56]). Subnational governments can be engaged in the NDC process through different approaches depending on national and subnational capacities and circumstances (NDC Partnership and UNFCCC, 2024[57]). For instance, in France the “Regional Conference of the Parties” (“Regional COP”) uses a co-ordinated planning process to facilitate the implementation of environmental objectives at the local level, and provide local perspectives to inform the development of the NDC and LT-LEDS (see Box 7.8). Establishing alignment and co-ordination mechanisms across levels of government can help to mainstream NDC commitments in urban, rural, and regional policies, support a placed-based, territorial approach to climate action and resilience, and strengthen ownership by subnational governments (OECD, 2023[49]). In some countries, engagement at subnational levels will require support to build capacities at the national level (for government departments to engage with subnational authorities and include a strong subnational component in their NDCs) and at the subnational level (to effectively engage in the NDC cycle and support implementation).
The “Regional Conference of the Parties” (“Regional COP”) in France – inspired by the UNFCCC COP - is an environmental planning process, that convenes all levels of government alongside economic and civil society actors, co-ordinated by the Secrétariat Général à la Planification Écologique (General Secretariat for Ecological Planning). This approach seeks to identify leading areas in decarbonisation, ensures proposed strategies and actions are inclusive and encompass a range of local perspectives and expertise and emphasises the need to scale up and replicate models across local governments.
“Regional COP” events, chaired by the Prefect (central government representative) and the President of the Regional Council, engage all French regions in a discussion process that helps to set and implement strategies at the regional/local level to achieve national GHG reduction and biodiversity protection objectives. The regional COP approach entails four steps:
1. Diagnosis: Participants collaboratively assess and present actions underway by local authorities to identify current progress and challenges.
2. Debate: Territorial actors (e.g., local governments, stakeholders) discuss and propose concrete goals.
3. Sharing: Actions are broken down and shared across sub-regional territories (e.g., departments and CRTE areas), with an indicative allocation of responsibilities and tasks for each region.
4. Roadmap: A detailed plan is developed to formalise the commitments made including concrete actions, strategies, and a trajectory to achieve the regional environmental objectives by 2030.
Note: Case box drafted by Tadashi Matsumoto, Eleanor West and Celia Zuberec (OECD)
Stakeholder engagement across the NDC process can encourage collaboration between key actors, build social acceptance and political acceptability of more ambitious climate action. Stakeholders outside government can play different roles across the NDC process depending on national context and capacities (see Table 7.1). The importance of stakeholder engagement in the NDC process is widely recognised with 79% of countries referring to formal arrangements for domestic stakeholder consultations in preparing their current NDCs, with 93% of those countries indicating consultations were inclusive and participatory; 59% noting consultations were gender-sensitive and 44% providing information on the involvement of Indigenous Peoples (UNFCCC, 2024[1]). Research indicates that countries that conducted stakeholder consultations with civil society, business, and labour groups before developing their current NDCs were more likely to enhance their GHG reduction targets (Peterson et al., 2023[60]). Countries have adopted different approaches to stakeholder engagement from formal structures for consultation, such as the Presidential Climate Commission in South Africa to Chile’s “Mesa NDC” process (see Box 7.5 and Box 7.6).
Meaningful and inclusive stakeholder engagement processes are challenging to put into practice and requires careful design and implementation. Governments often face various challenges to implementing stakeholder engagement processes, including institutional barriers, limited capacities, and budget constraints (NDC Partnership, 2024[31]). Moreover, there are challenges to making stakeholder engagement processes truly inclusive given geographical, financial, capacity, and linguistic barriers that affect the ability of certain stakeholders to fully engage in the process and may lead to an under-representation of vulnerable groups. There are also challenges in translating stakeholder engagement into higher public support for ambitious climate action. How the stakeholder engagement process is managed (and the resources available to deliver it) is an important factor to ensure the process is meaningful and inclusive, and can build on lessons from experiences.
Early engagement with affected communities can improve understanding of the potential distributional impacts of climate policies and help to design just transition plans. Engaging affected stakeholder groups throughout the NDC process can help to ensure diverse perspectives including from civil society, women, marginalised groups, workers, and the private sector are considered. This can in turn help to design effective compensation mechanisms to address distributional impacts and ensure just transition plans are an integral part of NDCs, helping to build social acceptance for the speed and scale of the transformative actions needed (NDC Partnership, 2019[61]). Governments can play a crucial role in minimising negative impacts of the transition through targeted support for affected communities and workers such as reskilling programmes, economic diversification strategies, and policies that support a just transition (see example of Australia in Box 7.9).
Australia is undergoing a transformation from an economy reliant on fossil fuel exports to one that embraces the global net-zero effort, aiming for 82% of renewable electricity in the grid by 2030, up from around 33% in 2023. This transition will inevitably re-shape communities and economic activity, but Australia is putting in place policies that can mitigate negative impacts through engaging workers, communities and the private sector.
Australia’s Net Zero Plan will guide the transition to Net Zero by 2050, covering all major sectors of the economy. The plan is informed by Australia’s 2022 NDC and will feed the upcoming NDC, expected in 2025. The Net Zero plan will be supported by sectoral plans, including the Electricity and Energy Sector Plan, which relies on the Net Zero Economy Authority (NZEA) to ensure a just transition in emission-intensive sectors.
The newly established NZEA in Australia supports workers, communities and regions significantly affected by the transition to net zero. The NZEA supports the development of Regional Workforce Transition Plans which provide career guidance, skills training, job search assistance, financial advice and wellbeing support to communities in a targeted way, tailored to specific regions. The NZEA also administers the Energy Industry Jobs Plan which establishes a framework to support communities and workers affected by impending power station closures. The Plan provides training and job placement assistance for employees impacted by power station closures to access support to prepare for and transition to new employment opportunities.
The NZEA also plays a key role to support the Government’s Future Made in Australia agenda announced in 2024, which aims to maximise the economic and industrial benefits of the transition towards a global net-zero economy while building a stronger and more resilient economy. Under the agenda, the Government is also investing in strategic sectors such as renewable hydrogen, green metals, critical minerals and clean energy technology manufacturing, enhancing skills and training of the workforce, and undertaking efforts to encourage private sector investment in priority industries.
For example, a new Front Door established as part of the 2024-25 budget makes investment simpler for global and domestic investors proposing major, transformational investments, including projects large capital investment or with large job creation effects in strategic sectors outlined in the Future Made in Australia agenda. It supports them in identifying, navigating, and co-ordinating regulatory and approvals frameworks, existing grant programs and public financing. The design of this Front Door is based on a broad public consultation with diverse stakeholders and engagement with investors, First Nations and the broader community and will continue throughout the implementation phase.
The Future Made in Australia agenda also establishes Community Benefit Principles, enshrined in law, that will apply to every Future Made in Australia project, ensuring that the benefit of public investment and the mobilised private investment flows to communities. These principles include promoting safe and secure jobs, developing skilled and inclusive workforces, engaging First Nations communities, strengthening local supply chains and demonstrating transparency in investment pipelines.
Note: Case box drafted by Ana Diaz Vidal (OECD)
Close engagement and collaboration between government and the private sector from the outset can help to identify barriers and create enablers for NDC-aligned investments by the private sector. Engaging the private sector, including investors and real economy corporates, can help governments understand practical challenges to financing NDC-aligned activities and making them investable across different subsectors and types of actors (OECD, 2022[66]). Moreover, dialogues between the public and private sector allow businesses to share insights on current gaps in the domestic investment environment and policies needed to incentivise low-carbon innovation, create new markets, and redirect investments. Active engagement between public and private actors, including business, investors, central banks, and multilateral development banks (MBDs), from an early stage in the NDC process can be mutually reinforcing. Involvement of the private sector supports the government’s climate targets, government policies create a predictable, stable environment for private sector NDC-aligned investments that reflects the specific country context and circumstances, while their collaboration can support the co-development of project pipelines to direct private capital into (large-scale) NDC-aligned projects.
There are different models and approaches to engage public and private stakeholders, co‑ordinate support, address investment barriers and mobilise finance to meet a country’s priorities, including its NDC. In recent years, country platforms such as Egypt’s multisectoral Nexus of Water, Food, and Energy Platform (see Box 7.10) and Brazil’s Climate and Ecological Transformation Investment Platform (Government of Brazil, 2025[67]) have emerged as one model for co-ordinating technical assistance and finance from different sources (public, private, national, international), to address investment barriers and develop joint investment solutions to support cross-sectoral transformational plans (Simpson, Jacobs and Gilmour, 2023[68]; WRI, 2024[55]). The term country platform “typically refers to efforts to bring together myriad sources of finance at the country level to invest in sectoral or economy-wide transformations that achieve both domestic and international goals” (Robinson and Olver, 2025[69]).Country platforms can help to address various barriers to investment (e.g. by co-ordinating technical assistance for developing project pipelines), facilitate access to different blended and innovative financing structures to improve risk–return ratios and strengthen the development of project pipelines (e.g. with the engagement of MDBs and DFIs), and connect standalone private and other sources of finance with a country’s priorities, including its NDC (Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, 2023[12]).
Launched in 2022 under Egypt's COP27 Presidency, the Nexus of Water, Food, and Energy (NWFE) Country Platform plays a pivotal role in advancing Egypt’s National Climate Change Strategy 2050 and its updated current NDC. The platform serves as a strategic co-ordination mechanism to mobilise climate finance and foster strategic partnerships across the water, food and energy sectors. It identifies policy reforms, supports the design, structure and preparation of concrete climate projects, leverages technical co-operation, and mobilises financing with instruments such as debt swaps, guarantees, concessional loans, grants, and private investments. The NWFE Programme, as the operational arm of the platform, translates these strategies into actionable projects across the three interconnected pillars and the extended NWFE+ for sustainable transport.
The Energy Pillar, led by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), is critical component of delivering Egypt’s NDC which aims to achieve a 42% renewable energy share in the power mix and annual reduction of 17 million tonnes of CO2 emissions by 2030. The Energy Pillar focuses on decommissioning 5 GW of inefficient oil and gas power plants, mobilising USD 10 billion to deploy an additional 10 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2028, and upgrading the transmission network to enhance grid resilience and integration.
Between 2022 and 2024, the platform made significant progress toward its objectives. Under the first pillar (“Replacing inefficient thermal power plants with renewable energy”) up to USD 7 million in grants to retire 1.2 GW of thermal power plants were mobilised. For the second pillar (“investments in renewable energy”), NWFE successfully mobilised USD 4 billion in development financing to establish seven renewable energy projects totalling 4.2 GW, with further projects expected in 2025 to add 3.4 GW. Under the third pillar (“transmission network investment”), the platform secured USD 1.2 billion in development financing, primarily from public sources such as the EIB, EBRD, AFD, and the German Government. Technical assistance has also been provided by the EBRD and other development partners through three support programmes aimed at strengthening green supply chains and renewable energy developments, improving the electric network, and promoting a just energy transition. In addition to activities under the pillars, Egypt received a USD 10 billion investment from the Norwegian company Scatec for green hydrogen projects and now hosts 33 green hydrogen development projects. Looking ahead to 2025, NWFE aims to mobilise an additional USD 165 million in debt swaps, concessional finance, and financial grants from Germany, and USD 10 billion in private investments.
Notable achievements have been made under the three pillars of the NWFE programme. Egypt’s NWFE has been recognised by MDBs as an effective country programme for mobilising innovative climate finance and driving impactful investment. While its achievements to date are notable, further efforts are needed to accelerate the mobilisation of finance to USD 6.5 billion annually which as estimated by IRENA's REmap analysis is needed to fully realise Egypt's renewable energy potential and achieve its ambitious 2030 target.
Note: Case box drafted by Moongyung Lee and Joana Argemi Ribalta (OECD)
Source: (Ministry of International Cooperation, 2023[70]; Ministry of International Cooperation, 2024[71]; OECD, 2024[72]; Daily News Egypt, 2024[73]; IRENA, 2018[74]); Personal communication with the Ministry of Planning, Economic Development and International Cooperation (February 2025)
Other approaches to co-ordinating technical assistance and finance from different sources include Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) and Country Packages for Forests, Nature and Climate. JETPs, launched in recent years in South Africa, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Senegal (see Box 7.12), provide another approach for aligning national priorities with providers’ capacities and mandates (OECD, 2023[75]). Each JETP is country-specific, involving a political declaration that sets out a joint political commitment, followed by an investment plan that outlines investment priorities, policy actions, and institutional arrangements to accelerate the recipient country’s energy transition. For example, in Viet Nam, since the JETP political declaration was adopted in December 2022, the Government has tightened its GHG reduction targets, reflecting them in its 2022 NDC, National Climate Change Strategy, and the eighth Power Development Plan which includes a commitment to halt new coal power after 2030 (Government of Viet Nam - Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2025[76]). Outside the energy sector, country packages for forests, nature, and climate adopted in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, and Papua New Guinea, under the Forest and Climate Leaders’ Partnership provide bundled packages of technical and financial support, investment and business partnerships to support country commitments (Jeudy-Hugo et al., 2024[32]). Another example is the Climate Club’s support for decarbonisation in the industrial sector (see Box 7.11). These types of platforms bring together relevant public and private actors and can raise the profile of NDC-related investment opportunities, identify and address barriers to investment and formulate solutions to mobilise required finance to support country priorities.
The Climate Club is an inclusive and ambitious high-level forum for industry to support implementation of the Paris Agreement (Climate Club, 2024[77]). At COP29, the Climate Club Secretariat hosted by the OECD and the IEA, alongside the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) launched the Global Matchmaking Platform (GMP). The GMP of the Climate Club aims to fast-track the decarbonisation of heavy-emitting industries in EMDEs by connecting countries with technical and financial solutions through delivery partners including international finance organisations, national development banks and governments (Climate Club, 2025[78]). The GMP matches support to countries for effective policy development, transfer of innovative technologies and in facilitating investment to drive the transition to net-zero and the development of ambitious new NDCs (Climate Club, 2025[78]). Pilot projects are underway in Argentina, Cambodia, Colombia, Chile, Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya and Morocco.
The Climate Club supports policymakers in implementing their NDCs with the development of investment plans to mobilise private finance for industrial decarbonisation, and supporting policy recommendations, including practical information on how to merge industrial decarbonisation ambitions with NDC targets, with technical support through the GMP (Climate Club, 2024[79]). The Climate Club will also promote strategic dialogues and policy learning exchanges to strengthen implementation of industrial decarbonisation efforts to realise NDCs (Climate Club, 2024[79]).
Note: Case box drafted by Amylia Mesic and Cécile Seguineaud (OECD)
The success of country platforms and JETPs depend on various factors including national ownership, governance arrangements, effective investor feedback loops, credible commitments by partners, as well as the availability of support both to set up and take forward the platform. High-level political ownership by the host government can be facilitated by a robust package of concessional financing, co-ordination structures, and sustained commitments from partners beyond the initial launch of the initiative (Carney, 2021[80]). The design of country platforms needs to be underpinned by robust analytical work to ensure the platform is fits national capacities (Bhattacharya et al., 2021[81]) and is adapted to the country context (Robinson and Olver, 2025[69]). For example, inputs from the World Bank Group’s Country Climate and Development Reports (CCDRs) have supported the design and implementation of country-led platforms such as Egypt’s Nexus of Water, Food, and Energy (NWFE) Platform and the Bangladesh Climate and Development Platform (World Bank Group, 2024[82]). Broadening stakeholder engagement externally (among donors, international and domestic financial institutions) and internally (e.g. bringing in Ministries of Environment) and ensuring inclusive dialogue with relevant stakeholders throughout the process (OECD, 2023[75]) as well as developing a programmatic approach to the provision of finance and ensuring transparency and accountability (World Bank, 2024[83]) are other important foundations for successful country platform approaches. Moreover, for investments to flow, country platforms need to be underpinned by robust enabling policies (e.g. upgraded grids, energy subsidy reforms,), institutions and bankable project pipelines (e.g. with enough information and financial structuring for private investors to assess feasibility, risks and returns), which requires careful sequencing, strong partnerships and feedback loops between governments and investors (Robinson and Olver, 2025[69]). Effective investor feedback loops between government stakeholders (sectoral leads and MoF) and private investors are key and should focus on specific sectoral/programmatic priorities. Country platforms require support to be set-up (i.e. to convene stakeholders, prepare an investment plan, establish a Secretariat to co-ordinate the country platform etc.) and consultations with MDBs highlighted the need to scale up funding to support these preparations, for example through the Green Climate Fund (GCF) Readiness Program and the MDBs’ Long-Term Strategies Program (LTS-P). To secure buy-in for the process, including from the MoF, consultations with MDBs also stressed the importance of having a dedicated funding envelope available to take forward the country platform once it is set up, for example a dedicated climate action window under the Global Environment Facility (GEF) allocating funding to NDC-aligned country platforms.
Signed on 15 November 2022 at the G20 Leaders' Summit in Bali, between the President of Indonesia and the International Partners Group (IPG),1 the Indonesia JETP is an agreement to mobilise around USD 20 billion to support a just energy transition in the country. IPG countries pledged over USD 11 billion of public funding2 while commercial banks represented by the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ) also indicated their interest in providing around USD 10 billion to the Indonesian JETP. This is larger than amounts committed under the JETPs in South Africa or Viet Nam.
The JETP Secretariat3 organised multi-stakeholder discussions and published a Comprehensive Investment and Policy Plan (CIPP) in 2023 that provides a strategic blueprint for Indonesia’s decarbonisation and energy transformation by 2030, and for implementing the JETP. The CIPP lists priority projects to be financed by JETP-earmarked funding. The plan estimates around USD 97 billion of cumulative power sector investments are required by 2030 under the JETP scenario, including USD 67 billion to finance over 400 priority projects. Thus there is a substantial 70% financing gap between the investment needs identified in the CIPP and the USD 21 billion package deal of the Indonesia JETP for which additional financing sources (both domestic and international) will need to be tapped. The Indonesian experience shows that it can take several years between initial commitments and disbursements of funds as underlying priority projects have to mature and financial solutions be designed. It remains to be seen how recent changes in the IPG, with Germany stepping in to co-lead the Indonesian JETP together with Japan, will affect progress going forward.
Indonesia’s current NDC sets out the country’s broader strategy for decarbonisation, while the CIPP focuses on the energy sector.4 As such, the NDC is recognised in the first sentence of the CIPP in setting the broader framework for decarbonisation. About half of the emissions reductions planned originate from the energy sector, so the CIPP provides a critical roadmap for implementing the current NDC. PLN, the national power utility, published an investment plan for the period 2021-2030 (the “RUPTL”) which estimates renewable energy capacity additions to represent 21 GW, which is much less than what the CIPP aims at. In addition, the RUPTL comprises 20 GW of power capacity addition from fossil fuels. Reconciling the RUPTL and CIPP is important to ensure the credibility of underlying policy commitments and support the mobilisation of finance for Indonesia’s clean energy policy which is a corner stone of its decarbonisation strategy and health policy.
Notes:
1. G7 countries minus the US and plus the EU, Denmark and Norway
2. It remains to be seen how the withdrawal of the US from the JETP, including the cancelation of a USD 50M MCC grant and non-concessional loans from the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) that made up half of the US pledge, will impact pledged amounts and the extent to which other IPG member countries may step in.
3. To implement the JETP agreement, the Government of Indonesia established a Secretariat to produce a Comprehensive Investment and Policy Plan (CIPP). The JETP Secretariat is supported by four Working Groups (WG): the Technical WG (led by the IEA), the Policy WG (led by the World Bank), the Financial WG (led by the ADB), and the Just Transition WG (led by the UNDP). The JETP Secretariat receives institutional support from the ADB with funding from the Government of Japan.
4. Although also touching upon manufacturing capacity related to renewables
Note: Case box drafted by Benjamin Denis (OECD)
Well-designed country-led platforms and partnerships that build on lessons from current experience can help to co-ordinate support and unlock finance from development partners and the private sector to support the delivery of NDCs. Country platforms and JETPs provide a useful model for aligning national needs and priorities with providers’ capacities and mandates (OECD, 2023[75]), ensuring different types of finance are more co-ordinated and coherent, with public finance playing a catalytic role (Robinson and Olver, 2025[69]). However, country platforms and JETPs have faced various challenges to date, for example relating to governance arrangements, capacity constraints, addressing social considerations, and leveraging private finance (Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, 2023[12]). Experiences with JETPs also highlight the importance of building in measures to ensure a just transition and reflect social considerations from the start, backed by adequate resources to support follow-through (Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, 2023[12]). Other important considerations include maintaining commitments by partners after administrative changes, capacity building, engaging investors early to ensure strong enabling policies and pipelines, and establishing a responsible team/unit within the host government with a stable mandate that is not affected by cabinet reshuffles or election cycles. Building on lessons from experiences and emerging design principles (see Box 7.13), these approaches could provide a basis for a country-led approach to co-ordinating investment and support by partners to support the delivery of specific commitments in NDCs.
In 2020, the G20 recognised country platforms as a valuable country-owned and country-led mechanism that can support a country’s sustainable development and adopted the “G20 Reference Framework for Effective Country Platforms” in which it encourages MDBs to implement existing country platforms and develop new ones where needed.
In 2024, an input paper prepared for the Task Force for the Global Mobilisation Against Climate Change (TF-CLIMA) set out principles for the design and implementation of effective country platforms including:
Strong country ownership with continuing political agreement and commitment to the goals of the country platform, clear links with national economic and climate plans including the NDC, inclusive design to secure broad-based support, stable institutional structure and capacities to implement the country platform over time.
Flexibility in design to adapt to changing institutional structures and country situations over time, evolving capacities of local and external stakeholders, insights and lessons learned from monitoring and tracking of implementation to inform revisions to policies and investment plan.
Mobilise and balance different sources of finance to reflect the nature of the goals and of the projects/programme to be financed, building on their comparative advantage for example:
MDB support to focus on analytics, policy advice, preparation of investment plans and projects, catalytic instruments to mobilise private finance and support implementation;
Vertical climate and environmental funds to support the development and implementation of the country platform;
National Development Banks and Public Development Banks to provide tools and instruments to channel finance to pipelines of investments, reflecting their alignment with country policies, local knowledge and local currency finance capacity;
Early engagement of the private sector in the development and implementation of the country platform to identify private investment opportunities, requirements for enabling policies and to adopt operating models that support engagement by the private sector.
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← 1. Some governments adopt national development plans that set out a country’s desired development outcomes and a framework for achieving them. National development plans typically focus on economic growth and job creation and cover a 5- to 25-year horizon.
← 2. Under the Paris Agreement, countries are urged to formulate LT-LEDS taking into account different national circumstances. As of May 2025, 76 LT-LEDS have been submitted to the UNFCCC.